Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.3
Committee Specification Draft 01
07 April 2016
Specification URIs
This version:
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/csd01/kmip-profiles-v1.3-csd01.doc (Authoritative)
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/csd01/kmip-profiles-v1.3-csd01.html
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/csd01/kmip-profiles-v1.3-csd01.pdf
Previous version:
N/A
Latest version:
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/kmip-profiles-v1.3.doc (Authoritative)
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/kmip-profiles-v1.3.html
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/kmip-profiles-v1.3.pdf
Technical Committee:
OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC
Chairs:
Saikat Saha (saikat.saha@oracle.com), Oracle
Tony Cox (tjc@cryptsoft.com), Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Editors:
Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com), Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Robert Lockhart (Robert.Lockhart@thalesesec.com), Thales e-Security
Additional artifacts:
This prose specification is one component of a Work Product that also includes
· Test cases: http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/csd01/test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/ and http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/csd01/test-cases/kmip-v1.3/optional/
Related work:
This specification replaces or supersedes:
This specification is related to:
Abstract:
This document is intended for developers and architects who wish to design systems and applications that conform to the Key Management Interoperability Protocol specification.
Status:
This document was last revised or approved by the OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the “Latest version” location noted above for possible later revisions of this document. Any other numbered Versions and other technical work produced by the Technical Committee (TC) are listed at https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=kmip#technical.
TC members should send comments on this specification to the TC’s email list. Others should send comments to the TC’s public comment list, after subscribing to it by following the instructions at the “Send A Comment” button on the TC’s web page at https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/.
For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the TC’s web page (https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/ipr.php).
Citation format:
When referencing this specification the following citation format should be used:
[KMIP-Profiles-v1.3]
Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.3. Edited by Tim Hudson and Robert Lockhart. 07 April 2016. OASIS Committee Specification Draft 01. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/csd01/kmip-profiles-v1.3-csd01.html. Latest version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.3/kmip-profiles-v1.3.html.
Notices
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Table of Contents
2.2 Guidelines for other Profiles
3.1 Basic Authentication Suite
3.1.1 Basic Authentication Protocols
3.1.2 Basic Authentication Cipher Suites
3.1.3 Basic Authentication Client Authenticity
3.1.4 Basic Authentication KMIP Port Number
3.2 TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite
3.2.1 TLS 1.2 Authentication Protocols
3.2.2 TLS 1.2 Authentication Cipher Suites
3.2.3 TLS 1.2 Authentication Client Authenticity.
3.2.4 TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Port Number
3.3 Suite B minLOS_128 Authentication Suite
3.3.1 Suite B minLOS_128 Protocols
3.3.2 Suite B minLOS_128 Cipher Suites
3.3.3 Suite B minLOS_128 Client Authenticity
3.3.4 Suite B minLOS_128 KMIP Port Number
3.4 Suite B minLOS_192 Authentication Suite
3.4.1 Suite B minLOS_192 Protocols
3.4.2 Suite B minLOS_192 Cipher Suites
3.4.3 Suite B minLOS_192 Client Authenticity
3.4.4 Suite B minLOS_192 KMIP Port Number
3.5 HTTPS Authentication Suite
4.1 Permitted Test Case Variations
5.3.3 HTTPS Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.4.4 XML Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.5.4 JSON Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.6 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Profiles
5.6.1 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Client
5.6.2 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Server
5.6.3 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.6.4 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Optional Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.7 Symmetric Key Foundry for FIPS 140 Profiles
5.7.1 Basic Symmetric Key Foundry Client
5.7.2 Intermediate Symmetric Key Foundry Client
5.7.3 Advanced Symmetric Key Foundry Client
5.7.4 Symmetric Key Foundry Server
5.7.5 Basic Symmetric Key Foundry Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.7.6 Intermediate Symmetric Key Foundry Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.7.7 Advanced Symmetric Key Foundry Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.8 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Profiles
5.8.1 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Client
5.8.2 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Server
5.8.3 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.8.4 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Optional Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.9.1 Basic Cryptographic Client
5.9.2 Advanced Cryptographic Client
5.9.3 RNG Cryptographic Client
5.9.4 Basic Cryptographic Server
5.9.5 Advanced Cryptographic Server
5.9.6 RNG Cryptographic Server
5.9.7 Basic Cryptographic Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.9.8 Advanced Cryptographic Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.9.9 RNG Cryptographic Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.9.10 RNG Cryptographic Optional Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.10 Opaque Managed Object Store Profiles
5.10.1 Opaque Managed Object Store Client
5.10.2 Opaque Managed Object Store Server
5.10.3 Opaque Managed Object Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.10.4 Opaque Managed Object Optional Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.11 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Profiles
5.11.1 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Client
5.11.2 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Server
5.11.3 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.12.1 Tape Library Profiles Terminology
