Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.1
Candidate OASIS Standard 01
21 September 2012
Specification URIs
This version:
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/cos01/kmip-profiles-v1.1-cos01.doc (Authoritative)
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/cos01/kmip-profiles-v1.1-cos01.html
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/cos01/kmip-profiles-v1.1-cos01.pdf
Previous version:
http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/44884/kmip-profiles-v1.1-csprd01.zip
Latest version:
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/kmip-profiles-v1.1.doc (Authoritative)
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/kmip-profiles-v1.1.html
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/kmip-profiles-v1.1.pdf
Technical Committee:
OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC
Chairs:
Robert Griffin (robert.griffin@rsa.com), EMC Corporation
Subhash Sankuratripati (Subhash.Sankuratripati@netapp.com), NetApp
Editors:
Robert Griffin (robert.griffin@rsa.com), EMC Corporation
Subhash Sankuratripati (Subhash.Sankuratripati@netapp.com), NetApp
Related work:
This specification replaces or supersedes:
· Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.0. 01 October 2010. OASIS Standard. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.0/os/kmip-profiles-1.0-os.html.
This specification is related to:
· Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.1. Latest version. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.1/kmip-ug-v1.1.html
Abstract:
This document is intended for developers and architects who wish to design systems and applications that conform to the Key Management Interoperability Protocol specification.
KMIP V1.1 enhances the KMIP V1.0 standard (established in October 2010) by
1) defining new functionality in the protocol to improve interoperability, such as a Discover Versions operation and a Group object;
2) defining additional Test Cases for verifying and validating the new functionality;
3) providing additional information in the KMIP Usage Guide to assist in effective implementation of KMIP in key management clients and servers; and
4) defining new profiles for establishing KMIP-compliant implementations.
The Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) is a single, comprehensive protocol for communication between clients that request any of a wide range of encryption keys and servers that store and manage those keys. By replacing redundant, incompatible key management protocols, KMIP provides better data security while at the same time reducing expenditures on multiple products.
Status:
This document was last revised or approved by the OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the “Latest version” location noted above for possible later revisions of this document.
Technical Committee members should send comments on this specification to the Technical Committee’s email list. Others should send comments to the Technical Committee by using the “Send A Comment” button on the Technical Committee’s web page at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/.
For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the Technical Committee web page (http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/ipr.php).
Citation format:
When referencing this specification the following citation format should be used:
[KMIP-Profiles]
Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version
1.1. 21 September 2012. Candidate OASIS Standard 01.
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/cos01/kmip-profiles-v1.1-cos01.html.
Notices
Copyright © OASIS Open 2012. All Rights Reserved.
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Table of Contents
2.1 Guidelines for Specifying Conformance Clauses
2.2 Guidelines for Specifying Authentication Suites
2.3 Guidelines for Specifying KMIP Profiles
2.4 Guidelines for Validating Conformance to KMIP Profiles
3.1 Basic Authentication Suite
3.2 TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite
4.1 Basic Discover Versions Server Profile
4.2 Basic Baseline Server KMIP Profile
4.3 Basic Secret Data Server KMIP Profile
4.4 Basic Symmetric Key Store and Server KMIP Profile
4.5 Basic Symmetric Key Foundry and Server KMIP Profile
4.6 Basic Asymmetric Key Store Server KMIP Profile
4.7 Basic Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Server KMIP Profile
4.8 Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server KMIP Profile
4.9 Basic Certificate Server KMIP Profile
4.10 Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Server KMIP Profile
4.11 Discover Versions TLS 1.2 Authentication Server Profile
4.12 Baseline Server TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.13 Secret Data Server TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.14 Symmetric Key Store and Server TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.15 Symmetric Key Foundry and Server TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.16 Asymmetric Key Store Server TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.17 Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Server TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.18 Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.19 Certificate Server TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.20 Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Server TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.21 Basic Discover Versions Client KMIP Profile.
4.22 Basic Baseline Client KMIP Profile
4.23 Basic Secret Data Client KMIP Profile
4.24 Basic Symmetric Key Store Client KMIP Profile
4.25 Basic Symmetric Key Foundry Client KMIP Profile
4.26 Basic Asymmetric Key Store Client KMIP Profile
4.27 Basic Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Client KMIP Profile
4.28 Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry Client KMIP Profile
4.29 Basic Certificate Client KMIP Profile
4.30 Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Client KMIP Profile
4.31 Discover Versions Client TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.32 Baseline Client TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.33 Secret Data Client TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.34 Symmetric Key Store Client TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.35 Symmetric Key Foundry Client TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.36 Asymmetric Key Store Client TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.37 Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Client TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.38 Asymmetric Key Foundry Client TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.39 Certificate Client TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.40 Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Client TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
4.41 Storage Client KMIP Profile
4.42 Storage Client TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Profile
5.1 Discover Versions Server Clause
5.1.1. Implementation Conformance
5.1.2 Conformance of a Discover Versions Server
5.2.1 Implementation Conformance
5.2.2 Conformance of a KMIP Baseline Server
5.3.1 Implementation Conformance
5.3.2 Conformance of a Secret Data Server
5.4 Symmetric Key Store and Server Conformance Clause
5.4.1 Implementation Conformance
5.4.2 Conformance as a Symmetric Key Store and Server
5.5 Symmetric Key Foundry and Server Conformance Clause
5.5.1 Implementation Conformance
5.5.2 Conformance as a KMIP Symmetric Key Foundry and Server
5.6 Asymmetric Key Store Server Conformance Clauses
5.6.1 Implementation Conformance
5.6.2 Conformance as an Asymmetric Key Store Server
5.7 Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Server Conformance Clauses
5.7.1 Implementation Conformance
5.7.2 Conformance as a Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Server
5.8 Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server Conformance Clauses
