This document is intended as a specification of the
protocol used for the communication between clients and servers to perform
certain management operations on objects stored and maintained by a key
management system. These objects are referred to as Managed Objects in
this specification. They include symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic keys,
digital certificates, and templates used to simplify the creation of objects
and control their use. Managed Objects are managed with operations that
include the ability to generate cryptographic keys, register objects with the
key management system, obtain objects from the system, destroy objects from the
system, and search for objects maintained by the system. Managed Objects also
have associated attributes, which are named values stored by the key
management system and are obtained from the system via operations. Certain
attributes are added, modified, or deleted by operations.
The protocol specified in this document includes several
certificate-related functions for which there are a number of existing
protocols – namely Validate (e.g., SCVP or XKMS), Certify (e.g., CMP, CMC,
SCEP) and Re-certify (e.g., CMP, CMC, SCEP). The protocol does not attempt to
define a comprehensive certificate management protocol, such as would be needed
for a certification authority. However, it does include functions that are
needed to allow a key server to provide a proxy for certificate management
functions.
In addition to the normative definitions for managed
objects, operations and attributes, this specification also includes normative
definitions for the following aspects of the protocol:
·
The expected behavior of the server and client as a result of
operations,
·
Message contents and formats,
·
Message encoding (including enumerations), and
·
Error handling.
This specification is complemented by several other documents. The
KMIP Usage Guide[KMIP-UG] provides illustrative
information on using the protocol. The KMIP Profiles Specification [KMIP-Prof] provides a selected set of base level
conformance profiles and authentication suites; additional KMIP Profiles define
specific sets of KMIP functionality for conformance purposes. The KMIP Test
Specification [KMIP-TC] provides samples of protocol
messages corresponding to a set of defined test cases. The KMIP Use Cases
document [KMIP-UC] provides user stories that define
the use of and context for functionality defined in KMIP.
This specification defines the KMIP protocol version major
1 and minor 2 (see 6.1).
The key words “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD
NOT”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described
in [RFC2119][RFC2119].
For acronyms used in this document, see Appendix E. For definitions not found in this document, see [SP800-57-1].
|
Archive
|
To place information not accessed frequently into
long-term storage.
|
|
Asymmetric key pair
(key pair)
|
A public key and its corresponding private key; a key pair
is used with a public key algorithm.
|
|
Authentication
|
A process that establishes the origin of information, or
determines an entity’s identity.
|
|
Authentication code
|
A cryptographic checksum based on a security function.
|
|
Authorization
|
Access privileges that are granted to an entity; conveying
an “official” sanction to perform a security function or activity.
|
|
Certificate length
|
The length (in bytes) of an X.509 public key certificate.
|
|
Certification authority
|
The entity in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is
responsible for issuing certificates, and exacting compliance to a PKI
policy.
|
|
Ciphertext
|
Data in its encrypted form.
|
|
Compromise
|
The unauthorized disclosure, modification, substitution or
use of sensitive data (e.g., keying material and other security-related
information).
|
|
Confidentiality
|
The property that sensitive information is not disclosed
to unauthorized entities.
|
|
Cryptographic algorithm
|
A well-defined computational procedure that takes variable
inputs, including a cryptographic key and produces an output.
|
|
Cryptographic key
(key)
|
A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic
algorithm that determines its operation in such a way that an entity with
knowledge of the key can reproduce or reverse the operation, while an entity
without knowledge of the key cannot. Examples include:
1. The transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext
data,
2. The transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext
data,
3. The computation of a digital signature from data,
4. The verification of a digital signature,
5. The computation of an authentication code from data,
and
6. The verification of an authentication code from data
and a received authentication code.
|
|
Decryption
|
The process of changing ciphertext into plaintext using a
cryptographic algorithm and key.
|
|
Digest (or hash)
|
The result of applying a hashing algorithm to information.
|
|
Digital signature
(signature)
|
The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that,
when properly implemented with supporting infrastructure and policy, provides
the services of:
1. origin authentication
2. data integrity, and
3. signer non-repudiation.
|
|
Digital Signature Algorithm
|
A cryptographic algorithm used for digital signature.
|
|
Encryption
|
The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext using a
cryptographic algorithm and key.
|
|
Hashing algorithm (or hash algorithm, hash function)
|
An algorithm that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to
a fixed length bit string. Approved hashing algorithms satisfy the following
properties:
1. (One-way) It
is computationally infeasible to find any input that
maps to any
pre-specified output, and
2. (Collision resistant) It is computationally infeasible
to find any two distinct inputs that map to the same output.
|
|
Integrity
|
The property that sensitive data has not been modified or
deleted in an unauthorized and undetected manner.
|
|
Key derivation
(derivation)
|
A function in the lifecycle of keying material; the process
by which one or more keys are derived from:
1) Either a shared secret from a key agreement computation
or a pre-shared cryptographic key, and
2) Other information.
|
|
Key management
|
The activities involving the handling of cryptographic
keys and other related security parameters (e.g., IVs and passwords) during
the entire life cycle of the keys, including their generation, storage,
establishment, entry and output, and destruction.
|
|
Key wrapping
(wrapping)
|
A method of encrypting and/or MACing/signing keys.
|
|
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
|
A cryptographic checksum on data that uses a symmetric key
to detect both accidental and intentional modifications of data.
|
|
PGP Key
|
A RFC 4880-compliant container of cryptographic keys and
associated metadata. Usually text-based (in PGP-parlance, ASCII-armored).
|
|
Private key
|
A cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic
algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and is not made public.
The private key is associated with a public key. Depending on the algorithm,
the private key MAY be used to:
1. Compute the corresponding public key,
2. Compute a digital signature that can be verified by the
corresponding public key,
3. Decrypt data that was encrypted by the corresponding
public key, or
4. Compute a piece of common shared data, together with
other information.
|
|
Profile
|
A specification of objects, attributes, operations,
message elements and authentication methods to be used in specific contexts
of key management server and client interactions (see [KMIP-Prof]).
|
|
Public key
|
A cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic
algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and that MAY be made
public. The public key is associated with a private key. The public key MAY
be known by anyone and, depending on the algorithm, MAY be used to:
1. Verify a digital signature that is signed by the
corresponding private key,
2. Encrypt data that can be decrypted by the corresponding
private key, or
3. Compute a piece of shared data.
|
|
Public key certificate
(certificate)
|
A set of data that uniquely identifies an entity, contains
the entity's public key and possibly other information, and is digitally
signed by a trusted party, thereby binding the public key to the entity.
|
|
Public key cryptographic algorithm
|
A cryptographic algorithm that uses two related keys, a
public key and a private key. The two keys have the property that determining
the private key from the public key is computationally infeasible.
|
|
Public Key Infrastructure
|
A framework that is established to issue, maintain and
revoke public key certificates.
|
|
Recover
|
To retrieve information that was archived to long-term
storage.
|
|
Split Key
|
A process by which a cryptographic key is split into n multiple
key components, individually providing no knowledge of the original key,
which can be subsequently combined to recreate the original cryptographic
key. If knowledge of k (where k is less than or equal to n)
components is necessary to construct the original key, then knowledge of any k-1
key components provides no information about the original key other than,
possibly, its length.
|
|
Symmetric key
|
A single cryptographic key that is used with a secret
(symmetric) key algorithm.
|
|
Symmetric key algorithm
|
A cryptographic algorithm that uses the same secret
(symmetric) key for an operation and its inverse (e.g., encryption and
decryption).
|
|
X.509 certificate
|
The ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard defined two types of
certificates – the X.509 public key certificate, and the X.509 attribute
certificate. Most commonly (including this document), an X.509 certificate
refers to the X.509 public key certificate.
|
|
X.509 public key certificate
|
The public key for a user
(or device) and a name for the user (or device), together with some other
information, rendered un-forgeable by the digital signature of the
certification authority that issued the certificate, encoded in the format
defined in the ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard.
|
Table 1: Terminology
[ECC-Brainpool] ECC
Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation v. 1.0.19.10.2005, http://www.ecc-brainpool.org/download/Domain-parameters.pdf.
[FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 186-4, March 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips18-4/fips-180-4.pdf.
[FIPS186-4] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS PUB 186-4, July 2013, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf.
[FIPS197] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, November 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf.
[FIPS198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), FIPS PUB 198-1, July 2008, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf.
[IEEE1003-1] IEEE Std 1003.1, Standard for information technology - portable
operating system interface (POSIX). Shell and utilities, 2004.
[ISO16609] ISO, Banking -- Requirements
for message authentication using symmetric techniques, ISO 16609, 2012.
[ISO9797-1] ISO/IEC, Information
technology -- Security techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs) --
Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, ISO/IEC 9797-1, 2011.
[KMIP-Prof] Key Management
Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.2 wd02, June 27, 2013, https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/kmip/download.php/49689/kmip-profiles-v1.2-wd02.doc.
[PKCS#1] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA
Cryptography Standard, June 14, 2002, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125.
[PKCS#5] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #5 v2.1: Password-Based
Cryptography Standard, October 5, 2006, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2127.
[PKCS#7] RSA
Laboratories, PKCS#7 v1.5: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard, November
1, 1993, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2129.
[PKCS#8] RSA
Laboratories, PKCS#8 v1.2: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard,
November 1, 1993, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2130.
[PKCS#10] RSA
Laboratories, PKCS #10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax Standard,
May 26, 2000, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2132.
[RFC1319] B. Kaliski, The MD2
Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1319, Apr 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt.
[RFC1320] R. Rivest, The MD4
Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1320, April 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt.
[RFC1321] R. Rivest, The MD5
Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1321, April 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt.
[RFC1421] J. Linn, Privacy Enhancement
for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication
Procedures,
IETF RFC 1421, February 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1421.txt.
[RFC1424] B. Kaliski, Privacy
Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key Certification and
Related Services, IETF RFC 1424, Feb 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1424.txt.
[RFC1945] T.
Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, H. Frystyk, Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0,
IETF RFC 1945, May 1996, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1945.txt.
[RFC2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R.
Canetti, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, IETF RFC 2104,
February 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt.
[RFC2119] S.
Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, IETF
RFC 2119, March 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt.
[RFC2315] B. Kaliski, PKCS #7:
Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5, IETF RFC2315, March 1998, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2315.txt.
[RFC2898] B. Kaliski, PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification
Version 2.0, IETF RFC 2898, September 2000, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt.
[RFC2986] M. Nystrom and
B. Kaliski, PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version
1.7, IETF RFC2986, November 2000, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt.
[RFC3394] J. Schaad, R. Housley, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm, IETF RFC 3394, September
2002, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt.
[RFC3447] J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski, Public-Key
Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,
IETF RFC 3447, Feb 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt.
[RFC3629] F. Yergeau, UTF-8, a
transformation format of ISO 10646, IETF RFC 3629, November 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3629.txt.
[RFC3647] S. Chokhani, W.
Ford, R. Sabett, C. Merrill, and S. Wu, Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework,
IETF RFC 3647, November 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3647.txt.
[RFC3686] R. Housley, Using Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) Counter Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP),
IETF RFC 3686, January 2004, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3686.txt. [RFC4055] J. Schadd, B. Kaliski, and R, Housley, HHAdditional Algorithms and Identifiers
for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, IETF
RFC 4055, June 2055, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4055.txt.
[RFC4210] C. Adams, S.
Farrell, T. Kause and T. Mononen, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), IETF RFC 2510, September 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4210.txt.
[RFC4211] J. Schaad, Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF), IETF
RFC 4211, September 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4211.txt.
[RFC4868] S. Kelly, S. Frankel, Using
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec, IETF RFC 4868, May
2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4868.txt.
[RFC4880] J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, D. Shaw, and R. Thayer, OpenPGP
Message Format, IETF RFC 4880, November 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt.
[RFC4949] R. Shirey, Internet
Security Glossary, Version 2, IETF RFC 4949, August 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt.
[RFC5208] B. Kaliski, Public Key
Cryptographic Standards (PKCS) #8: Private-Key Information Syntax
Specification Version 1.2, IETF RFC5208, May 2008, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5208.txt.
[RFC5272] J. Schaad and
M. Meyers, Certificate Management over CMS (CMC), IETF RFC 5272, June
2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5272.txt.
[RFC5280] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S.
Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk, Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate, IETF RFC 5280, May 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt.
[RFC5649] R. Housley, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm, IETF RFC 5649,
Aug 2009, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt.
[RFC5755] S. Turner, D. Brown, K. Yiu, R.
Housley, T. Polk, Updates for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS Algorithm Parameters,
IETF RFC5755, January 2010, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756.txt.
[RFC6402] J. Schaad, Certificate Management
over CMS (CMC) Updates, IETF RFC6402, November 2011, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6402.txt.
[RFC6818] P. Yee, Updates to the Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile, IETF RFC6818, January 2013, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6818.txt.
[SEC2] SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters,
http://www.secg.org/collateral/sec2_final.pdf.
[SP800-38A] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation –
Methods and Techniques, NIST Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf.
[SP800-38B] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
CMAC Mode for Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf.
[SP800-38C] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the
CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, NIST Special Publication
800-38C, May 2004, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf.
[SP800-38D] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, NIST Special Publication 800-38D, Nov
2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf.
[SP800-38E] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Block-Oriented Storage Devices, NIST
Special Publication 800-38E, January 2010, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf.
[SP800-38F] M. Dworkin, Recommendation for
Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, NIST Special
Publication 800-38F, December 2012, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf.
[SP800-56A] E. Barker, L. Chen, A. Roginsky and M. Smid, Recommendation for
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography,
NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, May 2013, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar2.pdf.
[SP800-56B] E. Barker, L. Chen, A. Regenscheid, and M. Smid, Recommendation for
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography,
NIST Special Publication 800-56B, August 2009, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56B/sp800-56B.pdf.
[SP800-57-1] E. Barker, W. Barker, W. Burr, W. Polk, and M. Smid, Recommendations
for Key Management - Part 1: General (Revision 3), NIST Special Publication
800-57 Part 1 Revision 3, July 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57-part1-rev3_general.pdf.
[SP800-67] W. Barker and E. Barker, Recommendation
for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, NIST Special
Publication 800-67 Revision 1, January 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf.
[SP800-108] L. Chen, Recommendation
for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), NIST Special
Publication 800-108, Oct 2009, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf.
[X.509] International
Telecommunication Union (ITU)–T, X.509: Information technology – Open systems
interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks, November 2008, http://www.itu.int/rec/recommendation.asp?lang=en&parent=T-REC-X.509-200811-1.
[X9.24-1] ANSI, X9.24 - Retail
Financial Services Symmetric Key Management - Part 1: Using Symmetric
Techniques, 2009.
[X9.31] ANSI, X9.31: Digital
Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry (rDSA), September 1998.
[X9.42] ANSI, X9.42:
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Agreement of
Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, 2003.
[X9.57] ANSI, X9.57: Public
Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Certificate Management,
1997.
[X9.62] ANSI, X9.62: Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA), 2005.
[X9.63] ANSI, X9.63: Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic
Curve Cryptography, 2011.
[X9.102] ANSI, X9.102: Symmetric Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Wrapping of Keys and
Associated Data, 2008.
[X9 TR-31] ANSI, X9 TR-31: Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block
Specification for Symmetric Algorithms, 2010.
[ISO/IEC 9945-2] The Open Group, Regular
Expressions, The Single UNIX Specification version 2, 1997, ISO/IEC
9945-2:1993, http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007908799/xbd/re.html.
[KMIP-UG] Key Management Interoperability Protocol
Usage Guide Version 1.2 Working Draft 06, August 22, 2013, https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/kmip/download.php/50409/kmip-ug-v1%202-wd06.pdf.
[KMIP-TC] Key Management Interoperability Protocol
Test Cases Version 1.2 Working Draft 02, August 07, 2013, https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/kmip/download.php/50188/kmip-testcases-v1.2-wd02.docx.
[KMIP-UC] Key Management Interoperability Protocol
Use Cases Version 1.2 Working Draft 10, June 20, 2013, https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/kmip/download.php/49644/kmip-usecases-v1.2-wd10.doc.
[RFC6151] S. Turner and L. Chen, Updated
Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms,
IETF RFC6151, March 2011, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6151.txt.
[RFC6712] T. Kause, and M. Peylo, Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure – HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP), IETF RFC6712, September 2012, http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6712.txt.
[w1979] A. Shamir, How to share a secret,
Communications of the ACM, vol 22, no. 11, pp. 612-613, November 1979.
The following subsections describe the objects that are
passed between the clients and servers of the key management system. Some of
these object types, called Base Objects, are used only in the protocol
itself, and are not considered Managed Objects. Key management systems MAY choose
to support a subset of the Managed Objects. The object descriptions refer to
the primitive data types of which they are composed. These primitive data types
are (see Section 9.1.1.4):
·
Integer
·
Long Integer
·
Big Integer
·
Enumeration – choices from a predefined list of values
·
Boolean
·
Text String – string of characters representing human-readable
text
·
Byte String – sequence of unencoded byte values
·
Date-Time – date and time, with a granularity of one second
·
Interval – a length of time expressed in seconds
Structures are composed of
ordered lists of primitive data types or sub-structures.
2.1 Base Objects
These objects are used within the messages of the
protocol, but are not objects managed by the key management system. They are components
of Managed Objects.
2.1.1 Attribute
An Attribute object is a structure (see Table 2) used for sending and receiving Managed Object attributes. The Attribute Name is a
text-string that is used to identify the attribute. The Attribute Index
is an index number assigned by the key management server. The Attribute Index
is used to identify the particular instance. Attribute Indices SHALL start with
0. The Attribute Index of an attribute SHALL NOT change when other instances
are added or deleted. Single-instance Attributes (attributes which an object
MAY only have at most one instance thereof) SHALL have an Attribute Index of 0.
The Attribute Value is either a primitive data type or structured
object, depending on the attribute.
When an Attribute structure is used to specify or return a
particular instance of an Attribute and the Attribute Index is not specified it
SHALL be assumed to be 0.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Attribute
|
Structure
|
|
|
Attribute Name
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Attribute Index
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Attribute Value
|
Varies, depending on attribute. See Section 3
|
Yes, except for the Notify operation (see Section 5.1)
|
Table
2: Attribute Object Structure
A Credential is a structure (see Table 3) used for client identification purposes and is not managed by the key management system
(e.g., user id/password pairs, Kerberos tokens, etc.). It MAY be used for
authentication purposes as indicated in [KMIP-Prof].
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Credential
|
Structure
|
|
|
Credential Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.1
|
Yes
|
|
Credential Value
|
Varies based on Credential Type.
|
Yes
|
Table 3: Credential Object Structure
If the Credential Type in the Credential is Username and
Password, then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 4. The Username field identifies the client, and the Password field is a secret
that authenticates the client.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Credential Value
|
Structure
|
|
|
Username
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Password
|
Text String
|
No
|
Table 4: Credential Value Structure for the Username
and Password Credential
If the Credential Type in the Credential is Device,
then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 5. One or a combination
of the Device Serial Number, Network Identifier, Machine
Identifier, and Media Identifier SHALL be unique. Server
implementations MAY enforce policies on uniqueness for individual fields. A
shared secret or password MAY also be used to authenticate the client. The
client SHALL provide at least one field.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Credential Value
|
Structure
|
|
|
Device Serial Number
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Password
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Device Identifier
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Network Identifier
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Machine Identifier
|
Text String
|
No
|
|
Media Identifier
|
Text String
|
No
|
Table 5: Credential Value Structure for the Device
Credential
If the Credential Type in the Credential is Attestation,
then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 6. The Nonce Value
is obtained from the key management server in a Nonce Object. The Attestation
Credential Object can contain a measurement from the client or an assertion
from a third party if the server is not capable or willing to verify the
attestation data from the client. Neither type of attestation data (Attestation
Measurement or Attestation Assertion) is necessary to allow the
server to accept either. However, the client SHALL provide attestation data in
either the Attestation Measurement or Attestation Assertion
fields.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Credential Value
|
Structure
|
|
|
Nonce
|
Structure, see 2.1.14
|
Yes
|
|
Attestation Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.36
|
Yes
|
|
Attestation Measurement
|
Byte String
|
No
|
|
Attestation Assertion
|
Byte String
|
No
|
Table 6: Credential Value
Structure for the Attestation Credential
A Key Block object is a structure (see Table 7) used to encapsulate all of the information that is closely associated with a
cryptographic key. It contains a Key Value of one of the following Key
Format Types:
·
Raw – This is a key that contains only cryptographic key
material, encoded as a string of bytes.
·
Opaque – This is an encoded key for which the encoding is
unknown to the key management system. It is encoded as a string of bytes.
·
PKCS1 – This is an encoded private key, expressed as a
DER-encoded ASN.1 PKCS#1 object.
·
PKCS8 – This is an encoded private key, expressed as a
DER-encoded ASN.1 PKCS#8 object, supporting both the RSAPrivateKey syntax and
EncryptedPrivateKey.
·
X.509 – This is an encoded object, expressed as a
DER-encoded ASN.1 X.509 object.
·
ECPrivateKey – This is an ASN.1 encoded elliptic curve private
key.
·
Several Transparent Key types – These are
algorithm-specific structures containing defined values for the various key
types, as defined in Section 2.1.7.
·
Extensions – These are vendor-specific extensions to allow
for proprietary or legacy key formats.
The Key Block MAY contain the Key Compression Type, which
indicates the format of the elliptic curve public key. By default, the public
key is uncompressed.
The Key Block also has the Cryptographic Algorithm and the
Cryptographic Length of the key contained in the Key Value field. Some example
values are:
·
RSA keys are typically 1024, 2048 or 3072 bits in length.
·
3DES keys are typically from 112 to 192 bits (depending upon key
length and the presence of parity bits).
·
AES keys are 128, 192 or 256 bits in length.
The Key Block SHALL contain a Key Wrapping Data structure
if the key in the Key Value field is wrapped (i.e., encrypted, or MACed/signed,
or both).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Format Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.3
|
Yes
|
|
Key Compression Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.2
|
No
|
|
Key Value
|
Byte String: for wrapped Key Value; Structure: for
plaintext Key Value, see 2.1.4
|
No
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13
|
Yes. MAY be omitted only if this information is available from the
Key Value. Does not apply to Secret Data (see Section 2.2.7) or Opaque
Objects (see Section 2.2.8). If
present, the Cryptographic Length SHALL also be present.
|
|
Cryptographic Length
|
Integer
|
Yes. MAY be omitted only if this information is available from the
Key Value. Does not apply to Secret Data (see Section 2.2.7) or Opaque
Objects (see Section 2.2.8). If
present, the Cryptographic Algorithm SHALL also be present.
|
|
Key Wrapping Data
|
Structure, see 2.1.5
|
No. SHALL only be present if the key is wrapped.
|
Table
7: Key Block Object Structure
The Key Value is used only inside a Key Block and
is either a Byte String or a structure (see Table 8):
·
The Key Value structure contains the key material, either as a
byte string or as a Transparent Key structure (see Section 2.1.7), and OPTIONAL attribute information that is associated and encapsulated with
the key material. This attribute information differs from the attributes
associated with Managed Objects, and is obtained via the Get Attributes
operation, only by the fact that it is encapsulated with (and possibly wrapped
with) the key material itself.
·
The Key Value Byte String is either the wrapped TTLV-encoded (see
Section 9.1) Key Value structure, or the wrapped un-encoded value of the Byte
String Key Material field.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Value
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Material
|
Byte String: for Raw, Opaque, PKCS1, PKCS8,
ECPrivateKey, or Extension Key Format types;
Structure:
for Transparent, or Extension Key Format Types
|
Yes
|
|
Attribute
|
Attribute Object, see Section 2.1.1
|
No. MAY be repeated
|
Table
8: Key Value Object Structure
The Key Block MAY also supply OPTIONAL information about a
cryptographic key wrapping mechanism used to wrap the Key Value. This consists
of a Key Wrapping Data structure (see Table 9). It is only used inside a Key Block.
This structure contains fields for:
·
A Wrapping Method, which indicates the method used to wrap
the Key Value.
