This document is intended as a specification of the protocol
used for the communication (request and response messages) between clients and
servers to perform certain management operations on objects stored and
maintained by a key management system. These objects are referred to as Managed
Objects in this specification. They include symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic keys and digital certificates . Managed Objects are managed with
operations that include the ability to generate cryptographic keys, register
objects with the key management system, obtain objects from the system, destroy
objects from the system, and search for objects maintained by the system.
Managed Objects also have associated attributes, which are named values stored
by the key management system and are obtained from the system via operations.
Certain attributes are added, modified, or deleted by operations.
This specification is complemented by several other
documents. The KMIP Usage Guide [KMIP-UG] provides
illustrative information on using the protocol. The KMIP Profiles Specification
[KMIP-Prof] provides a normative set of base level
conformance profiles and authentication suites that include the specific tests
used to test conformance with the applicable KMIP normative documents. The KMIP
Test Cases [KMIP-TC] provides samples of protocol
messages corresponding to a set of defined test cases that are also used in
conformance testing.
This specification defines the KMIP protocol version major 2
and minor 1 (see 6.1).
This specification is provided under the RF on
RAND Terms Mode of the OASIS IPR Policy,
the mode chosen when the Technical Committee was established. For information
on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to
implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms,
please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the TC’s web page (https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/ipr.php).
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL
NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
For acronyms used in this document, see Appendix BAppendix B. For definitions not found in this document, see [SP800-57-1].
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Archive
|
To place information not accessed frequently into long-term
storage.
|
|
Asymmetric key pair
(key pair)
|
A public key and its corresponding private key; a key pair
is used with a public key algorithm.
|
|
Authentication
|
A process that establishes the origin of information, or
determines an entity’s identity.
|
|
Authentication code
|
A cryptographic checksum based on a security function.
|
|
Authorization
|
Access privileges that are granted to an entity; conveying
an “official” sanction to perform a security function or activity.
|
|
Certificate length
|
The length (in bytes) of an X.509 public key certificate.
|
|
Certification authority
|
The entity in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is
responsible for issuing certificates, and exacting compliance to a PKI
policy.
|
|
Ciphertext
|
Data in its encrypted form.
|
|
Compromise
|
The unauthorized disclosure, modification, substitution or
use of sensitive data (e.g., keying material and other security-related
information).
|
|
Confidentiality
|
The property that sensitive information is not disclosed
to unauthorized entities.
|
|
Cryptographic algorithm
|
A well-defined computational procedure that takes variable
inputs, including a cryptographic key and produces an output.
|
|
Cryptographic key
(key)
|
A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic
algorithm that determines its operation in such a way that an entity with
knowledge of the key can reproduce or reverse the operation, while an entity
without knowledge of the key cannot. Examples include:
1. The transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext
data,
2. The transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext
data,
3. The computation of a digital signature from data,
4. The verification of a digital signature,
5. The computation of an authentication code from data,
and
6. The verification of an authentication code from data
and a received authentication code.
|
|
Decryption
|
The process of changing ciphertext into plaintext using a
cryptographic algorithm and key.
|
|
Digest (or hash)
|
The result of applying a hashing algorithm to information.
|
|
Digital signature
(signature)
|
The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that,
when properly implemented with supporting infrastructure and policy, provides
the services of:
1. origin authentication
2. data integrity, and
3. signer non-repudiation.
|
|
Digital Signature Algorithm
|
A cryptographic algorithm used for digital signature.
|
|
Encryption
|
The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext using a
cryptographic algorithm and key.
|
|
Hashing algorithm (or hash algorithm, hash function)
|
An algorithm that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to
a fixed length bit string. Approved hashing algorithms satisfy the following
properties:
1. (One-way) It is computationally
infeasible to find any input that
maps to any pre-specified output, and
2. (Collision resistant) It is computationally infeasible
to find any two distinct inputs that map to the same output.
|
|
Integrity
|
The property that sensitive data has not been modified or
deleted in an unauthorized and undetected manner.
|
|
Key derivation
(derivation)
|
A function in the lifecycle of keying material; the
process by which one or more keys are derived from:
1) Either a shared secret from a key agreement computation
or a pre-shared cryptographic key, and
2) Other information.
|
|
Key management
|
The activities involving the handling of cryptographic
keys and other related security parameters (e.g., IVs and passwords) during
the entire life cycle of the keys, including their generation, storage,
establishment, entry and output, and destruction.
|
|
Key wrapping
(wrapping)
|
A method of encrypting and/or MACing/signing keys.
|
|
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
|
A cryptographic checksum on data that uses a symmetric key
to detect both accidental and intentional modifications of data.
|
|
PGP Key
|
A RFC 4880-compliant container of cryptographic keys and
associated metadata. Usually text-based (in PGP-parlance, ASCII-armored).
|
|
Private key
|
A cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic
algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and is not made public.
The private key is associated with a public key. Depending on the algorithm,
the private key MAY be used to:
1. Compute the corresponding public key,
2. Compute a digital signature that can be verified by the
corresponding public key,
3. Decrypt data that was encrypted by the corresponding
public key, or
4. Compute a piece of common shared data, together with
other information.
|
|
Profile
|
A specification of objects, attributes, operations,
message elements and authentication methods to be used in specific contexts
of key management server and client interactions (see [KMIP-Prof]).
|
|
Public key
|
A cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic
algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and that MAY be made
public. The public key is associated with a private key. The public key MAY
be known by anyone and, depending on the algorithm, MAY be used to:
1. Verify a digital signature that is signed by the
corresponding private key,
2. Encrypt data that can be decrypted by the corresponding
private key, or
3. Compute a piece of shared data.
|
|
Public key certificate
(certificate)
|
A set of data that uniquely identifies an entity, contains
the entity's public key and possibly other information, and is digitally signed
by a trusted party, thereby binding the public key to the entity.
|
|
Public key cryptographic algorithm
|
A cryptographic algorithm that uses two related keys, a
public key and a private key. The two keys have the property that determining
the private key from the public key is computationally infeasible.
|
|
Public Key Infrastructure
|
A framework that is established to issue, maintain and
revoke public key certificates.
|
|
Recover
|
To retrieve information that was archived to long-term
storage.
|
|
Split Key
|
A process by which a cryptographic key is split into n multiple
key components, individually providing no knowledge of the original key,
which can be subsequently combined to recreate the original cryptographic
key. If knowledge of k (where k is less than or equal to n)
components is necessary to construct the original key, then knowledge of any k-1
key components provides no information about the original key other than,
possibly, its length.