5.8.1 Implementation Conformance
5.8.2 Conformance as a Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server
5.9 Certificate Server Conformance Clauses.
5.9.1 Implementation Conformance
5.9.2 Conformance as a Certificate Server
5.10 Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Server Conformance Clauses
5.10.1 Implementation Conformance
5.10.2 Conformance as a Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Server
5.11 Discover Versions Client Clause
5.11.1 Implementation Conformance
5.11.2 Conformance of a Discover Versions Client
5.12.1 Implementation Conformance
5.12.2 Conformance of a KMIP Baseline Client
5.13 Secret Data Client Clause
5.13.1 Implementation Conformance
5.13.2 Conformance of a Secret Data Client
5.14 Symmetric Key Store Client Conformance Clause
5.14.1 Implementation Conformance
5.14.2 Conformance as a Symmetric Key Store Client
5.15 Symmetric Key Foundry Client Conformance Clause
5.15.1 Implementation Conformance
5.15.2 Conformance as a KMIP Symmetric Key Foundry Client
5.16 Asymmetric Key Store Client Conformance Clauses
5.16.1 Implementation Conformance
5.16.2 Conformance as a Asymmetric Key Store Client
5.17 Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Client Conformance Clauses
5.17.1 Implementation Conformance
5.17.2 Conformance as an Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Client
5.18 Asymmetric Key Foundry Client Conformance Clauses
5.18.1 Implementation Conformance
5.18.2 Conformance as an Asymmetric Key Foundry Client
5.19 Certificate Client Conformance Clauses.
5.19.1 Implementation Conformance
5.19.2 Conformance as a Basic Certificate Client
5.20 Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Client Conformance Clauses
5.20.1 Implementation Conformance
5.20.2 Conformance as a Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Client
5.21 Storage Client Conformance Clauses
5.21.1 Implementation Conformance
5.21.2 Conformance as a Storage Client
OASIS requires a conformance section in an approved committee specification ([KMIP-Spec] [TCProc], section 2.18 Work Product Quality, paragraph 8a):
A specification that is approved by the TC at the Public Review Draft, Committee Specification or OASIS Standard level must include a separate section, listing a set of numbered conformance clauses, to which any implementation of the specification must adhere in order to claim conformance to the specification (or any optional portion thereof).
This document intends to meet this OASIS requirement on conformance clauses for a KMIP Server or KMIP Client ([KMIP-Spec] 12.1, 12.2) through profiles that define the use of KMIP objects, attributes, operations, message elements and authentication methods within specific contexts of KMIP server and client interaction. These profiles define a set of normative constraints for employing KMIP within a particular environment or context of use. They may, optionally, require the use of specific KMIP functionality or in other respects define the processing rules to be followed by profile actors.
For normative definition of the elements of KMIP specified in these profiles, see the KMIP Specification ([KMIP-Spec]). Illustrative guidance for the implementation of KMIP clients and servers is provided in the KMIP Usage Guide ([KMIP-UG]) and KMIP Test Cases ([KMIP_TC]).
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in .
[KMIP-Spec] Key
Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.1. 21
September 2012. Candidate OASIS Standard 01.
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/cos01/kmip-spec-v1.1-cos01.html.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt, IETF RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC 2246] T. Dierks & C.Allen, The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt, IETF RFC 2246, January 1999
[RFC 3268] P. Chown, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3268.txt, IETF RFC 3268, June 2002
[RFC 4346] T. Dierks & E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.1, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt, IETF RFC 4346, April 2006
[RFC 5246] T. Dierks & E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.2, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt, IETF RFC 5246, August 2008
[NIST 800-57 Part 3] Barker, Burr, et.al, Recommendation for Key Management Part 3: Application-Specific Key Management Guidance, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_PART3_key-management_Dec2009.pdf, December 2009
[KMIP-G] Key Management Interoperability
Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.1. 27 July 2012. OASIS Committee Note 01.
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.1/cn01/kmip-ug-v1.1-cn01.html.
[KMTC] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Test Cases Version 1.1. 27 July 2012. OASIS Committee Note 01. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/testcases/v1.1/cn01/kmip-testcases-v1.1-cn01.html.
This document defines a selected set of conformance clauses and authentication suites which when “paired together” form KMIP Profiles. The KMIP TC also welcomes proposals for new profiles. KMIP TC members are encouraged to submit these proposals to the KMIP TC for consideration for inclusion in a future version of this TC-approved document. However, some OASIS members may simply wish to inform the committee of profiles or other work related to KMIP.
