Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile Version 1.1.1

Committee Specification Draft 01

23 March 2011

Specification URIs:

This Version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd01.doc (Authoritative)

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd01.pdf

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd01.html

Previous Version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/v1.1/wss-v1.1-spec-errata-os-x509TokenProfile.doc

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/v1.1/wss-v1.1-spec-errata-os-x509TokenProfile.pdf

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/v1.1/wss-v1.1-spec-errata-os-x509TokenProfile.htm

Latest Version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1.doc (Authoritative)

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1.pdf

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1.html

Technical Committee:

OASIS Web Services Security Maintenance (WSS-M) TC

Chair(s):

David Turner, Microsoft

Editor(s):

Anthony Nadalin, IBM

Chris Kaler, Microsoft

Ronald Monzillo, Sun

Phillip Hallam-Baker, Verisign

Carlo Milono, Tibco

Related work:

This specification is one part of a multi-part Work Product.  The other parts include:

Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security Version 1.1.1

Web Services Security SAML Token Profile Version 1.1.1

Web Services Security Kerberos Token Profile Version 1.1.1

Web Services Security Rights Expression Language (REL) Token Profile Version 1.1.1

Web Services Security SOAP Messages with Attachments (SwA) Profile Version 1.1.1

Web Services Security Username Token Profile Version 1.1.1

Schemas: http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/xsd/

This specification supersedes:

·         Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile 1.1, OASIS Standard Incorporating Approved Errata, 1 November 2006

·         Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile 1.1, OASIS Approved Errata, 1 November 2006

Abstract:

This document describes how to use X.509 Certificates with the Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security] specification.

Status:

This document was last revised or approved by the OASIS Web Services Security Maintenance (WSS-M) TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the “Latest Version” location noted above for possible later revisions of this document.

Technical Committee members should send comments on this specification to the Technical Committee’s email list. Others should send comments to the Technical Committee by using the “Send A Comment” button on the Technical Committee’s web page at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/wss-m/.

For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the Technical Committee web page (http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/wss-m/ipr.php).

This document integrates specific error corrections or editorial changes to the preceding specification, within the scope of the Web Services Security and this TC.

This document introduces a third digit in the numbering convention where the third digit represents a consolidation of error corrections, bug fixes or editorial formatting changes (e.g., 1.1.1); it does not add any new features beyond those of the base specifications (e.g., 1.1).

 

Citation Format:

 

[WSS-X509-Certificate-Token-Profile-V1.1.1]

Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile Version 1.1.1. 23 March 2011. OASIS Committee Specification Draft 01. http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd01.doc.

Notices

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Table of Contents

 

1        Introduction (Non-Normative) 5

2        Notations and Terminology (Normative) 6

2.1 Notational Conventions. 6

2.2 Namespaces. 6

2.3 Terminology. 7

3        Usage (Normative) 8

3.1 Token types. 8

3.1.1 X509v3 Token Type. 8

3.1.2 X509PKIPathv1 Token Type. 8

3.1.3 PKCS7 Token Type. 8

3.2 Token References. 9

3.2.1 Reference to an X.509 Subject Key Identifier 9

3.2.2 Reference to a Security Token. 9

3.2.3 Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number 10

3.3 Signature. 10

3.3.1 Key Identifier 10

3.3.2 Reference to a Binary Security Token. 11

3.3.3 Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number 12

3.4 Encryption. 13

3.5 Error Codes. 14

4        Threat Model and Countermeasures (Non-Normative) 16

5        References. 17

# Conformance. 18

A.      Acknowledgements. 19

B.      Revision History. 23

 

 

 

 


1      Introduction (Non-Normative)

This specification describes the use of the X.509 authentication framework with the Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security].

 

An X.509 certificate specifies a binding between a public key and a set of attributes that includes (at least) a subject name, issuer name, serial number and validity interval. This binding may be subject to subsequent revocation advertised by mechanisms that include issuance of CRLs, OCSP tokens or mechanisms that are outside the X.509 framework, such as XKMS.

