This document is intended as a specification of the
protocol used for the communication between clients and servers to perform
certain management operations on objects stored and maintained by a key
management system. These objects are referred to as Managed Objects in
this specification. They include symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic keys,
digital certificates, and templates used to simplify the creation of objects
and control their use. Managed Objects are managed with operations that
include the ability to generate cryptographic keys, register objects with the
key management system, obtain objects from the system, destroy objects from the
system, and search for objects maintained by the system. Managed Objects also
have associated attributes, which are named values stored by the key
management system and are obtained from the system via operations. Certain
attributes are added, modified, or deleted by operations.
The protocol specified in this document includes several
certificate-related functions for which there are a number of existing
protocols – namely Validate (e.g., SCVP or XKMS), Certify (e.g., CMP [RFC4210], CMC [RFC5272][RFC6402], SCEP) and Re-certify (e.g., CMP [RFC4210],
CMC [RFC5272][RFC6402], SCEP). The protocol
does not attempt to define a comprehensive certificate management protocol,
such as would be needed for a certification authority. However, it does include
functions that are needed to allow a key server to provide a proxy for
certificate management functions.
In addition to the normative definitions for managed
objects, operations and attributes, this specification also includes normative
definitions for the following aspects of the protocol:
·
The expected behavior of the server and client as a result of
operations,
·
Message contents and formats,
·
Message encoding (including enumerations), and
·
Error handling.
This specification is complemented by several other
documents. The KMIP Usage Guide[KMIP-UG] provides illustrative information on using the
protocol. The KMIP Profiles Specification [KMIP-Prof]
provides a selected set of base level conformance profiles and authentication
suites; additional KMIP Profiles define specific sets of KMIP functionality for
conformance purposes. The KMIP Test Specification [KMIP-TC] provides samples of protocol
messages corresponding to a set of defined test cases. The KMIP Use Cases
document [KMIP-UC]
provides user stories that define the use of and context for functionality
defined in KMIP.
This specification defines the KMIP protocol version major
1 and minor 2 (see 6.1).
The key words “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD
NOT”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described
in [RFC2119] .
For acronyms used in this document, see Appendix E. For definitions not found in this document, see [SP800-57-1].
|
Archive
|
To place information not accessed frequently into
long-term storage.
|
|
Asymmetric key pair
(key pair)
|
A public key and its corresponding private key; a key pair
is used with a public key algorithm.
|
|
Authentication
|
A process that establishes the origin of information, or
determines an entity’s identity.
|
|
Authentication code
|
A cryptographic checksum based on a security function.
|
|
Authorization
|
Access privileges that are granted to an entity; conveying
an “official” sanction to perform a security function or activity.
|
|
Certificate length
|
The length (in bytes) of an X.509 public key certificate.
|
|
Certification authority
|
The entity in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is
responsible for issuing certificates, and exacting compliance to a PKI
policy.
|
|
Ciphertext
|
Data in its encrypted form.
|
|
Compromise
|
The unauthorized disclosure, modification, substitution or
use of sensitive data (e.g., keying material and other security-related
information).
|
|
Confidentiality
|
The property that sensitive information is not disclosed
to unauthorized entities.
|
|
Cryptographic algorithm
|
A well-defined computational procedure that takes variable
inputs, including a cryptographic key and produces an output.
|
|
Cryptographic key
(key)
|
A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic
algorithm that determines its operation in such a way that an entity with
knowledge of the key can reproduce or reverse the operation, while an entity
without knowledge of the key cannot. Examples include:
1. The transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext
data,
2. The transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext
data,
3. The computation of a digital signature from data,
4. The verification of a digital signature,
5. The computation of an authentication code from data,
and
6. The verification of an authentication code from data
and a received authentication code.
|
|
Decryption
|
The process of changing ciphertext into plaintext using a
cryptographic algorithm and key.
|
|
Digest (or hash)
|
The result of applying a hashing algorithm to information.
|
|
Digital signature
(signature)
|
The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that,
when properly implemented with supporting infrastructure and policy, provides
the services of:
1. origin authentication
2. data integrity, and
3. signer non-repudiation.
|
|
Digital Signature Algorithm
|
A cryptographic algorithm used for digital signature.
|
|
Encryption
|
The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext using a
cryptographic algorithm and key.
|
|
Hashing algorithm (or hash algorithm, hash function)
|
An algorithm that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to
a fixed length bit string. Approved hashing algorithms satisfy the following
properties:
1. (One-way) It
is computationally infeasible to find any input that
maps to any
pre-specified output, and
2. (Collision resistant) It is computationally infeasible
to find any two distinct inputs that map to the same output.
|
|
Integrity
|
The property that sensitive data has not been modified or
deleted in an unauthorized and undetected manner.
|
|
Key derivation
(derivation)
|
A function in the lifecycle of keying material; the
process by which one or more keys are derived from:
1) Either a shared secret from a key agreement computation
or a pre-shared cryptographic key, and
2) Other information.
|
|
Key management
|
The activities involving the handling of cryptographic
keys and other related security parameters (e.g., IVs and passwords) during
the entire life cycle of the keys, including their generation, storage,
establishment, entry and output, and destruction.
|
|
Key wrapping
(wrapping)
|
A method of encrypting and/or MACing/signing keys.
|
|
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
|
A cryptographic checksum on data that uses a symmetric key
to detect both accidental and intentional modifications of data.
|
|
PGP Key
|
A RFC 4880-compliant container of cryptographic keys and
associated metadata. Usually text-based (in PGP-parlance, ASCII-armored).
|
|
Private key
|
A cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic
algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and is not made public.
The private key is associated with a public key. Depending on the algorithm,
the private key MAY be used to:
1. Compute the corresponding public key,
2. Compute a digital signature that can be verified by the
corresponding public key,
3. Decrypt data that was encrypted by the corresponding
public key, or
4. Compute a piece of common shared data, together with
other information.
|
|
Profile
|
A specification of objects, attributes, operations,
message elements and authentication methods to be used in specific contexts
of key management server and client interactions (see [KMIP-Prof]).
|
|
Public key
|
A cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic
algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and that MAY be made
public. The public key is associated with a private key. The public key MAY
be known by anyone and, depending on the algorithm, MAY be used to:
1. Verify a digital signature that is signed by the
corresponding private key,
2. Encrypt data that can be decrypted by the corresponding
private key, or
3. Compute a piece of shared data.
|
|
Public key certificate
(certificate)
|
A set of data that uniquely identifies an entity, contains
the entity's public key and possibly other information, and is digitally
signed by a trusted party, thereby binding the public key to the entity.
|
|
Public key cryptographic algorithm
|
A cryptographic algorithm that uses two related keys, a
public key and a private key. The two keys have the property that determining
the private key from the public key is computationally infeasible.
|
|
Public Key Infrastructure
|
A framework that is established to issue, maintain and
revoke public key certificates.
|
|
Recover
|
To retrieve information that was archived to long-term
storage.
|
|
Split Key
|
A process by which a cryptographic key is split into n multiple
key components, individually providing no knowledge of the original key,
which can be subsequently combined to recreate the original cryptographic
key. If knowledge of k (where k is less than or equal to n)
components is necessary to construct the original key, then knowledge of any k-1
key components provides no information about the original key other than,
possibly, its length.
|
|
Symmetric key
|
A single cryptographic key that is used with a secret
(symmetric) key algorithm.
|
|
Symmetric key algorithm
|
A cryptographic algorithm that uses the same secret (symmetric)
key for an operation and its inverse (e.g., encryption and decryption).
|
|
X.509 certificate
|
The ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard defined two types of
certificates – the X.509 public key certificate, and the X.509 attribute
certificate. Most commonly (including this document), an X.509 certificate
refers to the X.509 public key certificate.
|
|
X.509 public key certificate
|
The public key for a user
(or device) and a name for the user (or device), together with some other
information, rendered un-forgeable by the digital signature of the
certification authority that issued the certificate, encoded in the format
defined in the ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard.
|
Table 1: Terminology
[ECC-Brainpool] ECC
Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation v. 1.0.19.10.2005, http://www.ecc-brainpool.org/download/Domain-parameters.pdf.
[FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 186-4, March 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips18-4/fips-180-4.pdf.
[FIPS186-4] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS PUB 186-4, July 2013, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf.
[FIPS197] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, November 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf.
[FIPS198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), FIPS PUB 198-1, July 2008, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf.
[IEEE1003-1] IEEE Std 1003.1, Standard for information technology - portable
operating system interface (POSIX). Shell and utilities, 2004.
[ISO16609] ISO, Banking -- Requirements
for message authentication using symmetric techniques, ISO 16609, 2012.
[ISO9797-1] ISO/IEC, Information
technology -- Security techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs) --
Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, ISO/IEC 9797-1, 2011.
[KMIP-Prof] Key Management Interoperability Protocol
Profiles Version 1.3. Edited by Tim Hudson and Robert Lockhart. Latest
version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/kmip-profiles-v1.3.html.
[PKCS#1] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA
Cryptography Standard, June 14, 2002, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125.
[PKCS#5] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #5 v2.1: Password-Based
Cryptography Standard, October 5, 2006, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2127.
[PKCS#8] RSA
Laboratories, PKCS#8 v1.2: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard,
November 1, 1993, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2130.
[PKCS#10] RSA
Laboratories, PKCS #10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax Standard,
May 26, 2000, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2132.
[RFC1319] B. Kaliski, The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1319, Apr
1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt.
[RFC1320] R. Rivest, The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1320,
April 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt.
[RFC1321] R. Rivest, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1321,
April 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt.
[RFC1421] J. Linn, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
Part I: Message
Encryption and Authentication Procedures, IETF RFC 1421, February 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1421.txt.
[RFC1424] B. Kaliski, Privacy
Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key Certification and
Related Services, IETF RFC 1424, Feb 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1424.txt.
[RFC2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
Authentication, IETF RFC 2104, February 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt.
[RFC2119] S.
Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, IETF
RFC 2119, March 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt.
[RFC2898] B. Kaliski, PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification
Version 2.0, IETF RFC 2898, September 2000, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt.
[RFC2986] M. Nystrom and
B. Kaliski, PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version
1.7, IETF RFC2986, November 2000, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt.
[RFC3447] J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski, Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1, IETF RFC 3447, Feb 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt.
[RFC3629] F. Yergeau, UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646, IETF
RFC 3629, November 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3629.txt.
[RFC3686] R. Housley, Using Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) Counter Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),
IETF RFC 3686, January 2004, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3686.txt.
[RFC4210] C. Adams, S. Farrell, T. Kause and T.
Mononen, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP), IETF RFC 4210, September 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4210.txt.
[RFC4211] J. Schaad, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF), IETF RFC 4211, September 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4211.txt.
[RFC4880] J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, D. Shaw, and R. Thayer, OpenPGP
Message Format, IETF RFC 4880, November 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt.
[RFC4949] R. Shirey, Internet
Security Glossary, Version 2, IETF RFC 4949, August 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt.
[RFC5208] B. Kaliski, Public
Key Cryptographic Standards (PKCS) #8: Private-Key Information Syntax
Specification Version 1.2, IETF RFC5208, May 2008, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5208.txt.
[RFC5272] J. Schaad and M. Meyers, Certificate
Management over CMS (CMC), IETF RFC 5272, June 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5272.txt.
[RFC5280] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk,
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate, IETF RFC 5280, May
2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt.
[RFC5639] M. Lochter, J. Merkle, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool
Standard Curves and Curve Generation, IETF RFC 5639, March 2010, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt.
[RFC6402] J. Schaad, Certificate
Management over CMS (CMC) Updates, IETF RFC6402, November 2011, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6402.txt.
[RFC6818] P. Yee, Updates to the Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile, IETF RFC6818, January 2013, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6818.txt.
