Specification URIs

This version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/cos01/kmip-spec-v1.1-cos01.doc (Authoritative)

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/cos01/kmip-spec-v1.1-cos01.html

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/cos01/kmip-spec-v1.1-cos01.pdf

Previous version:

http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/44885/kmip-spec-v1.1-csprd01.zip

Latest version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/kmip-spec-v1.1.doc (Authoritative)

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/kmip-spec-v1.1.html

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/kmip-spec-v1.1.pdf

Technical Committee:

OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC

Chairs:

Robert Griffin (robert.griffin@rsa.com), EMC Corporation

Subhash Sankuratripati (Subhash.Sankuratripati@netapp.com), NetApp

Editors:

Robert Haas (rha@zurich.ibm.com), IBM

Indra Fitzgerald (indra.fitzgerald@hp.com), HP

Related work:

This specification replaces or supersedes:

.         Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.0. 01 October 2010. OASIS Standard. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.0/os/kmip-spec-1.0-os.html

This specification is related to:

.         Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.1. Latest version http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/kmip-profiles-v1.1.html

.         Key Management Interoperability Protocol Test Cases Version 1.1. Latest version. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/testcases/v1.1/kmip-testcases-v1.1.html

.         Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.1. Latest version. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.1/kmip-ug-v1.1.html

Abstract:

This document is intended for developers and architects who wish to design systems and applications that interoperate using the Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification.

Status:

This document was last revised or approved by the OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the "Latest version" location noted above for possible later revisions of this document.

Technical Committee members should send comments on this specification to the Technical Committee's email list. Others should send comments to the Technical Committee by using the "Send A Comment" button on the Technical Committee's web page at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/.

For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the Technical Committee web page (http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/ipr.php).

Citation format:

When referencing this specification the following citation format should be used:

[KMIP-v1.1]

Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.1. 21 September 2012. Candidate OASIS Standard 01.
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/cos01/kmip-spec-v1.1-cos01.html.

Copyright (c) OASIS Open 2012. All Rights Reserved.

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1 Introduction. 8

1.1 Terminology. 8

1.2 Normative References. 11

1.3 Non-Normative References. 14

2 Objects. 15

2.1 Base Objects. 15

2.1.1 Attribute. 15

2.1.2 Credential 16

2.1.3 Key Block. 16

2.1.4 Key Value. 18

2.1.5 Key Wrapping Data. 18

2.1.6 Key Wrapping Specification. 20

2.1.7 Transparent Key Structures. 21

2.1.8 Template-Attribute Structures. 25

2.1.9 Extension Information. 26

2.2 Managed Objects. 26

2.2.1 Certificate. 26

2.2.2 Symmetric Key. 26

2.2.3 Public Key. 27

2.2.4 Private Key. 27

2.2.5 Split Key. 27

2.2.6 Template. 28

2.2.7 Secret Data. 29

2.2.8 Opaque Object 29

3 Attributes. 31

3.1 Unique Identifier 32

3.2 Name. 33

3.3 Object Type. 33

3.4 Cryptographic Algorithm.. 34

3.5 Cryptographic Length. 34

3.6 Cryptographic Parameters. 35

3.7 Cryptographic Domain Parameters. 37

3.8 Certificate Type. 37

3.9 Certificate Length. 38

3.10 X.509 Certificate Identifier 38

3.11 X.509 Certificate Subject 39

3.12 X.509 Certificate Issuer 40

3.13 Certificate Identifier 40

3.14 Certificate Subject 41

3.15 Certificate Issuer 42

3.16 Digital Signature Algorithm.. 42

3.17 Digest 43

3.18 Operation Policy Name. 44

3.18.1 Operations outside of operation policy control 45

3.18.2 Default Operation Policy. 45

3.19 Cryptographic Usage Mask. 47

3.20 Lease Time. 49

3.21 Usage Limits. 49

3.22 State. 51

3.23 Initial Date. 52

3.24 Activation Date. 53

3.25 Process Start Date. 54

3.26 Protect Stop Date. 54

3.27 Deactivation Date. 55

3.28 Destroy Date. 56

3.29 Compromise Occurrence Date. 56

3.30 Compromise Date. 56

3.31 Revocation Reason. 57

3.32 Archive Date. 58

3.33 Object Group. 58

3.34 Fresh. 59

3.35 Link. 59

3.36 Application Specific Information. 60

3.37 Contact Information. 61

3.38 Last Change Date. 62

3.39 Custom Attribute. 62

4 Client-to-Server Operations. 64

4.1 Create. 64

4.2 Create Key Pair 65

4.3 Register 67

4.4 Re-key. 68

4.5 Re-key Key Pair 70

4.6 Derive Key. 73

4.7 Certify. 75

4.8 Re-certify. 76

4.9 Locate. 78

4.10 Check. 80

4.11 Get 81

4.12 Get Attributes. 82

4.13 Get Attribute List 83

4.14 Add Attribute. 83

4.15 Modify Attribute. 84

4.16 Delete Attribute. 84

4.17 Obtain Lease. 85

4.18 Get Usage Allocation. 86

4.19 Activate. 86

4.20 Revoke. 87

4.21 Destroy. 87

4.22 Archive. 88

4.23 Recover 88

4.24 Validate. 89

4.25 Query. 89

4.26 Discover Versions. 90

4.27 Cancel 91

4.28 Poll 92

5 Server-to-Client Operations. 93

5.1 Notify. 93

5.2 Put 93

6 Message Contents. 95

6.1 Protocol Version. 95

6.2 Operation. 95

6.3 Maximum Response Size. 95

6.4 Unique Batch Item ID.. 95

6.5 Time Stamp. 96

6.6 Authentication. 96

6.7 Asynchronous Indicator 96

6.8 Asynchronous Correlation Value. 96

6.9 Result Status. 97

6.10 Result Reason. 97

6.11 Result Message. 98

6.12 Batch Order Option. 98

6.13 Batch Error Continuation Option. 98

6.14 Batch Count 99

6.15 Batch Item.. 99

6.16 Message Extension. 99

7 Message Format 100

7.1 Message Structure. 100

7.2 Operations. 100

8 Authentication. 102

9 Message Encoding. 103

9.1 TTLV Encoding. 103

9.1.1 TTLV Encoding Fields. 103

9.1.2 Examples. 105

9.1.3 Defined Values. 106

10 Transport 127

11 Error Handling. 128

11.1 General 128

11.2 Create. 129

11.3 Create Key Pair 129

11.4 Register 130

11.5 Re-key. 131

11.6 Re-key Key Pair 131

11.7 Derive Key. 132

11.8 Certify. 133

11.9 Re-certify. 133

11.10 Locate. 133

11.11 Check. 134

11.12 Get 134

11.13 Get Attributes. 135

11.14 Get Attribute List 135

11.15 Add Attribute. 135

11.16 Modify Attribute. 136

11.17 Delete Attribute. 136

11.18 Obtain Lease. 137

11.19 Get Usage Allocation. 137

11.20 Activate. 137

11.21 Revoke. 138

11.22 Destroy. 138

11.23 Archive. 138

11.24 Recover 138

11.25 Validate. 138

11.26 Query. 139

11.27 Cancel 139

11.28 Poll 139

11.29 Batch Items. 139

12 KMIP Server and Client Implementation Conformance. 140

12.1 KMIP Server Implementation Conformance. 140

12.2 KMIP Client Implementation Conformance. 140

Appendix A. Acknowledgments. 141

Appendix B. Attribute Cross-Reference. 143

Appendix C. Tag Cross-Reference. 145

Appendix D. Operations and Object Cross-Reference. 151

Appendix E. Acronyms. 153

Appendix F. List of Figures and Tables. 156

Appendix G. Revision History. 163

 

 

This document is intended as a specification of the protocol used for the communication between clients and servers to perform certain management operations on objects stored and maintained by a key management system. These objects are referred to as Managed Objects in this specification. They include symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic keys, digital certificates, and templates used to simplify the creation of objects and control their use. Managed Objects are managed with operations that include the ability to generate cryptographic keys, register objects with the key management system, obtain objects from the system, destroy objects from the system, and search for objects maintained by the system. Managed Objects also have associated attributes, which are named values stored by the key management system and are obtained from the system via operations. Certain attributes are added, modified, or deleted by operations.

The protocol specified in this document includes several certificate-related functions for which there are a number of existing protocols - namely Validate (e.g., SCVP or XKMS), Certify (e.g. CMP, CMC, SCEP) and Re-certify (e.g. CMP, CMC, SCEP). The protocol does not attempt to define a comprehensive certificate management protocol, such as would be needed for a certification authority. However, it does include functions that are needed to allow a key server to provide a proxy for certificate management functions.

In addition to the normative definitions for managed objects, operations and attributes, this specification also includes normative definitions for the following aspects of the protocol:

.         The expected behavior of the server and client as a result of operations,

.         Message contents and formats,

.         Message encoding (including enumerations), and

.         Error handling.

This specification is complemented by three other documents. The Usage Guide [KMIP-UG] provides illustrative information on using the protocol. The KMIP Profiles Specification [KMIP-Prof] provides a selected set of conformance profiles and authentication suites. The Test Specification [KMIP-TC] provides samples of protocol messages corresponding to a set of defined test cases.

This specification defines the KMIP protocol version major 1 and minor 1 (see 6.1).

1.1 Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

For acronyms used in this document, see Appendix E. For definitions not found in this document, see [SP800-57-1].

Archive	To place information not accessed frequently into long-term storage.
Asymmetric key pair (key pair)	A public key and its corresponding private key; a key pair is used with a public key algorithm.
Authentication	A process that establishes the origin of information, or determines an entity's identity.
Authentication code	A cryptographic checksum based on a security function (also known as a Message Authentication Code).
Authorization	Access privileges that are granted to an entity; conveying an "official" sanction to perform a security function or activity.
Certificate length	The length (in bytes) of an X.509 public key certificate.
Certification authority	The entity in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is responsible for issuing certificates, and exacting compliance to a PKI policy.
Ciphertext	Data in its encrypted form.
Compromise	The unauthorized disclosure, modification, substitution or use of sensitive data (e.g., keying material and other security-related information).
Confidentiality	The property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized entities.
Cryptographic algorithm	A well-defined computational procedure that takes variable inputs, including a cryptographic key and produces an output.
Cryptographic key (key)	A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that determines its operation in such a way that an entity with knowledge of the key can reproduce or reverse the operation, while an entity without knowledge of the key cannot. Examples include: 1. The transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data, 2. The transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data, 3. The computation of a digital signature from data, 4. The verification of a digital signature, 5. The computation of an authentication code from data, 6. The verification of an authentication code from data and a received authentication code.
Decryption	The process of changing ciphertext into plaintext using a cryptographic algorithm and key.
Digest (or hash)	The result of applying a hashing algorithm to information.
Digital signature (signature)	The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that, when properly implemented with supporting infrastructure and policy, provides the services of: 1. origin authentication 2. data integrity, and 3. signer non-repudiation.
Digital Signature Algorithm	A cryptographic algorithm used for digital signature.
Encryption	The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext using a cryptographic algorithm and key.
Hashing algorithm (or hash algorithm, hash function)	An algorithm that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a fixed length bit string. Approved hashing algorithms satisfy the following properties: 1. (One-way) It is computationally infeasible to find any input that maps to any pre-specified output, and 2. (Collision resistant) It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs that map to the same output.
Integrity	The property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorized and undetected manner.
Key derivation (derivation)	A function in the lifecycle of keying material; the process by which one or more keys are derived from 1) either a shared secret from a key agreement computation or a pre-shared cryptographic key, and 2) other information.
Key management	The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other related security parameters (e.g., IVs and passwords) during the entire life cycle of the keys, including their generation, storage, establishment, entry and output, and destruction.
Key wrapping (wrapping)	A method of encrypting and/or MACing/signing keys.
Message authentication code (MAC)	A cryptographic checksum on data that uses a symmetric key to detect both accidental and intentional modifications of data.
PGP certificate	A transferable public key in the OpenPGP Message Format (see [RFC4880]).
Private key	A cryptographic key, used with a public key cryptographic algorithm, that is uniquely associated with an entity and is not made public. The private key is associated with a public key. Depending on the algorithm, the private key may be used to: 1. Compute the corresponding public key, 2. Compute a digital signature that may be verified by the corresponding public key, 3. Decrypt data that was encrypted by the corresponding public key, or 4. Compute a piece of common shared data, together with other information.
Profile	A specification of objects, attributes, operations, message elements and authentication methods to be used in specific contexts of key management server and client interactions (see [KMIP-Prof]).
Public key	A cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and that may be made public. The public key is associated with a private key. The public key may be known by anyone and, depending on the algorithm, may be used to: 1. Verify a digital signature that is signed by the corresponding private key, 2. Encrypt data that can be decrypted by the corresponding private key, or 3. Compute a piece of shared data.
Public key certificate (certificate)	A set of data that uniquely identifies an entity, contains the entity's public key and possibly other information, and is digitally signed by a trusted party, thereby binding the public key to the entity.
Public key cryptographic algorithm	A cryptographic algorithm that uses two related keys, a public key and a private key. The two keys have the property that determining the private key from the public key is computationally infeasible.
Public Key Infrastructure	A framework that is established to issue, maintain and revoke public key certificates.
Recover	To retrieve information that was archived to long-term storage.
Split knowledge	A process by which a cryptographic key is split into n multiple key components, individually providing no knowledge of the original key, which can be subsequently combined to recreate the original cryptographic key. If knowledge of k (where k is less than or equal to n) components is required to construct the original key, then knowledge of any k-1 key components provides no information about the original key other than, possibly, its length.
Symmetric key	A single cryptographic key that is used with a secret (symmetric) key algorithm.
Symmetric key algorithm	A cryptographic algorithm that uses the same secret (symmetric) key for an operation and its complement (e.g., encryption and decryption).
X.509 certificate	The ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard defined two types of certificates - the X.509 public key certificate, and the X.509 attribute certificate. Most commonly (including this document), an X.509 certificate refers to the X.509 public key certificate.
X.509 public key certificate	The public key for a user (or device) and a name for the user (or device), together with some other information, rendered un-forgeable by the digital signature of the certification authority that issued the certificate, encoded in the format defined in the ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard.