|
|
Symmetric key
|
A single cryptographic key that is used with a secret (symmetric)
key algorithm.
|
|
Symmetric key algorithm
|
A cryptographic algorithm that uses the same secret
(symmetric) key for an operation and its inverse (e.g., encryption and
decryption).
|
|
X.509 certificate
|
The ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard defined two types of
certificates – the X.509 public key certificate, and the X.509 attribute
certificate. Most commonly (including this document), an X.509 certificate
refers to the X.509 public key certificate.
|
|
X.509 public key certificate
|
The public key for a user
(or device) and a name for the user (or device), together with some other
information, rendered un-forgeable by the digital signature of the
certification authority that issued the certificate, encoded in the format
defined in the ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard.
|
Table 1: Terminology
[AWS-SIGV4] Authenticating
Requests (AWS Signature Version 4) https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sig-v4-authenticating-
requests.htm
[CHACHA] D. J. Bernstein.
ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20. https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
[ECC-Brainpool] M. Lochter, J. Merkle, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, IETF RFC 5639, March 2010, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5639.
[FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB
186-4, March 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips18-4/fips-180-4.pdf.
[FIPS186-4] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS
PUB 186-4, July 2013, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf.
[FIPS197] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS
PUB 197, November 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf.
[FIPS198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
(HMAC), FIPS PUB 198-1, July 2008, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf.
[FIPS202] SHA-3
Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, August 2015. http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
[IEEE1003-1] IEEE
Std 1003.1, Standard for information technology - portable operating system
interface (POSIX). Shell and utilities, 2004.
[ISO16609] ISO, Banking
-- Requirements for message authentication using symmetric techniques, ISO
16609, 2012.
[ISO9797-1] ISO/IEC, Information
technology -- Security techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs) --
Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, ISO/IEC 9797-1, 2011.
[KMIP-Prof] Key Management Interoperability Protocol
Profiles Version 2.1. Edited by Tim Chevalier and Tim Hudson. Latest stage:
https://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/kmip-profiles/v2.1/kmip-profiles-v2.1.html.
[PKCS#1] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA
Cryptography Standard, June 14, 2002, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017
[PKCS#5] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #5 v2.1: Password-Based
Cryptography Standard, October 5, 2006, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8018.
[PKCS#8] RSA Laboratories, PKCS#8 v1.2:
Private-Key Information Syntax Standard, November 1, 1993, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5208.
[PKCS#10] RSA
Laboratories, PKCS #10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax Standard,
May 26, 2000, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2986.
[PKCS#11] PKCS #11
Cryptographic Token Interface Base Specification Version 3.0. Edited by Chris
Zimman and Dieter Bong. 15 June 2020. OASIS Standard. https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-base/v3.0/os/pkcs11-base-v3.0-os.html.
Latest stage: https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-base/v3.0/pkcs11-base-v3.0.html.
[POLY1305] Daniel J.
Bernstein. The Poly1305-AES Message-Authentication Code. In Henri
Gilbert and Helena Handschuh, editors, Fast Software Encryption: 12th International
Workshop, FSE 2005, Paris, France, February 21-23, 2005, Revised Selected
Papers, volume 3557 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 32–49.
Springer, 2005.
[RFC1319] B. Kaliski, The MD2 Message-Digest
Algorithm, IETF RFC 1319, Apr 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt.
[RFC1320] R. Rivest, The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm,
IETF RFC 1320, April 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt.
[RFC1321] R. Rivest, The MD5 Message-Digest
Algorithm, IETF RFC 1321, April 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt.
[RFC1421] J. Linn, Privacy Enhancement for
Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication
Procedures, IETF RFC 1421, February 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1421.txt.
[RFC1424] B. Kaliski, Privacy
Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key Certification and
Related Services, IETF RFC 1424, Feb 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1424.txt.
[RFC2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, IETF RFC 2104, February 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt.
[RFC2119] Bradner,
S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, BCP 14, RFC
2119, March 1997. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt.
[RFC2898] B. Kaliski, PKCS #5: Password-Based
Cryptography Specification Version 2.0, IETF RFC 2898, September 2000, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt.
[RFC2986] M. Nystrom and
B. Kaliski, PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version
1.7, IETF RFC2986, November 2000, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt.
[RFC3447] J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski, Public-Key
Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,
IETF RFC 3447, Feb 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt.
[RFC3629] F. Yergeau, UTF-8, a transformation format
of ISO 10646, IETF RFC 3629, November 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3629.txt.
[RFC3686] R. Housley, Using Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) Counter Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),
IETF RFC 3686, January 2004, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3686.txt.
[RFC4210] C. Adams, S. Farrell, T. Kause and T.
Mononen, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP), IETF RFC 4210, September 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4210.txt.
[RFC4211] J. Schaad, Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF), IETF RFC 4211,
September 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4211.txt.
[RFC4880] J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, D.
Shaw, and R. Thayer, OpenPGP Message Format, IETF RFC 4880, November
2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt.
[RFC4949] R. Shirey, Internet
Security Glossary, Version 2, IETF RFC 4949, August 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt.
[RFC5272] J. Schaad and M. Meyers, Certificate
Management over CMS (CMC), IETF RFC 5272, June 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5272.txt.
[RFC5280] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S.
Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate, IETF RFC 5280, May 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt.
[RFC5639] M. Lochter, J. Merkle, Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, IETF RFC
5639, March 2010, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt.
[RFC5869] H.
Krawczyk, HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF), IETF
RFC5869, May 2010, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
[RFC5958] S. Turner,
Asymmetric Key Packages, IETF RFC5958, August 2010, https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5958.txt
[RFC6402] J. Schaad, Certificate
Management over CMS (CMC) Updates, IETF RFC6402, November 2011, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6402.txt.
[RFC6818] P. Yee, Updates
to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile, IETF RFC6818, January 2013, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6818.txt.
[RFC7778] A.
Langley, M. Hamburg, S. Turner Elliptic Curves for Security, IETF
RFC7748, January 2016, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748
[SEC2] SEC
2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters, http://www.secg.org/SEC2-Ver-1.0.pdf.
[SP800-38A] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation – Methods and Techniques, NIST Special Publication
800-38A, December 2001, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf
[SP800-38B] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, NIST Special
Publication 800-38B, May 2005, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38b.pdf
[SP800-38C] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality,
NIST Special Publication 800-38C, May 2004, updated July 2007 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
[SP800-38D] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, NIST Special
Publication 800-38D, Nov 2007, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf.