[SEC2] SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters,
http://www.secg.org/collateral/sec2_final.pdf.
[SP800-38A] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation –
Methods and Techniques, NIST Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf.
[SP800-38B] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
CMAC Mode for Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf.
[SP800-38C] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the
CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, NIST Special Publication
800-38C, May 2004, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf.
[SP800-38D] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, NIST Special Publication 800-38D, Nov
2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf.
[SP800-38E] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Block-Oriented Storage Devices, NIST
Special Publication 800-38E, January 2010, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf.
[SP800-56A] E. Barker, L. Chen, A. Roginsky and M. Smid, Recommendation for
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography,
NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, May 2013, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar2.pdf.
[SP800-57-1] E. Barker, W. Barker, W. Burr, W. Polk, and M. Smid, Recommendations
for Key Management - Part 1: General (Revision 3), NIST Special Publication
800-57 Part 1 Revision 3, July 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_part1_rev3_general.pdf.
[SP800-108] L. Chen, Recommendation
for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), NIST Special
Publication 800-108, Oct 2009, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf.
[X.509] International
Telecommunication Union (ITU)–T, X.509: Information technology – Open systems
interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks, November 2008, http://www.itu.int/rec/recommendation.asp?lang=en&parent=T-REC-X.509-200811-1.
[X9.24-1] ANSI, X9.24 - Retail
Financial Services Symmetric Key Management - Part 1: Using Symmetric
Techniques, 2009.
[X9.31] ANSI, X9.31: Digital
Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry (rDSA), September 1998.
[X9.42] ANSI, X9.42:
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Agreement of
Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, 2003.
[X9.62] ANSI, X9.62: Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA), 2005.
[X9.63] ANSI, X9.63: Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic
Curve Cryptography, 2011.
[X9.102] ANSI, X9.102: Symmetric Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Wrapping of Keys and
Associated Data, 2008.
[X9 TR-31] ANSI, X9 TR-31: Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block
Specification for Symmetric Algorithms, 2010.
[ISO/IEC 9945-2] The Open Group, Regular
Expressions, The Single UNIX Specification version 2, 1997, ISO/IEC
9945-2:1993, http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007908799/xbd/re.html.
[KMIP-UG] Key
Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.2. Edited by Indra Fitzgerald and Judith Furlong. Latest
version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.2/kmip-ug-v1.2.doc.
[KMIP-TC] Key
Management Interoperability Protocol Test Cases Version 1.2. Edited by Tim Hudson and Faisal Faruqui. Latest
version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/testcases/v1.2/kmip-testcases-v1.2.doc.
[KMIP-UC] Key
Management Interoperability Protocol Use Cases Version 1.2 Working Draft 10, June 20, 2013. https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/49644/kmip-usecases-v1.2-wd10.doc.
[RFC6151] S. Turner and L. Chen, Updated
Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms,
IETF RFC6151, March 2011, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6151.txt.
[w1979] A. Shamir, How to share a secret,
Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 612-613, November 1979.
The following subsections describe the objects that are
passed between the clients and servers of the key management system. Some of
these object types, called Base Objects, are used only in the protocol
itself, and are not considered Managed Objects. Key management systems MAY
choose to support a subset of the Managed Objects. The object descriptions
refer to the primitive data types of which they are composed. These primitive
data types are (see Section 9.1.1.4):
·
Integer
·
Long Integer
·
Big Integer
·
Enumeration – choices from a predefined list of values
·
Boolean
·
Text String – string of characters representing human-readable
text
·
Byte String – sequence of unencoded byte values
·
Date-Time – date and time, with a granularity of one second
·
Interval – a length of time expressed in seconds
Structures are composed of
ordered lists of primitive data types or sub-structures.
2.1 Base Objects
These objects are used within the messages of the
protocol, but are not objects managed by the key management system. They are
components of Managed Objects.
2.1.1 Attribute
An Attribute object is a structure (see Table 2) used for sending and receiving Managed Object attributes. The Attribute Name is a
text-string that is used to identify the attribute. The Attribute Index
is an index number assigned by the key management server. The Attribute Index
is used to identify the particular instance. Attribute Indices SHALL start with
0. The Attribute Index of an attribute SHALL NOT change when other instances
are added or deleted. Single-instance Attributes (attributes which an object
MAY only have at most one instance thereof) SHALL have an Attribute Index of 0.
The Attribute Value is either a primitive data type or structured
object, depending on the attribute.
When an Attribute structure is used to specify or return a
particular instance of an Attribute and the Attribute Index is not specified it
SHALL be assumed to be 0.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Attribute
|
Structure
|
|
|
Attribute Name
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Attribute Index
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Attribute Value
|
Varies, depending on attribute. See Section 3
|
Yes, except for the Notify operation (see Section 5.1)
|
Table
2: Attribute Object Structure
A Credential is a structure (see Table 3) used for client identification purposes and is not managed by the key management system
(e.g., user id/password pairs, Kerberos tokens, etc.). It MAY be used for
authentication purposes as indicated in [KMIP-Prof].
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Credential
|
Structure
|
|
|
Credential Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.1
|
Yes
|
|
Credential Value
|
Varies based on Credential Type.
|
Yes
|
Table 3: Credential Object Structure
If the Credential Type in the Credential is Username and
Password, then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 4. The Username field identifies the client, and the Password field is a secret
that authenticates the client.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Credential Value
|
Structure
|
|
|
Username
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Password
|
Text String
|
No
|
Table 4: Credential Value Structure for the Username
and Password Credential
If the Credential Type in the Credential is Device,
then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 5. One or a combination
of the Device Serial Number, Network Identifier, Machine
Identifier, and Media Identifier SHALL be unique. Server
implementations MAY enforce policies on uniqueness for individual fields. A
shared secret or password MAY also be used to authenticate the client. The
client SHALL provide at least one field.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Credential Value
|
Structure
|
|
|
Device Serial Number
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Password
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Device Identifier
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Network Identifier
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Machine Identifier
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Media Identifier
|
Text String
|
No
|
Table 5: Credential Value Structure for the Device
Credential
If the Credential Type in the Credential is Attestation,
then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 6. The Nonce Value
is obtained from the key management server in a Nonce Object. The Attestation
Credential Object can contain a measurement from the client or an assertion
from a third party if the server is not capable or willing to verify the
attestation data from the client. Neither type of attestation data (Attestation
Measurement or Attestation Assertion) is necessary to allow the
server to accept either. However, the client SHALL provide attestation data in
either the Attestation Measurement or Attestation Assertion
fields.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Credential Value
|
Structure
|
|
|
Nonce
|
Structure, see 2.1.14
|
Yes
|
|
Attestation Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.36
|
Yes
|
|
Attestation Measurement
|
Byte String
|
No
|
|
Attestation Assertion
|
Byte String
|
No
|
Table 6: Credential Value
Structure for the Attestation Credential
A Key Block object is a structure (see Table 7) used to encapsulate all of the information that is closely associated with a
cryptographic key. It contains a Key Value of one of the following Key
Format Types:
·
Raw – This is a key that contains only cryptographic key
material, encoded as a string of bytes.
·
Opaque – This is an encoded key for which the encoding is
unknown to the key management system. It is encoded as a string of bytes.
·
PKCS1 – This is an encoded private key, expressed as a
DER-encoded ASN.1 PKCS#1 object.
·
PKCS8 – This is an encoded private key, expressed as a
DER-encoded ASN.1 PKCS#8 object, supporting both the RSAPrivateKey syntax and
EncryptedPrivateKey.
·
X.509 – This is an encoded object, expressed as a
DER-encoded ASN.1 X.509 object.
·
ECPrivateKey – This is an ASN.1 encoded elliptic curve private
key.
·
Several Transparent Key types – These are
algorithm-specific structures containing defined values for the various key
types, as defined in Section 2.1.7.
·
Extensions – These are vendor-specific extensions to allow
for proprietary or legacy key formats.
The Key Block MAY contain the Key Compression Type, which
indicates the format of the elliptic curve public key. By default, the public
key is uncompressed.
The Key Block also has the Cryptographic Algorithm and the
Cryptographic Length of the key contained in the Key Value field. Some example
values are:
·
RSA keys are typically 1024, 2048 or 3072 bits in length.
·
3DES keys are typically from 112 to 192 bits (depending upon key
length and the presence of parity bits).
·
AES keys are 128, 192 or 256 bits in length.
The Key Block SHALL contain a Key Wrapping Data structure
if the key in the Key Value field is wrapped (i.e., encrypted, or MACed/signed,
or both).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Format Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.3
|
Yes
|
|
Key Compression Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.2
|
No
|
|
Key Value
|
Byte String: for wrapped Key Value; Structure: for
plaintext Key Value, see 2.1.4
|
No
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13
|
Yes. MAY be omitted only if this information is available from the
Key Value. Does not apply to Secret Data (see Section 2.2.7) or Opaque
Objects (see Section 2.2.8). If
present, the Cryptographic Length SHALL also be present.
|
|
Cryptographic Length
|
Integer
|
Yes. MAY be omitted only if this information is available from the
Key Value. Does not apply to Secret Data (see Section 2.2.7) or Opaque
Objects (see Section 2.2.8). If
present, the Cryptographic Algorithm SHALL also be present.
|
|
Key Wrapping Data
|
Structure, see 2.1.5
|
No. SHALL only be present if the key is wrapped.
|
Table
7: Key Block Object Structure
The Key Value is used only inside a Key Block and
is either a Byte String or a structure (see Table 8):
·
The Key Value structure contains the key material, either as a
byte string or as a Transparent Key structure (see Section 2.1.7), and OPTIONAL attribute information that is associated and encapsulated with
the key material. This attribute information differs from the attributes
associated with Managed Objects, and is obtained via the Get Attributes
operation, only by the fact that it is encapsulated with (and possibly wrapped
with) the key material itself.
·
The Key Value Byte String is either the wrapped TTLV-encoded (see
Section 9.1) Key Value structure, or the wrapped un-encoded value of the Byte
String Key Material field.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Value
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Material
|
Byte String: for Raw, Opaque, PKCS1, PKCS8,
ECPrivateKey, or Extension Key Format types;
Structure:
for Transparent, or Extension Key Format Types
|
Yes
|
|
Attribute
|
Attribute Object, see Section 2.1.1
|
No. MAY be repeated
|
Table
8: Key Value Object Structure
The Key Block MAY also supply OPTIONAL information about a
cryptographic key wrapping mechanism used to wrap the Key Value. This consists
of a Key Wrapping Data structure (see Table 9). It is only used inside a Key Block.
This structure contains fields for:
·
A Wrapping Method, which indicates the method used to wrap
the Key Value.
·
Encryption Key Information, which contains the Unique
Identifier (see 3.1) value of the encryption key and associated cryptographic
parameters.
·
MAC/Signature Key Information, which contains the Unique
Identifier value of the MAC/signature key and associated cryptographic
parameters.
·
A MAC/Signature, which contains a MAC or signature of the
Key Value.
·
An IV/Counter/Nonce, if REQUIRED by the wrapping method.
·
An Encoding Option, specifying the encoding of the Key
Material within the Key Value structure of the Key Block that has been wrapped.
If No Encoding is specified, then the Key Value structure SHALL NOT contain any
attributes.
If wrapping is used, then the whole Key Value structure is
wrapped unless otherwise specified by the Wrapping Method. The algorithms used
for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic Algorithm attributes of the
encryption key and/or MAC/signature key; the block-cipher mode, padding method,
and hashing algorithm used for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic
Parameters in the Encryption Key Information and/or MAC/Signature Key
Information, or, if not present, from the Cryptographic Parameters attribute of
the respective key(s). Either the Encryption Key Information or the
MAC/Signature Key Information (or both) in the Key Wrapping Data structure
SHALL be specified.