5.12.2 Tape Library Application Specific Information
5.12.3 Tape Library Alternative Name
5.12.6 Tape Library Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3.
5.13.1 Suite B minLOS_128 Client
5.13.2 Suite B minLOS_128 Server
5.13.3 Suite B minLOS_128 Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
5.13.4 Suite B minLOS_192 Client
5.13.5 Suite B minLOS_192 Server
5.13.6 Suite B minLOS_192 Mandatory Test Cases KMIP v1.3
6.1 Baseline Client Basic KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.2 Baseline Client TLS v1.2 KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.3 Baseline Server Basic KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.4 Baseline Server TLS v1.2 KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.5 Complete Server Basic KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.6 Complete Server TLS v1.2 KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.7 HTTPS Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.8 HTTPS Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.9 XML Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.10 XML Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.11 JSON Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.12 JSON Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.13 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.14 Symmetric Key Lifecycle Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.15 Basic Symmetric Key Foundry Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.16 Intermediate Symmetric Key Foundry Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.17 Advanced Symmetric Key Foundry Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.18 Symmetric Key Foundry Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.19 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.20 Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.21 Basic Cryptographic Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.22 Advanced Cryptographic Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.23 RNG Cryptographic Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.24 Basic Cryptographic Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.25 Advanced Cryptographic Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.26 RNG Cryptographic Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.27 Opaque Managed Object Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.28 Opaque Managed Object Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.29 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.30 Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.31 Tape Library Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.32 Tape Library Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.33 Suite B minLOS_128 Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.34 Suite B minLOS_128 Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.35 Suite B minLOS_192 Client KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
6.36 Suite B minLOS_192 Server KMIP v1.3 Profile Conformance
This document specifies conformance clauses in accordance with the OASIS TC Process ([TC-PROC] section 2.18 paragraph 8a) for the KMIP Specification ([KMIP-SPEC] 12.1 and 12.2) for a KMIP server or KMIP client through profiles that define the use of KMIP objects, attributes, operations, message elements and authentication methods within specific contexts of KMIP server and client interaction.
These profiles define a set of normative constraints for employing KMIP within a particular environment or context of use. They may, optionally, require the use of specific KMIP functionality or in other respects define the processing rules to be followed by profile actors.
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
[KMIP-SPEC] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.3. Edited by Kiran Thota and Tony Cox. Latest version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.3/kmip-spec-v1.3.html.
[SuiteB] Suite B Cryptography / Cryptographic Interoperability, http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt.
[RFC2246] T. Dierks & C.Allen, The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt, IETF RFC 2246, January 1999
[RFC2818] E. Rescorla, HTTP over TLS, IETF RFC 2818, May 2000, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2818.txt
[RFC3268] P. Chown, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3268.txt, IETF RFC 3268, June 2002
[RFC4346] T. Dierks & E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.1, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt, IETF RFC 4346, April 2006
[RFC5246] T. Dierks & E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.2, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt, IETF RFC 5246, August 2008
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format, RFC 7159, March 2014. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7159.txt
[CNSSP-15] N.S.A., “National Information Assurance Policy on the Use of Public Standards for the Secure Sharing of Information Among National Security Systems”, 1 October 2012, https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Policies.cfm.
[XML] Bray, Tim, et.al. eds, Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth Edition),
W3C Recommendation 26 November 2008, available at http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xml-20081126/
[TC-PROC] OASIS TC Process. 1 May 2014. OASIS Process. https://www.oasis-open.org/policies-guidelines/tc-process.
