This Key
Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.2 is intended to
complement the Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification [KMIP-Spec] by providing guidance on how to implement the
Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) most effectively to ensure
interoperability and to address key management usage scenarios. In particular,
it includes the following guidance:
·
Clarification
of assumptions and requirements that drive or influence the design of KMIP and
the implementation of KMIP-compliant key management.
·
Specific
recommendations for implementation of particular KMIP functionality.
·
Clarification
of mandatory and optional capabilities for conformant implementations.
Descriptions of how to use KMIP functionality to address specific
key management usage scenarios or to solve key management related issues. A
selected set of conformance profiles and authentication suites are defined in
the KMIP Profiles specification [KMIP-Prof].
Further assistance for implementing KMIP is provided by the
KMIP Test Cases document [KMIP-TC] that
describes a set of recommended test cases and provides the TTLV (Tag/Type/Length/Value)
format for the message exchanges defined by those test cases.
[FIPS 180-4]
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, March
2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf
[FIPS186-4]
Digital
Signature Standard (DSS). FIPS PUB 186-4. July 2013. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-4.pdf
[FIPS197]
Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES). FIPS PUB 197. November 26, 2001. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
[FIPS198-1]
The
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). FIPS PUB 198-1. July 2008. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
[KMIP-Spec]
Key Management
Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.2, Committee Specification Draft 01. 12 September
2013. https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=50670&wg_abbrev=kmip
[KMIP-Prof]
Key Management Interoperability
Protocol Profiles Version 1.2. Working
Draft 02. 25 June 2013. https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=49689&wg_abbrev=kmip
[PKCS#1]
RSA Laboratories. PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard.
June 14, 2002. http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125
[PKCS#10]
RSA Laboratories. PKCS #10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax
Standard. May 26, 2000. http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2132
[RFC1321]
R. Rivest, The
MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1321, Apr 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt
[RFC1421]
J. Linn, Privacy
Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption
and Authentication Procedures, IETF RFC 1421, Feb 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1421.txt
[RFC3647]
S. Chokhani, W. Ford, R. Sabett, C. Merrill, and S. Wu. RFC3647:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification
Practices Framework. November 2003. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3647.txt
[RFC4210]
C. Adams, S. Farrell, T. Kause and T. Mononen, Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), IETF RFC
2510, Sep 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4210.txt
[RFC4211]
J. Schaad, Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF),
IETF RFC 4211, Sep 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4211.txt
[RFC4949]
R. Shirey. RFC4949: Internet Security Glossary, Version 2.
August 2007. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt
[RFC4880]
J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, D. Shaw and R. Thayer. RFC4880:
OpenPGP Message Format. November 2007. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt
[RFC5272]
J. Schaad and M. Meyers, Certificate Management over CMS (CMC),
IETF RFC 5272, Jun 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5272.txt
[RFC5280]
D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, and W.
Polk. RFC5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. May 2008. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt
[RFC6818]
P. Yee, Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, IETF RFC6818,
January 2013, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6818.txt
[SP800-38A]
M. Dworkin. Recommendation
for Block Cipher Modes of Operation – Methods and Techniques. NIST Special
Publication 800-38A, Dec 2001. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
[SP800-38D]
M. Dworkin. Recommendation
for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.
NIST Special Publication 800-38D. Nov 2007. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
[SP800-56A]
E. Barker, L. Chen, A.
Roginsky, and M. Smid, Recommendations for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, NIST Special Publication
800-56A Revision 2, May 2013, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar2.pdf
[SP800-57-1]
E. Barker, W. Barker, W. Burr,
W. Polk and M. Smid, Recommendations for Key Management – Part 1: General
(Revision 3), NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 3, July 2012,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_part1_rev3_general.pdf
[SP800-67]
W. Barker and E. Barker, Recommendations for the Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1,
January 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf
[X.509]
International
Telecommunications Union (ITU)-T, X.509: Information technology – Open
systems interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks, November 2008,
http://www.itu.int/rec/recommendation.asp?lang=en&parent=T-REC-X.509-200811-I
[X9.31]
ANSI, X9.31:
Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry (rDSA). September 1998.
[X9.42]
ANSI, X9.42:
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Agreement of
Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography. 2003.
[X9 TR-31]
ANSI, X9
TR-31: Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block Specification for Symmetric
Algorithms. 2010.
[KMIP-TC]
Key Management
Interoperability Protocol Test Cases Version 1.2.Working Draft 02. 6 August 2013 https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=50188&wg_abbrev=kmip
[KMIP-UC]
Key Management Interoperability
Protocol Use Cases Version 1.2.Working Draft 01. 25 June 2013. https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=49644&wg_abbrev=kmip
The section describes assumptions that underlie the KMIP
protocol and the implementation of clients and servers that utilize the
protocol.
Clients may be provided key material by the server, but they
only use that keying material for the purposes explicitly listed in the
delivery payload. Clients that ignore these instructions and use the keys in
ways not explicitly allowed by the server are non-compliant. There is no
requirement for the key management system, however, to enforce this behavior.
KMIP relies
on the chosen authentication suite as specified in [KMIP-Prof]
to authenticate the client and on the underlying transport protocol to provide
confidentiality, integrity, message authentication and protection against
replay attack. KMIP offers a wrapping mechanism for the Key Value that does not
rely on the transport mechanism used for the messages; the wrapping mechanism
is intended for importing or exporting managed cryptographic objects.
The
protocol operates on the assumption that the server is state-less, which means
that there is no concept of “sessions” inherent in the protocol. This does not
mean that the server itself maintains no state, only that the protocol does not
require this.
The protocol
provides for “private” or vendor-specific extensions, which allow for
differentiation among vendor implementations. However, any objects, attributes
and operations included in an implementation are always implemented as
specified in [KMIP-Spec], regardless of
whether they are optional or mandatory.
A server is expected to be conformant to KMIP and supports the
conformance clauses as specified in[KMIP-Spec]. However,
a server may refuse a server-supported operation or client-settable attribute
if disallowed by the server policy (whether expressed within or outside KMIP).
Such a decision by the server may reflect the trust relationship with a
particular client, performance impact of the requested operation, or any of a
number of other considerations.
The
protocol supports key management system-related cryptographic objects. This
list currently includes:
·
Symmetric
Keys
·
Split
(multi-part) Keys
·
Asymmetric
Key Pairs (Public and Private Keys)
·
PGP
Keys
·
Certificates
·
Secret
Data
·
Opaque
(non-interpretable) cryptographic objects
The protocol operates primarily in a client-server,
message-based model. This means that most protocol exchanges are initiated by a
client sending a request message to a server, which then sends a response to
the client. The protocol also provides optional mechanisms to allow for
unsolicited notification of events to clients using the Notify operation, and
unsolicited delivery of cryptographic objects to clients using the Put
operation; that is, the protocol allows a “push” model, whereby the server
initiates the protocol exchange with either a Notify or Put operation. These Notify
or Put features are optionally supported by servers and clients. Clients may
register in order to receive such events/notifications. Registration is
implementation-specific and not described in the specification.
The protocol allows two modes of operation. Synchronous
(mandatory) operations are those in which a client sends a request and waits
for a response from the server. Polled Asynchronous operations (optional) are
those in which the client sends a request, the server responds with a “pending”
status, and the client polls the server for the completed response and
completion status. Server implementations may choose not to support the Polled
Asynchronous feature of the protocol.
2.9
Support for “Intelligent Clients” and “Key Using Devices”
The protocol supports intelligent clients, such as end-user
workstations, which are capable of requesting all of the functions of KMIP. It
also allows subsets of the protocol and possible alternate message
representations in order to support less-capable devices, which only need a
subset of the features of KMIP.
2.10 Batched Requests and Responses
The protocol contains a mechanism for sending batched
requests and receiving the corresponding batched responses, to allow for higher
throughput on operations that deal with a large number of entities, e. g.,
requesting dozens or hundreds of keys from a server at one time, and performing
operations in a group. An option is provided to indicate whether to continue
processing requests after an earlier request in the batch fails or to stop
processing the remaining requests in the batch. Note that there is no option to
treat an entire batch as atomic, that is, if a request in the batch fails, then
preceding requests in the batch are not undone or rolled back (see Section 3.15). A special ID Placeholder (see Section 3.18) is provided in KMIP to allow related requests in a batch to be pipelined.
The
reliable message delivery function is relegated to the transport protocol, and
is not part of the key management protocol itself.
For
requests that could result in large responses, a mechanism in the protocol
allows a client to specify in a request the maximum allowed size of a response
or in the case of the Locate operation the maximum number of items which should
be returned. The server indicates in a response to such a request that the
response would have been too large and, therefore, is not returned.
[KMIP-Spec]describes the key life-cycle
model, based on the [SP800-57-1] key state
definitions, supported by the KMIP protocol. Particular implications of the key
life-cycle model in terms of defining time-related attributes of objects are
discussed in Section 3.5 below.
This section provides guidance on using the functionality
described in the Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification.
3.1 Authentication
As discussed in [KMIP-Spec], a
conforming KMIP implementation establishes and maintains channel
confidentiality and integrity, and provides
assurance of server authenticity for KMIP messaging. Client
authentication is performed according to the chosen KMIP authentication suite
as specified in [KMIP-Prof]. Other mechanisms for
client and server authentication are possible and optional for KMIP
implementations.
KMIP
implementations that support the
KMIP-defined Credential Types or use other vendor-specific mechanisms
for authentication may use the optional
Authentication structure specified inside the Request Header to include
additional identification information. Depending on the server’s configuration,
the server may interpret the identity of the requestor from the Credential
structure, contained in the Authentication
structure if it is not provided during the channel-level authentication.
For example, in addition to performing mutual authentication during a TLS
handshake, the client passes the Credential structure (e.g., a username and
password) in the request. If the requestor’s username is not specified inside
the client certificate and is instead specified in the Credential structure,
the server interprets the identity of the requestor from the Credential
structure. This supports use cases where channel-level authentication
authenticates a machine or service that is used by multiple users of the KMIP
server. If the client provides the username of the requestor in both the client
certificate and the Credential structure, the server verifies that the
usernames are the same. If they differ, the authentication fails and the server
returns an error. If no Credential structure is included in the request, the
username of the requestor is expected to be provided inside the certificate. If no username is provided in the client certificate
and no Credential structure is included in the request message, the server is
expected to refuse authentication and return an error.
If authentication is
unsuccessful, and it is possible to return an “authentication not successful”
error, this error should be returned in preference to any other result status.
This prevents status code probing by a client that is not able to authenticate.
Server decisions regarding
which operations to reject if there is insufficiently strong authentication of
the client are not specified in the protocol. However, see Section 3.2 for
operations for which authentication and authorization are particularly
important.
The Credential object defined in the [KMIP-Spec]
is a structure used to convey information about the client, but the contents of
this object are not managed by the key management server. The type of
information convey within this object varies based on the type of credential.
KMIP 1.2 supports three credential types: Username and Password, Device
Credential and Attestation.
[KMIP-Spec] defines the
Username and Password structure for the Credential Type Username and Password.
The structure consists of two fields: Username and Password. Password is a
recommended, but optional, field, which may be excluded only if the client is
authenticated using one of the authentication suites defined in [KMIP-Prof] For example, if the client performs client certificate
authentication during the TLS handshake, and the Authentication structure is
provided in the Message Request, the Password field is an optional field in the
Username and Password structure of the Credential structure.
The Credential structure is
used to provide additional identification information. As described above, for
certain use cases, channel-level authentication may only authenticate a machine
or service that is used by multiple clients of the KMIP server. The Credential
structure may be used in this scenario to identify individual clients by
specifying the username in the Username and Password structure.
The Device Credential may be
used to uniquely identify back-end devices by specifying Device as the
Credential Type in the Credential structure.
The Device Credential may be
used in a proxy environment where the proxy authenticates with the client
certificate and supports KMIP while the back-end devices may not support KMIP
or TLS. An example is illustrated below:
Figure 1: Aggregator
Client Example
The end device identifies
itself with a device unique set of identifier values that include the device
hardware serial number, the network identifier, the machine identifier, or the
media identifier. For many of the self-encrypting devices there is a unique
serial number assigned to the device during manufacturing. The ability to use
network, machine, or media identifier explicitly should map to different device
types and achieve better interoperability since different types of identifier
values are explicitly enumerated. The device identifier is included for more
generic usage. An optional password or shared secret may be used to further
authenticate the device.
Server implementations may
choose to enforce rules for uniqueness for different types of identifier
values, combinations of TLS certificate used in combination with the Device
Credential, and optionally enforce the use of a Device Credential password.
Four identifiers are
optionally provided but are unique in aggregate:
1. Serial
Number, for example the hardware serial number of the device
2. Network
Identifier, for example the MAC address for Ethernet connected devices
3. Machine
Identifier, for example the client aggregator identifier, such as a tape
library aggregating tape drives
4. Media
Identifier, for example the volume identifier used for a tape cartridge
The device identifier by
choice of server policy may or may not be used in conjunction with the above
identifiers to insure uniqueness.
These additional identifiers
are generally useful for auditing and monitoring encryption and could according
to server policy be logged or used in server implementation specific validation.
A specific example for
self-encrypting tape drive and tape library would be:
1. the
tape drive has a serial number that is unique for that manufacturer and the
vendor has procedures for maintaining and tracking serial number usage
2. a
password optionally is created and stored either on the drive or the library to
help authenticate the drive
3. the
tape drives may be connected via fiber channel to the library and therefore
have a World Wide Name assigned
4. a
machine identifier can be used to identify the tape library that is aggregating
the device in question
5. the
media identifier helps identify the individual media such as a tape cartridge
for proof of encryption reporting
Another example using
self-encrypting disk drives inside of a server would be:
1. the
disk drive has a unique serial number
2. a
password may be supplied by configuration of the drive or the server where the
drive is located
3. the
network identifier may come from the internal attachment identifier for the
disk drive in the server
4. the
machine identifier may come from a server’s motherboard or service processor
identifier,
5. and
the media identifier comes from the volume name used by the server’s operating
system to identify the volume on the disk drive
Server implementations could
control what devices may read and write keys and use the device credential
fields to influence access control enforcement.
Another example applied to
server virtualization and encryption built into virtualization would be:
1. the
virtual machine instance has a unique identifier that is used for the serial
number
2. the
hypervisor supplies a shared secret that is used as the password to
authenticate the virtual machine
3. the
network identifier could be used to identify the MAC address of the physical
server where the virtual machine is running
4. the
machine identifier could be used to identify the hypervisor
5. the
media identifier could be used to identify the storage volume used by the
virtual machine
These are examples of usage
and are not meant to define all device credential usage patterns nor restrict
server specific implementations.
The device credentials may be
explicitly added by the administrator or may be captured in line with the
request and implicitly registered depending upon server policy.
When a server is not able to
resolve the identifier values in the device credential to a unique client
identification, it may choose to reject the request with an error code of
operation failed and reason code of item not found.
3.2
Authorization for Revoke, Recover, Destroy and Archive Operations
The authentication suite, as specified in [KMIP-Prof], describes how the client identity is
established for KMIP-compliant implementations. This authentication is
performed for all KMIP operations.
Certain operations that may be requested by a client via
KMIP, particularly Revoke, Recover, Destroy and Archive, may have a significant
impact on the availability of a key, on server performance and/or on key
security. When a server receives a request for one of these operations, it should
ensure that the client has authenticated its identity (see the Authentication
Suites section in [KMIP-Prof]. The server should
also ensure that the client requesting the operation is an object owner,
security officer or other identity authorized to issue the request. It may also
require additional authentication to ensure that the object owner or a security
officer has issued that request. Even with such authentication and
authorization, requests for these operations should be considered only a “hint”
to the key management system, which may or may not choose to act upon this
request depending on server policy.