[SP800-38E] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Block-Oriented
Storage Devices, NIST Special Publication 800-38E, January 2010, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38e.pdf.
[SP800-56A] E. Barker, L. Chen, A. Roginsky and M. Smid, Recommendation
for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography,
NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, May 2013, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar2.pdf.
[SP800-57-1] E. Barker, W. Barker, W. Burr, W. Polk, and M.
Smid, Recommendations for Key Management - Part 1: General (Revision 3),
NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 3, July 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_part1_rev3_general.pdf.
[SP800-108] L. Chen, Recommendation for Key Derivation
Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), NIST Special Publication 800-108,
Oct 2009, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-108.pdf.
[X.509] International
Telecommunication Union (ITU)–T, X.509: Information technology – Open systems
interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks, November 2008, https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509-200811-S
PDF: https://www.itu.int/rec/dologin_pub.asp?lang=e&id=T-REC-X.509-200811-S!!PDF-E&type=items.
[X9.24-1] ANSI, X9.24
- Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management - Part 1: Using Symmetric
Techniques, 2009.
[X9.31] ANSI, X9.31:
Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry (rDSA), September 1998.
[X9.42] ANSI, X9.42: Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Agreement of Symmetric Keys
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, 2003.
[X9.62] ANSI, X9.62: Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005.
[X9.63] ANSI, X9.63: Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key
Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2011.
[X9.102] ANSI, X9.102:
Symmetric Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Wrapping of Keys
and Associated Data, 2008.
[X9 TR-31] ANSI, X9 TR-31: Interoperable Secure Key
Exchange Key Block Specification for Symmetric Algorithms, 2010.
[ISO/IEC 9945-2] The
Open Group, Regular Expressions, The Single UNIX Specification version 2, 1997, ISO/IEC 9945-2:1993, http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007908799/xbd/re.html.
[KMIP-UG] Key Management Interoperability Protocol
Usage Guide Version 2.1. Edited by Judith Furlong and Jeff Bartell. Latest
stage: https://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/kmip-ug/v2.1/kmip-ug-v2.1.html.
[KMIP-TC] Key Management Interoperability Protocol
Test Cases Version 2.1. Edited by Tim Chevalier and Tim Hudson. Latest
stage: https://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/kmip-testcases/v2.1/kmip-testcases-v2.1.html.
[RFC6151] S. Turner and L. Chen, Updated
Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms,
IETF RFC6151, March 2011, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6151.txt.
[w1979] A. Shamir, How to share a secret,
Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 612-613, November 1979.
[RFC7292] K. Moriarty, M. Nystrom, S.
Parkinson, A. Rusch, M. Scott. PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange
Syntax v1.1, July 2014, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292
The following are the data types of which all items
(Objects, Attributes and Messages) are composed of Integer, Long Integer, Big
Integer, Enumeration, Boolean, Text String, Byte String, Date Time, Interval,
Date Time Extended, and Structure.
Managed Objects are objects that are the subjects of key
management operations. Managed Cryptographic Objects are the subset of
Managed Objects that contain cryptographic material.
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a digital
certificate. It is a DER-encoded X.509 public key certificate.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Certificate
|
Structure
|
|
|
Certificate Type
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
|
Certificate Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 2: Certificate Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object containing the Certificate
Request.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Certificate Request
|
Structure
|
|
|
Certificate Request
Type
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
|
Certificate Request
Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 3: Certificate Request Structure
A Managed Object that the key management server is
possibly not able to interpret. The context information for this object MAY be
stored and retrieved using Custom Attributes.
An Opaque Object MAY be a Managed Cryptographic Object
depending on the client context of usage and as such is treated in the same
manner as a Managed Cryptographic Object for handling of attributes.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Opaque Object
|
Structure
|
|
|
Opaque Data Type
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
|
Opaque Data Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 4: Opaque Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a text-based representation
of a PGP key. The Key Block field, indicated below, will contain the
ASCII-armored export of a PGP key in the format as specified in RFC 4880. It MAY
contain only a public key block, or both a public and private key block. Two
different versions of PGP keys, version 3 and version 4, MAY be stored in this
Managed Cryptographic Object.
KMIP implementers SHOULD treat the Key Block field as an
opaque blob. PGP-aware KMIP clients SHOULD take on the responsibility of
decomposing the Key Block into other Managed Cryptographic Objects (Public
Keys, Private Keys, etc.).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
PGP Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
PGP Key Version
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Key Block
|
Object Data Structure
|
Yes
|
Table 5: PGP Key Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the private portion
of an asymmetric key pair.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Private Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Block
|
Object Data Structure
|
Yes
|
Table 6: Private Key Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the public portion
of an asymmetric key pair. This is only a public key, not a certificate.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Public Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Block
|
Object Data Structure
|
Yes
|
Table 7: Public Key Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object containing a shared secret
value that is not a key or certificate (e.g., a password). The Key Block of the
Secret Data object contains a Key Value of the Secret Data Type. The Key
Value MAY be wrapped.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Secret Data
|
Structure
|
|
|
Secret Data Type
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
|
Key Block
|
Object Data Structure
|
Yes
|
Table 8: Secret Data Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a Split Key.
A split key is a secret, usually a symmetric key or a private key that has been
split into a number of parts, each of which MAY then be distributed to several
key holders, for additional security. The Split Key Parts field
indicates the total number of parts, and the Split Key Threshold field
indicates the minimum number of parts needed to reconstruct the entire key. The
Key Part Identifier indicates which key part is contained in the
cryptographic object, and SHALL be at least 1 and SHALL be less than or equal
to Split Key Parts.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Split Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Split Key Parts
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Key Part Identifier
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Split Key Threshold
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Split Key Method
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
|
Prime Field Size
|
Big Integer
|
No, REQUIRED only if Split Key Method is Polynomial
Sharing Prime Field.
|
|
Key Block
|
Object Data Structure
|
Yes
|
Table 9: Split Key Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a symmetric key.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Symmetric Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure
|
Yes
|
Table 10: Symmetric Key Object Structure
3.1 Key Block
A Key Block object is a structure used to
encapsulate all of the information that is closely associated with a
cryptographic key.
The Key Block MAY contain the Key Compression Type, which
indicates the format of the elliptic curve public key. By default, the public key
is uncompressed.