The following wrapping methods are currently defined:
·
Encrypt only (i.e., encryption using a symmetric key or
public key, or authenticated encryption algorithms that use a single key).
·
MAC/sign only (i.e., either MACing the Key Value with a
symmetric key, or signing the Key Value with a private key).
·
Encrypt then MAC/sign.
·
MAC/sign then encrypt.
·
TR-31.
·
Extensions.
The following encoding options
are currently defined:
·
No Encoding (i.e., the wrapped un-encoded value of the
Byte String Key Material field in the Key Value structure).
·
TTLV Encoding (i.e., the wrapped TTLV-encoded Key Value
structure).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Wrapping Data
|
Structure
|
|
|
Wrapping Method
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.4
|
Yes
|
|
Encryption Key
Information
|
Structure, see below
|
No. Corresponds to the key that was used to encrypt the Key Value.
|
|
MAC/Signature Key
Information
|
Structure, see below
|
No. Corresponds to the symmetric key used
to MAC the Key Value or the private key used to sign the Key Value
|
|
MAC/Signature
|
Byte String
|
No
|
|
IV/Counter/Nonce
|
Byte String
|
No
|
|
Encoding Option
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.32
|
No. Specifies the encoding of the Key Value Byte
String. If not present, the wrapped Key Value structure SHALL be TTLV
encoded.
|
Table 9: Key Wrapping Data Object Structure
The structures of the Encryption
Key Information (see Table 10) and the MAC/Signature Key Information (see Table 11) are as follows:
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Encryption Key
Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Unique Identifier
|
Text
string, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters
|
Structure,
see 3.6
|
No
|
Table 10: Encryption Key Information Object Structure
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
MAC/Signature Key
Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Unique Identifier
|
Text
string, see 3.1
|
Yes. It SHALL be either the Unique Identifier of the
Symmetric Key used to MAC, or of the Private Key (or its corresponding Public
Key) used to sign.
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters
|
Structure,
see 3.6
|
No
|
Table 11: MAC/Signature Key
Information Object Structure
This is a separate structure (see Table 12) that is
defined for operations that provide the option to return wrapped keys. The Key Wrapping Specification SHALL be included
inside the operation request if clients request the server to return a wrapped
key. If Cryptographic Parameters are specified in the Encryption Key
Information and/or the MAC/Signature Key Information of the Key
Wrapping Specification, then the server SHALL verify that they match one of the
instances of the Cryptographic Parameters attribute of the corresponding key.
If Cryptographic Parameters are omitted, then the server SHALL use the
Cryptographic Parameters attribute with the lowest Attribute Index of the
corresponding key. If the corresponding key does not have any Cryptographic
Parameters attribute, or if no match is found, then an error is returned.
This structure contains:
·
A Wrapping Method that indicates the method used to wrap the Key
Value.
·
Encryption Key Information with the Unique Identifier value of
the encryption key and associated cryptographic parameters.
·
MAC/Signature Key Information with the Unique Identifier value of
the MAC/signature key and associated cryptographic parameters.
·
Zero or more Attribute Names to indicate the attributes to be
wrapped with the key material.
·
An Encoding Option, specifying the encoding of the Key Value
before wrapping. If No Encoding is specified, then the Key Value SHALL NOT
contain any attributes
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Wrapping Specification
|
Structure
|
|
|
Wrapping Method
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.4
|
Yes
|
|
Encryption Key
Information
|
Structure, see 2.1.5
|
No, SHALL be present if MAC/Signature Key Information is omitted
|
|
MAC/Signature Key
Information
|
Structure, see 2.1.5
|
No, SHALL be present if Encryption Key Information is
omitted
|
|
Attribute Name
|
Text String
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
|
Encoding Option
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.32
|
No. If Encoding Option is not present, the wrapped
Key Value SHALL be TTLV encoded.
|
Table 12: Key Wrapping Specification Object Structure
2.1.7 Transparent Key Structures
Transparent Key structures describe the necessary
parameters to obtain the key material. They are used in the Key Value
structure. The mapping to the parameters specified in other standards is shown
in Table 13.
|
Object
|
Description
|
Mapping
|
|
P
|
For DSA and DH, the (large) prime field order.
For RSA, a prime factor of the modulus.
|
p in [FIPS186-4], [X9.42], [SP800-56A]
p in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Q
|
For DSA and DH, the (small) prime multiplicative subgroup
order.
For RSA, a prime factor of the modulus.
|
q in [FIPS186-4], [X9.42], [SP800-56A]
q in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
G
|
The generator of the subgroup of order Q.
|
g in [FIPS186-4], [X9.42], [SP800-56A]
|
|
X
|
DSA or DH private key.
|
x in [FIPS186-4]
x, xu, xv in [X9.42],
[SP800-56A] for static private keys
r, ru, rv in [X9.42],
[SP800-56A] for ephemeral private keys
|
|
Y
|
DSA or DH public key.
|
y in [FIPS186-4]
y, yu, yv in [X9.42],
[SP800-56A] for static public keys
t, tu, tv in [X9.42],
[SP800-56A] for ephemeral public keys
|
|
J
|
DH cofactor integer, where P = JQ + 1.
|
j in [X9.42]
|
|
Modulus
|
RSA modulus PQ, where P and Q are distinct primes.
|
n in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Private Exponent
|
RSA private exponent.
|
d in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Public Exponent
|
RSA public exponent.
|
e in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Prime Exponent P
|
RSA private exponent for the prime factor P in the CRT
format, i.e., Private Exponent (mod (P-1)).
|
dP in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Prime Exponent Q
|
RSA private exponent for the prime factor Q in the CRT
format, i.e., Private Exponent (mod (Q-1)).
|
dQ in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
CRT Coefficient
|
The (first) CRT coefficient, i.e., Q-1 mod P.
|
qInv in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Recommended Curve
|
NIST Recommended Curves (e.g., P-192).
|
See Appendix D of [FIPS186-4]
|
|
D
|
Elliptic curve private key.
|
d; de,U,de,V (ephemeral private
keys); ds,U,ds,V (static private keys) in [X9.62], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Q String
|
Elliptic curve public key.
|
Q; Qe,U,Qe,V
(ephemeral public keys); Qs,U,Qs,V (static
public keys) in [X9.62], [FIPS186-4]
|
Table 13: Parameter mapping.
2.1.7.1 Transparent Symmetric
Key
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent Symmetric Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 14.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table
14: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent Symmetric Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 15.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
X
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table
15: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Private Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 16.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Y
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table
16: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent RSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 17.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Modulus
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Private Exponent
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Public Exponent
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Prime Exponent P
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Prime Exponent Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
CRT Coefficient
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
Table 17: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Private Keys
One of the following SHALL be
present (refer to [PKCS#1]):
·
Private Exponent,
·
P and Q (the first two prime factors of Modulus), or
·
Prime Exponent P and Prime Exponent Q.
2.1.7.5 Transparent RSA Public
Key
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent RSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 18.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Modulus
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Public Exponent
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table
18: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DH Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 19.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
J
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
X
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 19: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Private Keys
2.1.7.7 Transparent DH Public
Key
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DH Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 20.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
J
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Y
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 20: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Public Keys
2.1.7.8 Transparent ECDSA
Private Key
The Transparent ECDSA Private Key
structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be
removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC
Private Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECDSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 21.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
D
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table
21: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Private Keys
The Transparent ECDSA Public Key
structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be
removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC
Public Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECDSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 22.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
Q String
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 22: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Public Keys
The Transparent ECDH Private Key
structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be
removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC
Private Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECDH Private Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 23.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
D
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table
23: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Private Keys
The Transparent ECDH Public Key
structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be
removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC
Public Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECDH Public Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 24.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
Q String
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table
24: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Public Keys
The Transparent ECMQV Private Key
structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be
removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC
Private Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECMQV Private Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 25.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
D
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 25: Key Material Object Structure for
Transparent ECMQV Private Keys
The Transparent ECMQV Public Key
structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be
removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC
Public Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECMQV Public Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 26.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
Q String
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 26: Key Material Object Structure for
Transparent ECMQV Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent EC Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 27.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
D
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 27: Key Material Object Structure for
Transparent EC Private Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent EC Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 28.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
Q String
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 28: Key Material Object Structure for
Transparent EC Public Keys
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of
version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions
of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which
currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to
reference a Template.
These structures are used in various operations to provide
the desired attribute values and/or template names in the request and to return
the actual attribute values in the response.
The Template-Attribute,
Common Template-Attribute, Private Key Template-Attribute, and Public
Key Template-Attribute structures are defined identically as follows:
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Template-Attribute,
Common Template-Attribute, Private Key Template-Attribute,
Public Key Template-Attribute
|
Structure
|
|
|
Name
|
Structure, see 3.2
|
No, MAY be repeated. (deprecated)
|
|
Attribute
|
Attribute Object, see 2.1.1
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Table 29: Template-Attribute Object Structure
Name is the Name attribute of the Template object defined in
Section 2.2.6.
An Extension Information object is a structure (see
Table 30) describing Objects with Item Tag values in the Extensions range. The
Extension Name is a Text String that is used to name the Object (first column
of Table 266). The Extension Tag is the Item Tag Value of the Object (see Table 266). The Extension Type is the Item Type Value of the Object (see Table 264).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Extension Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Extension Name
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Extension Tag
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Extension Type
|
Integer
|
No
|
Table 30: Extension Information Structure
The Data object is used in requests and responses
in cryptographic operations that pass data between the client and the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Data
|
Byte String
|
Table 31: Data Structure
The Data Length is used in requests in cryptographic
operations to indicate the amount of data expected in a response.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Data Length
|
Integer
|
Table 32: Data Length Structure
The Signature Data is used in requests and
responses in cryptographic operations that pass signature data between the
client and the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Signature Data
|
Byte String
|
Table 33: Signature Data
Structure
The MAC Data is used in requests and responses in
cryptographic operations that pass MAC data between the client and the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
MAC Data
|
Byte String
|
Table 34: MAC Data Structure
A Nonce object is a structure (see Table 35) used by the server to send a random value to the client. The Nonce Identifier is assigned
by the server and used to identify the Nonce object. The Nonce Value consists
of the random data created by the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Nonce
|
Structure
|
|
|
Nonce ID
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
|
Nonce Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 35: Nonce Structure
The Correlation Value is used in requests and
responses in cryptographic operations that support multi-part (streaming)
operations. This is generated by the server and returned in the first response
to an operation that is being performed across multiple requests. Note: the
server decides which operations are supported for multi-part usage. A
server-generated correlation value SHALL be specified in any subsequent
cryptographic operations that pertain to the original operation.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Correlation Value
|
Byte String
|
Table 36: Correlation Value Structure
The Init Indicator is used in requests in
cryptographic operations that support multi-part (streaming) operations. This
is provided in the first request with a value of True to an operation that is
being performed across multiple requests.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Init Indicator
|
Boolean
|
Table 37: Init Indicator Structure
The Final Indicator is used in requests in
cryptographic operations that support multi-part (streaming) operations. This
is provided in the final (last) request with a value of True to an operation
that is being performed across multiple requests.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Final Indicator
|
Boolean
|
Table 38: Final Indicator Structure
2.1.18 RNG Parameters
The RNG Parameters
base object is a structure that contains a mandatory RNG Algorithm and a set of
OPTIONAL fields that describe a Random Number Generator. Specific fields
pertain only to certain types of RNGs.
The RNG Algorithm SHALL be
specified and if the algorithm implemented is unknown or the implementation
does not want to provide the specific details of the RNG Algorithm then the
Unspecified enumeration SHALL be used.