[XML-SCHEMA] Paul V. Biron, Ashok Malhotra, XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes Second Edition,
W3C Recommendation 26 November 2008, available at http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-2-20041028/
This document defines a list of KMIP Profiles. A profile may be standalone or may be specified in terms of changes relative to another profile.
The following items SHALL be addressed by each profile.
1. Specify the versions of the KMIP specification (protocol versions) that SHALL be supported
2. Specify the list of objects that SHALL be supported
3. Specify the list of Authentication Suites that SHALL be supported
4. Specify the list of Attributes that SHALL be supported
5. Specify the list of Operations that SHALL be supported
6. Specify any additional message content that SHALL be supported
7. Specify any other requirements that SHALL be supported
8. For profiles other than the Baseline Client, Baseline Server and Complete Server the profile SHALL specify the mandatory test cases that SHALL be supported and MAY specify the optional test cases that MAY be supported by conforming implementations
Any vendor or organization, such as other standards bodies, MAY create a KMIP Profile and publish it.
1. The profile SHALL be publicly available.
2. The KMIP Technical Committee SHALL be formally advised of the availability of the profile and the location of the published profile.
3. The profile SHALL meet all the requirements of section 2.1
4. The KMIP Technical Committee SHOULD review the profile prior to publication.
This section contains the list of the channel security, channel options, and server and client authentication requirements for a KMIP profile. Other Authentication Suites MAY be defined for other KMIP Profiles.
An Authentication Suite provides at least the following:
1. All communication over the security channel SHALL provide confidentiality and integrity
2. All communication over the security channel SHALL provide assurance of server authenticity
3. All communication over the security channel for Operations other than Query and Discover Versions SHALL provide assurance of client authenticity
4. All options such as channel protocol version and cipher suites for the secuity channel SHALL be specified
This authentication suite stipulates that a profile conforming to the Basic Authentication Suite SHALL use TLS to negotiate a secure channel.
Conformant KMIP clients or servers SHALL support:
· TLS v1.0 [RFC2246] and [RFC3268]
Conformant KMIP clients or servers SHOULD support:
· TLS v1.2 [RFC5246]
Conformant KMIP clients or servers MAY support:
· TLS v1.1 [RFC4346]
Conformant KMIP clients or servers SHALL NOT support:
· SSL v3.0
· SSL v2.0
· SSL v1.0
Conformant KMIP clients or servers SHALL support the following cipher suites:
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Conformant KMIP clients and servers MAY support the following cipher suites:
· TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
· TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
· TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
· TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
· TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
· TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
· TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
Conformant KMIP clients or servers SHALL NOT support any cipher suite not listed above.
NOTE: TLS 1.0 has known security issues and implementations that need protections against known issues SHOULD considering using the TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite (3.2)
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL require the use of channel (TLS) mutual authentication to provide assurance of client authenticity for all operations other than:
· Query
· Discover Versions
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL use the identity derived from the channel mutual authentication to determine the client identity if the KMIP client requests do not contain an Authentication object.
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL use the identity derived from the channel mutual authentication along with the Credential information to determine the client identity if the KMIP client requests contain an Authentication object.
The exact mechanisms determining the client identity are outside the scope of this specification.
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL use TCP port number 5696, as assigned by IANA.
This authentication suite stipulates that a profile conforming to the TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite SHALL use TLS version 1.2 to negotiate a secure channel.
Conformant KMIP clients and servers SHALL support:
· TLS v1.2 [RFC2246]
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL support the following cipher suites:
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
· TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
Conformant KMIP servers and clients MAY support the cipher suites specified as MAY in Basic Authentication Cipher Suites (3.1.2) of the Basic Authentication Suite.
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle client authenticity in accordance with Basic Authentication Client Authenticity (3.1.3) of the Basic Authentication Suite
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle the KMIP port number in in accordance with Basic Authentication KMIP Port Number (3.1.4) of the Basic Authentication Suite.
Implementations conformant to this profile SHALL use TLS to negotiate a mutually-authenticated connection.
Conformant KMIP clients and servers SHALL support:
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL support the following cipher suites:
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle client authenticity in accordance with TLS 1.2 Authentication Client Authenticity (3.2.3).