This section provides a checklist of issues that SHALL be addressed by each clause.
1. Implement functionality as mandated by [KMIP-Spec] Section 12 (Conformance clauses for a KMIP server or a KMIP client)
2. Specify the list of additional objects that SHALL be supported
3. Specify the list of additional attributes that SHALL be supported
4. Specify the list of additional operations that SHALL be supported
5. Specify any additional message content that SHALL be supported
1. Channel Security – For all operations, communication between Client and Server SHALL establish and maintain channel confidentiality and integrity,.
2. Channel Options – Options like protocol version and cipher suite
3. Server and Client Authenticity – For all operations, communication between Client and Server SHALL provide assurance of server authenticity and client authenticity
A KMIP profile is a tuple of {Conformance Clause, Authentication Suite}.
Any vendor or organization, such as other standards bodies, MAY create a KMIP Profile and publish it.
· The profile SHALL be publicly available.
· The KMIP Technical Committee SHALL be formally advised of the availability of the profile and the location of the published profile.
· The profile SHALL be defined as a tuple of {Conformance Clause, Authentication Suite}.
A KMIP server implementation SHALL claim conformance to a specific server profile only if it instruments all required objects, operations, messaging and attributes of that profile
• All objects specified as required in that profile
• All operations specified as required in that profile
• All attributes specified as required in that profile
• The defined wire protocols (TLS, SSL, IPSec, etc…) for that profile
• The defined methods of authentication for that profile
A KMIP client implementation SHALL claim conformance to a specific client profile only if it instruments all required objects, operations, messaging and attributes of that profile
• All objects specified as required in that profile
• All operations specified as required in that profile
• All attributes specified as required in that profile
• The defined wire protocols (TLS, SSL, IPSec, etc…) for that profile
• The defined methods of authentication for that profile
This section contains the list of protocol versions and cipher suites that are to be used by profiles contained within this document.
This authentication set stipulates that a KMIP client and server SHALL use TLS to negotiate a mutually-authenticated connection.
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL support TLSv1.0. They MAY support TLS v1.1 [RFC 4346], TLS v1.2 [RFC 5246] bearing in mind that they are not compatible with each other and SHALL NOT support SSLv3.0, SSLv2.0 and SSLv1.0.
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL support the following cipher suites:
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Basic Authentication Suite Conformant KMIP servers MAY support the cipher suites listed in tables 4-1 through 4-4 of NIST 800-57 Part 3 with the exception of NULL ciphers (at the time this document was created, the only NULL cipher in 800-57 Part 3 was: TLS_RSA_WITH_NONE_SHA)
Basic Authentication Suite Conformant KMIP servers SHALL NOT support any other cipher suites.
NOTE: TLS 1.0 has some security issues as described in http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt. Implementations that need protections against this attack should considering using the “TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite”
At the time this document was published, NIST 800-57 Part 3 Table 4-1, for cipher suites that have both SHA1 and SHA256 variants, erroneously categorizes SHA256 based ciphers under TLS versions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 and SHA1 based ciphers under TLS 1.2. The correct value for SHA256 based ciphers should 1.2 and for SHA1 based ciphers it should be 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2.
For authenticated services KMIP servers SHALL require the
use of channel (TLS) mutual authentication to provide assurance of client
authenticity.
In the absence of Credential information in the request header, KMIP servers
SHALL use the identity derived from the channel authentication as the client
identity.
In the presence of Credential information in the request header, KMIP servers
SHALL consider such Credential information into their evaluation of client
authenticity and identity, along with the authenticity and identity derived
from the channel. The exact mechanisms for such evaluation are outside
the scope of this specification.
KMIP objects have an owner. For those KMIP requests that result in new managed objects the client identity SHALL be used as the owner of the managed object. For those operations that only access pre-existent managed objects, the client identity SHALL be checked against the owner and access SHALL be controlled as detailed in section 3.18 of [KMIP-SPEC].
KMIP servers using the Basic Authentication Suite SHOULD use TCP port number 5696, as assigned by IANA, to receive and send KMIP messages. KMIP clients using the Basic Authentication Suite MAY use the same 5696 TCP port number.
This authentication set stipulates that a KMIP client and server SHALL use TLS to negotiate a mutually-authenticated connection.
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL support TLSv1.2
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL support the following cipher suites:
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite Conformant KMIP servers MAY support the cipher suites listed in tables 4-1 through 4-4 of NIST 800-57 Part 3 with the exception of NULL ciphers (at the time this document was created, the only NULL cipher in 800-57 Part 3 was: TLS_RSA_WITH_NONE_SHA)
TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite Conformant KMIP servers SHALL NOT support any other cipher suites
NIST 800-57 Part 3 Table 4-1, for cipher suites that have both SHA1 and SHA256 variants, erroneously categorizes SHA256 based ciphers under TLS versions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 and SHA1 based ciphers under TLS 1.2. The correct value for SHA256 based ciphers should 1.2 and for SHA1 based ciphers it should be 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2.