The Key Block also has the Cryptographic Algorithm and the
Cryptographic Length of the key contained in the Key Value field. Some example
values are:
|
Value
|
Description
|
|
RSA keys
|
Typically 1024, 2048 or 3072 bits in length.
|
|
3DES keys
|
Typically from 112 to 192 bits (depending upon key
length and the presence of parity bits).
|
|
AES keys
|
128, 192 or 256 bits in length
|
Table 11: Key Block Cryptographic Algorithm &
Length Description
The Key Block SHALL contain a Key Wrapping Data structure
if the key in the Key Value field is wrapped (i.e., encrypted, or MACed/signed,
or both).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Format Type
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
|
Key Compression Type
|
Enumeration
|
No
|
|
Key Value
|
Byte String: for wrapped Key Value; Structure: for
plaintext Key Value
|
No
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
Enumeration
|
Yes. MAY be omitted only if this information is available from the
Key Value. Does not apply to Secret Data or Opaque If present, the
Cryptographic Length SHALL also be present.
|
|
Cryptographic Length
|
Integer
|
Yes. MAY be omitted only if this information is available from the
Key Value. Does not apply to Secret Data (or Opaque. If present, the
Cryptographic Algorithm SHALL also be present.
|
|
Key Wrapping Data
|
Object Data Structure
|
No. SHALL only be present if the key is wrapped.
|
Table 12: Key Block Object
Structure
The Key Value is used only inside a Key Block and
is either a Byte String or a:
·
The Key Value structure contains the key material, either as a
byte string or as a Transparent Key structure, and OPTIONAL attribute
information that is associated and encapsulated with the key material. This
attribute information differs from the attributes associated with Managed
Objects, and is obtained via the Get Attributes operation, only by the fact
that it is encapsulated with (and possibly wrapped with) the key material
itself.
·
The Key Value Byte String is either the wrapped TTLV-encoded Key
Value structure, or the wrapped un-encoded value of the Byte String Key
Material field.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Value
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Material
|
Byte String: for Raw, Opaque, PKCS1, PKCS8,
ECPrivateKey, or Extension Key Format types;
Structure:
for Transparent, or Extension Key Format Types
|
Yes
|
|
Attributes
|
Structure
|
No
|
Table 13: Key Value Object
Structure
The Key Block MAY also supply OPTIONAL information about a
cryptographic key wrapping mechanism used to wrap the Key Value. This consists
of a Key Wrapping Data structure. It is
only used inside a Key Block.
This structure contains fields for:
|
Value
|
Description
|
|
Wrapping Method
|
Indicates the method used to wrap the Key Value.
|
|
Encryption Key Information
|
Contains the Unique Identifier value of the
encryption key and associated cryptographic parameters.
|
|
MAC/Signature Key Information
|
Contains the Unique Identifier value of the
MAC/signature key and associated cryptographic parameters.
|
|
MAC/Signature
|
Contains a MAC or signature of the Key Value
|
|
IV/Counter/Nonce
|
If REQUIRED by the wrapping method.
|
|
Encoding Option
|
Specifies the encoding of the Key Material within
the Key Value structure of the Key Block that has been wrapped. If No
Encoding is specified, then the Key Value structure SHALL NOT contain any
attributes.
|
Table 14: Key Wrapping Data Structure Description
If wrapping is used, then the whole Key Value structure is
wrapped unless otherwise specified by the Wrapping Method. The algorithms used
for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic Algorithm attributes of the
encryption key and/or MAC/signature key; the block-cipher mode, padding method,
and hashing algorithm used for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic
Parameters in the Encryption Key Information and/or MAC/Signature Key Information,
or, if not present, from the Cryptographic Parameters attribute of the
respective key(s). Either the Encryption Key Information or the MAC/Signature
Key Information (or both) in the Key Wrapping Data structure SHALL be specified.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Wrapping Data
|
Structure
|
|
|
Wrapping Method
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
|
Encryption Key
Information
|
Structure, see below
|
No. Corresponds to the key that was used to encrypt the Key Value.
|
|
MAC/Signature Key
Information
|
Structure, see below
|
No. Corresponds to the symmetric key used
to MAC the Key Value or the private key used to sign the Key Value
|
|
MAC/Signature
|
Byte String
|
No
|
|
IV/Counter/Nonce
|
Byte String
|
No
|
|
Encoding Option
|
Enumeration
|
No. Specifies the encoding of the Key Value Byte
String. If not present, the wrapped Key Value structure SHALL be TTLV
encoded.
|
Table 15: Key Wrapping Data Object Structure
The structures of the Encryption
Key Information and the MAC/Signature Key Information are as follows:
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Encryption Key Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Unique Identifier
|
Text string
|
Yes
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters
|
Structure
|
No
|
Table 16: Encryption Key Information Object Structure
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
MAC/Signature Key Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Unique Identifier
|
Text string
|
Yes. It SHALL be either the Unique
Identifier of the Symmetric Key used to MAC, or of the Private Key (or its
corresponding Public Key) used to sign.
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters
|
Structure
|
No
|
Table 17: MAC/Signature Key Information Object Structure
3.4 Transparent Symmetric Key
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent Symmetric Key, then Key Material is a structure.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 18: Key Material Object Structure
for Transparent Symmetric Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
X
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 19: Key Material Object
Structure for Transparent DSA Private Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Y
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 20: Key Material Object
Structure for Transparent DSA Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent RSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Modulus
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Private Exponent
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Public Exponent
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Prime Exponent P
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Prime Exponent Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
CRT Coefficient
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
Table 21: Key Material Object Structure for
Transparent RSA Private Keys
One of the following SHALL be
present (refer to [PKCS#1]):
·
Private Exponent,
·
P and Q (the first two prime factors of Modulus), or
·
Prime Exponent P and Prime Exponent Q.
3.8 Transparent
RSA Public Key
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent RSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Modulus
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Public Exponent
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 22: Key Material Object
Structure for Transparent RSA Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DH Private Key, then Key Material is a structure.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
J
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
X
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 23: Key Material Object Structure for
Transparent DH Private Keys
3.10 Transparent
DH Public Key
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DH Public Key, then Key Material is a.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
J
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Y
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 24: Key Material Object Structure for
Transparent DH Public Keys
3.11 Transparent EC Private Key
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent EC Private Key, then Key Material is a structure.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
|
D
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table
25: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent EC Private Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent EC Public Key, then Key Material is a structure.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
|
Q String
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table
26: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent EC Public Keys
The following subsections describe the attributes that are
associated with Managed Objects. Attributes that an object MAY have multiple
instances of are referred to as multi-instance attributes. All instances
of an attribute SHOULD have a different value. Similarly, attributes which an
object SHALL only have at most one instance of are referred to as single-instance
attributes. Attributes are able to be obtained by a client from the server
using the Get Attribute operation. Some attributes are able to be set by the
Add Attribute operation or updated by the Modify Attribute operation, and some
are able to be deleted by the Delete Attribute operation if they no longer
apply to the Managed Object. Read-only attributes are attributes that
SHALL NOT be modified by either server or client, and that SHALL NOT be deleted
by a client.