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle the KMIP port number in accordance with TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Port Number (3.2.4).
Implementations conformant to this profile SHALL use TLS to negotiate a mutually-authenticated connection.
Conformant KMIP clients and servers SHALL support:
Conformant KMIP servers SHALL support the following cipher suites:
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle client authenticity in accordance with TLS 1.2 Authentication Client Authenticity (3.2.3).
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle the KMIP port number in accordance with TLS 1.2 Authentication KMIP Port Number (3.2.4).
This authentication suite stipulates that a profile conforming to the HTTPS Authentication Suite SHALL use HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] to negotiate a secure channel.
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle client authenticity in accordance with Basic Authentication Protocols (3.1.1).
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle client authenticity in accordance with Basic Authentication Cipher Suites (3.1.2).
Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle client authenticity in accordance with Basic Authentication Client Authenticity (3.1.3).
KMIP servers conformant to this profile MAY use TCP port number 5696, as assigned by IANA, to receive and send KMIP messages provided that both HTTPS and non-HTTPS encoded messages are supported.
KMIP clients SHALL enable end user configuration of the TCP port number used, as a KMIP server MAY specify a different TCP port number for HTTPS usage.
The test cases define a number of request-response pairs for KMIP operations. Each test case is provided in the XML format specified in XML Encoding (5.4.1) intended to be both human-readable and usable by automated tools.
Each test case has a unique label (the section name) which includes indication of mandatory (-M-) or optional (-O-) status and the protocol version major and minor numbers as part of the identifier.
The test cases may depend on a specific configuration of a KMIP client and server being configured in a manner consistent with the test case assumptions.
Where possible the flow of unique identifiers between tests, the date-time values, and other dynamic items are indicated using symbolic identifiers – in actual request and response messages these dynamic values will be filled in with valid values.
Symbolic identifiers are of the form $UPPERCASE_NAME followed by optional unique index value. Wherever a symbolic identifier occurs in a test cases the implementation must replace it with a reasonable appearing datum of the expected type. Time values can be specified in terms of an offset from the current time in seconds of the form $NOW or $NOW-n or $NOW+n.
Note: the values for the returned items and the custom attributes are illustrative. Actual values from a real client or server system may vary as specified in section 4.1.
Whilst the test cases provided in a Profile define the allowed request and response content, some inherent variations MAY occur and are permitted within a successfully completed test case.
Each test case MAY include allowed variations in the description of the test case in addition to the variations noted in this section.
Other variations not explicitly noted in this section SHALL be deemed non-conformant.
An implementation conformant to a Profile MAY vary the following values:
a. The HashingAlgorithm selected by the server when it calculates the digest for a managed object for which it has access to the key material
b. The Digest Value
a. Additional vendor or application prefixes
An implementation conformant to a Profile MAY allow the following response variations:
An implementation conformant to a Profile SHALL allow variation of the following behavior:
A Baseline Client provides some of the most basic functionality that is expected of a conformant KMIP client – the ability to request information about the server.
An implementation is a conforming Baseline Client Clause if it meets the following conditions:
A Baseline Server provides the most basic functionality that is expected of a conformant KMIP server – the ability to provide information about the server and the managed objects supported by the server.
if it meets the following conditions:
A Complete Server provides functionality that is expected of a conformant KMIP server that implements the entire specification.
An implementation is a conforming Complete Server if it meets the following conditions:
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS) is simply the use of HTTP over TLS in the same manner that HTTP is used over TCP.
KMIP over HTTPS is simply the use of KMIP messages over HTTPS in the same manner that KMIP is used over TLS.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP clients that support responding to server to client operations SHALL behave as a HTTPS server.
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers that support server to client operations SHALL behave as a HTTPS client.
Perform a Query operation, querying the Operations and Objects supported by the server, with a restriction on the Maximum Response Size set in the request header. Since the resulting Query response is too big, an error is returned. Increase the Maximum Response Size, resubmit the Query request, and get a successful response.
The specific list of operations and object types returned in the response MAY vary.