·
Encryption Key Information, which contains the Unique
Identifier (see 3.1) value of the encryption key and associated cryptographic
parameters.
·
MAC/Signature Key Information, which contains the Unique
Identifier value of the MAC/signature key and associated cryptographic
parameters.
·
A MAC/Signature, which contains a MAC or signature of the
Key Value.
·
An IV/Counter/Nonce, if REQUIRED by the wrapping method.
·
An Encoding Option, specifying the encoding of the Key
Material within the Key Value structure of the Key Block that has been wrapped.
If No Encoding is specified, then the Key Value structure SHALL NOT contain any
attributes.
If wrapping is used, then the whole Key Value structure is
wrapped unless otherwise specified by the Wrapping Method. The algorithms used
for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic Algorithm attributes of the
encryption key and/or MAC/signature key; the block-cipher mode, padding method,
and hashing algorithm used for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic
Parameters in the Encryption Key Information and/or MAC/Signature Key
Information, or, if not present, from the Cryptographic Parameters attribute of
the respective key(s). Either the Encryption Key Information or the MAC/Signature
Key Information (or both) in the Key Wrapping Data structure SHALL be specified.
The following wrapping methods are currently defined:
·
Encrypt only (i.e., encryption using a symmetric key or
public key, or authenticated encryption algorithms that use a single key).
·
MAC/sign only (i.e., either MACing the Key Value with a
symmetric key, or signing the Key Value with a private key).
·
Encrypt then MAC/sign.
·
MAC/sign then encrypt.
·
TR-31.
·
Extensions.
The following encoding options
are currently defined:
·
No Encoding (i.e., the wrapped un-encoded value of the
Byte String Key Material field in the Key Value structure).
·
TTLV Encoding (i.e., the wrapped TTLV-encoded Key Value
structure).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Wrapping Data
|
Structure
|
|
|
Wrapping Method
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.4
|
Yes
|
|
Encryption Key
Information
|
Structure, see below
|
No. Corresponds to the key that was used to encrypt the Key Value.
|
|
MAC/Signature Key
Information
|
Structure, see below
|
No. Corresponds to the symmetric key used
to MAC the Key Value or the private key used to sign the Key Value
|
|
MAC/Signature
|
Byte String
|
No
|
|
IV/Counter/Nonce
|
Byte String
|
No
|
|
Encoding Option
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.32
|
No. Specifies the encoding of the Key Value Byte
String. If not present, the wrapped Key Value structure SHALL be TTLV
encoded.
|
Table 9: Key Wrapping Data Object Structure
The structures of the Encryption
Key Information (see Table 10) and the MAC/Signature Key Information (see Table 11) are as follows:
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Encryption Key
Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Unique Identifier
|
Text
string, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters
|
Structure,
see 3.6
|
No
|
Table 10: Encryption Key Information Object Structure
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
MAC/Signature Key
Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Unique Identifier
|
Text
string, see 3.1
|
Yes. It SHALL be either the Unique Identifier of the
Symmetric Key used to MAC, or of the Private Key (or its corresponding Public
Key) used to sign.
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters
|
Structure,
see 3.6
|
No
|
Table 11: MAC/Signature Key
Information Object Structure
This is a separate structure (see Table 12) that is
defined for operations that provide the option to return wrapped keys. The Key Wrapping Specification SHALL be included
inside the operation request if clients request the server to return a wrapped
key. If Cryptographic Parameters are specified in the Encryption Key
Information and/or the MAC/Signature Key Information of the Key
Wrapping Specification, then the server SHALL verify that they match one of the
instances of the Cryptographic Parameters attribute of the corresponding key.
If Cryptographic Parameters are omitted, then the server SHALL use the
Cryptographic Parameters attribute with the lowest Attribute Index of the
corresponding key. If the corresponding key does not have any Cryptographic
Parameters attribute, or if no match is found, then an error is returned.
This structure contains:
·
A Wrapping Method that indicates the method used to wrap the Key
Value.
·
Encryption Key Information with the Unique Identifier value of
the encryption key and associated cryptographic parameters.
·
MAC/Signature Key Information with the Unique Identifier value of
the MAC/signature key and associated cryptographic parameters.
·
Zero or more Attribute Names to indicate the attributes to be
wrapped with the key material.
·
An Encoding Option, specifying the encoding of the Key Value
before wrapping. If No Encoding is specified, then the Key Value SHALL NOT
contain any attributes
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Wrapping Specification
|
Structure
|
|
|
Wrapping Method
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.4
|
Yes
|
|
Encryption Key
Information
|
Structure, see 2.1.5
|
No, SHALL be present if MAC/Signature Key Information is omitted
|
|
MAC/Signature Key
Information
|
Structure, see 2.1.5
|
No, SHALL be present if Encryption Key Information is
omitted
|
|
Attribute Name
|
Text String
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
|
Encoding Option
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.32
|
No. If Encoding Option is not present, the wrapped
Key Value SHALL be TTLV encoded.
|
Table 12: Key Wrapping Specification Object Structure
2.1.7 Transparent Key Structures
Transparent Key structures describe the necessary
parameters to obtain the key material. They are used in the Key Value
structure. The mapping to the parameters specified in other standards is shown
in Table 13.
|
Object
|
Description
|
Mapping
|
|
P
|
For DSA and DH, the (large) prime field order.
For RSA, a prime factor of the modulus.
|
p in [FIPS186-4], [X9.42], [SP800-56A]
p in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Q
|
For DSA and DH, the (small) prime multiplicative subgroup
order.
For RSA, a prime factor of the modulus.
|
q in [FIPS186-4], [X9.42], [SP800-56A]
q in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
G
|
The generator of the subgroup of order Q.
|
g in [FIPS186-4], [X9.42], [SP800-56A]
|
|
X
|
DSA or DH private key.
|
x in [FIPS186-4]
x, xu, xv in [X9.42],
[SP800-56A] for static private keys
r, ru, rv in [X9.42],
[SP800-56A] for ephemeral private keys
|
|
Y
|
DSA or DH public key.
|
y in [FIPS186-4]
y, yu, yv in [X9.42],
[SP800-56A] for static public keys
t, tu, tv in [X9.42],
[SP800-56A] for ephemeral public keys
|
|
J
|
DH cofactor integer, where P = JQ + 1.
|
j in [X9.42]
|
|
Modulus
|
RSA modulus PQ, where P and Q are distinct primes.
|
n in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Private Exponent
|
RSA private exponent.
|
d in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Public Exponent
|
RSA public exponent.
|
e in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Prime Exponent P
|
RSA private exponent for the prime factor P in the CRT
format, i.e., Private Exponent (mod (P-1)).
|
dP in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Prime Exponent Q
|
RSA private exponent for the prime factor Q in the CRT
format, i.e., Private Exponent (mod (Q-1)).
|
dQ in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
CRT Coefficient
|
The (first) CRT coefficient, i.e., Q-1 mod P.
|
qInv in [PKCS#1], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Recommended Curve
|
NIST Recommended Curves (e.g., P-192).
|
See Appendix D of [FIPS186-4]
|
|
D
|
Elliptic curve private key.
|
d; de,U,de,V (ephemeral private
keys); ds,U,ds,V (static private keys) in [X9.62], [FIPS186-4]
|
|
Q String
|
Elliptic curve public key.
|
Q; Qe,U,Qe,V
(ephemeral public keys); Qs,U,Qs,V (static
public keys) in [X9.62], [FIPS186-4]
|
Table 13: Parameter mapping.
2.1.7.1 Transparent
Symmetric Key
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent Symmetric Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 14.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table
14: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent Symmetric Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 15.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
X
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table
15: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Private Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 16.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Y
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table
16: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent RSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 17.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Modulus
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Private Exponent
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Public Exponent
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Prime Exponent P
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Prime Exponent Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
CRT Coefficient
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
Table 17: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Private Keys
One of the following SHALL be
present (refer to [PKCS#1]):
·
Private Exponent,
·
P and Q (the first two prime factors of Modulus), or
·
Prime Exponent P and Prime Exponent Q.
2.1.7.5 Transparent RSA
Public Key
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent RSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 18.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Modulus
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Public Exponent
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table
18: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DH Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 19.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
J
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
X
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 19: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Private Keys
2.1.7.7 Transparent DH
Public Key
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent DH Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as
shown in Table 20.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
P
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Q
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
G
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
|
J
|
Big Integer
|
No
|
|
Y
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 20: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Public Keys
2.1.7.8 Transparent
ECDSA Private Key
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECDSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 21.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
D
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table
21: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Private Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECDSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 22.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
Q String
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 22: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECDH Private Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 23.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
D
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table
23: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Private Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECDH Public Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 24.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
Q String
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table
24: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Public Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECMQV Private Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 25.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
D
|
Big Integer
|
Yes
|
Table 25: Key Material Object Structure for
Transparent ECMQV Private Keys
If the Key Format Type in the Key
Block is Transparent ECMQV Public Key, then Key Material is a structure
as shown in Table 26.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Material
|
Structure
|
|
|
Recommended
Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
Yes
|
|
Q String
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 26: Key Material Object Structure for
Transparent ECMQV Public Keys
These structures are used in various operations to provide
the desired attribute values and/or template names in the request and to return
the actual attribute values in the response.
The Template-Attribute,
Common Template-Attribute, Private Key Template-Attribute, and Public
Key Template-Attribute structures are defined identically as follows:
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Template-Attribute,
Common Template-Attribute, Private Key Template-Attribute,
Public Key Template-Attribute
|
Structure
|
|
|
Name
|
Structure, see 3.2
|
No, MAY be repeated.
|
|
Attribute
|
Attribute Object, see 2.1.1
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Table 27: Template-Attribute Object Structure
Name is the Name attribute of the Template object defined in
Section 2.2.6.
An Extension Information object is a structure (see
Table 28) describing Objects with Item Tag values in the Extensions range. The
Extension Name is a Text String that is used to name the Object (first column
of Table 251). The Extension Tag is the Item Tag Value of the Object (see Table 251). The Extension Type is the Item Type Value of the Object (see Table 249).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Extension Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Extension Name
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Extension Tag
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Extension Type
|
Integer
|
No
|
Table 28: Extension Information Structure
The Data object is used in requests and responses
in cryptographic operations that pass data between the client and the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Data
|
Byte String
|
Table 29: Data Structure
The Data Length is used in requests in cryptographic
operations to indicate the amount of data expected in a response.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Data Length
|
Integer
|
Table 30: Data Length Structure
The Signature Data is used in requests and
responses in cryptographic operations that pass signature data between the
client and the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Signature Data
|
Byte String
|
Table 31: Signature Data
Structure
The MAC Data is used in requests and responses in
cryptographic operations that pass MAC data between the client and the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
MAC Data
|
Byte String
|
Table 32: MAC Data Structure
A Nonce object is a structure (see Table 33) used by the server to send a random value to the client. The Nonce Identifier is assigned
by the server and used to identify the Nonce object. The Nonce Value consists
of the random data created by the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Nonce
|
Structure
|
|
|
Nonce ID
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
|
Nonce Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 33: Nonce Structure
2.2 Managed Objects
Managed Objects are objects that are the subjects of key
management operations, which are described in Sections 4 and 5. Managed Cryptographic Objects are the subset of Managed Objects that contain
cryptographic material (e.g., certificates, keys, and secret data).
2.2.1 Certificate
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a digital
certificate. It is a DER-encoded X.509 public key certificate. The PGP
certificate type is deprecated as of version 1.2 of this specification and MAY
be removed from subsequent versions of the specification. The PGP Key object
(see section 2.2.9) SHOULD be used instead.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Certificate
|
Structure
|
|
|
Certificate Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.6
|
Yes
|
|
Certificate Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 34: Certificate Object
Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a symmetric key.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Symmetric Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 35: Symmetric Key Object
Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the public portion
of an asymmetric key pair. This is only a public key, not a certificate.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Public Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 36: Public Key Object
Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the private portion
of an asymmetric key pair.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Private Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 37: Private Key Object
Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a Split Key.
A split key is a secret, usually a symmetric key or a private key that has been
split into a number of parts, each of which MAY then be distributed to several
key holders, for additional security. The Split Key Parts field
indicates the total number of parts, and the Split Key Threshold field
indicates the minimum number of parts needed to reconstruct the entire key. The
Key Part Identifier indicates which key part is contained in the
cryptographic object, and SHALL be at least 1 and SHALL be less than or equal
to Split Key Parts.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Split Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
Split Key Parts
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Key Part Identifier
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Split Key Threshold
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Split Key Method
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.8
|
Yes
|
|
Prime Field Size
|
Big Integer
|
No, REQUIRED only if Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing Prime
Field.
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 38: Split Key Object Structure
There are three Split Key
Methods for secret sharing: the first one is based on XOR, and the other
two are based on polynomial secret sharing, according to [w1979].
Let L
be the minimum number of bits needed to represent all values of the secret.
·
When the Split Key Method is XOR, then the Key Material in the
Key Value of the Key Block is of length L
bits. The number of split keys is Split Key Parts (identical to Split Key
Threshold), and the secret is reconstructed by XORing all of the parts.
·
When the Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing Prime Field, then
secret sharing is performed in the field GF(Prime Field Size),
represented as integers, where Prime Field Size is a prime bigger than 2L.
·
When the Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing GF(216),
then secret sharing is performed in the field GF(216). The Key
Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is a bit string of length L, and when L
is bigger than 216, then secret sharing is applied piecewise in
pieces of 16 bits each. The Key Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is
the concatenation of the corresponding shares of all pieces of the secret.
Secret sharing is performed in the field GF(216),
which is represented as an algebraic extension of GF(28):
GF(216) ≈ GF(28) [y]/(y2+y+m),
where m is defined later.
An element of this field then consists of a linear
combination uy + v, where u and v are elements of the
smaller field GF(28).
The representation of field elements and the notation
in this section rely on [FIPS197], Sections 3 and 4.
The field GF(28) is as described in [FIPS197],
GF(28) ≈ GF(2) [x]/(x8+x4+x3+x+1).
An element of GF(28) is represented as a
byte. Addition and subtraction in GF(28) is performed as a bit-wise
XOR of the bytes. Multiplication and inversion are more complex (see [FIPS197] Section 4.1 and 4.2 for details).
An element of GF(216) is represented as a
pair of bytes (u, v). The element m is given by
m = x5+x4+x3+x,
which is represented by the byte 0x3A (or {3A} in
notation according to [FIPS197]).
Addition and subtraction in GF(216) both
correspond to simply XORing the bytes. The product of two elements ry + s
and uy + v is given by
(ry + s) (uy + v)
= ((r + s)(u + v) + sv)y + (ru
+ svm).
The inverse of an element uy + v is given
by
(uy + v)-1 = ud-1y
+ (u + v)d-1, where d = (u + v)v
+ mu2.
2.2.6 Template
A Template is a named Managed Object containing the
client-settable attributes of a Managed Cryptographic Object. A Template is
used to specify the attributes of a new Managed Cryptographic Object in various
operations. Attributes associated with a Managed Object MAY also be specified
in the Template-Attribute structures in the operations in Section 4.
Attributes specified in a Template apply to any object
created that reference the Template by name using the Name object in any of the
Template-Attribute structures in Section 2.1.8.
The name of a Template (as it is for any Managed Object)
is specified as an Attribute in the Template-Attribute structure in the
Register operation where the Attribute Name is "Name" and the
Attribute Value is the name of the Template Managed Object.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Template
|
Structure
|
|
|
Attribute
|
Attribute Object, see 2.1.1
|
Yes. MAY be repeated.
|
Table 39: Template Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object containing a shared secret
value that is not a key or certificate (e.g., a password). The Key Block of the
Secret Data object contains a Key Value of the Secret Data Type. The Key
Value MAY be wrapped.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Secret Data
|
Structure
|
|
|
Secret Data Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.9
|
Yes
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 40: Secret Data Object
Structure
A Managed Object that the key management server is
possibly not able to interpret. The context information for this object MAY be
stored and retrieved using Custom Attributes.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Opaque Object
|
Structure
|
|
|
Opaque Data Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.10
|
Yes
|
|
Opaque Data Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table
41: Opaque Object Structure
A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a text-based
representation of a PGP key. The Key Block field, indicated below, will contain
the ASCII-armored export of a PGP key in the format as specified in RFC 4880. It
MAY contain only a public key block, or both a public and private key block. Two
different versions of PGP keys, version 3 and version 4, MAY be stored in this
Managed Cryptographic Object.
KMIP implementers SHOULD treat the Key Block field as an
opaque blob. PGP-aware KMIP clients SHOULD take on the responsibility of
decomposing the Key Block into other Managed Cryptographic Objects (Public
Keys, Private Keys, etc.).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
PGP Key
|
Structure
|
|
|
PGP Key Version
|
Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Key Block
|
Structure, see 2.1.3
|
Yes
|
Table 42: PGP Key Object
Structure
The following subsections describe the attributes that are
associated with Managed Objects. Attributes that an object MAY have multiple
instances of are referred to as multi-instance attributes. All instances
of an attribute SHOULD have a different value. Similarly, attributes which an
object SHALL only have at most one instance of are referred to as single-instance
attributes. Attributes are able to be obtained by a client from the server
using the Get Attribute operation. Some attributes are able to be set by the
Add Attribute operation or updated by the Modify Attribute operation, and some
are able to be deleted by the Delete Attribute operation if they no longer
apply to the Managed Object. Read-only attributes are attributes that
SHALL NOT be modified by either server or client, and that SHALL NOT be deleted
by a client.
When attributes are returned by the server (e.g., via a
Get Attributes operation), the attribute value returned MAY differ for
different clients (e.g., the Cryptographic Usage Mask value MAY be different
for different clients, depending on the policy of the server).
The first table in each subsection contains the attribute
name in the first row. This name is the canonical name used when managing
attributes using the Get Attributes, Get Attribute List, Add Attribute, Modify
Attribute, and Delete Attribute operations.
A server SHALL NOT delete attributes without receiving a
request from a client until the object is destroyed. After an object is
destroyed, the server MAY retain all, some or none of the object attributes,
depending on the object type and server policy.
The second table in each subsection lists certain
attribute characteristics (e.g., “SHALL always have a value”): Table 43 below explains the meaning of each characteristic that MAY appear in those
tables. The server policy MAY further restrict these attribute characteristics.
|
SHALL always have a value
|
All Managed Objects that are of the Object Types for which this
attribute applies, SHALL always have this attribute set once the object has
been created or registered, up until the object has been destroyed.
|
|
Initially set by
|
Who is permitted to initially set the value of the attribute (if the
attribute has never been set, or if all the attribute values have been
deleted)?
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Is the server allowed to change an existing value of the attribute
without receiving a request from a client?
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Is the client able to change an existing value of the attribute value
once it has been set?
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Is the client able to delete an instance of the attribute?
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Are multiple instances of the attribute permitted?
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Which operations MAY cause this attribute to be set even if the
attribute is not specified in the operation request itself?
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Which Managed Objects MAY have this attribute set?
|
Table 43: Attribute Rules
The Unique Identifier is generated by the key
management system to uniquely identify a Managed Object. It is only REQUIRED to
be unique within the identifier space managed by a single key management
system, however this identifier SHOULD be globally unique in order to allow for
a key management domain export of such objects. This attribute SHALL be assigned
by the key management system at creation or registration time, and then SHALL
NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
|
Unique Identifier
|
Text String
|
|
Table 44: Unique Identifier Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table
45: Unique Identifier Attribute Rules
The Name attribute is a structure (see Table 46) used to identify and locate an object. This attribute is assigned by the
client, and the Name Value is intended to be in a form that humans are
able to interpret. The key management system MAY specify rules by which the
client creates valid names. Clients are informed of such rules by a mechanism
that is not specified by this standard. Names SHALL be unique within a given
key management domain, but are NOT REQUIRED to be globally unique.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Name
|
Structure
|
|
|
Name Value
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Name Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.11
|
Yes
|
Table 46: Name Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 47: Name Attribute Rules
The Object Type of a Managed Object (e.g., public
key, private key, symmetric key, etc.) SHALL be set by the server when the
object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before
the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Object Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.12
|
Table 48: Object Type Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 49: Object Type Attribute
Rules
The Cryptographic Algorithm of an object. The Cryptographic
Algorithm of a Certificate object identifies the algorithm for the public key
contained within the Certificate. The digital signature algorithm used to sign
the Certificate is identified in the Digital Signature Algorithm attribute
defined in Section 3.16. This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the
object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before
the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13
|
Table 50: Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Certify, Create, Create Key Pair, Re-certify, Register, Derive Key,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Keys, Certificates, Templates
|
Table 51: Cryptographic
Algorithm Attribute Rules
For keys, Cryptographic Length is the length in
bits of the clear-text cryptographic key material of the Managed Cryptographic
Object. For certificates, Cryptographic Length is the length in bits of
the public key contained within the Certificate. This attribute SHALL be set by
the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be
changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Cryptographic Length
|
Integer
|
Table 52: Cryptographic Length Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Certify, Create, Create Key Pair, Re-certify, Register, Derive Key,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Keys, Certificates, Templates
|
Table 53: Cryptographic Length
Attribute Rules
The Cryptographic Parameters attribute is a
structure (see Table 54) that contains a set of OPTIONAL fields that describe
certain cryptographic parameters to be used when performing cryptographic
operations using the object. Specific fields MAY pertain only to certain types
of Managed Cryptographic Objects. The Cryptographic Parameters attribute of a
Certificate object identifies the cryptographic parameters of the public key
contained within the Certificate.
The Cryptographic Algorithm is also used to specify the
parameters for cryptographic operations. For operations involving digital signatures,
either the Digital Signature Algorithm can be specified or the Cryptographic
Algorithm and Hashing Algorithm combination can be specified.
Random IV can be used to request that the KMIP server
generate an appropriate IV for a cryptographic operation that uses an IV. The
generated Random IV is returned in the response to the cryptographic operation.
IV Length is the length of the Initialization Vector in
bits. This parameter SHALL be provided when the specified Block Cipher Mode
supports variable IV lengths such as CTR or GCM.
Tag Length is the length of the authenticator tag in
bytes. This parameter SHALL be provided when the Block Cipher Mode is GCM.
The IV used with counter modes of operation (e.g., CTR and
GCM) cannot repeat for a given cryptograhic key. To prevent an IV/key reuse,
the IV is often constructed of three parts: a fixed field, an invocation field,
and a counter as described in [SP800-38A] and [SP800-38D]. The Fixed Field Length is the length of the
fixed field portion of the IV in bits. The Invocation Field Length is the
length of the invocation field portion of the IV in bits. The Counter Length is
the length of the counter portion of the IV in bits.
Initial Counter Value is the starting counter value for
CTR mode (for [RFC3686] it is 1).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters
|
Structure
|
|
|
Block Cipher Mode
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.14
|
No
|
|
Padding Method
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.15
|
No
|
|
Hashing Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.16
|
No
|
|
Key Role Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.17
|
No
|
|
Digital Signature Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.7
|
No
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13
|
No
|
|
Random IV
|
Boolean
|
No
|
|
IV Length
|
Integer
|
No unless Block Cipher Mode supports variable IV lengths
|
|
Tag Length
|
Integer
|
No unless Block Cipher Mode is GCM
|
|
Fixed Field Length
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Invocation Field Length
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Counter Length
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Initial Counter Value
|
Integer
|
No
|
Table 54: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Keys, Certificates, Templates
|
Table 55: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Rules
Key Role Type definitions match those defined in ANSI X9
TR-31 [X9 TR-31] and are defined in Table 56:
|
BDK
|
Base Derivation Key (ANSI X9.24 DUKPT key
derivation)
|
|
CVK
|
Card Verification Key (CVV/signature strip number
validation)
|
|
DEK
|
Data Encryption Key (General Data Encryption)
|
|
MKAC
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Application Cryptograms
|
|
MKSMC
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Secure Messaging for
Confidentiality
|
|
MKSMI
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Secure Messaging for
Integrity
|
|
MKDAC
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Data Authentication Code
|
|
MKDN
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Dynamic Numbers
|
|
MKCP
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Card Personalization
|
|
MKOTH
|
EMV/chip card Master Key: Other
|
|
KEK
|
Key Encryption or Wrapping Key
|
|
MAC16609
|
ISO16609 MAC Algorithm 1
|
|
MAC97971
|
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 1
|
|
MAC97972
|
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 2
|
|
MAC97973
|
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 3 (Note this is commonly
known as X9.19 Retail MAC)
|
|
MAC97974
|
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 4
|
|
MAC97975
|
ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 5
|
|
ZPK
|
PIN Block Encryption Key
|
|
PVKIBM
|
PIN Verification Key, IBM 3624 Algorithm
|
|
PVKPVV
|
PIN Verification Key, VISA PVV Algorithm
|
|
PVKOTH
|
PIN Verification Key, Other Algorithm
|
Table
56: Key Role Types
Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. - Financial Industry
Standards (www.x9.org) contributed to Table 56. Key role names and descriptions
are derived from material in the Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc.'s
Technical Report "TR-31 2010 Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block
Specification for Symmetric Algorithms" and used with the permission of
Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. in an effort to improve
interoperability between X9 standards and OASIS KMIP. The complete ANSI X9
TR-31 is available at www.x9.org.