When attributes are returned by the server (e.g., via a
Get Attributes operation), the attribute value returned SHALL NOT differ for
different clients unless specifically noted against each attribute.
The first table in each subsection contains the attribute
name in the first row. This name is the canonical name used when managing
attributes using the Get Attributes, Get Attribute List, Add Attribute, Modify
Attribute, and Delete Attribute operations.
A server SHALL NOT delete attributes without receiving a
request from a client until the object is destroyed. After an object is
destroyed, the server MAY retain all, some or none of the object attributes,
depending on the object type and server policy.
The second table in each subsection lists certain
attribute characteristics (e.g., “SHALL always have a value. The server policy
MAY further restrict these attribute characteristics.
|
SHALL always have a value
|
All Managed Objects that are of the Object Types for which this
attribute applies, SHALL always have this attribute set once the object has
been created or registered, up until the object has been destroyed.
|
|
Initially set by
|
Who is permitted to initially set the value of the attribute (if the
attribute has never been set, or if all the attribute values have been
deleted)?
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Is the server allowed to change an existing value of the attribute
without receiving a request from a client?
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Is the client able to change an existing value of the attribute value
once it has been set?
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Is the client able to delete an instance of the attribute?
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Are multiple instances of the attribute permitted?
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Which operations MAY cause this attribute to be set even if the
attribute is not specified in the operation request itself?
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Which Managed Objects MAY have this attribute set?
|
Table
27: Attribute Rules
There are default values for some mandatory attributes of
Cryptographic Objects. The values in use by a particular server are available
via Query. KMIP servers SHALL supply values for these attributes if the client
omits them.
|
Object
|
Attribute
|
|
Symmetric Key
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
Cryptographic Length
Cryptographic Usage Mask
|
|
Private Key
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
Cryptographic Length
Cryptographic Usage Mask
|
|
Public Key
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
Cryptographic Length
Cryptographic Usage Mask
|
|
Certificate
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
Cryptographic Length
Digital Signature Algorithm
|
|
Split Key
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
Cryptographic Length
Cryptographic Usage Mask
|
|
Secret Data
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask
|
Table 28: Default Cryptographic Parameters
The Activation Date attribute contains the date and
time when the Managed Object MAY begin to be used. This time corresponds to
state transition. The object SHALL NOT be used for any cryptographic purpose
before the Activation Date has been reached. Once the state transition
from Pre-Active has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or
deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Activation Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 29: Activation Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active state
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active state
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key,
Activate Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 30: Activation Date Attribute Rules
The Alternative Name attribute is used to
identify and locate the object. This attribute is assigned by the client, and
the Alternative Name Value is intended to be in a form that humans
are able to interpret. The key management system MAY specify rules by which the
client creates valid alternative names. Clients are informed of such rules by a
mechanism that is not specified by this standard. Alternative Names MAY NOT be
unique within a given key management server.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Alternative Name
|
Structure
|
|
|
Alternative Name Value
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Alternative Name Type
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
Table 31: Alternative Name Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes (Only if no value present)
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 32: Alternative Name Attribute Rules
The server SHALL create this attribute, and set it to True if
the Sensitive attribute has always been True. The server SHALL set it to False
if the Sensitive attribute has ever been set to False.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Sensitive
|
Boolean
|
Table 33: Always Sensitive Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
When Sensitive attribute is set or changed
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 34: Always Sensitive Attribute Rules
The Application Specific Information attribute is a
structure used to store data specific to the application(s) using the Managed
Object. It consists of the following fields: an Application Namespace
and Application Data specific to that application namespace.
Clients MAY request to set (i.e., using any of the
operations that result in new Managed Object(s) on the server or
adding/modifying the attribute of an existing Managed Object an instance of
this attribute with a particular Application Namespace while omitting Application
Data. In that case, if the server supports this namespace (as indicated by
the Query operation), then it SHALL return a suitable Application Data
value. If the server does not support this namespace, then an error SHALL be
returned.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Application Specific Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Application Namespace
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Application Data
|
Text String
|
No
|
Table 35: Application Specific Information Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server (only if the Application Data is
omitted, in the client request)
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes (only if the Application Data is omitted in the
client request)
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key
Key Pair, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 36: Application Specific Information Attribute
Rules
The Archive Date attribute is the date and time
when the Managed Object was placed in archival storage. This value is set by
the server as a part of the Archive operation. The server SHALL delete this
attribute whenever a Recover operation is performed.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Archive Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 37: Archive Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Archive
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 38: Archive Date Attribute Rules
The Certificate Attributes are the various items included in
a certificate. The following list is based on RFC2253.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Certificate Subject CN
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Subject O
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Subject OU
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Subject Email
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Subject C
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Subject ST
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Subject L
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Subject UID
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Subject Serial Number
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Subject Title
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Subject DC
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Subject DN Qualifier
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer CN
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer O
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer OU
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer Email
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer C
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer ST
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer L
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer UID
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer Serial Number
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer Title
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer DC
|
Text String
|
|
Certificate Issuer DN Qualifier
|
Text String
|
Table 39: Certificate Attributes
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 40: Certificate Attribute
Rules
The Certificate Type attribute is a type of
certificate (e.g., X.509).
The Certificate Type value SHALL be set by the
server when the certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be
changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
|
Certificate Type
|
Enumeration
|
|
Table 41: Certificate Type Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 42: Certificate Type Attribute Rules
The Certificate Length attribute is the length in
bytes of the Certificate object. The Certificate Length SHALL be set by
the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be
changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Certificate Length
|
Integer
|
Table 43: Certificate Length Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 44: Certificate Length Attribute Rules
The Comment attribute is used for descriptive purposes only.
It is not used for policy enforcement. The attribute is set by the client or
the server.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Description
|
Text String
|
Table 45: Comment Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 46: Comment Rules
The Compromise Date attribute contains the date and
time when the Managed Cryptographic Object entered into the compromised state.
