Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.3
OASIS Standard
27 December 2016
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http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.3/csprd01/kmip-spec-v1.3-csprd01.pdf
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http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.3/kmip-spec-v1.3.pdf
Technical Committee:
OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC
Chairs:
Tony Cox (tony.cox@cryptsoft.com), Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Saikat Saha (saikat.saha@oracle.com), Oracle
Editors:
Kiran Thota (kthota@vmware.com), VMware, Inc.
Tony Cox (tony.cox@cryptsoft.com), Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Related work:
This specification replaces or supersedes:
This specification is related to:
Abstract:
This document is intended for developers and architects who wish to design systems and applications that interoperate using the Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification.
Status:
This document was last revised or approved by the Members of OASIS on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the “Latest version” location noted above for possible later revisions of this document. Any other numbered Versions and other technical work produced by the Technical Committee (TC) are listed at https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=kmip#technical.
TC members should send comments on this specification to the TC’s email list. Others should send comments to the TC’s public comment list, after subscribing to it by following the instructions at the “Send A Comment” button on the TC’s web page at https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/.
For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the TC’s web page (https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/ipr.php).
Note that any machine-readable content (aka Computer Language Definitions) declared Normative for this Work Product is provided in separate plain text files. In the event of a discrepancy between any such plain text file and display content in the Work Product's prose narrative document(s), the content in the separate plain text file prevails.
Citation format:
When referencing this specification the following citation format should be used:
[kmip-spec-v1.3]
Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.3. Edited by Kiran Thota and Tony Cox. 27 December 2016. OASIS Standard. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.3/os/kmip-spec-v1.3-os.html. Latest version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.3/kmip-spec-v1.3.html.
Notices
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Table of Contents
2.1.6 Key Wrapping Specification
2.1.7 Transparent Key Structures
2.1.7.1 Transparent Symmetric Key
2.1.7.2 Transparent DSA Private Key
2.1.7.3 Transparent DSA Public Key
2.1.7.4 Transparent RSA Private Key
2.1.7.5 Transparent RSA Public Key
2.1.7.6 Transparent DH Private Key
2.1.7.7 Transparent DH Public Key
2.1.7.8 Transparent ECDSA Private Key
2.1.7.9 Transparent ECDSA Public Key
2.1.7.10 Transparent ECDH Private Key
2.1.7.11 Transparent ECDH Public Key
2.1.7.12 Transparent ECMQV Private Key
2.1.7.13 Transparent ECMQV Public Key
2.1.7.14 Transparent EC Private Key
2.1.7.15 Transparent EC Public Key
2.1.8 Template-Attribute Structures
3.7 Cryptographic Domain Parameters
3.10 X.509 Certificate Identifier
3.11 X.509 Certificate Subject
3.16 Digital Signature Algorithm
3.18.1 Operations outside of operation policy control
3.18.2 Default Operation Policy
3.18.2.1 Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects
3.18.2.2 Default Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects
3.18.2.3 Default Operation Policy for Template Objects
3.29 Compromise Occurrence Date
3.36 Application Specific Information
6.8 Asynchronous Correlation Value
6.13 Batch Error Continuation Option
6.17 Attestation Capable Indicator
9.1.3.2.1 Credential Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.2 Key Compression Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.3 Key Format Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.4 Wrapping Method Enumeration
9.1.3.2.5 Recommended Curve Enumeration
9.1.3.2.6 Certificate Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.7 Digital Signature Algorithm Enumeration
9.1.3.2.8 Split Key Method Enumeration
9.1.3.2.9 Secret Data Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.10 Opaque Data Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.11 Name Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.12 Object Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.13 Cryptographic Algorithm Enumeration
9.1.3.2.14 Block Cipher Mode Enumeration
9.1.3.2.15 Padding Method Enumeration
9.1.3.2.16 Hashing Algorithm Enumeration
9.1.3.2.17 Key Role Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.19 Revocation Reason Code Enumeration
9.1.3.2.20 Link Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.21 Derivation Method Enumeration
9.1.3.2.22 Certificate Request Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.23 Validity Indicator Enumeration
9.1.3.2.24 Query Function Enumeration
9.1.3.2.25 Cancellation Result Enumeration
9.1.3.2.26 Put Function Enumeration
9.1.3.2.27 Operation Enumeration
9.1.3.2.28 Result Status Enumeration
9.1.3.2.29 Result Reason Enumeration
9.1.3.2.30 Batch Error Continuation Option Enumeration
9.1.3.2.31 Usage Limits Unit Enumeration
9.1.3.2.32 Encoding Option Enumeration
9.1.3.2.33 Object Group Member Enumeration
9.1.3.2.34 Alternative Name Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.35 Key Value Location Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.36 Attestation Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.37 RNG Algorithm Enumeration
9.1.3.2.38 DRBG Algorithm Enumeration
9.1.3.2.39 FIPS186 Variation Enumeration
9.1.3.2.40 Validation Authority Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.41 Validation Type Enumeration
9.1.3.2.42 Profile Name Enumeration
9.1.3.2.43 Unwrap Mode Enumeration
9.1.3.2.44 Destroy Action Enumeration
9.1.3.2.45 Shredding Algorithm Enumeration
9.1.3.2.46 RNG Mode Enumeration
9.1.3.2.47 Client Registration Method Enumeration
9.1.3.3.1 Cryptographic Usage Mask
12 KMIP Server and Client Implementation Conformance.
12.1 KMIP Server Implementation Conformance
12.2 KMIP Client Implementation Conformance
Appendix B. Attribute Cross-Reference
Appendix C. Tag Cross-Reference
Appendix D. Operations and Object Cross-Reference
Appendix F. List of Figures and Tables
This document is intended as a specification of the protocol used for the communication between clients and servers to perform certain management operations on objects stored and maintained by a key management system. These objects are referred to as Managed Objects in this specification. They include symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic keys, digital certificates, and templates used to simplify the creation of objects and control their use. Managed Objects are managed with operations that include the ability to generate cryptographic keys, register objects with the key management system, obtain objects from the system, destroy objects from the system, and search for objects maintained by the system. Managed Objects also have associated attributes, which are named values stored by the key management system and are obtained from the system via operations. Certain attributes are added, modified, or deleted by operations.
The protocol specified in this document includes several certificate-related functions for which there are a number of existing protocols – namely Validate (e.g., SCVP or XKMS), Certify (e.g., CMP [RFC4210], CMC [RFC5272][RFC6402], SCEP) and Re-certify (e.g., CMP [RFC4210], CMC [RFC5272][RFC6402], SCEP). The protocol does not attempt to define a comprehensive certificate management protocol, such as would be needed for a certification authority. However, it does include functions that are needed to allow a key server to provide a proxy for certificate management functions.
In addition to the normative definitions for managed objects, operations and attributes, this specification also includes normative definitions for the following aspects of the protocol:
· The expected behavior of the server and client as a result of operations,
· Message contents and formats,
· Message encoding (including enumerations), and
· Error handling.
This specification is complemented by several other documents. The KMIP Usage Guide[KMIP-UG] provides illustrative information on using the protocol. The KMIP Profiles Specification [KMIP-Prof] provides a selected set of base level conformance profiles and authentication suites; additional KMIP Profiles define specific sets of KMIP functionality for conformance purposes. The KMIP Test Specification [KMIP-TC] provides samples of protocol messages corresponding to a set of defined test cases. The KMIP Use Cases document [KMIP-UC] provides user stories that define the use of and context for functionality defined in KMIP.
This specification defines the KMIP protocol version major 1 and minor 2 (see 6.1).
The key words “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .
For acronyms used in this document, see Appendix E. For definitions not found in this document, see [SP800-57-1].
Archive |
To place information not accessed frequently into long-term storage. |
Asymmetric key pair (key pair) |
A public key and its corresponding private key; a key pair is used with a public key algorithm. |
Authentication |
A process that establishes the origin of information, or determines an entity’s identity. |
Authentication code |
A cryptographic checksum based on a security function. |
Authorization |
Access privileges that are granted to an entity; conveying an “official” sanction to perform a security function or activity. |
Certificate length |
The length (in bytes) of an X.509 public key certificate. |
Certification authority |
The entity in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is responsible for issuing certificates, and exacting compliance to a PKI policy. |
Ciphertext |
Data in its encrypted form. |
Compromise |
The unauthorized disclosure, modification, substitution or use of sensitive data (e.g., keying material and other security-related information). |
Confidentiality |
The property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized entities. |
Cryptographic algorithm |
A well-defined computational procedure that takes variable inputs, including a cryptographic key and produces an output. |
Cryptographic key |
A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that determines its operation in such a way that an entity with knowledge of the key can reproduce or reverse the operation, while an entity without knowledge of the key cannot. Examples include: 1. The transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data, 2. The transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data, 3. The computation of a digital signature from data, 4. The verification of a digital signature, 5. The computation of an authentication code from data, and 6. The verification of an authentication code from data and a received authentication code. |
Decryption |
The process of changing ciphertext into plaintext using a cryptographic algorithm and key. |
Digest (or hash) |
The result of applying a hashing algorithm to information. |
Digital signature |
The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that, when properly implemented with supporting infrastructure and policy, provides the services of: 1. origin authentication 2. data integrity, and 3. signer non-repudiation. |
Digital Signature Algorithm |
A cryptographic algorithm used for digital signature. |
Encryption |
The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext using a cryptographic algorithm and key. |
Hashing algorithm (or hash algorithm, hash function) |
An algorithm that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a fixed length bit string. Approved hashing algorithms satisfy the following properties: 1. (One-way) It is computationally infeasible to find any input that maps to any pre-specified output, and 2. (Collision resistant) It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs that map to the same output. |
Integrity |
The property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorized and undetected manner. |
Key derivation |
A function in the lifecycle of keying material; the process by which one or more keys are derived from: 1) Either a shared secret from a key agreement computation or a pre-shared cryptographic key, and 2) Other information. |
Key management |
The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other related security parameters (e.g., IVs and passwords) during the entire life cycle of the keys, including their generation, storage, establishment, entry and output, and destruction. |
Key wrapping |
A method of encrypting and/or MACing/signing keys. |
Message Authentication Code (MAC) |
A cryptographic checksum on data that uses a symmetric key to detect both accidental and intentional modifications of data. |
PGP Key |
A RFC 4880-compliant container of cryptographic keys and associated metadata. Usually text-based (in PGP-parlance, ASCII-armored). |
Private key |
A cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and is not made public. The private key is associated with a public key. Depending on the algorithm, the private key MAY be used to: 1. Compute the corresponding public key, 2. Compute a digital signature that can be verified by the corresponding public key, 3. Decrypt data that was encrypted by the corresponding public key, or 4. Compute a piece of common shared data, together with other information. |
Profile |
A specification of objects, attributes, operations, message elements and authentication methods to be used in specific contexts of key management server and client interactions (see [KMIP-Prof]). |
Public key |
A cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and that MAY be made public. The public key is associated with a private key. The public key MAY be known by anyone and, depending on the algorithm, MAY be used to: 1. Verify a digital signature that is signed by the corresponding private key, 2. Encrypt data that can be decrypted by the corresponding private key, or 3. Compute a piece of shared data. |
Public key certificate |
A set of data that uniquely identifies an entity, contains the entity's public key and possibly other information, and is digitally signed by a trusted party, thereby binding the public key to the entity. |
Public key cryptographic algorithm |
A cryptographic algorithm that uses two related keys, a public key and a private key. The two keys have the property that determining the private key from the public key is computationally infeasible. |
Public Key Infrastructure |
A framework that is established to issue, maintain and revoke public key certificates. |
Recover |
To retrieve information that was archived to long-term storage. |
Split Key |
A process by which a cryptographic key is split into n multiple key components, individually providing no knowledge of the original key, which can be subsequently combined to recreate the original cryptographic key. If knowledge of k (where k is less than or equal to n) components is necessary to construct the original key, then knowledge of any k-1 key components provides no information about the original key other than, possibly, its length. |
Symmetric key |
A single cryptographic key that is used with a secret (symmetric) key algorithm. |
Symmetric key algorithm |
A cryptographic algorithm that uses the same secret (symmetric) key for an operation and its inverse (e.g., encryption and decryption). |
X.509 certificate |
The ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard defined two types of certificates – the X.509 public key certificate, and the X.509 attribute certificate. Most commonly (including this document), an X.509 certificate refers to the X.509 public key certificate. |
X.509 public key certificate |
The public key for a user (or device) and a name for the user (or device), together with some other information, rendered un-forgeable by the digital signature of the certification authority that issued the certificate, encoded in the format defined in the ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard. |
Table 1: Terminology
[ECC-Brainpool] ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation v. 1.0.19.10.2005, http://www.ecc-brainpool.org/download/Domain-parameters.pdf.
[FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 186-4, March 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips18-4/fips-180-4.pdf.
[FIPS186-4] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS PUB 186-4, July 2013, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf.
[FIPS197] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, November 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf.
[FIPS198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), FIPS PUB 198-1, July 2008, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf.
[IEEE1003-1] IEEE Std 1003.1, Standard for information technology - portable operating system interface (POSIX). Shell and utilities, 2004.
[ISO16609] ISO, Banking -- Requirements for message authentication using symmetric techniques, ISO 16609, 2012.
[ISO9797-1] ISO/IEC, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs) -- Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, ISO/IEC 9797-1, 2011.
[KMIP-Prof] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.3. Edited by Tim Hudson and Robert Lockhart. Latest version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/kmip-profiles-v1.3.html.
[PKCS#1] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, June 14, 2002, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125.
[PKCS#5] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #5 v2.1: Password-Based Cryptography Standard, October 5, 2006, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2127.
[PKCS#8] RSA Laboratories, PKCS#8 v1.2: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard, November 1, 1993, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2130.
[PKCS#10] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax Standard, May 26, 2000, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2132.
[RFC1319] B. Kaliski, The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1319, Apr 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt.
[RFC1320] R. Rivest, The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1320, April 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt.
[RFC1321] R. Rivest, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1321, April 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt.
[RFC1421] J. Linn, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures, IETF RFC 1421, February 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1421.txt.
[RFC1424] B. Kaliski, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key Certification and Related Services, IETF RFC 1424, Feb 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1424.txt.
[RFC2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, IETF RFC 2104, February 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, IETF RFC 2119, March 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt.
[RFC2898] B. Kaliski, PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0, IETF RFC 2898, September 2000, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt.
[RFC2986] M. Nystrom and B. Kaliski, PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7, IETF RFC2986, November 2000, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt.
[RFC3447] J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski, Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1, IETF RFC 3447, Feb 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt.
[RFC3629] F. Yergeau, UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646, IETF RFC 3629, November 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3629.txt.
[RFC3686] R. Housley, Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), IETF RFC 3686, January 2004, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3686.txt.
[RFC4210] C. Adams, S. Farrell, T. Kause and T. Mononen, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), IETF RFC 4210, September 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4210.txt.
[RFC4211] J. Schaad, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF), IETF RFC 4211, September 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4211.txt.
[RFC4880] J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, D. Shaw, and R. Thayer, OpenPGP Message Format, IETF RFC 4880, November 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt.
[RFC4949] R. Shirey, Internet Security Glossary, Version 2, IETF RFC 4949, August 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt.
[RFC5208] B. Kaliski, Public Key Cryptographic Standards (PKCS) #8: Private-Key Information Syntax Specification Version 1.2, IETF RFC5208, May 2008, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5208.txt.
[RFC5272] J. Schaad and M. Meyers, Certificate Management over CMS (CMC), IETF RFC 5272, June 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5272.txt.
[RFC5280] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate, IETF RFC 5280, May 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt.
[RFC5639] M. Lochter, J. Merkle, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, IETF RFC 5639, March 2010, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt.
[RFC6402] J. Schaad, Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Updates, IETF RFC6402, November 2011, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6402.txt.
[RFC6818] P. Yee, Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, IETF RFC6818, January 2013, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6818.txt.
[SEC2] SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters, http://www.secg.org/collateral/sec2_final.pdf.
[SP800-38A] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation – Methods and Techniques, NIST Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf.
[SP800-38B] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf.
[SP800-38C] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, NIST Special Publication 800-38C, May 2004, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf.
[SP800-38D] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, NIST Special Publication 800-38D, Nov 2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf.
[SP800-38E] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Block-Oriented Storage Devices, NIST Special Publication 800-38E, January 2010, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf.
[SP800-56A] E. Barker, L. Chen, A. Roginsky and M. Smid, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, May 2013, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar2.pdf.
[SP800-57-1] E. Barker, W. Barker, W. Burr, W. Polk, and M. Smid, Recommendations for Key Management - Part 1: General (Revision 3), NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 3, July 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_part1_rev3_general.pdf.
[SP800-108] L. Chen, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), NIST Special Publication 800-108, Oct 2009, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf.
[X.509] International Telecommunication Union (ITU)–T, X.509: Information technology – Open systems interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks, November 2008, http://www.itu.int/rec/recommendation.asp?lang=en&parent=T-REC-X.509-200811-1.
[X9.24-1] ANSI, X9.24 - Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management - Part 1: Using Symmetric Techniques, 2009.
[X9.31] ANSI, X9.31: Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), September 1998.
[X9.42] ANSI, X9.42: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Agreement of Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, 2003.
[X9.62] ANSI, X9.62: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005.
[X9.63] ANSI, X9.63: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2011.
[X9.102] ANSI, X9.102: Symmetric Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Wrapping of Keys and Associated Data, 2008.
[X9 TR-31] ANSI, X9 TR-31: Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block Specification for Symmetric Algorithms, 2010.
[ISO/IEC 9945-2] The Open Group, Regular Expressions, The Single UNIX Specification version 2, 1997, ISO/IEC 9945-2:1993, http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007908799/xbd/re.html.
[KMIP-UG] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.2. Edited by Indra Fitzgerald and Judith Furlong. Latest version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.2/kmip-ug-v1.2.doc.
[KMIP-TC] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Test Cases Version 1.2. Edited by Tim Hudson and Faisal Faruqui. Latest version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/testcases/v1.2/kmip-testcases-v1.2.doc.
[KMIP-UC] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Use Cases Version 1.2 Working Draft 10, June 20, 2013. https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/49644/kmip-usecases-v1.2-wd10.doc.
[RFC6151] S. Turner and L. Chen, Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms, IETF RFC6151, March 2011, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6151.txt.
[w1979] A. Shamir, How to share a secret, Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 612-613, November 1979.
The following subsections describe the objects that are passed between the clients and servers of the key management system. Some of these object types, called Base Objects, are used only in the protocol itself, and are not considered Managed Objects. Key management systems MAY choose to support a subset of the Managed Objects. The object descriptions refer to the primitive data types of which they are composed. These primitive data types are (see Section 9.1.1.4):
· Integer
· Long Integer
· Big Integer
· Enumeration – choices from a predefined list of values
· Boolean
· Text String – string of characters representing human-readable text
· Byte String – sequence of unencoded byte values
· Date-Time – date and time, with a granularity of one second
· Interval – a length of time expressed in seconds
Structures are composed of ordered lists of primitive data types or sub-structures.
These objects are used within the messages of the protocol, but are not objects managed by the key management system. They are components of Managed Objects.
An Attribute object is a structure (see Table 2) used for sending and receiving Managed Object attributes. The Attribute Name is a text-string that is used to identify the attribute. The Attribute Index is an index number assigned by the key management server. The Attribute Index is used to identify the particular instance. Attribute Indices SHALL start with 0. The Attribute Index of an attribute SHALL NOT change when other instances are added or deleted. Single-instance Attributes (attributes which an object MAY only have at most one instance thereof) SHALL have an Attribute Index of 0. The Attribute Value is either a primitive data type or structured object, depending on the attribute.
When an Attribute structure is used to specify or return a particular instance of an Attribute and the Attribute Index is not specified it SHALL be assumed to be 0.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Attribute |
Structure |
|
Attribute Name |
Text String |
Yes |
Attribute Index |
Integer |
No |
Attribute Value |
Varies, depending on attribute. See Section 3 |
Yes, except for the Notify operation (see Section 5.1) |
Table 2: Attribute Object Structure
A Credential is a structure (see Table 3) used for client identification purposes and is not managed by the key management system (e.g., user id/password pairs, Kerberos tokens, etc.). It MAY be used for authentication purposes as indicated in [KMIP-Prof].
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Credential |
Structure |
|
Credential Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.1 |
Yes |
Credential Value |
Varies based on Credential Type. |
Yes |
Table 3: Credential Object Structure
If the Credential Type in the Credential is Username and Password, then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 4. The Username field identifies the client, and the Password field is a secret that authenticates the client.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Credential Value |
Structure |
|
Username |
Text String |
Yes |
Password |
Text String |
No |
Table 4: Credential Value Structure for the Username and Password Credential
If the Credential Type in the Credential is Device, then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 5. One or a combination of the Device Serial Number, Network Identifier, Machine Identifier, and Media Identifier SHALL be unique. Server implementations MAY enforce policies on uniqueness for individual fields. A shared secret or password MAY also be used to authenticate the client. The client SHALL provide at least one field.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Credential Value |
Structure |
|
Device Serial Number |
Text String |
No |
Password |
Text String |
No |
Device Identifier |
Text String |
No |
Network Identifier |
Text String |
No |
Machine Identifier |
Text String |
No |
Media Identifier |
Text String |
No |
Table 5: Credential Value Structure for the Device Credential
If the Credential Type in the Credential is Attestation, then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 6. The Nonce Value is obtained from the key management server in a Nonce Object. The Attestation Credential Object can contain a measurement from the client or an assertion from a third party if the server is not capable or willing to verify the attestation data from the client. Neither type of attestation data (Attestation Measurement or Attestation Assertion) is necessary to allow the server to accept either. However, the client SHALL provide attestation data in either the Attestation Measurement or Attestation Assertion fields.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Credential Value |
Structure |
|
Nonce |
Structure, see 2.1.14 |
Yes |
Attestation Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.36 |
Yes |
Attestation Measurement |
Byte String |
No |
Attestation Assertion |
Byte String |
No |
Table 6: Credential Value Structure for the Attestation Credential
A Key Block object is a structure (see Table 7) used to encapsulate all of the information that is closely associated with a cryptographic key. It contains a Key Value of one of the following Key Format Types:
· Raw – This is a key that contains only cryptographic key material, encoded as a string of bytes.
· Opaque – This is an encoded key for which the encoding is unknown to the key management system. It is encoded as a string of bytes.
· PKCS1 – This is an encoded private key, expressed as a DER-encoded ASN.1 PKCS#1 object.
· PKCS8 – This is an encoded private key, expressed as a DER-encoded ASN.1 PKCS#8 object, supporting both the RSAPrivateKey syntax and EncryptedPrivateKey.
· X.509 – This is an encoded object, expressed as a DER-encoded ASN.1 X.509 object.
· ECPrivateKey – This is an ASN.1 encoded elliptic curve private key.
· Several Transparent Key types – These are algorithm-specific structures containing defined values for the various key types, as defined in Section 2.1.7.
· Extensions – These are vendor-specific extensions to allow for proprietary or legacy key formats.
The Key Block MAY contain the Key Compression Type, which indicates the format of the elliptic curve public key. By default, the public key is uncompressed.
The Key Block also has the Cryptographic Algorithm and the Cryptographic Length of the key contained in the Key Value field. Some example values are:
· RSA keys are typically 1024, 2048 or 3072 bits in length.
· 3DES keys are typically from 112 to 192 bits (depending upon key length and the presence of parity bits).
· AES keys are 128, 192 or 256 bits in length.
The Key Block SHALL contain a Key Wrapping Data structure if the key in the Key Value field is wrapped (i.e., encrypted, or MACed/signed, or both).
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Block |
Structure |
|
Key Format Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.3 |
Yes |
Key Compression Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.2 |
No |
Key Value |
Byte String: for wrapped Key Value; Structure: for plaintext Key Value, see 2.1.4 |
No |
Cryptographic Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13 |
Yes. MAY be omitted only if this information is available from the Key Value. Does not apply to Secret Data (see Section 2.2.7) or Opaque Objects (see Section 2.2.8). If present, the Cryptographic Length SHALL also be present. |
Cryptographic Length |
Integer |
Yes. MAY be omitted only if this information is available from the Key Value. Does not apply to Secret Data (see Section 2.2.7) or Opaque Objects (see Section 2.2.8). If present, the Cryptographic Algorithm SHALL also be present. |
Key Wrapping Data |
Structure, see 2.1.5 |
No. SHALL only be present if the key is wrapped. |
Table 7: Key Block Object Structure
The Key Value is used only inside a Key Block and is either a Byte String or a structure (see Table 8):
· The Key Value structure contains the key material, either as a byte string or as a Transparent Key structure (see Section 2.1.7), and OPTIONAL attribute information that is associated and encapsulated with the key material. This attribute information differs from the attributes associated with Managed Objects, and is obtained via the Get Attributes operation, only by the fact that it is encapsulated with (and possibly wrapped with) the key material itself.