 

An X.509 certificate may be used to validate a public key that may be used to authenticate a SOAP message or to identify the public key with a SOAP message that has been encrypted.

 

Note that Sections 2.1, 2.2, all of 3, and indicated parts of 5 are normative.  All other sections are non-normative.

2      Notations and Terminology (Normative)

This section specifies the notations, namespaces and terminology used in this specification.

2.1 Notational Conventions

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

 

When describing abstract data models, this specification uses the notational convention used by the XML Infoset. Specifically, abstract property names always appear in square brackets (e.g., [some property]).

 

When describing concrete XML schemas, this specification uses a convention where each member of an element’s [children] or [attributes] property is described using an XPath-like notation (e.g., /x:MyHeader/x:SomeProperty/@value1).  The use of {any} indicates the presence of an element wildcard (<xs:any/>). The use of @{any} indicates the presence of an attribute wildcard (<xs:anyAttribute/>).

2.2 Namespaces

Namespace URIs (of the general form "some-URI") represents some application-dependent or context-dependent URI as defined in RFC 3986 [URI]. This specification is designed to work with the general SOAP [SOAP11, SOAP12] message structure and message processing model, and should be applicable to any version of SOAP. The current SOAP 1.1 namespace URI is used herein to provide detailed examples, but there is no intention to limit the applicability of this specification to a single version of SOAP.

 

The namespaces used in this document are shown in the following table (note that for brevity, the examples use the prefixes listed below but do not include the URIs – those listed below are assumed).

 

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.1.xsd

The following namespace prefixes are used in this document:

Prefix

Namespace

S11

http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/

S12

http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope

ds

http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#

xenc

http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#

wsse

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd

wsse11

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.1.xsd

wsu

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd

Table 1- Namespace prefixes

URI fragments defined in this specification are relative to the following base URI unless otherwise stated:

 

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0

 

The following table lists the full URI for each URI fragment referred to in this specification.

URI Fragment

Full URI

#Base64Binary

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary

#STR-Transform

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#STR-Transform

#PKCS7

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#PKCS7

#X509v3

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509v3

#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier

 

2.3 Terminology

This specification adopts the terminology defined in Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security]

 

Readers are presumed to be familiar with the definitions of terms in the Internet Security Glossary [Glossary].

 

3      Usage (Normative)

This specification describes the syntax and processing rules for the use of the X.509 authentication framework with the Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security]. For the purposes of determining the order of preference of reference types, the use of IssuerSerial within X509Data should be considered to be a form of Key Identifier

3.1 Token types

This profile defines the syntax of, and processing rules for, three types of binary security token using the URI values specified in Table 2.

 

If the ValueType attribute is missing, the receiver may interpret it either based on a prior agreement or by parsing the content.

 

Token

ValueType URI

Description

Single certificate

#X509v3

An X.509 v3 certificate capable of signature-verification at a minimum

Certificate Path

#X509PKIPathv1

An ordered list of X.509 certificates packaged in a PKIPath

Set of certificates and CRLs

#PKCS7

A list of X.509 certificates and (optionally) CRLs packaged in a PKCS#7 wrapper

Table 2 – Token types

3.1.1 X509v3 Token Type

The type of the end-entity that is authenticated by a certificate used in this manner is a matter of policy that is outside the scope of this specification.

3.1.2 X509PKIPathv1 Token Type

The X509PKIPathv1 token type MAY be used to represent a certificate path.

3.1.3 PKCS7 Token Type

The PKCS7 token type MAY be used to represent a certificate path. It is RECOMMENDED that applications use the PKIPath object for this purpose instead.

 

The order of the certificates in a PKCS#7 data structure is not significant. If an ordered certificate path is converted to PKCS#7 encoded bytes and then converted back, the order of the certificates may not be preserved. Processors SHALL NOT assume any significance to the order of the certificates in the data structure. See [PKCS7] for more information.

3.2 Token References

In order to ensure a consistent processing model across all the token types supported by WSS: SOAP Message Security, the <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element SHALL be used to specify all references to X.509 token types in signature or encryption elements that comply with this profile.

