Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 2.1
Committee Specification 01
07 May 2020
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Technical Committee:
OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC
Chairs:
Tony Cox (tony.cox@cryptsoft.com), Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Judith Furlong (Judith.Furlong@dell.com), Dell
Editors:
Tim Chevalier (Tim.Chevalier@netapp.com), NetApp
Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com), Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
This prose specification is one component of a Work Product that also includes:
Related work:
This specification replaces or supersedes:
This specification is related to:
Abstract:
This document is intended for developers and architects who wish to design systems and applications that interoperate using the Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification.
Status:
This document was last revised or approved by the OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the “Latest stage” location noted above for possible later revisions of this document. Any other numbered Versions and other technical work produced by the Technical Committee (TC) are listed at https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=kmip#technical.
TC members should send comments on this specification to the TC’s email list. Others should send comments to the TC’s public comment list, after subscribing to it by following the instructions at the “Send A Comment” button on the TC’s web page at https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/.
This specification is provided under the RF on RAND Terms Mode of the OASIS IPR Policy, the mode chosen when the Technical Committee was established. For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the TC’s web page (https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/ipr.php).
Note that any machine-readable content (Computer Language Definitions) declared Normative for this Work Product is provided in separate plain text files. In the event of a discrepancy between any such plain text file and display content in the Work Product's prose narrative document(s), the content in the separate plain text file prevails.
Citation format:
When referencing this specification, the following citation format should be used:
[kmip-profiles-v2.1]
Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 2.1. Edited by Tim Chevalier and Tim Hudson. 07 May 2020. Committee Specification 01. https://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/kmip-profiles/v2.1/cs01/kmip-profiles-v2.1-cs01.html. Latest stage: https://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/kmip-profiles/v2.1/kmip-profiles-v2.1.html.
Notices
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Table of Contents
2.2 Guidelines for other Profiles
3.1 Basic Authentication Suite
3.1.1 Basic Authentication Protocols
3.1.2 Basic Authentication Cipher Suites
3.1.3 Basic Authentication Client Authenticity
3.1.4 Basic Authentication KMIP Port Number
3.2 HTTPS Authentication Suite
4.1 Permitted Test Case Variations
5.1.3 Baseline Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.3.3 HTTPS Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.4.1.6.4 Integer - Special case for Masks
5.4.4 XML Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.5.1.6.4 Integer - Special case for Masks
5.5.4 JSON Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.6 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Profiles
5.6.1 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Client
5.6.2 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Server
5.6.3 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.6.4 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Optional Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.7 Symmetric Key Foundry for FIPS 140 Profiles
5.7.1 Basic Symmetric Key Foundry Client
5.7.2 Intermediate Symmetric Key Foundry Client
5.7.3 Advanced Symmetric Key Foundry Client
5.7.4 Symmetric Key Foundry Server
5.7.5 Basic Symmetric Key Foundry Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.7.6 Intermediate Symmetric Key Foundry Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1.
5.7.7 Advanced Symmetric Key Foundry Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.8 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Profiles
5.8.1 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Client
5.8.2 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Server
5.8.3 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.8.4 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Optional Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.9.1 Basic Cryptographic Client
5.9.2 Advanced Cryptographic Client
5.9.3 RNG Cryptographic Client
5.9.4 Basic Cryptographic Server
5.9.5 Advanced Cryptographic Server
5.9.6 RNG Cryptographic Server
5.9.7 Basic Cryptographic Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.9.7.18 CS-BC-M-CHACHA20-1-21
5.9.7.19 CS-BC-M-CHACHA20-2-21
5.9.7.20 CS-BC-M-CHACHA20-3-21
5.9.7.21 CS-BC-M-CHACHA20POLY1305-1-21
5.9.8 Advanced Cryptographic Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.9.9 RNG Cryptographic Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.9.10 RNG Cryptographic Optional Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.10 Opaque Managed Object Store Profiles
5.10.1 Opaque Managed Object Store Client
5.10.2 Opaque Managed Object Store Server
5.10.3 Opaque Managed Object Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.10.4 Opaque Managed Object Optional Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.11 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Profiles
5.11.1 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Client
5.11.2 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Server
5.11.3 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.12.1 Tape Library Profiles Terminology
5.12.2 Tape Library Application Specific Information
5.12.3 Tape Library Alternative Name
5.12.6 Tape Library Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.13.3 AES XTS Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.17 Mandatory Quantum Safe Test Cases KMIP v2.1
5.18.2.1 PKCS#11 Initialization
5.18.2.3 PKCS#11 C_GetAttributeValue
5.18.5 PKCS#11 Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v2.1
6.1 Baseline Client Basic KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.2 Baseline Server Basic KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.3 Complete Server Basic KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.4 HTTPS Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.5 HTTPS Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.6 XML Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.7 XML Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.8 JSON Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.9 JSON Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.10 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.11 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.12 Basic Symmetric Key Foundry Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.13 Intermediate Symmetric Key Foundry Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.14 Advanced Symmetric Key Foundry Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.15 Symmetric Key Foundry Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.16 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.17 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.18 Basic Cryptographic Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.19 Advanced Cryptographic Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.20 RNG Cryptographic Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.21 Basic Cryptographic Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.22 Advanced Cryptographic Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.23 RNG Cryptographic Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.24 Opaque Managed Object Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.25 Opaque Managed Object Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.26 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.27 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.28 Tape Library Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.29 Tape Library Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.30 AES XTS Client KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.31 AES XTS Server KMIP v2.1 Profile Conformance
6.32 Quantum Safe Client KMIP V2.1 Profile Conformance
6.33 Quantum Safe Server KMIP V2.1 Profile Conformance
6.34 PKCS#11 Client KMIP V2.1 Profile Conformance
6.35 PKCS#11 Server KMIP V2.1 Profile Conformance
This document specifies conformance clauses in accordance with the OASIS TC Process ([TC-PROC] section 2.2.6 for the KMIP Specification [KMIP-SPEC] for a KMIP server or KMIP client through profiles that define the use of KMIP objects, attributes, operations, message elements and authentication methods within specific contexts of KMIP server and client interaction.
These profiles define a set of normative constraints for employing KMIP within a particular environment or context of use. They may, optionally, require the use of specific KMIP functionality or in other respects define the processing rules to be followed by profile actors.
This specification is provided under the RF on RAND Terms Mode of the OASIS IPR Policy, the mode chosen when the Technical Committee was established. For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the TC’s web page (https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/ipr.php).
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] and [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
[KMIP-SPEC] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 2.1. Edited by Tony Cox and Charles White. Latest version: <https://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/kmip-spec/v2.1/kmip-spec-v2.1.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] E. Rescorla, HTTP over TLS, IETF RFC 2818, May 2000,<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC5246] T. Dierks & E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, August 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format, RFC 7159, March 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3, IETF RFC 8446, August 2018, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[XML] Bray, Tim, et.al. eds, Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth Edition), W3C Recommendation 26 November 2008, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xml-20081126>.
[RFC2246] T. Dierks & C. Allen, The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0, IETF RFC 2246, January 1999, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
[RFC4346] T. Dierks & E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.1, IETF RFC 4346, April 2006, <http:www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
[TC-PROC] OASIS TC Process. 1 July 2017. OASIS Process, <https://www.oasis-open.org/policies-guidelines/tc-process>.
[XML-SCHEMA] Paul V. Biron, Ashok Malhotra, XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes Second Edition, W3C Recommendation 26 November 2008, <https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-2-20041028>.
This document defines a list of KMIP Profiles. A profile may be standalone or may be specified in terms of changes relative to another profile.
The following items SHALL be addressed by each profile.
1. Specify the versions of the KMIP specification (protocol versions) that SHALL be supported if versions other than [KMIP-SPEC] are supported
2. Specify the list of Objects that SHALL be supported
3. Specify the list of Authentication Suites that SHALL be supported
4. Specify the list of Object Attributes that SHALL be supported
5. Specify the list of Operations that SHALL be supported
6. Specify any other requirements that SHALL be supported
7. Specify the mandatory test cases that SHALL be supported by conforming implementations
Specify the optional test cases that MAY be supported by conforming implementations
Any vendor or organization, such as other standards bodies, MAY create a KMIP Profile and publish it.
1. The profile SHALL be publicly available.
2. The KMIP Technical Committee SHALL be formally advised of the availability of the profile and the location of the published profile.
3. The profile SHALL meet all the requirements of section 2.1
4. The KMIP Technical Committee SHOULD review the profile prior to final publication.
This section contains the list of the channel security, channel options, and server and client authentication requirements for a KMIP profile. Other Authentication Suites MAY be defined for other KMIP Profiles.
An Authentication Suite provides at least the following:
1. All communication over the security channel SHALL provide confidentiality and integrity
2. All communication over the security channel SHALL provide assurance of server authenticity
3. All communication over the security channel SHALL provide assurance of client authenticity
4. All options such as channel protocol version and cipher suites for the secuity channel SHALL be specified
When using automated client provisioning, the assurance of server authenticity and client authenticity MAY be provided via means outside of the security channel protocol.