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/MSGENC-HTTPS-M-1-13.xml
The informative corresponding wire encoding for the test case is:
Request Time 0 00000000: 50 4f 53 54 20 2f 6b 6d-69 70 20 48 54 54 50 2f POST /kmip HTTP/ 00000010: 31 2e 30 0d 0a 50 72 61-67 6d 61 3a 20 6e 6f 2d 1.0..Pragma: no- 00000020: 63 61 63 68 65 0d 0a 43-61 63 68 65 2d 43 6f 6e cache..Cache-Con 00000030: 74 72 6f 6c 3a 20 6e 6f-2d 63 61 63 68 65 0d 0a trol: no-cache.. 00000040: 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69-6f 6e 3a 20 6b 65 65 70 Connection: keep 00000050: 2d 61 6c 69 76 65 0d 0a-43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d -alive..Content- 00000060: 54 79 70 65 3a 20 61 70-70 6c 69 63 61 74 69 6f Type: applicatio 00000070: 6e 2f 6f 63 74 65 74 2d-73 74 72 65 61 6d 0d 0a n/octet-stream.. 00000080: 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d-4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a 20 Content-Length: 00000090: 31 35 32 20 20 20 20 20-20 20 0d 0a 0d 0a 42 00 152 ....B. 000000a0: 15 32 78 01 00 00 00 90-42 00 77 01 00 00 00 48 .2x.....B.w....H 000000b0: 42 00 69 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 6a 02 00 00 00 04 B.i.... B.j..... 000000c0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 6b 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.k..... 000000d0: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 50 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.P..... 000000e0: 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00-42 00 0d 02 00 00 00 04 ........B....... 000000f0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 0f 01 00 00 00 38 ........B......8 00000100: 42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 B.\............. 00000110: 42 00 79 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 74 05 00 00 00 04 B.y.... B.t..... 00000120: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 74 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.t..... 00000130: 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00- ........ |
Response Time 0 00000000: 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31-20 32 30 30 20 4f 4b 0d HTTP/1.1 200 OK. 00000010: 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74-2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 61 .Content-Type: a 00000020: 70 70 6c 69 63 61 74 69-6f 6e 2f 6f 63 74 65 74 pplication/octet 00000030: 2d 73 74 72 65 61 6d 0d-0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 -stream..Content 00000040: 2d 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a-20 31 36 38 0d 0a 0d 0a -Length: 168.... 00000050: 42 00 7b 01 00 00 00 a0-42 00 7a 01 00 00 00 48 B.{.... B.z....H 00000060: 42 00 69 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 6a 02 00 00 00 04 B.i.... B.j..... 00000070: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 6b 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.k..... 00000080: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 92 09 00 00 00 08 ........B....... 00000090: 00 00 00 00 56 8a 5b e2-42 00 0d 02 00 00 00 04 ....V.[bB....... 000000a0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 0f 01 00 00 00 48 ........B......H 000000b0: 42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 B.\............. 000000c0: 42 00 7f 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 B............... 000000d0: 42 00 7e 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 B.~............. 000000e0: 42 00 7d 07 00 00 00 09-54 4f 4f 5f 4c 41 52 47 B.}.....TOO_LARG 000000f0: 45 00 00 00 00 00 00 00- E....... |
Request Time 1 00000000: 50 4f 53 54 20 2f 6b 6d-69 70 20 48 54 54 50 2f POST /kmip HTTP/ 00000010: 31 2e 30 0d 0a 50 72 61-67 6d 61 3a 20 6e 6f 2d 1.0..Pragma: no- 00000020: 63 61 63 68 65 0d 0a 43-61 63 68 65 2d 43 6f 6e cache..Cache-Con 00000030: 74 72 6f 6c 3a 20 6e 6f-2d 63 61 63 68 65 0d 0a trol: no-cache.. 00000040: 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69-6f 6e 3a 20 6b 65 65 70 Connection: keep 00000050: 2d 61 6c 69 76 65 0d 0a-43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d -alive..Content- 00000060: 54 79 70 65 3a 20 61 70-70 6c 69 63 61 74 69 6f Type: applicatio 00000070: 6e 2f 6f 63 74 65 74 2d-73 74 72 65 61 6d 0d 0a n/octet-stream.. 00000080: 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d-4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a 20 Content-Length: 00000090: 31 35 32 20 20 20 20 20-20 20 0d 0a 0d 0a 42 00 152 ....B. 000000a0: 15 32 78 01 00 00 00 90-42 00 77 01 00 00 00 48 .2x.....B.w....H 000000b0: 42 00 69 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 6a 02 00 00 00 04 B.i.... B.j..... 000000c0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 6b 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.k..... 000000d0: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 50 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.P..... 000000e0: 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00-42 00 0d 02 00 00 00 04 ........B....... 000000f0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 0f 01 00 00 00 38 ........B......8 00000100: 42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 B.\............. 00000110: 42 00 79 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 74 05 00 00 00 04 B.y.... B.t..... 00000120: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 74 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.t..... 00000130: 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00- ........ |