 

A <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element MAY reference an X.509 token type by one of the following means:

 

·         Reference to a Subject Key Identifier
The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element contains a <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element that specifies the token data by means of a X.509 SubjectKeyIdentifier reference. A subject key identifier MAY only be used to reference an X.509v3 certificate.”

 

·         Reference to a Binary Security Token
The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element contains a wsse:Reference> element that references a local <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element or a remote data source that contains the token data itself.

 

·         Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number
The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element contains a <ds:X509Data> element that contains a <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element that uniquely identifies an end entity certificate by its X.509 Issuer and Serial Number.

3.2.1 Reference to an X.509 Subject Key Identifier

The <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element is used to specify a reference to an X.509v3 certificate by means of a reference to its X.509 SubjectKeyIdentifier attribute. This profile defines the syntax of, and processing rules for referencing a Subject Key Identifier using the URI values specified in Table 3 (note that URI fragments are relative to http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0).

 

Subject Key Identifier

ValueType URI

Description

Certificate Key Identifier

#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier

Value of the certificate’s X.509 SubjectKeyIdentifier

Table 3 – Subject Key Identifier

The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element from which the reference is made contains the <wsse:KeyIdentifier>  element. The <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element MUST have a ValueType attribute with the value #X509SubjectKeyIdentifier and its contents MUST be the value of the certificate’s X.509v3 SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, encoded as per the <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element’s EncodingType attribute. For the purposes of this specification, the value of the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension is the contents of the KeyIdentifier octet string, excluding the encoding of the octet string prefix.

3.2.2 Reference to a Security Token

The <wsse:Reference> element is used to reference an X.509 security token value by means of a URI reference.

 

The URI reference MAY be internal in which case the URI reference SHOULD be a bare name XPointer reference to a <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element contained in a preceding message header that contains the binary X.509 security token data.

3.2.3 Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number

The <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element is used to specify a reference to an X.509 security token by means of the certificate issuer name and serial number.

 

The <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element is a direct child of the <ds:X509Data> element that is in turn a direct child of the <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element in which the reference is made

3.3 Signature

Signed data MAY specify the certificate associated with the signature using any of the X.509 security token types and references defined in this specification.

 

An X.509 certificate specifies a binding between a public key and a set of attributes that includes (at least) a subject name, issuer name, serial number and validity interval. Other attributes may specify constraints on the use of the certificate or affect the recourse that may be open to a relying party that depends on the certificate. A given public key may be specified in more than one X.509 certificate; consequently a given public key may be bound to two or more distinct sets of attributes.

 

It is therefore necessary to ensure that a signature created under an X.509 certificate token uniquely and irrefutably specifies the certificate under which the signature was created.

 

Implementations SHOULD protect against a certificate substitution attack by including either the certificate itself or an immutable and unambiguous reference to the certificate within the scope of the signature according to the method used to reference the certificate as described in the following sections.

3.3.1 Key Identifier

The <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element does not guarantee an immutable and unambiguous reference to the certificate referenced. Consequently implementations that use this form of reference within a signature SHOULD employ the STR Dereferencing Transform within a  reference to the signature key information in order to ensure that the referenced certificate is signed, and not just the ambiguous reference. The form of the reference is a bare name reference as defined by the XPointer specification [XPointer].

 

The following example shows a certificate referenced by means of a KeyIdentifier. The scope of the signature is the <ds:SignedInfo> element which includes both the message body (#body) and the signing certificate by means of a reference to the <ds:KeyInfo> element which references it (#keyinfo). Since the <ds:KeyInfo> element only contains a mutable reference to the certificate rather than the certificate itself, a transformation is specified which replaces the reference to the certificate with the certificate. The <ds:KeyInfo> element specifies the signing key by means of a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which contains a <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element which specifies the X.509 subject key identifier of the signing certificate.