This authentication suite stipulates that a profile conforming to the Basic Authentication Suite SHALL use TLS to negotiate a secure channel.
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL support:
· TLS v1.3 [RFC8446]
Conformant KMIP clients SHOULD support:
· TLS v1.3 [RFC8446]
Conformant KMIP servers SHOULD support:
· TLS v1.2 [RFC5246]
Conformant KMIP clients MAY support:
· TLS v1.2 [RFC5246]
Conformant KMIP clients or servers SHALL NOT support:
· TLS v1.1 [RFC4346]
· TLS v1.0 [RFC2246]
· Any version of the SSL protocol
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL support all of the following cipher suites for TLSv1.3 if TLSv1.3 is supported:
Conformant KMIP clients SHALL support at least one of the following cipher suites for TLSv1.3 if TLSv1.3 is supported:
Conformant KMIP clients or servers SHALL support the following cipher suites for TLSv1.2 if TLSv1.2 is supported:
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
Conformant KMIP clients or servers MAY support the following cipher suites for TLSv1.2 if TLSv1.2 is supported:
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
· TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
· TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
· TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
Conformant KMIP clients or servers SHALL NOT support any cipher suite not listed above.
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL require the use of channel (TLS) mutual authentication to provide assurance of client authenticity for all operations except when using automated client provisioning.
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL use the identity derived from the channel mutual authentication to determine the client identity if the KMIP client requests do not contain an Authentication object.
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL use the identity derived from the Credential information to determine the client identity if the KMIP client requests contain an Authentication object.
The exact mechanisms determining the client identity are outside the scope of this specification.
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL use TCP port number 5696, as assigned by IANA.
This authentication suite stipulates that a profile conforming to the HTTPS Authentication Suite SHALL use HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] to negotiate a secure channel.
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle client authenticity in accordance with Basic Authentication Protocols (3.1.1).
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle client authenticity in accordance with Basic Authentication Cipher Suites (3.1.2).
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle client authenticity in accordance with Basic Authentication Client Authenticity (3.1.3).
KMIP servers conformant to this profile SHOULD use TCP port number 5696, as assigned by IANA, to receive and send KMIP messages provided that both HTTPS and non-HTTPS encoded messages are supported.
KMIP clients SHALL enable end user configuration of the TCP port number used, as a KMIP server MAY specify a different TCP port number for HTTPS usage.
The test cases define a number of request-response pairs for KMIP operations. Each test case is provided in the XML format specified in XML Encoding (5.4.1) intended to be both human-readable and usable by automated tools.
Each test case has a unique label (the section name) which includes indication of mandatory (-M-) or optional (-O-) status and the protocol version major and minor numbers as part of the identifier.
The test cases may depend on a specific configuration of a KMIP client and server being configured in a manner consistent with the test case assumptions.
Where possible the flow of unique identifiers between tests, the date-time values, and other dynamic items are indicated using symbolic identifiers – in actual request and response messages these dynamic values will be filled in with valid values.
Symbolic identifiers are of the form $UPPERCASE_NAME followed by optional unique index value. Wherever a symbolic identifier occurs in a test cases the implementation must replace it with a reasonable appearing datum of the expected type. Time values can be specified in terms of an offset from the current time in seconds of the form $NOW or $NOW-n or $NOW+n.
Note: the values for the returned items and the custom attributes are illustrative. Actual values from a real client or server system may vary as specified in section 4.1.
Whilst the test cases provided in a Profile define the allowed request and response content, some inherent variations MAY occur and are permitted within a successfully completed test case.
Each test case MAY include allowed variations in the description of the test case in addition to the variations noted in this section.
Other variations not explicitly noted in this section SHALL be deemed non-conformant.
An implementation conformant to a Profile MAY vary the following values:
a. The Hashing Algorithm selected by the server when it calculates the digest for a managed object for which it has access to the key material provided that a Digest is always available with the Hashing Algorithm of SHA256 (the default)
b. The Digest Value
a. Additional vendor or application prefixes
An implementation conformant to a Profile MAY allow the following response variations:
An implementation conformant to a Profile SHALL allow variation of the following behavior:
A Baseline Client provides some of the most basic functionality that is expected of a conformant KMIP client – the ability to request information about the server.
An implementation is a conforming Baseline Client if it meets the following conditions:
A Baseline Server provides the most basic functionality that is expected of a conformant KMIP server – the ability to provide information about the server and the managed objects supported by the server.
An implementation is a conforming Baseline Server if it meets the following conditions:
a. Activate
b. Add Attribute
c. Adjust Attribute
d. Check
e. Delete Attribute
f. Destroy
g. Discover Versions
h. Export
i. Get
j. Get Attribute List
k. Get Attributes
l. Import
m. Interop
n. Modify Attribute
o. Locate
p. Log
q. Query
r. Register
s. Revoke
t. Set Attribute
u. Set Endpoint Role
a. Discover Versions
b. Notify
c. Put
d. Query
e. Set Endpoint Role
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-2-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-3-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-4-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-5-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-6-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-7-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-8-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-9-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-10-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-11-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-12-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/BL-M-13-21.xml.
A Complete Server provides functionality that is expected of a conformant KMIP server that implements the entire specification.
An implementation is a conforming Complete Server if it meets the following conditions:
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS) is simply the use of HTTP over TLS in the same manner that HTTP is used over TCP.
KMIP over HTTPS is simply the use of KMIP messages over HTTPS in the same manner that KMIP is used over TLS.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP clients that support responding to server to client operations SHALL behave as a HTTPS server.
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers that support server to client operations SHALL behave as a HTTPS client.
Perform a Query operation, querying the Operations and Objects supported by the server, with a restriction on the Maximum Response Size set in the request header. Since the resulting Query response is too big, an error is returned. Increase the Maximum Response Size, resubmit the Query request, and get a successful response.
The specific list of operations and object types returned in the response MAY vary.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/MSGENC-HTTPS-M-1-21.xml.
The informative corresponding wire encoding for the test case is:
Request Time 0 00000000: 50 4f 53 54 20 2f 6b 6d-69 70 20 48 54 54 50 2f POST /kmip HTTP/ 00000010: 31 2e 30 0d 0a 50 72 61-67 6d 61 3a 20 6e 6f 2d 1.0..Pragma: no- 00000020: 63 61 63 68 65 0d 0a 43-61 63 68 65 2d 43 6f 6e cache..Cache-Con 00000030: 74 72 6f 6c 3a 20 6e 6f-2d 63 61 63 68 65 0d 0a trol: no-cache.. 00000040: 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69-6f 6e 3a 20 6b 65 65 70 Connection: keep 00000050: 2d 61 6c 69 76 65 0d 0a-43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d -alive..Content- 00000060: 54 79 70 65 3a 20 61 70-70 6c 69 63 61 74 69 6f Type: applicatio 00000070: 6e 2f 6f 63 74 65 74 2d-73 74 72 65 61 6d 0d 0a n/octet-stream.. 00000080: 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d-4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a 20 Content-Length: 00000090: 31 35 32 20 20 20 20 20-20 20 0d 0a 0d 0a 42 00 152 ....B. 000000a0: 15 32 78 01 00 00 00 90-42 00 77 01 00 00 00 48 .2x.....B.w....H 000000b0: 42 00 69 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 6a 02 00 00 00 04 B.i.... B.j..... 000000c0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 6b 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.k..... 000000d0: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 50 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.P..... 000000e0: 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00-42 00 0d 02 00 00 00 04 ........B....... 000000f0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 0f 01 00 00 00 38 ........B......8 00000100: 42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 B.\............. 00000110: 42 00 79 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 74 05 00 00 00 04 B.y.... B.t..... 00000120: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 74 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.t..... 00000130: 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00- ........ |
Response Time 0 00000000: 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31-20 32 30 30 20 4f 4b 0d HTTP/1.1 200 OK. 00000010: 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74-2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 61 .Content-Type: a 00000020: 70 70 6c 69 63 61 74 69-6f 6e 2f 6f 63 74 65 74 pplication/octet 00000030: 2d 73 74 72 65 61 6d 0d-0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 -stream..Content 00000040: 2d 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a-20 31 36 38 0d 0a 0d 0a -Length: 168.... 00000050: 42 00 7b 01 00 00 00 a0-42 00 7a 01 00 00 00 48 B.{.... B.z....H 00000060: 42 00 69 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 6a 02 00 00 00 04 B.i.... B.j..... 00000070: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 6b 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.k..... 00000080: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 92 09 00 00 00 08 ........B....... 00000090: 00 00 00 00 56 8a 5b e2-42 00 0d 02 00 00 00 04 ....V.[bB....... 000000a0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 0f 01 00 00 00 48 ........B......H 000000b0: 42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 B.\............. 000000c0: 42 00 7f 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 B............... 000000d0: 42 00 7e 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 B.~............. 000000e0: 42 00 7d 07 00 00 00 09-54 4f 4f 5f 4c 41 52 47 B.}.....TOO_LARG 000000f0: 45 00 00 00 00 00 00 00- E....... |