· The Key Value Byte String is either the wrapped TTLV-encoded (see Section 9.1) Key Value structure, or the wrapped un-encoded value of the Byte String Key Material field.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Value |
Structure |
|
Key Material |
Byte String: for Raw, Opaque, PKCS1, PKCS8, ECPrivateKey, or Extension Key Format types; Structure: for Transparent, or Extension Key Format Types |
Yes |
Attribute |
Attribute Object, see Section 2.1.1 |
No. MAY be repeated |
Table 8: Key Value Object Structure
The Key Block MAY also supply OPTIONAL information about a cryptographic key wrapping mechanism used to wrap the Key Value. This consists of a Key Wrapping Data structure (see Table 9). It is only used inside a Key Block.
This structure contains fields for:
· A Wrapping Method, which indicates the method used to wrap the Key Value.
· Encryption Key Information, which contains the Unique Identifier (see 3.1) value of the encryption key and associated cryptographic parameters.
· MAC/Signature Key Information, which contains the Unique Identifier value of the MAC/signature key and associated cryptographic parameters.
· A MAC/Signature, which contains a MAC or signature of the Key Value.
· An IV/Counter/Nonce, if REQUIRED by the wrapping method.
· An Encoding Option, specifying the encoding of the Key Material within the Key Value structure of the Key Block that has been wrapped. If No Encoding is specified, then the Key Value structure SHALL NOT contain any attributes.
If wrapping is used, then the whole Key Value structure is wrapped unless otherwise specified by the Wrapping Method. The algorithms used for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic Algorithm attributes of the encryption key and/or MAC/signature key; the block-cipher mode, padding method, and hashing algorithm used for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic Parameters in the Encryption Key Information and/or MAC/Signature Key Information, or, if not present, from the Cryptographic Parameters attribute of the respective key(s). Either the Encryption Key Information or the MAC/Signature Key Information (or both) in the Key Wrapping Data structure SHALL be specified.
The following wrapping methods are currently defined:
· Encrypt only (i.e., encryption using a symmetric key or public key, or authenticated encryption algorithms that use a single key).
· MAC/sign only (i.e., either MACing the Key Value with a symmetric key, or signing the Key Value with a private key).
· Encrypt then MAC/sign.
· MAC/sign then encrypt.
· TR-31.
· Extensions.
The following encoding options are currently defined:
· No Encoding (i.e., the wrapped un-encoded value of the Byte String Key Material field in the Key Value structure).
· TTLV Encoding (i.e., the wrapped TTLV-encoded Key Value structure).
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Wrapping Data |
Structure |
|
Wrapping Method |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.4 |
Yes |
Encryption Key Information |
Structure, see below |
No. Corresponds to the key that was used to encrypt the Key Value. |
MAC/Signature Key Information |
Structure, see below |
No. Corresponds to the symmetric key used to MAC the Key Value or the private key used to sign the Key Value |
MAC/Signature |
Byte String |
No |
IV/Counter/Nonce |
Byte String |
No |
Encoding Option |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.32 |
No. Specifies the encoding of the Key Value Byte String. If not present, the wrapped Key Value structure SHALL be TTLV encoded. |
Table 9: Key Wrapping Data Object Structure
The structures of the Encryption Key Information (see Table 10) and the MAC/Signature Key Information (see Table 11) are as follows:
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Encryption Key Information |
Structure |
|
Unique Identifier |
Text string, see 3.1 |
Yes |
Cryptographic Parameters |
Structure, see 3.6 |
No |
Table 10: Encryption Key Information Object Structure
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
MAC/Signature Key Information |
Structure |
|
Unique Identifier |
Text string, see 3.1 |
Yes. It SHALL be either the Unique Identifier of the Symmetric Key used to MAC, or of the Private Key (or its corresponding Public Key) used to sign. |
Cryptographic Parameters |
Structure, see 3.6 |
No |
Table 11: MAC/Signature Key Information Object Structure
This is a separate structure (see Table 12) that is defined for operations that provide the option to return wrapped keys. The Key Wrapping Specification SHALL be included inside the operation request if clients request the server to return a wrapped key. If Cryptographic Parameters are specified in the Encryption Key Information and/or the MAC/Signature Key Information of the Key Wrapping Specification, then the server SHALL verify that they match one of the instances of the Cryptographic Parameters attribute of the corresponding key. If Cryptographic Parameters are omitted, then the server SHALL use the Cryptographic Parameters attribute with the lowest Attribute Index of the corresponding key. If the corresponding key does not have any Cryptographic Parameters attribute, or if no match is found, then an error is returned.
This structure contains:
· A Wrapping Method that indicates the method used to wrap the Key Value.
· Encryption Key Information with the Unique Identifier value of the encryption key and associated cryptographic parameters.
· MAC/Signature Key Information with the Unique Identifier value of the MAC/signature key and associated cryptographic parameters.
· Zero or more Attribute Names to indicate the attributes to be wrapped with the key material.
· An Encoding Option, specifying the encoding of the Key Value before wrapping. If No Encoding is specified, then the Key Value SHALL NOT contain any attributes
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Wrapping Specification |
Structure |
|
Wrapping Method |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.4 |
Yes |
Encryption Key Information |
Structure, see 2.1.5 |
No, SHALL be present if MAC/Signature Key Information is omitted |
MAC/Signature Key Information |
Structure, see 2.1.5 |
No, SHALL be present if Encryption Key Information is omitted |
Attribute Name |
Text String |
No, MAY be repeated |
Encoding Option |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.32 |
No. If Encoding Option is not present, the wrapped Key Value SHALL be TTLV encoded. |
Table 12: Key Wrapping Specification Object Structure
Transparent Key structures describe the necessary parameters to obtain the key material. They are used in the Key Value structure. The mapping to the parameters specified in other standards is shown in Table 13.
Object |
Description |
Mapping |
P |
For DSA and DH, the (large) prime field order.
For RSA, a prime factor of the modulus. |
p in [FIPS186-4], [X9.42], [SP800-56A] p in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4] |
Q |
For DSA and DH, the (small) prime multiplicative subgroup order. For RSA, a prime factor of the modulus. |
q in [FIPS186-4], [X9.42], [SP800-56A] q in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4] |
G |
The generator of the subgroup of order Q. |
g in [FIPS186-4], [X9.42], [SP800-56A] |
X |
DSA or DH private key. |
x in [FIPS186-4] x, xu, xv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for static private keys r, ru, rv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for ephemeral private keys |
Y |
DSA or DH public key. |
y in [FIPS186-4] y, yu, yv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for static public keys t, tu, tv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for ephemeral public keys |
J |
DH cofactor integer, where P = JQ + 1. |
j in [X9.42] |
Modulus |
RSA modulus PQ, where P and Q are distinct primes. |
n in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4] |
Private Exponent |
RSA private exponent. |
d in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4] |
Public Exponent |
RSA public exponent. |
e in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4] |
Prime Exponent P |
RSA private exponent for the prime factor P in the CRT format, i.e., Private Exponent (mod (P-1)). |
dP in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4] |
Prime Exponent Q |
RSA private exponent for the prime factor Q in the CRT format, i.e., Private Exponent (mod (Q-1)). |
dQ in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4] |
CRT Coefficient |
The (first) CRT coefficient, i.e., Q-1 mod P. |
qInv in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4] |
Recommended Curve |
NIST Recommended Curves (e.g., P-192). |
See Appendix D of [FIPS186-4] |
D |
Elliptic curve private key. |
d; de,U,de,V (ephemeral private keys); ds,U,ds,V (static private keys) in [X9.62], [FIPS186-4] |
Q String |
Elliptic curve public key. |
Q; Qe,U,Qe,V (ephemeral public keys); Qs,U,Qs,V (static public keys) in [X9.62], [FIPS186-4] |
Table 13: Parameter mapping.
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent Symmetric Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 14.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
Key |
Byte String |
Yes |
Table 14: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent Symmetric Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 15.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
P |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Q |
Big Integer |
Yes |
G |
Big Integer |
Yes |
X |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Table 15: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Private Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 16.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
P |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Q |
Big Integer |
Yes |
G |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Y |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Table 16: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent RSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 17.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
Modulus |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Private Exponent |
Big Integer |
No |
Public Exponent |
Big Integer |
No |
P |
Big Integer |
No |
Q |
Big Integer |
No |
Prime Exponent P |
Big Integer |
No |
Prime Exponent Q |
Big Integer |
No |
CRT Coefficient |
Big Integer |
No |
Table 17: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Private Keys
One of the following SHALL be present (refer to [PKCS#1]):
· P and Q (the first two prime factors of Modulus), or
· Prime Exponent P and Prime Exponent Q.
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent RSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 18.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
Modulus |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Public Exponent |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Table 18: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DH Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 19.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
P |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Q |
Big Integer |
No |
G |
Big Integer |
Yes |
J |
Big Integer |
No |
X |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Table 19: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Private Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DH Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 20.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
P |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Q |
Big Integer |
No |
G |
Big Integer |
Yes |
J |
Big Integer |
No |
Y |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Table 20: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Public Keys
The Transparent ECDSA Private Key structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC Private Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 21.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
Recommended Curve |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5 |
Yes |
D |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Table 21: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Private Keys
The Transparent ECDSA Public Key structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC Public Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 22.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
Recommended Curve |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5 |
Yes |
Q String |
Byte String |
Yes |
Table 22: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Public Keys
The Transparent ECDH Private Key structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC Private Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDH Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 23.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
Recommended Curve |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5 |
Yes |
D |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Table 23: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Private Keys
The Transparent ECDH Public Key structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC Public Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDH Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 24.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
Recommended Curve |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5 |
Yes |
Q String |
Byte String |
Yes |
Table 24: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Public Keys
The Transparent ECMQV Private Key structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC Private Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECMQV Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 25.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
Recommended Curve |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5 |
Yes |
D |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Table 25: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECMQV Private Keys
The Transparent ECMQV Public Key structure is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The Transparent EC Public Key structure SHOULD be used as a replacement.
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECMQV Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 26.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
Recommended Curve |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5 |
Yes |
Q String |
Byte String |
Yes |
Table 26: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECMQV Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent EC Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 27.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
Recommended Curve |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5 |
Yes |
D |
Big Integer |
Yes |
Table 27: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent EC Private Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent EC Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 28.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Material |
Structure |
|
Recommended Curve |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5 |
Yes |
Q String |
Byte String |
Yes |
Table 28: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent EC Public Keys
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference a Template.
These structures are used in various operations to provide the desired attribute values and/or template names in the request and to return the actual attribute values in the response.
The Template-Attribute, Common Template-Attribute, Private Key Template-Attribute, and Public Key Template-Attribute structures are defined identically as follows:
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Template-Attribute, Common Template-Attribute, Private Key Template-Attribute, Public Key Template-Attribute |
Structure |
|
Name |
Structure, see 3.2 |
No, MAY be repeated. (deprecated) |
Attribute |
Attribute Object, see 2.1.1 |
No, MAY be repeated |
Table 29: Template-Attribute Object Structure
Name is the Name attribute of the Template object defined in Section 2.2.6.
An Extension Information object is a structure (see Table 30) describing Objects with Item Tag values in the Extensions range. The Extension Name is a Text String that is used to name the Object (first column of Table 266). The Extension Tag is the Item Tag Value of the Object (see Table 266). The Extension Type is the Item Type Value of the Object (see Table 264).
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Extension Information |
Structure |
|
Extension Name |
Text String |
Yes |
Extension Tag |
Integer |
No |
Extension Type |
Integer |
No |
Table 30: Extension Information Structure
The Data object is used in requests and responses in cryptographic operations that pass data between the client and the server.
Object |
Encoding |
Data |
Byte String |
Table 31: Data Structure
The Data Length is used in requests in cryptographic operations to indicate the amount of data expected in a response.
Object |
Encoding |
Data Length |
Integer |
Table 32: Data Length Structure
The Signature Data is used in requests and responses in cryptographic operations that pass signature data between the client and the server.
Object |
Encoding |
Signature Data |
Byte String |
Table 33: Signature Data Structure
The MAC Data is used in requests and responses in cryptographic operations that pass MAC data between the client and the server.
Object |
Encoding |
MAC Data |
Byte String |
Table 34: MAC Data Structure
A Nonce object is a structure (see Table 35) used by the server to send a random value to the client. The Nonce Identifier is assigned by the server and used to identify the Nonce object. The Nonce Value consists of the random data created by the server.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Nonce |
Structure |
|
Nonce ID |
Byte String |
Yes |
Nonce Value |
Byte String |
Yes |
Table 35: Nonce Structure
The Correlation Value is used in requests and responses in cryptographic operations that support multi-part (streaming) operations. This is generated by the server and returned in the first response to an operation that is being performed across multiple requests. Note: the server decides which operations are supported for multi-part usage. A server-generated correlation value SHALL be specified in any subsequent cryptographic operations that pertain to the original operation.