This time corresponds to state transitions 3, 5, 8, or 10. This time indicates
when the key management system was made aware of the compromise, not
necessarily when the compromise occurred. This attribute is set by the server
when it receives a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason containing
a Revocation Reason Code of Compromised code, or due to server policy or
out-of-band administrative action.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Compromise Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 47: Compromise Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Revoke
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 48: Compromise Date Attribute Rules
The Compromise Occurrence Date attribute is the
date and time when the Managed Object was first believed to be compromised. If
it is not possible to estimate when the compromise occurred, then this value
SHOULD be set to the Initial Date for the object.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Compromise Occurrence Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 49: Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Revoke
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 50: Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute Rules
The Contact Information attribute is used for
descriptive purposes only. It is not used for policy enforcement. The attribute
is set by the client or the server.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Contact Information
|
Text String
|
Table 51: Contact Information Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 52: Contact Information Attribute Rules
The Cryptographic Algorithm of an object. The Cryptographic
Algorithm of a Certificate object identifies the algorithm for the public key
contained within the Certificate. The digital signature algorithm used to sign
the Certificate is identified in the Digital Signature Algorithm attribute.
This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or
registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is
destroyed.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
Enumeration
|
Table
53: Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes (except for Secret Data and Opaque Object)
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Certify, Create, Create Key Pair, Re-certify, Register,
Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 54: Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute Rules
The Cryptographic Domain Parameters attribute is a
structure that contains fields that MAY need to be specified in the Create Key
Pair Request Payload. Specific fields MAY only pertain to certain types of
Managed Cryptographic Objects.
The domain parameter Qlength correponds to the bit length
of parameter Q (refer to [RFC7778], [SEC2] and [SP800-56A]).
Qlength applies to algorithms such as DSA and DH. The bit
length of parameter P (refer to to [RFC7778], [SEC2] and [SP800-56A])
is specified separately by setting the Cryptographic Length attribute.
Recommended Curve is applicable to elliptic curve
algorithms such as ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
Required
|
|
Cryptographic Domain Parameters
|
Structure
|
Yes
|
|
Qlength
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Recommended Curve
|
Enumeration
|
No
|
Table 55: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute
Structure
|
Shall always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key
Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Public Keys, Private Keys
|
Table 56: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute
Rules
For keys, Cryptographic Length is the length in
bits of the clear-text cryptographic key material of the Managed Cryptographic
Object. For certificates, Cryptographic Length is the length in bits of
the public key contained within the Certificate. This attribute SHALL be set by
the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be
changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Cryptographic Length
|
Integer
|
Table
57: Cryptographic Length Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes (Except for Opaque Object)
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Certify, Create, Create Key Pair, Re-certify,
Register, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key
Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 58: Cryptographic Length Attribute Rules
The Cryptographic Parameters attribute is a
structure that contains a set of OPTIONAL fields that describe certain
cryptographic parameters to be used when performing cryptographic operations
using the object. Specific fields MAY pertain only to certain types of Managed
Objects. The Cryptographic Parameters attribute of a Certificate object
identifies the cryptographic parameters of the public key contained within the
Certificate.
The Cryptographic Algorithm is also used to specify the
parameters for cryptographic operations. For operations involving digital
signatures, either the Digital Signature Algorithm can be specified or the
Cryptographic Algorithm and Hashing Algorithm combination can be specified.
Random IV can be used to request that the KMIP server
generate an appropriate IV for a cryptographic operation that uses an IV. The
generated Random IV is returned in the response to the cryptographic operation.
IV Length is the length of the Initialization Vector in
bits. This parameter SHALL be provided when the specified Block Cipher Mode
supports variable IV lengths such as CTR or GCM.
Tag Length is the length of the authenticator tag in
bytes. This parameter SHALL be provided when the Block Cipher Mode is GCM.
The IV used with counter modes of operation (e.g., CTR and
GCM) cannot repeat for a given cryptographic key. To prevent an IV/key reuse,
the IV is often constructed of three parts: a fixed field, an invocation field,
and a counter as described in [SP800-38A] and [SP800-38D]. The Fixed Field Length is the length of the
fixed field portion of the IV in bits. The Invocation Field Length is the
length of the invocation field portion of the IV in bits. The Counter Length is
the length of the counter portion of the IV in bits.
Initial Counter Value is the starting counter value for
CTR mode (for [RFC3686] it is 1).
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters
|
Structure
|
|
|
Block Cipher Mode
|
Enumeration
|
No
|
|
Padding Method
|
Enumeration
|
No
|
|
Hashing Algorithm
|
Enumeration
|
No
|
|
Key Role Type
|
Enumeration
|
No
|
|
Digital Signature
Algorithm
|
Enumeration
|
No
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
Enumeration
|
No
|
|
Random IV
|
Boolean
|
No
|
|
IV Length
|
Integer
|
No unless Block Cipher Mode supports variable IV
lengths
|
|
Tag Length
|
Integer
|
No unless Block Cipher Mode is GCM
|
|
Fixed Field Length
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Invocation Field Length
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Counter Length
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Initial Counter Value
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Salt Length
|
Integer
|
No (if omitted, defaults to the block size of the
Mask Generator Hashing Algorithm)
|
|
Mask Generator
|
Enumeration
|
No (if omitted defaults to MGF1).
|
|
Mask Generator Hashing Algorithm
|
Enumeration
|
No. (if omitted defaults to SHA-1).
|
|
P Source
|
Byte String
|
No (if omitted, defaults to an empty byte string for
encoding input P in OAEP padding)
|
|
Trailer Field
|
Integer
|
No (if omitted, defaults to the standard one-byte
trailer in PSS padding)
|
Table 59: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key
Key Pair, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table
60: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Rules
The Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute defines the
cryptographic usage of a key. This is a bit mask that indicates to the client
which cryptographic functions MAY be performed using the key, and which ones
SHALL NOT be performed.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask
|
Integer
|
Table 61: Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes (Except for Opaque Object)
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key,
Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key
Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 62: Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute Rules
The Deactivation Date attribute is the date and
time when the Managed Object SHALL NOT be used for any purpose, except for
decryption, signature verification, or unwrapping, but only under extraordinary
circumstances and only when special permission is granted. This time
corresponds to state transition 6. This attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted
before the object is destroyed, unless the object is in the Pre-Active or
Active state.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Deactivation Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 63: Deactivation Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key,
Revoke Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 64: Deactivation Date Attribute Rules
The Description attribute is used for descriptive purposes
only. It is not used for policy enforcement. The attribute is set by the client
or the server.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Description
|
Text String
|
Table 65: Description Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 66: Description Attribute Rules
The Destroy Date attribute is the date and time
when the Managed Object was destroyed. This time corresponds to state
transitions 2, 7, or 9 This value is set by the server when the object is
destroyed due to the reception of a Destroy operation, or due to server policy or
out-of-band administrative action.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Destroy Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 67: Destroy Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Destroy
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 68: Destroy Date Attribute Rules
The Digest attribute is a structure that contains
the digest value of the key or secret data (i.e., digest of the Key Material),
certificate (i.e., digest of the Certificate Value), or opaque object (i.e.,
digest of the Opaque Data Value). If the Key Material is a Byte String, then
the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on this Byte String. If the Key Material is
a structure, then the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on the TTLV-encoded Key
Material structure. The Key Format Type field in the Digest attribute indicates
the format of the Managed Object from which the Digest Value was calculated. Multiple
digests MAY be calculated using different algorithms and/or key format types.