Same as the basic authentication suite Section 3.1.3.
Same as the basic authentication suite Section 3.1.4.
Same as the basic authentication suite Section 3.1.5.
This section lists the KMIP profiles that are defined in this specification. More than one profile may be supported at the same time provided there are no conflicting requirements.
A profile that consists of the tuple {Discover Versions Server Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Baseline Server Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Secret Data Server Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Symmetric Key Store and Server Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Symmetric Key Foundry and Server Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key Store Server Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}.
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Server Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}.
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}.
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Certificate Server Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}.
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Server Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}.
A profile that consists of the tuple {Discover Versions Server Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Baseline Server Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Secret Data Server Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Symmetric Key Store and Server Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Symmetric Key Foundry and Server Conformance Clause, TLS
A profile that consists of the tuple {Asymmetric Key Store Server Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite)
A profile that consists of the tuple {Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Store Server Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite)
A profile that consists of the tuple {Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite)
A profile that consists of the tuple {Certificate Server Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Store Server Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite)
A profile that consists of the tuple {Discover Versions Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Baseline Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Secret Data Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Symmetric Key Store Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Symmetric Key Foundry Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key Store Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Certificate Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Discover Versions Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Baseline Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Secret Data Client Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Symmetric Key Store Client Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Symmetric Key Foundry and Server Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key Store Client Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Client Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry Client Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Certificate Client Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Client Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Storage Client Conformance Clause, Basic Authentication Suite}
A profile that consists of the tuple {Storage Client Conformance Clause, TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite}
The following subsections describe currently-defined profiles related to the use of KMIP.
This proposal builds on the KMIP server conformance clauses to provide the most basic functionality that would be expected of a conformant KMIP server – the ability to provide the server version.
An implementation is a conforming Discover Versions Server Clause if it meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a Discover Versions Server if it meets the following conditions:
This proposal builds on the KMIP server conformance clauses to provide some of the most basic functionality that would be expected of a conformant KMIP server – the ability to provide information about the server.
An implementation is a conforming Baseline Server Clause if it meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a Baseline Server if it meets the following conditions:
a. Attribute ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.1)
b. Credential ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.2)
c. Key Block ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.3)
d. Key Value ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.4)
e. Template-Attribute Structure ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.8)
a. Unique Identifier ([KMIP-Spec] 3.1)
b. Name ([KMIP-Spec] 3.2)
c. Object Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.3)
d. Cryptographic Algorithm ([KMIP-Spec] 3.4)
e. Cryptographic Length ([KMIP-Spec] 3.5)
f. Cryptographic Parameters ([KMIP-Spec] 3.6)
g. Digest ([KMIP-Spec] 3.17)
h. Default Operation Policy ([KMIP-Spec] 3.18.2)
i. Cryptographic Usage Mask ([KMIP-Spec] 3.19)
j. State ([KMIP-Spec] 3.22)
k. Initial Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.23)
l. Activation Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.24)
m. Deactivation Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.27)
n. Compromise Occurrence Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.29)
o. Compromise Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.30)
p. Revocation Reason ([KMIP-Spec] 3.31)
q. Last Change Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.38)
4. Supports the ID Placeholder ([KMIP-Spec] 4)
a. Locate ([KMIP-Spec] 4.9)
b. Check ([KMIP-Spec] 4.10)
c. Get ([KMIP-Spec] 4.11)
d. Get Attributes ([KMIP-Spec] 4.12)
e. Get Attribute List ([KMIP-Spec] 4.13)
f. Add Attribute ([KMIP-Spec] 4.14)
g. Modify Attribute ([KMIP-Spec] 4.15)
h. Delete Attribute ([KMIP-Spec] 4.16)
i. Activate ([KMIP-Spec] 4.19)
j. Revoke ([KMIP-Spec] 4.20)
k. Destroy ([KMIP-Spec] 4.21)
l. Query ([KMIP-Spec] 4.25)
m. Discover Versions ([KMIP-Spec] 4.26)
6. Supports the following message contents:
a. Protocol Version ([KMIP-Spec] 6.1)
b. Operation ([KMIP-Spec] 6.2)
c. Maximum Response Size ([KMIP-Spec] 6.3)
d. Unique Batch Item ID ([KMIP-Spec] 6.4)
e. Time Stamp ([KMIP-Spec] 6.5)
f. Asynchronous Indicator ([KMIP-Spec] 6.7)
g. Result Status ([KMIP-Spec] 6.9)
h. Result Reason ([KMIP-Spec] 6.10)
i. Batch Order Option ([KMIP-Spec] 6.12)
j. Batch Error Continuation Option ([KMIP-Spec] 6.13)
k. Batch Count ([KMIP-Spec] 6.14)
l. Batch Item ([KMIP-Spec] 6.15)
7. Supports Message Format ([KMIP-Spec] 7)
8. Supports Authentication ([KMIP-Spec] 8)
9. Supports the TTLV encoding ([KMIP-Spec] 9.1)
10. Supports the transport requirements ([KMIP-Spec] 10)
11. Supports Error Handling ([KMIP-Spec] 11) for any supported object, attribute, or operation
This proposal builds on the KMIP server conformance clauses to provide some of the most basic functionality that would be expected of a conformant KMIP server – the ability to create, register and get secret data in an interoperable fashion.