If the cryptographic
building blocks used within the RNG are known they MAY be specified in
combination of the remaining fields within the RNG Parameters structure.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
RNG Parameters
|
Structure
|
|
|
RNG Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.37
|
Yes
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see
9.1.3.2.13
|
No
|
|
Cryptographic Length
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Hashing Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.16
|
No
|
|
DRBG Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.38
|
No
|
|
Recommended Curve
|
Enumeration, see
9.1.3.2.5
|
No
|
|
FIPS186 Variation
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.39
|
No
|
|
Prediction Resistance
|
Boolean
|
No
|
Table 39: RNG Parameters
Structure
The Profile Information base object is a structure
that contains details of the supported profiles. Specific fields MAY pertain
only to certain types of profiles.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Profile Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Profile Name
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.42
|
Yes
|
|
Server URI
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Server Port
|
Integer
|
No
|
Table 40: Profile Information
Structure
The Validation Information base object is a structure
that contains details of a formal validation. Specific fields MAY pertain only
to certain types of validations.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Validation Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Validation Authority
Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.40
|
Yes
|
|
Validation Authority
Country
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Validation Authority
URI
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Validation Version
Major
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Validation Version Minor
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Validation Type
|
Enumeration, see 0
|
Yes
|
|
Validation Level
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Validation Certificate
Identifier
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Validation Certificate
URI
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Validation Vendor URI
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Validation Profile
|
Text String (MAY be
repeated)
|
No
|
Table 41: Validation
Information Structure
The Validation Authority along with the Validation Version
Major, Validation Type and Validation Level SHALL be provided to uniquely
identify a validation for a given validation authority. If the Validation
Certificate URI is not provided the server SHOULD include a Validation Vendor
URI from which information related to the validation is available.
The Validation Authority Country is the two letter ISO
country code.
The Capability Information base object is a structure
that contains details of the supported capabilities.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Capability Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Streaming Capability
|
Boolean
|
No
|
|
Asynchronous Capability
|
Boolean
|
No
|
|
Attestation Capability
|
Boolean
|
No
|
|
Unwrap Mode
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.43
|
No
|
|
Destroy Action
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.44
|
No
|
|
Shredding Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.45
|
No
|
|
RNG Mode
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.46
|
No
|
Table 42: Capability
Information Structure
Managed Objects are objects that are the subjects of key
management operations, which are described in Sections 4 and 5. Managed Cryptographic Objects are the subset of Managed Objects that contain
cryptographic material (e.g., certificates, keys, and secret data).
2.2.1 Certificate
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a digital
certificate. It is a DER-encoded X.509 public key certificate. The PGP
certificate type is deprecated as of version 1.2 of this specification and MAY
be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The PGP Key object
(see section 2.2.9) SHOULD be used instead.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Certificate
|
Structure
|
|
|
Certificate Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.6
|
Yes
|
|
Certificate Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 43: Certificate Object
Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a symmetric key.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Symmetric Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 44: Symmetric Key Object
Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the public portion
of an asymmetric key pair. This is only a public key, not a certificate.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Public Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 45: Public Key Object
Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the private portion
of an asymmetric key pair.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Private Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 46: Private Key Object
Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a Split Key.
A split key is a secret, usually a symmetric key or a private key that has been
split into a number of parts, each of which MAY then be distributed to several
key holders, for additional security. The Split Key Parts field
indicates the total number of parts, and the Split Key Threshold field
indicates the minimum number of parts needed to reconstruct the entire key. The
Key Part Identifier indicates which key part is contained in the
cryptographic object, and SHALL be at least 1 and SHALL be less than or equal
to Split Key Parts.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Split Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Split Key Parts
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Key Part Identifier
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Split Key Threshold
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Split Key Method
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.8
|
Yes
|
|
Prime Field Size
|
Big Integer
|
No, REQUIRED only if Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing Prime
Field.
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 47: Split Key Object Structure
There are three Split Key
Methods for secret sharing: the first one is based on XOR, and the other
two are based on polynomial secret sharing, according to [w1979].
Let L
be the minimum number of bits needed to represent all values of the secret.
·
When the Split Key Method is XOR, then the Key Material in the
Key Value of the Key Block is of length L
bits. The number of split keys is Split Key Parts (identical to Split Key
Threshold), and the secret is reconstructed by XORing all of the parts.
·
When the Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing Prime Field, then
secret sharing is performed in the field GF(Prime Field Size),
represented as integers, where Prime Field Size is a prime bigger than 2L.
·
When the Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing GF(216),
then secret sharing is performed in the field GF(216). The Key
Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is a bit string of length L, and when L
is bigger than 216, then secret sharing is applied piecewise in
pieces of 16 bits each. The Key Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is
the concatenation of the corresponding shares of all pieces of the secret.
Secret sharing is performed in the field GF(216),
which is represented as an algebraic extension of GF(28):
GF(216) ≈ GF(28) [y]/(y2+y+m),
where m is defined later.
An element of this field then consists of a linear
combination uy + v, where u and v are elements of the
smaller field GF(28).
The representation of field elements and the notation
in this section rely on [FIPS197], Sections 3 and 4.
The field GF(28) is as described in [FIPS197],
GF(28) ≈ GF(2) [x]/(x8+x4+x3+x+1).
An element of GF(28) is represented as a
byte. Addition and subtraction in GF(28) is performed as a bit-wise
XOR of the bytes. Multiplication and inversion are more complex (see [FIPS197] Section 4.1 and 4.2 for details).
An element of GF(216) is represented as a
pair of bytes (u, v). The element m is given by
m = x5+x4+x3+x,
which is represented by the byte 0x3A (or {3A} in
notation according to [FIPS197]).
Addition and subtraction in GF(216) both
correspond to simply XORing the bytes. The product of two elements ry + s
and uy + v is given by
(ry + s) (uy + v)
= ((r + s)(u + v) + sv)y + (ru
+ svm).
The inverse of an element uy + v is given
by
(uy + v)-1 = ud-1y
+ (u + v)d-1, where d = (u + v)v
+ mu2.
2.2.6 Template
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of
version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions
of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which
currently support use of a Template.
A Template is a named Managed Object containing the
client-settable attributes of a Managed Cryptographic Object. A Template is
used to specify the attributes of a new Managed Cryptographic Object in various
operations. Attributes associated with a Managed Object MAY also be specified
in the Template-Attribute structures in the operations in Section 4.
Attributes specified in a Template apply to any object
created that reference the Template by name using the Name object in any of the
Template-Attribute structures in Section 2.1.7.14.
The name of a Template (as it is for any Managed Object)
is specified as an Attribute in the Template-Attribute structure in the
Register operation where the Attribute Name is "Name" and the
Attribute Value is the name of the Template Managed Object.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Template
|
Structure
|
|
|
Attribute
|
Attribute Object, see 2.1.1
|
Yes. MAY be repeated.
|
Table 48: Template Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object containing a shared secret
value that is not a key or certificate (e.g., a password). The Key Block of the
Secret Data object contains a Key Value of the Secret Data Type. The Key
Value MAY be wrapped.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Secret Data
|
Structure
|
|
|
Secret Data Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.9
|
Yes
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 49: Secret Data Object
Structure
A Managed Object that the key management server is
possibly not able to interpret. The context information for this object MAY be
stored and retrieved using Custom Attributes.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Opaque Object
|
Structure
|
|
|
Opaque Data Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.10
|
Yes
|
|
Opaque Data Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table
50: Opaque Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a text-based
representation of a PGP key. The Key Block field, indicated below, will contain
the ASCII-armored export of a PGP key in the format as specified in RFC 4880. It
MAY contain only a public key block, or both a public and private key block. Two
different versions of PGP keys, version 3 and version 4, MAY be stored in this
Managed Cryptographic Object.
KMIP implementers SHOULD treat the Key Block field as an
opaque blob. PGP-aware KMIP clients SHOULD take on the responsibility of
decomposing the Key Block into other Managed Cryptographic Objects (Public
Keys, Private Keys, etc.).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
PGP Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
PGP Key Version
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 51: PGP Key Object
Structure
The following subsections describe the attributes that are
associated with Managed Objects. Attributes that an object MAY have multiple
instances of are referred to as multi-instance attributes. All instances
of an attribute SHOULD have a different value. Similarly, attributes which an
object SHALL only have at most one instance of are referred to as single-instance
attributes. Attributes are able to be obtained by a client from the server
using the Get Attribute operation. Some attributes are able to be set by the
Add Attribute operation or updated by the Modify Attribute operation, and some
are able to be deleted by the Delete Attribute operation if they no longer
apply to the Managed Object. Read-only attributes are attributes that
SHALL NOT be modified by either server or client, and that SHALL NOT be deleted
by a client.
When attributes are returned by the server (e.g., via a
Get Attributes operation), the attribute value returned MAY differ for
different clients (e.g., the Cryptographic Usage Mask value MAY be different
for different clients, depending on the policy of the server).
The first table in each subsection contains the attribute
name in the first row. This name is the canonical name used when managing
attributes using the Get Attributes, Get Attribute List, Add Attribute, Modify
Attribute, and Delete Attribute operations.
A server SHALL NOT delete attributes without receiving a
request from a client until the object is destroyed. After an object is
destroyed, the server MAY retain all, some or none of the object attributes,
depending on the object type and server policy.
The second table in each subsection lists certain
attribute characteristics (e.g., “SHALL always have a value”): Table 52 below explains the meaning of each characteristic that MAY appear in those
tables. The server policy MAY further restrict these attribute characteristics.
|
SHALL always have a value
|
All Managed Objects that are of the Object Types for which this
attribute applies, SHALL always have this attribute set once the object has
been created or registered, up until the object has been destroyed.
|
|
Initially set by
|
Who is permitted to initially set the value of the attribute (if the
attribute has never been set, or if all the attribute values have been
deleted)?
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Is the server allowed to change an existing value of the attribute
without receiving a request from a client?
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Is the client able to change an existing value of the attribute value
once it has been set?
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Is the client able to delete an instance of the attribute?
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Are multiple instances of the attribute permitted?
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Which operations MAY cause this attribute to be set even if the
attribute is not specified in the operation request itself?
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Which Managed Objects MAY have this attribute set?
|
Table 52: Attribute Rules
The Unique Identifier is generated by the key
management system to uniquely identify a Managed Object. It is only REQUIRED to
be unique within the identifier space managed by a single key management
system, however this identifier SHOULD be globally unique in order to allow for
a key management domain export of such objects. This attribute SHALL be
assigned by the key management system at creation or registration time, and
then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
|
Unique Identifier
|
Text String
|
|
Table 53: Unique Identifier Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table
54: Unique Identifier Attribute Rules
The Name attribute is a structure (see Table 55) used to identify and locate an object. This attribute is assigned by the
client, and the Name Value is intended to be in a form that humans are
able to interpret. The key management system MAY specify rules by which the
client creates valid names. Clients are informed of such rules by a mechanism
that is not specified by this standard. Names SHALL be unique within a given
key management domain, but are NOT REQUIRED to be globally unique.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Name
|
Structure
|
|
|
Name Value
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Name Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.11
|
Yes
|
Table 55: Name Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 56: Name Attribute Rules
The Object Type of a Managed Object (e.g., public
key, private key, symmetric key, etc.) SHALL be set by the server when the
object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before
the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Object Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.12
|
Table 57: Object Type Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 58: Object Type Attribute
Rules
The Cryptographic Algorithm of an object. The Cryptographic
Algorithm of a Certificate object identifies the algorithm for the public key
contained within the Certificate. The digital signature algorithm used to sign
the Certificate is identified in the Digital Signature Algorithm attribute
defined in Section 3.16. This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the
object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before
the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13
|
Table 59: Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Certify, Create, Create Key Pair, Re-certify, Register, Derive Key,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Keys, Certificates, Templates
|
Table 60: Cryptographic
Algorithm Attribute Rules
For keys, Cryptographic Length is the length in
bits of the clear-text cryptographic key material of the Managed Cryptographic
Object. For certificates, Cryptographic Length is the length in bits of
the public key contained within the Certificate. This attribute SHALL be set by
the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be
changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Cryptographic Length
|
Integer
|
Table 61: Cryptographic Length Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Certify, Create, Create Key Pair, Re-certify, Register, Derive Key,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Keys, Certificates, Templates
|
Table 62: Cryptographic Length
Attribute Rules
The Cryptographic Parameters attribute is a
structure (see Table 63) that contains a set of OPTIONAL fields that describe
certain cryptographic parameters to be used when performing cryptographic
operations using the object. Specific fields MAY pertain only to certain types
of Managed Cryptographic Objects. The Cryptographic Parameters attribute of a
Certificate object identifies the cryptographic parameters of the public key
contained within the Certificate.