Response Time 1 00000000: 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31-20 32 30 30 20 4f 4b 0d HTTP/1.1 200 OK. 00000010: 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74-2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 61 .Content-Type: a 00000020: 70 70 6c 69 63 61 74 69-6f 6e 2f 6f 63 74 65 74 pplication/octet 00000030: 2d 73 74 72 65 61 6d 0d-0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 -stream..Content 00000040: 2d 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a-20 39 30 34 0d 0a 0d 0a -Length: 904.... 00000050: 42 00 7b 01 00 00 03 80-42 00 7a 01 00 00 00 48 B.{.....B.z....H 00000060: 42 00 69 01 00 00 00 20-42 00 6a 02 00 00 00 04 B.i.... B.j..... 00000070: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 6b 02 00 00 00 04 ........B.k..... 00000080: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 92 09 00 00 00 08 ........B....... 00000090: 00 00 00 00 56 8a 5b e2-42 00 0d 02 00 00 00 04 ....V.[bB....... 000000a0: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 0f 01 00 00 03 28 ........B......( 000000b0: 42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 B.\............. 000000c0: 42 00 7f 05 00 00 00 04-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 B............... 000000d0: 42 00 7c 01 00 00 03 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 B.|.....B.\..... 000000e0: 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000000f0: 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000100: 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000110: 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000120: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000130: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000140: 00 00 00 0b 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000150: 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000160: 00 00 00 0d 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000170: 00 00 00 0e 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000180: 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000190: 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001a0: 00 00 00 13 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001b0: 00 00 00 1a 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001c0: 00 00 00 19 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001d0: 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001e0: 00 00 00 11 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000001f0: 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000200: 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000210: 00 00 00 15 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000220: 00 00 00 16 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000230: 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000240: 00 00 00 1d 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000250: 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000260: 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000270: 00 00 00 1e 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000280: 00 00 00 1b 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 00000290: 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000002a0: 00 00 00 25 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...%....B.\..... 000002b0: 00 00 00 26 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...&....B.\..... 000002c0: 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.\..... 000002d0: 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ... ....B.\..... 000002e0: 00 00 00 21 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...!....B.\..... 000002f0: 00 00 00 22 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ..."....B.\..... 00000300: 00 00 00 23 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...#....B.\..... 00000310: 00 00 00 24 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...$....B.\..... 00000320: 00 00 00 27 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...'....B.\..... 00000330: 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 00-42 00 5c 05 00 00 00 04 ...(....B.\..... 00000340: 00 00 00 29 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ...)....B.W..... 00000350: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 00000360: 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 00000370: 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 00000380: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 00000390: 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 000003a0: 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 000003b0: 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 000003c0: 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00-42 00 57 05 00 00 00 04 ........B.W..... 000003d0: 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00- ........ |
The XML profile specifies the use of KMIP replacing the TTLV message encoding with an XML message encoding. The results returned using the XML encoding SHALL be logically the same as if the message encoding was in TTLV form. All size or length values specified within tag values for KMIP items SHALL be the same in XML form as if the message encoding were in TTLV form. The implications of this are that items such as MaximumResponseSize are interpreted to refer to a maximum length computed as if it were a TTLV-encoded response, not the length of the JSON-encoded response.
KMIP text values of Tags, Types and Enumerations SHALL be normalized to create a ‘CamelCase’ format that would be suitable to be used as a variable name in C/Java or an XML element name.