The Cryptographic Domain Parameters attribute is a
structure (see Table 57) that contains a set of OPTIONAL fields that MAY need
to be specified in the Create Key Pair Request Payload. Specific fields MAY
only pertain to certain types of Managed Cryptographic Objects.
The domain parameter Qlength correponds to the bit length
of parameter Q (refer to [SEC2] and [SP800-56A]). Qlength applies to algorithms such as DSA and DH. The
bit length of parameter P (refer to [SEC2] and [SP800-56A]) is specified separately by setting the
Cryptographic Length attribute.
Recommended Curve is applicable to elliptic curve
algorithms such as ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
Required
|
|
Cryptographic Domain Parameters
|
Structure
|
Yes
|
|
Qlength
|
Integer
|
No
|
|
Recommended Curve
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5
|
No
|
Table 57: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute Structure
|
Shall always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Asymmetric Keys, Templates
|
Table 58: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute
Rules
The Certificate Type attribute is a type of
certificate (e.g., X.509). The PGP certificate type is deprecated as of version
1.2 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of the
specification.
The Certificate Type value SHALL be set by the
server when the certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be
changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
|
Certificate Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.6
|
|
Table 59: Certificate Type Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 60: Certificate Type Attribute Rules
The Certificate Length attribute is the length in
bytes of the Certificate object. The Certificate Length SHALL be set by
the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be
changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Certificate Length
|
Integer
|
Table 61: Certificate Length Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 62: Certificate Length Attribute Rules
The X.509 Certificate Identifier attribute
is a structure (see Table 63) used to provide the
identification of an X.509 public key certificate. The X.509 Certificate
Identifier contains the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field
of the X.509 certificate) and the Certificate Serial Number (i.e., from the
Serial Number field of the X.509 certificate). The X.509 Certificate
Identifier SHALL be set by the server when the X.509 certificate is created or
registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is
destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
X.509 Certificate Identifier
|
Structure
|
|
|
Issuer Distinguished
Name
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
|
Certificate Serial Number
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
Table 63: X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute
Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
X.509 Certificates
|
Table 64: X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute Rules
The X.509 Certificate Subject attribute is a
structure (see Table 65) used to identify the subject of a X.509 certificate.
The X.509 Certificate Subject contains the Subject Distinguished Name (i.e.,
from the Subject field of the X.509 certificate). It MAY include one or more
alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the subject
of the X.509 certificate (i.e., from the Subject Alternative Name extension
within the X.509 certificate). The X.509 Certificate Subject SHALL be set by
the server based on the information it extracts from the X.509 certificate that
is created (as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation) or registered
(as part of a Register operation) and SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before
the object is destroyed.
If the Subject Alternative Name extension is included in
the X.509 certificate and is marked critical within the X.509 certificate
itself, then an X.509 certificate MAY be issued with the subject field left
blank. Therefore an empty string is an acceptable value for the Subject
Distinguished Name.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
X.509 Certificate Subject
|
Structure
|
|
|
Subject Distinguished Name
|
Byte String
|
Yes, but MAY be the empty string
|
|
Subject Alternative Name
|
Byte String
|
Yes, if the Subject Distinguished Name
is an empty string. MAY be repeated
|
Table 65: X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute
Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
X.509 Certificates
|
Table 66: X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute Rules
The X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute is a
structure (see Table 71) used to identify the issuer of a X.509 certificate,
containing the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the
X.509 certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email
address, IP address, DNS name) for the issuer of the certificate (i.e., from
the Issuer Alternative Name extension within the X.509 certificate). The server
SHALL set these values based on the information it extracts from a X.509
certificate that is created as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation
or is sent as part of a Register operation. These values SHALL NOT be changed
or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
X.509 Certificate Issuer
|
Structure
|
|
|
Issuer Distinguished Name
|
Byte String
|
Yes
|
|
Issuer Alternative Name
|
Byte String
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Table 67: X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
X.509 Certificates
|
Table 68: X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules
This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this
specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this
specification. The X.509 Certificate Identifier attribute (see Section 3.10)
SHOULD be used instead.
The Certificate Identifier attribute is a structure
(see Table 69) used to provide the identification of a
certificate. For X.509 certificates, it contains the Issuer Distinguished Name
(i.e., from the Issuer field of the certificate) and the Certificate Serial
Number (i.e., from the Serial Number field of the certificate). For PGP
certificates, the Issuer contains the OpenPGP Key ID of the key issuing the
signature (the signature that represents the certificate). The Certificate
Identifier SHALL be set by the server when the certificate is created or
registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is
destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Certificate Identifier
|
Structure
|
|
|
Issuer
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Serial Number
|
Text String
|
Yes (for X.509 certificates) / No (for
PGP certificates since they do not contain a serial number)
|
Table 69: Certificate Identifier Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 70: Certificate
Identifier Attribute Rules
This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this
specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this
specification. The X.509 Certificate Subject attribute (see Section 3.11)
SHOULD be used instead.
The Certificate Subject attribute is a structure
(see Table 71) used to identify the subject of a certificate. For X.509
certificates, it contains the Subject Distinguished Name (i.e., from the
Subject field of the certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names
(e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the subject of the certificate
(i.e., from the Subject Alternative Name extension within the certificate). For
PGP certificates, the Certificate Subject Distinguished Name contains the
content of the first User ID packet in the PGP certificate (that is, the first
User ID packet after the Public-Key packet in the transferable public key that
forms the PGP certificate). These values SHALL be set by the server based on
the information it extracts from the certificate that is created (as a result
of a Certify or a Re-certify operation) or registered (as part of a Register
operation) and SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
If the Subject Alternative Name extension is included in
the certificate and is marked CRITICAL (i.e., within the certificate
itself), then it is possible to issue an X.509 certificate where the subject
field is left blank. Therefore an empty string is an acceptable value for the
Certificate Subject Distinguished Name.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Certificate Subject
|
Structure
|
|
|
Certificate Subject Distinguished Name
|
Text String
|
Yes, but MAY be the empty string
|
|
Certificate Subject Alternative Name
|
Text String
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Table
71: Certificate Subject Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 72: Certificate Subject
Attribute Rules
This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this
specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this
specification. The X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute (see Section 3.12) SHOULD
be used instead.
The Certificate Issuer attribute is a structure
(see Table 74) used to identify the issuer of a certificate, containing the
Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the certificate). It
MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS
name) for the issuer of the certificate (i.e., from the Issuer Alternative Name
extension within the certificate). The server SHALL set these values based on
the information it extracts from a certificate that is created as a result of a
Certify or a Re-certify operation or is sent as part of a Register operation.
These values SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Certificate Issuer
|
Structure
|
|
|
Certificate Issuer Distinguished Name
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Certificate Issuer Alternative Name
|
Text String
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Table 73: Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Register, Certify, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates
|
Table 74: Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules
The Digital Signature Algorithm attribute
identifies the digital signature algorithm associated with a digitally signed
object (e.g., Certificate). This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the
object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before
the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Digital Signature Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.7
|
Table 75: Digital
Signature Algorithm Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes for PGP keys. No for X.509 certificates.
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Certify, Re-certify, Register
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Certificates, PGP keys
|
Table 76: Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute Rules
The Digest attribute is a structure (see Table 77) that contains the digest value of the key or secret data (i.e., digest of
the Key Material), certificate (i.e., digest of the Certificate Value), or
opaque object (i.e., digest of the Opaque Data Value). If the Key Material is a
Byte String, then the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on this Byte String. If
the Key Material is a structure, then the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on
the TTLV-encoded (see Section 9.1) Key Material structure. The Key Format Type
field in the Digest attribute indicates the format of the Managed Object from
which the Digest Value was calculated. Multiple digests MAY be calculated using
different algorithms listed in Section 9.1.3.2.16 and/or key format types
listed in Section 9.1.3.2.3. If this attribute exists, then it SHALL have a
mandatory attribute instance computed with the SHA-256 hashing algorithm. For
objects registered by a client, the server SHALL compute the digest of the
mandatory attribute instance using the Key Format Type of the registered object.
In all other cases, the server MAY use any Key Format Type when computing the
digest of the mandatory attribute instance, provided it is able to serve the
object to clients in that same format. The digest(s) are static and SHALL be
set by the server when the object is created or registered, provided that the
server has access to the Key Material or the Digest Value (possibly obtained
via out-of-band mechanisms).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Digest
|
Structure
|
|
|
Hashing Algorithm
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.16
|
Yes
|
|
Digest Value
|
Byte String
|
Yes, if the server has access to the Digest Value or
the Key Material (for keys and secret data), the Certificate Value (for
certificates) or the Opaque Data Value (for opaque objects).
|
|
Key Format Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.3
|
Yes, if the Managed Object is a key or secret data
object.
|
Table 77: Digest Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes, if the server has access to the Digest Value or the Key Material
(for keys and secret data), the Certificate Value (for certificates) or the
Opaque Data Value (for opaque objects).
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Objects
|
Table 78: Digest Attribute
Rules
An operation policy controls what entities MAY perform
which key management operations on the object. The content of the Operation
Policy Name attribute is the name of a policy object known to the key
management system and, therefore, is server dependent. The named policy objects
are created and managed using mechanisms outside the scope of the protocol. The
policies determine what entities MAY perform specified operations on the
object, and which of the object’s attributes MAY be modified or deleted. The
Operation Policy Name attribute SHOULD be set when operations that result in a
new Managed Object on the server are executed. It is set either explicitly or
via some default set by the server, which then applies the named policy to all
subsequent operations on the object.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Operation Policy Name
|
Text String
|
Table 79: Operation Policy Name Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 80: Operation Policy Name
Attribute Rules
Some of the operations SHOULD be allowed for any client at
any time, without respect to operation policy. These operations are:
·
Create
·
Create Key Pair
·
Register
·
Certify
·
Re-certify
·
Validate
·
Query
·
Cancel
·
Poll
3.18.2 Default Operation Policy
A key management system
implementation SHALL implement at least one named operation policy, which is
used for objects when the Operation Policy attribute is not specified by
the Client in operations that result in a new Managed Object on the server, or
in a template specified in these operations. This policy is named default.
It specifies the following rules for operations on objects created or
registered with this policy, depending on the object type. For the profiles
defined in [KMIP-Prof], the owner SHALL be as
defined in [KMIP-Prof].
This policy applies to Symmetric
Keys, Private Keys, Split Keys, Secret Data, and Opaque Objects.
|
Default
Operation Policy for Secret Objects
|
|
Operation
|
Policy
|
|
Re-key
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Re-key Key Pair
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Derive Key
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Locate
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Check
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get Attributes
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get Attribute List
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Add Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Modify Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Delete Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Obtain Lease
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get Usage Allocation
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Activate
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Revoke
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Destroy
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Archive
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Recover
|
Allowed to owner only
|
Table 81: Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects
3.18.2.2 Default
Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects
This policy applies to
Certificates and Public Keys.
|
Default
Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects
|
|
Operation
|
Policy
|
|
Locate
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Check
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get Attributes
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get Attribute List
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Add Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Modify Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Delete Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Obtain Lease
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Activate
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Revoke
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Destroy
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Archive
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Recover
|
Allowed to owner only
|
Table 82: Default Operation
Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects
The operation policy specified as
an attribute in the Register operation for a template object is the
operation policy used for objects created using that template, and is not the
policy used to control operations on the template itself. There is no mechanism
to specify a policy used to control operations on template objects, so the
default policy for template objects is always used for templates created by
clients using the Register operation to create template objects.
|
Default
Operation Policy for Private Template Objects
|
|
Operation
|
Policy
|
|
Locate
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get Attributes
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Get Attribute List
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Add Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Modify Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Delete Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Destroy
|
Allowed to owner only
|
|
Any operation referencing the Template using a Template-Attribute
|
Allowed to owner only
|
Table 83: Default Operation Policy for Private
Template Objects
In addition to private template
objects (which are controlled by the above policy, and which MAY be created by
clients or the server), publicly known and usable templates MAY be created and
managed by the server, with a default policy different from private template
objects.
|
Default
Operation Policy for Public Template Objects
|
|
Operation
|
Policy
|
|
Locate
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get Attributes
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Get Attribute List
|
Allowed to all
|
|
Add Attribute
|
Disallowed to all
|
|
Modify Attribute
|
Disallowed to all
|
|
Delete Attribute
|
Disallowed to all
|
|
Destroy
|
Disallowed to all
|
|
Any operation referencing the Template using a Template-Attribute
|
Allowed to all
|
Table 84: Default Operation
Policy for Public Template Objects
The Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute defines the
cryptographic usage of a key. This is a bit mask that indicates to the client
which cryptographic functions MAY be performed using the key, and which ones
SHALL NOT be performed.
·
Sign
·
Verify
·
Encrypt
·
Decrypt
·
Wrap Key
·
Unwrap Key
·
Export
·
MAC Generate
·
MAC Verify
·
Derive Key
·
Content Commitment
·
Key Agreement
·
Certificate Sign
·
CRL Sign
·
Generate Cryptogram
·
Validate Cryptogram
·
Translate Encrypt
·
Translate Decrypt
·
Translate Wrap
·
Translate Unwrap
This list takes into
consideration values that MAY appear in the Key Usage extension in an X.509
certificate. However, the list does not consider the additional usages that MAY
appear in the Extended Key Usage extension.
X.509 Key Usage values SHALL be mapped to Cryptographic
Usage Mask values in the following manner:
|
X.509
Key Usage to Cryptographic Usage Mask Mapping
|
|
X.509 Key Usage Value
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask Value
|
|
digitalSignature
|
Sign
or Verify
|
|
contentCommitment
|
Content Commitment
(Non Repudiation)
|
|
keyEncipherment
|
Wrap
Key or Unwrap Key
|
|
dataEncipherment
|
Encrypt
or Decrypt
|
|
keyAgreement
|
Key
Agreement
|
|
keyCertSign
|
Certificate
Sign
|
|
cRLSign
|
CRL
Sign
|
|
encipherOnly
|
Encrypt
|
|
decipherOnly
|
Decrypt
|
Table 85: X.509 Key Usage to Cryptographic Usage Mask
Mapping
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask
|
Integer
|
Table 86: Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Templates
|
Table 87: Cryptographic Usage Mask
Attribute Rules
The Lease Time attribute defines a time interval
for a Managed Cryptographic Object beyond which the client SHALL NOT use the
object without obtaining another lease. This attribute always holds the initial
length of time allowed for a lease, and not the actual remaining time. Once its
lease expires, the client is only able to renew the lease by calling Obtain
Lease. A server SHALL store in this attribute the maximum Lease Time it is able
to serve and a client obtains the lease time (with Obtain Lease) that is less
than or equal to the maximum Lease Time. This attribute is read-only for
clients. It SHALL be modified by the server only.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Lease Time
|
Interval
|
Table
88: Lease Time Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects
|
Table 89: Lease Time Attribute
Rules
The Usage Limits attribute is a mechanism for
limiting the usage of a Managed Cryptographic Object. It only applies to
Managed Cryptographic Objects that are able to be used for applying
cryptographic protection and it SHALL only reflect their usage for applying
that protection (e.g., encryption, signing, etc.). This attribute does not
necessarily exist for all Managed Cryptographic Objects, since some objects are
able to be used without limit for cryptographically protecting data, depending
on client/server policies. Usage for processing cryptographically protected
data (e.g., decryption, verification, etc.) is not limited. The Usage Limits
attribute has the three following fields:
·
Usage Limits Total – the total number of Usage Limits
Units allowed to be protected. This is the total value for the entire life of
the object and SHALL NOT be changed once the object begins to be used for
applying cryptographic protection.
·
Usage Limits Count – the currently remaining number of
Usage Limits Units allowed to be protected by the object.
·
Usage Limits Unit – The type of quantity for which this
structure specifies a usage limit (e.g., byte, object).
When the attribute is initially set (usually during object
creation or registration), the Usage Limits Count is set to the Usage Limits
Total value allowed for the useful life of the object, and are decremented when
the object is used. The server SHALL ignore the Usage Limits Count value if the
attribute is specified in an operation that creates a new object. Changes made
via the Modify Attribute operation reflect corrections to the Usage Limits
Total value, but they SHALL NOT be changed once the Usage Limits Count value
has changed by a Get Usage Allocation operation. The Usage Limits Count value
SHALL NOT be set or modified by the client via the Add Attribute or Modify
Attribute operations.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Usage Limits
|
Structure
|
|
|
Usage Limits Total
|
Long Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Usage Limits Count
|
Long Integer
|
Yes
|
|
Usage Limits Unit
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.31
|
Yes
|
Table 90: Usage Limits Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server (Total, Count, and Unit) or Client (Total and/or Unit only)
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes (Total and/or Unit only, as long as Get Usage Allocation has not
been performed)
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes, as long as Get Usage Allocation has not been performed
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair,
Get Usage Allocation
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Keys, Templates
|
Table
91: Usage Limits Attribute Rules
This
attribute is an indication of the State of an object as known to the key
management server. The State SHALL NOT be changed by using the Modify Attribute
operation on this attribute. The State SHALL only be changed by the server as a
part of other operations or other server processes. An object SHALL be in one
of the following states at any given time. (Note: These states correspond to
those described in [SP800-57-1]).
·
Pre-Active: The object exists and SHALL NOT be used for
any cryptographic purpose.
·
Active: The object SHALL be transitioned to
the Active state prior to being used for any cryptographic purpose. The
object SHALL only be used for all cryptographic purposes that are allowed by
its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. If a Process Start Date (see 3.25) attribute is set, then the object SHALL NOT be used for cryptographic purposes
prior to the Process Start Date. If a Protect Stop Date (see 3.26) attribute is set, then the object SHALL NOT be used for cryptographic purposes after the
Process Stop Date.
·
Deactivated: The object SHALL NOT be used for applying
cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption, signing, wrapping, MACing,
deriving) . The object SHALL only be used for cryptographic purposes permitted
by the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. The object SHOULD only be used to
process cryptographically-protected information (e.g., decryption, signature
verification, unwrapping, MAC verification under extraordinary circumstances
and when special permission is granted.
·
Compromised: The object SHALL NOT be used for applying
cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption, signing, wrapping, MACing,
deriving). The object SHOULD only be used to process
cryptographically-protected information (e.g., decryption, signature
verification, unwrapping, MAC verification in a client that is trusted to use
managed objects that have been compromised. The object SHALL only be used for
cryptographic purposes permitted by the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute.
·
Destroyed: The object SHALL NOT be used for any
cryptographic purpose.
·
Destroyed Compromised: The object SHALL NOT be used for
any cryptographic purpose; however its compromised status SHOULD be retained
for audit or security purposes.
State transitions occur as follows:
1. The
transition from a non-existent key to the Pre-Active state is caused by the
creation of the object. When an object is created or registered, it
automatically goes from non-existent to Pre-Active. If, however, the operation
that creates or registers the object contains an Activation Date that has
already occurred, then the state immediately transitions from Pre-Active to
Active. In this case, the server SHALL set the Activation Date attribute to the
value specified in the request, or fail the request attempting to create or
register the object, depending on server policy. If the operation contains an
Activation Date attribute that is in the future, or contains no Activation
Date, then the Cryptographic Object is initialized in the key management system
in the Pre-Active state.
2. The
transition from Pre-Active to Destroyed is caused by a client issuing a Destroy
operation. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.
3. The
transition from Pre-Active to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a
Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
4. The
transition from Pre-Active to Active SHALL occur in one of three ways:
·
The Activation Date is reached,
·
A client successfully issues a Modify Attribute operation,
modifying the Activation Date to a date in the past, or the current date, or
·
A client issues an Activate operation on the object. The server
SHALL set the Activation Date to the time the Activate operation is received.
5. The
transition from Active to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke
operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
6. The
transition from Active to Deactivated SHALL occur in one of three ways:
·
The object's Deactivation Date is reached,
·
A client issues a Revoke operation, with a Revocation Reason
other than Compromised, or
·
The client successfully issues a Modify Attribute operation,
modifying the Deactivation Date to a date in the past, or the current date.
7. The transition
from Deactivated to Destroyed is caused by a client issuing a Destroy
operation, or by a server, both in accordance with server policy. The server
destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.
8. The
transition from Deactivated to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a
Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
9. The
transition from Compromised to Destroyed Compromised is caused by a client
issuing a Destroy operation, or by a server, both in accordance with server
policy. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.
10. The transition from
Destroyed to Destroyed Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke
operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.
Only the transitions described
above are permitted.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
State
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.18
|
Table 92: State Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No, but only by the server in response to certain requests (see
above)
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate, Revoke,
Destroy, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects
|
Table 93: State Attribute Rules
The Initial Date attribute contains the date and
time when the Managed Object was first created or registered at the server.
This time corresponds to state transition 1 (see Section 3.22). This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, and then
SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed. This attribute
is also set for non-cryptographic objects (e.g., templates) when they are first
registered with the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Initial Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 94: Initial Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 95: Initial Date
Attribute Rules
The Activation Date attribute contains the date and
time when the Managed Cryptographic Object MAY begin to be used. This time
corresponds to state transition 4 (see Section 3.22). The object SHALL NOT be
used for any cryptographic purpose before the Activation Date has been
reached. Once the state transition from Pre-Active has occurred, then this
attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Activation Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 96: Activation Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active state
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active state
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate Certify,
Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Templates
|
Table 97: Activation Date
Attribute Rules
The Process Start Date attribute is the date and
time when a Managed Symmetric Key Object MAY begin to be used to process cryptographically
protected information (e.g., decryption or unwrapping), depending on the value
of its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. The object SHALL NOT be used for
these cryptographic purposes before the Process Start Date has been
reached. This value MAY be equal to or later than, but SHALL NOT precede, the
Activation Date. Once the Process Start Date has occurred, then this attribute
SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Process Start Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 98: Process Start Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the
Process Start Date has been not reached.
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the
Process Start Date has been not reached.
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Register, Derive Key, Re-key
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Symmetric Keys, Split Keys of symmetric keys,
Templates
|
Table 99: Process Start Date
Attribute Rules
The Protect Stop Date attribute is the date and
time after which a Managed Symmetric Key Object SHALL NOT be used for applying
cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption or wrapping), depending on the value
of its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. This value MAY be equal to or
earlier than, but SHALL NOT be later than the Deactivation Date. Once the Protect
Stop Date has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted
before the object is destroyed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Protect Stop Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 100: Protect Stop Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the
Protect Stop Date has not been reached.
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the
Protect Stop Date has not been reached.