Table 1: Terminology

 

1.2 Normative References

[FIPS186-3] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS PUB 186-3, Jun 2009, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf

[FIPS197] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, Nov 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf

[FIPS198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), FIPS PUB 198-1, Jul 2008, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf

[IEEE1003-1] IEEE Std 1003.1, Standard for information technology - portable operating system interface (POSIX). Shell and utilities, 2004.

[ISO16609] ISO, Banking -- Requirements for message authentication using symmetric techniques, ISO 16609, 1991

[ISO9797-1] ISO/IEC, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs) -- Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, ISO/IEC 9797-1, 1999

[KMIP-Prof] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.1. 21 September 2012. Candidate OASIS Standard 01. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/cos01/kmip-profiles-v1.1-cos01.html.

[PKCS#1] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Jun 14, 2002, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125

[PKCS#5] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #5 v2.1: Password-Based Cryptography Standard, Oct 5, 2006, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2127

[PKCS#7] RSA Laboratories, PKCS#7 v1.5: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard, Nov 1, 1993, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2129

[PKCS#8] RSA Laboratories, PKCS#8 v1.2: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard, Nov 1, 1993, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2130

[PKCS#10] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax Standard, May 26, 2000, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2132

[RFC1319] B. Kaliski, The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1319, Apr 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt

[RFC1320] R. Rivest, The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1320, Apr 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt

[RFC1321] R. Rivest, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1321, Apr 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt

[RFC1421] J. Linn, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures, IETF RFC 1421, Feb 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1421.txt

[RFC1424] B. Kaliski, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key Certification and Related Services, IETF RFC 1424, Feb 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1424.txt

[RFC2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, IETF RFC 2104, Feb 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt

[RFC2119] S. Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt, IETF RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC 2246] T. Dierks and C. Allen, The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0, IETF RFC 2246, Jan 1999, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt

[RFC2898] B. Kaliski, PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0, IETF RFC 2898, Sep 2000, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt

[RFC 3394] J. Schaad, R. Housley, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm, IETF RFC 3394, Sep 2002, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt

[RFC3447] J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski, Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1, IETF RFC 3447, Feb 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt

[RFC3629] F. Yergeau, UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646, IETF RFC 3629, Nov 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3629.txt

[RFC3647] S. Chokhani, W. Ford, R. Sabett, C. Merrill, and S. Wu, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, IETF RFC 3647, Nov 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3647.txt

[RFC4055] J. Schadd, B. Kaliski, and R, Housley, HHAdditional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, IETF RFC 4055, June 2055, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4055.txt

[RFC4210] C. Adams, S. Farrell, T. Kause and T. Mononen, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), IETF RFC 2510, Sep 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4210.txt

[RFC4211] J. Schaad, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF), IETF RFC 4211, Sep 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4211.txt

[RFC4868] S. Kelly, S. Frankel, Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec, IETF RFC 4868, May 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4868.txt

[RFC4880] J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, D. Shaw, and R. Thayer, OpenPGP Message Format, IETF RFC 4880, Nov 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt

[RFC4949] R. Shirey, Internet Security Glossary, Version 2, IETF RFC 4949, Aug 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt

[RFC5272] J. Schaad and M. Meyers, Certificate Management over CMS (CMC), IETF RFC 5272, Jun 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5272.txt

[RFC5280] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate, IETF RFC 5280, May 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt

[RFC5649] R. Housley, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm, IETF RFC 5649, Aug 2009, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt

[SHAMIR1979] A. Shamir, How to share a secret, Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 612-613, Nov 1979

[SP800-38A] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation - Methods and Techniques, NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Dec 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf

[SP800-38B] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf

[SP800-38C] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, NIST Special Publication 800-38C, May 2004, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf

[SP800-38D] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, NIST Special Publication 800-38D, Nov 2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf

[SP800-38E] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Block-Oriented Storage Devices, NIST Special Publication 800-38E, Jan 2010, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf

[SP800-56A] E. Barker, D. Johnson, and M. Smid, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), NIST Special Publication 800-56A, Mar 2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56A/SP800-56A_Revision1_Mar08-2007.pdf

[SP800-56B] E. Barker, L. Chen, A. Regenscheid, and M. Smid, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, NIST Special Publication 800-56B, Aug 2009, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56B/sp800-56B.pdf

[SP800-57-1] E. Barker, W. Barker, W. Burr, W. Polk, and M. Smid, Recommendations for Key Management - Part 1: General (Revised), NIST Special Publication 800-57 part 1, Mar 2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57-Part1-revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf

[SP800-67] W. Barker, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, NIST Special Publication 800-67, Version 1.1, Revised 19 May 2008, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67/SP800-67.pdf

[SP800-108] L. Chen, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), NIST Special Publication 800-108, Oct 2009, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf

[X.509] International Telecommunication Union (ITU)-T, X.509: Information technology - Open systems interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks, Aug 2005, http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509-200508-I/en

[X9.24-1] ANSI, X9.24 - Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management - Part 1: Using Symmetric Techniques, 2004.

[X9.31] ANSI, X9.31:Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), Sep 1998.

[X9.42] ANSI, X9-42: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Agreement of Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, 2003.

[X9-57] ANSI, X9-57: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Certificate Management, 1997.

[X9.62] ANSI, X9-62: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005.

[X9-63] ANSI, X9-63: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2001.

[X9-102] ANSI, X9-102: Symmetric Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Wrapping of Keys and Associated Data, 2008.

[X9 TR-31] ANSI, X9 TR-31: Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block Specification for Symmetric Algorithms, 2005.

 

1.3 Non-Normative References

[KMIP-UG] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.1. 27 July 2012. OASIS Committee Note 01. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.1/cn01/kmip-ug-v1.1-cn01.html.

[KMIP-TC] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Test Cases Version 1.1. 27 July 2012. OASIS Committee Note 01. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/testcases/v1.1/cn01/kmip-testcases-v1.1-cn01.html.

[ISO/IEC 9945-2] The Open Group, Regular Expressions, The Single UNIX Specification version 2, 1997, ISO/IEC 9945-2:1993, http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007908799/xbd/re.html

 

 

 

The following subsections describe the objects that are passed between the clients and servers of the key management system. Some of these object types, called Base Objects, are used only in the protocol itself, and are not considered Managed Objects. Key management systems MAY choose to support a subset of the Managed Objects. The object descriptions refer to the primitive data types of which they are composed. These primitive data types are (see Section 9.1.1.4):

.         Integer

.         Long Integer

.         Big Integer

.         Enumeration - choices from a predefined list of values

.         Boolean

.         Text String - string of characters representing human-readable text

.         Byte String - sequence of unencoded byte values

.         Date-Time - date and time, with a granularity of one second

.         Interval - a length of time expressed in seconds

Structures are composed of ordered lists of primitive data types or sub-structures.

2.1 Base Objects

These objects are used within the messages of the protocol, but are not objects managed by the key management system. They are components of Managed Objects.

2.1.1 Attribute

An Attribute object is a structure (see Table 2) used for sending and receiving Managed Object attributes. The Attribute Name is a text-string that is used to identify the attribute. The Attribute Index is an index number assigned by the key management server. The Attribute Index is used to identify the particular instance. Attribute Indices SHALL start with 0. The Attribute Index of an attribute SHALL NOT change when other instances are added or deleted. Single-instance Attributes (attributes which an object MAY only have at most one instance thereof) SHALL have an Attribute Index of 0. The Attribute Value is either a primitive data type or structured object, depending on the attribute.

When an Attribute structure is used to specify or return a particular instance of an Attribute and the Attribute Index is not specified it SHALL be assumed to be 0.

Table 2: Attribute Object Structure

2.1.2 Credential

A Credential is a structure (see Table 3) used for client identification purposes and is not managed by the key management system (e.g., user id/password pairs, Kerberos tokens, etc). It MAY be used for authentication purposes as indicated in [KMIP-Prof].

Table 3: Credential Object Structure

If the Credential Type in the Credential is Username and Password, then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 4. The Username field identifies the client, and the Password field is a secret that authenticates the client.

Table 4: Credential Value Structure for the Username and Password Credential

If the Credential Type in the Credential is Device, then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 5. One or a combination of the Device Serial Number, Network Identifier, Machine Identifier, and Media Identifier SHALL be unique. Server implementations MAY enforce policies on uniqueness for individual fields. Optionally a shared secret or password MAY also be used to authenticate the client.

Table 5: Credential Value Structure for the Device Credential

 

2.1.3 Key Block

A Key Block object is a structure (see Table 6) used to encapsulate all of the information that is closely associated with a cryptographic key. It contains a Key Value of one of the following Key Format Types:

.         Raw - This is a key that contains only cryptographic key material, encoded as a string of bytes.

.         Opaque - This is an encoded key for which the encoding is unknown to the key management system. It is encoded as a string of bytes.

.         PKCS1 - This is an encoded private key, expressed as a DER-encoded ASN.1 PKCS#1 object.

.         PKCS8 - This is an encoded private key, expressed as a DER-encoded ASN.1 PKCS#8 object, supporting both the RSAPrivateKey syntax and EncryptedPrivateKey.

.         X.509 - This is an encoded object, expressed as a DER-encoded ASN.1 X.509 object.

.         ECPrivateKey - This is an ASN.1 encoded elliptic curve private key.

.         Several Transparent Key types - These are algorithm-specific structures containing defined values for the various key types, as defined in Section 2.1.7

.         Extensions - These are vendor-specific extensions to allow for proprietary or legacy key formats.

The Key Block MAY contain the Key Compression Type, which indicates the format of the elliptic curve public key. By default, the public key is uncompressed.

The Key Block also has the Cryptographic Algorithm and the Cryptographic Length of the key contained in the Key Value field. Some example values are:

.         RSA keys are typically 1024, 2048 or 3072 bits in length

.         3DES keys are typically from 112 to 192 bits (depending upon key length and the presence of parity bits)

.         AES keys are 128, 192 or 256 bits in length

The Key Block SHALL contain a Key Wrapping Data structure if the key in the Key Value field is wrapped (i.e., encrypted, or MACed/signed, or both).

Table 6: Key Block Object Structure

2.1.4 Key Value

The Key Value is used only inside a Key Block and is either a Byte String or a structure (see Table 7):

.         The Key Value structure contains the key material, either as a byte string or as a Transparent Key structure (see Section 2.1.7), and OPTIONAL attribute information that is associated and encapsulated with the key material. This attribute information differs from the attributes associated with Managed Objects, and which is obtained via the Get Attributes operation, only by the fact that it is encapsulated with (and possibly wrapped with) the key material itself.