If this attribute exists, then it SHALL have a mandatory attribute instance computed
with the SHA-256 hashing algorithm and the default Key Value Format for this
object type and algorithm. Clients may request via supplying a non-default Key
Format Value attribute on operations that create a Managed Object, and the
server SHALL produce an additional Digest attribute for that Key Value Type.
The digest(s) are static and SHALL be set by the server when the object is
created or registered, provided that the server has access to the Key Material
or the Digest Value (possibly obtained via out-of-band mechanisms).
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Digest
|
Structure
|
|
|
Hashing Algorithm
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
|
Digest Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes, if the server has access to the Digest Value or
the Key Material (for keys and secret data), the Certificate Value (for certificates)
or the Opaque Data Value (for opaque objects).
|
|
Key Format Type
|
Enumeration
|
Yes, if the Managed Object is a key or secret data
object.
|
Table 69: Digest Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes, if the server has access to the Digest Value or
the Key Material (for keys and secret data), the Certificate Value (for
certificates) or the Opaque Data Value (for opaque objects).
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify,
Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 70: Digest Attribute Rules
The Digital Signature Algorithm attribute
identifies the digital signature algorithm associated with a digitally signed
object (e.g., Certificate). This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the
object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before
the object is destroyed.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Digital Signature Algorithm
|
Enumeration
|
Table 71: Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes for PGP keys. No for X.509 certificates.
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Certify, Re-certify, Register
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates, PGP keys
|
Table 72: Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute Rules
If False then the server SHALL prevent the object value being
retrieved. The server SHALL set its value to True if not provided by the
client.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Extractable
|
Boolean
|
Table 73: Extractable Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
When object is created or registered
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 74: Extractable Attribute Rules
The Fresh attribute is a Boolean attribute that
indicates that the object has not yet been served to a client using a Get
operation. The Fresh attribute SHALL be set to True when a new object is
created on the server unless the client provides a False value in Register or
Import. The server SHALL change the attribute value to False as soon as the
object has been served via the Get operation to a client.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Fresh
|
Boolean
|
Table 75: Fresh Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key,
Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 76: Fresh Attribute Rules
The Initial Date attribute contains the date and
time when the Managed Object was first created or registered at the server.
This time corresponds to state transition 1. This attribute SHALL be set by the
server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be changed
or deleted before the object is destroyed. This attribute is also set for
non-cryptographic objects when they are first registered with the server.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Initial Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 77: Initial Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key,
Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 78: Initial Date Attribute Rules
The Key Format Type attribute is a required attribute of a
Cryptographic Object. It is set by the server, but a particular Key Format Type
MAY be requested by the client if the cryptographic material is produced by the
server (i.e., Create, Create Key Pair, Create Split Key, Re-key, Re-key Key
Pair, Derive Key) on the client’s behalf. The server SHALL comply with the
client’s requested format or SHALL fail the request. When the server calculates
a Digest for the object, it SHALL compute the digest on the data in the
assigned Key Format Type, as well as a digest in the default KMIP Key Format
Type for that type of key and the algorithm requested (if a non-default value
is specified).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Key Format Type
|
Enumeration
|
Table 79: Key Format Type Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 80: Key Format Type Attribute Rules
Keys have a default Key Format Type that SHALL be produced
by KMIP servers. The default Key Format Type by object (and algorithm) is
listed in the following table:
|
Object
|
Default Key Format Type
|
|
Certificate
|
X.509
|
|
Certificate Request
|
PKCS#10
|
|
Opaque Object
|
Opaque
|
|
PGP Key
|
Raw
|
|
Secret Data
|
Raw
|
|
Symmetric Key
|
Raw
|
|
Split Key
|
Raw
|
|
RSA Private Key
|
PKCS#1
|
|
RSA Public Key
|
PKCS#1
|
|
EC Private Key
|
Transparent EC Private Key
|
|
EC Public Key
|
Transparent EC Public Key
|
|
DSA Private Key
|
Transparent DSA Private Key
|
|
DSA Public Key
|
Transparent DSA Public Key
|
Table 81: Default Key Format Type, by Object
Key Value Location MAY be specified by the client
when the Key Value is omitted from the Key Block in a Register request. Key
Value Location is used to indicate the location of the Key Value absent from
the object being registered..
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Value Location
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Value Location
Value
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Key Value Location Type
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
Table
82: Key Value Location Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Never
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 83: Key Value Location
Attribute Rules
Key Value Present is an attribute of the managed object
created by the server. It SHALL NOT be specified by the client in a Register
request. Key Value Present SHALL be created by the server if the Key
Value is absent from the Key Block in a Register request. The value of Key
Value Present SHALL NOT be modified by either the client or the server. Key
Value Present attribute MAY be used as a part of the Locate operation.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Value Present
|
Boolean
|
No
|
Table 84: Key Value Present Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
During Register operation
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 85: Key Value Present Attribute Rules
The Last Change Date attribute contains the date
and time of the last change of the specified object.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Last Change Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 86: Last Change Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key,
Activate, Revoke, Destroy, Archive, Recover, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair,
Add Attribute, Modify Attribute, Delete Attribute, Get Usage Allocation
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 87: Last Change Date Attribute Rules
The Lease Time attribute defines a time interval
for a Managed Object beyond which the client SHALL NOT use the object without
obtaining another lease. This attribute always holds the initial length of time
allowed for a lease, and not the actual remaining time. Once its lease expires,
the client is only able to renew the lease by calling Obtain Lease. A server
SHALL store in this attribute the maximum Lease Time it is able to serve and a
client obtains the lease time (with Obtain Lease) that is less than or equal to
the maximum Lease Time. This attribute is read-only for clients. It SHALL be
modified by the server only.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Lease Time
|
Interval
|
Table 88: Lease Time Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key,
Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key
Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 89: Lease Time Attribute Rules
The Link attribute is a structure used to create a
link from one Managed Cryptographic Object to another, closely related target
Managed Cryptographic Object. The link has a type, and the allowed types
differ, depending on the Object Type of the Managed Cryptographic Object, as
listed below. The Linked Object Identifier identifies the target Managed
Cryptographic Object by its Unique Identifier. The link contains information
about the association between the Managed Objects (e.g., the private key
corresponding to a public key; the parent certificate for a certificate in a
chain; or for a derived symmetric key, the base key from which it was derived).