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Register, Derive Key, Re-key
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Symmetric Keys, Split Keys of symmetric keys,
Templates
|
Table 101: Protect Stop Date
Attribute Rules
The Deactivation Date attribute is the date and
time when the Managed Cryptographic Object SHALL NOT be used for any purpose,
except for decryption, signature verification, or unwrapping, but only under
extraordinary circumstances and only when special permission is granted. This
time corresponds to state transition 6 (see Section 3.22). This attribute SHALL
NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed, unless the object is
in the Pre-Active or Active state.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Deactivation Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 102: Deactivation Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server or Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Revoke Certify,
Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Templates
|
Table 103: Deactivation Date
Attribute Rules
The Destroy Date attribute is the date and time
when the Managed Object was destroyed. This time corresponds to state
transitions 2, 7, or 9 (see Section 3.22). This value is set by the server when
the object is destroyed due to the reception of a Destroy operation, or due to
server policy or out-of-band administrative action.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Destroy Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 104: Destroy Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Destroy
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Objects
|
Table
105: Destroy Date Attribute Rules
The Compromise Occurrence Date attribute is the
date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object was first believed to be
compromised. If it is not possible to estimate when the compromise occurred,
then this value SHOULD be set to the Initial Date for the object.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Compromise Occurrence Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 106: Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Revoke
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object
|
Table 107: Compromise
Occurrence Date Attribute Rules
The Compromise Date attribute contains the date and
time when the Managed Cryptographic Object entered into the compromised state.
This time corresponds to state transitions 3, 5, 8, or 10 (see Section 3.22). This time indicates when the key management system was made aware of the
compromise, not necessarily when the compromise occurred. This attribute is set
by the server when it receives a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason
of Compromised code, or due to server policy or out-of-band administrative
action.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Compromise Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 108: Compromise Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Revoke
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object
|
Table 109: Compromise Date
Attribute Rules
The Revocation Reason attribute is a structure (see
Table 110) used to indicate why the Managed Cryptographic Object was revoked
(e.g., “compromised”, “expired”, “no longer used”, etc.). This attribute is
only set by the server as a part of the Revoke Operation.
The Revocation Message is an OPTIONAL field that is
used exclusively for audit trail/logging purposes and MAY contain additional
information about why the object was revoked (e.g., “Laptop stolen”, or
“Machine decommissioned”).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Revocation Reason
|
Structure
|
|
|
Revocation Reason Code
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.19
|
Yes
|
|
Revocation Message
|
Text String
|
No
|
Table 110: Revocation Reason Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Revoke
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object
|
Table 111: Revocation Reason
Attribute Rules
The Archive Date attribute is the date and time
when the Managed Object was placed in archival storage. This value is set by
the server as a part of the Archive operation. The server SHALL delete this
attribute whenever a Recover operation is performed.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Archive Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 112: Archive Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Archive
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table
113: Archive Date Attribute Rules
An object MAY be part of a group of objects. An object MAY
belong to more than one group of objects. To assign an object to a group of objects,
the object group name SHOULD be set into this attribute. “default” is a
reserved Text String for Object Group.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Object Group
|
Text String
|
Table 114: Object Group Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 115: Object Group
Attribute Rules
The Fresh attribute is a Boolean attribute that
indicates that the object has not yet been served to a client. The Fresh
attribute SHALL be set to True when a new object is created on the server. The
server SHALL change the attribute value to False as soon as the object has been
served to a client.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Fresh
|
Boolean
|
Table 116: Fresh Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-key Key
Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects
|
Table 117: Fresh Attribute Rules
The Link attribute is a structure (see Table 118) used to create a link from one Managed Cryptographic Object to another,
closely related target Managed Cryptographic Object. The link has a type, and
the allowed types differ, depending on the Object Type of the Managed
Cryptographic Object, as listed below. The Linked Object Identifier
identifies the target Managed Cryptographic Object by its Unique Identifier.
The link contains information about the association between the Managed
Cryptographic Objects (e.g., the private key corresponding to a public key; the
parent certificate for a certificate in a chain; or for a derived symmetric
key, the base key from which it was derived).
Possible values of Link Type in accordance with the
Object Type of the Managed Cryptographic Object are:
·
Private Key Link: For a Public Key object: the private
key corresponding to the public key.
·
Public Key Link: For a Private Key object: the public key
corresponding to the private key. For a Certificate object: the public key
contained in the certificate.
·
Certificate Link: For Certificate objects: the parent
certificate for a certificate in a certificate chain. For Public Key objects: the
corresponding certificate(s), containing the same public key.
·
Derivation Base Object Link: For a derived Symmetric Key
or Secret Data object: the object(s) from which the current symmetric key was
derived.
·
Derived Key Link: the symmetric key(s) or Secret Data
object(s) that were derived from the current object.
·
Replacement Object Link: For a Symmetric Key, an
Asymmetric Private Key, or an Asymmetric Public Key object: the key that
resulted from the re-key of the current key. For a Certificate object: the
certificate that resulted from the re-certify. Note that there SHALL be only
one such replacement object per Managed Object.
·
Replaced Object Link: For a Symmetric Key, an
Asymmetric Private Key, or an Asymmetric Public Key object: the key that was
re-keyed to obtain the current key. For a Certificate object: the certificate
that was re-certified to obtain the current certificate.
·
Parent Link: For all object types: the owner, container or
other parent object corresponding to the object.
·
Child Link: For all object types: the subordinate, derived
or other child object corresponding to the object.
·
Previous Link: For all object types: the previous object
to this object.
·
Next Link: For all object types: the next object to this
object.
The Link attribute SHOULD be present for private keys and
public keys for which a certificate chain is stored by the server, and for
certificates in a certificate chain.
Note that it is possible for a Managed Object to have
multiple instances of the Link attribute (e.g., a Private Key has links to the
associated certificate, as well as the associated public key; a Certificate
object has links to both the public key and to the certificate of the
certification authority (CA) that signed the certificate).
It is also possible that a Managed Object does not have
links to associated cryptographic objects. This MAY occur in cases where the
associated key material is not available to the server or client (e.g., the
registration of a CA Signer certificate with a server, where the corresponding
private key is held in a different manner).
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Link
|
Structure
|
|
|
Link Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.20
|
Yes
|
|
Linked Object Identifier, see 3.1
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
Table 118: Link Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Cryptographic Objects
|
Table
119: Link Attribute Structure Rules
The Application Specific Information attribute is a
structure (see Table 120) used to store data specific to the application(s)
using the Managed Object. It consists of the following fields: an Application
Namespace and Application Data specific to that application
namespace.
Clients MAY request to set (i.e., using any of the
operations that result in new Managed Object(s) on the server or
adding/modifying the attribute of an existing Managed Object) an instance of
this attribute with a particular Application Namespace while omitting Application
Data. In that case, if the server supports this namespace (as indicated by
the Query operation in Section 4.25), then it SHALL return a suitable Application
Data value. If the server does not support this namespace, then an error
SHALL be returned.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Application Specific Information
|
Structure
|
|
|
Application Namespace
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Application Data
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
Table 120: Application Specific Information Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server (only if the Application Data is omitted, in the
client request)
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes (only if the Application Data is omitted in the client request)
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 121: Application Specific
Information Attribute Rules
The Contact Information attribute is OPTIONAL, and
its content is used for contact purposes only. It is not used for policy
enforcement. The attribute is set by the client or the server.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Contact Information
|
Text String
|
Table 122: Contact Information Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify,
Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 123: Contact Information
Attribute Rules
The Last Change Date attribute contains the date
and time of the last change of the specified object.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Last Change Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 124: Last Change Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
Yes
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate, Revoke,
Destroy, Archive, Recover, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair,
Add Attribute, Modify Attribute, Delete Attribute, Get Usage Allocation
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 125: Last Change Date
Attribute Rules
A Custom Attribute is a client- or server-defined
attribute intended for vendor-specific purposes. It is created by the client
and not interpreted by the server, or is created by the server and MAY be
interpreted by the client. All custom attributes created by the client SHALL
adhere to a naming scheme, where the name of the attribute SHALL have a prefix
of 'x-'. All custom attributes created by the key management server SHALL
adhere to a naming scheme where the name of the attribute SHALL have a prefix
of 'y-'. The server SHALL NOT accept a client-created or modified attribute,
where the name of the attribute has a prefix of ‘y-‘. The tag type Custom
Attribute is not able to identify the particular attribute; hence such an
attribute SHALL only appear in an Attribute Structure with its name as defined
in Section 2.1.1.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
|
Custom Attribute
|
Any data type or structure. If a structure, then the structure SHALL
NOT include sub structures
|
The name of the attribute SHALL start with 'x-' or
'y-'.
|
Table 126 Custom Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes, for server-created attributes
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes, for client-created attributes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes, for client-created attributes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate, Revoke,
Destroy, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table
127: Custom Attribute Rules
The Alternative Name attribute is used to
identify and locate the object. This attribute is assigned by the client, and
the Alternative Name Value is intended to be in a form that humans
are able to interpret. The key management system MAY specify rules by which the
client creates valid alternative names. Clients are informed of such rules by a
mechanism that is not specified by this standard. Alternative Names MAY NOT be
unique within a given key management domain.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Alternative Name
|
Structure
|
|
|
Alternative Name Value
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Alternative Name Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.34
|
Yes
|
Table 128: Alternative Name
Attribute Structure
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
Yes (Only if no value present)
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 129: Alternative Name
Attribute Rules
Key Value Present is an OPTIONAL attribute of the
managed object created by the server. It SHALL NOT be specified by the client
in a Register request. Key Value Present SHALL be created by the server
if the Key Value is absent from the Key Block in a Register request. The value
of Key Value Present SHALL NOT be modified by either the client or the server. Key
Value Present attribute MAY be used as a part of the Locate operation. This
attribute does not apply to Templates, Certificates, Public Keys or Opaque
Objects.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Value Present
|
Boolean
|
No
|
Table 130: Key Value Present
Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Server
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
During Register operation
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Symmetric Key, Private Key, Split Key, Secret Data
|
Table 131: Key Value Present
Attribute Rules
Key Value Location is an OPTIONAL attribute of a
managed object. It MAY be specified by the client when the Key Value is omitted
from the Key Block in a Register request. Key Value Location is used to
indicate the location of the Key Value absent from the object being registered.
This attribute does not apply to Templates, Certificates, Public Keys or Opaque
Objects.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Key Value Location
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Value Location
Value
|
Text String
|
Yes
|
|
Key Value Location Type
|
Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.35
|
Yes
|
Table 132: Key Value Location
Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Deletable by client
|
Yes
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
Yes
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Never
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
Symmetric Key, Private Key, Split Key, Secret Data
|
Table 133: Key Value Location Attribute
Rules
The Original Creation Date attribute contains the
date and time the object was originally created, which can be different from
when the object is registered with a key management server.
It is OPTIONAL for an object being registered by a client.
The Original Creation Date MAY be set by the client during a Register
operation. If no Original Creation Date attribute was set by the client
during a Register operation, it MAY do so at a later time through an Add
Attribute operation for that object.
It is mandatory for an object created on the server as a
result of a Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, or Re-key Key Pair
operation. In such cases the Original Creation Date SHALL be set by the
server and SHALL be the same as the Initial Date attribute.
In all cases, once the Original Creation Date is
set, it SHALL NOT be deleted or updated.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
|
Original Creation Date
|
Date-Time
|
Table 134: Original Creation Date Attribute
|
SHALL always have a value
|
No
|
|
Initially set by
|
Client or Server (when object is generated by Server)
|
|
Modifiable by server
|
No
|
|
Modifiable by client
|
No
|
|
Deletable by client
|
No
|
|
Multiple instances permitted
|
No
|
|
When implicitly set
|
Create, Create Key Pair, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair
|
|
Applies to Object Types
|
All Objects
|
Table 135: Original Creation
Date Attribute Rules
The following subsections describe the operations that MAY
be requested by a key management client. Not all clients have to be capable of
issuing all operation requests; however any client that issues a specific
request SHALL be capable of understanding the response to the request. All
Object Management operations are issued in requests from clients to servers,
and results obtained in responses from servers to clients. Multiple operations
MAY be combined within a batch, resulting in a single request/response message
pair.
A number of the operations whose descriptions follow are
affected by a mechanism referred to as the ID Placeholder.
The key management server SHALL implement a temporary
variable called the ID Placeholder. This value consists of a single Unique
Identifier. It is a variable stored inside the server that is only valid and
preserved during the execution of a batch of operations. Once the batch of
operations has been completed, the ID Placeholder value SHALL be discarded
and/or invalidated by the server, so that subsequent requests do not find this
previous ID Placeholder available.
The ID Placeholder is obtained from the Unique Identifier
returned in response to the Create, Create Pair, Register, Derive Key, Re-key,
Re-key Key Pair, Certify, Re-Certify, Locate, and Recover operations. If any of
these operations successfully completes and returns a Unique Identifier, then
the server SHALL copy this Unique Identifier into the ID Placeholder variable,
where it is held until the completion of the operations remaining in the
batched request or until a subsequent operation in the batch causes the ID
Placeholder to be replaced. If the Batch Error Continuation Option is set to
Stop and the Batch Order Option is set to true, then subsequent operations in
the batched request MAY make use of the ID Placeholder by omitting the Unique
Identifier field from the request payloads for these operations.
Requests MAY contain attribute values to be assigned to
the object. This information is specified with a Template-Attribute (see
Section 2.1.8) that contains zero or more template names and zero or more
individual attributes. If more than one template name is specified, and there
is a conflict between the single-instance attributes in the templates, then the
value in the last of the conflicting templates takes precedence. If there is a
conflict between the single-instance attributes in the request and the
single-instance attributes in a specified template, then the attribute values
in the request take precedence. For multi-instance attributes, the union of
attribute values is used when the attributes are specified more than once.
Responses MAY contain attribute values that were not
specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the server. This
information is specified with a Template-Attribute that contains one or more
individual attributes.
For any operations that operate on Managed Objects already
stored on the server, any archived object SHALL first be made available by a
Recover operation (see Section 4.23) before they MAY be specified (i.e., as
on-line objects).
4.1 Create
This operation requests the server to generate a new
symmetric key as a Managed Cryptographic Object. This operation is not used to
create a Template object (see Register operation, Section 4.3).
The request contains information about the type of object
being created, and some of the attributes to be assigned to the object (e.g.,
Cryptographic Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, etc.). This information MAY be
specified by the names of Template objects that already exist.
The response contains the Unique Identifier of the created
object. The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier returned by this operation
into the ID Placeholder variable.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
Yes
|
Determines the type of object to be created.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
Yes
|
Specifies desired attributes using to be associated
with the new object templates and/or individual attributes.
|
Table 136: Create Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
Yes
|
Type of object created.
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the newly created object.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of object attributes with values
that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the
key management server.
|
Table 137: Create Response Payload
Table 138 indicates which
attributes SHALL be included in the Create request using the Template-Attribute
object.
|
Attribute
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm, see 3.4
|
Yes
|
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask, see 3.19
|
Yes
|
Table
138: Create Attribute Requirements
This operation requests the server to generate a new
public/private key pair and register the two corresponding new Managed
Cryptographic Objects.
The request contains attributes to be assigned to the
objects (e.g., Cryptographic Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, etc.). Attributes
and Template Names MAY be specified for both keys at the same time by
specifying a Common Template-Attribute object in the request. Attributes not
common to both keys (e.g., Name, Cryptographic Usage Mask) MAY be specified
using the Private Key Template-Attribute and Public Key Template-Attribute
objects in the request, which take precedence over the Common
Template-Attribute object.
For the Private Key, the server SHALL create a Link
attribute of Link Type Public Key pointing to the Public Key. For the Public
Key, the server SHALL create a Link attribute of Link Type Private Key pointing
to the Private Key. The response contains the Unique Identifiers of both
created objects. The ID Placeholder value SHALL be set to the Unique Identifier
of the Private Key.
|
Request
Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Common Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
Specifies desired attributes in templates and/or as individual
attributes to be associated with the new object that apply to both the
Private and Public Key Objects.
|
|
Private Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
Specifies templates and/or attributes to be associated with the new
object that apply to the Private Key Object. Order of precedence applies.
|
|
Public Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
Specifies templates and/or attributes to be
associated with the new object that apply to the Public Key Object. Order of
precedence applies.
|
Table 139: Create Key Pair Request Payload
For multi-instance attributes,
the union of the values found in the templates and attributes of the Common,
Private, and Public Key Template-Attribute SHALL be used. For single-instance
attributes, the order of precedence is as follows:
1. attributes
specified explicitly in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
2. attributes
specified via templates in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
3. attributes
specified explicitly in the Common Template-Attribute, then
4. attributes
specified via templates in the Common Template-Attribute.
If there are multiple templates in the Common, Private, or
Public Key Template-Attribute, then the last value of the single-instance
attribute that conflicts takes precedence.
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Private Key Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the newly created Private Key object.
|
|
Public Key Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the newly created Public Key object.
|
|
Private Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of attributes, for the Private Key Object, with
values that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set
by the key management server.
|
|
Public Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of attributes, for the Public Key
Object, with values that were not specified in the request, but have been
implicitly set by the key management server.
|
Table 140: Create Key Pair Response Payload
Table 141 indicates which
attributes SHALL be included in the Create Key pair request using
Template-Attribute objects, as well as which attributes SHALL have the same
value for the Private and Public Key.
|
Attribute
|
REQUIRED
|
SHALL contain the same value for both Private and Public Key
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm, see 3.4
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
Cryptographic Length, see 3.5
|
No
|
Yes
|
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask, see 3.19
|
Yes
|
No
|
|
Cryptographic Domain Parameters, see 3.7
|
No
|
Yes
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters, see 3.6
|
No
|
Yes
|
Table
141: Create Key Pair Attribute Requirements
Setting the same Cryptographic Length value for both private
and public key does not imply that both keys are of equal length. For RSA,
Cryptographic Length corresponds to the bit length of the Modulus. For DSA and
DH algorithms, Cryptographic Length corresponds to the bit length of parameter
P, and the bit length of Q is set separately in the Cryptographic Domain
Parameters attribute. For ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV algorithms, Cryptographic
Length corresponds to the bit length of parameter Q.
This operation requests the server to register a Managed
Object that was created by the client or obtained by the client through some
other means, allowing the server to manage the object. The arguments in the
request are similar to those in the Create operation, but contain the object
itself for storage by the server.
The request contains information about the type of object
being registered and attributes to be assigned to the object (e.g., Cryptographic
Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, etc.). This information SHALL be specified by
the use of a Template-Attribute object.
The response contains the Unique Identifier assigned by
the server to the registered object. The server SHALL copy the Unique
Identifier returned by this operations into the ID Placeholder variable. The
Initial Date attribute of the object SHALL be set to the current time.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
Yes
|
Determines the type of object being registered.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
Yes
|
Specifies desired object attributes to be associated with the new
object using templates and/or individual attributes.
|
|
Certificate, Symmetric Key, Private Key, Public Key, Split Key,
Template Secret Data or Opaque Object, see 2.2
|
Yes
|
The object being registered. The object and
attributes MAY be wrapped.
|
Table 142: Register Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the newly registered object.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of object attributes with values
that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the
key management server.
|
Table 143: Register Response Payload
If a Managed Cryptographic Object
is registered, then the following attributes SHALL be included in the Register
request, either explicitly, or via specification of a template that contains
the attribute.
|
Attribute
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm, see 3.4
|
Yes, MAY be omitted only if
this information is encapsulated in the Key Block. Does not apply to Secret
Data. If present, then Cryptographic Length below SHALL also be present.
|
|
Cryptographic Length, see 3.5
|
Yes, MAY be omitted only if
this information is encapsulated in the Key Block. Does not apply to Secret
Data. If present, then Cryptographic Algorithm above SHALL also be present.
|
|
Certificate Length, see 3.9
|
Yes. Only applies to Certificates.
|
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask, see 3.19
|
Yes.
|
|
Digital Signature Algorithm, see 3.16
|
Yes, MAY be
omitted only if this information is encapsulated in the Certificate object.
Only applies to Certificates.
|
Table 144: Register Attribute
Requirements
This request is used to generate a replacement key for an
existing symmetric key. It is analogous to the Create operation, except that
attributes of the replacement key are copied from the existing key, with the
exception of the attributes listed in Table 146.
As the replacement key takes over the name attribute of
the existing key, Re-key SHOULD only be performed once on a given key.
The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier of the
replacement key returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable.
For the existing key, the server SHALL create a Link
attribute of Link Type Replacement Object pointing to the replacement key. For
the replacement key, the server SHALL create a Link attribute of Link Type
Replaced Key pointing to the existing key.
An Offset MAY be used to indicate the difference
between the Initialization Date and the Activation Date of the replacement key.
If no Offset is specified, the Activation Date, Process Start Date, Protect
Stop Date and Deactivation Date values are copied from the existing key. If
Offset is set and dates exist for the existing key, then the dates of the
replacement key SHALL be set based on the dates of the existing key as follows:
|
Attribute in Existing Key
|
Attribute in Replacement Key
|
|
Initial Date (IT1)
|
Initial Date (IT2) > IT1
|
|
Activation Date (AT1)
|
Activation Date (AT2) = IT2+ Offset
|
|
Process Start Date (CT1)
|
Process Start Date = CT1+(AT2-
AT1)
|
|
Protect Stop Date (TT1)
|
Protect Stop Date = TT1+(AT2-
AT1)
|
|
Deactivation Date (DT1)
|
Deactivation Date
= DT1+(AT2- AT1)
|
Table 145: Computing New Dates from Offset during Re-key
Attributes requiring special
handling when creating the replacement key are:
|
Attribute
|
Action
|
|
Initial Date, see 3.23
|
Set to the current time
|
|
Destroy Date, see 3.28
|
Not set
|
|
Compromise Occurrence Date, see 3.29
|
Not set
|
|
Compromise Date, see 3.30
|
Not set
|
|
Revocation Reason, see 3.31
|
Not set
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
New value generated
|
|
Usage Limits, see 3.21
|
The Total value is copied from the existing key, and the Count value
in the existing key is set to the Total value.
|
|
Name, see 3.2
|
Set to the name(s) of the existing key; all name attributes are
removed from the existing key.
|
|
State, see 3.22
|
Set based on attributes values, such as dates, as shown in Table 145
|
|
Digest, see 3.16
|
Recomputed from the replacement key value
|
|
Link, see 3.35
|
Set to point to the existing key as the replaced key
|
|
Last Change Date, see 3.38
|
Set to current time
|
Table 146: Re-key Attribute Requirements
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the existing Symmetric Key being re-keyed. If omitted,
then the ID Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Offset
|
No
|
An Interval object indicating the difference between the
Initialization Date and the Activation Date of the replacement key to be
created.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
Specifies desired object attributes using templates
and/or individual attributes.
|
Table 147: Re-key Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the newly-created replacement Symmetric Key.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of object attributes with values
that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the
key management server.
|
Table 148: Re-key Response
Payload
This request is used to generate a replacement key pair
for an existing public/private key pair. It is analogous to the Create Key
Pair operation, except that attributes of the replacement key pair are copied
from the existing key pair, with the exception of the attributes listed in Table 150.
As the replacement of the key pair takes over the name
attribute for the existing public/private key pair, Re-key Key Pair SHOULD only
be performed once on a given key pair.
For both the existing public key and private key, the
server SHALL create a Link attribute of Link Type Replacement Key pointing to
the replacement public and private key, respectively. For both the replacement
public and private key, the server SHALL create a Link attribute of Link Type
Replaced Key pointing to the existing public and private key, respectively.
The server SHALL copy the Private Key Unique Identifier of
the replacement private key returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder
variable.