.         The Key Value Byte String is either the wrapped TTLV-encoded (see Section 9.1) Key Value structure, or the wrapped un-encoded value of the Byte String Key Material field.

Table 7: Key Value Object Structure

2.1.5 Key Wrapping Data

The Key Block MAY also supply OPTIONAL information about a cryptographic key wrapping mechanism used to wrap the Key Value. This consists of a Key Wrapping Data structure (see Table 8). It is only used inside a Key Block.

This structure contains fields for:

.         A Wrapping Method, which indicates the method used to wrap the Key Value.

.         Encryption Key Information, which contains the Unique Identifier (see 3.1) value of the encryption key and associated cryptographic parameters.

.         MAC/Signature Key Information, which contains the Unique Identifier value of the MAC/signature key and associated cryptographic parameters.

.         A MAC/Signature, which contains a MAC or signature of the Key Value.

.         An IV/Counter/Nonce, if REQUIRED by the wrapping method.

.         An Encoding Option, specifying the encoding of the Key Value Byte String that has been wrapped. If No Encoding is specified, then the Key Value SHALL NOT contain any attributes.

If wrapping is used, then the whole Key Value structure is wrapped unless otherwise specified by the Wrapping Method. The algorithms used for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic Algorithm attributes of the encryption key and/or MAC/signature key; the block-cipher mode, padding method, and hashing algorithm used for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic Parameters in the Encryption Key Information and/or MAC/Signature Key Information, or, if not present, from the Cryptographic Parameters attribute of the respective key(s). At least one of the Encryption Key Information and the MAC/Signature Key Information SHALL be specified.

The following wrapping methods are currently defined:

.         Encrypt only (i.e., encryption using a symmetric key or public key, or authenticated encryption algorithms that use a single key)

.         MAC/sign only (i.e., either MACing the Key Value with a symmetric key, or signing the Key Value with a private key)

.         Encrypt then MAC/sign

.         MAC/sign then encrypt

.         TR-31

.         Extensions

The following encoding options are currently defined:

.         No Encoding (i.e., the wrapped un-encoded value of the Byte String Key Material field)

.         TTLV Encoding (i.e., the wrapped TTLV-encoded Key Value structure).

 

Table 8: Key Wrapping Data Object Structure

The structures of the Encryption Key Information (see Table 9) and the MAC/Signature Key Information (see Table 10) are as follows:

Table 9: Encryption Key Information Object Structure

Table 10: MAC/Signature Key Information Object Structure

2.1.6 Key Wrapping Specification

This is a separate structure (see Table 11) that is defined for operations that provide the option to return wrapped keys. The Key Wrapping Specification SHALL be included inside the operation request if clients request the server to return a wrapped key. If Cryptographic Parameters are specified in the Encryption Key Information and/or the MAC/Signature Key Information of the Key Wrapping Specification, then the server SHALL verify that they match one of the instances of the Cryptographic Parameters attribute of the corresponding key. If Cryptographic Parameters are omitted, then the server SHALL use the Cryptographic Parameters attribute with the lowest Attribute Index of the corresponding key. If the corresponding key does not have any Cryptographic Parameters attribute, or if no match is found, then an error is returned.

This structure contains:

.         A Wrapping Method that indicates the method used to wrap the Key Value.

.         Encryption Key Information with the Unique Identifier value of the encryption key and associated cryptographic parameters.

.         MAC/Signature Key Information with the Unique Identifier value of the MAC/signature key and associated cryptographic parameters.

.         Zero or more Attribute Names to indicate the attributes to be wrapped with the key material.

.         An Encoding Option, specifying the encoding of the Key Value before wrapping. If No Encoding is specified, then the Key Value SHALL NOT contain any attributes

Table 11: Key Wrapping Specification Object Structure

2.1.7 Transparent Key Structures

Transparent Key structures describe the necessary parameters to obtain the key material. They are used in the Key Value structure. The mapping to the parameters specified in other standards is shown in Table 12.

Object	Description	Mapping
P	For DSA and DH, the (large) prime field order.   For RSA, a prime factor of the modulus.	p in [FIPS186-3], [X9.42], [SP800-56A] p in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]
Q	For DSA and DH, the (small) prime multiplicative subgroup order. For RSA, a prime factor of the modulus.	q in [FIPS186-3], [X9.42], [SP800-56A] q in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]
G	The generator of the subgroup of order Q.	g in [FIPS186-3], [X9.42], [SP800-56A]
X	DSA or DH private key.	x in [FIPS186-3] x, xu, xv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for static private keys r, ru, rv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for ephemeral private keys
Y	DSA or DH public key.	y in [FIPS186-3] y, yu, yv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for static public keys t, tu, tv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for ephemeral public keys
J	DH cofactor integer, where P = JQ + 1.	j in [X9.42]
Modulus	RSA modulus PQ, where P and Q are distinct primes.	n in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]
Private Exponent	RSA private exponent.	d in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]
Public Exponent	RSA public exponent.	e in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]
Prime Exponent P	RSA private exponent for the prime factor P in the CRT format, i.e., Private Exponent (mod (P-1)).	dP in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]
Prime Exponent Q	RSA private exponent for the prime factor Q in the CRT format, i.e., Private Exponent (mod (Q-1)).	dQ in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]
CRT Coefficient	The (first) CRT coefficient, i.e., Q-1 mod P.	qInv in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]
Recommended Curve	NIST Recommended Curves (e.g., P-192).	See Appendix D of [FIPS186-3]
D	Elliptic curve private key.	d; de,U,de,V (ephemeral private keys); ds,U,ds,V (static private keys) in [X9-63], [SP800-56A]
Q String	Elliptic curve public key.	Q; Qe,U,Qe,V (ephemeral public keys); Qs,U,Qs,V (static public keys) in [X9-63], [SP800-56A]

Table 12: Parameter mapping.

2.1.7.1 Transparent Symmetric Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent Symmetric Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 13.

Table 13: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent Symmetric Keys

2.1.7.2 Transparent DSA Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 14.

Table 14: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Private Keys

2.1.7.3 Transparent DSA Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 15.

Table 15: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Public Keys

2.1.7.4 Transparent RSA Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent RSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 16.

Table 16: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Private Keys

One of the following SHALL be present (refer to [PKCS#1]):

.         Private Exponent

.         P and Q (the first two prime factors of Modulus)

.         Prime Exponent P and Prime Exponent Q.

2.1.7.5 Transparent RSA Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent RSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 17.

Table 17: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Public Keys

2.1.7.6 Transparent DH Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DH Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 18.

Table 18: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Private Keys

2.1.7.7 Transparent DH Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DH Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 19.

Table 19: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Public Keys

2.1.7.8 Transparent ECDSA Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 20.

Table 20: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Private Keys

2.1.7.9 Transparent ECDSA Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 21.

Table 21: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Public Keys

2.1.7.10 Transparent ECDH Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDH Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 22.

Table 22: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Private Keys

2.1.7.11 Transparent ECDH Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDH Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 23.

Table 23: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Public Keys

2.1.7.12 Transparent ECMQV Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECMQV Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 24.

Table 24: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECMQV Private Keys

2.1.7.13 Transparent ECMQV Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECMQV Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 25.

Table 25: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECMQV Public Keys

2.1.8 Template-Attribute Structures

These structures are used in various operations to provide the desired attribute values and/or template names in the request and to return the actual attribute values in the response.

The Template-Attribute, Common Template-Attribute, Private Key Template-Attribute, and Public Key Template-Attribute structures are defined identically as follows:

Table 26: Template-Attribute Object Structure

Name is the Name attribute of the Template object defined in Section 2.2.6.

2.1.9 Extension Information

An Extension Information object is a structure (see Table 27) describing Objects with Item Tag values in the Extensions range. The Extension Name is a Text String that is used to name the Object (first column of Table 213). The Extension Tag is the Item Tag Value of the Object (see Table 213). The Extension Type is the Item Type Value of the Object (see Table 211).

Table 27: Extension Information Structure

2.2 Managed Objects

Managed Objects are objects that are the subjects of key management operations, which are described in Sections 4 and 5. Managed Cryptographic Objects are the subset of Managed Objects that contain cryptographic material (e.g. certificates, keys, and secret data).

2.2.1 Certificate

A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a digital certificate. Its is a DER-encoded X.509 public key certificate. For PGP certificates, it is a transferable public key in the OpenPGP message format.

Table 28: Certificate Object Structure

2.2.2 Symmetric Key

A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a symmetric key.

Table 29: Symmetric Key Object Structure

2.2.3 Public Key

A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the public portion of an asymmetric key pair. This is only a public key, not a certificate.

Table 30: Public Key Object Structure

2.2.4 Private Key

A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the private portion of an asymmetric key pair.

Table 31: Private Key Object Structure

2.2.5 Split Key

A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a Split Key. A split key is a secret, usually a symmetric key or a private key that has been split into a number of parts, each of which MAY then be distributed to several key holders, for additional security. The Split Key Parts field indicates the total number of parts, and the Split Key Threshold field indicates the minimum number of parts needed to reconstruct the entire key. The Key Part Identifier indicates which key part is contained in the cryptographic object, and SHALL be at least 1 and SHALL be less than or equal to Split Key Parts.

Table 32: Split Key Object Structure

There are three Split Key Methods for secret sharing: the first one is based on XOR, and the other two are based on polynomial secret sharing, according to [SHAMIR1979].

Let L be the minimum number of bits needed to represent all values of the secret.

.         When the Split Key Method is XOR, then the Key Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is of length L bits. The number of split keys is Split Key Parts (identical to Split Key Threshold), and the secret is reconstructed by XORing all of the parts.

.         When the Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing Prime Field, then secret sharing is performed in the field GF(Prime Field Size), represented as integers, where Prime Field Size is a prime bigger than 2^L.

.         When the Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing GF(2¹⁶), then secret sharing is performed in the field GF(2¹⁶). The Key Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is a bit string of length L, and when L is bigger than 2¹⁶, then secret sharing is applied piecewise in pieces of 16 bits each. The Key Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is the concatenation of the corresponding shares of all pieces of the secret.

Secret sharing is performed in the field GF(2¹⁶), which is represented as an algebraic extension of GF(2⁸):

GF(2¹⁶) ≈ GF(2⁸) [y]/(y²+y+m), where m is defined later.

An element of this field then consists of a linear combination uy + v, where u and v are elements of the smaller field GF(2⁸).

The representation of field elements and the notation in this section rely on [FIPS197], Sections 3 and 4. The field GF(2⁸) is as described in [FIPS197],

GF(2⁸) ≈ GF(2) [x]/(x⁸+x⁴+x³+x+1).

An element of GF(2⁸) is represented as a byte. Addition and subtraction in GF(2⁸) is performed as a bit-wise XOR of the bytes. Multiplication and inversion are more complex (see [FIPS197] Section 4.1 and 4.2 for details).

An element of GF(2¹⁶) is represented as a pair of bytes (u, v). The element m is given by

m = x⁵+x⁴+x³+x,

which is represented by the byte 0x3A (or {3A} in notation according to [FIPS197]).

Addition and subtraction in GF(2¹⁶) both correspond to simply XORing the bytes. The product of two elements ry + s and uy + v is given by

(ry + s) (uy + v) = ((r + s)(u + v) + sv)y + (ru + svm).

The inverse of an element uy + v is given by

(uy + v)^-1 = ud^-1y + (u + v)d^-1, where d = (u + v)v + mu².

2.2.6 Template

A Template is a named Managed Object containing the client-settable attributes of a Managed Cryptographic Object (i.e., a stored, named list of attributes). A Template is used to specify the attributes of a new Managed Cryptographic Object in various operations. It is intended to be used to specify the cryptographic attributes of new objects in a standardized or convenient way. None of the client-settable attributes specified in a Template except the Name attribute apply to the template object itself, but instead apply to any object created using the Template.

The Template MAY be the subject of the Register, Locate, Get, Get Attributes, Get Attribute List, Add Attribute, Modify Attribute, Delete Attribute, and Destroy operations.

An attribute specified in a Template is applicable either to the Template itself or to objects created using the Template.

Attributes applicable to the Template itself are: Unique Identifier, Object Type, Name, Initial Date, Archive Date, and Last Change Date.