Object |
Encoding |
Correlation Value |
Byte String |
Table 36: Correlation Value Structure
The Init Indicator is used in requests in cryptographic operations that support multi-part (streaming) operations. This is provided in the first request with a value of True to an operation that is being performed across multiple requests.
Object |
Encoding |
Init Indicator |
Boolean |
Table 37: Init Indicator Structure
The Final Indicator is used in requests in cryptographic operations that support multi-part (streaming) operations. This is provided in the final (last) request with a value of True to an operation that is being performed across multiple requests.
Object |
Encoding |
Final Indicator |
Boolean |
Table 38: Final Indicator Structure
The RNG Parameters base object is a structure that contains a mandatory RNG Algorithm and a set of OPTIONAL fields that describe a Random Number Generator. Specific fields pertain only to certain types of RNGs.
The RNG Algorithm SHALL be specified and if the algorithm implemented is unknown or the implementation does not want to provide the specific details of the RNG Algorithm then the Unspecified enumeration SHALL be used.
If the cryptographic building blocks used within the RNG are known they MAY be specified in combination of the remaining fields within the RNG Parameters structure.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
RNG Parameters |
Structure |
|
RNG Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.37 |
Yes |
Cryptographic Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13 |
No |
Cryptographic Length |
Integer |
No |
Hashing Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.16 |
No |
DRBG Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.38 |
No |
Recommended Curve |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5 |
No |
FIPS186 Variation |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.39 |
No |
Prediction Resistance |
Boolean |
No |
Table 39: RNG Parameters Structure
The Profile Information base object is a structure that contains details of the supported profiles. Specific fields MAY pertain only to certain types of profiles.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Profile Information |
Structure |
|
Profile Name |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.42 |
Yes |
Server URI |
Text String |
No |
Server Port |
Integer |
No |
Table 40: Profile Information Structure
The Validation Information base object is a structure that contains details of a formal validation. Specific fields MAY pertain only to certain types of validations.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Validation Information |
Structure |
|
Validation Authority Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.40 |
Yes |
Validation Authority Country |
Text String |
No |
Validation Authority URI |
Text String |
No |
Validation Version Major |
Integer |
Yes |
Validation Version Minor |
Integer |
No |
Validation Type |
Enumeration, see 0 |
Yes |
Validation Level |
Integer |
Yes |
Validation Certificate Identifier |
Text String |
No |
Validation Certificate URI |
Text String |
No |
Validation Vendor URI |
Text String |
No |
Validation Profile |
Text String (MAY be repeated) |
No |
Table 41: Validation Information Structure
The Validation Authority along with the Validation Version Major, Validation Type and Validation Level SHALL be provided to uniquely identify a validation for a given validation authority. If the Validation Certificate URI is not provided the server SHOULD include a Validation Vendor URI from which information related to the validation is available.
The Validation Authority Country is the two letter ISO country code.
The Capability Information base object is a structure that contains details of the supported capabilities.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Capability Information |
Structure |
|
Streaming Capability |
Boolean |
No |
Asynchronous Capability |
Boolean |
No |
Attestation Capability |
Boolean |
No |
Unwrap Mode |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.43 |
No |
Destroy Action |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.44 |
No |
Shredding Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.45 |
No |
RNG Mode |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.46 |
No |
Table 42: Capability Information Structure
Managed Objects are objects that are the subjects of key management operations, which are described in Sections 4 and 5. Managed Cryptographic Objects are the subset of Managed Objects that contain cryptographic material (e.g., certificates, keys, and secret data).
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a digital certificate. It is a DER-encoded X.509 public key certificate. The PGP certificate type is deprecated as of version 1.2 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The PGP Key object (see section 2.2.9) SHOULD be used instead.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Certificate |
Structure |
|
Certificate Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.6 |
Yes |
Certificate Value |
Byte String |
Yes |
Table 43: Certificate Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a symmetric key.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Symmetric Key |
Structure |
|
Key Block |
Structure, see 2.1.3 |
Yes |
Table 44: Symmetric Key Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the public portion of an asymmetric key pair. This is only a public key, not a certificate.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Public Key |
Structure |
|
Key Block |
Structure, see 2.1.3 |
Yes |
Table 45: Public Key Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the private portion of an asymmetric key pair.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Private Key |
Structure |
|
Key Block |
Structure, see 2.1.3 |
Yes |
Table 46: Private Key Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a Split Key. A split key is a secret, usually a symmetric key or a private key that has been split into a number of parts, each of which MAY then be distributed to several key holders, for additional security. The Split Key Parts field indicates the total number of parts, and the Split Key Threshold field indicates the minimum number of parts needed to reconstruct the entire key. The Key Part Identifier indicates which key part is contained in the cryptographic object, and SHALL be at least 1 and SHALL be less than or equal to Split Key Parts.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Split Key |
Structure |
|
Split Key Parts |
Integer |
Yes |
Key Part Identifier |
Integer |
Yes |
Split Key Threshold |
Integer |
Yes |
Split Key Method |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.8 |
Yes |
Prime Field Size |
Big Integer |
No, REQUIRED only if Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing Prime Field. |
Key Block |
Structure, see 2.1.3 |
Yes |
Table 47: Split Key Object Structure
There are three Split Key Methods for secret sharing: the first one is based on XOR, and the other two are based on polynomial secret sharing, according to [w1979].
Let L be the minimum number of bits needed to represent all values of the secret.
· When the Split Key Method is XOR, then the Key Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is of length L bits. The number of split keys is Split Key Parts (identical to Split Key Threshold), and the secret is reconstructed by XORing all of the parts.
· When the Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing Prime Field, then secret sharing is performed in the field GF(Prime Field Size), represented as integers, where Prime Field Size is a prime bigger than 2L.
· When the Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing GF(216), then secret sharing is performed in the field GF(216). The Key Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is a bit string of length L, and when L is bigger than 216, then secret sharing is applied piecewise in pieces of 16 bits each. The Key Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is the concatenation of the corresponding shares of all pieces of the secret.
Secret sharing is performed in the field GF(216), which is represented as an algebraic extension of GF(28):
GF(216) ≈ GF(28) [y]/(y2+y+m), where m is defined later.
An element of this field then consists of a linear combination uy + v, where u and v are elements of the smaller field GF(28).
The representation of field elements and the notation in this section rely on [FIPS197], Sections 3 and 4. The field GF(28) is as described in [FIPS197],
GF(28) ≈ GF(2) [x]/(x8+x4+x3+x+1).
An element of GF(28) is represented as a byte. Addition and subtraction in GF(28) is performed as a bit-wise XOR of the bytes. Multiplication and inversion are more complex (see [FIPS197] Section 4.1 and 4.2 for details).
An element of GF(216) is represented as a pair of bytes (u, v). The element m is given by
m = x5+x4+x3+x,
which is represented by the byte 0x3A (or {3A} in notation according to [FIPS197]).
Addition and subtraction in GF(216) both correspond to simply XORing the bytes. The product of two elements ry + s and uy + v is given by
(ry + s) (uy + v) = ((r + s)(u + v) + sv)y + (ru + svm).
The inverse of an element uy + v is given by
(uy + v)-1 = ud-1y + (u + v)d-1, where d = (u + v)v + mu2.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently support use of a Template.
A Template is a named Managed Object containing the client-settable attributes of a Managed Cryptographic Object. A Template is used to specify the attributes of a new Managed Cryptographic Object in various operations. Attributes associated with a Managed Object MAY also be specified in the Template-Attribute structures in the operations in Section 4.
Attributes specified in a Template apply to any object created that reference the Template by name using the Name object in any of the Template-Attribute structures in Section 2.1.7.14.
The name of a Template (as it is for any Managed Object) is specified as an Attribute in the Template-Attribute structure in the Register operation where the Attribute Name is "Name" and the Attribute Value is the name of the Template Managed Object.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Template |
Structure |
|
Attribute |
Attribute Object, see 2.1.1 |
Yes. MAY be repeated. |
Table 48: Template Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object containing a shared secret value that is not a key or certificate (e.g., a password). The Key Block of the Secret Data object contains a Key Value of the Secret Data Type. The Key Value MAY be wrapped.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Secret Data |
Structure |
|
Secret Data Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.9 |
Yes |
Key Block |
Structure, see 2.1.3 |
Yes |
Table 49: Secret Data Object Structure
A Managed Object that the key management server is possibly not able to interpret. The context information for this object MAY be stored and retrieved using Custom Attributes.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Opaque Object |
Structure |
|
Opaque Data Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.10 |
Yes |
Opaque Data Value |
Byte String |
Yes |
Table 50: Opaque Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a text-based representation of a PGP key. The Key Block field, indicated below, will contain the ASCII-armored export of a PGP key in the format as specified in RFC 4880. It MAY contain only a public key block, or both a public and private key block. Two different versions of PGP keys, version 3 and version 4, MAY be stored in this Managed Cryptographic Object.
KMIP implementers SHOULD treat the Key Block field as an opaque blob. PGP-aware KMIP clients SHOULD take on the responsibility of decomposing the Key Block into other Managed Cryptographic Objects (Public Keys, Private Keys, etc.).
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
PGP Key |
Structure |
|
PGP Key Version |
Integer |
Yes |
Key Block |
Structure, see 2.1.3 |
Yes |
Table 51: PGP Key Object Structure
The following subsections describe the attributes that are associated with Managed Objects. Attributes that an object MAY have multiple instances of are referred to as multi-instance attributes. All instances of an attribute SHOULD have a different value. Similarly, attributes which an object SHALL only have at most one instance of are referred to as single-instance attributes. Attributes are able to be obtained by a client from the server using the Get Attribute operation. Some attributes are able to be set by the Add Attribute operation or updated by the Modify Attribute operation, and some are able to be deleted by the Delete Attribute operation if they no longer apply to the Managed Object. Read-only attributes are attributes that SHALL NOT be modified by either server or client, and that SHALL NOT be deleted by a client.
When attributes are returned by the server (e.g., via a Get Attributes operation), the attribute value returned MAY differ for different clients (e.g., the Cryptographic Usage Mask value MAY be different for different clients, depending on the policy of the server).
The first table in each subsection contains the attribute name in the first row. This name is the canonical name used when managing attributes using the Get Attributes, Get Attribute List, Add Attribute, Modify Attribute, and Delete Attribute operations.
A server SHALL NOT delete attributes without receiving a request from a client until the object is destroyed. After an object is destroyed, the server MAY retain all, some or none of the object attributes, depending on the object type and server policy.
The second table in each subsection lists certain attribute characteristics (e.g., “SHALL always have a value”): Table 52 below explains the meaning of each characteristic that MAY appear in those tables. The server policy MAY further restrict these attribute characteristics.