3.3 Using Notify and Put
Operations
The Notify and Put operations are the only operations in the
KMIP protocol that are initiated by the server, rather than the client. As
client-initiated requests are able to perform these functions (e.g., by polling
to request notification), these operations are optional for conforming KMIP
implementations. However, they provide a mechanism for optimized communication
between KMIP servers and clients.
In using Notify and Put, the following constraints and
guidelines should be observed:
·
The
client enrolls with the server, so that the server knows how to locate the
client to which a Notify or Put is being sent and which events for the Notify
are supported. However, such registration is outside the scope of the KMIP
protocol. Registration also includes a specification of whether a given client
supports Put and Notify, and what attributes may be included in a Put for a
particular client.
·
Communication
between the client and the server is authenticated. Authentication for a
particular client/server implementation is at a minimum accomplished using one
of the mandatory authentication mechanisms (see [KMIP-Prof]).
Further strengthening of the client/server communications integrity by means of
signed message content and/or wrapped keys is recommended.
·
In
order to minimize possible divergence of key or state information between
client and server as a result of server-initiated communication, any client
receiving Notify or Put messages returns acknowledgements of these messages to
the server. This acknowledgement may be at communication layers below the KMIP
layer, such as by using transport-level acknowledgement provided in TCP/IP.
·
For
client devices that are incapable of responding to messages from the server,
communication with the server happens via a proxy entity that communicates with
the server, using KMIP, on behalf of the client. It is possible to secure
communication between a proxy entity and the client using other, potentially
proprietary mechanisms.
3.4 Usage Allocation
Usage should be allocated and handled carefully at the
client, since power outages or other types of client failures (crashes) may
render allocated usage lost. For example, in the case of a key being used for the
encryption of tapes, such a loss of the usage allocation information following
a client failure during encryption may result in the necessity for the entire
tape backup session to be re-encrypted using a different key, if the server is
not able to allocate more usage. It is possible to address this through such
approaches as caching usage allocation information on stable storage at the
client, and/or having conservative allocation policies at the server (e.g., by
keeping the maximum possible usage allocation per client request moderate). In
general, usage allocations should be as small as possible; it is preferable to
use multiple smaller allocation requests rather than a single larger request to
minimize the likelihood of unused allocation.
3.5
Key State and Times
[KMIP-Spec] provides a number of
time-related attributes, including the following:
- Initial Date: The date and time when the managed cryptographic
object was first created by or registered at the server.
- Activation Date: The date and time when the managed cryptographic
object should begin to be used for applying cryptographic protection to
data.
- Process Start Date: The date and time when a managed symmetric
key object should begin to be used for processing cryptographically
protected data. The managed symmetric key object should not be used prior
to this date.
- Protect Stop Date: The date and time when a managed symmetric
key object should no longer be used for applying cryptographic protection
to data
- Deactivation Date: The date and time when the managed cryptographic
object should no longer be used for applying
cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption, signing, wrapping, MACing, deriving).
Under extraordinary circumstances and when special permission is
granted the managed symmetric key object can be used for decryption,
signature verification, unwrapping, or MAC verification,
- Destroy Date: The date and time when the managed cryptographic
object was destroyed
- Compromise Occurrence Date: The date and time when the managed
cryptographic object was first believed to be compromised.
- Compromise Date: The date and time when the managed cryptographic
object was entered into the compromised state.
- Archive Date: The date and time when the managed object
was placed in Off-Line storage.
These attributes apply to all cryptographic objects (symmetric
keys, asymmetric keys, etc.) with exceptions as noted in [KMIP-Spec].
However, certain of these attributes (such as the Initial Date) are not
specified by the client and are implicitly set by the server.
In using these attributes, the following guidelines should
be observed:
- As discussed for each of these attributes in [KMIP-Spec], a number of these times are set once and it is
not possible for the client or server to modify them. However, several of
the time attributes (particularly the Activation Date, Protect Start Date,
Process Stop Date and Deactivation Date) may be set by the server and/or
requested by the client. Coordination of time-related attributes between
client and server, therefore, is primarily the responsibility of the
server, as it manages the cryptographic object and its state. However, special
conditions related to time-related attributes, governing when the server
accepts client modifications to time-related attributes, may be
communicated out-of-band between the client and server outside the scope
of KMIP. In general, state transitions occur as a result of operational
requests, such as Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Activate, Revoke, and
Destroy. However, clients may need to specify times in the future for such
things as Activation Date, Deactivation Date, Process Start Date, and Protect
Stop Date.
KMIP allows clients to specify times in the past for such attributes as
Activation Date and Deactivation Date. This is intended primarily for
clients that were disconnected from the server at the time that the client
performed that operation on a given key.
- It is valid to have a projected Deactivation Date when
there is no Activation Date. This means, however, that the key is not yet
active, even though its projected Deactivation Date has been specified. A
valid Deactivation Date is greater than or equal to the Activation Date
(if the Activation Date has been set).
- The Protect Stop Date may be equal to, but may not be
later than the Deactivation Date. Similarly, the Process Start Date may be
equal to, but may not precede, the Activation Date. KMIP implementations
should consider specifying both these attributes, particularly for
symmetric keys, as a key may be needed for processing protected data
(e.g., decryption) long after it is no longer appropriate to use it for
applying cryptographic protection to data (e.g., encryption).
- KMIP does not allow an Active object to be destroyed with
the Destroy operation. The server returns an error, if the client invokes
the Destroy operation on an Active object. To destroy an Active object,
clients first call the Revoke operation or explicitly set the Deactivation
Date of the object. Once the object is in Deactivated state, clients may destroy
the object by calling the Destroy operation. These operations may be
performed in a batch. If other time-related attributes (e.g., Protect Stop
Date) are set to a future date, the server should set these to the
Deactivation Date.
- After a cryptographic object is destroyed, a key
management server may retain certain information about the object, such as
the Unique Identifier.
KMIP allows the specification of attributes on a per-client
basis, such that a server could maintain or present different sets of
attributes for different clients. This flexibility may be necessary in some
cases, such as when a server maintains the availability of a given key for some
clients, even after that same key is moved to an inactive state (e.g.,
Deactivated state) for other clients. However, such an approach might result in
significant inconsistencies regarding the object state from the point of view
of all participating clients and should, therefore, be avoided. A server should
maintain a consistent state for each object, across all clients that have or are
able to request that object.
3.6
Template
The usage of templates is an
alternative approach for setting attributes in an operation request. Instead of
individually specifying each attribute, a template may be used to provide
attribute values.
A template also has attributes that are applicable to the
template itself which are referred to in the specification as associated
attributes to distinguish them from the attributes that are contained
within the template managed object. When registering a template, the Name
attribute for the template itself must be set. It is used to identify the
template in the Template-Attribute structure when attributes for a managed
object are set in KMIP operations.
The Template-Attribute structure allows for multiple
template names (zero or more) and individual attributes (zero or more) to be
specified in an operation request. The structure is used in the Create, Create
Key Pair, Register, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Derive Key, Certify, and
Re-certify operations. All of these operations with the exception of the Create
Key Pair and the Re-key Key Pair operations use the Template-Attribute tag. The
Create Key Pair and the Re-key Key Pair operations use the Common
Template-Attribute, Private Key Template Attribute, and Public Key
Template-Attribute tags allowing specification of different attributes for the
public and private managed cryptographic objects.
Templates may be the subject of the Register, Locate, Get,
Get Attributes, Get Attribute List, Add Attribute, Modify Attribute, Delete
Attribute, Delete Attribute, and Destroy operations. Templates are created
using the Register operation. When the template is the subject of an operation,
the Unique Identifier is used to identify the template. The template name is
only used to identify the template when referenced inside a Template-Attribute
structure.
The purpose of these examples
is to illustrate how templates are used. The first example shows how a template
is registered. The second example shows how the newly registered template is
used to create a symmetric key.
In this example, a client
registers a template by encapsulating attributes for creating a 256-bit AES key
with the Cryptographic Usage Mask set to Encrypt and Decrypt.
The following is specified
inside the Register Request Payload:
·
Object Type: Template
·
Template-Attribute:
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name : Name
·
Attribute Value: Template1
·
Template
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Algorithm
·
Attribute Value: AES
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Length
·
Attribute Value: 256
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Usage Mask
·
Attribute Value: Encrypt and Decrypt
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Operation Policy Name
·
Attribute Value: OperationPolicy1
The Operation Policy OperationPolicy1 applies to the AES key
being created using the template. It is not used to control operations on the
template itself. KMIP does not allow operation policies to be specified for
controlling operations on the template itself. The default policy for template
objects is used for this purpose and is specified in the KMIP Specification.
In this example, the client
uses the template created in example 3.6.1 to create a 256-bit AES key.
The following is specified in
the Create Request Payload:
·
Object Type: Symmetric Key
·
Template-Attribute:
·
Name: Template1
·
Attribute:
·
Attribute Name: Name
·
Attribute Value:
AESkey
·
Attribute:
·
Attribute Name: x-Custom
Attribute1
·
Attribute Value:
ID74592
The Template-Attribute
structure specifies both a template name and additional associated attributes.
It is possible to specify the Custom Attribute inside the template when the
template is registered; however, this particular example sets this attribute
separately.
Versions of KMIP prior to KMIP version 1.2 contained a fixed
list of attributes applicable to objects created using a template and those
applicable to the template managed object. The value returned by the Get
operation for a template was subject to varying interpretations. KMIP 1.2
alters this handling to provide clarification of the expected handling for
templates. KMIP clients may need to be mindful of this change when registering
or performing operations which refer to templates as the handling of templates
in a KMIP server vary depending on the version of the KMIP protocol specified.
As the baseline server profile does not mandate (require)
support for templates a KMIP client that requires support for templates cannot
be guaranteed to interoperate with all servers that conform to the KMIP
specification.
When the Archive operation is performed, it is recommended
that a unique identifier and a minimal set of attributes be retained within the
server for operational efficiency. In such a case, the retained attributes may
include Unique Identifier and State.
Any number of vendor-specific extensions may be included in
the Message Extension optional structure. This allows KMIP implementations to
create multiple extensions to the protocol.
3.9 Unique
Identifiers
For clients that require unique identifiers in a special
form, out-of-band registration/configuration may be used to communicate this
requirement to the server.
3.10 Result Message Text
KMIP specifies the Result Status, the Result Reason and the
Result Message as normative message contents. For the Result Status and Result Reason,
the enumerations provided in [KMIP-Spec] are the
normative values. The values for the Result Message text are
implementation-specific. In consideration of internationalization, it is
recommended that any vendor implementation of KMIP provide appropriate language
support for the Return Message. How a client specifies the language for Result
Messages is outside the scope of the KMIP.
3.11 Query
Query does not explicitly support client requests to
determine what operations require authentication. To determine whether an
operation requires authentication, a client should request that operation.
3.12 Canceling Asynchronous Operations
If an asynchronous operation is cancelled by the client, no
information is returned by the server in the result code regarding any
operations that may have been partially completed. Identification and
remediation of partially completed operations is the responsibility of the
server.
It is the responsibility of the server to determine when to
discard the status of asynchronous operations. The determination of how long a
server should retain the status of an asynchronous operation is
implementation-dependent and not defined by KMIP.
Once a client has received the status on an asynchronous
operation other than “pending”, any subsequent request for status of that
operation may return either the same status as in a previous polling request or
an “unavailable” response.
3.13
Multi-instance Hash
The Digest attribute contains the output of hashing a
managed object, such as a key or a certificate. The server always generates the
SHA-256 hash value when the object is created or generated. KMIP allows
multiple instances of the digest attribute to be associated with the same
managed object. For example, it is common practice for publicly trusted CAs to
publish two digests (often referred to as the fingerprint or the thumbprint) of
their certificate: one calculated using the SHA-1 algorithm and another using
the MD5 algorithm. In this case, each digest would be calculated by the server
using a different hash algorithm.
3.14 Returning Related Objects
The key block returns a single object, with associated
attributes and other data. For those cases in which multiple related objects
are needed by a client, such as the private key and the related certificate,
the client should issue multiple Get requests to obtain these related objects.
3.15 Reducing Multiple Requests
through the Use of Batch
KMIP supports batch operations in order to reduce the number
of calls between the client and server. For example, Locate and Get are likely
to be commonly accomplished within a single batch request.
KMIP does not ensure that batch operations are atomic on the
server side. If servers implement such atomicity, the client is able to use the
optional “undo” mode to request roll-back for batch operations implemented as
atomic transactions. However, support for “undo” mode is optional in the
protocol, and there is no guarantee that a server that supports “undo” mode has
effectively implemented atomic batches. The use of “undo”, therefore, should be
restricted to those cases in which it is possible to assure the client, through
mechanisms outside of KMIP, of the server effectively supporting atomicity for
batch operations.
3.16 Maximum Message Size
When a server is processing requests in a batch, it should
compare the cumulative response size of the message to be returned after each request
with the specified Maximum Response Size. If the message is too large, it
should prepare a maximum message size error response message at that point,
rather than continuing with operations in the batch. This increases the
client’s ability to understand what operations have and have not been completed.
When processing individual requests within the batch, the
server that has encountered a Maximum Response Size error should not return
attribute values or other information as part of the error response.
The Locate operation also
supports the concept of a maximum item count to include in the returned list of
unique identifiers.
3.17 Using Offset in Re-key and Re-certify Operations
The Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, and Re-certify operations allow
the specification of an offset interval.
The Re-key and the Re-key Key Pair operations allow the
client to specify an offset interval for activation of the key. This offset
specifies the duration of time between the time the request is made and the
time when the activation of the key occurs. If an offset is specified, all
other times for the new key are determined from the new Activation Date, based
on the intervals used by the previous key, i.e., from the Activation Date to the
Process Start Date, Protect Stop Date, etc.
The Re-certify operation allows the client to specify an
offset interval that indicates the difference between the Initial Date of the
new certificate and the Activation Date of the new certificate. As with the Re-key
operation, all other times for the certificate are determined using the
intervals used for the previous certificate.
Note that in re-key operations if activation date, process
start date, protect stop date and deactivation date are obtained from the
existing key, and the initial date is obtained from the current time, then the
deactivation/activation date/process start date/protect stop date is smaller or
less than initial date. KMIP allows back-dating of these values to prevent this
contradiction (see [KMIP-Spec] section 3.22).