An Offset MAY be used to indicate the difference
between the Initialization Date and the Activation Date of the replacement key
pair. If no Offset is specified, the Activation Date and Deactivation Date
values are copied from the existing key pair. If Offset is set and dates exist
for the existing key pair, then the dates of the replacement key pair SHALL be
set based on the dates of the existing key pair as follows
|
Attribute in Existing Key Pair
|
Attribute in Replacement Key Pair
|
|
Initial Date (IT1)
|
Initial Date (IT2) > IT1
|
|
Activation Date (AT1)
|
Activation Date (AT2) = IT2+ Offset
|
|
Deactivation Date (DT1)
|
Deactivation Date
= DT1+(AT2- AT1)
|
Table 149: Computing New Dates from Offset during
Re-key Key Pair
Attributes for the replacement key pair that are not
copied from the existing key pair and which are handled in a specific way are:
|
Attribute
|
Action
|
|
Private Key Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
New value generated
|
|
Public Key Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
New value generated
|
|
Name, see 3.2
|
Set to the name(s) of the existing public/private keys; all name
attributes of the existing public/private keys are removed.
|
|
Digest, see 3.17
|
Recomputed for both replacement public and private keys from the new
public and private key values
|
|
Usage Limits, see 3.21
|
The Total Bytes/Total Objects value is copied from the existing key
pair, while the Byte Count/Object Count values are set to the Total
Bytes/Total Objects.
|
|
State, see 3.22
|
Set based on attributes values, such as dates, as shown in Table 149.
|
|
Initial Date, see 3.23
|
Set to the current time
|
|
Destroy Date, see 3.28
|
Not set
|
|
Compromise Occurrence Date, see 3.29
|
Not set
|
|
Compromise Date, see 3.30
|
Not set
|
|
Revocation Reason, see 3.31
|
Not set
|
|
Link, see 3.35
|
Set to point to the existing public/private keys as the replaced
public/private keys
|
|
Last Change Date, see 3.38
|
Set to current time
|
Table 150: Re-key Key Pair Attribute Requirements
|
Request
Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Private Key Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the existing Asymmetric key pair to be re-keyed. If
omitted, then the ID Placeholder is substituted by the server.
|
|
Offset
|
No
|
An Interval object indicating the difference between the
Initialization date and the Activation Date of the replacement key pair to be
created.
|
|
Common Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
Specifies desired attributes in templates and/or as individual
attributes that apply to both the Private and Public Key Objects.
|
|
Private Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
Specifies templates and/or attributes that apply to the Private Key
Object. Order of precedence applies.
|
|
Public Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
Specifies templates and/or attributes that apply to
the Public Key Object. Order of precedence applies.
|
Table 151: Re-key Key Pair Request Payload
For multi-instance attributes,
the union of the values found in the templates and attributes of the Common,
Private, and Public Key Template-Attribute is used. For single-instance
attributes, the order of precedence is as follows:
1. attributes
specified explicitly in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
2. attributes
specified via templates in the Private and Public Key Template-Attribute, then
3. attributes
specified explicitly in the Common Template-Attribute, then
4. attributes
specified via templates in the Common Template-Attribute.
If there are multiple templates in the Common, Private, or
Public Key Template-Attribute, then the subsequent value of the single-instance
attribute takes precedence.
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Private Key Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the newly created replacement Private Key
object.
|
|
Public Key Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the newly created replacement Public Key
object.
|
|
Private Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of attributes, for the Private Key Object, with
values that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set
by the key management server.
|
|
Public Key Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of attributes, for the Public Key
Object, with values that were not specified in the request, but have been
implicitly set by the key management server.
|
Table 152: Re-key Key Pair Response Payload
This request is used to derive a Symmetric Key or Secret
Data object from keys or Secret Data objects that are already known to the key
management system. The request SHALL only apply to Managed Cryptographic
Objects that have the Derive Key bit set in the Cryptographic Usage Mask
attribute of the specified Managed Object (i.e., are able to be used for key
derivation). If the operation is issued for an object that does not have this
bit set, then the server SHALL return an error. For all derivation methods, the
client SHALL specify the desired length of the derived key or Secret Data
object using the Cryptographic Length attribute. If a key is created, then the
client SHALL specify both its Cryptographic Length and Cryptographic Algorithm.
If the specified length exceeds the output of the derivation method, then the
server SHALL return an error. Clients MAY derive multiple keys and IVs by
requesting the creation of a Secret Data object and specifying a Cryptographic
Length that is the total length of the derived object. If the specified length
exceeds the output of the derivation method, then the server SHALL return an error.
The fields in the request specify the Unique Identifiers
of the keys or Secret Data objects to be used for derivation (e.g., some
derivation methods MAY use multiple keys or Secret Data objects to derive the
result), the method to be used to perform the derivation, and any parameters
needed by the specified method. The method is specified as an enumerated value.
Currently defined derivation methods include:
·
PBKDF2 – This method is used to derive a symmetric key
from a password or pass phrase. The PBKDF2 method is published in [PKCS#5] and [RFC2898].
·
HASH – This method derives a key by computing a hash over
the derivation key or the derivation data.
·
HMAC – This method derives a key by computing an HMAC over
the derivation data.
·
ENCRYPT – This method derives a key by encrypting the
derivation data.
·
NIST800-108-C – This method derives a key by computing the
KDF in Counter Mode as specified in [SP800-108].
·
NIST800-108-F – This method derives a key by computing the
KDF in Feedback Mode as specified in [SP800-108].
·
NIST800-108-DPI – This method derives a key by computing
the KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode as specified in [SP800-108].
·
Extensions.
The server SHALL perform the derivation function, and then
register the derived object as a new Managed Object, returning the new Unique
Identifier for the new object in the response. The server SHALL copy the Unique
Identifier returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable.
For
the keys or Secret Data objects from which the key or Secret Data object is
derived, the server SHALL create a Link attribute of Link Type Derived Key
pointing to the Symmetric Key or Secret Data object derived as a result
of this operation. For the
Symmetric Key or Secret Data object derived as a result of this
operation, the server SHALL create a Link attribute of Link Type Derivation Base Object
pointing to the keys or Secret Data objects from which the key or Secret Data
object is derived.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
Yes
|
Determines the type of object to be created.
|
|
Unique Identifier,
see 3.1
|
Yes. MAY be repeated
|
Determines the object or objects to be used to derive a new key. Note
that the current value of the ID Placeholder SHALL NOT be used in place of a
Unique Identifier in this operation.
|
|
Derivation Method, see 9.1.3.2.21
|
Yes
|
An Enumeration object specifying the method to be used to derive the
new key.
|
|
Derivation Parameters, see below
|
Yes
|
A Structure object containing the parameters needed by the specified
derivation method.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
Yes
|
Specifies desired attributes to be associated with
the new object using templates and/or individual attributes; the length and
algorithm SHALL always be specified for the creation of a symmetric key.
|
Table 153: Derive Key Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier,
see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the newly derived key or Secret Data object.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of object attributes with values
that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the
key management server.
|
Table 154: Derive Key Response Payload
The Derivation
Parameters for all derivation methods consist of the following
parameters, except PBKDF2, which takes two additional parameters.
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Derivation Parameters
|
Structure
|
Yes.
|
|
Cryptographic
Parameters, see 3.6
|
Structure
|
Yes, except for HMAC derivation keys.
|
|
Initialization Vector
|
Byte String
|
No, depends on PRF and mode of operation: empty IV is assumed if not
provided.
|
|
Derivation Data
|
Byte String
|
Yes, unless the Unique Identifier of a Secret Data
object is provided.
|
Table 155: Derivation Parameters Structure (Except
PBKDF2)
Cryptographic Parameters identify
the Pseudorandom Function (PRF) or the mode of operation of the PRF (e.g., if a
key is to be derived using the HASH derivation method, then clients are
REQUIRED to indicate the hash algorithm inside Cryptographic Parameters;
similarly, if a key is to be derived using AES in CBC mode, then clients are
REQUIRED to indicate the Block Cipher Mode). The server SHALL verify that the
specified mode matches one of the instances of Cryptographic Parameters set for
the corresponding key. If Cryptographic Parameters are omitted, then the server
SHALL select the Cryptographic Parameters with the lowest Attribute Index for
the specified key. If the corresponding key does not have any Cryptographic
Parameters attribute, or if no match is found, then an error is returned.
If a key is derived using HMAC, then the attributes of the
derivation key provide enough information about the PRF, and the Cryptographic
Parameters are ignored.
Derivation Data is either the data to be encrypted,
hashed, or HMACed. For the NIST SP 800-108 methods [SP800-108],
Derivation Data is Label||{0x00}||Context, where the all-zero byte is OPTIONAL.
Most derivation methods (e.g., Encrypt) REQUIRE a
derivation key and the derivation data to be used. The HASH derivation method
REQUIRES either a derivation key or derivation data. Derivation data MAY either
be explicitly provided by the client with the Derivation Data field or
implicitly provided by providing the Unique Identifier of a Secret Data object.
If both are provided, then an error SHALL be returned.
The PBKDF2 derivation method takes two additional
parameters:
|
Object
|
Encoding
|
REQUIRED
|
|
Derivation Parameters
|
Structure
|
Yes.
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters, see 3.6
|
Structure
|
No, depends on the PRF.
|
|
Initialization Vector
|
Byte String
|
No, depends on the PRF (if different than those defined in
[PKCS#5]) and mode of operation: an empty IV is
assumed if not provided.
|
|
Derivation Data
|
Byte String
|
Yes, unless the Unique Identifier of a Secret Data object is
provided.
|
|
Salt
|
Byte String
|
Yes.
|
|
Iteration Count
|
Integer
|
Yes.
|
Table 156: PBKDF2 Derivation
Parameters Structure
This request is used to generate a Certificate object for
a public key. This request supports the certification of a new public key, as
well as the certification of a public key that has already been certified
(i.e., certificate update). Only a single certificate SHALL be requested at a
time. Server support for this operation is OPTIONAL. If the server does not
support this operation, an error SHALL be returned.
The Certificate Request object MAY be omitted, in which
case the public key for which a Certificate object is generated SHALL be
specified by its Unique Identifier only. If the Certificate Request Type and
the Certificate Request objects are omitted from the request, then the
Certificate Type SHALL be specified using the Template-Attribute object.
The Certificate Request is passed as a Byte String, which
allows multiple certificate request types for X.509 certificates (e.g.,
PKCS#10, PEM, etc.) to be submitted to the server.
The generated Certificate object whose Unique Identifier is returned MAY be obtained by the client via a
Get operation in the same batch, using the ID Placeholder mechanism.
For the public key, the server SHALL create a Link
attribute of Link Type Certificate pointing to the generated certificate. For
the generated certificate, the server SHALL create a Link attribute of Link
Type Public Key pointing to the Public Key.
The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier of the
generated certificate returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder
variable.
If the information in the Certificate Request conflicts
with the attributes specified in the Template-Attribute, then the information
in the Certificate Request takes precedence.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
The Unique Identifier of the Public Key being certified. If omitted,
then the ID Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Certificate Request Type, see 9.1.3.2.22
|
No
|
An Enumeration object specifying the type of certificate request. It
is REQUIRED if the Certificate Request is present.
|
|
Certificate Request
|
No
|
A Byte String object with the certificate request.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
Specifies desired object attributes using templates
and/or individual attributes.
|
Table 157: Certify Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the generated Certificate object.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of object attributes with values
that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the
key management server.
|
Table 158: Certify Response
Payload
This request is used to renew an existing certificate for
the same key pair. Only a single certificate SHALL be renewed at a time. Server
support for this operation is OPTIONAL. If the server does not support this
operation, an error SHALL be returned.
The Certificate Request object MAY be omitted, in which
case the public key for which a Certificate object is generated SHALL be
specified by its Unique Identifier only. If the Certificate Request Type and
the Certificate Request objects are omitted and the Certificate Type is not
specified using the Template-Attribute object in the request, then the
Certificate Type of the new certificate SHALL be the same as that of the existing
certificate.
The Certificate Request is passed as a Byte String, which
allows multiple certificate request types for X.509 certificates (e.g.,
PKCS#10, PEM, etc.) to be submitted to the server.
The server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier of the new
certificate returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable.
If the information in the Certificate Request field in the
request conflicts with the attributes specified in the Template-Attribute, then
the information in the Certificate Request takes precedence.
As the new certificate takes over the name attribute of
the existing certificate, Re-certify SHOULD only be performed once on a given
(existing) certificate.
For the existing certificate, the server SHALL create a
Link attribute of Link Type Replacement pointing to the new certificate. For
the new certificate, the server SHALL create a Link attribute of Link Type
Replaced pointing to the existing certificate. For the public key, the server
SHALL change the Link attribute of Link Type Certificate to point to the new
certificate.
An Offset MAY be used to indicate the difference
between the Initialization Date and the Activation Date of the new certificate.
If no Offset is specified, the Activation Date and Deactivation Date values are
copied from the existing certificate. If Offset is set and dates exist for the
existing certificate, then the dates of the new certificate SHALL be set based
on the dates of the existing certificate as follows:
|
Attribute in Existing Certificate
|
Attribute in New Certificate
|
|
Initial Date (IT1)
|
Initial Date (IT2) > IT1
|
|
Activation Date (AT1)
|
Activation Date (AT2) = IT2+ Offset
|
|
Deactivation Date (DT1)
|
Deactivation Date
= DT1+(AT2- AT1)
|
Table 159: Computing New Dates from Offset during Re-certify
Attributes that are not copied
from the existing certificate and that are handled in a specific way for the
new certificate are:
|
Attribute
|
Action
|
|
Initial Date, see 3.23
|
Set to current time.
|
|
Destroy Date, see 3.28
|
Not set.
|
|
Revocation Reason, see 3.31
|
Not set.
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.2
|
New value generated.
|
|
Name, see 3.2
|
Set to the name(s) of the existing certificate; all name attributes
are removed from the existing certificate.
|
|
State, see 3.22
|
Set based on attributes values, such as dates, as shown in Table 159.
|
|
Digest, see 3.16
|
Recomputed from the new certificate value.
|
|
Link, see 3.35
|
Set to point to the existing certificate as the replaced certificate.
|
|
Last Change Date, see 3.38
|
Set to current time.
|
Table 160: Re-certify Attribute Requirements
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
The Unique Identifier of the Certificate being renewed. If omitted,
then the ID Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Certificate Request Type, see 9.1.3.2.22
|
No
|
An Enumeration object specifying the type of certificate request. It
is REQUIRED if the Certificate Request is present.
|
|
Certificate Request
|
No
|
A Byte String object with the certificate request.
|
|
Offset
|
No
|
An Interval object indicating the difference between the Initial Date
of the new certificate and the Activation Date of the new certificate.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
Specifies desired object attributes using templates
and/or individual attributes.
|
Table 161: Re-certify Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the new certificate.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of object attributes with values
that were not specified in the request, but have been implicitly set by the
key management server.
|
Table 162: Re-certify Response
Payload
This operation requests that the server search for one or
more Managed Objects, depending on the attributes specified in the request. All
attributes are allowed to be used. However, Attribute Index values SHOULD NOT
be specified in the request. Attribute Index values that are provided SHALL be
ignored by the server. The request MAY contain a Maximum Items field,
which specifies the maximum number of objects to be returned. If the Maximum
Items field is omitted, then the server MAY return all objects matched, or MAY
impose an internal maximum limit due to resource limitations.
If more than one object satisfies the identification
criteria specified in the request, then the response MAY contain Unique
Identifiers for multiple Managed Objects. Returned objects SHALL match all of
the attributes in the request. If no objects match, then an empty response
payload is returned. If no attribute is specified in the request, any object
SHALL be deemed to match the Locate request.
The server returns a list of Unique Identifiers of the
found objects, which then MAY be retrieved using the Get operation. If the
objects are archived, then the Recover and Get operations are REQUIRED to be
used to obtain those objects. If a single Unique Identifier is returned to the
client, then the server SHALL copy the Unique Identifier returned by this
operation into the ID Placeholder variable. If the Locate operation matches
more than one object, and the Maximum Items value is omitted in the request, or
is set to a value larger than one, then the server SHALL empty the ID
Placeholder, causing any subsequent operations that are batched with the Locate,
and which do not specify a Unique Identifier explicitly, to fail. This ensures
that these batched operations SHALL proceed only if a single object is returned
by Locate.
Wild-cards or regular expressions (defined, e.g., in [ISO/IEC 9945-2]) MAY be supported by specific key
management system implementations for matching attribute fields when the field
type is a Text String or a Byte String.
The Date attributes in the Locate request (e.g., Initial
Date, Activation Date, etc.) are used to specify a time or a time range for the
search. If a single instance of a given Date attribute is used in the request
(e.g., the Activation Date), then objects with the same Date attribute are
considered to be matching candidate objects. If two instances of the same Date
attribute are used (i.e., with two different values specifying a range), then
objects for which the Date attribute is inside or at a limit of the range are
considered to be matching candidate objects. If a Date attribute is set to its
largest possible value, then it is equivalent to an undefined attribute. The
KMIP Usage Guide [KMIP-UG] provides examples.
When the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute is specified
in the request, candidate objects are compared against this field via an
operation that consists of a logical AND of the requested mask with the mask in
the candidate object, and then a comparison of the resulting value with the
requested mask. For example, if the request contains a mask value of
10001100010000, and a candidate object mask contains 10000100010000, then the
logical AND of the two masks is 10000100010000, which is compared against the
mask value in the request (10001100010000) and the match fails. This means that
a matching candidate object has all of the bits set in its mask that are set in
the requested mask, but MAY have additional bits set.
When the Usage Limits attribute is specified in the
request, matching candidate objects SHALL have a Usage Limits Count and Usage
Limits Total equal to or larger than the values specified in the request.
When an attribute that is defined as a structure is
specified, all of the structure fields are not REQUIRED to be specified. For
instance, for the Link attribute, if the Linked Object Identifier value is specified
without the Link Type value, then matching candidate objects have the Linked
Object Identifier as specified, irrespective of their Link Type.
When the Object Group attribute and the Object Group
Member flag are specified in the request, and the value specified for Object
Group Member is ‘Group Member Fresh’, matching candidate objects SHALL be fresh
objects (see 3.34) from the object group. If there are no more fresh objects in
the group, the server MAY choose to generate a new object on-the-fly, based on
server policy. If the value specified for Object Group Member is ‘Group Member
Default’, the server locates the default object as defined by server policy.
The Storage Status Mask field (see Section 9.1.3.3.2) is used to indicate whether only on-line
objects, only archived objects, or both on-line and archived objects are to be
searched. Note that the server MAY store attributes of archived objects in
order to expedite Locate operations that search through archived objects.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Maximum Items
|
No
|
An Integer object that indicates the maximum number of object
identifiers the server MAY return.
|
|
Storage Status Mask, see 9.1.3.3.2
|
No
|
An Integer object (used as a bit mask) that indicates whether only
on-line objects, only archived objects, or both on-line and archived objects
are to be searched. If omitted, then on-line only is assumed.
|
|
Object Group Member, see 9.1.3.2.33
|
No
|
An Enumeration object that indicates the object group member type.
|
|
Attribute, see 3
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Specifies an attribute and its value(s) that are
REQUIRED to match those in a candidate object (according to the matching
rules defined above).
|
Table 163: Locate Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
The Unique Identifier of the located objects.
|
Table 164: Locate Response
Payload
This operation requests that the server check for the use
of a Managed Object according to values specified in the request. This
operation SHOULD only be used when placed in a batched set of operations,
usually following a Locate, Create, Create Pair, Derive Key, Certify,
Re-Certify, Re-key or Re-key Key Pair operation, and followed by a Get
operation.
If the server determines that the client is allowed to use
the object according to the specified attributes, then the server returns the
Unique Identifier of the object.
If the server determines that the client is not allowed to
use the object according to the specified attributes, then the server empties the
ID Placeholder and does not return the Unique Identifier, and the operation
returns the set of attributes specified in the request that caused the server
policy denial. The only attributes returned are those that resulted in the
server determining that the client is not allowed to use the object, thus
allowing the client to determine how to proceed.
In a batch containing a Check operation the Batch Order
Option SHOULD be set to true. Only STOP or UNDO Batch Error Continuation Option
values SHOULD be used by the client in such a batch. Additional attributes that
MAY be specified in the request are limited to:
·
Usage Limits Count (see Section 3.21) – The request MAY contain
the usage amount that the client deems necessary to complete its needed
function. This does not require that any subsequent Get Usage Allocation
operations request this amount. It only means that the client is ensuring that
the amount specified is available.
·
Cryptographic Usage Mask – This is used to specify the
cryptographic operations for which the client intends to use the object (see
Section 3.19). This allows the server to determine if the policy allows this
client to perform these operations with the object. Note that this MAY be a
different value from the one specified in a Locate operation that precedes this
operation. Locate, for example, MAY specify a Cryptographic Usage Mask
requesting a key that MAY be used for both Encryption and Decryption, but the value
in the Check operation MAY specify that the client is only using the key for
Encryption at this time.
·
Lease Time – This specifies a desired lease time (see Section 3.20). The client MAY use this to determine if the server allows the client to use
the object with the specified lease or longer. Including this attribute in the
Check operation does not actually cause the server to grant a lease, but only
indicates that the requested lease time value MAY be granted if requested by a
subsequent, batched Obtain Lease operation.
Note that these objects are not encoded in an Attribute
structure as shown in Section 2.1.1
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object being checked. If omitted, then the ID
Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Usage Limits Count, see 3.21
|
No
|
Specifies the number of Usage
Limits Units to be protected to be checked against server policy.
|
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask, see 3.19
|
No
|
Specifies the Cryptographic Usage for which the client intends to use
the object.
|
|
Lease Time, see 3.20
|
No
|
Specifies a Lease Time value that the Client is
asking the server to validate against server policy.
|
Table 165: Check Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes, unless a failure,
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
|
Usage Limits Count, see 3.21
|
No
|
Returned by the Server if the Usage Limits value specified in the
Request Payload is larger than the value that the server policy allows.
|
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask, see 3.19
|
No
|
Returned by the Server if the Cryptographic Usage Mask specified in
the Request Payload is rejected by the server for policy violation.
|
|
Lease Time, see 3.20
|
No
|
Returned by the Server if the Lease Time value in
the Request Payload is larger than a valid Lease Time that the server MAY
grant.
|
Table 166: Check Response Payload
4.11 Get
This operation requests that the server returns the
Managed Object specified by its Unique Identifier.
Only a single object is returned. The response contains
the Unique Identifier of the object, along with the object itself, which MAY be
wrapped using a wrapping key as specified in the request.
The following key format capabilities SHALL be assumed by
the client; restrictions apply when the client requests the server to return
an object in a particular format:
·
If a client registered a key in a given format, the server SHALL
be able to return the key during the Get operation in the same format that was
used when the key was registered.
·
Any other format conversion MAY be supported by the server.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object being requested. If omitted, then the ID
Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Key Format Type, see 9.1.3.2.3
|
No
|
Determines the key format type to be returned.
|
|
Key Compression Type, see 9.1.3.2.2
|
No
|
Determines the compression method for elliptic curve public keys.
|
|
Key Wrapping Specification, see 2.1.6
|
No
|
Specifies keys and other information for wrapping
the returned object. This field SHALL NOT be specified if the requested
object is a Template.
|
Table 167: Get Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
Yes
|
Type of object.
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
|
Certificate, Symmetric Key, Private Key, Public Key,
Split Key, Template, Secret Data, or Opaque Object, see 2.2
|
Yes
|
The cryptographic object being returned.
|
Table 168: Get Response Payload
This operation requests one or more attributes associated
with a Managed Object. The object is specified by its Unique Identifier, and
the attributes are specified by their name in the request. If a specified
attribute has multiple instances, then all instances are returned. If a
specified attribute does not exist (i.e., has no value), then it SHALL NOT be
present in the returned response. If no requested attributes exist, then the
response SHALL consist only of the Unique Identifier. If no attribute name is
specified in the request, all attributes SHALL be deemed to match the Get
Attributes request. The same attribute name SHALL NOT be present more than once
in a request.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object whose attributes are being requested. If omitted,
then the ID Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique
Identifier.
|
|
Attribute Name, see 2.1.1
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Specifies the name of an attribute associated with
the object.
|
Table 169: Get Attributes Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
|
Attribute, see 2.1.1
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
The requested attribute associated with the object.
|
Table 170: Get Attributes
Response Payload
This operation requests a list of the attribute names
associated with a Managed Object. The object is specified by its Unique
Identifier.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object whose attribute names are
being requested. If omitted, then the ID Placeholder value is used by the
server as the Unique Identifier.
|
Table 171: Get Attribute List Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
|
Attribute Name, see 2.1.1
|
Yes, MAY be repeated
|
The names of the available attributes associated
with the object.
|
Table 172: Get Attribute List
Response Payload
This operation requests the server to add a new attribute
instance to be associated with a Managed Object and set its value. The request
contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed Object to which the attribute
pertains, along with the attribute name and value. For single-instance
attributes, this is how the attribute value is created. For multi-instance
attributes, this is how the first and subsequent values are created. Existing
attribute values SHALL only be changed by the Modify Attribute operation. Read-Only
attributes SHALL NOT be added using the Add Attribute operation. The Attribute
Index SHALL NOT be specified in the request. The response returns a new
Attribute Index and the Attribute Index MAY be omitted if the index of the
added attribute instance is 0. Multiple Add Attribute requests MAY be included
in a single batched request to add multiple attributes.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
The Unique Identifier of the object. If omitted, then the ID
Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Attribute, see 2.1.1
|
Yes
|
Specifies the attribute to be added as an attribute
for the object.
|
Table 173: Add Attribute Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
|
Attribute, see 2.1.1
|
Yes
|
The added attribute associated with the object.
|
Table 174: Add Attribute
Response Payload
This operation requests the server to modify the value of
an existing attribute instance associated with a Managed Object. The request
contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed Object whose attribute is to be
modified, the attribute name, the OPTIONAL Attribute Index, and the new value.