Attributes applicable to objects created using the Template are:

.         Cryptographic Algorithm

.         Cryptographic Length

.         Cryptographic Domain Parameters

.         Cryptographic Parameters

.         Certificate Length

.         Operation Policy Name

.         Cryptographic Usage Mask

.         Digital Signature Algorithm

.         Usage Limits

.         Activation Date

.         Process Start Date

.         Protect Stop Date

.         Deactivation Date

.         Object Group

.         Application Specific Information

.         Contact Information

.         Custom Attribute

Table 33: Template Object Structure

2.2.7 Secret Data

A Managed Cryptographic Object containing a shared secret value that is not a key or certificate (e.g., a password). The Key Block of the Secret Data object contains a Key Value of the Opaque type. The Key Value MAY be wrapped.

Table 34: Secret Data Object Structure

2.2.8 Opaque Object

A Managed Object that the key management server is possibly not able to interpret. The context information for this object MAY be stored and retrieved using Custom Attributes.

Table 35: Opaque Object Structure

The following subsections describe the attributes that are associated with Managed Objects. Attributes that an object MAY have multiple instances of are referred to as multi-instance attributes. All instances of an attribute SHOULD have a different value. Similarly, attributes which an object SHALL only have at most one instance of are referred to as single-instance attributes. Attributes are able to be obtained by a client from the server using the Get Attribute operation. Some attributes are able to be set by the Add Attribute operation or updated by the Modify Attribute operation, and some are able to be deleted by the Delete Attribute operation if they no longer apply to the Managed Object. Read-only attributes are attributes that SHALL NOT be modified by either server or client, and that SHALL NOT be deleted by a client.

When attributes are returned by the server (e.g., via a Get Attributes operation), the attribute value returned MAY differ for different clients (e.g., the Cryptographic Usage Mask value MAY be different for different clients, depending on the policy of the server).

The first table in each subsection contains the attribute name in the first row. This name is the canonical name used when managing attributes using the Get Attributes, Get Attribute List, Add Attribute, Modify Attribute, and Delete Attribute operations.

A server SHALL NOT delete attributes without receiving a request from a client until the object is destroyed. After an object is destroyed, the server MAY retain all, some or none of the object attributes, depending on the object type and server policy.

The second table in each subsection lists certain attribute characteristics (e.g., "SHALL always have a value"): Table 36 below explains the meaning of each characteristic that may appear in those tables. The server policy MAY further restrict these attribute characteristics.

Table 36: Attribute Rules

3.1 Unique Identifier

The Unique Identifier is generated by the key management system to uniquely identify a Managed Object. It is only REQUIRED to be unique within the identifier space managed by a single key management system, however it is RECOMMENDED that this identifier be globally unique in order to allow for a key management domain export of such objects. This attribute SHALL be assigned by the key management system at creation or registration time, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 37: Unique Identifier Attribute

Table 38: Unique Identifier Attribute Rules

3.2 Name

The Name attribute is a structure (see Table 39) used to identify and locate the object. This attribute is assigned by the client, and the Name Value is intended to be in a form that humans are able to interpret. The key management system MAY specify rules by which the client creates valid names. Clients are informed of such rules by a mechanism that is not specified by this standard. Names SHALL be unique within a given key management domain, but are not REQUIRED to be globally unique.

Table 39: Name Attribute Structure

Table 40: Name Attribute Rules

3.3 Object Type

The Object Type of a Managed Object (e.g., public key, private key, symmetric key, etc) SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 41: Object Type Attribute

Table 42: Object Type Attribute Rules

3.4 Cryptographic Algorithm

The Cryptographic Algorithm of an object (e.g., RSA, DSA, DES, 3DES, AES, etc). The Cryptographic Algorithm of a Certificate object identifies the algorithm for the public key contained within the Certificate. The digital signature algorithm used to sign the Certificate is identified in the Digital Signature Algorithm attribute defined in Section 3.16. This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 43: Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute

Table 44: Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute Rules

3.5 Cryptographic Length

For keys, Cryptographic Length is the length in bits of the clear-text cryptographic key material of the Managed Cryptographic Object. For certificates, Cryptographic Length is the length in bits of the public key contained within the Certificate. This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 45: Cryptographic Length Attribute

Table 46: Cryptographic Length Attribute Rules

3.6 Cryptographic Parameters

The Cryptographic Parameters attribute is a structure (see Table 47) that contains a set of OPTIONAL fields that describe certain cryptographic parameters to be used when performing cryptographic operations using the object. Specific fields MAY pertain only to certain types of Managed Cryptographic Objects. The Cryptographic Parameters attribute of a Certificate object identifies the cryptographic parameters of the public key contained within the Certificate.

Table 47: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Structure

 

Table 48: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Rules

Key Role Type definitions match those defined in ANSI X9 TR-31 [X9 TR-31] and are defined in Table 49:

Table 49: Key Role Types

Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. - Financial Industry Standards (www.x9.org) contributed to Table 49. Key role names and descriptions are derived from material in the Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc's Technical Report "TR-31 2005 Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block Specification for Symmetric Algorithms" and used with the permission of Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. in an effort to improve interoperability between X9 standards and OASIS KMIP. The complete ANSI X9 TR-31 is available at www.x9.org.

3.7 Cryptographic Domain Parameters

The Cryptographic Domain Parameters attribute is a structure (see Table 50) that contains a set of OPTIONAL fields that MAY need to be specified in the Create Key Pair Request Payload. Specific fields MAY only pertain to certain types of Managed Cryptographic Objects.

The domain parameter Qlength correponds to the bit length of parameter Q (refer to [FIPS186-3] and [SP800-56A]). Qlength applies to algorithms such as DSA and DH. The bit length of parameter P (refer to [FIPS186-3] and [SP800-56A]) is specified separately by setting the Cryptographic Length attribute.

Recommended Curve is applicable to elliptic curve algorithms such as ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV.

Table 50: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute Structure

 

Table 51: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute Rules

3.8 Certificate Type

The type of a certificate (e.g., X.509, PGP, etc). The Certificate Type value SHALL be set by the server when the certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 52: Certificate Type Attribute

Table 53: Certificate Type Attribute Rules

3.9 Certificate Length

The length in bytes of the Certificate object. The Certificate Length SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 54: Certificate Length Attribute

Table 55: Certificate Length Attribute Rules

 

3.10 X.509 Certificate Identifier

The X.509 Certificate Identifier attribute is a structure (see Table 56) used to provide the identification of an X.509 public key certificate. The X.509 Certificate Identifier contains the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the X.509 certificate) and the Certificate Serial Number (i.e., from the Serial Number field of the X.509 certificate). The X.509 Certificate Identifier SHALL be set by the server when the X.509 certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 56: X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute Structure

Table 57: X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute Rules

3.11 X.509 Certificate Subject

The X.509 Certificate Subject attribute is a structure (see Table 58) used to identify the subject of a X.509 certificate. The X.509 Certificate Subject contains the Subject Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Subject field of the X.509 certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the subject of the X.509 certificate (i.e., from the Subject Alternative Name extension within the X.509 certificate). The X.509 Certificate Subject SHALL be set by the server based on the information it extracts from the X.509 certificate that is created (as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation) or registered (as part of a Register operation) and SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

If the Subject Alternative Name extension is included in the X.509 certificate and is marked critical within the X.509 certificate itself, then an X.509 certificate MAY be issued with the subject field left blank. Therefore an empty string is an acceptable value for the Subject Distinguished Name.

Table 58: X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute Structure

Table 59: X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute Rules

3.12 X.509 Certificate Issuer

The X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute is a structure (see Table 64) used to identify the issuer of a X.509 certificate, containing the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the X.509 certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the issuer of the certificate (i.e., from the Issuer Alternative Name extension within the X.509 certificate). The server SHALL set these values based on the information it extracts from a X.509 certificate that is created as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation or is sent as part of a Register operation. These values SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 60: X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure

Table 61: X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules

3.13 Certificate Identifier

This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this specification. The X.509 Certificate Identifier attribute (see Section 3.10) SHOULD be used instead.

The Certificate Identifier attribute is a structure (see Table 62) used to provide the identification of a certificate. For X.509 certificates, it contains the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the certificate) and the Certificate Serial Number (i.e., from the Serial Number field of the certificate). For PGP certificates, the Issuer contains the OpenPGP Key ID of the key issuing the signature (the signature that represents the certificate). The Certificate Identifier SHALL be set by the server when the certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 62: Certificate Identifier Attribute Structure

Table 63: Certificate Identifier Attribute Rules

3.14 Certificate Subject

This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this specification. The X.509 Certificate Subject attribute (see Section 3.11) SHOULD be used instead.

The Certificate Subject attribute is a structure (see Table 64) used to identify the subject of a certificate. For X.509 certificates, it contains the Subject Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Subject field of the certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the subject of the certificate (i.e., from the Subject Alternative Name extension within the certificate). For PGP certificates, the Certificate Subject Distinguished Name contains the content of the first User ID packet in the PGP certificate (that is, the first User ID packet after the Public-Key packet in the transferable public key that forms the PGP certificate). These values SHALL be set by the server based on the information it extracts from the certificate that is created (as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation) or registered (as part of a Register operation) and SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

If the Subject Alternative Name extension is included in the certificate and is marked CRITICAL (i.e., within the certificate itself), then it is possible to issue an X.509 certificate where the subject field is left blank. Therefore an empty string is an acceptable value for the Certificate Subject Distinguished Name.

Table 64: Certificate Subject Attribute Structure

Table 65: Certificate Subject Attribute Rules

3.15 Certificate Issuer

This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this specification. The X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute (see Section 3.12) SHOULD be used instead.

The Certificate Issuer attribute is a structure (see Table 67) used to identify the issuer of a certificate, containing the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the issuer of the certificate (i.e., from the Issuer Alternative Name extension within the certificate). The server SHALL set these values based on the information it extracts from a certificate that is created as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation or is sent as part of a Register operation. These values SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 66: Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure

Table 67: Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules

3.16 Digital Signature Algorithm

The Digital Signature Algorithm identifies the digital signature algorithm associated with a digitally signed object (e.g., Certificate). This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

 

Table 68: Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute

Table 69: Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute Rules

3.17 Digest

The Digest attribute is a structure (see Table 70) that contains the digest value of the key or secret data (i.e., digest of the Key Material), certificate (i.e., digest of the Certificate Value), or opaque object (i.e., digest of the Opaque Data Value). If the Key Material is a Byte String, then the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on this Byte String. If the Key Material is a structure, then the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on the TTLV-encoded (see Section 9.1) Key Material structure. The Key Format Type field in the Digest attribute indicates the format of the Managed Object from which the Digest Value was calculated. Multiple digests MAY be calculated using different algorithms listed in Section 9.1.3.2.16 and/or key format types listed in Section 9.1.3.2.3. If this attribute exists, then it SHALL have a mandatory attribute instance computed with the SHA-256 hashing algorithm. For objects registered by a client, the server SHALL compute the digest of the mandatory attribute instance using the Key Format Type of the registered object. In all other cases, the server MAY use any Key Format Type when computing the digest of the mandatory attribute instance, provided it is able to serve the object to clients in that same format. The digest(s) are static and SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, provided that the server has access to the Key Material or the Digest Value (possibly obtained via out-of-band mechanisms).

Table 70: Digest Attribute Structure

Table 71: Digest Attribute Rules

3.18 Operation Policy Name

An operation policy controls what entities MAY perform which key management operations on the object. The content of the Operation Policy Name attribute is the name of a policy object known to the key management system and, therefore, is server dependent. The named policy objects are created and managed using mechanisms outside the scope of the protocol. The policies determine what entities MAY perform specified operations on the object, and which of the object's attributes MAY be modified or deleted. The Operation Policy Name attribute SHOULD be set when operations that result in a new Managed Object on the server are executed. It is set either explicitly or via some default set by the server, which then applies the named policy to all subsequent operations on the object.

Table 72: Operation Policy Name Attribute

Table 73: Operation Policy Name Attribute Rules

3.18.1 Operations outside of operation policy control

Some of the operations SHOULD be allowed for any client at any time, without respect to operation policy. These operations are:

.         Create

.         Create Key Pair

.         Register

.         Certify

.         Re-certify

.         Validate

.         Query

.         Cancel

.         Poll

3.18.2 Default Operation Policy

A key management system implementation SHALL implement at least one named operation policy, which is used for objects when the Operation Policy attribute is not specified by the Client in operations that result in a new Managed Object on the server, or in a template specified in these operations. This policy is named default. It specifies the following rules for operations on objects created or registered with this policy, depending on the object type. For the profiles defined in [KMIP-Prof], the creator SHALL be as defined in [KMIP-Prof].