3.18 ID
Placeholder
A number of operations are affected by a mechanism referred
to as the ID Placeholder. This is a temporary variable consisting of a single
Unique Identifier that is stored inside the server for the duration of
executing a batch of operations. The ID Placeholder is obtained from the Unique
Identifier returned by certain operations; the applicable operations are
identified in Table 1, along with a list of operations that accept the ID
Placeholder as input.
|
Operation
|
ID Placeholder at the
beginning of the operation
|
ID Placeholder upon
completion of the operation (in case of operation failure, a batch using the
ID Placeholder stops)
|
|
Create
|
-
|
ID of new Object
|
|
Create Key Pair
|
-
|
ID of new Private Key (ID of new
Public Key may be obtained via a Locate)
|
|
Create Split Key
|
-
|
ID of the split whose Key Part Identifier is 1
|
|
Join Split Key
|
|
ID of returned object
|
|
Register
|
-
|
ID of newly registered Object
|
|
Derive Key
|
- (multiple Unique Identifiers
may be specified in the request)
|
ID of new Symmetric Key
|
|
Locate
|
-
|
ID of located Object
|
|
Get
|
ID of Object
|
no change
|
|
Validate
|
-
|
-
|
|
Get Attributes
List/Modify/Add/Delete
|
ID of Object
|
no change
|
|
Activate
|
ID of Object
|
no change
|
|
Revoke
|
ID of Object
|
no change
|
|
Destroy
|
ID of Object
|
no change
|
|
Archive/Recover
|
ID of Object
|
no change
|
|
Certify
|
ID of Public Key
|
ID of new Certificate
|
|
Re-certify
|
ID of Certificate
|
ID of new Certificate
|
|
Re-key
|
ID of Symmetric Key to be
rekeyed
|
ID of new Symmetric Key
|
|
Re-key Key Pair
|
ID of Private Key to be
rekeyed
|
ID of new Private Key (ID of new
Public Key may be obtained via a Locate)
|
|
Obtain Lease
|
ID of Object
|
no change
|
|
Get Usage Allocation
|
ID of Key
|
no
change
|
|
Check
|
ID of Object
|
no
change
|
Table 1: ID
Placeholder Prior to and Resulting from a KMIP Operation
3.19 Key Block
The protocol uses the Key Block structure to transport a key
to the client or server. This Key Block consists of the Key Value Type, the Key
Value, and the Key Wrapping Data. The Key Value Type identifies the format of
the Key Material, e.g., Raw format or Transparent Key structure. The Key Value
consists of the Key Material and optional attributes. The Key Wrapping Data
provides information about the wrapping key and the wrapping mechanism, and is
returned only if the client requests the Key Value to be wrapped by specifying
the Key Wrapping Specification inside the Get Request Payload. The Key Wrapping
Data may also be included inside the Key Block if the client registers a
wrapped key.
The protocol allows any attribute to be included inside the
Key Value and allows these attributes to be cryptographically bound to the Key Material
(i.e., by signing, MACing, encrypting, or both encrypting and signing/MACing
the Key Value). Some of the attributes that may be included include the
following:
·
Unique Identifier – uniquely identifies the key
·
Cryptographic Algorithm (e.g., AES, 3DES, RSA) – this attribute
is either specified inside the Key Block structure or the Key Value structure
·
Cryptographic Length (e.g., 128, 256, 2048) – this attribute is
either specified inside the Key Block structure or the Key Value structure
·
Cryptographic Usage Mask– identifies the cryptographic usage of
the key (e.g., Encrypt, Wrap Key, Export)
·
Cryptographic Parameters – provides additional parameters for
determining how the key may be used
·
Block Cipher Mode (e.g., CBC, NISTKeyWrap, GCM) – this parameter
identifies the mode of operation, including block cipher-based MACs or wrapping
mechanisms
·
Padding Method (e.g., OAEP, X9.31, PSS) – identifies the padding
method and if applicable the signature or encryption scheme
·
Hashing Algorithm (e.g., SHA-256) – identifies the hash algorithm
to be used with the signature/encryption mechanism or Mask Generation Function;
note that the different HMACs are defined individually as algorithms and do not
require the Hashing Algorithm parameter to be set
·
Key Role Type – Identifies the functional key role (e.g., DEK,
KEK)
·
State (e.g., Active)
·
Dates (e.g., Activation Date, Process Start Date, Protect Stop
Date)
·
Custom Attribute – allows vendors and clients to define
vendor-specific attributes; may also be used to prevent replay attacks by
setting a nonce
3.20
Object Group
The key management system may specify rules for valid group
names which may be created by the client. Clients are informed of such rules by
a mechanism that is not specified by [KMIP-Spec]KMIP_Spec. In
the protocol, the group names themselves are text strings of no specified
format. Specific key management system implementations may choose to support
hierarchical naming schemes or other syntax restrictions on the names. Groups
may be used to associate objects for a variety of purposes. A set of keys used
for a common purpose, but for different time intervals, may be linked by a
common Object Group. Servers may create predefined groups and add objects to
them independently of client requests.
KMIP allows clients to specify whether it wants a “fresh” or
“default” object from a common Object Group. Fresh is an indication of whether
a member of a group has been retrieved by a client with the Get operation. The
value of fresh may be set as an attribute when creating or registering an
object. Subsequently, the Fresh attribute is modifiable only by the server.
For example, a set of symmetric keys belong to the Object Group
“SymmetricKeyGroup1” and the Fresh attribute is set to true for members of the
group at the time of creating or registering the member. To add a new symmetric
key to the group, the Object Group attribute is set to “SymmetricKeyGroup1” and
the Fresh attribute is set to true when creating or registering the symmetric
key object.
The definition of a “default” object in a group is based on
server policy. One example of server policy is to use round robin selection to
serve a key from a group. In this case when a client requests the default key
from a group, the server uses round robin selection to serve the key.
An object may be removed from a group by deleting the Object
Group attribute, as long as server policy permits it. A client would need to
delete each individual member of a group to remove all members of a group.
The Object Group Member flag is specified in the Locate
request to indicate the type of group member to return. Object Group Member is
an enumeration that can take the value Group Member Fresh or Group Member
Default. Following are examples of how the Object Group Member flag is used:
When a Locate request is made by specifying the Object Group
attribute (e.g., "symmetricKeyGroup1) and setting the Object Group Member
flag to "Group Member Fresh", matching objects from the specified
group (e.g., "symmetricKeyGroup1") have the Fresh attribute set to
true. If there are no fresh objects remaining in the group, the server may
generate a new object on the fly based on server policy.
When a Locate request is made by specifying the Object Group
attribute (e.g., "symmetricKeyGroup2) and setting the Object Group Member
flag to "Group Member Default", a default object is returned from the
group. In this example, the server policy defines default to be the next key in
the group "symmetricKeyGroup2”; the group has three group members whose
Unique Identifiers are uuid1, uuid2, uuid3. If the client performs four
consecutive batched Locate and Get operations with Object Group set to
"symmetricKeyGroup2" and Object Group Member set to “Group Member
Default” in the Locate request, the server returns uuid1, uuid2, uuid3, and
uuid1 (restarting from the beginning with uuid1 for the fourth request) in the
four Get responses.
The key management system may contain multiple embedded CAs
or may have access to multiple external CAs. How the server routes a certificate
request to a CA is vendor-specific and outside the scope of KMIP. If the server
requires and supports the capability for clients to specify the CA to be used
for signing a Certificate Request, then this information may be provided by
including the X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute in the Certify or Re-certify
request.
[KMIP-Spec]KMIP_Spec supports multiple options
for submitting a certificate request to the key management server within a
Certify or Re-Certify operation. It is a vendor decision as to whether the key
management server offers certification authority (CA) functionality or proxies
the certificate request onto a separate CA for processing. The type of
certificate request formats supported is also a vendor decision, and this may,
in part, be based upon the request formats supported by any CA to which the
server proxies the certificate requests.
All certificate request formats for requesting X.509
certificates specified in [KMIP-Spec] (i.e.,
PKCS#10, PEM and CRMF) provide a means for allowing the CA to verify that the
client that created the certificate request possesses the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This is referred to
as Proof-of-Possession (POP). However, it should be noted that in the case of
the CRMF format, some CAs may not support the CRMF POP option, but instead rely
upon the underlying certificate management protocols (i.e., CMP and CMC) to
provide POP. In the case where the CA does not support POP via the CRMF format
(including CA functionality within the key management server), an alternative
certificate request format (i.e., PKCS#10, PEM) would need to be used if POP
needs to be verified.
The Create Key Pair and the Re-key Key Pair operations allow
clients to specify attributes using the Common Template-Attribute, Private Key
Template-Attribute, and Public Key Template-Attribute. The Common
Template-Attribute object includes a list of attributes that apply to both the
public and private key. Attributes that are not common to both keys may be
specified using the Private Key Template-Attribute or Public Key
Template-Attribute. If a single-instance attribute is specified in multiple
Template-Attribute objects, the server obeys the following order of precedence:
1. Attributes specified
explicitly in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
2. Attributes specified via
templates in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
3. Attributes specified
explicitly in the Common Template-Attribute, then
4. Attributes specified via
templates in the Common Template-Attribute
A client specifies several attributes in the Create Key Pair
Request Payload. The Common Template-Attribute includes the template name
RSACom and other explicitly specified common attributes:
RSACom Template
·
Template
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Algorithm
·
Attribute Value: RSA
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Length
·
Attribute Value: 2048
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Parameters
·
Attribute Value:
·
Padding Method: OAEP
·
Attribute:
·
Attribute Name: x-Serial
·
Attribute Value: 1234
·
Attribute:
·
Attribute Name: Object Group:
·
Attribute Value: Key encryption group 1
Common Template-Attribute
·
Name
·
Name Value: RSACom
·
Name Type: Uninterpreted Text String
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Length:
·
Attribute Value: 4096
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Parameters
·
Attribute Value:
·
Padding Method: PKCS1 v1.5
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: x-ID
·
Attribute Value: 56789
The Private Key Template-Attribute includes a reference to
the template name RSAPriv and other explicitly-specified private key
attributes:
RSAPriv Template
·
Template
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Object Group
·
Attribute Value: Key encryption group 2
Private Key Template-Attribute
·
Name
·
Name Value: RSAPriv
·
Name Type: Uninterpreted Text String
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Usage Mask
·
Attribute Value: Unwrap Key
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Name
·
Attribute Value:
·
Name Value: PrivateKey1
·
Name Type: Uninterpreted Text String
The Public Key Template Attribute includes explicitly-specified
public key attributes:
Public Key Template-Attribute
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Usage Mask
·
Attribute Value: Wrap Key
·
Attribute
·
Attribute Name: Name
·
Attribute Value:
·
Name Value: PublicKey1
·
Name Type: Uninterpreted Text String
Following the attribute precedence rule, the server creates a 4096-bit RSA key.
The following client-specified attributes are set:
Private Key
·
Cryptographic Algorithm: RSA
·
Cryptographic Length: 4096
·
Cryptographic Parameters:
·
Padding Method: OAEP
·
Cryptographic Parameters:
·
Padding Method: PKCS1 v1.5
·
Cryptographic Usage Mask: Unwrap Key
·
x-Serial: 1234
·
x-ID: 56789
·
Object Group: Key encryption group 1
·
Object Group: Key encryption group 2
·
Name:
·
Name Value: PrivateKey1
·
Name Type: Uninterpreted Text String
Public Key
·
Cryptographic Algorithm: RSA
·
Cryptographic Length: 4096
·
Cryptographic Parameters:
·
Padding Method: OAEP
·
Cryptographic Parameters:
·
Padding Method: PKCS1 v1.5
·
Cryptographic Usage Mask: Wrap Key
·
x-Serial: 1234
·
x-ID: 56789
·
Object Group: Key encryption group 1
·
Name:
·
Name Value: PublicKey1
·
Name Type: Uninterpreted Text String
During a Create Key Pair or Re-key Key Pair operation, a
Link Attribute is automatically created by the server for each object (i.e., a
link is created from the private key to the public key and vice versa). Certain
attributes are the same for both objects and are set by the server while
creating the key pair. The KMIP protocol does not support an equivalent
operation for registering a key pair. Clients are able to register the objects
independently and manually set the Link attributes to make the server aware
that these keys are associated with each other. When the Link attribute is set
for both objects, the server should verify that the registered objects indeed
correspond to each other and apply similar restrictions as if the key pair was
created on the server.
Clients should perform the following steps when registering
a key pair:
1. Register the public key
and set all associated attributes:
a.
Cryptographic Algorithm
b.
Cryptographic
Length
c.
Cryptographic
Usage Mask
5. Register the private key
and set all associated attributes
a.
Cryptographic
Algorithm is the same for both public and private key
b.
Cryptographic
Length is the same for both public and private key
c.
Cryptographic
Parameters may be set; if set, the value is the same for both the public and
private key
d.
Cryptographic
Usage Mask is set, but does not contain the same value for both the public and
private key
e.
Link is set for
the Private Key with Link Type Public Key Link and the Linked Object
Identifier of the corresponding Public Key
f.
Link is set for
the Public Key with Link Type Private Key Link and the Linked Object
Identifier of the corresponding Private Key
The KMIP protocol allows clients to register Secret Data
objects. Secret Data objects may include passwords or data that are used to
derive keys.
KMIP defines Secret Data as cryptographic objects. Even if
the object is not used for cryptographic purposes, clients may still set
certain attributes, such as the Cryptographic Usage Mask, for this object
unless otherwise stated. Similarly, servers set certain attributes for this
object, including the Digest, State, and certain Date attributes, even if the
attributes may seem relevant only for other types of cryptographic objects.
When registering a Secret Data object, the following
attributes are set by the server:
·
Unique Identifier
·
Object Type
·
Digest
·
State
·
Initial Date
·
Last Change Date
When registering a Secret Data object for non-cryptographic
purposes, the following attributes are set by either the client or the server:
·
Cryptographic Usage Mask
The Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute is intended to
support asymmetric concepts using symmetric keys. This is common practice in
established crypto systems: the MAC is an example of an operation where a
single symmetric key is used at both ends, but policy dictates that one end may
only generate cryptographic tokens using this key (the MAC) and the other end may
only verify tokens. The security of the system fails if the verifying end is
able to use the key to perform generation operations.
In these cases it is not sufficient to describe the usage
policy on the keys in terms of cryptographic primitives like “encrypt” vs.
“decrypt” or “sign” vs. “verify”. There are two reasons why this is the case.
·
In
some of these operations, such as MAC generation and verification, the same
cryptographic primitive is used in both of the complementary operations. MAC
generation involves computing and returning the MAC, while MAC verification
involves computing that same MAC and comparing it to a supplied value to
determine if they are the same. Thus, both generation and verification use the
“encrypt” operation, and the two usages are not able to be distinguished by
considering only “encrypt” vs. “decrypt”.
·
Some
operations which require separate key types use the same fundamental
cryptographic primitives. For example, encryption of data, encryption of a key,
and computation of a MAC all use the fundamental operation “encrypt”, but in
many applications, securely differentiated keys are used for these three
operations. Simply looking for an attribute that permits “encrypt” is not
sufficient.
Allowing the use of these keys outside of their specialized purposes
may compromise security. Instead, specialized application-level permissions are
necessary to control the use of these keys. KMIP provides several pairs of such
permissions in the Cryptographic Usage Mask (3.14), such as:
|
MAC GENERATE
MAC VERIFY
|
For cryptographic MAC operations. Although it is possible
to compose certain MACs using a series of encrypt calls, the security of the
MAC relies on the operation being atomic and specific.
|
|
GENERATE CRYPTOGRAM
VALIDATE CRYPTOGRAM
|
For composite cryptogram operations such as financial CVC or
ARQC. To specify exactly which cryptogram the key is used for it is also
necessary to specify a role for the key (see Section 3.6 “Cryptographic Parameters” in [KMIP-Spec]).
|
|
TRANSLATE ENCRYPT
TRANSLATE DECRYPT
TRANSLATE WRAP
TRANSLATE UNWRAP
|
To accommodate secure routing of traffic and data. In
many areas that rely on symmetric techniques (notably, but not exclusively
financial networks), information is sent from place to place encrypted using
shared symmetric keys. When encryption keys are changed, it is desirable for
the change to be an atomic operation, otherwise distinct unwrap-wrap or
decrypt-encrypt steps risk leaking the plaintext data during the translation
process.
TRANSLATE ENCRYPT/DECRYPT is used for data
encipherment.