If no Attribute Index is specified in the request, then the Attribute Index
SHALL be assumed to be 0. Only existing attributes MAY be changed via this
operation. New attributes SHALL only be added by the Add Attribute operation.
Only the specified instance of the attribute SHALL be modified. Specifying an
Attribute Index for which there exists no Attribute object SHALL result in an
error. The response returns the modified Attribute (new value) and the
Attribute Index MAY be omitted if the index of the modified attribute instance
is 0. Multiple Modify Attribute requests MAY be included in a single batched
request to modify multiple attributes.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
The Unique Identifier of the object. If omitted, then the ID
Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Attribute, see 2.1.1
|
Yes
|
Specifies the attribute associated with the object
to be modified.
|
Table 175: Modify Attribute Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
|
Attribute, see 2.1.1
|
Yes
|
The modified attribute associated with the object
with the new value.
|
Table 176: Modify Attribute Response Payload
4.16 Delete Attribute
This operation requests the server to delete an attribute
associated with a Managed Object. The request contains the Unique Identifier of
the Managed Object whose attribute is to be deleted, the attribute name, and
the OPTIONAL Attribute Index of the attribute. If no Attribute Index is
specified in the request, then the Attribute Index SHALL be assumed to be 0.
Attributes that are always REQUIRED to have a value SHALL never be deleted by
this operation. Attempting to delete a non-existent attribute or specifying an
Attribute Index for which there exists no Attribute Value SHALL result in an
error. The response returns the deleted Attribute and the Attribute Index MAY
be omitted if the index of the deleted attribute instance is 0. Multiple Delete
Attribute requests MAY be included in a single batched request to delete
multiple attributes.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object whose attributes are being deleted. If omitted,
then the ID Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique
Identifier.
|
|
Attribute Name, see 2.1.1
|
Yes
|
Specifies the name of the attribute associated with the object to be
deleted.
|
|
Attribute Index, see 2.1.1
|
No
|
Specifies the Index of the Attribute.
|
Table 177: Delete Attribute Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
|
Attribute, see 2.1.1
|
Yes
|
The deleted attribute associated with the object.
|
Table
178: Delete Attribute Response Payload
This operation requests the server to obtain a new Lease
Time for a specified Managed Object. The Lease Time is an interval value
that determines when the client's internal cache of information about the
object expires and needs to be renewed. If the returned value of the lease time
is zero, then the server is indicating that no lease interval is effective, and
the client MAY use the object without any lease time limit. If a client's
lease expires, then the client SHALL NOT use the associated cryptographic
object until a new lease is obtained. If the server determines that a new lease
SHALL NOT be issued for the specified cryptographic object, then the server
SHALL respond to the Obtain Lease request with an error.
The response payload for the operation contains the
current value of the Last Change Date attribute for the object. This MAY be
used by the client to determine if any of the attributes cached by the client
need to be refreshed, by comparing this time to the time when the attributes
were previously obtained.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object for which the lease is being
obtained. If omitted, then the ID Placeholder value is used by the server as
the Unique Identifier.
|
Table 179: Obtain Lease Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
|
Lease Time, see 3.20
|
Yes
|
An interval (in seconds) that specifies the amount of time that the
object MAY be used until a new lease needs to be obtained.
|
|
Last Change Date, see 3.38
|
Yes
|
The date and time indicating when the latest change
was made to the contents or any attribute of the specified object.
|
Table 180: Obtain Lease
Response Payload
This operation requests the server to obtain an allocation
from the current Usage Limits value to allow the client to use the Managed
Cryptographic Object for applying cryptographic protection. The allocation only
applies to Managed Cryptographic Objects that are able to be used for applying
protection (e.g., symmetric keys for encryption, private keys for signing,
etc.) and is only valid if the Managed Cryptographic Object has a Usage Limits
attribute. Usage for processing cryptographically protected information (e.g.,
decryption, verification, etc.) is not limited and is not able to be allocated.
A Managed Cryptographic Object that has a Usage Limits attribute SHALL NOT be
used by a client for applying cryptographic protection unless an allocation has
been obtained using this operation. The operation SHALL only be requested
during the time that protection is enabled for these objects (i.e., after the
Activation Date and before the Protect Stop Date). If the operation is
requested for an object that has no Usage Limits attribute, or is not an object
that MAY be used for applying cryptographic protection, then the server SHALL
return an error.
The field in the request specifies the number of units
that the client needs to protect. If the requested amount is not available or
if the Managed Object is not able to be used for applying cryptographic
protection at this time, then the server SHALL return an error. The server
SHALL assume that the entire allocated amount is going to be consumed. Once the
entire allocated amount has been consumed, the client SHALL NOT continue to use
the Managed Cryptographic Object for applying cryptographic protection until a
new allocation is obtained.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object whose usage allocation is being requested. If
omitted, then the ID Placeholder is substituted by the server.
|
|
Usage Limits Count, see Usage Limits Count field in 3.21
|
Yes
|
The number of Usage Limits Units to be protected.
|
Table 181: Get Usage Allocation Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
Table 182: Get Usage Allocation Response Payload
4.19 Activate
This operation requests the server to activate a Managed
Cryptographic Object. The request SHALL NOT specify a Template object. The
operation SHALL only be performed on an object in the Pre-Active state and has
the effect of changing its state to Active, and setting its Activation Date to
the current date and time.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object being activated. If omitted,
then the ID Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
Table 183: Activate Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
Table 184: Activate Response
Payload
This operation requests the server to revoke a Managed
Cryptographic Object or an Opaque Object. The request SHALL NOT specify a
Template object. The request contains a reason for the revocation (e.g., “key
compromise”, “cessation of operation”, etc.). Special authentication and
authorization SHOULD be enforced to perform this request (see [KMIP-UG]). Only the object owner or an authorized
security officer SHOULD be allowed to issue this request. The operation has one
of two effects. If the revocation reason is “key compromise”, then the object
is placed into the “compromised” state, and the Compromise Date attribute is
set to the current date and time. Otherwise, the object is placed into the
“deactivated” state, and the Deactivation Date attribute is set to the current
date and time.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object being revoked. If omitted, then the ID
Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Revocation Reason, see 3.31
|
Yes
|
Specifies the reason for revocation.
|
|
Compromise Occurrence Date, see 3.29
|
No
|
SHALL be specified if the Revocation Reason is 'key
compromise'.
|
Table 185: Revoke Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
Table 186: Revoke Response
Payload
This operation is used to indicate to the server that the
key material for the specified Managed Object SHALL be destroyed. The meta-data
for the key material MAY be retained by the server (e.g., used to ensure that
an expired or revoked private signing key is no longer available). Special
authentication and authorization SHOULD be enforced to perform this request
(see [KMIP-UG]). Only the object owner or an
authorized security officer SHOULD be allowed to issue this request. If the
Unique Identifier specifies a Template object, then the object itself,
including all meta-data, SHALL be destroyed. Cryptographic Objects MAY only be
destroyed if they are in either Pre-Active or Deactivated state. A
Cryptographic Object in the Active state MAY be destroyed if the server sets
the Deactivation date (the state of the object transitions to Deactivated) to a
date that is prior to or equal to the current date before destroying the
object.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object being destroyed. If omitted,
then the ID Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
Table 187: Destroy Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
Table 188: Destroy Response
Payload
This operation is used to specify that a Managed Object
MAY be archived. The actual time when the object is archived, the location of
the archive, or level of archive hierarchy is determined by the policies within
the key management system and is not specified by the client. The request
contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed Object. Special authentication
and authorization SHOULD be enforced to perform this request (see [KMIP-UG]). Only the object owner or an authorized security
officer SHOULD be allowed to issue this request. This request is only an
indication from a client that, from its point of view, the key management
system MAY archive the object.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object being archived. If omitted,
then the ID Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
Table 189: Archive Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
Table 190: Archive Response
Payload
This operation is used to obtain access to a Managed
Object that has been archived. This request MAY need asynchronous polling to
obtain the response due to delays caused by retrieving the object from the
archive. Once the response is received, the object is now on-line, and MAY be
obtained (e.g., via a Get operation). Special authentication and authorization
SHOULD be enforced to perform this request (see [KMIP-UG]).
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
Determines the object being recovered. If omitted,
then the ID Placeholder value is used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
Table 191: Recover Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object.
|
Table 192: Recover Response
Payload
This operation requests the server to validate a
certificate chain and return information on its validity. Only a single
certificate chain SHALL be included in each request. Support for this operation
at the server is OPTIONAL. If the server does not support this operation, an
error SHALL be returned.
The request MAY contain a list of certificate objects,
and/or a list of Unique Identifiers that identify Managed Certificate objects.
Together, the two lists compose a certificate chain to be validated. The
request MAY also contain a date for which all certificates in the certificate
chain are REQUIRED to be valid.
The method or policy by which validation is conducted is a
decision of the server and is outside of the scope of this protocol. Likewise,
the order in which the supplied certificate chain is validated and the
specification of trust anchors used to terminate validation are also controlled
by the server.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Certificate, see 2.2.1
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
One or more Certificates.
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
One or more Unique Identifiers of Certificate Objects.
|
|
Validity Date
|
No
|
A Date-Time object indicating when the certificate
chain needs to be valid. If omitted, the current date and time SHALL be
assumed.
|
Table 193: Validate Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Validity Indicator, see 9.1.3.2.23
|
Yes
|
An Enumeration object indicating whether the
certificate chain is valid, invalid, or unknown.
|
Table 194: Validate Response Payload
This operation is used by the client to interrogate the
server to determine its capabilities and/or protocol mechanisms. The Query
operation SHOULD be invocable by unauthenticated clients to interrogate server
features and functions. The Query Function field in the request SHALL
contain one or more of the following items:
·
Query Operations
·
Query Objects
·
Query Server Information
·
Query Application Namespaces
·
Query Extension List
·
Query Extension Map
·
Query Attestation Types
The Operation fields in the response contain
Operation enumerated values, which SHALL list all the operations that the
server supports. If the request contains a Query Operations value in the Query
Function field, then these fields SHALL be returned in the response.
The Object Type fields in the response contain
Object Type enumerated values, which SHALL list all the object types that the
server supports. If the request contains a Query Objects value in the
Query Function field, then these fields SHALL be returned in the response.
The Server Information field in the response is a
structure containing vendor-specific fields and/or substructures. If the
request contains a Query Server Information value in the Query Function
field, then this field SHALL be returned in the response.
The Application Namespace fields in the response
contain the namespaces that the server SHALL generate values for if requested
by the client (see Section 3.36). These fields SHALL only be returned in the
response if the request contains a Query Application Namespaces value in the
Query Function field.
The Extension Information fields in the response
contain the descriptions of Objects with Item Tag values in the Extensions
range that are supported by the server (see Section 2.1.9). If the request
contains a Query Extension List and/or Query Extension Map value
in the Query Function field, then the Extensions Information fields SHALL be
returned in the response. If the Query Function field contains the Query
Extension Map value, then the Extension Tag and Extension Type fields SHALL be
specified in the Extension Information values.
The Attestation Type fields in the response contain
Attestation Type enumerated values, which SHALL list all the attestation types
that the server supports. If the request contains a Query Attestation Types
value in the Query Function field, then this field SHALL be returned in the
response if the server supports any Attestation Types.
Note that the response payload is empty if there are no
values to return.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Query Function, see 9.1.3.2.24
|
Yes, MAY be Repeated
|
Determines the information being queried.
|
Table 195: Query Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Operation, see 9.1.3.2.27
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Specifies an Operation that is supported by the server.
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Specifies a Managed Object Type that is supported by the server.
|
|
Vendor Identification
|
No
|
SHALL be returned if Query Server Information is requested. The
Vendor Identification SHALL be a text string that uniquely identifies the
vendor.
|
|
Server Information
|
No
|
Contains vendor-specific information possibly be of
interest to the client.
|
|
Application Namespace, see 3.36
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Specifies an Application Namespace supported by the
server.
|
|
Extension Information, see 2.1.9
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
SHALL be returned if Query Extension List or Query
Extension Map is requested and supported by the server.
|
|
Attestation Type, see 9.1.3.2.36
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
Specifies an Attestation Type that is supported by
the server.
|
Table 196: Query Response
Payload
This operation is used by the client to determine a list
of protocol versions that is supported by the server. The request payload contains
an OPTIONAL list of protocol versions that is supported by the client. The
protocol versions SHALL be ranked in order of preference (highest preference
first).
The response payload contains a list of protocol versions
that are supported by the server. The protocol versions are ranked in order of
preference (highest preference first). If the client provides the server with a
list of supported protocol versions in the request payload, the server SHALL
return only the protocol versions that are supported by both the client and
server. The server SHOULD list all the protocol versions supported by both
client and server. If the protocol version specified in the request header is
not specified in the request payload and the server does not support any protocol
version specified in the request payload, the server SHALL return an empty list
in the response payload. If no protocol versions are specified in the request
payload, the server SHOULD return all the protocol versions that are supported
by the server.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Protocol Version, see 6.1
|
No, MAY be Repeated
|
The list of protocol versions supported by the
client ordered in highest preference first.
|
Table 197: Discover Versions Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Protocol Version, see 6.1
|
No, MAY be repeated
|
The list of protocol versions supported by the server ordered in
highest preference first.
|
Table 198: Discover Versions Response Payload
This operation requests the server to cancel an
outstanding asynchronous operation. The correlation value (see Section 6.8) of the original operation SHALL be specified in the request. The server SHALL
respond with a Cancellation Result that contains one of the following
values:
·
Canceled – The cancel operation succeeded in canceling the
pending operation.
·
Unable To Cancel – The cancel operation is unable to
cancel the pending operation.
·
Completed – The pending operation completed successfully
before the cancellation operation was able to cancel it.
·
Failed – The pending operation completed with a failure
before the cancellation operation was able to cancel it.
·
Unavailable – The specified correlation value did not
match any recently pending or completed asynchronous operations.
The response to this operation is not able to be
asynchronous.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Asynchronous Correlation Value, see 6.8
|
Yes
|
Specifies the request being canceled.
|
Table 199: Cancel Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Asynchronous Correlation Value, see 6.8
|
Yes
|
Specified in the request.
|
|
Cancellation Result, see 9.1.3.2.25
|
Yes
|
Enumeration indicating the result of the
cancellation.
|
Table 200: Cancel Response
Payload
This operation is used to poll the server in order to
obtain the status of an outstanding asynchronous operation. The correlation
value (see Section 6.8) of the original operation SHALL be specified in the
request. The response to this operation SHALL NOT be asynchronous.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Asynchronous Correlation Value, see 6.8
|
Yes
|
Specifies the request being polled.
|
Table 201: Poll Request Payload
The server SHALL reply with one of two responses:
If the operation has not completed, the response SHALL
contain no payload and a Result Status of Pending.
If the operation has completed, the response SHALL contain
the appropriate payload for the operation. This response SHALL be identical to
the response that would have been sent if the operation had completed
synchronously.
4.29 Encrypt
This operation requests the server to perform an
encryption operation on the provided data using a Managed Cryptographic Object
as the key for the encryption operation.
The request contains information about the cryptographic
parameters (mode and padding method), the data to be encrypted, and the
IV/Counter/Nonce to use. The cryptographic parameters MAY be omitted from the
request as they can be specified as associated attributes of the Managed
Cryptographic Object. The IV/Counter/Nonce MAY also be omitted from the request
if the cryptographic parameters indicate that the server shall generate a
Random IV on behalf of the client or the encryption algorithm does not need an
IV/Counter/Nonce. The server does not store or otherwise manage the
IV/Counter/Nonce.
If the Managed Cryptographic Object referenced has a Usage
Limits attribute then the server SHALL obtain an allocation from the current
Usage Limits value prior to performing the encryption operation. If the
allocation is unable to be obtained the operation SHALL return with a result
status of Operation Failed and result reason of Permission Denied.
The response contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed
Cryptographic Object used as the key and the result of the encryption
operation.
The success or failure of the operation is indicated by
the Result Status (and if failure the Result Reason) in the response header.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object
that is the key to use for the encryption operation. If omitted, then the ID
Placeholder value SHALL be used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters, see 3.6
|
No
|
The Cryptographic Parameters (Block Cipher Mode, Padding
Method, RandomIV) corresponding to the particular encryption method
requested. If omitted then the Cryptographic Parameters associated with the
Managed Cryptographic Object with the lowest Attribute Index SHALL be used.
If there are no Cryptographic Parameters associated with
the Managed Cryptographic Object and the algorithm requires parameters then
the operation SHALL return with a Result Status of Operation Failed.
|
|
Data
|
Yes
|
The data to be encrypted (as a Byte String).
|
|
IV/Counter/Nonce
|
No
|
The initialization vector, counter or nonce to be used
(where appropriate).
|
Table 202: Encrypt Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object
that was the key used for the encryption operation.
|
|
Data
|
Yes
|
The encrypted data (as a Byte String).
|
|
IV/Counter/Nonce
|
No
|
The value used if the Cryptographic Parameters specified
Random IV and the IV/Counter/Nonce value was not provided in the request and
the algorithm requires the provision of an IV/Counter/Nonce.
|
Table 203: Encrypt Response Payload
This operation requests the server to perform a decryption
operation on the provided data using a Managed Cryptographic Object as the key
for the decryption operation.
The request contains information about the cryptographic
parameters (mode and padding method), the data to be decrypted, and the
IV/Counter/Nonce to use. The cryptographic parameters MAY be omitted from the
request as they can be specified as associated attributes of the Managed
Cryptographic Object. The initialization vector/counter/nonce MAY also be
omitted from the request if the algorithm does not use an IV/Counter/Nonce.
The response contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed
Cryptographic Object used as the key and the result of the decryption
operation.
The success or failure of the operation is indicated by
the Result Status (and if failure the Result Reason) in the response header.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object
that is the key to use for the decryption operation. If omitted, then the ID
Placeholder value SHALL be used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters, see 3.6
|
No
|
The Cryptographic Parameters (Block Cipher Mode, Padding
Method) corresponding to the particular decryption method requested. If
omitted then the Cryptographic Parameters associated with the Managed
Cryptographic Object with the lowest Attribute Index SHALL be used.
If there are no Cryptographic Parameters associated with
the Managed Cryptographic Object and the algorithm requires parameters then
the operation SHALL return with a Result Status of Operation Failed.
|
|
Data
|
Yes
|
The data to be decrypted (as a Byte String).
|
|
IV/Counter/Nonce
|
No
|
The initialization vector, counter or nonce to be used
(where appropriate).
|
Table 204: Decrypt Request
Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object
that is the key used for the decryption operation.
|
|
Data
|
Yes
|
The decrypted data (as a Byte String).
|
Table 205: Decrypt Response
Payload
This operation requests the server to perform a signature
operation on the provided data using a Managed Cryptographic Object as the key
for the signature operation.
The request contains information about the cryptographic
parameters (digital signature algorithm or cryptographic algorithm and hash
algorithm) and the data to be signed. The cryptographic parameters MAY be
omitted from the request as they can be specified as associated attributes of
the Managed Cryptographic Object.
If the Managed Cryptographic Object referenced has a Usage
Limits attribute then the server SHALL obtain an allocation from the current
Usage Limits value prior to performing the signing operation. If the allocation
is unable to be obtained the operation SHALL return with a result status of
Operation Failed and result reason of Permission Denied.
The response contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed
Cryptographic Object used as the key and the result of the signature operation.
The success or failure of the operation is indicated by
the Result Status (and if failure the Result Reason) in the response header.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object
that is the key to use for the signature operation. If omitted, then the ID
Placeholder value SHALL be used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters, see 3.6
|
No
|
The Cryptographic Parameters (Digital Signature Algorithm
or Cryptographic Algorithm and Hashing Algorithm) corresponding to the
particular signature generation method requested. If omitted then the
Cryptographic Parameters associated with the Managed Cryptographic Object
with the lowest Attribute Index SHALL be used.
If there are no Cryptographic Parameters associated with
the Managed Cryptographic Object and the algorithm requires parameters then
the operation SHALL return with a Result Status of Operation Failed.
|
|
Data
|
Yes
|
The data to be signed (as a Byte String).
|
Table 206: Sign Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object
that is the key used for the signature operation.
|
|
Signature Data
|
Yes
|
The signed data (as a Byte String).
|
Table 207: Sign Response
Payload
This operation requests the server to perform a signature
verify operation on the provided data using a Managed Cryptographic Object as
the key for the signature verification operation.
The request contains information about the cryptographic
parameters (digital signature algorithm or cryptographic algorithm and hash
algorithm) and the signature to be verified and MAY contain the data that was
passed to the signing operation (for those algorithms which need the original
data to verify a signature).
The cryptographic parameters MAY be omitted from the
request as they can be specified as associated attributes of the Managed
Cryptographic Object.
The response contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed
Cryptographic Object used as the key and the OPTIONAL data recovered from the
signature (for those signature algorithms where data recovery from the
signature is supported). The validity of the signature is indicated by the
Validity Indicator field.
The success or failure of the operation is indicated by
the Result Status (and if failure the Result Reason) in the response header.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object
that is the key to use for the signature verify operation. If omitted, then
the ID Placeholder value SHALL be used by the server as the Unique
Identifier.
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters, see 3.6
|
No
|
The Cryptographic Parameters (Digital Signature Algorithm
or Cryptographic Algorithm and Hashing Algorithm) corresponding to the
particular signature verification method requested. If omitted then the
Cryptographic Parameters associated with the Managed Cryptographic Object
with the lowest Attribute Index SHALL be used.
If there are no Cryptographic Parameters associated with
the Managed Cryptographic Object and the algorithm requires parameters then
the operation SHALL return with a Result Status of Operation Failed.
|
|
Data
|
No
|
The data that was signed (as a Byte String).
|
|
Signature Data
|
Yes
|
The signature to be verified (as a Byte String).
|
Table 208: Signature Verify
Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object that
is the key used for the verification operation.
|
|
Validity Indicator, see 9.1.3.2.23
|
Yes
|
An Enumeration object indicating whether the signature is
valid, invalid, or unknown.
|
|
Data
|
No
|
The OPTIONAL recovered data (as a Byte String) for those
signature algorithms where data recovery from the signature is supported.
|
Table 209: Signature Verify
Response Payload
This operation requests the server to perform message
authentication code (MAC) operation on the provided data using a Managed
Cryptographic Object as the key for the MAC operation.
The request contains information about the cryptographic
parameters (cryptographic algorithm) and the data to be MACed. The
cryptographic parameters MAY be omitted from the request as they can be
specified as associated attributes of the Managed Cryptographic Object.
The response contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed
Cryptographic Object used as the key and the result of the MAC operation.
The success or failure of the operation is indicated by
the Result Status (and if failure the Result Reason) in the response header.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object
that is the key to use for the MAC operation. If omitted, then the ID
Placeholder value SHALL be used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters, see 3.6
|
No
|
The Cryptographic Parameters (Cryptographic Algorithm)
corresponding to the particular MAC method requested. If omitted then the
Cryptographic Parameters associated with the Managed Cryptographic Object
with the lowest Attribute Index SHALL be used.