An implementation is a conforming Secret Data Server Clause if it meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a Secret Data Server if it meets the following conditions:
i. Secret Data
i. Password
i. Opaque
This proposal builds on the KMIP server conformance clauses to provide support for symmetric key store and foundry use cases.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Symmetric Key Store and Server if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a Symmetric Key Store and Server if it meets the following conditions:
i. 3DES
ii. AES
i. Symmetric Key
i. Raw
ii. Transparent Symmetric Key
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Server Conformance Clause to provide basic symmetric key services. The intent is to simply allow key creation and serving with very limited key types.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Symmetric Key Store and Server if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Symmetric Key Foundry and Server if it meets the following conditions:
i. 3DES
ii. AES
i. Symmetric Key
i. Raw
ii. Transparent Symmetric Key
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Server Conformance Clauses to allow asymmetric key pairs generated external to the key server to be vaulted by a key server. The intent is to simply support key registration for a very limited number of key types.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Asymmetric Key Store Server if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Asymmetric Key Store Server if it meets the following conditions:
i. Public Key
ii. Private Key
i. RSA
i. Public Key Link
ii. Private Key Link
i. PKCS#1
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Server Conformance Clauses to allow asymmetric key pairs and certificates generated external to the key server to be vaulted by a key server. The intent is to simply support key and certificate registration for a very limited number of key types.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Server if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Server if it meets the following conditions:
a. Register ([KMIP-Spec] 4.3)
a. Object Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.3 and 9.1.3.2.12)
i. Certificate
ii. Public Key
iii. Private Key
b. Cryptographic Algorithm ([KMIP-Spec] 3.4 and 9.1.3.2.13)
i. RSA
c. Certificate Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.8 and 9.1.3.2.6)
i. X.509
d. X.509 Certificate Identifier ([KMIP-Spec] 3.10)
e. X.509 Certificate Subject ([KMIP-Spec] 3.11)
f. X.509 Certificate Issuer ([KMIP-Spec] 3.12)
g. Link ([KMIP-Spec] 3.35 and 9.1.3.2.20)
a. Certificate Link
b. Public Key Link
c. Private Key Link
i. PKCS#1
ii. X.509
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Server Conformance Clauses to provide basic asymmetric key services for central key generation (by the key server). The intent is to simply allow key creation and serving with very limited key types.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server if it meets the following conditions:
a. Public Key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.3)
b. Private Key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.4)
a. Object Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.3 and 9.1.3.2.12)
i. Public Key
ii. Private Key
b. Cryptographic Algorithm ([KMIP-Spec] 3.4 and 9.1.3.2.13)
i. RSA
c. Link ([KMIP-Spec] 3.35 and 9.1.3.2.20)
i. Public Key Link
ii. Private Key Link
iii. Replacement Object Link
iv. Replaced Object Link
c. Key Format Type ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.3 and 9.1.3.2.3)
i. PKCS#1
ii. Transparent RSA private key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4)
iii. Transparent RSA public key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.5)
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Certificate Server if it meets the following conditions:
a. Certificate ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.1)
b. Public Key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.3)
c. Private Key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.4)
a. Certify ([KMIP-Spec] 4.7)
b. Re-Certify ([KMIP-Spec] 4.8)
a. Object Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.3 and 9.1.3.2.12)
i. Certificate
ii. Public Key
iii. Private Key
b. Cryptographic Algorithm ([KMIP-Spec] 3.4 and 9.1.3.2.13)
i. RSA
c. Certificate Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.8 and 9.1.3.2.6)
i. X.509
d. X.509 Certificate Identifier ([KMIP-Spec] 3.10)
e. X.509 Certificate Subject ([KMIP-Spec] 3.11)
f. X.509 Certificate Issuer ([KMIP-Spec] 3.12)
g. Link ([KMIP-Spec] 3.35 and 9.1.3.2.20)
i. Certificate Link
ii. Public Key Link
iii. Private Key Link
iv. Replacement Object Link
v. Replaced Object Link
h. Certificate Request Type ([KMIP-Spec] 4.7, 4.8 and 9.1.3.2.22)
i. PKCS#10
ii. PEM
a. Key Format Type ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.3 and 9.1.3.2.3)
i. PKCS#1
ii. X.509
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Server Conformance Clauses to provide basic asymmetric key services for central key generation (by the key server). The intent is to simply allow key and certificate creation and serving with very limited key types.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Server (Central Generation) if it meets the following conditions:
a. Certificate ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.1)
b. Public Key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.3)
c. Private Key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.4)
a. Create Key Pair ([KMIP-Spec] 4.2)
b. Re-key Key Pair ([KMIP-Spec] 4.5)
c. Certify ([KMIP-Spec] 4.7)
d. Re-Certify ([KMIP-Spec] 4.8)
a. Object Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.3 and 9.1.3.2.12)
i. Certificate
ii. Public Key
iii. Private Key
b. Cryptographic Algorithm ([KMIP-Spec] 3.4 and 9.1.3.2.13)
i. RSA
c. Certificate Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.8 and 9.1.3.2.6)
i. X.509
d. X.509 Certificate Identifier ([KMIP-Spec] 3.10)
e. X.509 Certificate Subject ([KMIP-Spec] 3.11)
f. X.509 Certificate Issuer ([KMIP-Spec] 3.12)
g. Link ([KMIP-Spec] 3.35 and 9.1.3.2.20)
i. Certificate Link
ii. Public Key Link
iii. Private Key Link
iv. Replacement Object Link
v. Replaced Object Link
h. Certificate Request Type ([KMIP-Spec] 4.7, 4.8 and 9.1.3.2.22)
i. PKCS#10
ii. PEM
d. Key Format Type ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.3 and 9.1.3.2.3)
i. PKCS#1
ii. X.509
iii. Transparent RSA private key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4)
iv. Transparent RSA public key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4)
This proposal builds on the KMIP client conformance clauses to provide the most basic functionality that would be expected of a conformant KMIP client – the ability to request the server version.