Request Time 1 00000000: 50 4f 53 54 20 2f 6b 6d-69 70 20 48 54 54 50 2f POST /kmip HTTP/ 00000010: 31 2e 30 0d 0a 50 72 61-67 6d 61 3a 20 6e 6f 2d 1.0..Pragma: no- 00000020: 63 61 63 68 65 0d 0a 43-61 63 68 65 2d 43 6f 6e cache..Cache-Con 00000030: 74 72 6f 6c 3a 20 6e 6f-2d 63 61 63 68 65 0d 0a trol: no-cache.. 00000040: 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69-6f 6e 3a 20 6b 65 65 70 Connection: keep 00000050: 2d 61 6c 69 76 65 0d 0a-43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d -alive..Content- 00000060: 54 79 70 65 3a 20 61 70-70 6c 69 63 61 74 69 6f Type: applicatio 00000070: 6e 2f 6f 63 74 65 74 2d-73 74 72 65 61 6d 0d 0a n/octet-stream.. 00000080: 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d-4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a 20 Content-Length: 00000090: 31 35 32 20 20 20 20 20-20 20 0d 0a 0d 0a 42 00 152 ....B. 000000a0: 15 32 78 01 00 00 00 90-42 00 77 01 00 00 00 48 .2x.....B.w....H 000000b0: 42 00 69 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 6a 02 00 00 00 04 B.i.... B.j..... 000000c0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 6b 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.k..... 000000d0: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 50 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.P..... 000000e0: 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00-42 00 0d 02 00 00 00 04 ........B....... 000000f0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 0f 01 00 00 00 38 ........B......8 00000100: 42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 B.\............. 00000110: 42 00 79 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 74 05 00 00 00 04 B.y.... B.t..... 00000120: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 74 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.t..... 00000130: 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00- ........ |
Response Time 1 00000000: 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31-20 32 30 30 20 4f 4b 0d HTTP/1.1 200 OK. 00000010: 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74-2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 61 .Content-Type: a 00000020: 70 70 6c 69 63 61 74 69-6f 6e 2f 6f 63 74 65 74 pplication/octet 00000030: 2d 73 74 72 65 61 6d 0d-0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 -stream..Content 00000040: 2d 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a-20 39 30 34 0d 0a 0d 0a -Length: 904.... 00000050: 42 00 7b 01 00 00 03 80-42 00 7a 01 00 00 00 48 B.{.....B.z....H 00000060: 42 00 69 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 6a 02 00 00 00 04 B.i.... B.j..... 00000070: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 6b 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.k..... 00000080: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 92 09 00 00 00 08 ........B....... 00000090: 00 00 00 00 56 8a 5b e2-42 00 0d 02 00 00 00 04 ....V.[bB....... 000000a0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 0f 01 00 00 03 28 ........B......( 000000b0: 42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 B.\............. 000000c0: 42 00 7f 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 B............... 000000d0: 42 00 7c 01 00 00 03 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 B.|.....B.\..... 000000e0: 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000000f0: 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000100: 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000110: 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000120: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000130: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000140: 00 00 00 0b 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000150: 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000160: 00 00 00 0d 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000170: 00 00 00 0e 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000180: 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000190: 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001a0: 00 00 00 13 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001b0: 00 00 00 1a 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001c0: 00 00 00 19 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001d0: 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001e0: 00 00 00 11 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001f0: 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000200: 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000210: 00 00 00 15 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000220: 00 00 00 16 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000230: 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000240: 00 00 00 1d 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000250: 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000260: 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000270: 00 00 00 1e 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000280: 00 00 00 1b 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000290: 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000002a0: 00 00 00 25 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...%....B.\..... 000002b0: 00 00 00 26 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...&....B.\..... 000002c0: 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000002d0: 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ... ....B.\..... 000002e0: 00 00 00 21 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...!....B.\..... 000002f0: 00 00 00 22 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ..."....B.\..... 00000300: 00 00 00 23 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...#....B.\..... 00000310: 00 00 00 24 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...$....B.\..... 00000320: 00 00 00 27 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...'....B.\..... 00000330: 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...(....B.\..... 00000340: 00 00 00 29 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ...)....B.W..... 00000350: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 00000360: 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 00000370: 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 00000380: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 00000390: 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 000003a0: 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 000003b0: 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 000003c0: 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 000003d0: 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00- ........ |
The XML profile specifies the use of KMIP replacing the TTLV message encoding with an XML message encoding. The results returned using the XML encoding SHALL be logically the same as if the message encoding was in TTLV form. All size or length values specified within tag values for KMIP items SHALL be the same in XML form as if the message encoding were in TTLV form. The implications of this are that items such as MaximumResponseSize are interpreted to refer to a maximum length computed as if it were a TTLV-encoded response, not the length of the XML-encoded response.
KMIP text values of Tags, Types and Enumerations SHALL be normalized to create a ‘CamelCase’ format that would be suitable to be used as a variable name in C/Java or an XML element name.
The basic approach to converting from KMIP text to CamelCase is to separate the text into individual word tokens (rules 1-4), capitalize the first letter of each word (rule 5) and then join with spaces removed (rule 6). The tokenizing splits on whitespace and on dashes where the token following is a valid word. The tokenizing also removes round brackets and shifts decimals from the front to the back of the first word in each string. The following rules SHALL be applied to create the normalized CamelCase form:
Hex representations of numbers must always begin with ‘0x’ and must not include any spaces. They may use either upper or lower case ‘a’-’f’. The hex representation must include all leading zeros or sign extension bits when representing a value of a fixed width such as Tags (3 bytes), Integer (32-bit signed big-endian), Long Integer (64-bit signed big-endian) and Big Integer (big-endian multiple of 8 bytes). The Integer values for -1, 0, 1 are represented as "0xffffffff", "0x00000000", "0x00000001". Hex representation for Byte Strings are similar to numbers, but do not include the ‘0x’ prefix, and can be of any length.
Tags are a String that may contain either:
Other text values may be used such as published names of Extension tags, or names of new tags added in future KMIP versions. Producers may however choose to use hex values for these tags to ensure they are understood by all consumers.
Type must be a String containing a CamelCase representation of one of the normalized values as defined in the KMIP specification.
If type is not included, the default type of Structure SHALL be used.
The specification of a value is represented differently for each TTLV type.
For XML, each TTLV is represented as an XML element with attributes. The general form uses a single element named ‘TTLV’ with ‘tag’, optional ‘name’ and ‘type’ attributes. This form allows any TTLV including extensions to be encoded. For tags defined in the KMIP Specification or other well-known extensions, a more specific form can be used where each tag is encoded as an element with the same name and includes a ‘type’ attribute. For either form, structure values are encoded as nested xml elements, and non-structure values are encoded using the ‘value’ attribute.
<TTLV tag="0x420001" name="ActivationDate" type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
<TTLV tag="0x420001" type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
<ActivationDate type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
<TTLV tag="0x54FFFF" name="SomeExtension" type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
The ‘type’ property / attribute SHALL have a default value of ‘Structure’ and may be omitted for Structures.
If namespaces are required, XML elements SHALL use the following namespace:
urn:oasis:tc:kmip:xmlns
Tags are a String that may contain either:
Other text values may be used such as published names of Extension tags, or names of new tags added in future KMIP versions. Producers may however choose to use hex values for these tags to ensure they are understood by all consumers.
<ActivationDate xmlns="urn:oasis:tc:kmip:xmlns" type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
<IVCounterNonce type="ByteString" value="a1b2c3d4"/>
<PrivateKeyTemplateAttribute type="Structure"/>
<TTLV tag="0x545352" name="SomeExtension" type="TextString" value="This is an extension"/>
<WELL_KNOWN_EXTENSION type="TextString" value="This is an extension"/>
For XML, sub-items are nested elements.
<ProtocolVersion type="Structure">
<ProtocolVersionMajor type="Integer" value="1"/>
<ProtocolVersionMinor type="Integer" value="0"/>
</ProtocolVersion>
<ProtocolVersion>
<ProtocolVersionMajor type="Integer" value="1"/>
<ProtocolVersionMinor type="Integer" value="0"/>
</ProtocolVersion>
The ‘type’ property / attribute is optional for a Structure.
For XML, value is a decimal and uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:int
<BatchCount type="Integer" value="10"/>
(Cryptographic Usage Mask, Storage Status Mask):
Integer mask values can also be encoded as a String containing mask components. XML uses an attribute with [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:list which uses a space separator. Components may be either the text of the enumeration value as defined in KMIP 9.1.3.3.1/KMIP 12.1 or as a 32-bit unsigned big-endian hex string.