 

<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="...">

   <S11:Header>

      <wsse:Security

           xmlns:wsse="..."

           xmlns:wsu="...">

         <ds:Signature

              xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

            <ds:SignedInfo>…

               <ds:Reference URI="#body">…</ds:Reference>

               <ds:Reference URI="#keyinfo">

                  <ds:Transforms>

                     <ds:Transform  Algorithm="...#STR-Transform">

                        <wsse:TransformationParameters>

                          <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="…"/>

                        </wsse:TransformationParameters>

                     </ds:Transform>

                  </ds:Transforms>…

               </ds:Reference>

            </ds:SignedInfo>

            <ds:SignatureValue>HFLP…</ds:SignatureValue>

            <ds:KeyInfo Id="keyinfo">

               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

                  <wsse:KeyIdentifier EncodingType="...#Base64Binary"

                       ValueType="...#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier">

                     MIGfMa0GCSq…

                  </wsse:KeyIdentifier>

               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

            </ds:KeyInfo>

         </ds:Signature>

      </wsse:Security>

   </S11:Header>

   <S11:Body wsu:Id="body"

        xmlns:wsu=".../">

      …

   </S11:Body>

</S11:Envelope>

3.3.2 Reference to a Binary Security Token

The signed data SHOULD contain a core bare name reference (as defined by the XPointer specification [XPointer]) to the<wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element that contains the security token referenced, or a core reference to the external data source containing the security token.

 

The following example shows a certificate embedded in a <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element and referenced by URI within a signature. The certificate is included in the <wsse:Security>  header as a <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element with identifier binarytoken. The scope of the signature defined by a <ds:Reference> element within the <ds:SignedInfo> element includes the signing certificate which is referenced by means of the URI bare name pointer #binarytoken. The <ds:KeyInfo> element specifies the signing key by means of a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which contains a <wsse:Reference> element which references the certificate by means of the URI bare name pointer #binarytoken.

 

<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="...">

   <S11:Header>

      <wsse:Security

           xmlns:wsse="..."

           xmlns:wsu="...">

         <wsse:BinarySecurityToken

              wsu:Id="binarytoken"

              ValueType="…#X509v3"

              EncodingType="…#Base64Binary">

            MIIEZzCCA9CgAwIBAgIQEmtJZc0…

         </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>

         <ds:Signature

              xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

            <ds:SignedInfo>…

               <ds:Reference URI="#body">...</ds:Reference>

               <ds:Reference URI="#binarytoken">...</ds:Reference>

            </ds:SignedInfo>

            <ds:SignatureValue>HFLP…</ds:SignatureValue>

            <ds:KeyInfo>

               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

                  <wsse:Reference URI="#binarytoken" />

               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

            </ds:KeyInfo>

         </ds:Signature>

      </wsse:Security>

   </S11:Header>

   <S11:Body wsu:Id="body"

        xmlns:wsu="...">

      …

   </S11:Body>

</S11:Envelope>

3.3.3 Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number

The signed data SHOULD contain a core bare name reference (as defined by the XPointer specification [XPointer]) to the <ds:KeyInfo> element that contains the security token reference.

 

The following example shows a certificate referenced by means of its issuer name and serial number. In this example the certificate is not included in the message. The scope of the signature defined by the <ds:SignedInfo> element includes both the message body (#body) and the key information element (#keyInfo). The <ds:KeyInfo> element contains a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which specifies the issuer and serial number of the specified certificate by means of the <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element.

 

<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="...">

   <S11:Header>

      <wsse:Security

           xmlns:wsse="..."

           xmlns:wsu="...">

         <ds:Signature

                xmlns:ds="...">

            <ds:SignedInfo>…

               <ds:Reference URI="#body">...</ds:Reference>                

               <ds:Reference URI="#keyinfo">...</ds:Reference>

            </ds:SignedInfo>

            <ds:SignatureValue>HFLP…</ds:SignatureValue>

            <ds:KeyInfo Id="keyinfo">

               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

                  <ds:X509Data>

                     <ds:X509IssuerSerial>

                        <ds:X509IssuerName>

                           DC=ACMECorp, DC=com

                        </ds:X509IssuerName>

                        <ds:X509SerialNumber>12345678</ds:X509SerialNumber>

                     </ds:X509IssuerSerial>

                  </ds:X509Data>

               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

            </ds:KeyInfo>

         </ds:Signature>

      </wsse:Security>

   </S11:Header>

   <S11:Body wsu:Id="body"

        xmlns:wsu="...">

      …

   </S11:Body>

</S11:Envelope>

3.4 Encryption

Encrypted keys or data MAY identify a key required for decryption by identifying the corresponding key used for encryption by means of any of the X.509 security token types or references specified herein.