The Cryptographic Algorithm is also used to specify the
parameters for cryptographic operations. For operations involving digital
signatures, either the Digital Signature Algorithm can be specified or the
Cryptographic Algorithm and Hashing Algorithm combination can be specified.
Random IV can be used to request that the KMIP server
generate an appropriate IV for a cryptographic operation that uses an IV. The
generated Random IV is returned in the response to the cryptographic operation.
IV Length is the length of the Initialization Vector in
bits. This parameter SHALL be provided when the specified Block Cipher Mode
supports variable IV lengths such as CTR or GCM.
Tag Length is the length of the authenticator tag in
bytes. This parameter SHALL be provided when the Block Cipher Mode is GCM.
The IV used with counter modes of operation (e.g., CTR and
GCM) cannot repeat for a given cryptographic key. To prevent an IV/key reuse,
the IV is often constructed of three parts: a fixed field, an invocation field,
and a counter as described in [SP800-38A] and [SP800-38D]. The Fixed Field Length is the length of the
fixed field portion of the IV in bits. The Invocation Field Length is the
length of the invocation field portion of the IV in bits. The Counter Length is
the length of the counter portion of the IV in bits.
Initial Counter Value is the starting counter value for
CTR mode (for [RFC3686] it is 1).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters
|
Structure
|
|
|
Block Cipher Mode
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.14
|
No
|
|
Padding Method
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.15
|
No
|
|
Hashing Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.16
|
No
|
|
Key Role Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.17
|
No
|
|
Digital Signature Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.7
|
No
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13
|
No
|
|
Random IV
|
Boolean
|
No
|
|
IV Length
|
Integer
|
No unless Block Cipher Mode supports variable IV lengths
|
|
Tag Length
|
Integer
|
No unless Block Cipher Mode is GCM
|
|
Fixed Field Length
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Invocation Field Length
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Counter Length
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Initial Counter Value
|
Integer
|
No
|
Table 63: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Keys, Certificates, Templates
|
Table 64: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Rules
Key Role Type definitions match those defined in ANSI X9
TR-31 [X9 TR-31] and are defined in Table 65:
|
BDK
|
Base Derivation Key (ANSI X9.24 DUKPT key
derivation)
|
|
CVK
|
Card Verification Key (CVV/signature strip number
validation)
|
|
DEK
|
Data Encryption Key (General Data Encryption)
|
|
MKAC
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Application Cryptograms
|
|
MKSMC
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Secure Messaging for
Confidentiality
|
|
MKSMI
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Secure Messaging for
Integrity
|
|
MKDAC
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Data Authentication Code
|
|
MKDN
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Dynamic Numbers
|
|
MKCP
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Card Personalization
|
|
MKOTH
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Other
|
|
KEK
|
Key Encryption or Wrapping Key
|
|
MAC16609
|
ISO16609 MAC Algorithm 1
|
|
MAC97971
|
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 1
|
|
MAC97972
|
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 2
|
|
MAC97973
|
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 3 (Note this is commonly
known as X9.19 Retail MAC)
|
|
MAC97974
|
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 4
|
|
MAC97975
|
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 5
|
|
ZPK
|
PIN Block Encryption Key
|
|
PVKIBM
|
PIN Verification Key, IBM 3624 Algorithm
|
|
PVKPVV
|
PIN Verification Key, VISA PVV Algorithm
|
|
PVKOTH
|
PIN Verification Key, Other Algorithm
|
Table
65: Key Role Types
Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. - Financial Industry
Standards (www.x9.org) contributed to Table 65. Key role names and descriptions
are derived from material in the Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc.'s
Technical Report "TR-31 2010 Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block
Specification for Symmetric Algorithms" and used with the permission of
Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. in an effort to improve
interoperability between X9 standards and OASIS KMIP. The complete ANSI X9
TR-31 is available at www.x9.org.
The Cryptographic Domain Parameters attribute is a
structure (see Table 66) that contains a set of OPTIONAL fields that MAY need
to be specified in the Create Key Pair Request Payload. Specific fields MAY
only pertain to certain types of Managed Cryptographic Objects.
The domain parameter Qlength correponds to the bit length
of parameter Q (refer to [SEC2] and [SP800-56A]). Qlength applies to algorithms such as DSA and DH. The
bit length of parameter P (refer to [SEC2] and [SP800-56A]) is specified separately by setting the
Cryptographic Length attribute.
Recommended Curve is applicable to elliptic curve
algorithms such as ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
Required
|
|
Cryptographic Domain Parameters
|
Structure
|
Yes
|
|
Qlength
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Recommended Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
No
|
Table 66: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute Structure
|
Shall always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Asymmetric Keys, Templates
|
Table 67: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute
Rules
The Certificate Type attribute is a type of
certificate (e.g., X.509). The PGP certificate type is deprecated as of version
1.2 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the
specification.
The Certificate Type value SHALL be set by the
server when the certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be
changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
|
Certificate Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.6
|
|
Table 68: Certificate Type Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 69: Certificate Type Attribute Rules
The Certificate Length attribute is the length in
bytes of the Certificate object. The Certificate Length SHALL be set by
the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be
changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Certificate Length
|
Integer
|
Table 70: Certificate Length Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 71: Certificate Length Attribute Rules
The X.509 Certificate Identifier attribute
is a structure (see Table 72) used to provide the
identification of an X.509 public key certificate. The X.509 Certificate
Identifier contains the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field
of the X.509 certificate) and the Certificate Serial Number (i.e., from the
Serial Number field of the X.509 certificate). The X.509 Certificate
Identifier SHALL be set by the server when the X.509 certificate is created or
registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is
destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
X.509 Certificate Identifier
|
Structure
|
|
|
Issuer Distinguished
Name
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
|
Certificate Serial Number
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 72: X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute
Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
X.509 Certificates
|
Table 73: X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute Rules
The X.509 Certificate Subject attribute is a
structure (see Table 74) used to identify the subject of a X.509 certificate.
The X.509 Certificate Subject contains the Subject Distinguished Name (i.e.,
from the Subject field of the X.509 certificate). It MAY include one or more
alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the subject
of the X.509 certificate (i.e., from the Subject Alternative Name extension
within the X.509 certificate). The X.509 Certificate Subject SHALL be set by
the server based on the information it extracts from the X.509 certificate that
is created (as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation) or registered
(as part of a Register operation) and SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before
the object is destroyed.
If the Subject Alternative Name extension is included in
the X.509 certificate and is marked critical within the X.509 certificate
itself, then an X.509 certificate MAY be issued with the subject field left
blank. Therefore an empty string is an acceptable value for the Subject
Distinguished Name.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
X.509 Certificate Subject
|
Structure
|
|
|
Subject Distinguished Name
|
Byte String
|
Yes, but MAY be the empty string
|
|
Subject Alternative Name
|
Byte String
|
Yes, if the Subject Distinguished Name
is an empty string. MAY be repeated
|
Table 74: X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute
Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
X.509 Certificates
|
Table 75: X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute Rules
The X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute is a
structure (see Table 80) used to identify the issuer of a X.509 certificate,
containing the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the
X.509 certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email
address, IP address, DNS name) for the issuer of the certificate (i.e., from
the Issuer Alternative Name extension within the X.509 certificate). The server
SHALL set these values based on the information it extracts from a X.509
certificate that is created as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation
or is sent as part of a Register operation. These values SHALL NOT be changed
or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
X.509 Certificate Issuer
|
Structure
|
|
|
Issuer Distinguished Name
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
|
Issuer Alternative Name
|
Byte String
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Table 76: X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
X.509 Certificates
|
Table 77: X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules
This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this
specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this
specification. The X.509 Certificate Identifier attribute (see Section 3.10)
SHOULD be used instead.
The Certificate Identifier attribute is a structure
(see Table 78) used to provide the identification of a
certificate. For X.509 certificates, it contains the Issuer Distinguished Name
(i.e., from the Issuer field of the certificate) and the Certificate Serial
Number (i.e., from the Serial Number field of the certificate). For PGP
certificates, the Issuer contains the OpenPGP Key ID of the key issuing the
signature (the signature that represents the certificate). The Certificate
Identifier SHALL be set by the server when the certificate is created or
registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is
destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Certificate Identifier
|
Structure
|
|
|
Issuer
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Serial Number
|
Text String
|
Yes (for X.509 certificates) / No (for
PGP certificates since they do not contain a serial number)
|
Table 78: Certificate Identifier Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 79: Certificate
Identifier Attribute Rules
This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this
specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this
specification. The X.509 Certificate Subject attribute (see Section 3.11)
SHOULD be used instead.
The Certificate Subject attribute is a structure
(see Table 80) used to identify the subject of a certificate. For X.509
certificates, it contains the Subject Distinguished Name (i.e., from the
Subject field of the certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names
(e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the subject of the certificate
(i.e., from the Subject Alternative Name extension within the certificate). For
PGP certificates, the Certificate Subject Distinguished Name contains the
content of the first User ID packet in the PGP certificate (that is, the first
User ID packet after the Public-Key packet in the transferable public key that
forms the PGP certificate). These values SHALL be set by the server based on
the information it extracts from the certificate that is created (as a result
of a Certify or a Re-certify operation) or registered (as part of a Register
operation) and SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
If the Subject Alternative Name extension is included in
the certificate and is marked CRITICAL (i.e., within the certificate
itself), then it is possible to issue an X.509 certificate where the subject
field is left blank. Therefore an empty string is an acceptable value for the
Certificate Subject Distinguished Name.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Certificate Subject
|
Structure
|
|
|
Certificate Subject Distinguished Name
|
Text String
|
Yes, but MAY be the empty string
|
|
Certificate Subject Alternative Name
|
Text String
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Table
80: Certificate Subject Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 81: Certificate Subject
Attribute Rules
This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this
specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this
specification. The X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute (see Section 3.12) SHOULD
be used instead.
The Certificate Issuer attribute is a structure
(see Table 83) used to identify the issuer of a certificate, containing the
Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the certificate). It
MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS
name) for the issuer of the certificate (i.e., from the Issuer Alternative Name
extension within the certificate). The server SHALL set these values based on
the information it extracts from a certificate that is created as a result of a
Certify or a Re-certify operation or is sent as part of a Register operation.
These values SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Certificate Issuer
|
Structure
|
|
|
Certificate Issuer Distinguished Name
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Certificate Issuer Alternative Name
|
Text String
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Table 82: Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 83: Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules
The Digital Signature Algorithm attribute
identifies the digital signature algorithm associated with a digitally signed
object (e.g., Certificate). This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the
object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before
the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Digital Signature Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.7
|
Table 84: Digital
Signature Algorithm Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes for PGP keys. No for X.509 certificates.
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Certify, Re-certify, Register
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates, PGP keys
|
Table 85: Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute Rules
The Digest attribute is a structure (see Table 86) that contains the digest value of the key or secret data (i.e., digest of
the Key Material), certificate (i.e., digest of the Certificate Value), or
opaque object (i.e., digest of the Opaque Data Value). If the Key Material is a
Byte String, then the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on this Byte String. If
the Key Material is a structure, then the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on
the TTLV-encoded (see Section 9.1) Key Material structure. The Key Format Type
field in the Digest attribute indicates the format of the Managed Object from
which the Digest Value was calculated. Multiple digests MAY be calculated using
different algorithms listed in Section 9.1.3.2.16 and/or key format types
listed in Section 9.1.3.2.3. If this attribute exists, then it SHALL have a
mandatory attribute instance computed with the SHA-256 hashing algorithm. For
objects registered by a client, the server SHALL compute the digest of the
mandatory attribute instance using the Key Format Type of the registered object.