<CryptographicUsageMask type="Integer" value="0x0000100c"/>
<CryptographicUsageMask type="Integer" value="Encrypt Decrypt CertificateSign"/>
<CryptographicUsageMask type="Integer" value="CertificateSign 0x00000004 0x0000008"/>
<CryptographicUsageMask type="Integer" value="CertificateSign 0x0000000c"/>
For XML, value uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:long
<x540001 type="LongInteger" value="-2"/>
<UsageLimitsCount type="LongInteger" value="1152921504606846976"/>
For XML, value uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:hexBinary
<X type="BigInteger" value="0000000000000000"/>
For XML, value uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:string and is either a hex string or the CamelCase enum text. If an XSD with xsd:enumeration restriction is used to define valid values (as is the case with the XSD included as an appendix), parsers should also accept any hex string in addition to defined enum values.
<ObjectType type="Enumeration" value="0x00000002"/>
<ObjectType type="Enumeration" value="SymmetricKey"/>
For XML, value uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:Boolean
<BatchOrderOption type=”Boolean" value="true"/>
XML uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:string
<AttributeName type="TextString" value="Cryptographic Algorithm"/>
XML uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:hexBinary
<MACSignature type="ByteString" value="C50F77"/>
For XML, value uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:dateTime
<ArchiveDate type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
The value SHALL always be “time zoned” – i.e. a time zone specifier SHALL always be included.
XML uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:unsignedInt
<Offset type="Interval" value="27"/>
For XML, value uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:long
<x540001 type="DateTimeExtended" value="2"/>
<X540001 type="DateTimeExtended" value="1152921504606846976"/>
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
Perform a Query operation, querying the Operations and Objects supported by the server, with a restriction on the Maximum Response Size set in the request header. Since the resulting Query response is too big, an error is returned. Increase the Maximum Response Size, resubmit the Query request, and get a successful response.
The specific list of operations and object types returned in the response MAY vary.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/MSGENC-XML-M-1-21.xml.
The JSON profile specifies the use of KMIP replacing the TTLV message encoding with a JSON message encoding. The results returned using the JSON encoding SHALL be logically the same as if the message encoding was in TTLV form. All size or length values specified within tag values for KMIP items SHALL be the same in JSON form as if the message encoding were in TTLV form. The implications of this are that items such as MaximumResponseSize are interpreted to refer to a maximum length computed as if it were a TTLV-encoded response, not the length of the JSON-encoded response.
KMIP text values of Tags, Types and Enumerations SHALL be normalized to create a ‘CamelCase’ format that would be suitable to be used as a variable name in C/Java or an JSON name.
The basic approach to converting from KMIP text to CamelCase is to separate the text into individual word tokens (rules 1-4), capitalize the first letter of each word (rule 5) and then join with spaces removed (rule 6). The tokenizing splits on whitespace and on dashes where the token following is a valid word. The tokenizing also removes round brackets and shifts decimals from the front to the back of the first word in each string. The following rules SHALL be applied to create the normalized CamelCase form:
Hex representations of numbers must always begin with ‘0x’ and must not include any spaces. They may use either upper or lower case ‘a’-’f’. The hex representation must include all leading zeros or sign extension bits when representing a value of a fixed width such as Tags (3 bytes), Integer (32-bit signed big-endian), Long Integer (64-bit signed big-endian) and Big Integer (big-endian multiple of 8 bytes). The Integer values for -1, 0, 1 are represented as "0xffffffff", "0x00000000", "0x00000001". Hex representation for Byte Strings are similar to numbers, but do not include the ‘0x’ prefix, and can be of any length.
Tags are a String that may contain either:
Other text values may be used such as published names of Extension tags, or names of new tags added in future KMIP versions. Producers may however choose to use hex values for these tags to ensure they are understood by all consumers.
Type must be a String containing a CamelCase representation of one of the normalized values as defined in the KMIP specification.
If type is not included, the default type of Structure SHALL be used.
The specification of a value is represented differently for each TTLV type.
For JSON encoding, each TTLV is represented as a JSON Object with properties ‘tag’, optional ‘name’, ‘type’ and ‘value’.
{"tag": "ActivationDate", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"}
{"tag": "0x54FFFF", "name":"SomeExtension", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"}
The ‘type’ property / attribute SHALL have a default value of ‘Structure’ and may be omitted for Structures.
Tags are a String that may contain either:
Other text values may be used such as published names of Extension tags, or names of new tags added in future KMIP versions. Producers may however choose to use hex values for these tags to ensure they are understood by all consumers.
{"tag": "0x420001", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"}
{"tag": "ActivationDate", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"}
{"tag": "IVCounterNonce", "type":"ByteString", "value":"a1b2c3d4"}
{"tag": "PrivateKeyTemplateAttribute", "type":"Structure", "value":[]}
{"tag": "0x545352", "type":"TextString", "value":"This is an extension"}
{"tag": "WELL_KNOWN_EXTENSION", "type":"TextString", "value":"This is an extension"}
For JSON, value is an Array containing sub-items, or may be null.
{"tag": "ProtocolVersion", "type":"Structure", "value":[
{"tag": "ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":1},
{"tag": "ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":0}
]}
{"tag": "ProtocolVersion", "value":[
{"tag": "ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":1},
{"tag": "ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":0}
]}
The ‘type’ property / attribute is optional for a Structure.
For JSON, value is either a Number or a hex string.
{"tag": "BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":10}
{"tag": "BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x0000000A"}
(Cryptographic Usage Mask, Storage Status Mask):
Integer mask values can also be encoded as a String containing mask components. JSON uses ‘|’ as the separator. Components may be either the text of the enumeration value as defined in the KMIP Specification or a 32-bit unsigned big-endian hex string.
{"tag": "CryptographicUsageMask", "type":"Integer", "value": "0x0000100c"}
{"tag": "CryptographicUsageMask", "type":"Integer", "value": "Encrypt|Decrypt|CertificateSign"}
{"tag": "CryptographicUsageMask", "type":"Integer", "value": "CertificateSign|0x00000004|0x0000008"}
{"tag": "CryptographicUsageMask", "type":"Integer", "value": "CertificateSign|0x0000000c"}
For JSON, value is either a Number or a hex string. Note that JS Numbers are 64-bit floating point and can only represent 53-bits of precision, so any values >= 2^52 must be represented as hex strings.
{"tag": "0x540001", "type":"LongInteger", "value":"0xfffffffffffffffe"}
{"tag": "0x540001", "type":"LongInteger", "value":-2}
{"tag": "UsageLimitsCount", "type":"LongInteger", "value":"0x1000000000000000"}
Note that this value (2^60) is too large to be represented as a Number in JSON.
For JSON, value is either a Number or a hex string. Note that Big Integers must be sign extended to contain a multiple of 8 bytes, and as per LongInteger, JS numbers only support a limited range of values.
{"tag": "X", "type":"BigInteger", "value":0}
{"tag": "X", "type":"BigInteger", "value":"0x0000000000000000"}
For JSON, value may contain:
{"tag": "0x420057", "type":"Enumeration", "value":2}
{"tag": "ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"0x00000002"}
{"tag": "ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"SymmetricKey"}
For JSON, value must be either a hex string, or a JSON Boolean ‘true’ or ‘false’.
{"tag": "BatchOrderOption", "type":"Boolean", "value":true}
{"tag": "BatchOrderOption", "type":"Boolean", "value":"0x0000000000000001"}
For JSON, value must be a String
{"tag": "AttributeName", "type":"TextString", "value":"Cryptographic Algorithm"}
For JSON, value must be a hex string. Note Byte Strings do not include the ‘0x’ prefix, and do not have any leading bytes.
{"tag": "MACSignature", "type":"ByteString", "value":"C50F77"}
For JSON, value must be either a hex string, or an ISO8601 DateTime as used in XSD using format:
'-'? yyyy '-' mm '-' dd 'T' hh ':' mm ':' ss ('.' s+)? ((('+' | '-') hh ':' mm) | 'Z')?
Fractional seconds are not used in KMIP and should not generally be shown. If they are used, they should be ignored (truncated).
{"tag": "ArchiveDate", "type":"DateTime", "value":"0x000000003a505520"}
{"tag": "ArchiveDate", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"}
The value SHALL always be “time zoned” – i.e. a time zone specifier SHALL always be included.
For JSON, value is either a Number or a hex string. Note that intervals are 32-bit unsigned big-endian values.
{"tag": "Offset", "type":"Interval", "value":27}
{"tag": "Offset", "type":"Interval", "value":"0x0000001b"}
For JSON, value is either a Number or a hex string. Note that JS Numbers are 64-bit floating point and can only represent 53-bits of precision, so any values >= 252 must be represented as hex strings.
{"tag": "0x540001", "type":"DateTimeExtended", "value":"0xfffffffffffffffe"}
{"tag": "0x540001", "type":"DateTimeExtended", "value":2}
Note that this value (260) is too large to be represented as a Number in JSON.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
Perform a Query operation, querying the Operations and Objects supported by the server, with a restriction on the Maximum Response Size set in the request header. Since the resulting Query response is too big, an error is returned. Increase the Maximum Response Size, resubmit the Query request, and get a successful response.