SHALL always have a value |
All Managed Objects that are of the Object Types for which this attribute applies, SHALL always have this attribute set once the object has been created or registered, up until the object has been destroyed. |
Initially set by |
Who is permitted to initially set the value of the attribute (if the attribute has never been set, or if all the attribute values have been deleted)? |
Modifiable by server |
Is the server allowed to change an existing value of the attribute without receiving a request from a client? |
Modifiable by client |
Is the client able to change an existing value of the attribute value once it has been set? |
Deletable by client |
Is the client able to delete an instance of the attribute? |
Multiple instances permitted |
Are multiple instances of the attribute permitted? |
When implicitly set |
Which operations MAY cause this attribute to be set even if the attribute is not specified in the operation request itself? |
Applies to Object Types |
Which Managed Objects MAY have this attribute set? |
Table 52: Attribute Rules
The Unique Identifier is generated by the key management system to uniquely identify a Managed Object. It is only REQUIRED to be unique within the identifier space managed by a single key management system, however this identifier SHOULD be globally unique in order to allow for a key management domain export of such objects. This attribute SHALL be assigned by the key management system at creation or registration time, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
|
Unique Identifier |
Text String |
|
Table 53: Unique Identifier Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 54: Unique Identifier Attribute Rules
The Name attribute is a structure (see Table 55) used to identify and locate an object. This attribute is assigned by the client, and the Name Value is intended to be in a form that humans are able to interpret. The key management system MAY specify rules by which the client creates valid names. Clients are informed of such rules by a mechanism that is not specified by this standard. Names SHALL be unique within a given key management domain, but are NOT REQUIRED to be globally unique.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Name |
Structure |
|
Name Value |
Text String |
Yes |
Name Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.11 |
Yes |
Table 55: Name Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
Yes |
Deletable by client |
Yes |
Multiple instances permitted |
Yes |
When implicitly set |
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 56: Name Attribute Rules
The Object Type of a Managed Object (e.g., public key, private key, symmetric key, etc.) SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
Object Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.12 |
Table 57: Object Type Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 58: Object Type Attribute Rules
The Cryptographic Algorithm of an object. The Cryptographic Algorithm of a Certificate object identifies the algorithm for the public key contained within the Certificate. The digital signature algorithm used to sign the Certificate is identified in the Digital Signature Algorithm attribute defined in Section 3.16. This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
Cryptographic Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13 |
Table 59: Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Certify, Create, Create Key Pair, Re-certify, Register, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
Keys, Certificates, Templates |
Table 60: Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute Rules
For keys, Cryptographic Length is the length in bits of the clear-text cryptographic key material of the Managed Cryptographic Object. For certificates, Cryptographic Length is the length in bits of the public key contained within the Certificate. This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
Cryptographic Length |
Integer |
Table 61: Cryptographic Length Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Certify, Create, Create Key Pair, Re-certify, Register, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
Keys, Certificates, Templates |
Table 62: Cryptographic Length Attribute Rules
The Cryptographic Parameters attribute is a structure (see Table 63) that contains a set of OPTIONAL fields that describe certain cryptographic parameters to be used when performing cryptographic operations using the object. Specific fields MAY pertain only to certain types of Managed Cryptographic Objects. The Cryptographic Parameters attribute of a Certificate object identifies the cryptographic parameters of the public key contained within the Certificate.
The Cryptographic Algorithm is also used to specify the parameters for cryptographic operations. For operations involving digital signatures, either the Digital Signature Algorithm can be specified or the Cryptographic Algorithm and Hashing Algorithm combination can be specified.
Random IV can be used to request that the KMIP server generate an appropriate IV for a cryptographic operation that uses an IV. The generated Random IV is returned in the response to the cryptographic operation.
IV Length is the length of the Initialization Vector in bits. This parameter SHALL be provided when the specified Block Cipher Mode supports variable IV lengths such as CTR or GCM.
Tag Length is the length of the authenticator tag in bytes. This parameter SHALL be provided when the Block Cipher Mode is GCM.
The IV used with counter modes of operation (e.g., CTR and GCM) cannot repeat for a given cryptographic key. To prevent an IV/key reuse, the IV is often constructed of three parts: a fixed field, an invocation field, and a counter as described in [SP800-38A] and [SP800-38D]. The Fixed Field Length is the length of the fixed field portion of the IV in bits. The Invocation Field Length is the length of the invocation field portion of the IV in bits. The Counter Length is the length of the counter portion of the IV in bits.
Initial Counter Value is the starting counter value for CTR mode (for [RFC3686] it is 1).
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Cryptographic Parameters |
Structure |
|
Block Cipher Mode |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.14 |
No |
Padding Method |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.15 |
No |
Hashing Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.16 |
No |
Key Role Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.17 |
No |
Digital Signature Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.7 |
No |
Cryptographic Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13 |
No |
Random IV |
Boolean |
No |
IV Length |
Integer |
No unless Block Cipher Mode supports variable IV lengths |
Tag Length |
Integer |
No unless Block Cipher Mode is GCM |
Fixed Field Length |
Integer |
No |
Invocation Field Length |
Integer |
No |
Counter Length |
Integer |
No |
Initial Counter Value |
Integer |
No |
Table 63: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
Yes |
Deletable by client |
Yes |
Multiple instances permitted |
Yes |
When implicitly set |
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify |
Applies to Object Types |
Keys, Certificates, Templates |
Table 64: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Rules
Key Role Type definitions match those defined in ANSI X9 TR-31 [X9 TR-31] and are defined in Table 65:
BDK |
Base Derivation Key (ANSI X9.24 DUKPT key derivation) |
CVK |
Card Verification Key (CVV/signature strip number validation) |
DEK |
Data Encryption Key (General Data Encryption) |
MKAC |
EMV/chip card Master Key: Application Cryptograms |
MKSMC |
EMV/chip card Master Key: Secure Messaging for Confidentiality |
MKSMI |
EMV/chip card Master Key: Secure Messaging for Integrity |
MKDAC |
EMV/chip card Master Key: Data Authentication Code |
MKDN |
EMV/chip card Master Key: Dynamic Numbers |
MKCP |
EMV/chip card Master Key: Card Personalization |
MKOTH |
EMV/chip card Master Key: Other |
KEK |
Key Encryption or Wrapping Key |
MAC16609 |
ISO16609 MAC Algorithm 1 |
MAC97971 |
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 1 |
MAC97972 |
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 2 |
MAC97973 |
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 3 (Note this is commonly known as X9.19 Retail MAC) |
MAC97974 |
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 4 |
MAC97975 |
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 5 |
ZPK |
PIN Block Encryption Key |
PVKIBM |
PIN Verification Key, IBM 3624 Algorithm |
PVKPVV |
PIN Verification Key, VISA PVV Algorithm |
PVKOTH |
PIN Verification Key, Other Algorithm |
Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. - Financial Industry Standards (www.x9.org) contributed to Table 65. Key role names and descriptions are derived from material in the Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc.'s Technical Report "TR-31 2010 Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block Specification for Symmetric Algorithms" and used with the permission of Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. in an effort to improve interoperability between X9 standards and OASIS KMIP. The complete ANSI X9 TR-31 is available at www.x9.org.
The Cryptographic Domain Parameters attribute is a structure (see Table 66) that contains a set of OPTIONAL fields that MAY need to be specified in the Create Key Pair Request Payload. Specific fields MAY only pertain to certain types of Managed Cryptographic Objects.
The domain parameter Qlength correponds to the bit length of parameter Q (refer to [SEC2] and [SP800-56A]). Qlength applies to algorithms such as DSA and DH. The bit length of parameter P (refer to [SEC2] and [SP800-56A]) is specified separately by setting the Cryptographic Length attribute.
Recommended Curve is applicable to elliptic curve algorithms such as ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV.
Object |
Encoding |
Required |
Cryptographic Domain Parameters |
Structure |
Yes |
Qlength |
Integer |
No |
Recommended Curve |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5 |
No |
Table 66: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute Structure
Shall always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
Asymmetric Keys, Templates |
Table 67: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute Rules
The Certificate Type attribute is a type of certificate (e.g., X.509). The PGP certificate type is deprecated as of version 1.2 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification.
The Certificate Type value SHALL be set by the server when the certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
|
Certificate Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.6 |
|
Table 68: Certificate Type Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Register, Certify, Re-certify |
Applies to Object Types |
Certificates |
Table 69: Certificate Type Attribute Rules
The Certificate Length attribute is the length in bytes of the Certificate object. The Certificate Length SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
Certificate Length |
Integer |
Table 70: Certificate Length Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Register, Certify, Re-certify |
Applies to Object Types |
Certificates |
Table 71: Certificate Length Attribute Rules
The X.509 Certificate Identifier attribute is a structure (see Table 72) used to provide the identification of an X.509 public key certificate. The X.509 Certificate Identifier contains the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the X.509 certificate) and the Certificate Serial Number (i.e., from the Serial Number field of the X.509 certificate). The X.509 Certificate Identifier SHALL be set by the server when the X.509 certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
X.509 Certificate Identifier |
Structure |
|
Issuer Distinguished Name |
Byte String |
Yes |
Certificate Serial Number |
Byte String |
Yes |
Table 72: X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Register, Certify, Re-certify |
Applies to Object Types |
X.509 Certificates |
Table 73: X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute Rules
The X.509 Certificate Subject attribute is a structure (see Table 74) used to identify the subject of a X.509 certificate. The X.509 Certificate Subject contains the Subject Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Subject field of the X.509 certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the subject of the X.509 certificate (i.e., from the Subject Alternative Name extension within the X.509 certificate). The X.509 Certificate Subject SHALL be set by the server based on the information it extracts from the X.509 certificate that is created (as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation) or registered (as part of a Register operation) and SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
If the Subject Alternative Name extension is included in the X.509 certificate and is marked critical within the X.509 certificate itself, then an X.509 certificate MAY be issued with the subject field left blank. Therefore an empty string is an acceptable value for the Subject Distinguished Name.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
X.509 Certificate Subject |
Structure |
|
Subject Distinguished Name |
Byte String |
Yes, but MAY be the empty string |
Subject Alternative Name |
Byte String |
Yes, if the Subject Distinguished Name is an empty string. MAY be repeated |
Table 74: X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Register, Certify, Re-certify |
Applies to Object Types |
X.509 Certificates |
Table 75: X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute Rules
The X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute is a structure (see Table 80) used to identify the issuer of a X.509 certificate, containing the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the X.509 certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the issuer of the certificate (i.e., from the Issuer Alternative Name extension within the X.509 certificate). The server SHALL set these values based on the information it extracts from a X.509 certificate that is created as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation or is sent as part of a Register operation. These values SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
X.509 Certificate Issuer |
Structure |
|
Issuer Distinguished Name |
Byte String |
Yes |
Issuer Alternative Name |
Byte String |
No, MAY be repeated |
Table 76: X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Register, Certify, Re-certify |
Applies to Object Types |
X.509 Certificates |
Table 77: X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules
This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this specification. The X.509 Certificate Identifier attribute (see Section 3.10) SHOULD be used instead.
The Certificate Identifier attribute is a structure (see Table 78) used to provide the identification of a certificate. For X.509 certificates, it contains the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the certificate) and the Certificate Serial Number (i.e., from the Serial Number field of the certificate). For PGP certificates, the Issuer contains the OpenPGP Key ID of the key issuing the signature (the signature that represents the certificate). The Certificate Identifier SHALL be set by the server when the certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Certificate Identifier |
Structure |
|
Issuer |
Text String |
Yes |
Serial Number |
Text String |
Yes (for X.509 certificates) / No (for PGP certificates since they do not contain a serial number) |
Table 78: Certificate Identifier Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Register, Certify, Re-certify |
Applies to Object Types |
Certificates |
Table 79: Certificate Identifier Attribute Rules
This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this specification. The X.509 Certificate Subject attribute (see Section 3.11) SHOULD be used instead.
The Certificate Subject attribute is a structure (see Table 80) used to identify the subject of a certificate. For X.509 certificates, it contains the Subject Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Subject field of the certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the subject of the certificate (i.e., from the Subject Alternative Name extension within the certificate). For PGP certificates, the Certificate Subject Distinguished Name contains the content of the first User ID packet in the PGP certificate (that is, the first User ID packet after the Public-Key packet in the transferable public key that forms the PGP certificate). These values SHALL be set by the server based on the information it extracts from the certificate that is created (as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation) or registered (as part of a Register operation) and SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
If the Subject Alternative Name extension is included in the certificate and is marked CRITICAL (i.e., within the certificate itself), then it is possible to issue an X.509 certificate where the subject field is left blank. Therefore an empty string is an acceptable value for the Certificate Subject Distinguished Name.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Certificate Subject |
Structure |
|
Certificate Subject Distinguished Name |
Text String |
Yes, but MAY be the empty string |
Certificate Subject Alternative Name |
Text String |
No, MAY be repeated |
Table 80: Certificate Subject Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Register, Certify, Re-certify |
Applies to Object Types |
Certificates |
Table 81: Certificate Subject Attribute Rules
This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this specification. The X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute (see Section 3.12) SHOULD be used instead.