The basic approach to converting from KMIP text to CamelCase is to separate the text into individual word tokens (rules 1-4), capitalize the first letter of each word (rule 5) and then join with spaces removed (rule 6). The tokenizing splits on whitespace and on dashes where the token following is a valid word. The tokenizing also removes round brackets and shifts decimals from the front to the back of the first word in each string. The following rules SHALL be applied to create the normalized CamelCase form:
Hex representations of numbers must always begin with ‘0x’ and must not include any spaces. They may use either upper or lower case ‘a’-’f’. The hex representation must include all leading zeros or sign extension bits when representing a value of a fixed width such as Tags (3 bytes), Integer (32-bit signed big-endian), Long Integer (64-bit signed big-endian) and Big Integer (big-endian multiple of 8 bytes). The Integer values for -1, 0, 1 are represented as "0xffffffff", "0x00000000", "0x00000001". Hex representation for Byte Strings are similar to numbers, but do not include the ‘0x’ prefix, and can be of any length.
Tags are a String that may contain either:
Other text values may be used such as published names of Extension tags, or names of new tags added in future KMIP versions. Producers may however choose to use hex values for these tags to ensure they are understood by all consumers.
Type must be a String containing one of the normalized CamelCase values as defined in the KMIP specification.
If type is not included, the default type of Structure SHALL be used.
The specification of a value is represented differently for each TTLV type.
For XML, each TTLV is represented as an XML element with attributes. The general form uses a single element named ‘TTLV’ with ‘tag’, optional ‘name’ and ‘type’ attributes. This form allows any TTLV including extensions to be encoded. For tags defined in the KMIP Specification or other well-known extensions, a more specific form can be used where each tag is encoded as an element with the same name and includes a ‘type’ attribute. For either form, structure values are encoded as nested xml elements, and non-structure values are encoded using the ‘value’ attribute.
<TTLV tag="0x420001" name="ActivationDate" type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
<TTLV tag="0x420001" type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
<ActivationDate type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
<TTLV tag="0x54FFFF" name="SomeExtension" type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
The ‘type’ property / attribute SHALL have a default value of ‘Structure’ and may be omitted for Structures.
If namespaces are required, XML elements SHALL use the following namespace:
urn:oasis:tc:kmip:xmlns
Tags are a String that may contain either:
Other text values may be used such as published names of Extension tags, or names of new tags added in future KMIP versions. Producers may however choose to use hex values for these tags to ensure they are understood by all consumers.
<ActivationDate xmlns="urn:oasis:tc:kmip:xmlns" type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
<IVCounterNonce type="ByteString" value="a1b2c3d4"/>
<PrivateKeyTemplateAttribute type="Structure"/>
<TTLV tag="0x545352" name="SomeExtension" type="TextString" value="This is an extension"/>
<WELL_KNOWN_EXTENSION type="TextString" value="This is an extension"/>
For XML, sub-items are nested elements.
<ProtocolVersion type="Structure">
<ProtocolVersionMajor type="Integer" value="1"/>
<ProtocolVersionMinor type="Integer" value="0"/>
</ProtocolVersion>
<ProtocolVersion>
<ProtocolVersionMajor type="Integer" value="1"/>
<ProtocolVersionMinor type="Integer" value="0"/>
</ProtocolVersion>
The ‘type’ property / attribute is optional for a Structure.
For XML, value is a decimal and uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:int
<BatchCount type="Integer" value="10"/>
(Cryptographic Usage Mask, Storage Status Mask):
Integer mask values can also be encoded as a String containing mask components. XML uses an attribute with [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:list which uses a space separator. Components may be either the text of the enumeration value as defined in KMIP 9.1.3.3.1 / KMIP 9.1.3.3.2, or a 32-bit unsigned big-endian hex string.