The specific list of operations and object types returned in the response MAY vary.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/MSGENC-JSON-M-1-21.xml.
The normative corresponding wire encoding in JSON for the test case is:
Request Time 0 {"tag":"RequestMessage", "value":[ {"tag":"RequestHeader", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersion", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"}, {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMinor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000004"} ]}, {"tag":"MaximumResponseSize", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000100"}, {"tag":"BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"} ]}, {"tag":"BatchItem", "value":[ {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Query"}, {"tag":"RequestPayload", "value":[ {"tag":"QueryFunction", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"QueryOperations"}, {"tag":"QueryFunction", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"QueryObjects"} ]} ]} ]} |
Response Time 0 {"tag":"ResponseMessage", "value":[ {"tag":"ResponseHeader", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersion", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"}, {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMinor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000004"} ]}, {"tag":"TimeStamp", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2016-01-04T11:47:46+00:00"}, {"tag":"BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"} ]}, {"tag":"BatchItem", "value":[ {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Query"}, {"tag":"ResultStatus", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"OperationFailed"}, {"tag":"ResultReason", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ResponseTooLarge"}, {"tag":"ResultMessage", "type":"TextString", "value":"TOO_LARGE"} ]} ]} |
Request Time 1 {"tag":"RequestMessage", "value":[ {"tag":"RequestHeader", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersion", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"}, {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMinor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000004"} ]}, {"tag":"MaximumResponseSize", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000800"}, {"tag":"BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"} ]}, {"tag":"BatchItem", "value":[ {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Query"}, {"tag":"RequestPayload", "value":[ {"tag":"QueryFunction", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"QueryOperations"}, {"tag":"QueryFunction", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"QueryObjects"} ]} ]} ]} |
Response Time 1 {"tag":"ResponseMessage", "value":[ {"tag":"ResponseHeader", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersion", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"}, {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMinor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000004"} ]}, {"tag":"TimeStamp", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2016-01-04T11:47:46+00:00"}, {"tag":"BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"} ]}, {"tag":"BatchItem", "value":[ {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Query"}, {"tag":"ResultStatus", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Success"}, {"tag":"ResponsePayload", "value":[ {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Query"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Locate"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Destroy"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Get"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Create"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Register"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"GetAttributes"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"GetAttributeList"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"AddAttribute"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ModifyAttribute"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"DeleteAttribute"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Activate"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Revoke"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Poll"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Cancel"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Check"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"GetUsageAllocation"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"CreateKeyPair"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ReKey"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Archive"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Recover"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ObtainLease"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ReKeyKeyPair"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Certify"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ReCertify"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"DiscoverVersions"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Notify"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Put"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"RNGRetrieve"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"RNGSeed"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Encrypt"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Decrypt"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Sign"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"SignatureVerify"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"MAC"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"MACVerify"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Hash"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"CreateSplitKey"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"JoinSplitKey"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Certificate"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"SymmetricKey"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"SecretData"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"PublicKey"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"PrivateKey"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Template"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"OpaqueObject"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"SplitKey"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"PGPKey"} ]} ]} ]} |
The Symmetric Key Lifecycle Profile is a KMIP server performing symmetric key lifecycle operations based on requests received from a KMIP client.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Cryptographic Algorithm
b. Object Type
c. Process Start Date
d. Protect Stop Date
a. Create
a. Cryptographic Algorithm with values:
i. 3DES
ii. AES
b. Object Type with value:
i. Symmetric Key
c. Key Format Type with value:
i. Raw
ii. Transparent Symmetric Key
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKLC-M-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKLC-M-2-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKLC-M-3-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/optional/SKLC-O-1-21.xml.
The Symmetric Key Lifecycle Profile is a KMIP server performing symmetric key lifecycle operations based on requests received from a KMIP client. The use of algorithms within this profile set has been limited to those permitted under the NIST FIPS 140 validation program.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Symmetric Key
a. Cryptographic Algorithm
b. Cryptographic Length with values:
i. 168 (3DES)
ii. 128 (AES)
iii. 192 (AES)
iv. 256 (AES)
c. Object Type
d. Process Start Date
e. Protect Stop Date
a. Create
a. Cryptographic Algorithm with values:
i. 3DES
ii. AES
b. Key Format Type with value:
i. Raw
ii. Transparent Symmetric Key
c. Object Type with value:
i. Symmetric Key
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-2-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-3-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-4-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-5-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-6-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-7-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-8-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-9-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-10-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-11-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SKFF-M-12-21.xml
The Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Profile is a KMIP server performing symmetric key lifecycle operations based on requests received from a KMIP client.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Public Key
b. Private Key
a. Cryptographic Algorithm
b. Object Type
c. Process Start Date
d. Process Stop Date
a. Cryptographic Algorithm with values:
i. RSA
b. Key Format Type with value:
i. PKCS#1
ii. PKCS#8
iii. Transparent RSA Public Key
iv. Transparent RSA Private Key
c. Object Type with value:
i. Public Key
ii. Private Key
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/AKLC-M-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/AKLC-M-2-21.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/AKLC-M-3-21.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/optional/AKLC-O-1-21.xml.
The Basic Cryptographic Client and Server profiles specify the use of KMIP to request encryption and decryption operations from a KMIP server.
The Advanced Cryptographic Client and Server profiles specify the use of KMIP to request encryption, decryption, signature, and verification operations from a KMIP server.
The RNG Cryptographic Client and Server profiles specify the use of KMIP to request random number generator operations from a KMIP server.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-2-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-3-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-4-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-5-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-6-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-7-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-8-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-9-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-10-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-11-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-12-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-21-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-20-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-GCM-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-GCM-2-21.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-GCM-3-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-CHACHA20-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-CHACHA20-2-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-CHACHA20-3-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-BC-M-CHACHA20POLY1305-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-2-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-3-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-4-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-5-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-6-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-7-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-8-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-OAEP-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-OAEP-2-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-OAEP-3-21.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-OAEP-4-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-OAEP-5-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-OAEP-6-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-OAEP-7-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-OAEP-8-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-OAEP-9-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-AC-M-OAEP-10-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/CS-RNG-M-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/optional/CS-RNG-O-1-21.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/optional/CS-RNG-O-2-21.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/optional/CS-RNG-O-3-21.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/optional/CS-RNG-O-4-21.xml
The Opaque Managed Object Store Profile is a KMIP server performing storage related operations on opaque objects based on requests received from a KMIP client.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Opaque Object
a. Object Type
a. Register
a. Opaque Data Type
b. Object Type with value:
i. Opaque Object
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/OMOS-M-1-21.xml.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/optional/OMOS-O-1-21.xml.
The Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Profile is a storage array containing self-encrypting drives operating as a KMIP client interacting with a KMIP server.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Vendor Attribute
a. Register
a. Name Type value:
i. Uninterpreted Text String
b. Object Type values:
i. Secret Data
c. Secret Data Type value:
i. Password
a. TextString
Determine server configuration details including operations supported (only the mandatory operations are listed in the response example), objects supported (only the mandatory objects types are listed in the response example), and optional server information.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SASED-M-1-21.xml.
The secret data for the authentication key is registered. The server must allow the registration of managed objects for Object Groups either by allowed arbitrary values for Object Groups or by pre-configuration of specific Object Groups prior to the storage array registering the authentication key. The authentication key may be a new authentication key or a replacement authentication key.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SASED-M-2-21.xml.
Locate and retrieve the previously registered authentication key and finally destroy the authentication key.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/SASED-M-3-21.xml.
The Tape Library Profile specifies the behavior of a tape library operating as a KMIP client interacting with a KMIP server.
Key Associated Data (KAD) |
Part of the tape format. May be segmented into authenticated and unauthenticated fields. KAD usage is detailed in the SCSI SSC-3 standard from the T10 organization available as ANSI INCITS 335-2000. |
Hexadecimal Numeric Characters |
Case-sensitive, printable, single byte ASCII characters representing the numbers 0 through 9 and uppercase alpha A through F. (US-ASCII characters 30h-39h and 41h-46h). Each byte (single 8-bit numeric value) is represented as two hexadecimal numeric characters with the high-nibble represented by the first (left-most) hexadecimal numeric character and the low-nibble represented by the second (right-most) hexadecimal numeric character. |
N(a) |
The maximum number of bytes in the tape authenticated KAD field. For LTO4, N(a) is 12 bytes. For LTO5, N(a) is 60 bytes. For LTO6, N(a) is 60 bytes. |
N(u) |
The maximum number of bytes in the tape unauthenticated KAD field. For LTO4, N(u) is 32 bytes. For LTO5, N(u) is 32 bytes. For LTO6, N(u) is 32 bytes. |
N(k) |
The maximum number of bytes in the tape format KAD fields – i.e. N(a) + N(u). For LTO4, N(k) is 44 bytes. For LTO5, N(k) is 92 bytes. For LTO6, N(k) is 92 bytes. |
This information applies to Tape Libraries that use the Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] attribute to store key identifiers. KMIP clients are not required to use Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] however KMIP servers conforming to the Tape Library Profiles are required to support KMIP clients that use Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] and KMIP clients that do not use Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC].
The Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] MAY be used to store data that is specific to the application (Tape Library) using the object.
The following Application Namespaces SHOULD be used in the Application Namespace field of the Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC]:
· LIBRARY-LTO, LIBRARY-LTO4, LIBRARY-LTO5, LIBRARY-LTO6, LIBRARY-LTO7
Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] supports key identifiers being created either on the server or on the client (Tape Library), but not both. This profile specifies use of key identifiers created by the client.
The Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] method of key identification relies on the ability to uniquely identify a key based only on its Application Data (preferably), or (alternatively) on some combination of Application Data and Custom Attributes [KMIP-SPEC], which the key creator guarantees to be unique within the Application Namespace.
Key identifiers stored in the KMIP server's Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] are in text format. Key identifiers stored in the KMIP client's tape format KAD fields are numeric format. The specific algorithm for converting between text and numeric formats is specified below.
All information contained in the tape format’s KAD fields is converted to a text format consisting of hexadecimal numeric character pairs as follows:
If the implementation uses client-created key identifiers, then the client generates a new identifier in text format that SHALL be unique within the chosen namespace. The source material for generating the string is dependent on client policy. The numeric representation of this identifier SHALL be no larger than the N(k) bytes of the KAD for the tape media being used.
For KMIP clients and servers conforming to this profile, Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] SHALL be created by the Tape Library KMIP client based on the tape format's KAD fields as follows:
1. Define an empty output buffer sufficient to contain a string with a maximum length of 2*N(k) bytes.
2. Copy the tape format’s unauthenticated KAD (if present) to the output buffer, converting each byte value to exactly two Hexadecimal Numeric Characters. The first byte (i.e., byte 0) of the output buffer is the first byte of unauthenticated KAD.
3. Concatenate the tape format’s authenticated KAD to the output buffer, converting each byte value to exactly two Hexadecimal Numeric Characters.
Note: the contents of the unauthenticated KAD and authenticated KAD fields may be less than the maximum permitted lengths; the implementation provides the correct length values to use in the algorithm rather than using fixed maximum length fields.
If Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] is supported, then it SHALL be used by the client for locating the object for the purpose of encrypting and decrypting data on tape. The Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] value SHALL solely be used for this purpose.
The Tape Library client SHALL assign a text (i.e., human-readable) representation of the media barcode to the Alternative Name [KMIP-SPEC] of the object. This SHALL occur on first use of the object for encryption, which normally is when the library requests the server to create the object.
The relationship between key identifiers in Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] and Alternative Name [KMIP-SPEC] is as follows:
a) The values for both are provided by the client
b) The identifier in Alternative Name [KMIP-SPEC] (i.e., the barcode) SHALL be used by the server administrator for finding keys associated with specific tape media (e.g., a server administrator may want to find the key(s) associated with a missing tape cartridge, where the barcode of that tape cartridge is known).
c) The Alternative Name [KMIP-SPEC] SHALL NOT be used by a client for locating the object to encrypt or decrypt data, since the value (barcode) is not required to be unique and therefore does not ensure retrieval of the correct key.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
a. Alternative Name Type with value:
i. Uninterpreted Text String
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Alternative Name
b. Application Specific Information
c. Cryptographic Algorithm
d. Name
e. Vendor Attribute
a. Create
a. Batch Count value:
i. 1 to 32
b. Batch Order Option value:
i. True
a. Alternative Name Type value:
i. Uninterpreted Text String
b. Cryptographic Algorithm value:
i. AES
c. Cryptographic Length value :
i. 256
d. Key Format Type value:
i. Raw
e. Name Type value:
i. Uninterpreted Text String
f. Object Type value:
i. Symmetric Key
a. Date Time
b. Integer
c. Text String
Determine server configuration details including operations supported (only the mandatory operations are listed in the response example), objects supported (only the mandatory objects types are listed in the response example), optional server information, and optional list of application name spaces. Additional information MAY be returned by tape library clients and servers.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/TL-M-1-21.xml.
This case may occur when the Write operation starts with the first block on a tape. The implementation may choose which Write operations qualify for creation of a new key. Regardless of the initiating circumstances, the Tape Library requests the server to create a new AES-256 symmetric key with appropriate identifying information which is unique within the Application Namespace.
Additional custom attributes MAY be specified in order to:
- ensure uniqueness of the key identifier when later Locating the key via Application Specific Information
- provide human-readable information (such as the tape Barcode value)
- provide information to support client-specific purposes
Tape Library implementations are not required to use custom attributes and custom attributes within the create request MAY be omitted.
A Tape Library client MAY elect to perform the steps in separate requests. A Tape Library server SHALL support both requests containing multiple batch items and multiple equivalent requests containing single batch items within each request.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/TL-M-2-21.xml.
The Tape Library constructs an identifier string based on the method in Tape Library Application Specific Information (5.12.2), and requests the server to locate the matching managed object for that Application Specific Information value. A Get is then requested based on the key's unique identifier. The Tape Library MAY update attributes associated with the Symmetric Key Managed Object. The following test case shows extensive use of custom attributes. Custom attributes are not required if the Application Name is unique within the Application Namespace. An implementation may also use custom attributes for vendor-unique purposes, or to improve usability.
Tape Library implementations are not required to use custom attributes and those steps within the test case that refer to custom attribute setting and update are optional, and MAY be omitted. The steps using Get Attribute List, Get Attributes and Modify Attribute are optional for a client to use but remain mandatory for a server to support for those clients that elect to use the custom attributes.
A Tape Library client MAY elect to perform the steps in separate requests. A Tape Library server SHALL support both requests containing multiple batch items and multiple equivalent requests containing single batch items within each request.
The test case destroys the key created in the previous test case to clean up after the test. Tape Library implementations MAY elect to not perform this step.
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/TL-M-3-21.xml.
The AES XTS Profile is a KMIP server performing AES XTX key generation related operations based on requests received from a KMIP client.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Symmetric Key
a. Object Type
d. Cryptographic Algorithm with values:
i. AES
e. Key Format Type with value:
i. Raw
ii. Transparent Symmetric Key
f. Object Type with value:
i. Symmetric Key
Usage of AES XTS directly without a key encrypting key (KEK).
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/AX-M-1-21.xml.
Usage of AES XTS directly with a key encrypting key (KEK).
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/AX-M-2-21.xml.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile under [KMIP-SPEC]:
2. SHALL support TLS v1.3 [RFC8446]
4. MAY support extensions outside the scope of this standard (e.g., vendor extensions, conformance clauses) that do not contradict any KMIP requirements.
KMIP servers conformant to this profile under [KMIP-SPEC]:
2. SHALL support TLS v1.3 [RFC8446]
a. Cryptographic Algorithm
b. Cryptographic Length
c. Protection Level
d. Protection Period
e. Quantum Safe
a. Certify
b. Create
c. Create Key Pair
d. Decrypt
e. Encrypt
f. Re-Certify
g. Register
h. Re-key
i. Re-key Key Pair
j. Sign
k. Signature Verify
a. Notify
b. Put
a. Recommended Curve value:
i. P-384 (SECP384R1)
ii. P-521
b. Certificate Type value:
i. X.509
c. Cryptographic Algorithm value:
i. AES
ii. ChaCha20
iii. ChaChar20Poly1305
iv. McEliece-6960119
v. McEliece-8192128
vi. SPHINCS-256
d. Hashing Algorithm value:
i. SHA-384
ii. SHA-512
iii. SHA3-256
iv. SHA3-384
v. SHA3-512
e. Object Type value:
i. Certificate
ii. Private Key
iii. Public Key
iv. Symmetric Key
f. Key Format Type value:
i. Raw
ii. X.509
g. Digital Signature Algorithm value:
i. ECDSA with SHA384 (on P-384)
ii. Ed25519 with Ed25519
This section documents the test cases that a client or server conformant to this profile SHALL support.
Perform a Query operation, querying the Operations and Objects supported by the server, and get a successful response.
The specific list of operations noted in the test case are the minimum list of operations – additional operations MAY be supported.
The TLS protocol version and cipher suite SHALL be TLS v1.3 [RFC8446].
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/QS-M-1-21.xml.
Perform a Create operation, stating the period the key must be able to offer protection (Protection Period) and the relative sensitivity of the information (Protection Type).
The TLS protocol version and cipher suite SHALL be TLS v1.3 [RFC8446].
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/QS-M-2-21.xml.
The PKCS profile specifies the use of KMIP to encapsulate PKCS#11 calls.
PKCS#11 function calls are mapped into a KMIP PKCS#11 operation. The parameters are a direct representation of the parameters of the PKCS#11 functions, attributes and other structures defined in [PKCS#11].
The function return values are provided directly in the PKCS#11 Return Code field in the Response Payload. Output Parameters may be omitted in the case of an error status.