TRANSLATE WRAP/UNWRAP
is used for key wrapping.
|
Table 2: Cryptographic
Usage Masks Pairs
In order to support asymmetric concepts using symmetric keys
in a KMIP system, the server implementation needs to be able to differentiate
between clients for generate operations and clients for verify operations. As
indicated by Section 3 (“Attributes”) of [KMIP-Spec]
there is a single key object in the system to which all relevant clients refer,
but when a client requests that key, the server is able to choose which
attributes (permissions) to send with it, based on the identity and configured
access rights of that specific client. There is, thus, no need to maintain and
synchronize distinct copies of the symmetric key – just a need to define access
policy for each client or group of clients.
The internal implementation of this feature at the server
end is a matter of choice for the vendor: storing multiple key blocks with all
necessary combinations of attributes or generating key blocks dynamically are
both acceptable approaches.
The Application Specific Information attribute is used to
store data which is specific to the application(s) using the object. Some
examples of Application Namespace and Application Data pairs are given below.
·
SMIME, 'someuser@company.com'
·
TLS, 'some.domain.name'
·
Volume Identification, '123343434'
·
File Name, 'secret.doc'
·
Client Generated Key ID, ‘450994003'
The following Application Namespaces are recommended:
·
SMIME
·
TLS
·
IPSEC
·
HTTPS
·
PGP
·
Volume Identification
·
File Name
·
LTO4, LTO5, and LTO6
·
LIBRARY-LTO, LIBRARY-LTO4, LIBRARY-LTO5 and LIBRARY-LTO6
KMIP provides optional support for server-generated
Application Data. Clients may request the server to generate the Application
Data for the client by omitting Application Data while setting or modifying the
Application Specific Information attribute. A server only generates the
Application Data if the Application Data is completely omitted from the
request, and the client-specified Application Namespace is recognized and
supported by the server. An example for requesting the server to generate the
Application Data is shown below:
AddAttribute(Unique ID,
AppSpecInfo{AppNameSpace=’LIBRARY-LTO4’});
If the server does not recognize the namespace, the
“Application Namespace Not Supported” error is returned to the client.
If the Application Data is provided, and the Application
Namespace is recognized by the server, the server uses the provided
Application Data, and does not generate the Application Data for the client. In
the example below, the server stores the Application Specific Information
attribute with the Application Data value set to null.
AddAttribute(Unique ID,
AppSpecInfo{AppNameSpace=’LIBRARY-LTO4’, AppData=null});
KMIP does not support server mutation of client-supplied
attributes. If a server does not accept an attribute value that is being
specified inside the request by the client, the server returns an error and
specifies “Invalid Field” as Result Reason.
Attributes that are not set by the client, but are implicitly
set by the server as a result of the operation, may optionally be returned by
the server in the operation response inside the Template–Attribute.
If a client sets a time-related attribute to the current
date and time (as perceived by the client), but as a result of a clock skew,
the specified date of the attribute is earlier than the time perceived by the
server, the server’s policy is used to determine whether to accept the “backdated
attribute”. KMIP does not require the server to fail a request if a backdated
attribute is set by the client.
If a server does not support backdated attributes, and
cryptographic objects are expected to change state at the specified current
date and time (as perceived by the client), clients are recommended to issue
the operation that would implicitly set the date for the client. For example,
instead of explicitly setting the Activation Date, clients could issue the
Activate operation. This would require the server to set the Activation Date to
the current date and time as perceived by the server.
If it is not possible to set a date attribute via an
operation, and the server does not support backdated attributes, clients need
to take into account that potential clock skew issues may cause the server to
return an error even if a date attribute is set to the client’s current date
and time.
For additional information, refer to the sections describing
the State attribute and the Time Stamp field in [KMIP-Spec].
The enumerations for the Revocation Reason attribute specified in
KMIP (see table 9.1.3.2.19 in [KMIP-Spec]) are aligned
with the Reason Code specified in [X.509] and
referenced in [RFC5280] with the following
exceptions. The certificateHold and removeFromCRL reason codes
have been excluded from [KMIP-Spec] since KMIP does
not support certificate suspension (putting a certificate hold) or unsuspension
(removing a certificate from hold). The aaCompromise reason code has
been excluded from [KMIP-Spec] since it only applies
to attribute certificates, which are out-of-scope for [KMIP-Spec].
The privilegeWithdrawn reason code is included in [KMIP-Spec]
since it may be used for either attribute or public key certificates. In the
context of its use within KMIP it is assumed to only apply to public key
certificates.
The process of generating a new certificate to replace an existing
certificate may be referred to by multiple terms, based upon what data within
the certificate is changed when the new certificate is created. In all
situations, the new certificate includes a new serial number and new validity
dates [KMIP-Spec] uses the following terminology
which is aligned with the definitions found in IETF [RFC3647]
and [RFC4949]:
·
Certificate Renewal: The issuance of a new certificate to
the subject without changing the subject public key or other information (except
the serial number and certificate validity dates) in the certificate.
·
Certificate Update: The issuance of a new certificate,
due to changes in the information in the certificate other than the subject
public key.
·
Certificate Rekey: The generation of a new key pair for
the subject and the issuance of a new certificate that certifies the new public
key.
The KMIP Specification supports certificate renewals using
the Re-Certify operation and certificate updates using the Certify operation.
Certificate rekey is supported through the submission of a Re-key Key Pair
operation, which generates a replacement (new) key pair, followed by a Certify
operation, which issues a new certificate containing the replacement (new)
public key.
3.30 Key Encoding
Two parties receiving the same key as a Key Value Byte String make
use of the key in exactly the same way in order to interoperate. To ensure
that, it is necessary to define a correspondence between the abstract syntax of
Key and the notation in the standard algorithm description that defines how the
key is used. The next sections establish that correspondence for the algorithms
AES [FIPS197] and Triple-DES [SP800-67].
AES Key Encoding [FIPS197] section
5.2, titled Key Expansion, uses the input key as an array of bytes indexed
starting at 0. The first byte of the Key becomes the key byte in AES that is
labeled index 0 in [FIPS197] and the
other key bytes follow in index order.
Proper parsing and key load of the contents of the Key for AES is
determined by using the following Key byte string to generate and match the key
expansion test vectors in [FIPS197] Appendix A for
the 128-bit (16 byte) AES Cipher Key: 2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 A6 AB F7 15 88 09 CF
4F 3C.
A Triple-DES key consists of three keys for the
cryptographic engine (Key1, Key2, and Key3) that are each 64 bits (even though
only 56 are used); the three keys are also referred to as a key bundle (KEY) [SP800-67].SP800_67 A key bundle may employ either two or three
mutually independent keys. When only two are employed (called two-key
Triple-DES), then Key1 = Key3.
Each key in a Triple-DES key bundle is expanded into a key
schedule according to a procedure defined in [SP800-67]
Appendix A. That procedure numbers the bits in the key from 1 to 64, with
number 1 being the left most, or most significant bit. The first byte of the
Key is bits 1 through 8 of Key1, with bit 1 being the most significant bit. The
second byte of the Key is bits 9 through 16 of Key1, and so forth, so that the
last byte of the KEY is bits 57 through 64 of Key3 (or Key2 for two-key
Triple-DES).
Proper parsing and key load of the contents of Key for
Triple-DES is determined by using the following Key byte string to generate and
match the key expansion test vectors in [SP800-67]
Appendix B for the key bundle:
Key1 = 0123456789ABCDEF
Key2 = 23456789ABCDEF01
Key3 = 456789ABCDEF0123
There are mathematical relationships between certain
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms such as the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) and Diffie-Hellman (DH) and their elliptic curve equivalents ECDSA and
ECDH that allow the same asymmetric key pair to be used in both algorithms. In
addition, there are overlaps in the key format used to represent the asymmetric
key pair for each algorithm type.
Even though a single key pair may be used in multiple algorithms,
the KMIP Specification has chosen to specify separate key formats for
representing the asymmetric key pair for use in each algorithm. This approach
keeps KMIP in line with the reference standards (e.g., NIST [FIPS186-4], ANSI [X9.42],
etc.) from which the key formats are obtained and the best practice documents
(e.g., NIST [SP800-57-1], NIST [SP800-56A]
etc.) which recommend that a key pair only be used for one purpose.
The value (e.g., 2048 bits) referred to in the KMIP Cryptographic
Length attribute for an asymmetric (public or private) key may be
misleading, since this length only refers to certain portions of the
mathematical values that comprise the key. The actual length of all the
mathematical values comprising the public or the private key is longer than the
referenced value. This point may be illustrated by looking at the components
of a RSA public and private key.
The RSA public key is comprised of a modulus (n) and an
(public) exponent (e). When one indicates that the RSA public key is 2048 bits
in length that is a reference to the bit length of the modulus (n) only. So
the full length of the RSA public key is actually longer than 2048 bits, since
it also includes the length of the exponent (e) and the overhead of the
encoding (e.g., ASN.1) of the key material.
The RSA private key is comprised of a modulus (n), the
public exponent (e), the private exponent (d), prime 1 (p), prime 2 (q),
exponent 1 (d mod (p-1)), exponent 2 (d mod (p-1)), and coefficient ((inverse
of q) mod p). Once again the 2048 bit key length is referring only to the
length of the modulus (n), so the overall length of the private key would be
longer given the number of additional components which comprise the key and the
overhead of encoding (e.g., ASN.1) of the key material.
KMIP implementations need to ensure they do not make
assumptions about the actual length of asymmetric (public and private) key
material based on the value specified in the Cryptographic Length
attribute.
The Discover Versions operation allows clients and servers
to identify a KMIP protocol version that both client and server understand. The
operation was added to KMIP 1.1. KMIP 1.0 clients and servers may therefore not
support this operation. If the Discover Versions request is sent to a KMIP 1.0
server and the server does not support the operation, the server returns the
“Operation Not Supported” error.
The operation addresses both the “dumb” and “smart” client
scenarios. Dumb clients may simply pick the first protocol version that is
returned by the server, assuming that the client provides the server with a
list of supported protocol version. Smart clients may request the server to
return a complete list of supported protocol versions by sending an empty
request payload and picking a protocol version that is supported by both client
and server.
Clients specify the protocol version in the request header
and optionally provide a list of protocol versions in the request payload. If
the protocol version in the request header is not specified in the request
payload and the server does not support any protocol version specified in the request
payload, the server returns an empty list in the response payload. In this
scenario, clients are aware that the request did not result in an error and
could communicate with the server using the protocol version specified in the
request header.
KMIP allows for vendor extensions in a number of areas:
1. Enumerations
have specific ranges which are noted as extensions
2. Item Tag values
of the form 0x54xxxx are reserved for vendor extensions
3. Attributes may
be defined by the client with a “x-“ prefix or by the server with a “y-“ prefix
Extensions may be used by vendors to communicate information
between a KMIP client and a KMIP server that is not currently defined within
the KMIP specification.
A common use of extensions is to allow for the structured
definition of attributes using KMIP TTLV encoding rather than encoding vendor
specific information in opaque byte strings.
Any Certificate Revocation List (CRL) checking which may be
required for certificate-related operations such as register and re-key should
be performed by the client prior to requesting the operation from a server.
As defined in Section 2.1.3 of the KMIP Specification V1.1,
the “raw” key format is intended to be used for “a key that contains only
cryptographic key material, encoded as a string of bytes. The “raw” key format
supports situations such as “non-KMIP-aware end-clients are aware how wrapped
cryptographic objects (possibly Raw keys) from the KMIP server should be used
without having to rely on the attributes provided by the Get Attributes
operation” and in that regard is similar to the Opaque key format type.
“Raw” key format is intended to be applied to symmetric keys and not
asymmetric keys; therefore, this format is not specified
in the asymmetric key profiles included in KMIP V1.1.
Meta-Data Only ( MDO) keys are those Managed Key Objects for
which no Key Value is present, as introduced in version 1.2 of [KMIP-Spec] MDO objects can be one of the following: Symmetric Keys,
Private Keys, Split Keys, or Secret Data.
This may be a result of the KMIP client only wanting to
register information (Meta-Data) about the key with a Key Management System,
without having the key itself leave the client’s physical boundary. One such
example could be for keys created and stored within a Hardware Security Module
(HSM), with a policy that does not allow for the keys to leave its hardware.
In such cases, the KMIP client will not include a Key Value within the Key
Block during a Register operation, although it may optionally include a Key
Value Location attribute indicating the location of the Key Value instead. For
such keys, as part of the Register operation, the server will create a Key
Value Present attribute and set it to false to indicate the key value is not
stored on the server.
The KMIP protocol does not support the addition of a Key
Value to an existing MDO key object on the server. If for some reason the
client wanted to do this, it would have to carry out another Register operation
and create a new managed object with the Key Value.
Finally, because there is no Key Value associated with an
MDO key on the server, KMIP operations for Re-key, Re-key Key Pair and Derive
Key cannot be carried out on an MDO key object. An attempt to do so will return
an appropriate error as specified in the Error Handling section of [KMIP-Spec].
KMIP supports creation and registration of managed objects
and retrieval of managed objects in both plaintext and optionally wrapped with
another managed object. KMIP also includes support for a subset of the
operations necessary for certificate management (certifying certificate
requests and validating certificate hierarchies). KMIP defines a range of
Hash-based and MAC-based key derivation options.
There are certain situations in which having capability for
a KMIP client to request cryptographic operations from a KMIP server is
beneficial in terms of simplifying the client implementation, strengthening the
integration between the key management and cryptographic operations, or
improving the overall security of a solution.
KMIP 1.2 adds support for cryptographic services in the form
of client-to-server operations for cryptographic services using managed objects
for encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification, MAC
generation, MAC verification, random number generation, and general hashing.
This support for cryptographic services is similar to the
approach taken in KMIP for certificates. The protocol supports a base set of
operations on certificates that enable a key manager to act as a proxy for a
Certification Authority or in fact operate as a Certification Authority in the contexts
where that is appropriate. A KMIP server supporting cryptographic services may
be acting as a proxy for another cryptographic device or in fact operating as a
cryptographic device in the contexts where that is appropriate.
KMIP clients and KMIP servers using cryptographic services
operations should be mindful of selecting a level of protection for the
communication channel (the TLS connection) that provides sufficient protection
of the plaintext data included in cryptographic operations and commensurate
with the security strength of the operation. There is no requirement for the KMIP
server to enforce selection of a level of protection.
Similarly, server policy regarding accepting random from a
client (see section 2.5 regarding server policy) should reflect the level of
confidence that that server has in a particular client or all clients. Issues
in the quality or integrity of random provided in RNG Seed can affect key creation, nonce and IV generation, client-server TLS session key
creation, and the random delivered to clients with the RNG Retrieve Operation.
KMIP, as a protocol, does not itself enforce restrictions on the quality
or nature of the random provided by a client in the RNG Seed operation.
A KMIP server that supports the RNG Retrieve and RNG Seed
operations may have a single RNG for the server, an RNG which is shared in an
unspecified manner by KMIP clients or a separate RNG for each KMIP client.
There is no requirement for the KMIP server to implement any specific RNG
model.
In some scenarios the server may want assurance of the
integrity of the client’s system before honoring a client’s request.
Additionally, the server may want a guarantee of the freshness of the
attestation computation in the integrity measurement.
Generally, the process takes four passes:
1. The
client sends a request to the server which requires attestation.
2. The
server returns a random nonce to the client that will be used in the
attestation computation to guarantee the freshness of the measurement.
3. The
client sends a request to the server which includes the measurement of the
client’s system, and the measurement contains the nonce from the server.
4.