In all other cases, the server MAY use any Key Format Type when computing the
digest of the mandatory attribute instance, provided it is able to serve the
object to clients in that same format. The digest(s) are static and SHALL be
set by the server when the object is created or registered, provided that the
server has access to the Key Material or the Digest Value (possibly obtained
via out-of-band mechanisms).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Digest
|
Structure
|
|
|
Hashing Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.16
|
Yes
|
|
Digest Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes, if the server has access to the Digest Value or
the Key Material (for keys and secret data), the Certificate Value (for
certificates) or the Opaque Data Value (for opaque objects).
|
|
Key Format Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.3
|
Yes, if the Managed Object is a key or secret data
object.
|
Table 86: Digest Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes, if the server has access to the Digest Value or the Key Material
(for keys and secret data), the Certificate Value (for certificates) or the
Opaque Data Value (for opaque objects).
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Objects
|
Table 87: Digest Attribute
Rules
The Operation Policy Name Attribute is deprecated
as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent
versions of the specification.
An operation policy controls what entities MAY perform
which key management operations on the object. The content of the Operation
Policy Name attribute is the name of a policy object known to the key
management system and, therefore, is server dependent. The named policy objects
are created and managed using mechanisms outside the scope of the protocol. The
policies determine what entities MAY perform specified operations on the
object, and which of the object’s attributes MAY be modified or deleted. The
Operation Policy Name attribute SHOULD be set when operations that result in a
new Managed Object on the server are executed. It is set either explicitly or
via some default set by the server, which then applies the named policy to all
subsequent operations on the object.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Operation Policy Name
|
Text String
|
Table 88: Operation Policy Name Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 89: Operation Policy Name
Attribute Rules
Some of the operations SHOULD be allowed for any client at
any time, without respect to operation policy. These operations are:
·
Create
·
Create Key Pair
·
Register
·
Certify
·
Re-certify
·
Validate
·
Query
·
Cancel
·
Poll
3.18.2 Default Operation Policy
A key management system
implementation MAY implement a named operation policy, which is used for
objects when the Operation Policy attribute is not specified by the
Client in operations that result in a new Managed Object on the server, or in a
template specified in these operations. This policy is named default. It
specifies the following rules for operations on objects created or registered
with this policy, depending on the object type.
This policy applies to Symmetric
Keys, Private Keys, Split Keys, Secret Data, and Opaque Objects.
The Default Operation Policy for Template Objects is deprecated
as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent
versions of the specification.
|
Default
Operation Policy for Secret Objects
|
|
Operation
|
Policy
|
|
Re-key
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Re-key Key Pair
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Derive Key
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Locate
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Check
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get Attributes
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get Attribute List
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Add Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Modify Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Delete Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Obtain Lease
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get Usage Allocation
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Activate
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Revoke
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Destroy
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Archive
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Recover
|
Allowed to owner only
|
Table 90: Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects
3.18.2.2 Default Operation
Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects
This policy applies to
Certificates and Public Keys.
The Default Operation Policy for Template Objects is
deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from
subsequent versions of the specification.
|
Default
Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects
|
|
Operation
|
Policy
|
|
Locate
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Check
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get Attributes
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get Attribute List
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Add Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Modify Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Delete Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Obtain Lease
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Activate
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Revoke
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Destroy
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Archive
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Recover
|
Allowed to owner only
|
Table 91: Default Operation
Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects
The Default Operation Policy for Template Objects is
deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from
subsequent versions of the specification.
The operation policy specified as
an attribute in the Register operation for a template object is the
operation policy used for objects created using that template, and is not the
policy used to control operations on the template itself. There is no mechanism
to specify a policy used to control operations on template objects, so the
default policy for template objects is always used for templates created by
clients using the Register operation to create template objects.
|
Default
Operation Policy for Private Template Objects
|
|
Operation
|
Policy
|
|
Locate
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get Attributes
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get Attribute List
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Add Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Modify Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Delete Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Destroy
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Any operation referencing the Template using a Template-Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
Table 92: Default Operation Policy for Private
Template Objects
In addition to private template
objects (which are controlled by the above policy, and which MAY be created by
clients or the server), publicly known and usable templates MAY be created and
managed by the server, with a default policy different from private template
objects.
|
Default
Operation Policy for Public Template Objects
|
|
Operation
|
Policy
|
|
Locate
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get Attributes
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get Attribute List
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Add Attribute
|
Disallowed to all
|
|
Modify Attribute
|
Disallowed to all
|
|
Delete Attribute
|
Disallowed to all
|
|
Destroy
|
Disallowed to all
|
|
Any operation referencing the Template using a Template-Attribute
|
Allowed to all
|
Table 93: Default Operation
Policy for Public Template Objects
The Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute defines the
cryptographic usage of a key. This is a bit mask that indicates to the client
which cryptographic functions MAY be performed using the key, and which ones
SHALL NOT be performed.
·
Sign
·
Verify
·
Encrypt
·
Decrypt
·
Wrap Key
·
Unwrap Key
·
Export
·
MAC Generate
·
MAC Verify
·
Derive Key
·
Content Commitment
·
Key Agreement
·
Certificate Sign
·
CRL Sign
·
Generate Cryptogram
·
Validate Cryptogram
·
Translate Encrypt
·
Translate Decrypt
·
Translate Wrap
·
Translate Unwrap
This list takes into consideration
values that MAY appear in the Key Usage extension in an X.509 certificate.
However, the list does not consider the additional usages that MAY appear in
the Extended Key Usage extension.
X.509 Key Usage values SHALL be mapped to Cryptographic Usage
Mask values in the following manner:
|
X.509
Key Usage to Cryptographic Usage Mask Mapping
|
|
X.509 Key Usage Value
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask Value
|
|
digitalSignature
|
Sign or Verify
|
|
contentCommitment
|
Content Commitment
(Non Repudiation)
|
|
keyEncipherment
|
Wrap Key or Unwrap Key
|
|
dataEncipherment
|
Encrypt or Decrypt
|
|
keyAgreement
|
Key Agreement
|
|
keyCertSign
|
Certificate Sign
|
|
cRLSign
|
CRL Sign
|
|
encipherOnly
|
Encrypt
|
|
decipherOnly
|
Decrypt
|
Table 94: X.509 Key Usage to Cryptographic Usage Mask
Mapping
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask
|
Integer
|
Table 95: Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Templates
|
Table 96: Cryptographic Usage
Mask Attribute Rules
The Lease Time attribute defines a time interval
for a Managed Cryptographic Object beyond which the client SHALL NOT use the
object without obtaining another lease. This attribute always holds the initial
length of time allowed for a lease, and not the actual remaining time. Once its
lease expires, the client is only able to renew the lease by calling Obtain
Lease. A server SHALL store in this attribute the maximum Lease Time it is able
to serve and a client obtains the lease time (with Obtain Lease) that is less
than or equal to the maximum Lease Time. This attribute is read-only for
clients. It SHALL be modified by the server only.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Lease Time
|
Interval
|
Table
97: Lease Time Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects
|
Table 98: Lease Time Attribute
Rules
The Usage Limits attribute is a mechanism for
limiting the usage of a Managed Cryptographic Object. It only applies to
Managed Cryptographic Objects that are able to be used for applying
cryptographic protection and it SHALL only reflect their usage for applying
that protection (e.g., encryption, signing, etc.). This attribute does not
necessarily exist for all Managed Cryptographic Objects, since some objects are
able to be used without limit for cryptographically protecting data, depending
on client/server policies. Usage for processing cryptographically protected
data (e.g., decryption, verification, etc.) is not limited. The Usage Limits
attribute has the three following fields:
·
Usage Limits Total – the total number of Usage Limits
Units allowed to be protected. This is the total value for the entire life of
the object and SHALL NOT be changed once the object begins to be used for
applying cryptographic protection.
·
Usage Limits Count – the currently remaining number of
Usage Limits Units allowed to be protected by the object.
·
Usage Limits Unit – The type of quantity for which this
structure specifies a usage limit (e.g., byte, object).
When the attribute is initially set (usually during object
creation or registration), the Usage Limits Count is set to the Usage Limits Total
value allowed for the useful life of the object, and are decremented when the
object is used. The server SHALL ignore the Usage Limits Count value if the
attribute is specified in an operation that creates a new object. Changes made
via the Modify Attribute operation reflect corrections to the Usage Limits
Total value, but they SHALL NOT be changed once the Usage Limits Count value
has changed by a Get Usage Allocation operation. The Usage Limits Count value
SHALL NOT be set or modified by the client via the Add Attribute or Modify
Attribute operations.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Usage Limits
|
Structure
|
|
|
Usage Limits Total
|
Long Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Usage Limits Count
|
Long Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Usage Limits Unit
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.31
|
Yes
|
Table 99: Usage Limits Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server (Total, Count, and Unit) or Client (Total and/or Unit only)
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes (Total and/or Unit only, as long as Get Usage Allocation has not
been performed)
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes, as long as Get Usage Allocation has not been performed
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair,
Get Usage Allocation
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Keys, Templates
|
Table
100: Usage Limits Attribute Rules
3.22 State
This attribute is
an indication of the State of an object as known to the key management
server. The State SHALL NOT be changed by using the Modify Attribute operation
on this attribute. The State SHALL only be changed by the server as a part of
other operations or other server processes. An object SHALL be in one of the
following states at any given time. (Note: These states correspond to those
described in [SP800-57-1]).
·
Pre-Active: The object exists and SHALL NOT be used for
any cryptographic purpose.
·
Active: The object SHALL be transitioned to
the Active state prior to being used for any cryptographic purpose. The
object SHALL only be used for all cryptographic purposes that are allowed by
its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. If a Process Start Date (see 3.25) attribute is set, then the object SHALL NOT be used for cryptographic purposes
prior to the Process Start Date. If a Protect Stop Date (see 3.26) attribute is set, then the object SHALL NOT be used for cryptographic purposes after the
Process Stop Date.
·
Deactivated: The object SHALL NOT be used for applying
cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption, signing, wrapping, MACing,
deriving) . The object SHALL only be used for cryptographic purposes permitted
by the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. The object SHOULD only be used to
process cryptographically-protected information (e.g., decryption, signature
verification, unwrapping, MAC verification under extraordinary circumstances
and when special permission is granted.
·
Compromised: The object SHALL NOT be used for applying
cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption, signing, wrapping, MACing,
deriving). The object SHOULD only be used to process
cryptographically-protected information (e.g., decryption, signature
verification, unwrapping, MAC verification in a client that is trusted to use
managed objects that have been compromised. The object SHALL only be used for
cryptographic purposes permitted by the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute.
·
Destroyed: The object SHALL NOT be used for any
cryptographic purpose.
·
Destroyed Compromised: The object SHALL NOT be used for
any cryptographic purpose; however its compromised status SHOULD be retained
for audit or security purposes.
State transitions occur as follows:
1. The
transition from a non-existent key to the Pre-Active state is caused by the
creation of the object. When an object is created or registered, it
automatically goes from non-existent to Pre-Active. If, however, the operation
that creates or registers the object contains an Activation Date that has
already occurred, then the state immediately transitions from Pre-Active to
Active. In this case, the server SHALL set the Activation Date attribute to the
value specified in the request, or fail the request attempting to create or
register the object, depending on server policy. If the operation contains an
Activation Date attribute that is in the future, or contains no Activation
Date, then the Cryptographic Object is initialized in the key management system
in the Pre-Active state.