 

Since the sole purpose is to identify the decryption key it is not necessary to specify either a trust path or the specific contents of the certificate itself.

 

The following example shows a decryption key referenced by means of the issuer name and serial number of an associated certificate.  In this example the certificate is not included in the message. The <ds:KeyInfo> element contains a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element  which specifies the issuer and serial number of the specified certificate by means of the <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element.

 

<S11:Envelope

     xmlns:S11="..."   

     xmlns:ds="..."

     xmlns:wsse="..."

     xmlns:xenc="...">

   <S11:Header>

      <wsse:Security>

         <xenc:EncryptedKey>

            <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="..."/>

            <ds:KeyInfo>

               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

          <ds:X509Data>

                  <ds:X509IssuerSerial>

                     <ds:X509IssuerName>

                        DC=ACMECorp, DC=com

                     </ds:X509IssuerName>

                     <ds:X509SerialNumber>12345678</ds:X509SerialNumber>

                  </ds:X509IssuerSerial>

                 </ds:X509Data>

               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

            </ds:KeyInfo>

            <xenc:CipherData>

               <xenc:CipherValue>…</xenc:CipherValue>

            </xenc:CipherData>

            <xenc:ReferenceList>

               <xenc:DataReference URI="#encrypted"/>

            </xenc:ReferenceList>

         </xenc:EncryptedKey>

      </wsse:Security>

   </S11:Header>

   <S11:Body>

      <xenc:EncryptedData Id="encrypted" Type="…">

         <xenc:CipherData>

            <xenc:CipherValue>…</xenc:CipherValue>

         </xenc:CipherData>

      </xenc:EncryptedData>

   </S11:Body>

</S11:Envelope>

 

The following example shows a decryption key referenced by means of the Thumbprint of an associated certificate.  In this example the certificate is not included in the message. The <ds:KeyInfo> element contains a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element  which specifies the Thumbprint of the specified certificate by means of the http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1 attribute of the <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element.

<S11:Envelope

     xmlns:S11="..."   

     xmlns:ds="..."

     xmlns:wsse="..."

     xmlns:xenc="...">

   <S11:Header>

      <wsse:Security>

         <xenc:EncryptedKey>

            <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="…"/>

            <ds:KeyInfo>

               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
                       <wsse:KeyIdentifier
                  ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-                  soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1" >LKiQ/CmFrJDJqCLFcjlhIsmZ/+0=
                    </wsse:KeyIdentifier>
               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

            </ds:KeyInfo>

            <xenc:CipherData>

               <xenc:CipherValue>…</xenc:CipherValue>

            </xenc:CipherData>

            <xenc:ReferenceList>

               <xenc:DataReference URI="#encrypted"/>

            </xenc:ReferenceList>

         </xenc:EncryptedKey>

      </wsse:Security>

   </S11:Header>

   <S11:Body>

      <xenc:EncryptedData Id="encrypted" Type="...">

         <xenc:CipherData>

            <xenc:CipherValue>…</xenc:CipherValue>

         </xenc:CipherData>

      </xenc:EncryptedData>

   </S11:Body>

</S11:Envelope>

 

3.5 Error Codes

When using X.509 certificates, the error codes defined in the WSS: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security] MUST be used. 

 

If an implementation requires the use of a custom error it is recommended that a sub-code be defined as an extension of one of the codes defined in the WSS: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security]

4      Threat Model and Countermeasures (Non-Normative)

The use of X.509 certificate token introduces no new threats beyond those identified in WSS: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security].