The server verifies the measurement and sends the appropriate response
to the client.
Passing attestation data with a
client request can be achieved in KMIP as follows:
- The client sends a
request to the server with the Attestation Capable Indicator set to True
in the request header.
- If the request requires attestation, the server will
return an “Attestation Required” error with a Nonce object in the response
header. {If the client request fails for any
reason other than “Attestation Required”, the server will not include a
nonce in the error message.}
- The client uses the nonce received from the server in the
attestation computation that will be used in the measurement.
- The client forms an Attestation Credential Object which
contains either the measurement from the client or an assertion from a
third party if the server is not capable or willing to verify the attestation
data from the client.
- The client then issues a request which contains the
Attestation Credential Object in the request header.
- The server validates the measurement or assertion data in
the Credential Object, checks that the nonce in the Credential Object
matches one sent recently by the server, then sends the appropriate
response to complete the request issued by the client. {If the
measurement or assertion data in the Credential Object does not validate
or if the nonce does not match one sent recently by the server, the server
will return an “Attestation Failed” error instead of completing the
request issued by the client.}
The server needs to be capable
of processing and verifying multiple Credential Objects in the same request
header since Attestation Credentials do not provide the same type of
authentication as the Username and Password or Device Credential.
How frequently (e.g. every
request, every 100 requests, etc.) the server generates a new random nonce
depends on server policy. The lifetime of the nonce once the server has sent
it to the client (i.e., the timeframe in which the client must return the nonce
before needs to request a fresh nonce from the server) also depends on server
policy.
If the client sends a request
that requires attestation but the client has not set the Attestation
Capable Indicator to True, then the server will send a “Permission Denied”
error and will not include a Nonce object in the response header.
KMIP v1.0 and KMIP v1.1 allow a client to register a Split
Key that was created or otherwise obtained by the client, but offer no client
operations to request a Split Key be generated or recombined by the server. The
Create Split Key operation and Join Split Key operation are added to KMIP v1.2
to provide a more complete set of split key functionality.
To request the server generate a split key, the client sends
a Create Split Key request that includes the Split Key parameters (Split Key
Parts, Split Key Threshold, Split Key Method) and desired key attributes (e.g.
Object Type, Cryptographic Length). If the client supplies the Unique
Identifier of an existing base key in a Create Split Key request, the server
will use the supplied key in the key splitting operation instead of generating
a new one. The server will respond with a list of Unique Identifiers for the
newly created Split Keys.
The client may want to add link
attributes to more easily locate the complete set of related Split Keys as
follows. The client adds a Previous Link from the Split Key with Key Part
Identifier K to the Split Key with Key Part Identifier K-1 and a Next Link to
the Split Key with Key Part Identifier K+1. Denoting the value of Split Key
Parts by N, the client adds a Previous Link from the Split Key with Key Part
Identifier 1 to the Split Key with Key Part Identifier N and a Next Link from
the Split Key with Key Part Identifier N to the Split Key with Key Part
Identifier 1. If the client supplies the Unique Identifier of an existing base
key in a Create Split Key request, the client may want to add a Parent Link
attribute from each newly generated Split Key to the base key that was supplied
in the Create Split Key request.
To request the server recombine a set of split keys, the
client sends a Join Split Key request that includes the type of object to be
returned (e.g. Symmetric Key, Private Key, or Secret Data) and a list of Unique
Identifiers of the Split Keys to be combined. The number of Unique Identifiers
in the request needs to be at least the value of Split Key Threshold in the
Split Keys to ensure the server will be able to combine the keys according to
the Split Key Method. The server will respond with the Unique Identifier of the
key obtained by combining the provided Split Keys.
A Cryptographic Object or Opaque Object may be compromised
for a variety of reasons. In KMIP, a client indicates to the server that a
Cryptographic Object is to be considered compromised by performing a Revoke
Operation with a Revocation Reason of Key Compromise or CA Compromise.
The KMIP client must provide a Compromise Occurrence Date (if the Revocation
Reason is Key Compromise) and if it is unable to estimate when the
compromise occurred then it should provide a Compromise Occurrence Date equal to
the Initial Date.
The KMIP specification [KMIP-Spec]
places no requirements on a KMIP server to perform any action on any Managed
Object that references (i.e., via Link attributes) a Cryptographic Object or
Opaque Object that a client has performed a Revoke operation with a Revocation
Reason of Key Compromise or CA Compromise. However, KMIP users
should be aware that there may be security relevant implications in continuing
to use a Managed Cryptographic Object in the following circumstances:
- For a compromised Private Key, the linked Public Key
and/or Certificate;
- For a compromised Public Key, the linked Private Key
and/or Certificate;
- For a compromised Derived Key, the linked derived key
and/or Secret Data Object
In these circumstances, it is the responsibility of the
client to either check the state of the referenced Managed Object or to also
perform a Revoke operation on the referenced Managed Object.
The KMIP Specification [KMIP-Spec]
(see section 9.1.3.2.5) specifies a number of ECC algorithms. These algorithms
are defined in multiple source documents and in some cases, the same algorithm
is known by multiple names since to the algorithm is defined in multiple
documents. The following table provides a mapping of the ECC algorithms
specified in the KMIP specification [KMIP-Spec].
The table identifies the KMIP enumeration, the Object Identifier (OID) and
multiples names (synonyms) for the ECC algorithms.
|
Algorithm Name
|
KMIP Enumeration
Value
|
OID
|
Algorithm
Synonym(s)
|
|
NIST P-192
|
00000001
|
1.2.840.10045.3.1.1
|
secp192r1
ansix9p192v1
|
|
NIST K-163
|
00000002
|
1.3.132.0.1
|
sect163k1
|
|
NIST B-163
|
00000003
|
1.3.132.0.15
|
sect163r2
|
|
NIST P-224
|
00000004
|
1.3.132.0.33
|
secp224r1
|
|
NIST K-233
|
00000005
|
1.3.132.0.26
|
sect233k1
|
|
NIST B-233
|
00000006
|
1.3.132.0.27
|
sect233r1
|
|
NIST P-256
|
00000007
|
1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
|
secp256r1
ansix9p256v1
|
|
NIST K-283
|
00000008
|
1.3.132.0.16
|
sect283k1
|
|
NIST B-283
|
00000009
|
1.3.132.0.17
|
sect283r1
|
|
NIST P-384
|
0000000A
|
1.3.132.0.34
|
secp384r1
|
|
NIST K-409
|
0000000B
|
1.3.132.0.36
|
sect409k1
|
|
NIST B-409
|
0000000C
|
1.3.132.0.37
|
sect409r1
|
|
NIST P-521
|
0000000D
|
1.3.132.0.35
|
secp521r1
|
|
NIST K-571
|
0000000E
|
1.3.132.0.38
|
sect571k1
|
|
NIST B-571
|
0000000F
|
1.3.132.0.39
|
sect571r1
|
|
secp112r1
|
00000010
|
1.3.132.0.6
|
|
|
secp112r2
|
00000011
|
1.3.132.0.7
|
|
|
secp128r1
|
00000012
|
1.3.132.0.28
|
|
|
secp128r2
|
00000013
|
1.3.132.0.29
|
|
|
secp160k1
|
00000014
|
1.3.132.0.9
|
|
|
secp160r1
|
00000015
|
1.3.132.0.8
|
|
|
secp160r2
|
00000016
|
1.3.132.0.30
|
|
|
secp192k1
|
00000017
|
1.3.132.0.31
|
|
|
secp192r1
|
00000001
|
1.2.840.10045.3.1.1
|
NIST P-192
ansix9p192v1
|
|
secp224k1
|
00000018
|
1.3.132.0.32
|
|
|
secp224r1
|
00000004
|
1.3.132.0.33
|
NIST P-224
|
|
secp256k1
|
00000019
|
1.3.132.0.10
|
|
|
secp256r1
|
00000007
|
1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
|
NIST P-256
ansix9p256v1
|
|
secp384r1
|
0000000A
|
1.3.132.0.34
|
NIST P-384
|
|
secp521r1
|
0000000D
|
1.3.132.0.35
|
NIST P-521
|
|
sect113r1
|
0000001A
|
1.3.132.0.4
|
|
|
sect113r2
|
0000001B
|
1.3.132.0.5
|
|
|
sect131r1
|
0000001C
|
1.3.132.0.22
|
|
|
sect131r2
|
0000001D
|
1.3.132.0.23
|
|
|
sect163k1
|
00000002
|
1.3.132.0.1
|
NIST K-163
|
|
sect163r1
|
0000001E
|
1.3.132.0.2
|
|
|
sect163r2
|
00000003
|
1.3.132.0.15
|
NIST B-163
|
|
sect193r1
|
0000001F
|
1.3.132.0.24
|
|
|
sect193r2
|
00000020
|
1.3.132.0.25
|
|
|
sect233k1
|
00000005
|
1.3.132.0.26
|
NIST K-233
|
|
sect233r1
|
00000006
|
1.3.132.0.27
|
NIST B-233
|
|
sect239k1
|
00000021
|
1.3.132.0.3
|
|
|
sect283k1
|
00000008
|
1.3.132.0.16
|
NIST K-283
|
|
sect283r1
|
00000009
|
1.3.132.0.17
|
NIST B-283
|
|
sect409k1
|
0000000B
|
1.3.132.0.36
|
NIST K-409
|
|
sect409r1
|
0000000C
|
1.3.132.0.37
|
NIST B-409
|
|
sect571k1
|
0000000E
|
1.3.132.0.38
|
NIST K-571
|
|
sect571r1
|
0000000F
|
1.3.132.0.39
|
NIST B-571
|
|
ansix9p192v1
|
00000001
|
1.2.840.10045.3.1.1
|
NIST P-192
secp192r1
|
|
ansix9p192v2
|
00000022
|
1.2.840.10045.3.1.2
|
|
|
ansix9p192v3
|
00000023
|
1.2.840.10045.3.1.3
|
|
|
ansix9p239v1
|
00000024
|
1.2.840.10045.3.1.4
|
|
|
ansix9p239v2
|
00000025
|
1.2.840.10045.3.1.5
|
|
|
ansix9p239v3
|
00000026
|
1.2.840.10045.3.1.6
|
|
|
ansix9p256v1
|
00000007
|
1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
|
NIST P-256
secp256r1
|
|
ansix9c2pnb163v1
|
00000027
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.1
|
|
|
ansix9c2pnb163v2
|
00000028
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.2
|
|
|
ansix9c2pnb163v3
|
00000029
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.3
|
|
|
ansix9c2pnb176v1
|
0000002A
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.4
|
|
|
ansix9c2tnb191v1
|
0000002B
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.5
|
|
|
ansix9c2tnb191v2
|
0000002C
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.6
|
|
|
ansix9c2tnb191v3
|
0000002D
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.7
|
|
|
ansix9c2pnb208w1
|
0000002E
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.10
|
|
|
ansix9c2tnb239v1
|
0000002F
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.11
|
|
|
ansix9c2tnb239v2
|
00000030
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.12
|
|
|
ansix9c2tnb239v3
|
00000031
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.13
|
|
|
ansix9c2pnb272w1
|
00000032
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.16
|
|
|
ansix9c2pnb304w1
|
00000033
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.17
|
|
|
ansix9c2tnb359v1
|
00000034
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.18
|
|
|
ansix9c2pnb368w1
|
00000035
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.19
|
|
|
ansix9c2tnb431r1
|
00000036
|
1.2.840.10045.3.0.20
|
|
|
Brainpool_P160r1
|
00000037
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.1
|
|
|
Brainpool_P160t1
|
00000038
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.2
|
|
|
Brainpool_P192r1
|
00000039
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.3
|
|
|
Brainpool_P192t1
|
0000003A
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.4
|
|
|
Brainpool_P224r1
|
0000003B
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.5
|
|
|
Brainpool_P224t1
|
0000003C
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.6
|
|
|
Brainpool_P256r1
|
0000003D
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7
|
|
|
Brainpool_P256t1
|
0000003E
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.8
|
|
|
Brainpool_P320r1
|
0000003F
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.9
|
|
|
Brainpool_P320t1
|
00000040
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.10
|
|
|
Brainpool_P384r1
|
00000041
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11
|
|
|
Brainpool_P384t1
|
00000042
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.12
|
|
|
Brainpool_P512r1
|
00000043
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13
|
|
|
Brainpool_P512t1
|
00000044
|
1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.14
|
|
Table 3: ECC Algorithm Mapping
This section describes how to apply the functionality
described in the Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification to address
specific key management usage scenarios or to solve key management related
issues.
It is possible to formulate Locate queries to address any of
the following conditions:
·
Exact
match of a transition to a given state. Locate the key(s) with a transition to
a certain state at a specified time (t).
·
Range
match of a transition to a given state. Locate the key(s) with a transition to
a certain state at any time at or between two specified times (t and t’).
·
Exact
match of a state at a specified time. Locate the key(s) that are in a certain
state at a specified time (t).
·
Match
of a state during an entire time range. Locate the key(s) that are in a certain
state during an entire time specified with times (t and t’). Note that the
Activation Date could occur at or before t and that the Deactivation Date could
occur at or after t’+1.
·
Match
of a state at some point during a time range. Locate the key(s) that are in a
certain state at some time at or between two specified times (t and t’). In
this case, the transition to that state could be before the start of the
specified time range.
This is accomplished by allowing any date/time attribute to
be present either once (for an exact match) or at most twice (for a range
match).
For instance, if the state we are interested in is Active,
the Locate queries would be the following (corresponding to the bulleted list
above):
·
Exact
match of a transition to a given state: Locate (ActivationDate(t)). Locate keys
with an Activation Date of t.
·
Range
match of a transition to a given state: Locate (ActivationDate(t),
ActivationDate(t')). Locate keys with an Activation Date at or between t and
t’.
·
Exact
match of a state at a specified time: Locate (ActivationDate(0),
ActivationDate(t), DeactivationDate(t+1), DeactivationDate(MAX_INT),
CompromiseDate(t+1), CompromiseDate(MAX_INT) ). Locate keys in the Active state
at time t, by looking for keys with a transition to Active before or until t,
and a transition to Deactivated or Compromised after t (because we don't want the
keys that have a transition to Deactivated or Compromised before t). The server
assumes that keys without a DeactivationDate or CompromiseDate is equivalent to
MAX_INT (i.e., infinite).
·
Match
of a state during an entire time range: Locate (ActivationDate(0),
ActivationDate(t), DeactivationDate(t'+1), DeactivationDate(MAX_INT),
CompromiseDate(t'+1), CompromiseDate(MAX_INT) ). Locate keys in the Active
state during the entire time from t to t’.
·
Match
of a state at some point during a time range: Locate (ActivationDate(0),
ActivationDate(t'-1), DeactivationDate(t+1), DeactivationDate(MAX_INT),
CompromiseDate(t+1), CompromiseDate(MAX_INT)). Locate keys in the Active state
at some time from t to t’, by looking for keys with a transition to Active
between 0 and t’-1 and exit out of Active on or after t+1.
The queries would be similar for Initial Date, Deactivation
Date, Compromise Date and Destroy Date.
In the case of the Destroyed-Compromise state, there are two
dates recorded: the Destroy Date and the Compromise Date. For this state, the
Locate operation would be expressed as follows:
Exact
match of a transition to a given state: Locate (CompromiseDate(t),
State(Destroyed-Compromised)) and Locate (DestroyDate(t),
State(Destroyed-Compromised)). KMIP does not support the OR in the Locate
request, so two requests should be issued
·
Range
match of a transition to a given state: Locate (CompromiseDate(t),
CompromiseDate(t'), State(Destroyed-Compromised)) and Locate (DestroyDate(t),
DestroyDate(t'), State(Destroyed-Compromised)). Locate keys that are
Destroyed-Compromised and were Compromised or Destroyed at or between t and t’.