2. The
transition from Pre-Active to Destroyed is caused by a client issuing a Destroy
operation. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.
3. The
transition from Pre-Active to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a
Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
4. The
transition from Pre-Active to Active SHALL occur in one of three ways:
·
The Activation Date is reached,
·
A client successfully issues a Modify Attribute operation,
modifying the Activation Date to a date in the past, or the current date, or
·
A client issues an Activate operation on the object. The server
SHALL set the Activation Date to the time the Activate operation is received.
5. The
transition from Active to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke
operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
6. The
transition from Active to Deactivated SHALL occur in one of three ways:
·
The object's Deactivation Date is reached,
·
A client issues a Revoke operation, with a Revocation Reason
other than Compromised, or
·
The client successfully issues a Modify Attribute operation,
modifying the Deactivation Date to a date in the past, or the current date.
7. The
transition from Deactivated to Destroyed is caused by a client issuing a
Destroy operation, or by a server, both in accordance with server policy. The
server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.
8. The
transition from Deactivated to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a
Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
9. The
transition from Compromised to Destroyed Compromised is caused by a client
issuing a Destroy operation, or by a server, both in accordance with server
policy. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.
10. The transition from
Destroyed to Destroyed Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke
operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
Only the transitions described
above are permitted.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
State
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.18
|
Table 101: State Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No, but only by the server in response to certain requests (see
above)
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate, Revoke,
Destroy, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects
|
Table 102: State Attribute
Rules
The Initial Date attribute contains the date and
time when the Managed Object was first created or registered at the server.
This time corresponds to state transition 1 (see Section 3.22). This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, and then
SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed. This attribute
is also set for non-cryptographic objects (e.g., templates) when they are first
registered with the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Initial Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 103: Initial Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 104: Initial Date
Attribute Rules
The Activation Date attribute contains the date and
time when the Managed Cryptographic Object MAY begin to be used. This time
corresponds to state transition 4 (see Section 3.22). The object SHALL NOT be
used for any cryptographic purpose before the Activation Date has been
reached. Once the state transition from Pre-Active has occurred, then this
attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Activation Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 105: Activation Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active state
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active state
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate Certify,
Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Templates
|
Table 106: Activation Date
Attribute Rules
The Process Start Date attribute is the date and
time when a Managed Symmetric Key Object MAY begin to be used to process
cryptographically protected information (e.g., decryption or unwrapping),
depending on the value of its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. The object
SHALL NOT be used for these cryptographic purposes before the Process Start
Date has been reached. This value MAY be equal to or later than, but SHALL
NOT precede, the Activation Date. Once the Process Start Date has occurred,
then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is
destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Process Start Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 107: Process Start Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the
Process Start Date has been not reached.
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the
Process Start Date has been not reached.
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Register, Derive Key, Re-key
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Symmetric Keys, Split Keys of symmetric keys,
Templates
|
Table 108: Process Start Date
Attribute Rules
The Protect Stop Date attribute is the date and
time after which a Managed Symmetric Key Object SHALL NOT be used for applying
cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption or wrapping), depending on the value
of its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. This value MAY be equal to or
earlier than, but SHALL NOT be later than the Deactivation Date. Once the Protect
Stop Date has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted
before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Protect Stop Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 109: Protect Stop Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the
Protect Stop Date has not been reached.
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the
Protect Stop Date has not been reached.
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Register, Derive Key, Re-key
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Symmetric Keys, Split Keys of symmetric keys,
Templates
|
Table 110: Protect Stop Date
Attribute Rules
The Deactivation Date attribute is the date and
time when the Managed Cryptographic Object SHALL NOT be used for any purpose,
except for decryption, signature verification, or unwrapping, but only under
extraordinary circumstances and only when special permission is granted. This
time corresponds to state transition 6 (see Section 3.22). This attribute SHALL
NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed, unless the object is
in the Pre-Active or Active state.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Deactivation Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 111: Deactivation Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Revoke Certify,
Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Templates
|
Table 112: Deactivation Date
Attribute Rules
The Destroy Date attribute is the date and time
when the Managed Object was destroyed. This time corresponds to state
transitions 2, 7, or 9 (see Section 3.22). This value is set by the server when
the object is destroyed due to the reception of a Destroy operation, or due to
server policy or out-of-band administrative action.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Destroy Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 113: Destroy Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Destroy
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Objects
|
Table
114: Destroy Date Attribute Rules
The Compromise Occurrence Date attribute is the
date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object was first believed to be
compromised. If it is not possible to estimate when the compromise occurred,
then this value SHOULD be set to the Initial Date for the object.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Compromise Occurrence Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 115: Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Revoke
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object
|
Table 116: Compromise
Occurrence Date Attribute Rules
The Compromise Date attribute contains the date and
time when the Managed Cryptographic Object entered into the compromised state.
This time corresponds to state transitions 3, 5, 8, or 10 (see Section 3.22). This time indicates when the key management system was made aware of the
compromise, not necessarily when the compromise occurred. This attribute is set
by the server when it receives a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason
of Compromised code, or due to server policy or out-of-band administrative
action.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Compromise Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 117: Compromise Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Revoke
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object
|
Table 118: Compromise Date
Attribute Rules
The Revocation Reason attribute is a structure (see
Table 119) used to indicate why the Managed Cryptographic Object was revoked
(e.g., “compromised”, “expired”, “no longer used”, etc.). This attribute is
only set by the server as a part of the Revoke Operation.
The Revocation Message is an OPTIONAL field that is
used exclusively for audit trail/logging purposes and MAY contain additional
information about why the object was revoked (e.g., “Laptop stolen”, or
“Machine decommissioned”).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Revocation Reason
|
Structure
|
|
|
Revocation Reason Code
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.19
|
Yes
|
|
Revocation Message
|
Text String
|
No
|
Table 119: Revocation Reason Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Revoke
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object
|
Table 120: Revocation Reason
Attribute Rules
The Archive Date attribute is the date and time
when the Managed Object was placed in archival storage. This value is set by
the server as a part of the Archive operation. The server SHALL delete this
attribute whenever a Recover operation is performed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Archive Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 121: Archive Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Archive
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table
122: Archive Date Attribute Rules
An object MAY be part of a group of objects. An object MAY
belong to more than one group of objects. To assign an object to a group of
objects, the object group name SHOULD be set into this attribute. “default” is
a reserved Text String for Object Group.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Object Group
|
Text String
|
Table 123: Object Group Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 124: Object Group
Attribute Rules
The Fresh attribute is a Boolean attribute that
indicates that the object has not yet been served to a client. The Fresh
attribute SHALL be set to True when a new object is created on the server. The
server SHALL change the attribute value to False as soon as the object has been
served to a client.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Fresh
|
Boolean
|
Table 125: Fresh Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-key Key
Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects
|
Table 126: Fresh Attribute Rules
The Link attribute is a structure (see Table 127) used to create a link from one Managed Cryptographic Object to another,
closely related target Managed Cryptographic Object. The link has a type, and
the allowed types differ, depending on the Object Type of the Managed
Cryptographic Object, as listed below. The Linked Object Identifier
identifies the target Managed Cryptographic Object by its Unique Identifier.
The link contains information about the association between the Managed
Cryptographic Objects (e.g., the private key corresponding to a public key; the
parent certificate for a certificate in a chain; or for a derived symmetric
key, the base key from which it was derived).
Possible values of Link Type in accordance with the
Object Type of the Managed Cryptographic Object are:
·
Private Key Link: For a Public Key object: the private
key corresponding to the public key.
·
Public Key Link: For a Private Key object: the public key
corresponding to the private key. For a Certificate object: the public key
contained in the certificate.
·
Certificate Link: For Certificate objects: the parent
certificate for a certificate in a certificate chain. For Public Key objects: the
corresponding certificate(s), containing the same public key.
·
Derivation Base Object Link: For a derived Symmetric Key
or Secret Data object: the object(s) from which the current symmetric key was
derived.
·
Derived Key Link: the symmetric key(s) or Secret Data
object(s) that were derived from the current object.
·
Replacement Object Link: For a Symmetric Key, an
Asymmetric Private Key, or an Asymmetric Public Key object: the key that
resulted from the re-key of the current key. For a Certificate object: the
certificate that resulted from the re-certify. Note that there SHALL be only
one such replacement object per Managed Object.
·
Replaced Object Link: For a Symmetric Key, an
Asymmetric Private Key, or an Asymmetric Public Key object: the key that was
re-keyed to obtain the current key. For a Certificate object: the certificate
that was re-certified to obtain the current certificate.
·
Parent Link: For all object types: the owner, container or
other parent object corresponding to the object.
·
Child Link: For all object types: the subordinate, derived
or other child object corresponding to the object.
·
Previous Link: For all object types: the previous object
to this object.
·
Next Link: For all object types: the next object to this
object.
The Link attribute SHOULD be present for private keys and
public keys for which a certificate chain is stored by the server, and for
certificates in a certificate chain.
Note that it is possible for a Managed Object to have
multiple instances of the Link attribute (e.g., a Private Key has links to the
associated certificate, as well as the associated public key; a Certificate
object has links to both the public key and to the certificate of the
certification authority (CA) that signed the certificate).
It is also possible that a Managed Object does not have
links to associated cryptographic objects. This MAY occur in cases where the
associated key material is not available to the server or client (e.g., the
registration of a CA Signer certificate with a server, where the corresponding
private key is held in a different manner).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Link
|
Structure
|
|
|
Link Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.20
|
Yes
|
|
Linked Object Identifier, see 3.1
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
Table 127: Link Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects
|
Table
128: Link Attribute Structure Rules
The Application Specific Information attribute is a
structure (see Table 129) used to store data specific to the application(s)
using the Managed Object. It consists of the following fields: an Application
Namespace and Application Data specific to that application
namespace.
Clients MAY request to set (i.e., using any of the
operations that result in new Managed Object(s) on the server or
adding/modifying the attribute of an existing Managed Object) an instance of
this attribute with a particular Application Namespace while omitting Application
Data. In that case, if the server supports this namespace (as indicated by
the Query operation in Section 4.25), then it SHALL return a suitable Application
Data value. If the server does not support this namespace, then an error
SHALL be returned.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Application Specific Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Application Namespace
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Application Data
|
Text String
|
No
|
Table 129: Application Specific Information Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server (only if the Application Data is omitted, in the
client request)
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes (only if the Application Data is omitted in the client request)
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 130: Application Specific
Information Attribute Rules
The Contact Information attribute is OPTIONAL, and
its content is used for contact purposes only. It is not used for policy
enforcement. The attribute is set by the client or the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Contact Information
|
Text String
|
Table 131: Contact Information Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 132: Contact Information
Attribute Rules
The Last Change Date attribute contains the date
and time of the last change of the specified object.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Last Change Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 133: Last Change Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate, Revoke,
Destroy, Archive, Recover, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair,
Add Attribute, Modify Attribute, Delete Attribute, Get Usage Allocation
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 134: Last Change Date
Attribute Rules
A Custom Attribute is a client- or server-defined
attribute intended for vendor-specific purposes. It is created by the client
and not interpreted by the server, or is created by the server and MAY be
interpreted by the client. All custom attributes created by the client SHALL
adhere to a naming scheme, where the name of the attribute SHALL have a prefix
of 'x-'. All custom attributes created by the key management server SHALL
adhere to a naming scheme where the name of the attribute SHALL have a prefix
of 'y-'. The server SHALL NOT accept a client-created or modified attribute,
where the name of the attribute has a prefix of ‘y-‘. The tag type Custom
Attribute is not able to identify the particular attribute; hence such an
attribute SHALL only appear in an Attribute Structure with its name as defined
in Section 2.1.1.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
|
Custom Attribute
|
Any data type or structure. If a structure, then the structure SHALL
NOT include sub structures
|
The name of the attribute SHALL start with 'x-' or
'y-'.
|
Table 135 Custom Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, for server-created attributes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, for client-created attributes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes, for client-created attributes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate, Revoke,
Destroy, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table
136: Custom Attribute Rules
The Alternative Name attribute is used to
identify and locate the object. This attribute is assigned by the client, and
the Alternative Name Value is intended to be in a form that
humans are able to interpret. The key management system MAY specify rules by
which the client creates valid alternative names. Clients are informed of such
rules by a mechanism that is not specified by this standard. Alternative Names
MAY NOT be unique within a given key management domain.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Alternative Name
|
Structure
|
|
|
Alternative Name Value
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Alternative Name Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.34
|
Yes
|
Table 137: Alternative Name
Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes (Only if no value present)
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 138: Alternative Name
Attribute Rules
Key Value Present is an OPTIONAL attribute of the
managed object created by the server. It SHALL NOT be specified by the client
in a Register request. Key Value Present SHALL be created by the server
if the Key Value is absent from the Key Block in a Register request. The value
of Key Value Present SHALL NOT be modified by either the client or the server. Key
Value Present attribute MAY be used as a part of the Locate operation. This
attribute does not apply to Templates, Certificates, Public Keys or Opaque
Objects.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Value Present
|
Boolean
|
No
|
Table 139: Key Value Present
Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
During Register operation
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Symmetric Key, Private Key, Split Key, Secret Data
|
Table 140: Key Value Present
Attribute Rules
Key Value Location is an OPTIONAL attribute of a
managed object. It MAY be specified by the client when the Key Value is omitted
from the Key Block in a Register request. Key Value Location is used to
indicate the location of the Key Value absent from the object being registered.