An implementation is a conforming Discover Versions Client Clause if it meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a Discover Versions Server if it meets the following conditions:
This proposal builds on the KMIP client conformance clauses to provide some of the most basic functionality that would be expected of a conformant KMIP client – the ability to request information about the server.
An implementation is a conforming Baseline Client Clause if it meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a Baseline Client if it meets the following conditions:
a. Attribute ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.1)
b. Credential ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.2)
c. Key Block ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.3)
d. Key Value ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.4)
e. Template-Attribute Structure ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.8)
a. Unique Identifier ([KMIP-Spec] 3.1)
b. Name ([KMIP-Spec] 3.2)
c. Object Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.3)
d. Cryptographic Algorithm ([KMIP-Spec] 3.4)
e. Cryptographic Length ([KMIP-Spec] 3.5)
f. Cryptographic Parameters ([KMIP-Spec] 3.6)
g. Digest ([KMIP-Spec] 3.17)
h. Default Operation Policy ([KMIP-Spec] 3.18.2)
i. Cryptographic Usage Mask ([KMIP-Spec] 3.19)
j. State ([KMIP-Spec] 3.22)
k. Initial Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.23)
l. Activation Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.24)
m. Deactivation Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.27)
n. Compromise Occurrence Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.29)
o. Compromise Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.30)
p. Revocation Reason ([KMIP-Spec] 3.31)
q. Last Change Date ([KMIP-Spec] 3.38)
4. Supports the ID Placeholder ([KMIP-Spec] 4)
a. Locate ([KMIP-Spec] 4.9)
b. Check ([KMIP-Spec] 4.10)
c. Get ([KMIP-Spec] 4.11)
d. Get Attributes ([KMIP-Spec] 4.12)
e. Get Attribute List ([KMIP-Spec] 4.13)
f. Add Attribute ([KMIP-Spec] 4.14)
g. Modify Attribute ([KMIP-Spec] 4.15)
h. Delete Attribute ([KMIP-Spec] 4.16)
i. Activate ([KMIP-Spec] 4.19)
j. Revoke ([KMIP-Spec] 4.20)
k. Destroy ([KMIP-Spec] 4.21)
l. Query ([KMIP-Spec] 4.25)
m. Discover Versions ([KMIP-Spec] 4.26)
6. Supports the following message contents:
a. Protocol Version ([KMIP-Spec] 6.1)
b. Operation ([KMIP-Spec] 6.2)
c. Maximum Response Size ([KMIP-Spec] 6.3)
d. Unique Batch Item ID ([KMIP-Spec] 6.4)
e. Time Stamp ([KMIP-Spec] 6.5)
f. Asynchronous Indicator ([KMIP-Spec] 6.7)
g. Result Status ([KMIP-Spec] 6.9)
h. Result Reason ([KMIP-Spec] 6.10)
i. Batch Order Option ([KMIP-Spec] 6.12)
j. Batch Error Continuation Option ([KMIP-Spec] 6.13)
k. Batch Count ([KMIP-Spec] 6.14)
l. Batch Item ([KMIP-Spec] 6.15)
7. Supports Message Format ([KMIP-Spec] 7)
8. Supports Authentication ([KMIP-Spec] 8)
9. Supports the TTLV encoding ([KMIP-Spec] 9.1)
10. Supports the transport requirements ([KMIP-Spec] 10)
11. Supports Error Handling ([KMIP-Spec] 11) for any supported object, attribute, or operation
This proposal builds on the KMIP client conformance clauses to provide some of the most basic functionality that would be expected of a conformant KMIP client – the ability to create, register and get secret data in an interoperable fashion.