 

Message alteration and eavesdropping can be addressed by using the integrity and confidentiality mechanisms described in WSS: SOAP Message Security [WS-Security].  Replay attacks can be addressed by using message timestamps and caching, as well as other application-specific tracking mechanisms.  For X.509 certificates, identity is authenticated by use of keys, man-in-the-middle attacks are generally mitigated.

 

It is strongly RECOMMENDED that all relevant and immutable message data be signed.

 

It should be noted that a transport-level security protocol such as SSL or TLS [RFC2246] MAY be used to protect the message and the security token as an alternative to or in conjunction with WSS: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security].

5      References

The following are normative references

[Glossary]              Informational RFC 2828, Internet Security Glossary, May 2000. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2828.txt

[KEYWORDS]         S. Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, RFC 2119, Harvard University, March 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt

[RFC2246]               T. Dierks, C. Allen., The TLS Protocol Version, 1.0.  IETF RFC 2246 January 1999. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt

[SOAP11]               W3C Note, "SOAP: Simple Object Access Protocol 1.1," 08 May 2000.

[SOAP12]               W3C Recommendation, "SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1: Messaging Framework", 23 June 2003.

[URI]                       T. Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax," RFC 3986, MIT/LCS, Day Software, Adobe Systems, January 2005.

[WS-Security]         A. Nadalin et al., Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security 1.1.1 http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-SOAPMessageSecurity-v1.1.1-csd01.pdf.

[PKCS7]                 PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard RSA Laboratories, November 1, 1993. http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-7/index.html

[PKIPATH]            http://www.itu.int/rec/recommendation.asp?type=items&lang=e&parent=T-REC-X.509-200110-S!Cor1

[X509]                     ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997.

 

The following are non-normative references

[XML-ns]                T. Bray, D. Hollander, A. Layman. Namespaces in XML. W3C Recommendation. January 1999. http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xml-names-19990114

[XML Encrypt]        W3C Recommendation, "XML Encryption Syntax andProcessing," 10 December 2002  

[XML Signature]     D. Eastlake, J. R., D. Solo, M. Bartel, J. Boyer , B. Fox , E. Simon. XML-Signature Syntax and Processing, W3C Recommendation, 12 February 2002.

 

# Conformance

The last numbered section in the specification must be the Conformance section. Conformance Statements/Clauses go here.

A.  Acknowledgements

The following individuals have participated in the creation of this specification and are gratefully acknowledged:

Participants:

Current Contributors:

Tom

Rutt

Fujitsu Limited

Jacques

Durand

Fujitsu Limited

Calvin

Powers

IBM

Kelvin

Lawrence

IBM

Michael

McIntosh

Individual

Thomas

Hardjono

M.I.T.

David

Turner

Microsoft Corporation

Anthony

Nadalin

Microsoft Corporation

Monica

Martin

Microsoft Corporation

Marc

Goodner

Microsoft Corporation

Peter

Davis

Neustar

Hal

Lockhart

Oracle Corporation

Rich

Levinson

Oracle Corporation

Anil

Saldhana

Red Hat

Martin

Raepple

SAP AG

Federico

Rossini

Telecom Italia S.p.a.

Carlo

Milono

TIBCO Software Inc.

Don

Adams

TIBCO Software Inc.

Jerry

Smith

US Department of Defense (DoD)

Previous Contributors:

Michael

Hu

Actional

Maneesh

Sahu

Actional

Duane

Nickull

Adobe Systems

Gene

Thurston

AmberPoint

Frank

Siebenlist

Argonne National Laboratory

Peter

Dapkus

BEA

Hal

Lockhart

BEA Systems

Denis

Pilipchuk

BEA Systems

Corinna

Witt

BEA Systems

Steve

Anderson

BMC Software

Rich

Levinson

Computer Associates

Thomas

DeMartini

ContentGuard

Guillermo

Lao

ContentGuard

TJ

Pannu

ContentGuard

Xin

Wang

ContentGuard

Merlin

Hughes

Cybertrust

Dale

Moberg

Cyclone Commerce

Shawn

Sharp

Cyclone Commerce

Rich

Salz

Datapower

Ganesh

Vaideeswaran

Documentum

Sam

Wei

EMC

Tim

Moses

Entrust

Carolina

Canales-Valenzuela

Ericsson

Dana S.