3.18.2.1 Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects

This policy applies to Symmetric Keys, Private Keys, Split Keys, Secret Data, and Opaque Objects.

Table 74: Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects

3.18.2.2 Default Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects

This policy applies to Certificates and Public Keys.

Table 75: Default Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects

3.18.2.3 Default Operation Policy for Template Objects

The operation policy specified as an attribute in the Register operation for a template object is the operation policy used for objects created using that template, and is not the policy used to control operations on the template itself. There is no mechanism to specify a policy used to control operations on template objects, so the default policy for template objects is always used for templates created by clients using the Register operation to create template objects.

Table 76: Default Operation Policy for Private Template Objects

In addition to private template objects (which are controlled by the above policy, and which MAY be created by clients or the server), publicly known and usable templates MAY be created and managed by the server, with a default policy different from private template objects.

Table 77: Default Operation Policy for Public Template Objects

3.19 Cryptographic Usage Mask

The Cryptographic Usage Mask defines the cryptographic usage of a key. This is a bit mask that indicates to the client which cryptographic functions MAY be performed using the key, and which ones SHALL NOT be performed.

.         Sign

.         Verify

.         Encrypt

.         Decrypt

.         Wrap Key

.         Unwrap Key

.         Export

.         MAC Generate

.         MAC Verify

.         Derive Key

.         Content Commitment

.         Key Agreement

.         Certificate Sign

.         CRL Sign

.         Generate Cryptogram

.         Validate Cryptogram

.         Translate Encrypt

.         Translate Decrypt

.         Translate Wrap

.         Translate Unwrap

This list takes into consideration values that MAY appear in the Key Usage extension in an X.509 certificate. However, the list does not consider the additional usages that MAY appear in the Extended Key Usage extension.

X.509 Key Usage values SHALL be mapped to Cryptographic Usage Mask values in the following manner:

Table 78: X.509 Key Usage to Cryptographic Usage Mask Mapping

 

Table 79: Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute

Table 80: Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute Rules

3.20 Lease Time

The Lease Time attribute defines a time interval for a Managed Cryptographic Object beyond which the client SHALL NOT use the object without obtaining another lease. This attribute always holds the initial length of time allowed for a lease, and not the actual remaining time. Once its lease expires, the client is only able to renew the lease by calling Obtain Lease. A server SHALL store in this attribute the maximum Lease Time it is able to serve and a client obtains the lease time (with Obtain Lease) that is less than or equal to the maximum Lease Time. This attribute is read-only for clients. It SHALL be modified by the server only.

Table 81: Lease Time Attribute

Table 82: Lease Time Attribute Rules

3.21 Usage Limits

The Usage Limits attribute is a mechanism for limiting the usage of a Managed Cryptographic Object. It only applies to Managed Cryptographic Objects that are able to be used for applying cryptographic protection and it SHALL only reflect their usage for applying that protection (e.g., encryption, signing, etc.). This attribute does not necessarily exist for all Managed Cryptographic Objects, since some objects are able to be used without limit for cryptographically protecting data, depending on client/server policies. Usage for processing cryptographically-protected data (e.g., decryption, verification, etc.) is not limited. The Usage Limits attribute has the three following fields:

.         Usage Limits Total - the total number of Usage Limits Units allowed to be protected. This is the total value for the entire life of the object and SHALL NOT be changed once the object begins to be used for applying cryptographic protection.

.         Usage Limits Count - the currently remaining number of Usage Limits Units allowed to be protected by the object.

.         Usage Limits Unit - The type of quantity for which this structure specifies a usage limit (e.g., byte, object).

When the attribute is initially set (usually during object creation or registration), the Usage Limits Count is set to the Usage Limits Total value allowed for the useful life of the object, and are decremented when the object is used. The server SHALL ignore the Usage Limits Count value if the attribute is specified in an operation that creates a new object. Changes made via the Modify Attribute operation reflect corrections to the Usage Limits Total value, but they SHALL NOT be changed once the Usage Limits Count value has changed by a Get Usage Allocation operation. The Usage Limits Count value SHALL NOT be set or modified by the client via the Add Attribute or Modify Attribute operations.

Table 83: Usage Limits Attribute Structure

Table 84: Usage Limits Attribute Rules

3.22 State

This attribute is an indication of the State of an object as known to the key management server. The State SHALL NOT be changed by using the Modify Attribute operation on this attribute. The state SHALL only be changed by the server as a part of other operations or other server processes. An object SHALL be in one of the following states at any given time. (Note: These states correspond to those described in [SP800-57-1]).

Figure 1: Cryptographic Object States and Transitions

.         Pre-Active: The object exists but is not yet usable for any cryptographic purpose.

.         Active: The object MAY be used for all cryptographic purposes that are allowed by its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute and, if applicable, by its Process Start Date (see 3.25) and Protect Stop Date (see 3.26) attributes.

.         Deactivated: The object SHALL NOT be used for applying cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption or signing), but, if permitted by the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute, then the object MAY be used to process cryptographically-protected information (e.g., decryption or verification), but only under extraordinary circumstances and when special permission is granted.

.         Compromised: It is possible that the object has been compromised, and SHOULD only be used to process cryptographically-protected information in a client that is trusted to use managed objects that have been compromised.

.         Destroyed: The object is no longer usable for any purpose.

.         Destroyed Compromised: The object is no longer usable for any purpose; however its compromised status MAY be retained for audit or security purposes.

State transitions occur as follows:

1.     The transition from a non-existent key to the Pre-Active state is caused by the creation of the object. When an object is created or registered, it automatically goes from non-existent to Pre-Active. If, however, the operation that creates or registers the object contains an Activation Date that has already occurred, then the state immediately transitions from Pre-Active to Active. In this case, the server SHALL set the Activation Date attribute to the value specified in the request, or fail the request attempting to create or register the object, depending on server policy. If the operation contains an Activation Date attribute that is in the future, or contains no Activation Date, then the Cryptographic Object is initialized in the key management system in the Pre-Active state.

2.     The transition from Pre-Active to Destroyed is caused by a client issuing a Destroy operation. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.

3.     The transition from Pre-Active to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.

4.     The transition from Pre-Active to Active SHALL occur in one of three ways:

.         The Activation Date is reached.

.         A client successfully issues a Modify Attribute operation, modifying the Activation Date to a date in the past, or the current date.

.         A client issues an Activate operation on the object. The server SHALL set the Activation Date to the time the Activate operation is received.

5.     The transition from Active to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.

6.     The transition from Active to Deactivated SHALL occur in one of three ways:

.         The object's Deactivation Date is reached.

.         A client issues a Revoke operation, with a Revocation Reason other than Compromised.

.         The client successfully issues a Modify Attribute operation, modifying the Deactivation Date to a date in the past, or the current date.

7.     The transition from Deactivated to Destroyed is caused by a client issuing a Destroy operation, or by a server, both in accordance with server policy. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.

8.     The transition from Deactivated to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.

9.     The transition from Compromised to Destroyed Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Destroy operation, or by a server, both in accordance with server policy. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.

10.  The transition from Destroyed to Destroyed Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.

Only the transitions described above are permitted.

Table 85: State Attribute

Table 86: State Attribute Rules

3.23 Initial Date

The Initial Date is the date and time when the Managed Object was first created or registered at the server. This time corresponds to state transition 1 (see Section 3.22). This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed. This attribute is also set for non-cryptographic objects (e.g., templates) when they are first registered with the server.

Table 87: Initial Date Attribute

Table 88: Initial Date Attribute Rules

3.24 Activation Date

This is the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object MAY begin to be used. This time corresponds to state transition 4 (see Section 3.22). The object SHALL NOT be used for any cryptographic purpose before the Activation Date has been reached. Once the state transition from Pre-Active has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 89: Activation Date Attribute

Table 90: Activation Date Attribute Rules

3.25 Process Start Date

This is the date and time when a Managed Symmetric Key Object MAY begin to be used to process cryptographically-protected information (e.g., decryption or unwrapping), depending on the value of its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. The object SHALL NOT be used for these cryptographic purposes before the Process Start Date has been reached. This value MAY be equal to or later than, but SHALL NOT precede, the Activation Date. Once the Process Start Date has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 91: Process Start Date Attribute

Table 92: Process Start Date Attribute Rules

3.26 Protect Stop Date

This is the date and time when a Managed Symmetric Key Object SHALL NOT be used for applying cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption or wrapping), depending on the value of its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. This value MAY be equal to or earlier than, but SHALL NOT be later than the Deactivation Date. Once the Protect Stop Date has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Table 93: Protect Stop Date Attribute

Table 94: Protect Stop Date Attribute Rules

3.27 Deactivation Date

The Deactivation Date is the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object SHALL NOT be used for any purpose, except for decryption, signature verification, or unwrapping, but only under extraordinary circumstances and only when special permission is granted. This time corresponds to state transition 6 (see Section 3.22). This attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed, unless the object is in the Pre-Active or Active state.

Table 95: Deactivation Date Attribute

Table 96: Deactivation Date Attribute Rules

3.28 Destroy Date

The Destroy Date is the date and time when the Managed Object was destroyed. This time corresponds to state transitions 2, 7, or 9 (see Section 3.22). This value is set by the server when the object is destroyed due to the reception of a Destroy operation, or due to server policy or out-of-band administrative action.

Table 97: Destroy Date Attribute

Table 98: Destroy Date Attribute Rules

3.29 Compromise Occurrence Date

The Compromise Occurrence Date is the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object was first believed to be compromised. If it is not possible to estimate when the compromise occurred, then this value SHOULD be set to the Initial Date for the object.

Table 99: Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute

Table 100: Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute Rules

3.30 Compromise Date

The Compromise Date is the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object entered into the compromised state. This time corresponds to state transitions 3, 5, 8, or 10 (see Section 3.22). This time indicates when the key management system was made aware of the compromise, not necessarily when the compromise occurred. This attribute is set by the server when it receives a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised, or due to server policy or out-of-band administrative action.

Table 101: Compromise Date Attribute

Table 102: Compromise Date Attribute Rules

3.31 Revocation Reason

The Revocation Reason attribute is a structure (see Table 103) used to indicate why the Managed Cryptographic Object was revoked (e.g., "compromised", "expired", "no longer used", etc). This attribute is only set by the server as a part of the Revoke Operation.

The Revocation Message is an OPTIONAL field that is used exclusively for audit trail/logging purposes and MAY contain additional information about why the object was revoked (e.g., "Laptop stolen", or "Machine decommissioned").

Table 103: Revocation Reason Attribute Structure

Table 104: Revocation Reason Attribute Rules

3.32 Archive Date

The Archive Date is the date and time when the Managed Object was placed in archival storage. This value is set by the server as a part of the Archive operation. The server SHALL delete this attribute whenever a Recover operation is performed.

Table 105: Archive Date Attribute

Table 106: Archive Date Attribute Rules

3.33 Object Group

An object MAY be part of a group of objects. An object MAY belong to more than one group of objects. To assign an object to a group of objects, the object group name SHOULD be set into this attribute. "default" is a reserved Text String for Object Group.

Table 107: Object Group Attribute

Table 108: Object Group Attribute Rules

3.34 Fresh

The Fresh attribute is a Boolean attribute that indicates if the object has not yet been served to a client. The Fresh attribute SHOULD be set to True when a new object is created on the server. The server SHALL change the attribute value to False as soon as the object has been served to a client.

Table 109: Fresh Attribute

Table 110: Fresh Attribute Rules

3.35 Link

The Link attribute is a structure (see Table 111) used to create a link from one Managed Cryptographic Object to another, closely related target Managed Cryptographic Object. The link has a type, and the allowed types differ, depending on the Object Type of the Managed Cryptographic Object, as listed below. The Linked Object Identifier identifies the target Managed Cryptographic Object by its Unique Identifier. The link contains information about the association between the Managed Cryptographic Objects (e.g., the private key corresponding to a public key; the parent certificate for a certificate in a chain; or for a derived symmetric key, the base key from which it was derived).

Possible values of Link Type in accordance with the Object Type of the Managed Cryptographic Object are:

.         Private Key Link. For a Public Key object: the private key corresponding to the public key.

.         Public Key Link. For a Private Key object: the public key corresponding to the private key. For a Certificate object: the public key contained in the certificate.