An implementation is a conforming Secret Data Client Clause if it meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a Secret Data Client if it meets the following conditions:
i. Secret Data
i. Password
i. Opaque
This proposal builds on the KMIP client conformance clauses to provide support for symmetric key store and foundry use cases.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Symmetric Key Store Client if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a Basic Symmetric Key Store Client if it meets the following conditions:
i. 3DES
ii. AES
i. Symmetric Key
i. Raw
ii. Transparent Symmetric Key
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Client Conformance Clause to provide basic symmetric key services. The intent is to simply allow key creation and serving with very limited key types.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Symmetric Key Foundry Client if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Symmetric Key Foundry Client if it meets the following conditions:
i. 3DES
ii. AES
i. Symmetric Key
i. Raw
ii. Transparent Symmetric Key
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Client Conformance Clauses to allow asymmetric key pairs generated external to the key server to be vaulted by a key server. The intent is to simply support key registration for a very limited number of key types.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Asymmetric Key Store Client if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Asymmetric Key Store Client if it meets the following conditions:
i. Public Key
ii. Private Key
i. RSA
i. Public Key Link
ii. Private Key Link
i. Raw
ii. PKCS#1
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Client Conformance Clauses to allow asymmetric key pairs and certificates generated external to the key server to be vaulted by a key server. The intent is to simply support key and certificate registration for a very limited number of key types.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Client if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store Client if it meets the following conditions:
a. Register ([KMIP-Spec] 4.3)
a. Object Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.3 and 9.1.3.2.12)
i. Certificate
ii. Public Key
iii. Private Key
b. Cryptographic Algorithm ([KMIP-Spec] 3.4 and 9.1.3.2.13)
i. RSA
c. Certificate Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.8 and 9.1.3.2.6)
i. X.509
d. X.509 Certificate Identifier ([KMIP-Spec] 3.10)
e. X.509 Certificate Subject ([KMIP-Spec] 3.11)
f. X.509 Certificate Issuer ([KMIP-Spec] 3.12)
g. Link ([KMIP-Spec] 3.35 and 9.1.3.2.20)
a. Certificate Link
b. Public Key Link
c. Private Key Link
a. Key Format Type ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.3 and 9.1.3.2.3)
i. PKCS#1
ii. X.509
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Client Conformance Clauses to provide basic asymmetric key services for central key generation (by the key server). The intent is to simply allow key creation and serving with very limited key types.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Asymmetric Key Foundry Client if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Asymmetric Key Foundry Client if it meets the following conditions:
a. Public Key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.3)
b. Private Key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.4)
a. Object Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.3 and 9.1.3.2.12)
i. Public Key
ii. Private Key
b. Cryptographic Algorithm ([KMIP-Spec] 3.4 and 9.1.3.2.13)
i. RSA
c. Link ([KMIP-Spec] 3.35 and 9.1.3.2.20)
i. Public Key Link
ii. Private Key Link
iii. Replacement Object Link
iv. Replaced Object Link
a. Key Format Type ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.3 and 9.1.3.2.3)
i. PKCS#1
ii. Transparent RSA private key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4)
iii. Transparent RSA public key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.5)
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Client Conformance Clauses to provide basic asymmetric key services for local key generation (external to the key server) and certification via a key server.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Certificate Client if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Certificate Client if it meets the following conditions:
a. Certificate ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.1)
b. Public Key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.3)
c. Private Key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.2.4)
a. Certify ([KMIP-Spec] 4.7)
b. Re-Certify ([KMIP-Spec] 4.8)
a. Object Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.3 and 9.1.3.2.12)
i. Certificate
ii. Public Key
iii. Private Key
b. Cryptographic Algorithm ([KMIP-Spec] 3.4 and 9.1.3.2.13)
i. RSA
c. Certificate Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.8 and 9.1.3.2.6)
i. X.509
d. X.509 Certificate Identifier ([KMIP-Spec] 3.10)
e. X.509 Certificate Subject ([KMIP-Spec] 3.11)
f. X.509 Certificate Issuer ([KMIP-Spec] 3.12)
g. Link ([KMIP-Spec] 3.35 and 9.1.3.2.20)
i. Certificate Link
ii. Public Key Link
iii. Private Key Link
iv. Replacement Object Link
v. Replaced Object Link
h. Certificate Request Type ([KMIP-Spec] 4.7, 4.8 and 9.1.3.2.22)
i. PKCS#10
ii. PEM
a. Key Format Type ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.3 and 9.1.3.2.3)
i. PKCS#1
ii. X.509
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Conformance Clauses to request basic asymmetric key services for central key generation (by the key server). The intent is to simply allow key and certificate creation and serving with very limited key types.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Client if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Client (Central Generation) if it meets the following conditions:
a. Re-Certify ([KMIP-Spec] 4.8)
a. Object Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.3 and 9.1.3.2.12)
i. Certificate
ii. Public Key
iii. Private Key
b. Cryptographic Algorithm ([KMIP-Spec] 3.4 and 9.1.3.2.13)
i. RSA
c. Certificate Type ([KMIP-Spec] 3.8 and 9.1.3.2.6)
i. X.509
d. X.509 Certificate Identifier ([KMIP-Spec] 3.10)
e. X.509 Certificate Subject ([KMIP-Spec] 3.11)
f. X.509 Certificate Issuer ([KMIP-Spec] 3.12)
g. Link ([KMIP-Spec] 3.35 and 9.1.3.2.20)
i. Certificate Link
ii. Public Key Link
iii. Private Key Link
iv. Replacement Object Link
v. Replaced Object Link
h. Certificate Request Type ([KMIP-Spec] 4.7, 4.8 and 9.1.3.2.22)
i. PKCS#10
ii. PEM
a. Key Format Type ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.3 and 9.1.3.2.3)
i. PKCS#1
ii. X.509
iii. Transparent RSA private key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4)
iv. Transparent RSA public key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4)
This proposal intends to meet this OASIS requirement by building on the KMIP Client Conformance Clauses to request services for storage-related capabilities by the key server...