For scalar types, CK_BYTE is represented as a single byte, while CK_ULONG and CK_LONG values are transmitted as 8 bytes, network byte order (big-endian). Other PKCS#11 types are built upon those base types as defined in [PKCS#11]. For example, a CK_DATE is a four-byte year followed by a two-byte month and a two-byte day, each byte representing an ASCII character. Strings are either space padded, or null terminated as defined in [PKCS#11].
If a parameter or element of a structure represents a pointer to a structure, then the elements of that structure are inserted in line, with its input or output elements listed recursively. If a parameter represents a fixed length array, then the elements appear in order. If the length is variable, then the count of the number of elements is provided immediately before the array and removed from its original position in the parameter list or structure. CK_ULONGs that represent a count or length are represented as 4 bytes big-endian values.
PKCS#11 functions that handle variable length data structures use a pattern in which the caller first calls with null pointers and the library then fills in the required length. This enables the caller to allocate sufficient memory for the result and call the function a second time with non-null pointers. An additional byte is inserted before such parameters in requests to indicate whether the values are required, or just the lengths.
Templates are represented by a 4-byte big-endian count of attributes followed by the attributes themselves. They may be encoded with or without the values for C_GetAttributeValue which reflects whether it has been called with null pointers or has maximum lengths already determined.
For each attribute a one-byte value indicator flag that indicates whether a value was defined via the pValue field of the attribute. This is followed by a second one-byte count indicator flag that indicates if a multiple of the count of values was defined via the ulValueLen field of the attribute. If the count indicator is set to false (0), then the value indicator SHALL be set to false (0) also. In the case of a C_GetAttributeValue input request, the value indicator SHALL be set to false (0) unless the value is an array attribute other than CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS.
Fixed length attributes (attributes of type CK_ULONG, CK_BYTE, CK_BOOL, CK_CHAR and fixed length arrays of those types) are provided in line, with an implicit count of the number of elements which is not present in the encoding. Byte strings are also provided in line but preceded by a 4-byte big-endian count of the number of bytes. CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS attribute values are preceded by a count of the number of elements followed by the values themselves; all other array attributes are stored recursively in the same manner as the encapsulating template.
Mechanisms are encoded by an 8-byte big-endian mechanism number followed by a one-byte flag that indicates whether the parameter field follows. If the flag is set (to 1), it is followed by a 4-byte big-endian field that stores the length in bytes of any mechanism parameter followed by the parameter itself. If the parameter is a byte string such as an Initialization Vector it is preceded by a second 4-byte big-endian length. The fields in structured parameters such as CK_GCM_PARAMS are simply stored sequentially, with any contained byte strings also preceded by a 4-byte big-endian length.
Values and functions that are only meaningful to the API itself are not encapsulated, nor are void pointers that do not have any well-defined meaning. In particular:-
CK_RV rv;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFunctionList;
CK_C_Initialize pC_Initialize;
rv = C_GetFunctionList(&pFunctionList); /* C_GetFunctionLists in V3.0 */
pC_Initialize = pFunctionList -> C_Initialize;
/* Call the C_Initialize function in the library */
CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS InitArgs;
InitArgs.CreateMutex = &MyCreateMutex;
InitArgs.DestroyMutex = &MyDestroyMutex;
InitArgs.LockMutex = &MyLockMutex;
InitArgs.UnlockMutex = &MyUnlockMutex;
InitArgs.flags = CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK;
InitArgs.pReserved = NULL_PTR;
rv = (*pC_Initialize)((CK_VOID_PTR)&InitArgs);
CK_INFO info;
rv = (*(pFunctionList -> C_GetInfo))(&info);
if(info.version.major == 2) {...}
CK_SLOT_ID pSlotList[64];
CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 64;
rv = (*(pFunctionList ->C_GetSlotList))(CK_TRUE, pSlotList, ulSlotCount);
C_GetFunctionList
Not passed through
Input C_Initialize
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_Initialize"/>
<PKCS_11InputParameters type="Byte String" value= ...
01 Version of encoding
Output C_Initialize
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_Initialize"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11ReturnCode type="Enumeration" value="OK"/>
<!-- No Output parameters -->
Input C_GetInfo
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_GetInfo"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<!-- No Input Parameters -->
Output C_GetInfo
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_GetInfo"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11OutputParameters type="Byte String" value=
<!-- Fields defined by CK_INFO structure. -->
0228 cryptokiVersion
4142... manufacturerID 32 bytes, blank filled
0000 0000 0000 0000 flags
4142... libraryDescription 32 bytes, blank filled
0101 libraryVersion
<PKCS_11ReturnCode type="Enumeration" value="OK"/>
Input C_GetSlotList
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_GetSlotList"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11InputParameters type="Byte String" value=
01 CK_TRUE, tokenPresent indicator
01 Slot info required
0000 0040 64 slots in the request array
Output C_GetSlotList
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_GetSlotList"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11OutputParameters type="Byte String" value=
<!-- Fields defined by parameter list. -->
01 Slot values are present
0000 0002 ulSlotCount returned
0000 0000 1234 5678 First CK_SLOT_ID
0000 0000 ABCD 0987 Second CK_SLOT_ID
<PKCS_11ReturnCode type="Enumeration" value="OK"/>
#define PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ 195
#define CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ 256
CK_ULONG firstPartLen, secondPartLen;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession = 0x12345678; /* For example only */
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey = 0x87654321;
CK_BYTE iv[8] = {1 ,2 ,3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8};
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
CKM_DES_CBC_PAD, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
CK_BYTE data[PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ] = {01, 02, 03, …};
CK_BYTE encryptedData[CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ];
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedData1Len; /* Output only(!) */
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedData2Len;
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedData3Len;
.
.
firstPartLen = 90;
secondPartLen = PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ-firstPartLen;
C_EncryptInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
/* Encrypt first Part */
ulEncryptedData1Len = sizeof(encryptedData);
C_EncryptUpdate(
hSession,
&data[0], firstPartLen,
&encryptedData[0], &ulEncryptedData1Len);
/* Encrypt second Part */
ulEncryptedData2Len = sizeof(encryptedData)-ulEncryptedData1Len;
C_EncryptUpdate(
hSession,
&data[firstPartLen], secondPartLen,
&encryptedData[ulEncryptedData1Len], &ulEncryptedData2Len);
/* Get last little encrypted bit */
ulEncryptedData3Len =
sizeof(encryptedData)-ulEncryptedData1Len-ulEncryptedData2Len;
C_EncryptFinal(
hSession,
&encryptedData[ulEncryptedData1Len+ulEncryptedData2Len],
&ulEncryptedData3Len);
Input C_EncryptInit
<PKCS_11Function type="Enumeration" value="C_EncryptInit"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11InputParameters type="Byte String" value= ...
0000 0000 1234 5678 hSession
0000 0000 0000 0125 CKM_DES_CBC_PAD
01 Parameter is present
0000 000C Entire parameter length encoding
0000 0008 ulParameterLen (for simple CK_BYTE array)
0102 0304 0506 0708 pParameter, the IV
0000 0000 8765 4321 hKey
Output C_EncryptInit
<PKCS_11Function type="Enumeration" value="C_EncryptInit"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11ReturnCode type="Enumeration" value="OK"/>
Input C_EncryptUpdate 1
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_EncryptUpdate"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11InputParameters type="Byte String" value= ...
0000 0000 1234 5678 hSession
0000 005A 90, firstPartLen
0102 0304 … 595A 90 bytes of plain text
01 encryptedPart wanted
0000 0100 256 available in encryptedPart buffer
Output C_EncryptUpdate 1
<PKCS_11Function type="Enumeration" value="C_EncryptUpdate"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString" value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11OutputParameters type="Byte String" value= ...
0000 0058 88, SIZE OF the first 11 blocks
A698 C3D8 ... 88 bytes of cipher text
<PKCS_11ReturnCode type="Enumeration" value="OK"/>
Input C_EncryptUpdate 2
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_EncryptUpdate"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11InputParameters type="Byte String" value= ...
0000 0000 1234 5678 hSession
0000 006E 105, secondPartLen
5B5C 5D5E ... C2C3 105 bytes of plain text
01 encryptedPart wanted
0000 00A8 256 - 88 available in encryptedPart buffer
Output C_EncryptUpdate 2
<PKCS_11Function type="Enumeration" value="C_EncryptUpdate"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString" value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11OutputParameters type="Byte String" value= ...
0000 0058 104, size the second 13 blocks
4A69 5C3D … 104 bytes of cipher text; 1 byte outstanding.
<PKCS_11ReturnCode type="Enumeration" value="OK"/>
Input C_EncryptFinal
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_EncryptFinal"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11InputParameters type="Byte String" value= ...
0000 0000 1234 5678 hSession
01 encryptedPart wanted
0000 0040 256 - 88 - 104 available in encryptedPart buffer
Output C_EncryptFinal
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_EncryptFinal"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11OutputParameters type="Byte String" value= ...