.         Certificate Link. For Certificate objects: the parent certificate for a certificate in a certificate chain. For Public Key objects: the corresponding certificate(s), containing the same public key.

.         Derivation Base Object Link for a derived Symmetric Key object: the object(s) from which the current symmetric key was derived.

.         Derived Key Link: the symmetric key(s) that were derived from the current object.

.         Replacement Object Link. For a Symmetric Key, an Asymmetric Private Key, or an Asymmetric Public Key object: the key that resulted from the re-key of the current key. For a Certificate object: the certificate that resulted from the re-certify. Note that there SHALL be only one such replacement object per Managed Object.

.         Replaced Object Link. For a Symmetric Key, an Asymmetric Private Key, or an Asymmetric Public Key object: the key that was re-keyed to obtain the current key. For a Certificate object: the certificate that was re-certified to obtain the current certificate.

The Link attribute SHOULD be present for private keys and public keys for which a certificate chain is stored by the server, and for certificates in a certificate chain.

Note that it is possible for a Managed Object to have multiple instances of the Link attribute (e.g., a Private Key has links to the associated certificate, as well as the associated public key; a Certificate object has links to both the public key and to the certificate of the certification authority (CA) that signed the certificate).

It is also possible that a Managed Object does not have links to associated cryptographic objects. This MAY occur in cases where the associated key material is not available to the server or client (e.g., the registration of a CA Signer certificate with a server, where the corresponding private key is held in a different manner).

Table 111: Link Attribute Structure

Table 112: Link Attribute Structure Rules

3.36 Application Specific Information

The Application Specific Information attribute is a structure (see Table 113) used to store data specific to the application(s) using the Managed Object. It consists of the following fields: an Application Namespace and Application Data specific to that application namespace.

Clients MAY request to set (i.e., using any of the operations that result in new Managed Object(s) on the server or adding/modifying the attribute of an existing Managed Object) an instance of this attribute with a particular Application Namespace while omitting Application Data. In that case, if the server supports this namespace (as indicated by the Query operation in Section 4.25), then it SHALL return a suitable Application Data value. If the server does not support this namespace, then an error SHALL be returned.

 

Table 113: Application Specific Information Attribute

 

Table 114: Application Specific Information Attribute Rules

3.37 Contact Information

The Contact Information attribute is OPTIONAL, and its content is used for contact purposes only. It is not used for policy enforcement. The attribute is set by the client or the server.

Table 115: Contact Information Attribute

Table 116: Contact Information Attribute Rules

3.38 Last Change Date

The Last Change Date attribute is a meta attribute that contains the date and time of the last change to the contents or attributes of the specified object.

Table 117: Last Change Date Attribute

Table 118: Last Change Date Attribute Rules

3.39 Custom Attribute

A Custom Attribute is a client- or server-defined attribute intended for vendor-specific purposes. It is created by the client and not interpreted by the server, or is created by the server and MAY be interpreted by the client. All custom attributes created by the client SHALL adhere to a naming scheme, where the name of the attribute SHALL have a prefix of 'x-'. All custom attributes created by the key management server SHALL adhere to a naming scheme where the name of the attribute SHALL have a prefix of 'y-'. The server SHALL NOT accept a client-created or modified attribute, where the name of the attribute has a prefix of 'y-'. The tag type Custom Attribute is not able to identify the particular attribute; hence such an attribute SHALL only appear in an Attribute Structure with its name as defined in Section 2.1.1.

Table 119 Custom Attribute

Table 120: Custom Attribute Rules

The following subsections describe the operations that MAY be requested by a key management client. Not all clients have to be capable of issuing all operation requests; however any client that issues a specific request SHALL be capable of understanding the response to the request. All Object Management operations are issued in requests from clients to servers, and results obtained in responses from servers to clients. Multiple operations MAY be combined within a batch, resulting in a single request/response message pair.

A number of the operations whose descriptions follow are affected by a mechanism referred to as the ID Placeholder.

The key management server SHALL implement a temporary variable called the ID Placeholder. This value consists of a single Unique Identifier. It is a variable stored inside the server that is only valid and preserved during the execution of a batch of operations. Once the batch of operations has been completed, the ID Placeholder value SHALL be discarded and/or invalidated by the server, so that subsequent requests do not find this previous ID Placeholder available.

The ID Placeholder is obtained from the Unique Identifier returned in response to the Create, Create Pair, Register, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Certify, Re-Certify, Locate, and Recover operations. If any of these operations successfully completes and returns a Unique Identifier, then the server SHALL copy this Unique Identifier into the ID Placeholder variable, where it is held until the completion of the operations remaining in the batched request or until a subsequent operation in the batch causes the ID Placeholder to be replaced. If the Batch Error Continuation Option is set to Stop and the Batch Order Option is set to true, then subsequent operations in the batched request MAY make use of the ID Placeholder by omitting the Unique Identifier field from the request payloads for these operations.

Requests MAY contain attribute values to be assigned to the object. This information is specified with a Template-Attribute (see Section 2.1.8) that contains zero or more template names and zero or more individual attributes. If more than one template name is specified, and there is a conflict between the single-instance attributes in the templates, then the value in the last of the conflicting templates takes precedence. If there is a conflict between the single-instance attributes in the request and the single-instance attributes in a specified template, then the attribute values in the request take precedence. For multi-instance attributes, the union of attribute values is used when the attributes are specified more than once.

Responses MAY contain attribute values that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the server. This information is specified with a Template-Attribute that contains one or more individual attributes.

For any operations that operate on Managed Objects already stored on the server, any archived object SHALL first be made available by a Recover operation (see Section 4.23) before they MAY be specified (i.e., as on-line objects).

4.1 Create

This operation requests the server to generate a new symmetric key as a Managed Cryptographic Object. This operation is not used to create a Template object (see Register operation, Section 4.3).

The request contains information about the type of object being created, and some of the attributes to be assigned to the object (e.g., Cryptographic Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, etc). This information MAY be specified by the names of Template objects that already exist.

The response contains the Unique Identifier of the created object. The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable.

Table 121: Create Request Payload

Table 122: Create Response Payload

Table 123 indicates which attributes SHALL be included in the Create request using the Template-Attribute object.

Table 123: Create Attribute Requirements

4.2 Create Key Pair

This operation requests the server to generate a new public/private key pair and register the two corresponding new Managed Cryptographic Objects.

The request contains attributes to be assigned to the objects (e.g., Cryptographic Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, etc). Attributes and Template Names MAY be specified for both keys at the same time by specifying a Common Template-Attribute object in the request. Attributes not common to both keys (e.g., Name, Cryptographic Usage Mask) MAY be specified using the Private Key Template-Attribute and Public Key Template-Attribute objects in the request, which take precedence over the Common Template-Attribute object.

A Link Attribute is automatically created by the server for each object, pointing to the corresponding object. The response contains the Unique Identifiers of both created objects. The ID Placeholder value SHALL be set to the Unique Identifier of the Private Key.

Table 124: Create Key Pair Request Payload

For multi-instance attributes, the union of the values found in the templates and attributes of the Common, Private, and Public Key Template-Attribute is used. For single-instance attributes, the order of precedence is as follows:

1.     attributes specified explicitly in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then

2.     attributes specified via templates in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then

3.     attributes specified explicitly in the Common Template-Attribute, then

4.     attributes specified via templates in the Common Template-Attribute

If there are multiple templates in the Common, Private, or Public Key Template-Attribute, then the last value of the single-instance attribute that conflicts takes precedence.

Table 125: Create Key Pair Response Payload

Table 126 indicates which attributes SHALL be included in the Create Key pair request using Template-Attribute objects, as well as which attributes SHALL have the same value for the Private and Public Key.

Table 126: Create Key Pair Attribute Requirements

Setting the same Cryptographic Length value for both private and public key does not imply that both keys are of equal length. For RSA, Cryptographic Length corresponds to the bit length of the Modulus. For DSA and DH algorithms, Cryptographic Length corresponds to the bit length of parameter P, and the bit length of Q is set separately in the Cryptographic Domain Parameters attribute. For ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV algorithms, Cryptographic Length corresponds to the bit length of parameter Q.

4.3 Register

This operation requests the server to register a Managed Object that was created by the client or obtained by the client through some other means, allowing the server to manage the object. The arguments in the request are similar to those in the Create operation, but also MAY contain the object itself for storage by the server. Optionally, objects that are not to be stored by the key management system MAY be omitted from the request (e.g., private keys).

The request contains information about the type of object being registered and some of the attributes to be assigned to the object (e.g., Cryptographic Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, etc). This information MAY be specified by the use of a Template-Attribute object.

The response contains the Unique Identifier assigned by the server to the registered object. The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier returned by this operations into the ID Placeholder variable. The Initial Date attribute of the object SHALL be set to the current time.

Table 127: Register Request Payload

Table 128: Register Response Payload

If a Managed Cryptographic Object is registered, then the following attributes SHALL be included in the Register request, either explicitly, or via specification of a template that contains the attribute.

Table 129: Register Attribute Requirements

4.4 Re-key

This request is used to generate a replacement key for an existing symmetric key. It is analogous to the Create operation, except that attributes of the replacement key are copied from the existing key, with the exception of the attributes listed in Table 131.

As the replacement key takes over the name attribute of the existing key, Re-key SHOULD only be performed once on a given key.

The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier of the replacement key returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable.

As a result of Re-key, the Link attribute of the existing key is set to point to the replacement key and vice versa.

An Offset MAY be used to indicate the difference between the Initialization Date and the Activation Date of the replacement key. If no Offset is specified, the Activation Date, Process Start Date, Protect Stop Date and Deactivation Date values are copied from the existing key. If Offset is set and dates exist for the existing key, then the dates of the replacement key SHALL be set based on the dates of the existing key as follows:

Table 130: Computing New Dates from Offset during Re-key

Attributes that are not copied from the existing key and are handled in a specific way for the replacement key are:

Table 131: Re-key Attribute Requirements

Table 132: Re-key Request Payload

Table 133: Re-key Response Payload

4.5 Re-key Key Pair

This request is used to generate a replacement key pair for an existing public/private key pair. It is analogous to the Create Key Pair operation, except that attributes of the replacement key pair are copied from the existing key pair, with the exception of the attributes listed in Table 135.

As the replacement of the key pair takes over the name attribute for the existing public/private key pair, Re-key Key Pair SHOULD only be performed once on a given key pair.

As a result of the Re-key Key Pair operation the Link Attribute for both the existing public key and private key objects are updated to point to the replacement public and private key, respectively, and vice-versa .

The server SHALL copy the Private Key Unique Identifier of the replacement private key returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable.

An Offset MAY be used to indicate the difference between the Initialization Date and Activation Date of the replacement key pair. If the Offset is set and the dates exist for the existing key pair, then the dates of the replacement key pair SHALL be set based on the dates of the existing key pair as follows:

Table 134: Computing New Dates from Offset during Re-key Key Pair

Attributes that are not copied from the existing key pair and which are handled in a specific way are:

Table 135: Re-key Key Pair Attribute Requirements

 

 

 

Table 136: Re-key Key Pair Request Payload

For multi-instance attributes, the union of the values found in the templates and attributes of the Common, Private, and Public Key Template-Attribute is used. For single-instance attributes, the order of precedence is as follows:

1.     attributes specified explicitly in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then

2.     attributes specified via templates in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then

3.     attributes specified explicitly in the Common Template-Attribute, then

4.     attributes specified via templates in the Common Template-Attribute

If there are multiple templates in the Common, Private, or Public Key Template-Attribute, then the subsequent value of the single-instance attribute takes precedence.

Table 137: Re-key Key Pair Response Payload

 

4.6 Derive Key

This request is used to derive a symmetric key or Secret Data object from a key or secret data that is already known to the key management system. The request SHALL only apply to Managed Cryptographic Objects that have the Derive Key bit set in the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute of the specified Managed Object (i.e., are able to be used for key derivation). If the operation is issued for an object that does not have this bit set, then the server SHALL return an error. For all derivation methods, the client SHALL specify the desired length of the derived key or Secret Data object using the Cryptographic Length attribute. If a key is created, then the client SHALL specify both its Cryptographic Length and Cryptographic Algorithm. If the specified length exceeds the output of the derivation method, then the server SHALL return an error. Clients MAY derive multiple keys and IVs by requesting the creation of a Secret Data object and specifying a Cryptographic Length that is the total length of the derived object. The length SHALL NOT exceed the length of the output returned by the chosen derivation method.