If there are no Cryptographic Parameters associated with
the Managed Cryptographic Object and the algorithm requires parameters then
the operation SHALL return with a Result Status of Operation Failed.
|
|
Data
|
Yes
|
The data to be MACed (as a Byte String).
|
Table 210: MAC Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object
that is the key used for the MAC operation.
|
|
MAC Data
|
Yes
|
The data MACed (as a Byte String).
|
Table 211: MAC Response Payload
This operation requests the server to perform message
authentication code (MAC) verify operation on the provided data using a Managed
Cryptographic Object as the key for the MAC verify operation.
The request contains information about the cryptographic
parameters (cryptographic algorithm) and the data to be MAC verified and MAY
contain the data that was passed to the MAC operation (for those algorithms
which need the original data to verify a MAC). The cryptographic parameters MAY
be omitted from the request as they can be specified as associated attributes
of the Managed Cryptographic Object.
The response contains the Unique Identifier of the Managed
Cryptographic Object used as the key and the result of the MAC verify
operation. The validity of the MAC is indicated by the Validity Indicator
field.
The success or failure of the operation is indicated by
the Result Status (and if failure the Result Reason) in the response header.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object
that is the key to use for the MAC verify operation. If omitted, then the ID
Placeholder value SHALL be used by the server as the Unique Identifier.
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters, see 3.6
|
No
|
The Cryptographic Parameters (Cryptographic Algorithm)
corresponding to the particular MAC method requested. If omitted then the
Cryptographic Parameters associated with the Managed Cryptographic Object
with the lowest Attribute Index SHALL be used.
If there are no Cryptographic Parameters associated with
the Managed Cryptographic Object and the algorithm requires parameters then
the operation SHALL return with a Result Status of Operation Failed.
|
|
Data
|
No
|
The data that was MACed (as a Byte String).
|
|
MAC Data
|
Yes
|
The data to be MAC verified (as a Byte String).
|
Table 212: MAC Verify Request
Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the Managed Cryptographic Object
that is the key used for the verification operation.
|
|
Validity Indicator, see 9.1.3.2.23
|
Yes
|
An Enumeration object indicating whether the MAC is valid,
invalid, or unknown.
|
Table 213: MAC Verify Response
Payload
This operation requests the server to return output from a
Random Number Generator (RNG).
The request contains the quantity of output requested.
The response contains the RNG output.
The success or failure of the operation is indicated by
the Result Status (and if failure the Result Reason) in the response header.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Data Length
|
Yes
|
The amount of random number generator output to be returned (in
bytes).
|
Table 214: RNG Retrieve Request
Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Data
|
Yes
|
The random number generator output.
|
Table 215: RNG Retrieve
Response Payload
This operation requests the server to seed a Random Number
Generator.
The request contains the seeding material.
The response contains the amount of seed data used.
The success or failure of the operation is indicated by
the Result Status (and if failure the Result Reason) in the response header.
The server MAY elect to ignore the information provided by
the client (i.e. not accept the seeding material) and MAY indicate this to the
client by returning zero as the value in the Data Length response. A client
SHALL NOT consider a response from a server which does not use the provided
data as an error.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Data
|
Yes
|
The data to be provided as a seed to the random number generator.
|
Table 216: RNG Seed Request
Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Data Length
|
Yes
|
The amount of seed data used (in bytes).
|
Table 217: RNG Seed Response
Payload
This operation requests the server to perform a hash
operation on the data provided.
The request contains information about the cryptographic
parameters (hash algorithm) and the data to be hashed.
The response contains the result of the hash operation.
The success or failure of the operation is indicated by
the Result Status (and if failure the Result Reason) in the response header.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters, see 3.6
|
Yes
|
The Cryptographic Parameters (Hashing Algorithm)
corresponding to the particular hash method requested.
|
|
Data
|
Yes
|
The data to be hashed (as a Byte String).
|
Table 218: MAC Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Data
|
Yes
|
The hashed data (as a Byte String).
|
Table 219: HASH Response
Payload
This operation requests the server to generate a new split
key and register all the splits as individual new Managed Cryptographic
Objects.
The request contains attributes to be assigned to the
objects (e.g., Split Key Parts, Split Key Threshold, Split Key Method,
Cryptographic Algorithm, Cryptographic Length, etc.). The request MAY contain
the Unique Identifier of an existing cryptographic object that the client
requests be split by the server. If the attributes supplied in the request do
not match those of the key supplied, the attributes of the key take precedence.
The response contains the Unique Identifiers of all created
objects. The ID Placeholder value SHALL be set to the Unique Identifier of the
split whose Key Part Identifier is 1.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
Yes
|
Determines the type of object to be created.
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
No
|
The Unique Identifier of the key to be split (if
applicable).
|
|
Split Key Parts
|
Yes
|
The total number of parts.
|
|
Split Key Threshold
|
Yes
|
The minimum number of parts needed to reconstruct the
entire key.
|
|
Split Key Method
|
Yes
|
|
|
Prime Field Size
|
No
|
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
Yes
|
Specifies desired object
attributes using templates and/or individual attributes.
|
Table 220: Create Split Key Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
Yes
|
Type of object created.
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes, MAY be repeated
|
The list of Unique Identifiers of the newly created
objects.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of object
attributes with values that were not specified in the request, but have been
implicitly set by the key management system.
|
Table 221: Create Split Key
Response Payload
This operation requests the server to combine a list of
Split Keys into a single Managed Cryptographic Object. The number of Unique
Identifiers in the request SHALL be at least the value of the Split Key
Threshold defined in the Split Keys.
The request contains the Object Type of the Managed
Cryptographic Object that the client requests the Split Key Objects be combined
to form. If the Object Type formed is Secret Data, the client MAY include the
Secret Data Type in the request.
The response contains the Unique Identifier of the object
obtained by combining the Split Keys. The server SHALL copy the Unique
Identifier returned by this operation into the ID Placeholder variable.
|
Request Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
Yes
|
Determines the type of object to be created.
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes, MAY be repeated
|
Determines the Split Keys to be combined to form the
object returned by the server. The minimum number of identifiers is specified
by the Split Key Threshold field in each of the Split Keys.
|
|
Secret Data Type
|
No
|
Determines which Secret Data type the Split Keys form.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
Specifies desired object
attributes using templates and/or individual attributes.
|
Table 222: Join Split Key
Request Payload
|
Response Payload
|
|
Object
|
REQUIRED
|
Description
|
|
Object Type, see 3.3
|
Yes
|
Type of object created.
|
|
Unique Identifier, see 3.1
|
Yes
|
The Unique Identifier of the object obtained by combining
the Split Keys.
|
|
Template-Attribute, see 2.1.8
|
No
|
An OPTIONAL list of object
attributes with values that were not specified in the request, but have been
implicitly set by the key management system.
|
Table 223: Join Split Key
Response Payload
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Server if the
implementation meets the conditions specified in one or more server profiles
specified in [KMIP-Prof].
A KMIP server implementation SHALL be a conforming KMIP
Server.
If a KMIP server implementation claims support for a
particular server profile, then the implementation SHALL conform to all
normative statements within the clauses specified for that profile and for any
subclauses to each of those clauses.
An implementation is a conforming KMIP Client if the
implementation meets the conditions specified in one or more client profiles
specified in [KMIP-Prof].
A KMIP client implementation SHALL be a conforming KMIP
Client.
If a KMIP client implementation claims support for a
particular client profile, then the implementation SHALL conform to all
normative statements within the clauses specified for that profile and for any
subclauses to each of those clauses.
The following individuals have participated in the creation
of this specification and are gratefully acknowledged:
Participants:
Hal Aldridge, Sypris Electronics
Mike Allen, Symantec
Gordon Arnold, IBM
Todd Arnold, IBM
Richard Austin, Hewlett-Packard
Lars Bagnert, PrimeKey
Elaine Barker, NIST
Peter Bartok, Venafi, Inc.
Tom Benjamin, IBM
Anthony Berglas, Cryptsoft
Mathias Björkqvist, IBM
Kevin Bocket, Venafi
Anne Bolgert, IBM
Alan Brown, Thales e-Security
Tim Bruce, CA Technologies
Chris Burchett, Credant Technologies, Inc.
Kelley Burgin, National Security Agency
Robert Burns, Thales e-Security
Chuck Castleton, Venafi
Kenli Chong, QuintessenceLabs
John Clark, Hewlett-Packard
Tom Clifford, Symantec Corp.
Tony Cox, Cryptsoft
Russell Dietz, SafeNet, Inc
Graydon Dodson, Lexmark International Inc.
Vinod Duggirala, EMC Corporation
Chris Dunn, SafeNet, Inc.
Michael Duren, Sypris Electronics
James Dzierzanowski, American Express CCoE
Faisal Faruqui, Thales e-Security
Stan Feather, Hewlett-Packard
David Finkelstein, Symantec Corp.
James Fitzgerald, SafeNet, Inc.
Indra Fitzgerald, Hewlett-Packard
Judith Furlong, EMC Corporation
Susan Gleeson, Oracle
Robert Griffin, EMC Corporation
Paul Grojean, Individual
Robert Haas, IBM
Thomas Hardjono, M.I.T.
ChengDong He, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Steve He, Vormetric
Kurt Heberlein, Hewlett-Packard
Larry Hofer, Emulex Corporation
Maryann Hondo, IBM
Walt Hubis, NetApp
Tim Hudson, Cryptsoft
Jonas Iggbom, Venafi, Inc.
Sitaram Inguva, American Express CCoE
Jay Jacobs, Target Corporation
Glen Jaquette, IBM
Mahadev Karadiguddi, NetApp
Greg Kazmierczak, Wave Systems Corp.
Marc Kenig, SafeNet Inc.
Mark Knight, Thales e-Security
Kathy Kriese, Symantec Corporation
Mark Lambiase, SecureAuth
John Leiseboer, Quintenssence Labs
Hal Lockhart, Oracle Corporation
Robert Lockhart, Thales e-Security
Anne Luk, Cryptsoft
Sairam Manidi, Freescale
Luther Martin, Voltage Security
Neil McEvoy, iFOSSF
Marina Milshtein, Individual
Dale Moberg, Axway Software
Jishnu Mukeri, Hewlett-Packard
Bryan Olson, Hewlett-Packard
John Peck, IBM
Rob Philpott, EMC Corporation
Denis Pochuev, SafeNet, Inc.
Reid Poole, Venafi, Inc.
Ajai Puri, SafeNet, Inc.
Saravanan Ramalingam, Thales e-Security
Peter Reed, SafeNet, Inc.
Bruce Rich, IBM
Christina Richards, American Express CCoE
Warren Robbins, Dell
Peter Robinson, EMC Corporation
Scott Rotondo, Oracle
Saikat Saha, Oracle
Anil Saldhana, Red Hat
Subhash Sankuratripati, NetApp
Boris Schumperli, Cryptomathic
Greg Singh, QuintessenceLabs
David Smith, Venafi, Inc
Brian Spector, Certivox
Terence Spies, Voltage Security
Deborah Steckroth, RouteOne LLC
Michael Stevens, QuintessenceLabs
Marcus Streets, Thales e-Security
Satish Sundar, IBM
Kiran Thota, VMware
Somanchi Trinath, Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
Nathan Turajski, Thales e-Security
Sean Turner, IECA, Inc.
Paul Turner, Venafi, Inc.
Rod Wideman, Quantum Corporation
Steven Wierenga, Hewlett-Packard
Jin Wong, QuintessenceLabs
Sameer Yami, Thales e-Security
Peter Yee, EMC Corporation
Krishna Yellepeddy, IBM
Catherine Ying, SafeNet, Inc.
Tatu Ylonen, SSH Communications Security (Tectia Corp)
Michael Yoder, Vormetric. Inc.
Magda Zdunkiewicz, Cryptsoft
Peter Zelechoski, Election Systems & Software
The following table of Attribute names indicates the Managed
Object(s) for which each attribute applies. This table is not normative.
|
Attribute Name
|
Managed Object
|
|
Certificate
|
Symmetric Key
|
Public Key
|
Private Key
|
Split Key
|
Template
|
Secret Data
|
Opaque Object
|
PGP Key
|
|
Unique Identifier
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Name
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Object Type
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
|
x
|
|
Cryptographic Domain Parameters
|
|
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
|
|
|
|
Cryptographic Length
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
|
x
|
|
Cryptographic Parameters
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
|
x
|
|
Certificate Type
|
x
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
x
|
|
Certificate Identifier
|
x
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
x
|
|
Certificate Issuer
|
x
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
x
|
|
Certificate Length
|
x
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
x
|
|
Certificate Subject
|
x
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
x
|
|
Digital Signature Algorithm
|
x
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
x
|
|
Digest
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
|
x
|
|
Operation Policy Name
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Cryptographic Usage Mask
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
|
Lease Time
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Usage Limits
|
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
|
|
|
State
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
|
x
|
|
Initial Date
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Activation Date
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
|
Process Start Date
|
|
x
|
|
|
x
|
x
|
|
|
|
|
Protect Stop Date
|
|
x
|
|
|
x
|
x
|
|
|
|
|
Deactivation Date
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Destroy Date
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Compromise Occurrence Date
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Compromise Date
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Revocation Reason
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Archive Date
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Object Group
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Fresh
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
|
|
x
|
|
Link
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
|
x
|
|
Application Specific Information
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Contact Information
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Last Change Date
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Custom Attribute
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Alternative Name
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
|
Key Value Present
|
|
x
|
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
|
|
|
Key Value Location
|
|
x
|
|
x
|
x
|
|
x
|
|
|
|
Original Creation Date
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
x
|
Table 319: Attribute Cross-reference
This table is not normative.
|
Object
|
Defined
|
Type
|
Notes
|
|
Activation Date
|
3.24
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Application Data
|
3.36
|
Text String
|
|
|
Application Namespace
|
3.36
|
Text String
|
|
|
Application Specific
Information
|
3.36
|
Structure
|
|
|
Archive Date
|
3.32
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Asynchronous
Correlation Value
|
6.8
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Asynchronous Indicator
|
6.7
|
Boolean
|
|
|
Attribute
|
2.1.1
|
Structure
|
|
|
Attribute Index
|
2.1.1
|
Integer
|
|
|
Attribute Name
|
2.1.1
|
Text String
|
|
|
Attribute Value
|
2.1.1
|
*
|
type varies
|
|
Authentication
|
6.6
|
Structure
|
|
|
Batch Count
|
6.14
|
Integer
|
|
|
Batch Error
Continuation Option
|
6.13, 9.1.3.2.30
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Batch Item
|
6.15
|
Structure
|
|
|
Batch Order Option
|
6.12
|
Boolean
|
|
|
Block Cipher Mode
|
3.6, 9.1.3.2.14
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Cancellation Result
|
4.27, 9.1.3.2.25
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Certificate
|
2.2.1
|
Structure
|
|
|
Certificate Identifier
|
3.13
|
Structure
|
deprecated as of version
1.1
|
|
Certificate Issuer
|
3.13
|
Structure
|
deprecated as of
version 1.1
|
|
Certificate Issuer
Alternative Name
|
3.15
|
Text String
|
deprecated as of
version 1.1
|
|
Certificate Issuer
Distinguished Name
|
3.15
|
Text String
|
deprecated as of
version 1.1
|
|
Certificate Length
|
3.9
|
Integer
|
|
|
Certificate Request
|
4.7, 4.8
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Certificate Request
Type
|
4.7, 4.8, 9.1.3.2.22
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Certificate Serial
Number
|
3.9
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Certificate Subject
|
3.14
|
Structure
|
deprecated as of
version 1.1
|
|
Certificate Subject
Alternative Name
|
3.14
|
Text String
|
deprecated as of
version 1.1
|
|
Certificate Subject
Distinguished Name
|
3.14
|
Text String
|
deprecated as of
version 1.1
|
|
Certificate Type
|
2.2.1, 3.8 , 9.1.3.2.6
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Certificate Value
|
2.2.1
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Common
Template-Attribute
|
2.1.8
|
Structure
|
|
|
Compromise Occurrence
Date
|
3.29
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Compromise Date
|
3.30
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Contact Information
|
3.37
|
Text String
|
|
|
Credential
|
2.1.2
|
Structure
|
|
|
Credential Type
|
2.1.2, 9.1.3.2.1
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Credential Value
|
2.1.2
|
*
|
type varies
|
|
Criticality Indicator
|
6.16
|
Boolean
|
|
|
CRT Coefficient
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Cryptographic Algorithm
|
3.4, 9.1.3.2.13
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Cryptographic Length
|
3.5
|
Integer
|
|
|
Cryptographic
Parameters
|
3.6
|
Structure
|
|
|
Cryptographic Usage
Mask
|
3.19, 9.1.3.3.1
|
Integer
|
Bit mask
|
|
Custom Attribute
|
3.39
|
*
|
type varies
|
|
D
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Deactivation Date
|
3.27
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Derivation Data
|
4.6
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Derivation Method
|
4.6, 9.1.3.2.21
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Derivation Parameters
|
4.6
|
Structure
|
|
|
Destroy Date
|
3.28
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Device Identifier
|
2.1.2
|
Text String
|
|
|
Device Serial Number
|
2.1.2
|
Text String
|
|
|
Digest
|
3.17
|
Structure
|
|
|
Digest Value
|
3.17
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Digital Signature
Algorithm
|
3.16
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Encoding Option
|
2.1.5, 2.1.6, 9.1.3.2.32
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Encryption Key
Information
|
2.1.5
|
Structure
|
|
|
Extension Information
|
2.1.9
|
Structure
|
|
|
Extension Name
|
2.1.9
|
Text String
|
|
|
Extension Tag
|
2.1.9
|
Integer
|
|
|
Extension Type
|
2.1.9
|
Integer
|
|
|
Extensions
|
9.1.3
|
|
|
|
Fresh
|
3.34
|
Boolean
|
|
|
G
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Hashing Algorithm
|
3.6, 3.17, 9.1.3.2.16
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Initial Date
|
3.23
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Initialization Vector
|
4.6
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Issuer
|
3.13
|
Text String
|
deprecated as of
version 1.1
|
|
Issuer Alternative Name
|
3.12
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Issuer Distinguished
Name
|
3.12
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Iteration Count
|
4.6
|
Integer
|
|
|
IV/Counter/Nonce
|
2.1.5
|
Byte String
|
|
|
J
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Key
|
2.1.7
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Key Block
|
2.1.3
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Compression Type
|
9.1.3.2.2
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Key Format Type
|
2.1.4, 9.1.3.2.3
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Key Material
|
2.1.4, 2.1.7
|
Byte String / Structure
|
|
|
Key Part Identifier
|
2.2.5
|
Integer
|
|
|
Key Role Type
|
3.6, 9.1.3.2.17
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Key Value
|
2.1.4
|
Byte String / Structure
|
|
|
Key Wrapping Data
|
2.1.5
|
Structure
|
|
|
Key Wrapping
Specification
|
2.1.6
|
Structure
|
|
|
Last Change Date
|
3.38
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Lease Time
|
3.20
|
Interval
|
|
|
Link
|
3.35
|
Structure
|
|
|
Link Type
|
3.35, 9.1.3.2.20
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Linked Object
Identifier
|
3.35
|
Text String
|
|
|
MAC/Signature
|
2.1.5
|
Byte String
|
|
|
MAC/Signature Key
Information
|
2.1.5
|
Text String
|
|
|
Machine Identifier
|
2.1.2
|
Text String
|
|
|
Maximum Items
|
4.9
|
Integer
|
|
|
Maximum Response Size
|
6.3
|
Integer
|
|
|
Media Identifier
|
2.1.2
|
Text String
|
|
|
Message Extension
|
6.16
|
Structure
|
|
|
Modulus
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Name
|
3.2
|
Structure
|
|
|
Name Type
|
3.2, 9.1.3.2.11
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Name Value
|
3.2
|
Text String
|
|
|
Network Identifier
|
2.1.2
|
Text String
|
|
|
Object Group
|
3.33
|
Text String
|
|
|
Object Group Member
|
4.9
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Object Type
|
3.3, 9.1.3.2.12
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Offset
|
4.4, 4.8
|
Interval
|
|
|
Opaque Data Type
|
2.2.8, 9.1.3.2.10
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Opaque Data Value
|
2.2.8
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Opaque Object
|
2.2.8
|
Structure
|
|
|
Operation
|
6.2, 9.1.3.2.27
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Operation Policy Name
|
3.18
|
Text String
|
|
|
P
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Password
|
2.1.2
|
Text String
|
|
|
Padding Method
|
3.6, 9.1.3.2.15
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Prime Exponent P
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Prime Exponent Q
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Prime Field Size
|
2.2.5
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Private Exponent
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Private Key
|
2.2.4
|
Structure
|
|
|
Private Key
Template-Attribute
|
2.1.8
|
Structure
|
|
|
Private Key Unique
Identifier
|
4.2
|
Text String
|
|
|
Process Start Date
|
3.25
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Protect Stop Date
|
3.26
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Protocol Version
|
6.1
|
Structure
|
|
|
Protocol Version Major
|
6.1
|
Integer
|
|
|
Protocol Version Minor
|
6.1
|
Integer
|
|
|
Public Exponent
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Public Key
|
2.2.3
|
Structure
|
|
|
Public Key
Template-Attribute
|
2.1.8
|
Structure
|
|
|
Public Key Unique
Identifier
|
4.2
|
Text String
|
|
|
Put Function
|
5.2, 9.1.3.2.26
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Q
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
Q String
|
2.1.7
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Qlength
|
3.7
|
Integer
|
|
|
Query Function
|
4.25, 9.1.3.2.24
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Recommended Curve
|
2.1.7, 3.7, 9.1.3.2.5
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Replaced Unique Identifier
|
5.2
|
Text String
|
|
|
Request Header
|
7.2
|
Structure
|
|
|
Request Message
|
7.1
|
Structure
|
|
|
Request Payload
|
4, 5, 7.2
|
Structure
|
|
|
Response Header
|
7.2
|
Structure
|
|
|
Response Message
|
7.1
|
Structure
|
|
|
Response Payload
|
4, 7.2
|
Structure
|
|
|
Result Message
|
6.11
|
Text String
|
|
|
Result Reason
|
6.10, 9.1.3.2.29
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Result Status
|
6.9, 9.1.3.2.28
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Revocation Message
|
3.31
|
Text String
|
|
|
Revocation Reason
|
3.31
|
Structure
|
|
|
Revocation Reason Code
|
3.31, 9.1.3.2.19
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Salt
|
4.6
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Secret Data
|
2.2.7
|
Structure
|
|
|
Secret Data Type
|
2.2.7, 9.1.3.2.9
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Serial Number
|
3.13
|
Text String
|
deprecated as of
version 1.1
|
|
Server Information
|
4.25
|
Structure
|
contents
vendor-specific
|
|
Split Key
|
2.2.5
|
Structure
|
|
|
Split Key Method
|
2.2.5, 9.1.3.2.8
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Split Key Parts
|
2.2.5
|
Integer
|
|
|
Split Key Threshold
|
2.2.5
|
Integer
|
|
|
State
|
3.22, 9.1.3.2.18
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Storage Status Mask
|
4.9, 9.1.3.3.2
|
Integer
|
Bit mask
|
|
Subject Alternative
Name
|
3.11
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Subject Distinguished
Name
|
3.11
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Symmetric Key
|
2.2.2
|
Structure
|
|
|
Template
|
2.2.6
|
Structure
|
|
|
Template-Attribute
|
2.1.8
|
Structure
|
|
|
Time Stamp
|
6.5
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Transparent*
|
2.1.7
|
Structure
|
|
|
Unique Identifier
|
3.1
|
Text String
|
|
|
Unique Batch Item ID
|
6.4
|
Byte String
|
|
|
Username
|
2.1.2
|
Text String
|
|
|
Usage Limits
|
3.21
|
Structure
|
|
|
Usage Limits Count
|
3.21
|
Long Integer
|
|
|
Usage Limits Total
|
3.21
|
Long Integer
|
|
|
Usage Limits Unit
|
3.21
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Validity Date
|
4.24
|
Date-Time
|
|
|
Validity Indicator
|
4.24, 9.1.3.2.23
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
Vendor Extension
|
6.16
|
Structure
|
contents
vendor-specific
|
|
Vendor Identification
|
4.25, 6.16
|
Text String
|
|
|
Wrapping Method
|
2.1.5, 9.1.3.2.4
|
Enumeration
|
|
|
X
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
|
X.509 Certificate
Identifier
|
3.9
|
Structure
|
|
|
X.509 Certificate
Issuer
|
3.12
|
Structure
|
|
|
X.509 Certificate
Subject
|
3.11
|
Structure
|
|
|
Y
|
2.1.7
|
Big Integer
|
|
Table 320: Tag Cross-reference
The following table indicates the types of Managed Object(s)
that each Operation accepts as input or provides as output. This table is not
normative.