The Certificate Issuer attribute is a structure (see Table 83) used to identify the issuer of a certificate, containing the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the issuer of the certificate (i.e., from the Issuer Alternative Name extension within the certificate). The server SHALL set these values based on the information it extracts from a certificate that is created as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation or is sent as part of a Register operation. These values SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Certificate Issuer |
Structure |
|
Certificate Issuer Distinguished Name |
Text String |
Yes |
Certificate Issuer Alternative Name |
Text String |
No, MAY be repeated |
Table 82: Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Register, Certify, Re-certify |
Applies to Object Types |
Certificates |
Table 83: Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules
The Digital Signature Algorithm attribute identifies the digital signature algorithm associated with a digitally signed object (e.g., Certificate). This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
Digital Signature Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.7 |
Table 84: Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
Yes for PGP keys. No for X.509 certificates. |
When implicitly set |
Certify, Re-certify, Register |
Applies to Object Types |
Certificates, PGP keys |
Table 85: Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute Rules
The Digest attribute is a structure (see Table 86) that contains the digest value of the key or secret data (i.e., digest of the Key Material), certificate (i.e., digest of the Certificate Value), or opaque object (i.e., digest of the Opaque Data Value). If the Key Material is a Byte String, then the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on this Byte String. If the Key Material is a structure, then the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on the TTLV-encoded (see Section 9.1) Key Material structure. The Key Format Type field in the Digest attribute indicates the format of the Managed Object from which the Digest Value was calculated. Multiple digests MAY be calculated using different algorithms listed in Section 9.1.3.2.16 and/or key format types listed in Section 9.1.3.2.3. If this attribute exists, then it SHALL have a mandatory attribute instance computed with the SHA-256 hashing algorithm. For objects registered by a client, the server SHALL compute the digest of the mandatory attribute instance using the Key Format Type of the registered object. In all other cases, the server MAY use any Key Format Type when computing the digest of the mandatory attribute instance, provided it is able to serve the object to clients in that same format. The digest(s) are static and SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, provided that the server has access to the Key Material or the Digest Value (possibly obtained via out-of-band mechanisms).
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Digest |
Structure |
|
Hashing Algorithm |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.16 |
Yes |
Digest Value |
Byte String |
Yes, if the server has access to the Digest Value or the Key Material (for keys and secret data), the Certificate Value (for certificates) or the Opaque Data Value (for opaque objects). |
Key Format Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.3 |
Yes, if the Managed Object is a key or secret data object. |
Table 86: Digest Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
Yes, if the server has access to the Digest Value or the Key Material (for keys and secret data), the Certificate Value (for certificates) or the Opaque Data Value (for opaque objects). |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
Yes |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Objects |
Table 87: Digest Attribute Rules
The Operation Policy Name Attribute is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification.
An operation policy controls what entities MAY perform which key management operations on the object. The content of the Operation Policy Name attribute is the name of a policy object known to the key management system and, therefore, is server dependent. The named policy objects are created and managed using mechanisms outside the scope of the protocol. The policies determine what entities MAY perform specified operations on the object, and which of the object’s attributes MAY be modified or deleted. The Operation Policy Name attribute SHOULD be set when operations that result in a new Managed Object on the server are executed. It is set either explicitly or via some default set by the server, which then applies the named policy to all subsequent operations on the object.
Object |
Encoding |
Operation Policy Name |
Text String |
Table 88: Operation Policy Name Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server or Client |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 89: Operation Policy Name Attribute Rules
Some of the operations SHOULD be allowed for any client at any time, without respect to operation policy. These operations are:
· Create
· Create Key Pair
· Register
· Certify
· Re-certify
· Validate
· Query
· Cancel
· Poll
A key management system implementation MAY implement a named operation policy, which is used for objects when the Operation Policy attribute is not specified by the Client in operations that result in a new Managed Object on the server, or in a template specified in these operations. This policy is named default. It specifies the following rules for operations on objects created or registered with this policy, depending on the object type.
This policy applies to Symmetric Keys, Private Keys, Split Keys, Secret Data, and Opaque Objects.
The Default Operation Policy for Template Objects is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification.
Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects |
|
Operation |
Policy |
Re-key |
Allowed to owner only |
Re-key Key Pair |
Allowed to owner only |
Derive Key |
Allowed to owner only |
Locate |
Allowed to owner only |
Check |
Allowed to owner only |
Get |
Allowed to owner only |
Get Attributes |
Allowed to owner only |
Get Attribute List |
Allowed to owner only |
Add Attribute |
Allowed to owner only |
Modify Attribute |
Allowed to owner only |
Delete Attribute |
Allowed to owner only |
Obtain Lease |
Allowed to owner only |
Get Usage Allocation |
Allowed to owner only |
Activate |
Allowed to owner only |
Revoke |
Allowed to owner only |
Destroy |
Allowed to owner only |
Archive |
Allowed to owner only |
Recover |
Allowed to owner only |
Table 90: Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects
This policy applies to Certificates and Public Keys.
The Default Operation Policy for Template Objects is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification.
Default Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects |
|
Operation |
Policy |
Locate |
Allowed to all |
Check |
Allowed to all |
Get |
Allowed to all |
Get Attributes |
Allowed to all |
Get Attribute List |
Allowed to all |
Add Attribute |
Allowed to owner only |
Modify Attribute |
Allowed to owner only |
Delete Attribute |
Allowed to owner only |
Obtain Lease |
Allowed to all |
Activate |
Allowed to owner only |
Revoke |
Allowed to owner only |
Destroy |
Allowed to owner only |
Archive |
Allowed to owner only |
Recover |
Allowed to owner only |
Table 91: Default Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects
The Default Operation Policy for Template Objects is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification.
The operation policy specified as an attribute in the Register operation for a template object is the operation policy used for objects created using that template, and is not the policy used to control operations on the template itself. There is no mechanism to specify a policy used to control operations on template objects, so the default policy for template objects is always used for templates created by clients using the Register operation to create template objects.
Default Operation Policy for Private Template Objects |
|
Operation |
Policy |
Locate |
Allowed to owner only |
Get |
Allowed to owner only |
Get Attributes |
Allowed to owner only |
Get Attribute List |
Allowed to owner only |
Add Attribute |
Allowed to owner only |
Modify Attribute |
Allowed to owner only |
Delete Attribute |
Allowed to owner only |
Destroy |
Allowed to owner only |
Any operation referencing the Template using a Template-Attribute |
Allowed to owner only |
Table 92: Default Operation Policy for Private Template Objects
In addition to private template objects (which are controlled by the above policy, and which MAY be created by clients or the server), publicly known and usable templates MAY be created and managed by the server, with a default policy different from private template objects.
Default Operation Policy for Public Template Objects |
|
Operation |
Policy |
Locate |
Allowed to all |
Get |
Allowed to all |
Get Attributes |
Allowed to all |
Get Attribute List |
Allowed to all |
Add Attribute |
Disallowed to all |
Modify Attribute |
Disallowed to all |
Delete Attribute |
Disallowed to all |
Destroy |
Disallowed to all |
Any operation referencing the Template using a Template-Attribute |
Allowed to all |
Table 93: Default Operation Policy for Public Template Objects
The Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute defines the cryptographic usage of a key. This is a bit mask that indicates to the client which cryptographic functions MAY be performed using the key, and which ones SHALL NOT be performed.
· Sign
· Verify
· Encrypt
· Decrypt
· Wrap Key
· Unwrap Key
· Export
· MAC Generate
· MAC Verify
· Derive Key
· Content Commitment
· Key Agreement
· Certificate Sign
· CRL Sign
· Generate Cryptogram
· Validate Cryptogram
· Translate Encrypt
· Translate Decrypt
· Translate Wrap
· Translate Unwrap
This list takes into consideration values that MAY appear in the Key Usage extension in an X.509 certificate. However, the list does not consider the additional usages that MAY appear in the Extended Key Usage extension.
X.509 Key Usage values SHALL be mapped to Cryptographic Usage Mask values in the following manner:
X.509 Key Usage to Cryptographic Usage Mask Mapping |
|
X.509 Key Usage Value |
Cryptographic Usage Mask Value |
digitalSignature |
Sign or Verify |
contentCommitment |
Content Commitment (Non Repudiation) |
keyEncipherment |
Wrap Key or Unwrap Key |
dataEncipherment |
Encrypt or Decrypt |
keyAgreement |
Key Agreement |
keyCertSign |
Certificate Sign |
cRLSign |
CRL Sign |
encipherOnly |
Encrypt |
decipherOnly |
Decrypt |
Table 94: X.509 Key Usage to Cryptographic Usage Mask Mapping
Object |
Encoding |
Cryptographic Usage Mask |
Integer |
Table 95: Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server or Client |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects, Templates |
Table 96: Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute Rules
The Lease Time attribute defines a time interval for a Managed Cryptographic Object beyond which the client SHALL NOT use the object without obtaining another lease. This attribute always holds the initial length of time allowed for a lease, and not the actual remaining time. Once its lease expires, the client is only able to renew the lease by calling Obtain Lease. A server SHALL store in this attribute the maximum Lease Time it is able to serve and a client obtains the lease time (with Obtain Lease) that is less than or equal to the maximum Lease Time. This attribute is read-only for clients. It SHALL be modified by the server only.
Object |
Encoding |
Lease Time |
Interval |
Table 97: Lease Time Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects |
Table 98: Lease Time Attribute Rules
The Usage Limits attribute is a mechanism for limiting the usage of a Managed Cryptographic Object. It only applies to Managed Cryptographic Objects that are able to be used for applying cryptographic protection and it SHALL only reflect their usage for applying that protection (e.g., encryption, signing, etc.). This attribute does not necessarily exist for all Managed Cryptographic Objects, since some objects are able to be used without limit for cryptographically protecting data, depending on client/server policies. Usage for processing cryptographically protected data (e.g., decryption, verification, etc.) is not limited. The Usage Limits attribute has the three following fields:
· Usage Limits Total – the total number of Usage Limits Units allowed to be protected. This is the total value for the entire life of the object and SHALL NOT be changed once the object begins to be used for applying cryptographic protection.
· Usage Limits Count – the currently remaining number of Usage Limits Units allowed to be protected by the object.
· Usage Limits Unit – The type of quantity for which this structure specifies a usage limit (e.g., byte, object).
When the attribute is initially set (usually during object creation or registration), the Usage Limits Count is set to the Usage Limits Total value allowed for the useful life of the object, and are decremented when the object is used. The server SHALL ignore the Usage Limits Count value if the attribute is specified in an operation that creates a new object. Changes made via the Modify Attribute operation reflect corrections to the Usage Limits Total value, but they SHALL NOT be changed once the Usage Limits Count value has changed by a Get Usage Allocation operation. The Usage Limits Count value SHALL NOT be set or modified by the client via the Add Attribute or Modify Attribute operations.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Usage Limits |
Structure |
|
Usage Limits Total |
Long Integer |
Yes |
Usage Limits Count |
Long Integer |
Yes |
Usage Limits Unit |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.31 |
Yes |
Table 99: Usage Limits Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server (Total, Count, and Unit) or Client (Total and/or Unit only) |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
Yes (Total and/or Unit only, as long as Get Usage Allocation has not been performed) |
Deletable by client |
Yes, as long as Get Usage Allocation has not been performed |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Get Usage Allocation |
Applies to Object Types |
Keys, Templates |
Table 100: Usage Limits Attribute Rules
This attribute is an indication of the State of an object as known to the key management server. The State SHALL NOT be changed by using the Modify Attribute operation on this attribute. The State SHALL only be changed by the server as a part of other operations or other server processes. An object SHALL be in one of the following states at any given time. (Note: These states correspond to those described in [SP800-57-1]).
· Pre-Active: The object exists and SHALL NOT be used for any cryptographic purpose.
· Active: The object SHALL be transitioned to the Active state prior to being used for any cryptographic purpose. The object SHALL only be used for all cryptographic purposes that are allowed by its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. If a Process Start Date (see 3.25) attribute is set, then the object SHALL NOT be used for cryptographic purposes prior to the Process Start Date. If a Protect Stop Date (see 3.26) attribute is set, then the object SHALL NOT be used for cryptographic purposes after the Process Stop Date.
· Deactivated: The object SHALL NOT be used for applying cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption, signing, wrapping, MACing, deriving) . The object SHALL only be used for cryptographic purposes permitted by the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. The object SHOULD only be used to process cryptographically-protected information (e.g., decryption, signature verification, unwrapping, MAC verification under extraordinary circumstances and when special permission is granted.
· Compromised: The object SHALL NOT be used for applying cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption, signing, wrapping, MACing, deriving). The object SHOULD only be used to process cryptographically-protected information (e.g., decryption, signature verification, unwrapping, MAC verification in a client that is trusted to use managed objects that have been compromised. The object SHALL only be used for cryptographic purposes permitted by the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute.
· Destroyed: The object SHALL NOT be used for any cryptographic purpose.
· Destroyed Compromised: The object SHALL NOT be used for any cryptographic purpose; however its compromised status SHOULD be retained for audit or security purposes.
State transitions occur as follows:
1. The transition from a non-existent key to the Pre-Active state is caused by the creation of the object. When an object is created or registered, it automatically goes from non-existent to Pre-Active. If, however, the operation that creates or registers the object contains an Activation Date that has already occurred, then the state immediately transitions from Pre-Active to Active. In this case, the server SHALL set the Activation Date attribute to the value specified in the request, or fail the request attempting to create or register the object, depending on server policy. If the operation contains an Activation Date attribute that is in the future, or contains no Activation Date, then the Cryptographic Object is initialized in the key management system in the Pre-Active state.