The fields in the request specify the Unique Identifiers of the keys or Secret Data objects to be used for derivation (e.g., some derivation methods MAY require multiple keys or Secret Data objects to derive the result), the method to be used to perform the derivation, and any parameters needed by the specified method. The method is specified as an enumerated value. Currently defined derivation methods include:

.         PBKDF2 - This method is used to derive a symmetric key from a password or pass phrase. The PBKDF2 method is published in [PKCS#5] and [RFC2898].

.         HASH - This method derives a key by computing a hash over the derivation key or the derivation data.

.         HMAC - This method derives a key by computing an HMAC over the derivation data.

.         ENCRYPT - This method derives a key by encrypting the derivation data.

.         NIST800-108-C - This method derives a key by computing the KDF in Counter Mode as specified in [SP800-108].

.         NIST800-108-F - This method derives a key by computing the KDF in Feedback Mode as specified in [SP800-108].

.         NIST800-108-DPI - This method derives a key by computing the KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode as specified in [SP800-108].

.         Extensions

The server SHALL perform the derivation function, and then register the derived object as a new Managed Object, returning the new Unique Identifier for the new object in the response. The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable.

As a result of Derive Key, the Link attributes (i.e., Derived Key Link in the objects from which the key is derived, and the Derivation Base Object Link in the derived key) of all objects involved SHALL be set to point to the corresponding objects.

Table 138: Derive Key Request Payload

Table 139: Derive Key Response Payload

The Derivation Parameters for all derivation methods consist of the following parameters, except PBKDF2, which requires two additional parameters.

Table 140: Derivation Parameters Structure (Except PBKDF2)

Cryptographic Parameters identify the Pseudorandom Function (PRF) or the mode of operation of the PRF (e.g., if a key is to be derived using the HASH derivation method, then clients are REQUIRED to indicate the hash algorithm inside Cryptographic Parameters; similarly, if a key is to be derived using AES in CBC mode, then clients are REQUIRED to indicate the Block Cipher Mode). The server SHALL verify that the specified mode matches one of the instances of Cryptographic Parameters set for the corresponding key. If Cryptographic Parameters are omitted, then the server SHALL select the Cryptographic Parameters with the lowest Attribute Index for the specified key. If the corresponding key does not have any Cryptographic Parameters attribute, or if no match is found, then an error is returned.

If a key is derived using HMAC, then the attributes of the derivation key provide enough information about the PRF and the Cryptographic Parameters are ignored.

Derivation Data is either the data to be encrypted, hashed, or HMACed. For the NIST SP 800-108 methods [SP800-108], Derivation Data is Label||{0x00}||Context, where the all-zero byte is OPTIONAL.

Most derivation methods (e.g., ENCRYPT) require a derivation key and the derivation data to be used. The HASH derivation method requires either a derivation key or derivation data. Derivation data MAY either be explicitly provided by the client with the Derivation Data field or implicitly provided by providing the Unique Identifier of a Secret Data object. If both are provided, then an error SHALL be returned.

The PBKDF2 derivation method requires two additional parameters:

Table 141: PBKDF2 Derivation Parameters Structure

4.7 Certify

This request is used to generate a Certificate object for a public key. This request supports certification of a new public key as well as certification of a public key that has already been certified (i.e., certificate update). Only a single certificate SHALL be requested at a time. Server support for this operation is OPTIONAL, as it requires that the key management system have access to a certification authority (CA). If the server does not support this operation, an error SHALL be returned.

The Certificate Request object MAY be omitted, in which case the public key for which a Certificate object is generated SHALL be specified by its Unique Identifier only. If the Certificate Request Type and the Certificate Request objects are omitted from the request, then the Certificate Type SHALL be specified using the Template-Attribute object.

The Certificate Request is passed as a Byte String, which allows multiple certificate request types for X.509 certificates (e.g., PKCS#10, PEM, etc) or PGP certificates to be submitted to the server.

The generated Certificate object whose Unique Identifier is returned MAY be obtained by the client via a Get operation in the same batch, using the ID Placeholder mechanism.

As a result of Certify, the Link attribute of the Public Key and of the generated certificate SHALL be set to point at each other.

The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier of the generated certificate returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable.

If the information in the Certificate Request conflicts with the attributes specified in the Template-Attribute, then the information in the Certificate Request takes precedence.

Table 142: Certify Request Payload

Table 143: Certify Response Payload

4.8 Re-certify

This request is used to renew an existing certificate for the same key pair. Only a single certificate SHALL be renewed at a time. Server support for this operation is OPTIONAL, as it requires that the key management system to have access to a certification authority (CA). If the server does not support this operation, an error SHALL be returned.

The Certificate Request object MAY be omitted, in which case the public key for which a Certificate object is generated SHALL be specified by its Unique Identifier only. If the Certificate Request Type and the Certificate Request objects are omitted and the Certificate Type is not specified using the Template-Attribute object in the request, then the Certificate Type of the new certificate SHALL be the same as that of the existing certificate.

 

The Certificate Request is passed as a Byte String, which allows multiple certificate request types for X.509 certificates (e.g., PKCS#10, PEM, etc) or PGP certificates to be submitted to the server.

The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier of the new certificate returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable.

If the information in the Certificate Request field in the request conflicts with the attributes specified in the Template-Attribute, then the information in the Certificate Request takes precedence.

As the new certificate takes over the name attribute of the existing certificate, Re-certify SHOULD only be performed once on a given (existing) certificate.

The Link attribute of the existing certificate and of the new certificate are set to point at each other. The Link attribute of the Public Key is changed to point to the new certificate.

An Offset MAY be used to indicate the difference between the Initialization Date and the Activation Date of the new certificate. If Offset is set, then the dates of the new certificate SHALL be set based on the dates of the existing certificate (if such dates exist) as follows:

Table 144: Computing New Dates from Offset during Re-certify

Attributes that are not copied from the existing certificate and that are handled in a specific way for the new certificate are:

Table 145: Re-certify Attribute Requirements

Table 146: Re-certify Request Payload

Table 147: Re-certify Response Payload

4.9 Locate

This operation requests that the server search for one or more Managed Objects depending on the attributes specified in the request. All attributes are allowed to be used. However, Attribute Index values SHOULD NOT be specified in the request. Attribute Index values that are provided SHALL be ignored by the Locate operation. The request MAY also contain a Maximum Items field, which specifies the maximum number of objects to be returned. If the Maximum Items field is omitted, then the server MAY return all objects matched, or MAY impose an internal maximum limit due to resource limitations.

If more than one object satisfies the identification criteria specified in the request, then the response MAY contain Unique Identifiers for multiple Managed Objects. Returned objects SHALL match all of the attributes in the request. If no objects match, then an empty response payload is returned. If no attribute is specified in the request, any object SHALL be deemed to match the Locate request.

The server returns a list of Unique Identifiers of the found objects, which then MAY be retrieved using the Get operation. If the objects are archived, then the Recover and Get operations are REQUIRED to be used to obtain those objects. If a single Unique Identifier is returned to the client, then the server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable. If the Locate operation matches more than one object, and the Maximum Items value is omitted in the request, or is set to a value larger than one, then the server SHALL empty the ID Placeholder, causing any subsequent operations that are batched with the Locate, and which do not specify a Unique Identifier explicitly, to fail. This ensures that these batched operations SHALL proceed only if a single object is returned by Locate.

Wild-cards or regular expressions (defined, e.g., in [ISO/IEC 9945-2]) MAY be supported by specific key management system implementations for matching attribute fields when the field type is a Text String or a Byte String.

The Date attributes in the Locate request (e.g., Initial Date, Activation Date, etc) are used to specify a time or a time range for the search. If a single instance of a given Date attribute is used in the request (e.g., the Activation Date), then objects with the same Date attribute are considered to be matching candidate objects. If two instances of the same Date attribute are used (i.e., with two different values specifying a range), then objects for which the Date attribute is inside or at a limit of the range are considered to be matching candidate objects. If a Date attribute is set to its largest possible value, then it is equivalent to an undefined attribute. The KMIP Usage Guide [KMIP-UG] provides examples.

When the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute is specified in the request, candidate objects are compared against this field via an operation that consists of a logical AND of the requested mask with the mask in the candidate object, and then a comparison of the resulting value with the requested mask. For example, if the request contains a mask value of 10001100010000, and a candidate object mask contains 10000100010000, then the logical AND of the two masks is 10000100010000, which is compared against the mask value in the request (10001100010000) and the match fails. This means that a matching candidate object has all of the bits set in its mask that are set in the requested mask, but MAY have additional bits set.

When the Usage Limits attribute is specified in the request, matching candidate objects SHALL have an Usage Limits Count and Usage Limits Total equal to or larger than the values specified in the request.

When an attribute that is defined as a structure is specified, all of the structure fields are not REQUIRED to be specified. For instance, for the Link attribute, if the Linked Object Identifier value is specified without the Link Type value, then matching candidate objects have the Linked Object Identifier as specified, irrespective of their Link Type.

When the Object Group attribute and the Object Group Member flag are specified in the request, and the value specified for Object Group Member is 'Group Member Fresh', matching candidate objects SHALL be fresh objects (see 3.34) from the object group. If there are no more fresh objects in the group, the server MAY choose to generate a new object on the fly based on server policy. If the value specified for Object Group Member is 'Group Member Default', the server locates the default object as defined by server policy.

The Storage Status Mask field (see Section 9.1.3.3.2) is used to indicate whether only on-line objects, only archived objects, or both on-line and archived objects are to be searched. Note that the server MAY store attributes of archived objects in order to expedite Locate operations that search through archived objects.

Table 148: Locate Request Payload

Table 149: Locate Response Payload

4.10 Check

This operation requests that the server check for the use of a Managed Object according to values specified in the request. This operation SHOULD only be used when placed in a batched set of operations, usually following a Locate, Create, Create Pair, Derive Key, Certify, Re-Certify, Re-key or Re-key Key Pair operation, and followed by a Get operation.

If the server determines that the client is allowed to use the object according to the specified attributes, then the server returns the Unique Identifier of the object.

If the server determines that the client is not allowed to use the object according to the specified attributes, then the server empties the ID Placeholder and does not return the Unique Identifier, and the operation returns the set of attributes specified in the request that caused the server policy denial. The only attributes returned are those that resulted in the server determining that the client is not allowed to use the object, thus allowing the client to determine how to proceed.

In a batch containing Check operation the Batch Order Option SHOULD be set to true. Only STOP or UNDO Batch Error Continuation Option values SHOULD be used by the client in such a batch.Additional attributes that MAY be specified in the request are limited to:

.         Usage Limits Count (see Section 3.21) - The request MAY contain the usage amount that the client deems necessary to complete its needed function. This does not require that any subsequent Get Usage Allocation operations request this amount. It only means that the client is ensuring that the amount specified is available.

.         Cryptographic Usage Mask - This is used to specify the cryptographic operations for which the client intends to use the object (see Section 3.19). This allows the server to determine if the policy allows this client to perform these operations with the object. Note that this MAY be a different value from the one specified in a Locate operation that precedes this operation. Locate, for example, MAY specify a Cryptographic Usage Mask requesting a key that MAY be used for both Encryption and Decryption, but the value in the Check operation MAY specify that the client is only using the key for Encryption at this time.

.         Lease Time - This specifies a desired lease time (see Section 3.20). The client MAY use this to determine if the server allows the client to use the object with the specified lease or longer. Including this attribute in the Check operation does not actually cause the server to grant a lease, but only indicates that the requested lease time value MAY be granted if requested by a subsequent, batched, Obtain Lease operation.

Note that these objects are not encoded in an Attribute structure as shown in Section 2.1.1

Table 150: Check Request Payload

Table 151: Check Response Payload

4.11 Get

This operation requests that the server returns the Managed Object specified by its Unique Identifier.

Only a single object is returned. The response contains the Unique Identifier of the object, along with the object itself, which MAY be wrapped using a wrapping key as specified in the request.

The following key format capabilities SHALL be assumed by the client restrictions apply when the client requests the server to return an object in a particular format:

.         If a client registered a key in a given format, the server SHALL be able to return the key during the Get operation in the same format that was used when the key was registered.

.         Any other format conversion MAY optionally be supported by the server.