·
Exact
match of a state at a specified time: Locate (CompromiseDate(0),
CompromiseDate(t), DestroyDate(0), DestroyDate(t)); nothing else is needed,
since there is no exit transition. Locate keys with a Compromise Date at or
before t, and with a Destroy Date at or before t. These keys are, therefore, in
the Destroyed-Compromised state at time t.
·
Match
of a state during an entire time range: Locate (CompromiseDate(0),
CompromiseDate(t), DestroyDate(0), DestroyDate(t)). Same as above. As there is
no exit transition from the Destroyed-Compromised state, the end of the range
(t’) is irrelevant.
·
Match
of a state at some point during a time range: Locate (CompromiseDate(0),
CompromiseDate(t'-1), DestroyDate(0), DestroyDate(t'-1)). Locate keys with a
Compromise Date at or before t’-1, and with a Destroy Date at or before t’-1.
As there is no exit transition from the Destroyed-Compromised state, the start
of the range (t) is irrelevant.
KMIP provides the option to register and get keys in wrapped
format. Clients request the server to return a wrapped key by including the Key
Wrapping Specification in the Get Request Payload. Similarly, clients register
a wrapped key by including the Key Wrapping Data in the Register Request
Payload. The Wrapping Method identifies the type of mechanism used to wrap the
key, but does not identify the algorithm or block cipher mode. It is possible
to determine these from the attributes set for the specified Encryption Key or
MAC/Signing Key. If a key has multiple Cryptographic Parameters set, clients
may include the applicable parameters in Key Wrapping Specification. If
omitted, the server chooses the Cryptographic Parameter attribute with the
lowest index.
The Key Value includes both the Key Material and,
optionally, attributes of the key; these may be provided by the client in the
Register Request Payload; the server only includes attributes when requested in
the Key Wrapping Specification of the Get Request Payload. The Key Value may be
encrypted, signed/MACed, or both encrypted and signed/MACed (and vice versa).
In addition, clients have the option to request or import a wrapped Key Block
according to standards, such as ANSI TR-31, or vendor-specific key wrapping
methods.
It is important to note that if the Key Wrapping
Specification is included in the Get Request Payload, the Key Value may not
necessarily be encrypted. If the Wrapping Method is MAC/sign, the returned Key
Value is in plaintext, and the Key Wrapping Data includes the MAC or Signature
of the Key Value.
Prior to wrapping or unwrapping a key, the server should verify
that the wrapping key is allowed to be used for the specified purpose. For
example, if the Unique ID of a symmetric key is specified in the Key Wrapping
Specification inside the Get request, the symmetric key should have the “Wrap Key”
bit set in its Cryptographic Usage Mask. Similarly, if the client registers a
signed key, the server should verify that the Signature Key, as specified by
the client inside the Key Wrapping Data, has the “Verify” bit set in the Cryptographic
Usage Mask. If the wrapping key is not permitted to be used for the requested
purpose (e.g., when the Cryptographic Usage Mask is not set), the server should
return the Operation Failed result status.
The client sends a Get request to obtain a key that is
stored on the server. When the client sends a Get request to the server, a Key
Wrapping Specification may be included. If a Key Wrapping Specification is
included in the Get request, and a client wants the requested key and its
Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute to be wrapped with AES key wrap, the client
includes the following information in the Key Wrapping Specification:
·
Wrapping Method: Encrypt
·
Encryption Key Information
·
Unique Key ID: Key ID of the AES wrapping key
·
Cryptographic Parameters: The Block Cipher Mode is NISTKeyWrap
(not necessary if default block cipher mode for wrapping key is NISTKeyWrap)
·
Attribute Name: Cryptographic Usage Mask
The server uses the Unique Key ID specified by the client to
determine the attributes set for the proposed wrapping key. For example, the
algorithm of the wrapping key is not explicitly specified inside the Key
Wrapping Specification. The server determines the algorithm to be used for
wrapping the key by identifying the Algorithm attribute set for the specified
Encryption Key.
The Cryptographic Parameters attribute should be specified
by the client if multiple instances of the Cryptographic Parameters exist, and
the lowest index does not correspond to the NIST key wrap mode of operation.
The server should verify that the AES wrapping key has NISTKeyWrap set as an
allowable Block Cipher Mode, and that the “Wrap Key” bit is set in the
Cryptographic Usage Mask.
If the correct data was provided to the server, and no
conflicts exist, the server AES key wraps the Key Value (both the Key Material
and the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute) for the requested key with the
wrapping key specified in the Encryption Key Information. The wrapped key (byte
string) is returned in the server’s response inside the Key Value of the Key
Block.
The Key Wrapping Data of the Key Block in the Get Response
Payload includes the same data as specified in the Key Wrapping Specification of
the Get Request Payload except for the Attribute Name.
The client sends a Register request to the server and
includes the wrapped key and the Unique ID of the wrapping key inside the
Request Payload. The wrapped key is provided to the server inside the Key
Block. The Key Block includes the Key Value Type, the Key Value, and the Key Wrapping
Data. The Key Value Type identifies the format of the Key Material, the Key
Value consists of the Key Material and optional attributes that may be included
to cryptographically bind the attributes to the Key Material, and the Key
Wrapping Data identifies the wrapping mechanism and the encryption key used to
wrap the object and the wrapping mechanism.
Similar to the example in 4.2.1 the key is wrapped
using the AES key wrap. The Key Value includes four attributes: Cryptographic
Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, Cryptographic Parameters, and Cryptographic
Usage Mask.
The Key Wrapping Data includes the following information:
·
Wrapping Method: Encrypt
·
Encryption Key Information
·
Unique Key ID: Key ID of the AES wrapping key
·
Cryptographic Parameters: The Block Cipher Mode is NISTKeyWrap
(not necessary if default block cipher mode for wrapping key is NISTKeyWrap)
Attributes do not need to be specified in the Key Wrapping
Data. When registering a wrapped Key Value with attributes, clients may include
these attributes inside the Key Value without specifying them inside the
Template-Attribute.
Prior to unwrapping the key, the server determines the
wrapping algorithm from the Algorithm attribute set for the specified Unique ID
in the Encryption Key Information. The server verifies that the wrapping key
may be used for the specified purpose. In particular, if the client includes
the Cryptographic Parameters in the Encryption Key Information, the server
verifies that the specified Block Cipher Mode is set for the wrapping key. The
server also verifies that the wrapping key has the “Unwrap Key” bit set in the
Cryptographic Usage Mask.
The Register Response Payload includes the Unique ID of the
newly registered key and an optional list of attributes that were implicitly
set by the server.
The client sends a Get request to obtain a key (either
symmetric or asymmetric) that is stored on the server. When the client sends a
Get request to the server, a Key Wrapping Specification may be included. If a
Key Wrapping Specification is included, and the key is to be wrapped with an
RSA public key using the OAEP encryption scheme, the client includes the
following information in the Key Wrapping Specification. Note that for this
example, attributes for the requested key are not requested.
·
Wrapping Method: Encrypt
·
Encryption Key Information
·
Unique Key ID: Key ID of the RSA public key
·
Cryptographic Parameters:
Padding
Method: OAEP
Hashing
Algorithm: SHA-256
The Cryptographic Parameters attribute is specified by the
client if multiple instances of Cryptographic Parameters exist for the wrapping
key, and the lowest index does not correspond to the associated padding method.
The server should verify that the specified Cryptographic Parameters in the Key
Wrapping Specification and the “Wrap Key” bit in the Cryptographic Usage Mask
are set for the corresponding wrapping key.
The Key Wrapping Data returned by the server in the Key
Block of the Get Response Payload includes the same data as specified in the
Key Wrapping Specification of the Get Request Payload.
For both OAEP and PSS, KMIP assumes that the Hashing
Algorithm specified in the Cryptographic Parameters of the Get request is used
for both the Mask Generation Function (MGF) and hashing data. The example above
requires the server to use SHA-256 for both purposes.
The client sends a Get request to obtain a key that is
stored on the server. When the client sends a Get request to the server, a Key
Wrapping Specification may be included. If a key and Custom Attribute (i.e.,
x-Nonce) is to be MACed with HMAC SHA-256, the following Key Wrapping
Specification is specified:
·
Wrapping Method: MAC/sign
·
MAC/Signature Key Information
·
Unique Key ID: Key ID of the MACing key (note that the algorithm
associated with this key would be HMAC-SHA256)
·
Attribute Name: x-Nonce
For HMAC, no Cryptographic Parameters need to be specified,
since the algorithm, including the hash function, may be determined from the
Algorithm attribute set for the specified MAC Key. The server should verify
that the HMAC key has the “MAC Generate” bit set in the Cryptographic Usage
Mask. Note that an HMAC key does not require the “Wrap Key” bit to be set in
the Cryptographic Usage Mask.
The server creates an HMAC value over the Key Value if the specified
MACing key may be used for the specified purpose and no conflicts exist. The
Key Value is returned in plaintext, and the Key Block includes the following
Key Wrapping Data:
·
Wrapping Method: MAC/sign
·
MAC/Signature Key Information
·
Unique Key ID: Key ID of the MACing key
·
MAC/Signature: HMAC result of the Key Value
In the example, the custom attribute x-Nonce was included to
help clients, who are relying on the proxy model, to detect replay attacks.
End-clients, who communicate with the key management server, may not support
TLS and may not be able to rely on the message protection mechanisms provided by
a security protocol. An alternative approach for these clients would be to use
the custom attribute to hold a random number, counter, nonce, date, or time.
The custom attribute needs to be created before requesting the server to return
a wrapped key and is recommended to be set if clients frequently wrap/sign the
same key with the same wrapping/signing key.
Clients may want to register and store a wrapped key on the
server without the server being able to unwrap the key (i.e., the wrapping key
is not known to the server). Instead of storing the wrapped key as an opaque
object, clients have the option to store the wrapped key inside the Key Block
as an opaque cryptographic object, i.e., the wrapped key is registered as a
managed cryptographic object, but the encoding of the key is unknown to the
server. Registering an opaque cryptographic object allows clients to set all
the applicable attributes that apply to cryptographic objects (e.g., Cryptographic
Algorithm and Cryptographic Length),
Opaque cryptographic objects are set by specifying the
following inside the Key Block structure:
·
Key Format Type: Opaque
·
Key Material: Wrapped key as a Byte String
The Key Wrapping
Data does not need to be specified.
KMIP provides the option to specify the Encoding Option
inside the Key Wrapping Specification and Key Wrapping Data. This option allows
users to Get or Register the Key Value in a non-TTLV encoded format. This may
be desirable in a proxy environment, where the end-client is not KMIP-aware.
The Encoding Option is only available if no attributes are
specified inside the Key Value. The server returns the Encoding Option Error if
both the Encoding Option and Attribute Names are specified inside the Key
Wrapping Specification. Similarly, the server is expected to return the
Encoding Option Error when registering a wrapped object with attributes inside
the Key Value and the Encoding Option is set in the Key Wrapping Data. If no Encoding
Option is specified, KMIP assumes that the Key Value is TTLV-encoded. Thus, by
default, the complete TTLV-encoded Key Value content, as shown in the example
below, is wrapped:
Key Material || Byte String || Length || Key Material Value
420043 || 08 || 00000010 ||
0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF
Some end-clients may not understand or have the space for
anything more than the actual key material (i.e.,
0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF in the above example). To wrap only the Key Material
value during a Get operation, the Encoding Option (00001 for no encoding)
should be specified inside the Key Wrapping Specification. The same Encoding
Option should be specified in the Key Wrapping Data when returning the non-TTLV
encoded wrapped object inside the Get Response Payload or when registering a
wrapped object in non-TTLV encoded format.
It is important to be aware of the risks involved when
excluding the attributes from the Key Value. Binding the attributes to the key
material in certain environments is essential to the security of the
end-client. An untrusted proxy could change the attributes (provided separately
via the Get Attributes operation) that determine how the key is being used
(e.g., Cryptographic Usage). Including the attributes inside the Key Value and
cryptographically binding it to the Key Material could prevent potential misuse
of the cryptographic object and may prevent a replay attack if, for example, a
nonce is included as a custom attribute. The exclusion of attributes and
therefore the usage of the Encoding Option are only recommended in at least one
of the following scenarios:
1. End-clients are
registered with the KMIP server and are communicating with the server directly
(i.e., the TLS connection is between the server and client).
2. The environment
is controlled and non-KMIP-aware end-clients are aware how wrapped
cryptographic objects (possibly Raw keys) from the KMIP server should be used
without having to rely on the attributes provided by the Get Attributes
operation.
3. The wrapped
cryptographic object consists of attributes inside the Key Material value.
These attributes are not interpreted by the KMIP server, but are understood by
the end-client. This may be the case if the Key Format Type is opaque or
vendor-specific.
4. The proxy
communicating with the KMIP server on behalf of the end-client is considered to
be trusted and is operating in a secure environment.
Registering a wrapped object without attributes is not
recommended in a proxy environment, unless scenario 4 is met.
This section describes methods and provides examples for
creating and storing key identifiers that are interoperable across multi-vendor
KMIP clients, using the KMIP Tape Library Profile Version 1.0.
A common method for naming and retrieving keys is needed to
support moving tape cartridges between 2 or more KMIP-compliant tape libraries
that are all registered with the same KMIP key manager.
The method uses the KMIP Tape Library Profile. This profile
specifies use of the KMIP Application Specific Information (ASI) attribute. The
method supports both client-generated and server-generated key identifiers.
The key identifier is a KMIP string, composed of hexadecimal
numeric characters. This string of characters is unique within a chosen
namespace. Methods of generating the string are determined by policy. The
LIBRARY-LTO namespace is preferred for maximum interoperability.
A compressed (numeric) transformation of the identifier
string is stored in the tape format’s Key Associated Data. This allows for
future retrieval of the key for decryption.
Interoperability is achieved by a) standardized algorithms
to map byte values between the numeric (KAD) and text (ASI) representations of
the identifier; and b) standardized ordering of bytes within the KAD so the
identifier can be re-assembled in the correct sequence by other compliant
implementations. Examples of the algorithms are provided below.
Key Associated Data (KAD): Part of the tape format.
May be segmented into authenticated and unauthenticated fields. KAD usage is
detailed in the SCSI SSC-3 standard from the T10 organization.
Application Specific Information (ASI): A KMIP
attribute.
Hexadecimal numeric characters: Case-sensitive,
printable, single byte ASCII characters representing the numbers 0 through 9
and uppercase alpha A through F. (US-ASCII characters 30h-39h and 41h-46h).
Hexadecimal numeric characters are always paired, each pair representing a
single 8-bit numeric value. A leading zero character is provided, if necessary,
so that every byte in the tape’s KAD is represented by exactly 2 hexadecimal
numeric characters.
N(k): The number of bytes in the tape format combined
KAD fields (both authenticated and unauthenticated).
N(a), N(u): The number of bytes in the tape formats
authenticated, and unauthenticated KAD fields, respectively.
Refer to the KMIP Tape profile for algorithm 1.
This algorithm is associated with writing the KAD, typically
to allow future retrieval of a key. An example implementation is as follows.
1. The client creates
a key identifier or obtains one from the server. The identifier is a KMIP
string of hexadecimal numeric characters. Copy the string to an input buffer of
size 2*N(k) bytes. For LTO4, an 88 character string is sufficient to represent
any key name stored directly in the KAD fields. For LTO5, a 184 character
string is sufficient to represent any key name stored directly in the KAD
fields.