2. The transition from Pre-Active to Destroyed is caused by a client issuing a Destroy operation. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.
3. The transition from Pre-Active to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
4. The transition from Pre-Active to Active SHALL occur in one of three ways:
· The Activation Date is reached,
· A client successfully issues a Modify Attribute operation, modifying the Activation Date to a date in the past, or the current date, or
· A client issues an Activate operation on the object. The server SHALL set the Activation Date to the time the Activate operation is received.
5. The transition from Active to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
6. The transition from Active to Deactivated SHALL occur in one of three ways:
· The object's Deactivation Date is reached,
· A client issues a Revoke operation, with a Revocation Reason other than Compromised, or
· The client successfully issues a Modify Attribute operation, modifying the Deactivation Date to a date in the past, or the current date.
7. The transition from Deactivated to Destroyed is caused by a client issuing a Destroy operation, or by a server, both in accordance with server policy. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.
8. The transition from Deactivated to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
9. The transition from Compromised to Destroyed Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Destroy operation, or by a server, both in accordance with server policy. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.
10. The transition from Destroyed to Destroyed Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
Only the transitions described above are permitted.
Object |
Encoding |
State |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.18 |
Table 101: State Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
No, but only by the server in response to certain requests (see above) |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate, Revoke, Destroy, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects |
Table 102: State Attribute Rules
The Initial Date attribute contains the date and time when the Managed Object was first created or registered at the server. This time corresponds to state transition 1 (see Section 3.22). This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed. This attribute is also set for non-cryptographic objects (e.g., templates) when they are first registered with the server.
Object |
Encoding |
Initial Date |
Date-Time |
Table 103: Initial Date Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 104: Initial Date Attribute Rules
The Activation Date attribute contains the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object MAY begin to be used. This time corresponds to state transition 4 (see Section 3.22). The object SHALL NOT be used for any cryptographic purpose before the Activation Date has been reached. Once the state transition from Pre-Active has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
Activation Date |
Date-Time |
Table 105: Activation Date Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server or Client |
Modifiable by server |
Yes, only while in Pre-Active state |
Modifiable by client |
Yes, only while in Pre-Active state |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects, Templates |
Table 106: Activation Date Attribute Rules
The Process Start Date attribute is the date and time when a Managed Symmetric Key Object MAY begin to be used to process cryptographically protected information (e.g., decryption or unwrapping), depending on the value of its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. The object SHALL NOT be used for these cryptographic purposes before the Process Start Date has been reached. This value MAY be equal to or later than, but SHALL NOT precede, the Activation Date. Once the Process Start Date has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
Process Start Date |
Date-Time |
Table 107: Process Start Date Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server or Client |
Modifiable by server |
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the Process Start Date has been not reached. |
Modifiable by client |
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the Process Start Date has been not reached. |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Register, Derive Key, Re-key |
Applies to Object Types |
Symmetric Keys, Split Keys of symmetric keys, Templates |
Table 108: Process Start Date Attribute Rules
The Protect Stop Date attribute is the date and time after which a Managed Symmetric Key Object SHALL NOT be used for applying cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption or wrapping), depending on the value of its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. This value MAY be equal to or earlier than, but SHALL NOT be later than the Deactivation Date. Once the Protect Stop Date has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
Object |
Encoding |
Protect Stop Date |
Date-Time |
Table 109: Protect Stop Date Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server or Client |
Modifiable by server |
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the Protect Stop Date has not been reached. |
Modifiable by client |
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the Protect Stop Date has not been reached. |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Register, Derive Key, Re-key |
Applies to Object Types |
Symmetric Keys, Split Keys of symmetric keys, Templates |
Table 110: Protect Stop Date Attribute Rules
The Deactivation Date attribute is the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object SHALL NOT be used for any purpose, except for decryption, signature verification, or unwrapping, but only under extraordinary circumstances and only when special permission is granted. This time corresponds to state transition 6 (see Section 3.22). This attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed, unless the object is in the Pre-Active or Active state.
Object |
Encoding |
Deactivation Date |
Date-Time |
Table 111: Deactivation Date Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server or Client |
Modifiable by server |
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state |
Modifiable by client |
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Revoke Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects, Templates |
Table 112: Deactivation Date Attribute Rules
The Destroy Date attribute is the date and time when the Managed Object was destroyed. This time corresponds to state transitions 2, 7, or 9 (see Section 3.22). This value is set by the server when the object is destroyed due to the reception of a Destroy operation, or due to server policy or out-of-band administrative action.
Object |
Encoding |
Destroy Date |
Date-Time |
Table 113: Destroy Date Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Destroy |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Objects |
Table 114: Destroy Date Attribute Rules
The Compromise Occurrence Date attribute is the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object was first believed to be compromised. If it is not possible to estimate when the compromise occurred, then this value SHOULD be set to the Initial Date for the object.
Object |
Encoding |
Compromise Occurrence Date |
Date-Time |
Table 115: Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Revoke |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object |
Table 116: Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute Rules
The Compromise Date attribute contains the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object entered into the compromised state. This time corresponds to state transitions 3, 5, 8, or 10 (see Section 3.22). This time indicates when the key management system was made aware of the compromise, not necessarily when the compromise occurred. This attribute is set by the server when it receives a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised code, or due to server policy or out-of-band administrative action.
Object |
Encoding |
Compromise Date |
Date-Time |
Table 117: Compromise Date Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Revoke |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object |
Table 118: Compromise Date Attribute Rules
The Revocation Reason attribute is a structure (see Table 119) used to indicate why the Managed Cryptographic Object was revoked (e.g., “compromised”, “expired”, “no longer used”, etc.). This attribute is only set by the server as a part of the Revoke Operation.
The Revocation Message is an OPTIONAL field that is used exclusively for audit trail/logging purposes and MAY contain additional information about why the object was revoked (e.g., “Laptop stolen”, or “Machine decommissioned”).
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Revocation Reason |
Structure |
|
Revocation Reason Code |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.19 |
Yes |
Revocation Message |
Text String |
No |
Table 119: Revocation Reason Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Revoke |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object |
Table 120: Revocation Reason Attribute Rules
The Archive Date attribute is the date and time when the Managed Object was placed in archival storage. This value is set by the server as a part of the Archive operation. The server SHALL delete this attribute whenever a Recover operation is performed.
Object |
Encoding |
Archive Date |
Date-Time |
Table 121: Archive Date Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Archive |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 122: Archive Date Attribute Rules
An object MAY be part of a group of objects. An object MAY belong to more than one group of objects. To assign an object to a group of objects, the object group name SHOULD be set into this attribute. “default” is a reserved Text String for Object Group.
Object |
Encoding |
Object Group |
Text String |
Table 123: Object Group Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client or Server |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
Yes |
Deletable by client |
Yes |
Multiple instances permitted |
Yes |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 124: Object Group Attribute Rules
The Fresh attribute is a Boolean attribute that indicates that the object has not yet been served to a client. The Fresh attribute SHALL be set to True when a new object is created on the server. The server SHALL change the attribute value to False as soon as the object has been served to a client.
Object |
Encoding |
Fresh |
Boolean |
Table 125: Fresh Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client or Server |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects |
Table 126: Fresh Attribute Rules
The Link attribute is a structure (see Table 127) used to create a link from one Managed Cryptographic Object to another, closely related target Managed Cryptographic Object. The link has a type, and the allowed types differ, depending on the Object Type of the Managed Cryptographic Object, as listed below. The Linked Object Identifier identifies the target Managed Cryptographic Object by its Unique Identifier. The link contains information about the association between the Managed Cryptographic Objects (e.g., the private key corresponding to a public key; the parent certificate for a certificate in a chain; or for a derived symmetric key, the base key from which it was derived).
Possible values of Link Type in accordance with the Object Type of the Managed Cryptographic Object are:
· Private Key Link: For a Public Key object: the private key corresponding to the public key.
· Public Key Link: For a Private Key object: the public key corresponding to the private key. For a Certificate object: the public key contained in the certificate.
· Certificate Link: For Certificate objects: the parent certificate for a certificate in a certificate chain. For Public Key objects: the corresponding certificate(s), containing the same public key.
· Derivation Base Object Link: For a derived Symmetric Key or Secret Data object: the object(s) from which the current symmetric key was derived.
· Derived Key Link: the symmetric key(s) or Secret Data object(s) that were derived from the current object.
· Replacement Object Link: For a Symmetric Key, an Asymmetric Private Key, or an Asymmetric Public Key object: the key that resulted from the re-key of the current key. For a Certificate object: the certificate that resulted from the re-certify. Note that there SHALL be only one such replacement object per Managed Object.
· Replaced Object Link: For a Symmetric Key, an Asymmetric Private Key, or an Asymmetric Public Key object: the key that was re-keyed to obtain the current key. For a Certificate object: the certificate that was re-certified to obtain the current certificate.
· Parent Link: For all object types: the owner, container or other parent object corresponding to the object.
· Child Link: For all object types: the subordinate, derived or other child object corresponding to the object.
· Previous Link: For all object types: the previous object to this object.
· Next Link: For all object types: the next object to this object.
The Link attribute SHOULD be present for private keys and public keys for which a certificate chain is stored by the server, and for certificates in a certificate chain.
Note that it is possible for a Managed Object to have multiple instances of the Link attribute (e.g., a Private Key has links to the associated certificate, as well as the associated public key; a Certificate object has links to both the public key and to the certificate of the certification authority (CA) that signed the certificate).
It is also possible that a Managed Object does not have links to associated cryptographic objects. This MAY occur in cases where the associated key material is not available to the server or client (e.g., the registration of a CA Signer certificate with a server, where the corresponding private key is held in a different manner).
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Link |
Structure |
|
Link Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.20 |
Yes |
Linked Object Identifier, see 3.1 |
Text String |
Yes |
Table 127: Link Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client or Server |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
Yes |
Deletable by client |
Yes |
Multiple instances permitted |
Yes |
When implicitly set |
Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects |
Table 128: Link Attribute Structure Rules
The Application Specific Information attribute is a structure (see Table 129) used to store data specific to the application(s) using the Managed Object. It consists of the following fields: an Application Namespace and Application Data specific to that application namespace.
Clients MAY request to set (i.e., using any of the operations that result in new Managed Object(s) on the server or adding/modifying the attribute of an existing Managed Object) an instance of this attribute with a particular Application Namespace while omitting Application Data. In that case, if the server supports this namespace (as indicated by the Query operation in Section 4.25), then it SHALL return a suitable Application Data value. If the server does not support this namespace, then an error SHALL be returned.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Application Specific Information |
Structure |
|
Application Namespace |
Text String |
Yes |
Application Data |
Text String |
No |
Table 129: Application Specific Information Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client or Server (only if the Application Data is omitted, in the client request) |
Modifiable by server |
Yes (only if the Application Data is omitted in the client request) |
Modifiable by client |
Yes |
Deletable by client |
Yes |
Multiple instances permitted |
Yes |
When implicitly set |
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 130: Application Specific Information Attribute Rules
The Contact Information attribute is OPTIONAL, and its content is used for contact purposes only. It is not used for policy enforcement. The attribute is set by the client or the server.
Object |
Encoding |
Contact Information |
Text String |
Table 131: Contact Information Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client or Server |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
Yes |
Deletable by client |
Yes |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 132: Contact Information Attribute Rules
The Last Change Date attribute contains the date and time of the last change of the specified object.
Object |
Encoding |
Last Change Date |
Date-Time |
Table 133: Last Change Date Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
Yes |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
Yes |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate, Revoke, Destroy, Archive, Recover, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Add Attribute, Modify Attribute, Delete Attribute, Get Usage Allocation |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 134: Last Change Date Attribute Rules
A Custom Attribute is a client- or server-defined attribute intended for vendor-specific purposes. It is created by the client and not interpreted by the server, or is created by the server and MAY be interpreted by the client. All custom attributes created by the client SHALL adhere to a naming scheme, where the name of the attribute SHALL have a prefix of 'x-'. All custom attributes created by the key management server SHALL adhere to a naming scheme where the name of the attribute SHALL have a prefix of 'y-'. The server SHALL NOT accept a client-created or modified attribute, where the name of the attribute has a prefix of ‘y-‘. The tag type Custom Attribute is not able to identify the particular attribute; hence such an attribute SHALL only appear in an Attribute Structure with its name as defined in Section 2.1.1.