Kaufman

Forum Systems

Toshihiro

Nishimura

Fujitsu

Tom

Rutt

Fujitsu

Kefeng

Chen

GeoTrust

Irving

Reid

Hewlett-Packard

Kojiro

Nakayama

Hitachi

Yutaka

Kudo

Hitachi

Jason

Rouault

HP

Paula

Austel

IBM

Derek

Fu

IBM

Maryann

Hondo

IBM

Kelvin

Lawrence

IBM

Michael

McIntosh

IBM

Anthony

Nadalin

IBM

Nataraj

Nagaratnam

IBM

Bruce

Rich

IBM

Ron

Williams

IBM

Bob

Blakley

IBM

Joel

Farrell

IBM

Satoshi

Hada

IBM

Hiroshi

Maruyama

IBM

David

Melgar

IBM

Kent

Tamura

IBM

Wayne

Vicknair

IBM

Don

Flinn

Individual

Phil

Griffin

Individual

Mark

Hayes

Individual

John

Hughes

Individual

Peter

Rostin

Individual

Davanum

Srinivas

Individual

Bob

Morgan

Individual/Internet2

Kate

Cherry

Lockheed Martin

Paul

Cotton

Microsoft

Vijay

Gajjala

Microsoft

Martin

Gudgin

Microsoft

Chris

Kaler

Microsoft

Bob

Atkinson

Microsoft

Keith

Ballinger

Microsoft

Allen

Brown

Microsoft

Giovanni

Della-Libera

Microsoft

Alan

Geller

Microsoft

Johannes

Klein

Microsoft

Scott

Konersmann

Microsoft

Chris

Kurt

Microsoft

Brian

LaMacchia

Microsoft

Paul

Leach

Microsoft

John

Manferdelli

Microsoft

John

Shewchuk

Microsoft

Dan

Simon

Microsoft

Hervey

Wilson

Microsoft

Jeff

Hodges

Neustar

Frederick

Hirsch

Nokia

Senthil

Sengodan

Nokia

Abbie

Barbir

Nortel

Lloyd

Burch

Novell

Ed

Reed

Novell

Charles

Knouse

Oblix

Prateek

Mishra

Oracle

Vamsi

Motukuru

Oracle

Ramana

Turlapi

Oracle

Vipin

Samar

Oracle

Jerry

Schwarz

Oracle

Eric

Gravengaard

Reactivity

Andrew

Nash

Reactivity

Stuart

King

Reed Elsevier

Ben

Hammond

RSA Security

Rob

Philpott

RSA Security

Martijn

de Boer

SAP

Blake

Dournaee

Sarvega

Sundeep

Peechu

Sarvega

Coumara

Radja

Sarvega

Pete

Wenzel

SeeBeyond

Jonathan

Tourzan

Sony

Yassir

Elley

Sun

Manveen

Kaur

Sun Microsystems

Ronald

Monzillo

Sun Microsystems

Jan

Alexander

Systinet

Michael

Nguyen

The IDA of Singapore

Don

Adams

TIBCO Software Inc.

Symon

Chang

TIBCO Software Inc.

John

Weiland

US Navy

Hans

Granqvist

VeriSign

Phillip

Hallam-Baker

VeriSign

Hemma

Prafullchandra

VeriSign

Morten

Jorgensen

Vordel

 

B.  Revision History

 

Revision

Date

Editor

Changes Made

WD01

17-January-2011

Carlo Milono

Corrected/added hyperlinks where missing; added Status section

WD02

8-February-2011

Carlo Milono

Added Related Work to reflect v1.1.1 of the specs; changed References for SOAP Message Security to reflect v1.1.1; Changed WD# to 2; Added Date; Moved Current Members to Previous and added new Current Members; saved document under wd02; entered the Revision History

Merged Old Current Contributors with Old Previous, created a New Current Contributors.

WD03

16-March-2011

David Turner

Corrected and updated links.