This attribute does not apply to Templates, Certificates, Public Keys or Opaque
Objects.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Value Location
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Value Location
Value
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Key Value Location Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.35
|
Yes
|
Table 141: Key Value Location
Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Never
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Symmetric Key, Private Key, Split Key, Secret Data
|
Table 142: Key Value Location
Attribute Rules
The Original Creation Date attribute contains the
date and time the object was originally created, which can be different from
when the object is registered with a key management server.
It is OPTIONAL for an object being registered by a client.
The Original Creation Date MAY be set by the client during a Register
operation. If no Original Creation Date attribute was set by the client
during a Register operation, it MAY do so at a later time through an Add
Attribute operation for that object.
It is mandatory for an object created on the server as a
result of a Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, or Re-key Key Pair
operation. In such cases the Original Creation Date SHALL be set by the
server and SHALL be the same as the Initial Date attribute.
In all cases, once the Original Creation Date is
set, it SHALL NOT be deleted or updated.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Original Creation Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 143: Original Creation Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server (when object is generated by Server)
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 144: Original Creation
Date Attribute Rules
The Random Number Generator attribute contains the details
of the random number generator used during the creation of the managed cryptographic
object.
It is OPTIONAL for a managed cryptographic object being
registered by a client. The Random Number Generator MAY be set by the
client during a Register operation. If no Random Number Generator
attribute was set by the client during a Register operation, it MAY do so at a
later time through an Add Attribute operation for that object.
It is mandatory for an object created on the server as a
result of a Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, or Re-key Key Pair
operation. In such cases the Random Number Generator SHALL be set by the
server depending on which random number generator was used. If the specific
details of the random number generator are unknown then the RNG Algorithm
within the RNG Parameters structure SHALL be set to Unspecified.
If one or more Random Number Generator attribute values
are provided in the template attributes (either directly or via reference to
templates which contain Random Number Generator attribute values) in a Create,
Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, or Re-key Key Pair operation then the
server SHALL use a random number generator that matches one of the Random
Number Generator attributes. If the server does not support or is otherwise
unable to use a matching random number generator then it SHALL fail the
request.
The Random Number Generator attribute SHALL NOT be
copied from the original object in a Re-key or Re-key Key Pair operation.
In all cases, once the Random Number Generator attribute
is set, it SHALL NOT be deleted or updated.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Random Number Generator
|
RNG Parameters (see 2.1.18)
|
Table 145: Random Number Generator Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client (when the object is generated by the Client and registered) or
Server (when object is generated by Server)
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects
|
Table 146: Random Number
Generator Attribute Rules
The following subsections describe the operations that MAY
be requested by a key management client. Not all clients have to be capable of
issuing all operation requests; however any client that issues a specific
request SHALL be capable of understanding the response to the request. All
Object Management operations are issued in requests from clients to servers,
and results obtained in responses from servers to clients. Multiple operations
MAY be combined within a batch, resulting in a single request/response message
pair.
A number of the operations whose descriptions follow are
affected by a mechanism referred to as the ID Placeholder.
The key management server SHALL implement a temporary
variable called the ID Placeholder. This value consists of a single Unique
Identifier. It is a variable stored inside the server that is only valid and
preserved during the execution of a batch of operations. Once the batch of
operations has been completed, the ID Placeholder value SHALL be discarded
and/or invalidated by the server, so that subsequent requests do not find this
previous ID Placeholder available.
The ID Placeholder is obtained from the Unique Identifier
returned in response to the Create, Create Pair, Register, Derive Key, Re-key,
Re-key Key Pair, Certify, Re-Certify, Locate, and Recover operations. If any of
these operations successfully completes and returns a Unique Identifier, then
the server SHALL copy this Unique Identifier into the ID Placeholder variable,
where it is held until the completion of the operations remaining in the
batched request or until a subsequent operation in the batch causes the ID
Placeholder to be replaced. If the Batch Error Continuation Option is set to
Stop and the Batch Order Option is set to true, then subsequent operations in
the batched request MAY make use of the ID Placeholder by omitting the Unique
Identifier field from the request payloads for these operations.
Requests MAY contain attribute values to be assigned to
the object. This information is specified with a Template-Attribute (see
Section 2.1.8) that contains zero or more template names and zero or more
individual attributes. If more than one template name is specified, and there
is a conflict between the single-instance attributes in the templates, then the
value in the last of the conflicting templates takes precedence. If there is a
conflict between the single-instance attributes in the request and the
single-instance attributes in a specified template, then the attribute values
in the request take precedence. For multi-instance attributes, the union of
attribute values is used when the attributes are specified more than once.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of
version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions
of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which
currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to
reference a Template.
Responses MAY contain attribute values that were not
specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the server. This
information is specified with a Template-Attribute that contains one or more
individual attributes.
For any operations that operate on Managed Objects already
stored on the server, any archived object SHALL first be made available by a
Recover operation (see Section 4.23) before they MAY be specified (i.e., as
on-line objects).
Multi-part cryptographic operations (operations where a
stream of data is provided across multiple requests from a client to a server)
are optionally supported by those cryptographic operations that include the
Correlation Value (see section 2.1.15), Init Indicator (see section 2.1.16) and Final Indicator (see section 2.1.17) request parameters.
For multi-part cryptographic operations the following
sequence is performed
- On the first request
a. Provide an
Init Indicator with a value of True
b. Provide any
other required parameters
c. Preserve
the Correlation Value returned in the response for use in subsequent requests
d. Use the Data
output (if any) from the response
- On subsequent requests
a. Provide
the Correlation Value from the response to the first request
b. Provide any
other required parameters
c. Use the
next block of Data output (if any) from the response
- On the final request
a. Provide
the Correlation Value from the response to the first request
b. Provide a Final
Indicator with a value of True
c. Use the
final block of Data output (if any) from the response
Single-part cryptographic operations (operations where a
single input is provided and a single response returned) the following sequence
is performed:
- On each request
a. Do not
provide an Init Indicator, Final Indicator or Correlation Value or provide an
Init indicator and Final Indicator but no Correlation Value.
b. Provide any
other required parameters
c. Use the
Data output from the response
Data is always required in cryptographic operations except
when either Init Indicator or Final Indicator is true.
4.1 Create
This operation requests the server to generate a new
symmetric key as a Managed Cryptographic Object. This operation is not used to
create a Template object (see Register operation, Section 4.3).
The request contains information about the type of object
being created, and some of the attributes to be assigned to the object (e.g.,
Cryptographic Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, etc.). This information MAY be
specified by the names of Template objects that already exist.
The response contains the Unique Identifier of the created
object. The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier returned by this operation
into the ID Placeholder variable.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
Yes
|
Determines the type of object to be created.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14
|
Yes
|
Specifies desired attributes using to be associated
with the new object templates and/or individual attributes.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as
of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent
versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in
operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute
to reference a Template.
|
Table 147: Create Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
Yes
|
Type of object created.
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the newly created object.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of object attributes with values
that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the
key management server.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as
of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent
versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in
operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute
to reference a Template.
|
Table 148: Create Response Payload
Table 149 indicates which
attributes SHALL be included in the Create request using the Template-Attribute
object.
|
Attribute
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm, see 3.4
|
Yes
|
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask, see 3.19
|
Yes
|
Table
149: Create Attribute Requirements
This operation requests the server to generate a new
public/private key pair and register the two corresponding new Managed
Cryptographic Objects.
The request contains attributes to be assigned to the
objects (e.g., Cryptographic Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, etc.). Attributes
and Template Names MAY be specified for both keys at the same time by
specifying a Common Template-Attribute object in the request. Attributes not
common to both keys (e.g., Name, Cryptographic Usage Mask) MAY be specified
using the Private Key Template-Attribute and Public Key Template-Attribute
objects in the request, which take precedence over the Common
Template-Attribute object.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of
version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions
of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently
support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference a Template.
For the Private Key, the server SHALL create a Link
attribute of Link Type Public Key pointing to the Public Key. For the Public
Key, the server SHALL create a Link attribute of Link Type Private Key pointing
to the Private Key. The response contains the Unique Identifiers of both
created objects. The ID Placeholder value SHALL be set to the Unique Identifier
of the Private Key.
|
Request
Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Common Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14
|
No
|
Specifies desired attributes in templates and/or as individual
attributes to be associated with the new object that apply to both the
Private and Public Key Objects.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of
this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the
specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which
currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to
reference a Template.
|
|
Private Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14
|
No
|
Specifies templates and/or attributes to be associated with the new
object that apply to the Private Key Object. Order of precedence applies.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of
this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the
specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which
currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to
reference a Template.
|
|
Public Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14
|
No
|
Specifies templates and/or attributes to be
associated with the new object that apply to the Public Key Object. Order of
precedence applies.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as
of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent
versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in
operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute
to reference a Template.
|
Table 150: Create Key Pair Request Payload
For multi-instance attributes,
the union of the values found in the templates and attributes of the Common,
Private, and Public Key Template-Attribute SHALL be used. For single-instance
attributes, the order of precedence is as follows:
1. attributes
specified explicitly in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
2. attributes
specified via templates in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
3. attributes
specified explicitly in the Common Template-Attribute, then
4. attributes
specified via templates in the Common Template-Attribute.
If there are multiple templates in the Common, Private, or
Public Key Template-Attribute, then the last value of the single-instance
attribute that conflicts takes precedence.
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Private Key Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the newly created Private Key object.
|
|
Public Key Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the newly created Public Key object.
|
|
Private Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of attributes, for the Private Key Object, with
values that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set
by the key management server.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of
this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the
specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which
currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference
a Template.
|
|
Public Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of attributes, for the Public Key
Object, with values that were not specified in the request, but have been
implicitly set by the key management server.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as
of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent
versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in
operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute
to reference a Template.
|
Table 151: Create Key Pair Response Payload
Table 152 indicates which
attributes SHALL be included in the Create Key pair request using
Template-Attribute objects, as well as which attributes SHALL have the same
value for the Private and Public Key.
|
Attribute
|
REQUIRED
|
SHALL contain the same value for both Private and Public Key
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm, see 3.4
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
Cryptographic Length, see 3.5
|
No
|
Yes
|
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask, see 3.19
|