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Storage Client if the implementation meets the conditions as outlined in the following section.
An implementation conforms to this specification as a KMIP Storage Client if it meets the following conditions:
The following individuals have participated in the creation of this specification and are gratefully acknowledged:
Original Authors of the initial contribution:
Bruce Rich, IBM
Subhash Sankuratripati, NetApp
Hal Aldridge, Sypris Electronics
Mike Allen, Symantec
Gordon Arnold, IBM
Todd Arnold, IBM
Matthew Ball, Oracle Corporation
Elaine Barker, NIST
Peter Bartok, Venafi, Inc.
Mathias Björkqvist, IBM
Kelley Burgin, National Security Agency
John Clark, Hewlett-Packard
Tom Clifford, Symantec Corp.
Graydon Dodson, Lexmark International Inc.
Chris Dunn, SafeNet, Inc.
Michael Duren, Sypris Electronics
Paul Earsy, SafeNet, Inc.
Stan Feather, Hewlett-Packard
Indra Fitzgerald, Hewlett-Packard
Alan Frindell, SafeNet, Inc.
Judith Furlong, EMC Corporation
Jonathan Geater, Thales e-Security
Susan Gleeson, Oracle
Robert Griffin, EMC Corporation
Paul Grojean, Individual
Robert Haas, IBM
Thomas Hardjono, M.I.T.
Steve He, Vormetric Inc.
Kurt Heberlein, Hewlett-Packard
Joel Hockey, Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Larry Hofer, Emulex Corporation
Brandon Hoff, Emulex Corporation
Walt Hubis, NetApp
Tim Hudson, Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Jay Jacobs, Target Corporation
Glen Jaquette, IBM
Scott Kipp, Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
Kathy Kriese, Symantec Corporation
David Lawson, Emulex Corporation
John Leiseboer, Quintessence Labs
Hal Lockhart, Oracle Corporation
Robert Lockhart, Thales e-Security
Anne Luk, Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Shyam Mankala, EMC Corporation
Upendra Mardikar, PayPal Inc.
Luther Martin, Voltage Security
Hyrum Mills, Mitre Corporation
Bob Nixon, Emulex Corporation
René Pawlitzek, IBM
John Peck, IBM
Rob Philpott, EMC Corporation
Denis Pochuev, SafeNet, Inc.
Ajai Puri, SafeNet Inc.
Peter Reed, SafeNet Inc.
Bruce Rich, IBM
Warren Robbins, Credant Systems
Saikat Saha, SafeNet, Inc.
Subhash Sankuratripati, NetApp
Mark Schiller, Hewlett-Packard
Brian Spector, Certivox
Terence Spies, Voltage Security
Marcus Streets, Thales e-Security
Kiran Thota, VMware
Sean Turner, IECA, Inc.
Paul Turner, Venafi, Inc.
Marko Vukolić, EURECOM
Rod Wideman, Quantum Corporation
Steven Wierenga, Hewlett-Packard
Peter Yee, EMC Corporation
Krishna Yellepeddy, IBM
Michael Yoder, Voremetric. Inc.
Peter Zelechoski, Election Systems & Software
Magda Zdunkiewicz, Cryptsoft
Revision |
Date |
Editor |
Changes Made |
wd 01 |
2011-05-18 |
Robert Griffin |
Initial revision of KMIP V1.0 Profiles committee draft to include profile test case specifications. |
wd 02 |
2011-07-14 |
Robert Griffin |
Update to include draft client profiles |
wd 03 |
2011-08-2 |
Robert Griffin |
Update to include baseline profiles |
wd 04 |
2011-09-9 |
Robert Griffin |
Update to include storage client profile |
wd 05 |
2011-10-06 |
Robert Griffin |
Update to include required authentication, reformat profiles and clauses, and to remove test scenarios |
wd 06 |
2011-10-19 |
Robert Griffin |
Reformatted in OASIS standards track document format. |
wd 07 |
2011-12-01 |
Robert Griffin |
Incorporates revisions from “KMIP Profiles Conformance Proposal rev 29oct2011” and minor edits... |
wd 08 |
2011-12-17 |
Robert Griffin |
Incorporates editorial corrections. |
wd 09 |
2011-12-20 |
Robert Griffin |
References corrected |
CND |
2012-1-4 |
OASIS admin |
Committee Specification Draft for public review |
wd 10 |
2012-4-4 |
Robert Griffin |
Comments from public review incorporated. |
wd 11 |
2012-4-26 |
Robert Griffin |
Updated contributors list. |