Object |
Encoding |
|
Custom Attribute |
Any data type or structure. If a structure, then the structure SHALL NOT include sub structures |
The name of the attribute SHALL start with 'x-' or 'y-'. |
Table 135 Custom Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client or Server |
Modifiable by server |
Yes, for server-created attributes |
Modifiable by client |
Yes, for client-created attributes |
Deletable by client |
Yes, for client-created attributes |
Multiple instances permitted |
Yes |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate, Revoke, Destroy, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 136: Custom Attribute Rules
The Alternative Name attribute is used to identify and locate the object. This attribute is assigned by the client, and the Alternative Name Value is intended to be in a form that humans are able to interpret. The key management system MAY specify rules by which the client creates valid alternative names. Clients are informed of such rules by a mechanism that is not specified by this standard. Alternative Names MAY NOT be unique within a given key management domain.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Alternative Name |
Structure |
|
Alternative Name Value |
Text String |
Yes |
Alternative Name Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.34 |
Yes |
Table 137: Alternative Name Attribute Structure
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client |
Modifiable by server |
Yes (Only if no value present) |
Modifiable by client |
Yes |
Deletable by client |
Yes |
Multiple instances permitted |
Yes |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 138: Alternative Name Attribute Rules
Key Value Present is an OPTIONAL attribute of the managed object created by the server. It SHALL NOT be specified by the client in a Register request. Key Value Present SHALL be created by the server if the Key Value is absent from the Key Block in a Register request. The value of Key Value Present SHALL NOT be modified by either the client or the server. Key Value Present attribute MAY be used as a part of the Locate operation. This attribute does not apply to Templates, Certificates, Public Keys or Opaque Objects.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Value Present |
Boolean |
No |
Table 139: Key Value Present Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Server |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
During Register operation |
Applies to Object Types |
Symmetric Key, Private Key, Split Key, Secret Data |
Table 140: Key Value Present Attribute Rules
Key Value Location is an OPTIONAL attribute of a managed object. It MAY be specified by the client when the Key Value is omitted from the Key Block in a Register request. Key Value Location is used to indicate the location of the Key Value absent from the object being registered. This attribute does not apply to Templates, Certificates, Public Keys or Opaque Objects.
Object |
Encoding |
REQUIRED |
Key Value Location |
Structure |
|
Key Value Location Value |
Text String |
Yes |
Key Value Location Type |
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.35 |
Yes |
Table 141: Key Value Location Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
Yes |
Deletable by client |
Yes |
Multiple instances permitted |
Yes |
When implicitly set |
Never |
Applies to Object Types |
Symmetric Key, Private Key, Split Key, Secret Data |
Table 142: Key Value Location Attribute Rules
The Original Creation Date attribute contains the date and time the object was originally created, which can be different from when the object is registered with a key management server.
It is OPTIONAL for an object being registered by a client. The Original Creation Date MAY be set by the client during a Register operation. If no Original Creation Date attribute was set by the client during a Register operation, it MAY do so at a later time through an Add Attribute operation for that object.
It is mandatory for an object created on the server as a result of a Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, or Re-key Key Pair operation. In such cases the Original Creation Date SHALL be set by the server and SHALL be the same as the Initial Date attribute.
In all cases, once the Original Creation Date is set, it SHALL NOT be deleted or updated.
Object |
Encoding |
Original Creation Date |
Date-Time |
Table 143: Original Creation Date Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client or Server (when object is generated by Server) |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Objects |
Table 144: Original Creation Date Attribute Rules
The Random Number Generator attribute contains the details of the random number generator used during the creation of the managed cryptographic object.
It is OPTIONAL for a managed cryptographic object being registered by a client. The Random Number Generator MAY be set by the client during a Register operation. If no Random Number Generator attribute was set by the client during a Register operation, it MAY do so at a later time through an Add Attribute operation for that object.
It is mandatory for an object created on the server as a result of a Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, or Re-key Key Pair operation. In such cases the Random Number Generator SHALL be set by the server depending on which random number generator was used. If the specific details of the random number generator are unknown then the RNG Algorithm within the RNG Parameters structure SHALL be set to Unspecified.
If one or more Random Number Generator attribute values are provided in the template attributes (either directly or via reference to templates which contain Random Number Generator attribute values) in a Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, or Re-key Key Pair operation then the server SHALL use a random number generator that matches one of the Random Number Generator attributes. If the server does not support or is otherwise unable to use a matching random number generator then it SHALL fail the request.
The Random Number Generator attribute SHALL NOT be copied from the original object in a Re-key or Re-key Key Pair operation.
In all cases, once the Random Number Generator attribute is set, it SHALL NOT be deleted or updated.
Object |
Encoding |
Random Number Generator |
RNG Parameters (see 2.1.18) |
Table 145: Random Number Generator Attribute
SHALL always have a value |
No |
Initially set by |
Client (when the object is generated by the Client and registered) or Server (when object is generated by Server) |
Modifiable by server |
No |
Modifiable by client |
No |
Deletable by client |
No |
Multiple instances permitted |
No |
When implicitly set |
Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair |
Applies to Object Types |
All Cryptographic Objects |
Table 146: Random Number Generator Attribute Rules
The following subsections describe the operations that MAY be requested by a key management client. Not all clients have to be capable of issuing all operation requests; however any client that issues a specific request SHALL be capable of understanding the response to the request. All Object Management operations are issued in requests from clients to servers, and results obtained in responses from servers to clients. Multiple operations MAY be combined within a batch, resulting in a single request/response message pair.
A number of the operations whose descriptions follow are affected by a mechanism referred to as the ID Placeholder.
The key management server SHALL implement a temporary variable called the ID Placeholder. This value consists of a single Unique Identifier. It is a variable stored inside the server that is only valid and preserved during the execution of a batch of operations. Once the batch of operations has been completed, the ID Placeholder value SHALL be discarded and/or invalidated by the server, so that subsequent requests do not find this previous ID Placeholder available.
The ID Placeholder is obtained from the Unique Identifier returned in response to the Create, Create Pair, Register, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Certify, Re-Certify, Locate, and Recover operations. If any of these operations successfully completes and returns a Unique Identifier, then the server SHALL copy this Unique Identifier into the ID Placeholder variable, where it is held until the completion of the operations remaining in the batched request or until a subsequent operation in the batch causes the ID Placeholder to be replaced. If the Batch Error Continuation Option is set to Stop and the Batch Order Option is set to true, then subsequent operations in the batched request MAY make use of the ID Placeholder by omitting the Unique Identifier field from the request payloads for these operations.
Requests MAY contain attribute values to be assigned to the object. This information is specified with a Template-Attribute (see Section 2.1.8) that contains zero or more template names and zero or more individual attributes. If more than one template name is specified, and there is a conflict between the single-instance attributes in the templates, then the value in the last of the conflicting templates takes precedence. If there is a conflict between the single-instance attributes in the request and the single-instance attributes in a specified template, then the attribute values in the request take precedence. For multi-instance attributes, the union of attribute values is used when the attributes are specified more than once.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference a Template.
Responses MAY contain attribute values that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the server. This information is specified with a Template-Attribute that contains one or more individual attributes.
For any operations that operate on Managed Objects already stored on the server, any archived object SHALL first be made available by a Recover operation (see Section 4.23) before they MAY be specified (i.e., as on-line objects).
Multi-part cryptographic operations (operations where a stream of data is provided across multiple requests from a client to a server) are optionally supported by those cryptographic operations that include the Correlation Value (see section 2.1.15), Init Indicator (see section 2.1.16) and Final Indicator (see section 2.1.17) request parameters.
For multi-part cryptographic operations the following sequence is performed
a. Provide an Init Indicator with a value of True
b. Provide any other required parameters
c. Preserve the Correlation Value returned in the response for use in subsequent requests
d. Use the Data output (if any) from the response
a. Provide the Correlation Value from the response to the first request
b. Provide any other required parameters
c. Use the next block of Data output (if any) from the response
a. Provide the Correlation Value from the response to the first request
b. Provide a Final Indicator with a value of True
c. Use the final block of Data output (if any) from the response
Single-part cryptographic operations (operations where a single input is provided and a single response returned) the following sequence is performed:
a. Do not provide an Init Indicator, Final Indicator or Correlation Value or provide an Init indicator and Final Indicator but no Correlation Value.
b. Provide any other required parameters
c. Use the Data output from the response
Data is always required in cryptographic operations except when either Init Indicator or Final Indicator is true.
This operation requests the server to generate a new symmetric key as a Managed Cryptographic Object. This operation is not used to create a Template object (see Register operation, Section 4.3).
The request contains information about the type of object being created, and some of the attributes to be assigned to the object (e.g., Cryptographic Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, etc.). This information MAY be specified by the names of Template objects that already exist.
The response contains the Unique Identifier of the created object. The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable.
Request Payload |
||
Object |
REQUIRED |
Description |
Object Type, see 3.3 |
Yes |
Determines the type of object to be created. |
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14 |
Yes |
Specifies desired attributes using to be associated with the new object templates and/or individual attributes. The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference a Template. |
Table 147: Create Request Payload
Response Payload |
||
Object |
REQUIRED |
Description |
Object Type, see 3.3 |
Yes |
Type of object created. |
Unique Identifier, see 3.1 |
Yes |
The Unique Identifier of the newly created object. |
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14 |
No |
An OPTIONAL list of object attributes with values that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the key management server. The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference a Template. |
Table 148: Create Response Payload
Table 149 indicates which attributes SHALL be included in the Create request using the Template-Attribute object.
Attribute |
REQUIRED |
Cryptographic Algorithm, see 3.4 |
Yes |
Cryptographic Usage Mask, see 3.19 |
Yes |
Table 149: Create Attribute Requirements
This operation requests the server to generate a new public/private key pair and register the two corresponding new Managed Cryptographic Objects.
The request contains attributes to be assigned to the objects (e.g., Cryptographic Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, etc.). Attributes and Template Names MAY be specified for both keys at the same time by specifying a Common Template-Attribute object in the request. Attributes not common to both keys (e.g., Name, Cryptographic Usage Mask) MAY be specified using the Private Key Template-Attribute and Public Key Template-Attribute objects in the request, which take precedence over the Common Template-Attribute object.
The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference a Template.
For the Private Key, the server SHALL create a Link attribute of Link Type Public Key pointing to the Public Key. For the Public Key, the server SHALL create a Link attribute of Link Type Private Key pointing to the Private Key. The response contains the Unique Identifiers of both created objects. The ID Placeholder value SHALL be set to the Unique Identifier of the Private Key.
Request Payload |
||
Object |
REQUIRED |
Description |
Common Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14 |
No |
Specifies desired attributes in templates and/or as individual attributes to be associated with the new object that apply to both the Private and Public Key Objects. The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference a Template. |
Private Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14 |
No |
Specifies templates and/or attributes to be associated with the new object that apply to the Private Key Object. Order of precedence applies. The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference a Template. |
Public Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14 |
No |
Specifies templates and/or attributes to be associated with the new object that apply to the Public Key Object. Order of precedence applies. The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference a Template. |
Table 150: Create Key Pair Request Payload
For multi-instance attributes, the union of the values found in the templates and attributes of the Common, Private, and Public Key Template-Attribute SHALL be used. For single-instance attributes, the order of precedence is as follows:
1. attributes specified explicitly in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
2. attributes specified via templates in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
3. attributes specified explicitly in the Common Template-Attribute, then
4. attributes specified via templates in the Common Template-Attribute.
If there are multiple templates in the Common, Private, or Public Key Template-Attribute, then the last value of the single-instance attribute that conflicts takes precedence.
Response Payload |
||
Object |
REQUIRED |
Description |
Private Key Unique Identifier, see 3.1 |
Yes |
The Unique Identifier of the newly created Private Key object. |
Public Key Unique Identifier, see 3.1 |
Yes |
The Unique Identifier of the newly created Public Key object. |
Private Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14 |
No |
An OPTIONAL list of attributes, for the Private Key Object, with values that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the key management server. The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference a Template. |
Public Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.7.14 |
No |
An OPTIONAL list of attributes, for the Public Key Object, with values that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the key management server. The Template Managed Object is deprecated as of version 1.3 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. Individual Attributes SHOULD be used in operations which currently support use of a Name within a Template-Attribute to reference a Template. |
Table 151: Create Key Pair Response Payload
Table 152 indicates which attributes SHALL be included in the Create Key pair request using Template-Attribute objects, as well as which attributes SHALL have the same value for the Private and Public Key.
Attribute |
REQUIRED |
SHALL contain the same value for both Private and Public Key |
Cryptographic Algorithm, see 3.4 |
Yes |
Yes |
Cryptographic Length, see 3.5 |
No |
Yes |
Cryptographic Usage Mask, see 3.19 |