 

Table 152: Get Request Payload

Table 153: Get Response Payload

4.12 Get Attributes

This operation requests one or more attributes of a Managed Object. The object is specified by its Unique Identifier and the attributes are specified by their name in the request. If a specified attribute has multiple instances, then all instances are returned. If a specified attribute does not exist (i.e., has no value), then it SHALL NOT be present in the returned response. If no requested attributes exist, then the response SHALL consist only of the Unique Identifier. If no attribute name is specified in the request, all attributes SHALL be deemed to match the Get Attributes request. The same attribute name SHALL NOT be present more than once in a request.

Table 154: Get Attributes Request Payload

Table 155: Get Attributes Response Payload

4.13 Get Attribute List

This operation requests a list of the attribute names associated with a Managed Object. The object is specified by its Unique Identifier.

Table 156: Get Attribute List Request Payload

Table 157: Get Attribute List Response Payload

4.14 Add Attribute

This request adds a new attribute instance to a Managed Object and sets its value. The request contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed Object to which the attribute pertains, along with the attribute name and value. For single-instance attributes, this is how the attribute value is created. For multi-instance attributes, this is how the first and subsequent values are created. Existing attribute values SHALL only be changed by the Modify Attribute operation. Read-Only attributes SHALL NOT be added using the Add Attribute operation. The Attribute Index SHALL NOT be specified in the request. The response returns a new Attribute Index and the Attribute Index MAY be omitted if the index of the added attribute instance is 0. Multiple Add Attribute requests MAY be included in a single batched request to add multiple attributes.

Table 158: Add Attribute Request Payload

Table 159: Add Attribute Response Payload

4.15 Modify Attribute

This request modifies the value of an existing attribute instance associated with a Managed Object. The request contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed Object whose attribute is to be modified, and the attribute name, the optional Attribute Index, and the new value. If no Attribute Index is specified in the request, then the Attribute Index SHALL be assumed to be 0. Only existing attributes MAY be changed via this operation. New attributes SHALL only be added by the Add Attribute operation.Only the specified instance of the attribute SHALL be modified. Specifying an Attribute Index for which there exists no Attribute Value SHALL result in an error. The response returns the modified Attribute (new value) and the Attribute Index MAY be omitted if the index of the modified attribute instance is 0. Multiple Modify Attribute requests MAY be included in a single batched request to modify multiple attributes.

Table 160: Modify Attribute Request Payload

Table 161: Modify Attribute Response Payload

4.16 Delete Attribute

This request deletes an attribute associated with a Managed Object. The request contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed Object whose attribute is to be deleted, the attribute name, and the optional Attribute Index of the attribute. If no Attribute Index is specified in the request, then the Attribute Index SHALL be assumed to be 0. Attributes that are always required to have a value SHALL never be deleted by this operation. Attempting to delete a non-existent attribute or specifying an Attribute Index for which there exists no Attribute Value SHALL result in an error. The response returns the deleted Attribute and the Attribute Index MAY be omitted if the index of the deleted attribute instance is 0. Multiple Delete Attribute requests MAY be included in a single batched request to delete multiple attributes.

Table 162: Delete Attribute Request Payload

Table 163: Delete Attribute Response Payload

4.17 Obtain Lease

This request is used to obtain a new Lease Time for a specified Managed Object. The Lease Time is an interval value that determines when the client's internal cache of information about the object expires and needs to be renewed. If the returned value of the lease time is zero, then the server is indicating that no lease interval is effective, and the client MAY use the object without any lease time limit. If a client's lease expires, then the client SHALL NOT use the associated cryptographic object until a new lease is obtained. If the server determines that a new lease SHALL NOT be issued for the specified cryptographic object, then the server SHALL respond to the Obtain Lease request with an error.

The response payload for the operation contains the current value of the Last Change Date attribute for the object. This MAY be used by the client to determine if any of the attributes cached by the client need to be refreshed, by comparing this time to the time when the attributes were previously obtained.

Table 164: Obtain Lease Request Payload

Table 165: Obtain Lease Response Payload

4.18 Get Usage Allocation

This request is used to obtain an allocation from the current Usage Limits value to allow the client to use the Managed Cryptographic Object for applying cryptographic protection. The allocation only applies to Managed Cryptographic Objects that are able to be used for applying protection (e.g., symmetric keys for encryption, private keys for signing, etc.) and is only valid if the Managed Cryptographic Object has a Usage Limits attribute. Usage for processing cryptographically-protected information (e.g., decryption, verification, etc.) is not limited and is not able to be allocated. A Managed Cryptographic Object that has a Usage Limits attribute SHALL NOT be used by a client for applying cryptographic protection unless an allocation has been obtained using this operation. The operation SHALL only be requested during the time that protection is enabled for these objects (i.e., after the Activation Date and before the Protect Stop Date). If the operation is requested for an object that has no Usage Limits attribute, or is not an object that MAY be used for applying cryptographic protection, then the server SHALL return an error.

The field in the request specifies the number of units that the client needs to protect. If the requested amount is not available or if the Managed Object is not able to be used for applying cryptographic protection at this time, then the server SHALL return an error. The server SHALL assume that the entire allocated amount is going to be consumed. Once the entire allocated amount has been consumed, the client SHALL NOT continue to use the Managed Cryptographic Object for applying cryptographic protection until a new allocation is obtained.

Table 166: Get Usage Allocation Request Payload

Table 167: Get Usage Allocation Response Payload

4.19 Activate

This request is used to activate a Managed Cryptographic Object. The request SHALL NOT specify a Template object. The operation SHALL only be performed on an object in the Pre-Active state and has the effect of changing its state to Active, and setting its Activation Date to the current date and time.

Table 168: Activate Request Payload

Table 169: Activate Response Payload

4.20 Revoke

This request is used to revoke a Managed Cryptographic Object or an Opaque Object. The request SHALL NOT specify a Template object. The request contains a reason for the revocation (e.g., "key compromise", "cessation of operation", etc). Special authentication and authorization SHOULD be enforced to perform this request (see [KMIP-UG]). Only the object creator or an authorized security officer SHOULD be allowed to issue this request. The operation has one of two effects. If the revocation reason is "key compromise", then the object is placed into the "compromised" state, and the Compromise Date attribute is set to the current date and time. Otherwise, the object is placed into the "deactivated" state, and the Deactivation Date attribute is set to the current date and time.

Table 170: Revoke Request Payload

Table 171: Revoke Response Payload

4.21 Destroy

This request is used to indicate to the server that the key material for the specified Managed Object SHALL be destroyed. The meta-data for the key material MAY be retained by the server (e.g., used to ensure that an expired or revoked private signing key is no longer available). Special authentication and authorization SHOULD be enforced to perform this request (see [KMIP-UG]). Only the object creator or an authorized security officer SHOULD be allowed to issue this request. If the Unique Identifier specifies a Template object, then the object itself, including all meta-data, SHALL be destroyed. Cryptographic Objects MAY only be destroyed if they are in either Pre-Active or Deactivated state. A Cryptographic Object in the Active state MAY be destroyed if the server sets the Deactivation date (the state of the object transitions to Deactivated) prior to destroying the object.

Table 172: Destroy Request Payload

Table 173: Destroy Response Payload

4.22 Archive

This request is used to specify that a Managed Object MAY be archived. The actual time when the object is archived, the location of the archive, or level of archive hierarchy is determined by the policies within the key management system and is not specified by the client. The request contains the unique identifier of the Managed Object. Special authentication and authorization SHOULD be enforced to perform this request (see [KMIP-UG]). Only the object creator or an authorized security officer SHOULD be allowed to issue this request. This request is only an indication from a client that from its point of view it is possible for the key management system to archive the object.

Table 174: Archive Request Payload

Table 175: Archive Response Payload

4.23 Recover

This request is used to obtain access to a Managed Object that has been archived. This request MAY require asynchronous polling to obtain the response due to delays caused by retrieving the object from the archive. Once the response is received, the object is now on-line, and MAY be obtained (e.g., via a Get operation). Special authentication and authorization SHOULD be enforced to perform this request (see [KMIP-UG]).

Table 176: Recover Request Payload

Table 177: Recover Response Payload

4.24 Validate

This requests that the server validate a certificate chain and return information on its validity. Only a single certificate chain SHALL be included in each request. Support for this operation at the server is OPTIONAL. If the server does not support this operation, an error SHALL be returned.

The request may contain a list of certificate objects, and/or a list of Unique Identifiers that identify Managed Certificate objects. Together, the two lists compose a certificate chain to be validated. The request MAY also contain a date for which all certificates in the certificate chain are REQUIRED to be valid.

The method or policy by which validation is conducted is a decision of the server and is outside of the scope of this protocol. Likewise, the order in which the supplied certificate chain is validated and the specification of trust anchors used to terminate validation are also controlled by the server.

Table 178: Validate Request Payload

Table 179: Validate Response Payload

4.25 Query

This request is used by the client to interrogate the server to determine its capabilities and/or protocol mechanisms. The Query operation SHOULD be invocable by unauthenticated clients to interrogate server features and functions. The Query Function field in the request SHALL contain one or more of the following items:

.         Query Operations

.         Query Objects

.         Query Server Information

.         Query Application Namespaces

.         Query Extension List

.         Query Extension Map

The Operation fields in the response contain Operation enumerated values, which SHALL list all the operations that the server supports. If the request contains a Query Operations value in the Query Function field, then these fields SHALL be returned in the response.

The Object Type fields in the response contain Object Type enumerated values, which SHALL list all the object types that the server supports. If the request contains a Query Objects value in the Query Function field, then these fields SHALL be returned in the response.

The Server Information field in the response is a structure containing vendor-specific fields and/or substructures. If the request contains a Query Server Information value in the Query Function field, then this field SHALL be returned in the response.

The Application Namespace fields in the response contain the namespaces that the server SHALL generate values for if requested by the client (see Section 3.36). These fields SHALL only be returned in the response if the request contains a Query Application Namespaces value in the Query Function field.

The Extension Information fields in the response contain the descriptions of Objects with Item Tag values in the Extensions range that are supported by the server (see Section 2.1.9). If the request contains a Query Extension List and/or Query Extension Map value in the Query Function field, then the Extensions Information fields SHALL be returned in the response. If the Query Function field contains the Query Extension Map value, then the Extension Tag and Extension Type fields SHALL be specified in the Extension Information values.

Note that the response payload is empty if there are no values to return.

Table 180: Query Request Payload

Table 181: Query Response Payload

4.26 Discover Versions

This request is used by the client to determine a list of protocol versions that is supported by the server. The request payload contains an optional list of protocol versions that is supported by the client. The protocol versions SHALL be ranked in order of preference (highest preference first).

The response payload contains a list of protocol versions that is supported by the server. The protocol versions are ranked in order of preference (highest preference first). If the client provides the server with a list of supported protocol versions in the request payload, the server SHALL return only the protocol versions that are supported by both the client and server. The server SHOULD list all the protocol versions supported by both client and server. If the protocol version specified in the request header is not specified in the request payload and the server does not support any protocol version specified in the request payload, the server SHALL return an empty list in the response payload. If no protocol versions are specified in the request payload, the server SHOULD simply return all the protocol versions that are supported by the server.

Table 182: Discover Versions Request Payload

Table 183: Discover Versions Response Payload

4.27 Cancel

This request is used to cancel an outstanding asynchronous operation. The correlation value (see Section 6.8) of the original operation SHALL be specified in the request. The server SHALL respond with a Cancellation Result that contains one of the following values:

.         Canceled - The cancel operation succeeded in canceling the pending operation.

.         Unable To Cancel - The cancel operation is unable to cancel the pending operation.

.         Completed - The pending operation completed successfully before the cancellation operation was able to cancel it.

.         Failed - The pending operation completed with a failure before the cancellation operation was able to cancel it.

.         Unavailable - The specified correlation value did not match any recently pending or completed asynchronous operations.

The response to this operation is not able to be asynchronous.

Table 184: Cancel Request Payload

Table 185: Cancel Response Payload

4.28 Poll

This request is used to poll the server in order to obtain the status of an outstanding asynchronous operation. The correlation value (see Section 6.8) of the original operation SHALL be specified in the request. The response to this operation SHALL NOT be asynchronous.

Table 186: Poll Request Payload

The server SHALL reply with one of two responses:

If the operation has not completed, the response SHALL contain no payload and a Result Status of Pending.

If the operation has completed, the response SHALL contain the appropriate payload for the operation. This response SHALL be identical to the response that would have been sent if the operation had completed synchronously.