|
Operation
|
Managed
Objects
|
|
Certificate
|
Symmetric
Key
|
Public
Key
|
Private
Key
|
Split
Key
|
Template
|
Secret
Data
|
Opaque
Object
|
PGP
Key
|
|
Create
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
Create Key
Pair
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Y
|
Y
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
Register
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Re-key
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
Re-key Key
Pair
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Y
|
Y
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
Derive Key
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Y
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
Certify
|
Y
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Y
|
|
Re-certify
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Y
|
|
Locate
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Check
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
N/A
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Get
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Get Attributes
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Get Attribute
List
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Add Attribute
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Modify
Attribute
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Delete
Attribute
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Obtain Lease
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
Y
|
|
Get Usage
Allocation
|
N/A
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
Activate
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
N/A
|
Y
|
N/A
|
Y
|
|
Revoke
|
Y
|
Y
|
N/A
|
Y
|
Y
|
N/A
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Destroy
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Archive
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Recover
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Validate
|
Y
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Y
|
|
Query
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
Cancel
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
Poll
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
Notify
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
Put
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
Y
|
|
Discover Versions
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Table 321: Operation and Object Cross-reference
The following abbreviations and acronyms are used in this
document:
3DES - Triple Data Encryption Standard
specified in ANSI X9.52
AES - Advanced Encryption Standard
specified in FIPS 197
ASN.1 - Abstract Syntax Notation One
specified in ITU-T X.680
BDK - Base Derivation Key specified in
ANSI X9 TR-31
CA - Certification Authority
CBC - Cipher Block Chaining
CCM - Counter with CBC-MAC specified in
NIST SP 800-38C
CFB - Cipher Feedback specified in NIST
SP 800-38A
CMAC - Cipher-based MAC specified in NIST SP
800-38B
CMC - Certificate Management Messages over
CMS specified in RFC 5275
CMP - Certificate Management Protocol
specified in RFC 4210
CPU - Central Processing Unit
CRL - Certificate Revocation List
specified in RFC 5280
CRMF - Certificate Request Message Format
specified in RFC 4211
CRT - Chinese Remainder Theorem
CTR - Counter specified in NIST SP
800-38A
CVK - Card Verification Key specified in
ANSI X9 TR-31
DEK - Data Encryption Key
DER - Distinguished Encoding Rules
specified in ITU-T X.690
DES - Data Encryption Standard specified
in FIPS 46-3
DH - Diffie-Hellman specified in ANSI
X9.42
DNS - Domain Name Server
DSA - Digital Signature Algorithm
specified in FIPS 186-3
DSKPP - Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning
Protocol
ECB - Electronic Code Book
ECDH - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
specified in ANSI X9.63 and NIST SP 800-56A
ECDSA - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm specified in ANSX9.62
ECMQV - Elliptic Curve Menezes Qu Vanstone
specified in ANSI X9.63 and NIST SP 800-56A
FFC - Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS - Federal Information Processing
Standard
GCM - Galois/Counter Mode specified in
NIST SP 800-38D
GF - Galois field (or finite field)
HMAC - Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code specified in FIPS 198-1 and RFC 2104
HTTP - Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
HTTP(S) - Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (Secure
socket)
IEEE - Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers
IETF - Internet Engineering Task Force
IP - Internet Protocol
IPsec - Internet Protocol Security
IV - Initialization Vector
KEK - Key Encryption Key
KMIP - Key Management Interoperability
Protocol
MAC - Message Authentication Code
MKAC - EMV/chip card Master Key: Application
Cryptograms specified in ANSI X9 TR-31
MKCP - EMV/chip card Master Key: Card
Personalization specified in ANSI X9 TR-31
MKDAC - EMV/chip card Master Key: Data
Authentication Code specified in ANSI X9 TR-31
MKDN - EMV/chip card Master Key: Dynamic
Numbers specified in ANSI X9 TR-31
MKOTH - EMV/chip card Master Key: Other
specified in ANSI X9 TR-31
MKSMC - EMV/chip card Master Key: Secure
Messaging for Confidentiality specified in X9 TR-31
MKSMI - EMV/chip card Master Key: Secure
Messaging for Integrity specified in ANSI X9 TR-31
MD2 - Message Digest 2 Algorithm specified
in RFC 1319
MD4 - Message Digest 4 Algorithm specified
in RFC 1320
MD5 - Message Digest 5 Algorithm specified
in RFC 1321
NIST - National Institute of Standards and
Technology
OAEP - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
specified in PKCS#1
OFB - Output Feedback specified in NIST SP
800-38A
PBKDF2 - Password-Based Key Derivation Function
2 specified in RFC 2898
PCBC - Propagating Cipher Block Chaining
PEM - Privacy Enhanced Mail specified in
RFC 1421
PGP - OpenPGP specified in RFC 4880
PKCS - Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PKCS#1 - RSA Cryptography Specification Version
2.1 specified in RFC 3447
PKCS#5 - Password-Based Cryptography
Specification Version 2 specified in RFC 2898
PKCS#8 - Private-Key Information Syntax
Specification Version 1.2 specified in RFC 5208
PKCS#10 - Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7 specified in RFC 2986
POSIX - Portable Operating System Interface
RFC - Request for Comments documents of
IETF
RSA - Rivest, Shamir, Adelman (an
algorithm)
SCEP - Simple Certificate Enrollment
Protocol
SCVP - Server-based Certificate Validation
Protocol
SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm specified in
FIPS 180-2
SP - Special Publication
SSL/TLS - Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer
Security
S/MIME - Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions
TDEA - see 3DES
TCP - Transport Control Protocol
TTLV - Tag, Type, Length, Value
URI - Uniform Resource Identifier
UTC - Coordinated Universal Time
UTF-8 - Universal Transformation Format
8-bit specified in RFC 3629
XKMS - XML Key Management Specification
XML - Extensible Markup Language
XTS - XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with
Ciphertext Stealing specified in NIST SP 800-38E
X.509 - Public Key Certificate specified in
RFC 5280
ZPK - PIN Block Encryption Key specified
in ANSI X9 TR-31
Figure
1: Cryptographic Object States and Transitions. 54
Table 1:
Terminology. 12
Table 2:
Attribute Object Structure. 17
Table 3:
Credential Object Structure. 18
Table 4:
Credential Value Structure for the Username and Password Credential 18
Table 5:
Credential Value Structure for the Device Credential 18
Table 6:
Credential Value Structure for the Attestation Credential 19
Table 7: Key
Block Object Structure. 20
Table 8: Key
Value Object Structure. 21
Table 9: Key
Wrapping Data Object Structure. 22
Table 10:
Encryption Key Information Object Structure. 22
Table 11:
MAC/Signature Key Information Object Structure. 23
Table 12: Key
Wrapping Specification Object Structure. 23
Table 13:
Parameter mapping. 24
Table 14: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent Symmetric Keys. 25
Table 15: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Private Keys. 25
Table 16: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Public Keys. 25
Table 17: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Private Keys. 26
Table 18: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Public Keys. 26
Table 19: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Private Keys. 26
Table 20: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Public Keys. 27
Table 21: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Private Keys. 27
Table 22: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Public Keys. 27
Table 23: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Private Keys. 27
Table 24: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Public Keys. 28
Table 25: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent ECMQV Private Keys. 28
Table 26: Key
Material Object Structure for Transparent ECMQV Public Keys. 28
Table 27:
Template-Attribute Object Structure. 29
Table 28:
Extension Information Structure. 29
Table 29:
Data Structure. 29
Table 30:
Data Length Structure. 29
Table 31:
Signature Data Structure. 30
Table 32: MAC
Data Structure. 30
Table 33:
Nonce Structure. 30
Table 34:
Certificate Object Structure. 30
Table 35:
Symmetric Key Object Structure. 31
Table 36:
Public Key Object Structure. 31
Table 37:
Private Key Object Structure. 31
Table 38:
Split Key Object Structure. 31
Table 39:
Template Object Structure. 33
Table 40:
Secret Data Object Structure. 33
Table 41:
Opaque Object Structure. 33
Table 42: PGP
Key Object Structure. 33
Table 43:
Attribute Rules. 35
Table 44:
Unique Identifier Attribute. 35
Table 45:
Unique Identifier Attribute Rules. 36
Table 46:
Name Attribute Structure. 36
Table 47: Name
Attribute Rules. 36
Table 48:
Object Type Attribute. 37
Table 49:
Object Type Attribute Rules. 37
Table 50:
Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute. 37
Table 51:
Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute Rules. 37
Table 52:
Cryptographic Length Attribute. 38
Table 53:
Cryptographic Length Attribute Rules. 38
Table 54:
Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Structure. 39
Table 55:
Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Rules. 39
Table 56: Key
Role Types. 40
Table 57:
Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute Structure. 41
Table 58:
Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute Rules. 41
Table 59:
Certificate Type Attribute. 41
Table 60:
Certificate Type Attribute Rules. 41
Table 61:
Certificate Length Attribute. 42
Table 62:
Certificate Length Attribute Rules. 42
Table 63: X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute Structure. 42
Table 64:
X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute Rules. 42
Table 65:
X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute Structure. 43
Table 66:
X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute Rules. 43
Table 67:
X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure. 43
Table 68:
X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules. 44
Table 69: Certificate Identifier Attribute Structure. 44
Table 70:
Certificate Identifier Attribute Rules. 44
Table 71:
Certificate Subject Attribute Structure. 45
Table 72:
Certificate Subject Attribute Rules. 45
Table 73:
Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure. 46
Table 74:
Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules. 46
Table 75: Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute. 46
Table 76:
Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute Rules. 46
Table 77:
Digest Attribute Structure. 47
Table 78:
Digest Attribute Rules. 47
Table 79:
Operation Policy Name Attribute. 48
Table 80:
Operation Policy Name Attribute Rules. 48
Table 81:
Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects. 49
Table 82:
Default Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects. 50
Table 83:
Default Operation Policy for Private Template Objects. 50
Table 84:
Default Operation Policy for Public Template Objects. 51
Table 85:
X.509 Key Usage to Cryptographic Usage Mask Mapping. 52
Table 86: Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute. 52
Table 87:
Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute Rules. 52
Table 88:
Lease Time Attribute. 52
Table 89:
Lease Time Attribute Rules. 53
Table 90: Usage Limits Attribute Structure. 53
Table 91:
Usage Limits Attribute Rules. 54
Table 92:
State Attribute. 56
Table 93:
State Attribute Rules. 56
Table 94:
Initial Date Attribute. 56
Table 95:
Initial Date Attribute Rules. 56
Table 96:
Activation Date Attribute. 57
Table 97:
Activation Date Attribute Rules. 57
Table 98:
Process Start Date Attribute. 57
Table 99:
Process Start Date Attribute Rules. 58
Table 100:
Protect Stop Date Attribute. 58
Table 101:
Protect Stop Date Attribute Rules. 59
Table 102:
Deactivation Date Attribute. 59
Table 103:
Deactivation Date Attribute Rules. 59
Table 104:
Destroy Date Attribute. 59
Table 105:
Destroy Date Attribute Rules. 60
Table 106: Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute. 60
Table 107:
Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute Rules. 60
Table 108:
Compromise Date Attribute. 60
Table 109:
Compromise Date Attribute Rules. 61
Table 110:
Revocation Reason Attribute Structure. 61
Table 111:
Revocation Reason Attribute Rules. 61
Table 112:
Archive Date Attribute. 62
Table 113:
Archive Date Attribute Rules. 62
Table 114:
Object Group Attribute. 62
Table 115:
Object Group Attribute Rules. 62
Table 116:
Fresh Attribute. 62
Table 117:
Fresh Attribute Rules. 63
Table 118:
Link Attribute Structure. 64
Table 119:
Link Attribute Structure Rules. 64
Table 120:
Application Specific Information Attribute. 65
Table 121:
Application Specific Information Attribute Rules. 65
Table 122:
Contact Information Attribute. 65
Table 123:
Contact Information Attribute Rules. 65
Table 124:
Last Change Date Attribute. 65
Table 125: Last
Change Date Attribute Rules. 66
Table 126
Custom Attribute. 66
Table 127:
Custom Attribute Rules. 67
Table 128:
Alternative Name Attribute Structure. 67
Table 129:
Alternative Name Attribute Rules. 67
Table 130:
Key Value Present Attribute. 68
Table 131:
Key Value Present Attribute Rules. 68
Table 132:
Key Value Location Attribute. 68
Table 133:
Key Value Location Attribute Rules. 68
Table 134:
Original Creation Date Attribute. 69
Table 135:
Original Creation Date Attribute Rules. 69
Table 136:
Create Request Payload. 71
Table 137:
Create Response Payload. 71
Table 138:
Create Attribute Requirements. 71
Table 139:
Create Key Pair Request Payload. 72
Table 140:
Create Key Pair Response Payload. 72
Table 141:
Create Key Pair Attribute Requirements. 73
Table 142:
Register Request Payload. 73
Table 143:
Register Response Payload. 74
Table 144:
Register Attribute Requirements. 74
Table 145:
Computing New Dates from Offset during Re-key. 75
Table 146:
Re-key Attribute Requirements. 75
Table 147:
Re-key Request Payload. 76
Table 148:
Re-key Response Payload. 76
Table 149:
Computing New Dates from Offset during Re-key Key Pair 76
Table 150:
Re-key Key Pair Attribute Requirements. 77
Table 151:
Re-key Key Pair Request Payload. 78
Table 152:
Re-key Key Pair Response Payload. 79
Table 153: Derive
Key Request Payload. 80
Table 154:
Derive Key Response Payload. 80
Table 155:
Derivation Parameters Structure (Except PBKDF2) 80
Table 156:
PBKDF2 Derivation Parameters Structure. 81
Table 157:
Certify Request Payload. 82
Table 158:
Certify Response Payload. 82
Table 159:
Computing New Dates from Offset during Re-certify. 83
Table 160:
Re-certify Attribute Requirements. 83
Table 161:
Re-certify Request Payload. 84
Table 162:
Re-certify Response Payload. 84
Table 163:
Locate Request Payload. 86
Table 164:
Locate Response Payload. 86
Table 165:
Check Request Payload. 87
Table 166:
Check Response Payload. 87
Table 167:
Get Request Payload. 88
Table 168:
Get Response Payload. 88
Table 169:
Get Attributes Request Payload. 88
Table 170:
Get Attributes Response Payload. 89
Table 171:
Get Attribute List Request Payload. 89
Table 172:
Get Attribute List Response Payload. 89
Table 173:
Add Attribute Request Payload. 89
Table 174:
Add Attribute Response Payload. 90
Table 175:
Modify Attribute Request Payload. 90
Table 176:
Modify Attribute Response Payload. 90
Table 177:
Delete Attribute Request Payload. 91
Table 178:
Delete Attribute Response Payload. 91
Table 179:
Obtain Lease Request Payload. 91
Table 180:
Obtain Lease Response Payload. 92
Table 181:
Get Usage Allocation Request Payload. 92
Table 182:
Get Usage Allocation Response Payload. 92
Table 183:
Activate Request Payload. 93
Table 184:
Activate Response Payload. 93
Table 185:
Revoke Request Payload. 93
Table 186:
Revoke Response Payload. 93
Table 187:
Destroy Request Payload. 94
Table 188:
Destroy Response Payload. 94
Table 189:
Archive Request Payload. 94
Table 190:
Archive Response Payload. 94
Table 191:
Recover Request Payload. 95
Table 192:
Recover Response Payload. 95
Table 193:
Validate Request Payload. 95
Table 194:
Validate Response Payload. 95
Table 195:
Query Request Payload. 96
Table 196:
Query Response Payload. 97
Table 197:
Discover Versions Request Payload. 97
Table 198:
Discover Versions Response Payload. 97
Table 199:
Cancel Request Payload. 98
Table 200:
Cancel Response Payload. 98
Table 201:
Poll Request Payload. 98
Table 202:
Encrypt Request Payload. 99
Table 203:
Encrypt Response Payload. 100
Table 204:
Decrypt Request Payload. 100
Table 205:
Decrypt Response Payload. 101
Table 206:
Sign Request Payload. 102
Table 207:
Sign Response Payload. 102
Table 208:
Signature Verify Request Payload. 103
Table 209:
Signature Verify Response Payload. 103
Table 210:
MAC Request Payload. 104
Table 211:
MAC Response Payload. 104
Table 212:
MAC Verify Request Payload. 105
Table 213:
MAC Verify Response Payload. 105
Table 214:
RNG Retrieve Request Payload. 105
Table 215:
RNG Retrieve Response Payload. 106
Table 216:
RNG Seed Request Payload. 106
Table 217:
RNG Seed Response Payload. 106
Table 218:
MAC Request Payload. 106
Table 219:
HASH Response Payload. 107
Table 220:
Create Split Key Request Payload. 107
Table 221:
Create Split Key Response Payload. 108
Table 222:
Join Split Key Request Payload. 108
Table 223:
Join Split Key Response Payload. 108
Table 224:
Notify Message Payload. 109
Table 225:
Put Message Payload. 110
Table 226:
Protocol Version Structure in Message Header 111
Table 227:
Operation in Batch Item.. 111
Table 228:
Maximum Response Size in Message Request Header 111
Table 229:
Unique Batch Item ID in Batch Item.. 112
Table 230:
Time Stamp in Message Header 112
Table 231:
Authentication Structure in Message Header 112
Table 232: Asynchronous
Indicator in Message Request Header 112
Table 233:
Asynchronous Correlation Value in Response Batch Item.. 113
Table 234:
Result Status in Response Batch Item.. 113
Table 235:
Result Reason in Response Batch Item.. 114
Table 236:
Result Message in Response Batch Item.. 114
Table 237:
Batch Order Option in Message Request Header 114
Table 238:
Batch Error Continuation Option in Message Request Header 115
Table 239:
Batch Count in Message Header 115
Table 240:
Batch Item in Message. 115
Table 241:
Message Extension Structure in Batch Item.. 115
Table 242:
Attestation Capable Indicator in Message Request Header 116
Table 243:
Request Message Structure. 117
Table 244:
Response Message Structure. 117
Table 245:
Request Header Structure. 118
Table 246:
Request Batch Item Structure. 118
Table 247:
Response Header Structure. 119
Table 248:
Response Batch Item Structure. 119
Table 249:
Allowed Item Type Values. 121
Table 250:
Allowed Item Length Values. 122
Table 251:
Tag Values. 130
Table 252:
Credential Type Enumeration. 130
Table 253:
Key Compression Type Enumeration. 131
Table 254:
Key Format Type Enumeration. 131
Table 255:
Wrapping Method Enumeration. 132
Table 256:
Recommended Curve Enumeration for ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV. 134
Table 257:
Certificate Type Enumeration. 134
Table 258:
Digital Signature Algorithm Enumeration. 135
Table 259:
Split Key Method Enumeration. 135
Table 260:
Secret Data Type Enumeration. 136
Table 261:
Opaque Data Type Enumeration. 136
Table 262:
Name Type Enumeration. 136
Table 263:
Object Type Enumeration. 136
Table 264:
Cryptographic Algorithm Enumeration. 137
Table 265:
Block Cipher Mode Enumeration. 138
Table 266:
Padding Method Enumeration. 138
Table 267:
Hashing Algorithm Enumeration. 139
Table 268:
Key Role Type Enumeration. 140
Table 269:
State Enumeration. 141
Table 270:
Revocation Reason Code Enumeration. 141
Table 271: Link
Type Enumeration. 141
Table 272:
Derivation Method Enumeration. 142
Table 273:
Certificate Request Type Enumeration. 142
Table 274:
Validity Indicator Enumeration. 142
Table 275:
Query Function Enumeration. 143
Table 276:
Cancellation Result Enumeration. 143
Table 277:
Put Function Enumeration. 143
Table 278:
Operation Enumeration. 145
Table 279:
Result Status Enumeration. 145
Table 280:
Result Reason Enumeration. 146
Table 281:
Batch Error Continuation Option Enumeration. 147
Table 282: Usage Limits Unit Enumeration. 147
Table 283:
Encoding Option Enumeration. 147
Table 284:
Object Group Member Enumeration. 147
Table 285:
Alternative Name Type Enumeration. 147
Table 286:
Key Value Location Type Enumeration. 148
Table 287:
Attestation Type Enumeration. 148
Table 288:
Cryptographic Usage Mask. 149
Table 289:
Storage Status Mask. 149
Table 290:
General Errors. 152
Table 291:
Create Errors. 152
Table 292:
Create Key Pair Errors. 153
Table 293:
Register Errors. 154
Table 294:
Re-key Errors. 154
Table 295:
Re-key Key Pair Errors. 155
Table 296:
Derive Key Errors- 156
Table 297:
Certify Errors. 156
Table 298:
Re-certify Errors. 156
Table 299:
Locate Errors. 157
Table 300:
Check Errors. 157
Table 301:
Get Errors. 158
Table 302:
Get Attributes Errors. 158
Table 303:
Get Attribute List Errors. 158
Table 304:
Add Attribute Errors. 159
Table 305:
Modify Attribute Errors. 159
Table 306:
Delete Attribute Errors. 159
Table 307:
Obtain Lease Errors. 160
Table 308:
Get Usage Allocation Errors. 160
Table 309:
Activate Errors. 160
Table 310:
Revoke Errors. 161
Table 311:
Destroy Errors. 161
Table 312:
Archive Errors. 161
Table 313:
Recover Errors. 161
Table 314:
Validate Errors. 162
Table 315:
Poll Errors. 162
Table 316:
Batch Items Errors. 162
Table 317:
Create Split Key Errors. 163
Table 318:
Join Split Key Errors. 164
Table 319:
Attribute Cross-reference. 170
Table 320:
Tag Cross-reference. 176
Table 321:
Operation and Object Cross-reference. 178
|
Revision
|
Date
|
Editor
|
Changes Made
|
|
draft-01
|
2013-03-28
|
Kiran Thota
|
Ported to KMIP v1.2 Specification template
|
|
draft-02
|
2013-05-10
|
Kiran Thota
|
The following accepted proposals have been incorporated
into the document:
Meta Data Only
PGP Key
Alternative Key
Cryptographic Services
ECC Curves
|
|
draft-03
|
2013-05-12
|
Kiran Thota
|
The following proposals are also included –
Attested operations
Split Key
|
|
draft-04
|
2013-06-04
|
Kiran Thota
Kelley Burgin
|
Addressed many comments for KMIP v1.1 Spec.
Additions to Split Key
|
|
draft-05
|
2013-06-10
|
Kiran Thota
|
Incorporated feedback and updated Participants list
|
|
draft-06
|
2013-06-17
|
Kiran Thota
|
Incorporated feedback from Tim Hudson
|
|
draft-07
|
2013-08-08
|
Kiran Thota
Kelley Burgin
|
Fixed typos, references. Added tags and definitions.
|
|
draft-08
|
2013-08-21
|
Kelley Burgin
Kiran Thota
|
Fixed keywords. Editorial changes.
|
|
csd-01
|
2013-09-12
|
Kiran Thota
|
Updated references and participants list.
Added enumerations for SHA512/224 and SHA512/256
|
|
csd-01 (revised)
|
2013-10-31
|
Kiran Thota
|
Fixed the tag table entries for nonce et al as Tim pointed
out.
|