2. Define output
buffers for unauthenticated KAD, and authenticated KAD, of size N(u) and N(a)
respectively. For LTO4, this would be 32 bytes of unauthenticated data, and 12
bytes of authenticated data. For LTO5, this would be 32 bytes of
unauthenticated data and 60 bytes of authenticated data.
3. Define the standard
POSIX (also known as C) locale. Each character in the string is a single-byte
US-ASCII character.
4. First, populate the
authenticated KAD buffer, converting a sub-string consisting of the last (rightmost)
2*N(a) characters of the key identifier string.
5. When the
authenticated KAD is filled, next populate the unauthenticated KAD buffer, by
converting the remaining hexadecimal character pairs (if any) of the identifier
string.
This algorithm is associated with reading the KAD, typically
in preparation for retrieving a key. An example implementation is as follows
1. Define
an input buffer sized for N(k). For LTO4, N(k) is 44 bytes (12 bytes
authenticated, 32 unauthenticated). For LTO5, N(k) is 92 bytes (60 bytes
authenticated, 32 bytes unauthenticated).
2. Define
an output buffer sufficient to contain a string with a maximum length of
2*N(k) bytes.
3. Define
the standard POSIX (also known as C) locale. Each character in the string is a
single-byte US-ASCII character.
4. First, copy the
tape format’s unauthenticated
KAD
data
(if any) to
the input buffer. Next,
bytes
from the authenticated KAD are concatenated, after the unauthenticated bytes. In many
implementations the unauthenticated KAD is empty, and in those cases the entire
input buffer will be populated with bytes from authenticated KAD.
5. For
each byte in the input buffer, convert to US-ASCII as follows:
6. Convert the byte's
value to exactly 2 hexadecimal numeric characters, including a leading 0 where
necessary. Append these 2 numeric characters to the output buffer, with the
high-nibble represented by the left-most hexadecimal numeric character.
The following usage example will create a key identifier
which can be stored in ASI. The identifier will then be translated for storage
into a tape format’s KAD, using algorithm 1. Both LTO4 and LTO5 examples of
KAD contents are provided.
The reverse translation from KAD bytes to the KMIP key
identifier is not shown, but would be accomplished via algorithm 2. This
re-constructed key identifier string would be used to Locate the key via ASI.
Example of creating a key identifier.
Implementation-specific material is used to generate a key identifier. The
content of this material is based on server or client policy. An example of a
text string which could be used to generate a KMIP key identifier for tape is
as follows.
SN123456_MFR:XYZ
INC_BAR12345_TM20131234
This example is a set of 40 characters which will be used to
create a KMIP key identifier for use as specified in the KMIP Tape Profile.
Every 8th character is bold.
This set of characters is suitable as a key identifier for
either LTO4 or LTO5, since it will fit within the smaller 44 character KAD
space of LTO4.
The corresponding KMIP key identifier, which is a string of
hexadecimal numeric character pairs, is shown below. This string will be
stored in ASI Application Data.
53 4E 31 32 33 34 35 36 5F 4D 46 52 3A 58 59 5A
20 49 4E 43 5F 42 41 52
31 32 33 34 35 5F 54 4D 32 30 31 33 31 32 33 34
Spaces are shown for to improve readability, but are NOT
part of the ASI string. Every 8th hexadecimal numeric pair is
bold.
Note the identifier has exactly 2x more characters than the
material used to generate the KMIP key identifier.
Translating the key identifier to KAD bytes (LTO4).
The corresponding KAD content, for use with an LTO4 tape cartridge is shown in
the following figure.
Figure 2: KAD
Content for LTO4
Each square is 1 byte (8 bits). The contents of each
square is the 8 bit value which represents a pair of hexadecimal numeric
characters in the KMIP key identifier string.
Every 8th byte of KAD is shaded.
The KAD was populated by converting the rightmost 24
characters (12 character pairs) of the identifier string into bytes of
authenticated KAD. The remaining characters of the identifier were written to
unauthenticated KAD.
Translating the key identifier to KAD bytes (LTO5). The
corresponding KAD for use with an LTO5 and later tape cartridge is shown in the
following figure.
Figure 3: KAD
Content for LTO5
Each square is 1 byte (8 bits). The contents of each
square is the 8 bit value which represents a pair of hexadecimal numeric
characters in the key identifier string.
Every 8th byte of KAD is shaded.
The KAD was populated by converting the rightmost 80
characters (40 character pairs) of the identifier string into bytes of
authenticated KAD. The unauthenticated KAD is not used because all of the
data fits within authenticated KAD.
The Extension Information structure added to KMIP 1.1 and
the Query Extension List and Query Extension Map functions of the Query
Operation provide a mechanism for a KMIP client to be able to determine which
extensions a KMIP server supports.
A client may request the list of Extensions supported by a
KMIP 1.1 server by specifying the Query Extension List value in the Query
Function field. This provides the names of the supported extensions.
Example output:
Extension Information
Extension Name: ACME
LOCATION
Extension Information
Extension Name: ACME ZIP
CODE
A client may request the details of Extensions supported by
a KMIP 1.1 server by specifying the Query Extension Map value in the Query
Function field. This provides the names of the supported extensions.
Example output:
Extension Information
Extension Name: ACME
LOCATION
Extension Tag: 0x54AA01
Extension Type: Text String
Extension Information
Extension Name: ACME ZIP
CODE
Extension Tag: 0x54AA02
Extension Type: Integer
As tag values and their interpretation for the most part
should be known for a client and server to meaningfully use an extension, the
following registration procedure should be used.
1. Document the
Extensions including:
a. Extension Tag,
Extension Name, Extension Type values to be reserved
b. A brief description of
the purpose of the Extension
c. Example use case
messages (requests and responses)
d. Example Guidance
2. Send the
Document to the KMIP TC requesting review
3. Request a KMIP
TC ballot on accepting the reservation of the Extension
It is anticipated that a template document may be produced
for this registration process.
PGP, both as vendor product
and as standard, provides a rich environment for key management that addresses
significant use cases related to such areas as secure exchange of email,
documents and other resources. Although KMIP is by no means required for
support of PGP environments, it can provide a valuable mechanism for movement
of PGP keys between a particular PGP environment, such as Symantec Encryption
Management Server (SEMS, née PGP Universal), and another key management
environment.
KMIP does not attempt to
represent the full range of functionality in PGP environments. However, the use
cases related to movement of PGP keys across environments, described in the
KMIP Use Cases document, can be supported by taking advantage both of the
PGP-specific capabilities in KMIP, such as the PGP Key object introduced in
KMIP V1.2, and of KMIP messages, objects, operations and attributes in general.
In order to support the PGP
use cases, KMIP V1.2 introduces new capabilities:
·
PGP
Key managed object
·
Alternative
Name attribute
·
Enhancements
to Link attribute
The PGP Key managed object contains a PGP key (specified in [RFC4880]) as an opaque blob. KMIP compliant servers do
not need to understand the fine structure of PGP keys. The intention here is
that PGP-enabled clients be able to discover the PGP Key managed cryptographic
objects by searching for one of the various names contained within the block. The
Alternative Name attribute can be used to specify one or more names (e.g. User
IDs) that are attached to the PGP Key object. The PGP-enabled clients are
expected to digest the PGP Key object and properly assign these Alternative
Name attributes on to the cryptographic managed object. The KMIP server does
not have to do this work.
Internally, PGP keys may
contain many public-private key pairs, each tied to a specific type of encryption
operations (one key for signing, one for encryption, and one to tie the other
two together in a trust relationship is one typical arrangement.) The Link
attribute supports new values that enable the description of this set of PGP
Key relationships. The new values are parent, child, previous and next. For
example, the private and public keys associated with a PGP Key can be pointed
to from the PGP Key with the “child” link attribute. Additional Decryption Keys
(ADK) can be pointed to from the PGP Key with the “child” link attribute and
can be point to each other with the “previous” and “next” link attributes. In
this way, the link attributes can be used to define the structural
relationships required to establish the web of trust for a PGP Key.
As mentioned above, KMIP does
not attempt to represent all the information about PGP keys that would be
managed within a PGP implementation. For example, policies such as algorithms
supported, by a PGP key are not expressed within KMIP. Instead, KMIP enables the
specification of these attributes, if necessary, as information enclosed within
the opaque value defined for a given PGP key. This information would be handled
by security administration and out-of-band coordination between the PGP
environments that participate in the KMIP exchanges related to PGP keys.
KMIP complaint servers are
not expected to be able to create PGP Key objects from scratch. PGP-enabled
clients will do the key creation and pass the resulting information up to KMIP.
The KMIP V1.2 Use
Cases [KMIP-UC] document describes several common
approaches to registering KMIP clients with KMIP servers:
- Manual client registration within a single trust boundary
- Automatic client registration across multiple trust
boundaries
- Configuring a KMIP Server for use with Automatic Client
Registration
As described in that document, the goal of these three use
cases is to establish the KMIP-interoperable secure channel or channels between
KMIP servers and clients, such as a mutually-authenticated TLS channel.
The use cases establish high-level process flows for these
three approaches to establishing the mutually-authenticated TLS channel
described in the KMIP authentication suite profiles. In order to support the goal
of establishing an interoperable approach to establishing this channel, this
section provides more detailed information about these approaches to client
registration.
Reflecting common usage for KMIP, all three of the scenarios
described below discuss the use of X.509 certificates for trust establishment;
other mechanisms, such as quantum key distribution, may be used instead but are
not described here. Similarly, all three scenarios describe the establishment
of a mutually-authenticated TLS connection as the basis trusted exchange of
KMIP messages, corresponding to the published KMIP authentication suite
profiles; other authentication mechanisms can be used with KMIP, but are not
described here.
The use case process
flow in section 7.1 of the KMIP Use Cases [KMIP-UC]
document describes the interaction between human actors responsible for the
client and server systems, resulting in the client administrator receiving a
registration packet that can be used to authenticate the client to the server
and to confirm the authentication of the server by the client.
In this approach, there is no assumption of pre-population
of authentication credentials in the client, such as by installing an X.509
certificate into a tape library or drive during the manufacturing process.
Rather, a credential is propagated out-of-band to the client administrator, who
installs it into the client environment. The credential is then used on initial
and subsequent contact between the client and server systems.
The most common registration model that takes this approach
entails the server administrator creating a package that contains 1) X.509
certificate that the client will use to identify itself to the server when
creating a TLS mutually-authenticated session; 2) information about the X.509
certificate that will be presented by the server to the client during
negotiation of the mutual authentication, enabling the client to verify the
server identity; and 3) possibly additional information that can be included in
the credential of the KMIP message sent across the established channel, such as
to provide finer granularity for particular drives within a tape library. As
indicated, the use of this package of materials takes place during two phases:
first during the establishment of the TLS secure channel; second during the
transmission of KMIP messages. The server administrator must have configured
the server to recognize the X.509 certificate presented by the client, to
present the correct X.509 certificate of its own to the client in return and to
recognize the additional information provided in the credential object in the
KMIP message, if any.
In this model, KMIP is not used to transmit the X.509
certificate and server information used in establishing the secure channel.
There is nothing to prevent KMIP being used to send this information; but
commonly this is done using mechanisms other than KMIP, nor is there any
expectation that KMIP is a required or default mechanism for propagating the
credential and the information. The distribution mechanism, therefore, may well
vary across vendors.
The use of additional information as the credential in the
KMIP message is also neither required nor a default. Inclusion of such a
credential in the package distributed to the client administrator and in one or
more KMIP messages is also, therefore, likely to vary across vendors.
The use case in section 7.2 of the KMIP Use Cases [KMIP-UC] document that the credential used to establish a
mutually-authenticated TLS connection is not provided in the package provided
by the server administrator. Instead, the establishment of trust between the
client and server is accomplished by some other mechanism. In one common version
of this approach, an X.509 certificate is installed in a client device during
the manufacturing process. This certificate is then used as a bootstrap
mechanism for the subsequent exchange of the kind of information exchanged
between client administrator and server administrator in section 4.7.1.
As described in this use case (see KMIP Use Case [KMIP-UC] section 7.2), there will be typically be
configuration activity for the client device based on information, such as a
Service ID, received from the server administrator. Once the client administrator
initiates auto-registration, the client device sends the X.509 certificate to
the server, for example in order to use it to establish an initial TLS session.
The server then sends the equivalent of the registration packet in section 4.7.1 above to the client and the client returns the certificate to be used for
establishing the secure TLS channel with the server.
In this model, one common variant is to require
administrator intervention to determine whether the initial client certificate
should be accepted. The scenario above assumes that the return of the server’s
packet of registration is immediate and automatic; alternatively, the return of
the packet of information may be done manually by the server administrator, as
in section 4.7.1 above; or the return of the packet of server information may
be done by the server, but only after that action has been approved by an
administrator.
As discussed in section 4.7.1, KMIP can be used by the
client in sending the X.509 certificates to the server. However, this is not
required and is currently not typical. If it is sent to the server using a KMIP
register operation, the server must be able to distinguish that this operation
is intended not only to register the cryptographic object, but also to initiate
the registration of the client as a legitimate participant in KMIP message
exchange.
The third use case described in the KMIP Use Cases [KMIP-UC] document contains additional information about
setting up the KMIP server to participate in automatic client registration
described in section 4.7.2, particularly in terms of the distribution of the
service ID for the server.
Although not described in this use case, it does point to a
third common model for registering sub-clients of a trusted client. In this
model, the establishment of trust between the client and server can be
accomplished using either of the approaches in section 4.7.1 or 4.7.2. However, the server may also send additional information to the client, such as a “tenant
identifier”, which it will have to provide to sub-clients for them to use they
attempt to register individually. The individual sub-clients would follow a
registration model such a s that described in section 4.7.2, but would also
provide the tenant identifier along with the X.509 certificate so that the
server can decide whether to accept the client, based on such criteria as the
TCP/IP address of the sub-client relative to that of the primary client.
This approach is common for tiered clients such as virtual
machines that need to be grouped based on their association with a larger
trusted entity, but that also need individual identities and trust
relationships established based on those identities.
KMIP can be used for sending both the client certificate and
the tenant identifier to the server. But again this is no currently common
practice.
This section describes KMIP functionality that has been
deprecated.
Use of deprecated functionality is
discouraged since such functionality may be dropped in a future release of the [KMIP-Spec].
Items in the normative KMIP Specification [KMIP-Spec] document can be marked deprecated in any
document version, but will be removed only in a major version. Similarly,
conformance clauses or other normative information in the KMIP Profiles [KMIP-Prof]KMIP_Prof document can be deprecated in any document
version, but removed only in a major version. Information in the non-normative KMIP
Use Cases [KMIP-UC], KMIP Usage
Guide [this document] and KMIP Test Cases [KMIP-TC]
documents may be removed in any document version.
The KMIP v1.0 Certificate Identifier, Certificate Subject
and Certificate Issuer attributes are populated from values found
within X.509 public key or PGP certificates. In KMIP v1.0 these fields were
encoded as Text String, but the values of these fields are obtained from
certificates which are ASN.1 (X.509) or octet (PGP) encoded. In KMIP
v1.1, the data type associated with these fields was changed from Text String
to Byte String so that the values of these fields parsed from the
certificates can be preserved and no conversion from the encoded values into a
text string is necessary.