The Link attribute SHOULD be present for private keys and
public keys for which a certificate chain is stored by the server, and for
certificates in a certificate chain.
Note that it is possible for a Managed Object to have
multiple instances of the Link attribute (e.g., a Private Key has links to the
associated certificate, as well as the associated public key; a Certificate
object has links to both the public key and to the certificate of the
certification authority (CA) that signed the certificate).
It is also possible that a Managed Object does not have
links to associated cryptographic objects. This MAY occur in cases where the
associated key material is not available to the server or client (e.g., the
registration of a CA Signer certificate with a server, where the corresponding
private key is held in a different manner).
|
Encoding
|
Description
|
|
Text String
|
Unique Identifier of a Managed Object.
|
|
Enumeration
|
Unique Identifier Enumeration
|
|
Integer
|
Zero based nth Unique Identifier in the response. If
negative the count is backwards from the beginning of the current operation’s
batch item.
|
Table 90: Linked Object Identifier encoding
descriptions
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Link
|
Structure
|
|
|
Link Type
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
|
Linked Object
Identifier
|
Text
String/Enumeration/Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 91: Link Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Register
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 92: Link Attribute Structure Rules
The Name attribute is a structure used to identify
and locate an object. This attribute is assigned by the client, and the Name
Value is intended to be in a form that humans are able to interpret. The
key management system MAY specify rules by which the client creates valid
names. Clients are informed of such rules by a mechanism that is not specified
by this standard. Names SHALL be unique within a given key management server,
but are NOT REQUIRED to be globally unique.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Name
|
Structure
|
|
|
Name Value
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Name Type
|
Enumeration
|
Yes
|
Table 93: Name Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 94: Name Attribute Rules
The server SHALL create this attribute, and set it to True
if the Extractable attribute has always been False.
The server SHALL set it to False if the Extractable attribute
has ever been set to True.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Never Extractable
|
Boolean
|
Table 95: Never Extractable Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
When Never Extractable attribute is
set or changed
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 96: Never Extractable Attribute Rules
The NIST SP800-57 Key Type is an attribute of a Key (or
Secret Data object). It MAY be set by the client, preferably when the object is
registered or created. Although the attribute is optional, once set, MAY NOT
be deleted or modified by either the client or the server. This attribute is
intended to reflect the NIST SP-800-57 view of cryptographic material, so an
object SHOULD have only one usage (see [SP800-57-1]
for rationale), but this is not enforced at the server.
|
Item
|
|
Encoding
|
|
NIST Key Type
|
|
Enumeration
|
Table 97 SP800-57 Key Type Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 98 SP800-57 Key Type Attribute Rules
A Managed Object MAY be part of a group of objects. An
object MAY belong to more than one group of objects. To assign an object to a
group of objects, the object group name SHOULD be set into this attribute.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Object Group
|
Text String
|
Table 99: Object Group Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key,
Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key
Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 100: Object Group Attribute Rules
The Object Type of a Managed Object (e.g., public
key, private key, symmetric key, etc.) SHALL be set by the server when the
object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before
the object is destroyed.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Object Type
|
Enumeration
|
Table 101: Object Type Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key,
Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key
Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 102: Object Type Attribute Rules
The Opaque Data Type of an Opaque Object SHALL be
set by the server when the object is registered and then SHALL NOT be changed
or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Opaque Data Type
|
Enumeration
|
Table 103: Opaque Data Type Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Opaque Objects
|
Table 104: Opaque Data Type Attribute Rules
The Original Creation Date attribute contains the
date and time the object was originally created, which can be different from
when the object is registered with a key management server.
It is OPTIONAL for an object being registered by a client.
The Original Creation Date MAY be set by the client during a Register
operation. If no Original Creation Date attribute was set by the client
during a Register operation, it MAY do so at a later time through an Add
Attribute operation for that object.
It is mandatory for an object created on the server as a
result of a Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, or Re-key Key Pair
operation. In such cases the Original Creation Date SHALL be set by the
server and SHALL be the same as the Initial Date attribute.
In all cases, once the Original Creation Date is
set, it SHALL NOT be deleted or updated.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Original Creation Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 105: Original Creation Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server (when object is generated by Server)
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 106: Original Creation Date Attribute Rules
PKCS#12 Friendly Name is an attribute used for descriptive
purposes. If supplied on a Register Private Key with Key Format Type PKCS#12,
it informs the server of the alias/friendly name (see [RFC7292]) under which
the private key and its associated certificate chain SHALL be found in the Key
Material. If no such alias/friendly name is supplied, the server SHALL record
the alias/friendly name (if any) it finds for the first Private Key in the Key
Material.
When a Get with Key Format Type PKCS#12 is issued, this attribute
informs the server what alias/friendly name the server SHALL use when encoding
the response. If this attribute is absent for the object on which the Get is
issued, the server SHOULD use an alias/friendly name of “alias”. Since the PKCS#12
Friendly Name is defined in ASN.1 with an EQUALITY MATCHING RULE of
caseIgnoreMatch, clients and servers SHOULD utilize a lowercase text string.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
PKCS#12 Friendly Name
|
Text String
|
Table 107: PKCS#12 Friendly Name Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 108: Friendly Name Attribute Rules
The Process Start Date attribute is the date and
time when a valid Managed Object MAY begin to be used to process
cryptographically protected information (e.g., decryption or unwrapping),
depending on the value of its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. The object
SHALL NOT be used for these cryptographic purposes before the Process Start
Date has been reached. This value MAY be equal to or later than, but SHALL
NOT precede, the Activation Date. Once the Process Start Date has occurred,
then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is
destroyed.
|
Item
|
Encoding
|
|
Process Start Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 109: Process Start Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as
long as the Process Start Date has been not reached.
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as
long as the Process Start Date has been not reached.
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