0000 0000 1234 5678 hSession
0000 0008 8, size the final block
65BA C53D … 8 bytes of cipher text
<PKCS_11ReturnCode type="Enumeration" value="OK"/>
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession = 0x12345678; /* For example only */
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject = 0x87654321;
CK_BYTE sensitive;
CK_BYTE_PTR checkValue[16];
CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanisms[64];
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
{CKA_SENSITIVE, sensitive, sizeof(sensitive)},
{CKA_CHECK_VALUE, checkValue, sizeof(checkValue)},
{CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS, mechanisms, sizeof(mechanisms)},
{CKA_LABEL, NULL_PTR, 42 }
};
CK_RV rv;
rv = C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hObject, &template, 4);
Input
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_GetAttributeValue"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11InputParameters type="Byte String" value= ...
0000 0000 1234 5678 hSession
0000 0000 8765 4321 hObject
0000 0004 ulCount (Number of templates, moved up)
0000 0000 0000 0103 CKA_SENSITIVE
00 Value not defined
01 Length defined
0000 0000 0000 0090 CKA_CHECK_VALUE
00 Value not defined
01 Length defined
0000 0000 4000 0600 CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS
00 Value not defined
01 Length defined
0000 0040 64 mechanisms available
00 Value not defined
00 Length not defined (is output only)
Output
<PKCS_11Function
type="Enumeration" value="C_GetAttributeValue"/>
<CorrelationValue type="ByteString"
value="ABCD1234"/>
<PKCS_11OutputParameters type="Byte String" value= ...
0000 0004 ulCount
(Number of templates, moved up)
0000 0000 0000 0103 CKA_SENSITIVE
01 Value defined
01 Length defined
01 CK_TRUE
0000 0000 0000 0090 CKA_CHECK_VALUE
01 Value defined
01 Length defined
0000 0010 ulValueLen
16 -- number of byte values
1234 ..... ABCD Check value
0000 0000 4000 0600 CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS
01 Value defined
01 Length defined
0000 0002 2 mechanisms
0000 0000 0000 0121 CKM_DES_ECB
0000 0000 0000 0125 CKM_DES_CBC_PAD
0000 0000 0000 0003 CKA_LABEL
00 Value not defined
01 Length defined
0000 00003 3 bytes (for an example label of “foo”)
<PKCS_11ReturnCode type="Enumeration" value="OK"/>
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
See test-cases/kmip-v2.1/mandatory/PKCS11-M-1-21.xml.
The baseline server and client profiles provide the most basic functionality that is expected of a conformant KMIP client or server. The complete server profile defines a KMIP server that implements the entire specification. A KMIP implementation conformant to this specification (the Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles) SHALL meet all the conditions documented in one or more of the following sections.
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
The following individuals have participated in the creation of this specification and are gratefully acknowledged:
Participants:
Salutation |
First Name |
Last Name |
Company |
Mr. |
Ray |
An |
PlatON |
Dr. |
Warren |
Armstrong |
QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd. |
Mr. |
Todd |
Arnold |
IBM |
Mr. |
Dan |
Ashbaugh |
Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) |
Mr. |
Rinkesh |
Bansal |
IBM |
|
Jeff |
Bartell |
Individual |
Mr. |
Tom |
Benjamin |
IBM |
|
Anthony |
Berglas |
Cryptsoft Pty Ltd. |
Mr. |
Dieter |
Bong |
Utimaco IS GmbH |
|
Todd |
Bottger |
Oracle |
Mr. |
Patrick |
Bredenberg |
Oracle |
Mr. |
Alan |
Brown |
Thales e-Security |
|
Andrew |
Byrne |
Dell |
|
Mike |
Capone |
Fornetix |
|
Solomon |
Cates |
Thales e-Security |
Mr. |
Ed |
Chang |
Utimaco IS GmbH |
|
Tim |
Chevalier |
NetApp |
|
Kenli |
Chong |
QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd. |
|
James Bryce |
Clark |
OASIS |
Mr. |
Justin |
Corlett |
Cryptsoft Pty Ltd. |
Mr. |
Tony |
Cox |
Cryptsoft Pty Ltd. |
Mr. |
James |
Crossland |
Northrop Grumman |
Mr |
Quan |
Dinh |
Oracle |
Mr. |
Stephen |
Edwards |
Semper Fortis Solutions |
Mr. |
Chet |
Ensign |
OASIS |
Mr. |
Faisal |
Faruqui |
"Fortanix, Inc." |
|
David |
Featherstone |
Thales e-Security |
Dr. |
Robert |
Fitzpatrick |
Thales e-Security |
Mr. |
Jan |
Friedel |
Oracle |
|
Judith |
Furlong |
Dell |
Mr. |
Deepak |
Gaikwad |
Dell |
Mr. |
Gary |
Gardner |
Fornetix |
Mr. |
Xiaoyu |
Ge |
"Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd." |
Ms. |
Susan |
Gleeson |
Oracle |
Dr. |
Robert |
Haas |
IBM |
Mr. |
Thomas |
Hardjono |
M.I.T. |
Mrs. |
Jane |
Harnad |
OASIS |
Ms. |
Varsharani |
Hawanna |
IBM |
Mr. |
Steve |
He |
Thales e-Security |
Mr. |
Christopher |
Hillier |
Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) |
|
Tim |
Hudson |
Cryptsoft Pty Ltd. |
Mr. |
Gershon |
Janssen |
Individual |
|
Michael |
Jenkins |
National Security Agency |
Mrs. |
Elysa |
Jones |
Individual |
Dr. |
Mark |
Joseph |
"P6R, Inc" |
Mr. |
Shubham |
Kale |
IBM |
Mr. |
Mahadev |
Karadigudda |
NetApp |
Mr. |
Jason |
Katonica |
IBM |
Mr. |
Richard |
Kisley |
IBM |
Ms. |
Dina |
Kurktchi-Nimeh |
Oracle |
Mr. |
Paul |
Lechner |
KeyNexus Inc |
Dr. |
Sun-ho |
Lee |
"Hancom Secure, Inc." |
|
John |
Leiseboer |
QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd. |
Mr. |
Jarrett |
Lu |
Oracle |
|
Jeff |
MacMillan |
KeyNexus Inc |
|
Chris |
Malafis |
Red Hat |
|
Web |
Master |
OASIS |
Dr. |
Jane |
Melia |
QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd. |
Mr. |
Prashant |
Mestri |
IBM |
Ms. |
Ladan |
Nekuii |
Thales e-Security |
|
Jason |
Novecosky |
KeyNexus Inc |
Mr. |
Martin |
Oczko |
PrimeKey Solutions AB |
Mr. |
Oreste |
Panaia-Costa |
PrimeKey Solutions AB |
Mr. |
Sanjay |
Panchal |
IBM |
Mr. |
Mahesh |
Paradkar |
IBM |
Dr. |
Sung-Wook |
Park |
"Hancom Secure, Inc." |
Mr. |
John |
Peck |
IBM |
Mr. |
Michael |
Phillips |
Dell |
|
James |
Qu |
PlatON |
Mr. |
Saravanan |
Ramalingam |
Thales e-Security |
Mr. |
Bruce |
Rich |
Cryptsoft Pty Ltd. |
Mr. |
Jack |
Richins |
Microsoft |
Mr. |
Rick |
Robinson |
IBM |
Mr. |
Greg |
Scott |
Cryptsoft Pty Ltd. |
|
Faiyaz |
Shahpurwala |
"Fortanix, Inc." |
Mr. |
Martin |
Shannon |
QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd. |
|
Jacob |
Sheppard |
IBM |
Mr. |
Duncan |
Sparrell |
sFractal Consulting LLC |
Mr. |
Benton |
Stark |
Cisco Systems |
Mr. |
Petko |
Stoyanov |
McAfee |
Mr. |
Gerald |
Stueve |
Fornetix |
|
Jim |
Susoy |
"P6R, Inc" |
Mr. |
Jason |
Thatcher |
Cryptsoft Pty Ltd. |
|
Peter |
Tsai |
Thales e-Security |
Mr. |
Manish |
Upasani |
Utimaco IS GmbH |
Mr. |
Saarthak |
Vadhera |
IBM |
Mr. |
Nishank |
Vaish |
"Fortanix, Inc." |
Mr. |
Charles |
White |
Fornetix |
Mr. |
Steven |
Wierenga |
Utimaco IS GmbH |
|
Kyle |
Wuolle |
KeyNexus Inc |
|
Xiang |
Xie |
PlatON |
|
Krishna |
Yellepeddy |
IBM |
|
Tao |
Yuan |
SAP SE |
Ms. |
Magda |
Zdunkiewicz |
Cryptsoft Pty Ltd. |
Revision |
Date |
Editor |
Changes Made |
wd01 |
25-July-2019 |
Tim Chevalier |
Initial draft |
wd02 |
31 January 2020 |
Tim Hudson |
Working Draft to accompany updated Profile Test Cases |