Since these certificate-related attributes and associated
fields were included as part of the v1.0 KMIP specification and that there may
be implementations supporting these attributes using the Text String encoding,
a decision was made to deprecate these attributes in KMIP v1.1 and replace them
with newly named attributes and fields. As part of this change, separate
certificate-related attributes for X.509 certificates were introduced.
Table 4 provides a list of the deprecated
certificate-related attributes and fields along with their corresponding tag
value.
|
Deprecated Attribute/Field
|
Deprecated Tag Value
|
|
Certificate Identifier
|
420014
|
|
Certificate Issuer
|
420015
|
|
Certificate Issuer Alternative Name
|
420016
|
|
Certificate Issuer Distinguished Name
|
420017
|
|
Certificate Subject
|
42001A
|
|
Certificate Subject Alternative Name
|
42001B
|
|
Certificate Subject Distinguished Name
|
42001C
|
|
Issuer
|
42003B
|
|
Serial Number
|
420087
|
Table 4: Deprecated Certificate Related Attributes and Fields
Table 5 provides a mapping of v1.0 to v1.1 certificate
attributes and fields.
|
Deprecated V1.0 Attribute
|
Deprecated V1.0 Field
|
New V1.1 Attribute
|
New V1.1 Field
|
|
Certificate Identifier
|
Issuer
|
X.509 Certificate Identifier
|
Issuer Distinguished Name
|
|
Serial Number
|
Certificate Serial Number
|
|
Certificate Issuer
|
Certificate Issuer Distinguished Name
|
X.509 Certificate Issuer
|
Issuer Distinguished Name
|
|
Certificate Issuer Alternative Name
|
Issuer Alternative Name
|
|
Certificate Subject
|
Certificate Subject Distinguished Name
|
X.509 Certificate Subject
|
Subject Distinguished Name
|
|
Certificate Subject Alternative Name
|
Subject Alternative Name
|
Table 5: Mapping of v1.0 to v1.1 Certificate Related Attributes and
Fields
KMIP 1.0 and 1.1 included support for PGP via a PGP Certificate
Type and associated PGP Certificate Request Type. However the certificate
concept, which is typically associated with X.509 public key certificates, is
not well suited for describing PGP keys and associated credentials as specified
in [RFC4880]. For example, PGP may associate
multiple asymmetric key pairs and associated public key certificates to the
same subject, while a X.509 certificate associates a single public key to a
subject. As a result of these differences it was difficult to apply the X.509
public key certificate structure and attributes to PGP credentials in a
meaningful way.
KMIP 1.2 introduces changes and additions to KMIP that allow PGP
usage scenarios as specified in [RFC4880] to
be better supported within KMIP. (See Section 4.6 for more information.)
These changes include the deprecation of the PGP Certificate Type and PGP
Certificate Request Type concepts and the introduction of a new PGP Key managed
cryptographic object.
Table 6 lists the PGP Certificate Type enumeration which has
been deprecated as of KMIP 1.2.
|
Certificate
Type
|
|
Name
|
Value
|
|
PGP
|
00000002 (deprecated)
|
Table 6: Deprecated PGP Certificate Type
Table 7 lists the PGP Certificate Request Type enumeration
which has been deprecated as of KMIP 1.2
|
Certificate
Request Type
|
|
Name
|
Value
|
|
PGP
|
00000004 (deprecated)
|
Table 7: Deprecated PGP-Certificate Request Type
This document is intended to
be informational only and as such has no conformance clauses. The conformance
requirements for the KMIP Specification can be found in the "KMIP
Specification" document itself, at the URL noted in the “Normative
References” section of this document.
The following individuals have participated in the creation
of this specification and are gratefully acknowledged:
Participants
in KMIP Usage Guide V1.2
Hal Aldridge, Sypris Electronics
Mike Allen, Symantec
Gordon Arnold, IBM
Todd Arnold, IBM
Richard Austin, Hewlett-Packard
Lars Bagnert, PrimeKey
Elaine Barker, NIST
Peter Bartok, Venafi, Inc.
Tom Benjamin, IBM
Anthony Berglas, Cryptsoft
Mathias Björkqvist, IBM
Kevin Bocket, Venafi
Anne Bolgert, IBM
Alan Brown, Thales e-Security
Tim Bruce, CA Technologies
Chris Burchett, Credant Technologies, Inc.
Kelley Burgin, National Security Agency
Robert Burns, Thales e-Security
Chuck Castleton, Venafi
Kenli Chong, QuintessenceLabs
John Clark, Hewlett-Packard
Tom Clifford, Symantec Corp.
Tony Cox, Cryptsoft
Russell Dietz, SafeNet, Inc
Graydon Dodson, Lexmark International Inc.
Vinod Duggirala, EMC Corporation
Chris Dunn, SafeNet, Inc.
Michael Duren, Sypris Electronics
James Dzierzanowski, American Express CCoE
Faisal Faruqui, Thales e-Security
Stan Feather, Hewlett-Packard
David Finkelstein, Symantec Corp.
James Fitzgerald, SafeNet, Inc.
Indra Fitzgerald, Hewlett-Packard
Judith Furlong, EMC Corporation
Susan Gleeson, Oracle
Robert Griffin, EMC Corporation
Paul Grojean, Individual
Robert Haas, IBM
Thomas Hardjono, M.I.T.
ChengDong He, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Steve He, Vormetric
Kurt Heberlein, Hewlett-Packard
Larry Hofer, Emulex Corporation
Maryann Hondo, IBM
Walt Hubis, NetApp
Tim Hudson, Cryptsoft
Jonas Iggbom, Venafi, Inc.
Sitaram Inguva, American Express CCoE
Jay Jacobs, Target Corporation
Glen Jaquette, IBM
Mahadev Karadiguddi, NetApp
Greg Kazmierczak, Wave Systems Corp.
Marc Kenig, SafeNet, Inc.
Mark Knight, Thales e-Security
Kathy Kriese, Symantec Corporation
Mark Lambiase, SecureAuth
John Leiseboer, Quintenssence Labs
Hal Lockhart, Oracle Corporation
Robert Lockhart, Thales e-Security
Anne Luk, Cryptsoft
Sairam Manidi, Freescale
Luther Martin, Voltage Security
Neil McEvoy, iFOSSF
Marina Milshtein, Individual
Dale Moberg, Axway Software
Jishnu Mukeri, Hewlett-Packard
Bryan Olson, Hewlett-Packard
John Peck, IBM
Rob Philpott, EMC Corporation
Denis Pochuev, SafeNet, Inc.
Reid Poole, Venafi, Inc.
Ajai Puri, SafeNet, Inc.
Saravanan Ramalingam, Thales e-Security
Peter Reed, SafeNet, Inc.
Bruce Rich, IBM
Christina Richards, American Express CCoE
Warren Robbins, Dell
Peter Robinson, EMC Corporation
Scott Rotondo, Oracle
Saikat Saha, Oracle
Anil Saldhana, Red Hat
Subhash Sankuratripati, NetApp
Boris Schumperli, Cryptomathic
Greg Singh, QuintessenceLabs
David Smith, Venafi, Inc.
Brian Spector, Certivox
Terence Spies, Voltage Security
Deborah Steckroth, RouteOne LLC
Michael Stevens, QuintessenceLabs
Marcus Streets, Thales e-Security
Satish Sundar, IBM
Kiran Thota, VMware
Somanchi Trinath, Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
Nathan Turajski, Thales e-Security
Sean Turner, IECA, Inc.
Paul Turner, Venafi, Inc.
Rod Wideman, Quantum Corporation
Steven Wierenga, Hewlett-Packard
Jin Wong, QuintessenceLabs
Sameer Yami, Thales e-Security
Peter Yee, EMC Corporation
Krishna Yellepeddy, IBM
Catherine Ying, SafeNet, Inc.
Tatu Ylonen, SSH Communications Security (Tectia Corp)
Michael Yoder, Vormetric. Inc.
Magda Zdunkiewicz, Cryptsoft
Peter Zelechoski, Election Systems & Software
The following abbreviations and
acronyms are used in this document:
3DES -
Triple Data Encryption Standard
ADK - Additional Decryption
Key
AES -
Advanced Encryption Standard specified in [FIPS197]
ANSI -
American National Standards Institute
ARQC -
Authorization Request Cryptogram
ASCII -
American Standard Code for Information Interchange
ASI - Application Specific
Information
ASN.1 - Abstract Syntax Notation
One
CA -
Certification Authority
CBC -
Cipher Block Chaining specified in [SP800-38A]
CMC -
Certificate Management Messages over CMS specified in [RFC5272]
CMP -
Certificate Management Protocol specified in [RFC4210]
CRL - Certificate Revocation List specified in [X.509]
CRMF -
Certificate Request Message Format specified in [RFC4211]
CVC -
Card Verification Code
DEK -
Data Encryption Key
DH - Diffie-Hellman specified in [X9.42]
DSA - Digital Signature
Algorithm specified in [FIPS186-4]
DSS - Digital Signature
Standard
ECC - Elliptic Curve
Cryptography
ECDH - Elliptic Curve Diffie
Hellman
ECDSA - Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm
FIPS -
Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM -
Galois/Counter Mode specified in [SP800-38D]
HMAC -
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code specified in [FIPS198-1]
HSM -
Hardware Security Module
HTTP -
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
HTTPS -
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (Secure socket)
ID -
Identification
IP -
Internet Protocol
IPSec -
Internet Protocol Security
ITU - International
Telecommunication Union
KAD - Key Associated Data
KEK -
Key Encryption Key
KMIP -
Key Management Interoperability Protocol
LTO4 -
Linear Tape-Open, Generation 4
LTO5 -
Linear Tape-Open, Generation 5
LTO6 -
Linear Tape-Open, Generation 6
MAC -
Message Authentication Code
MD5 -
Message Digest 5 Algorithm specified in [RFC1321]
MDO - Meta-Data Only
MGF -
Mask Generation Function
NIST -
National Institute of Standards and Technology
OAEP - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding specified in [PKCS#1]
OID - Object Identifier
PEM -
Privacy Enhanced Mail specified in [RFC1421]
PGP - OpenPGP specified in [RFC4880]
PKCS -
Public-Key Cryptography Standards
POP -
Proof of Possession
POSIX -
Portable Operating System Interface
PSS - Probabilistic Signature Scheme specified in [PKCS#1]
RNG - Random Number Generator
RSA -
Rivest, Shamir, Adelman (an algorithm)
SEMS - Symantec Encryption
Management Server
SHA -
Secure Hash Algorithm specified in [FIPS
180-4]
SP -
Special Publication
SMIME -
Secure
Multipurpose
Internet Mail Extensions
TCP -
Transport Control Protocol
TDEA - Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm
TLS -
Transport Layer Security
TTLV -
Tag, Type, Length, Value
URI -
Uniform Resource Identifier
Table of Figures
Figure 1:
Aggregator Client Example. 17
Table 1: ID
Placeholder Prior to and Resulting from a KMIP Operation. 27
Table 2:
Cryptographic Usage Masks Pairs. 35
Table 3: ECC
Algorithm Mapping. 48
Figure 2: KAD
Content for LTO4. 59
Figure 3: KAD
Content for LTO5. 60
Table 4:
Deprecated Certificate Related Attributes and Fields. 67
Table 5:
Mapping of v1.0 to v1.1 Certificate Related Attributes and Fields. 67
Table 6:
Deprecated PGP Certificate Type. 67
Table 7:
Deprecated PGP-Certificate Request Type. 68
Table of Tables
Figure 1:
Aggregator Client Example. 17
Table 1: ID
Placeholder Prior to and Resulting from a KMIP Operation. 27
Table 2:
Cryptographic Usage Masks Pairs. 35
Table 3: ECC
Algorithm Mapping. 48
Figure 2: KAD
Content for LTO4. 59
Figure 3: KAD
Content for LTO5. 60
Table 4:
Deprecated Certificate Related Attributes and Fields. 67
Table 5:
Mapping of v1.0 to v1.1 Certificate Related Attributes and Fields. 67
Table 6:
Deprecated PGP Certificate Type. 67
Table 7:
Deprecated PGP-Certificate Request Type. 68
Figure 1:
Aggregator Client Example. 17
Table 1: ID
Placeholder Prior to and Resulting from a KMIP Operation. 27
Table 2:
Cryptographic Usage Masks Pairs. 35
Table 3: ECC
Algorithm Mapping. 48
Figure 2: KAD
Content for LTO4. 59
Figure 3: KAD
Content for LTO5. 60
Table 4:
Deprecated Certificate Related Attributes and Fields. 67
Table 5:
Mapping of v1.0 to v1.1 Certificate Related Attributes and Fields. 67
Table 6: Deprecated
PGP Certificate Type. 67
Table 7:
Deprecated PGP-Certificate Request Type. 68
|
Revision
|
Date
|
Editor
|
Changes Made
|
|
V1.2-wd01-01
|
3/18/13
|
Indra Fitzgerald
|
Conversion of UG into current OASIS template
|
|
V1.2-wd01-02
|
5/9/13
|
Judy Furlong
|
Restructuring of UG
·
Split section 3 into two section (Using vs. Applying KMIP
functionality)
·
Section 3.18 Locate Queries now 4.1
·
Section 3.21 Using Wrapped Keys now 4.2
·
Section 3.30 Interoperable Key Naming for Tape now section
4.3
·
Section 3.37 Vendor Extensions – the intro remains in
Section 3 (now section 3.34) and the subsections (3.37.1 and 3.37.2) moved to
Section 4 (4.4 and 4.5 respectively
·
Added a deprecation section
·
Removed the deferred item section (going to Use Case document).
Other editorial changes.
|
|
V1.2-wd01-03
|
5/16/13
|
Judy Furlong
|
Incorporation of the following balloted proposals:
- Metadata-only
Object
- Deprecation
Rule
- PGP and
Alternative Name
- Attested
Operations
- Split
Key
Incorporation of other UG related content:
- Compromised State of Linked Objects
- Client Registration
- PGP Cert and Cert Type Deprecation
|
|
V1.2-wd02
|
5/30/13
|
Judy Furlong
|
Incorporation of the UG text for the following balloted
proposals:
- Templates
- Cryptographic Services
Other UG related content changes:
- Application Specification Information
- Removed Compromised State of Linked Objects section
until wording can be agreed upon
- Incorporated 1.1 Errata for the Usage Guide
|
|
V1.2-wd03
|
6/27/13
|
Judy Furlong
|
Other UG related content changes:
- Updated section 4.3 Tape Key Name Space to bring
in-line with profile
- Readded Compromised Objects section
- Updated participant list
- Other editorial changes
|
|
V1.2-wd04
|
7/11/13
|
Judy Furlong
|
·
Incorporated review comments from TC members
·
Added ECC Algorithm Mapping information to close out
incorporation of all KMIP 1.2 balloted proposals.
·
Removed Acronym list in appendix (a single list will be
included in the KMIP Specification)
·
Other editorial and format changes.
|
|
V1.2-wd05
|
8/19/13
|
Judy Furlong
|
·
Incorporated review comments from TC members
·
Added new version of ECC Algorithm Mapping table.
·
Edits to 3.5 to align with latest KMIP Spec wording.
·
Other editorial changes
|
|
V1.2-wd06
|
8/22/13
|
Judy Furlong
|
·
Updated References
·
Re-added Acronym List
·
Other editorial and format changes
|
|
V1.2-cnd01
|
9/13/13
|
Judy Furlong
|
Converted to Committee Note Draft
Incorporated applicable updated references
Incorporated updated Participants List
Fixed Cross-references
|
|
[Rev number]
|
[Rev Date]
|
[Modified By]
|
[Summary of Changes]
|