<CryptographicUsageMask type="Integer" value="0x0000100c"/>
<CryptographicUsageMask type="Integer" value="Encrypt Decrypt CertificateSign"/>
<CryptographicUsageMask type="Integer" value="CertificateSign 0x00000004 0x0000008"/>
<CryptographicUsageMask type="Integer" value="CertificateSign 0x0000000c"/>
For XML, value uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:long
<x540001 type="LongInteger" value="-2"/>
<UsageLimitsCount type="LongInteger" value="1152921504606846976"/>
For XML, value uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:hexBinary
<X type="BigInteger" value="0000000000000000"/>
For XML, value uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:string and is either a hex string or the CamelCase enum text. If an XSD with xsd:enumeration restriction is used to define valid values (as is the case with the XSD included as an appendix), parsers should also accept any hex string in addition to defined enum values.
<ObjectType type="Enumeration" value="0x00000002"/>
<ObjectType type="Enumeration" value="SymmetricKey"/>
For XML, value uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:Boolean
<BatchOrderOption type=Boolean" value="true"/>
XML uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:string
<AttributeName type="TextString" value="Cryptographic Algorithm"/>
XML uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:hexBinary
<MACSignature type="ByteString" value="C50F77"/>
For XML, value uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:dateTime
<ArchiveDate type="DateTime" value="2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"/>
XML uses [XML-SCHEMA] type xsd:unsignedInt
<Offset type="Interval" value="27"/>
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
Perform a Query operation, querying the Operations and Objects supported by the server, with a restriction on the Maximum Response Size set in the request header. Since the resulting Query response is too big, an error is returned. Increase the Maximum Response Size, resubmit the Query request, and get a successful response.
The specific list of operations and object types returned in the response MAY vary.
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/MSGENC-XML-M-1-13.xml
The JSON profile specifies the use of KMIP replacing the TTLV message encoding with a JSON message encoding. The results returned using the JSON encoding SHALL be logically the same as if the message encoding was in TTLV form. All size or length values specified within tag values for KMIP items SHALL be the same in JSON form as if the message encoding were in TTLV form. The implications of this are that items such as MaximumResponseSize are interpreted to refer to a maximum length computed as if it were a TTLV-encoded response, not the length of the JSON-encoded response.
KMIP text values of Tags, Types and Enumerations SHALL be normalized to create a ‘CamelCase’ format that would be suitable to be used as a variable name in C/Java or an JSON name.
The basic approach to converting from KMIP text to CamelCase is to separate the text into individual word tokens (rules 1-4), capitalize the first letter of each word (rule 5) and then join with spaces removed (rule 6). The tokenizing splits on whitespace and on dashes where the token following is a valid word. The tokenizing also removes round brackets and shifts decimals from the front to the back of the first word in each string. The following rules SHALL be applied to create the normalized CamelCase form:
Hex representations of numbers must always begin with ‘0x’ and must not include any spaces. They may use either upper or lower case ‘a’-’f’. The hex representation must include all leading zeros or sign extension bits when representing a value of a fixed width such as Tags (3 bytes), Integer (32-bit signed big-endian), Long Integer (64-bit signed big-endian) and Big Integer (big-endian multiple of 8 bytes). The Integer values for -1, 0, 1 are represented as "0xffffffff", "0x00000000", "0x00000001". Hex representation for Byte Strings are similar to numbers, but do not include the ‘0x’ prefix, and can be of any length.
Tags are a String that may contain either:
Other text values may be used such as published names of Extension tags, or names of new tags added in future KMIP versions. Producers may however choose to use hex values for these tags to ensure they are understood by all consumers.
Type must be a String containing one of the normalized CamelCase values as defined in the KMIP specification.
If type is not included, the default type of Structure SHALL be used.
The specification of a value is represented differently for each TTLV type.
For JSON encoding, each TTLV is represented as a JSON Object with properties ‘tag’, optional ‘name’, ‘type’ and ‘value’.
{"tag": "ActivationDate", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"}
{"tag": "0x54FFFF", "name":"SomeExtension", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"}
The ‘type’ property / attribute SHALL have a default value of ‘Structure’ and may be omitted for Structures.
Tags are a String that may contain either:
Other text values may be used such as published names of Extension tags, or names of new tags added in future KMIP versions. Producers may however choose to use hex values for these tags to ensure they are understood by all consumers.
{"tag": "0x420001", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"}
{"tag": "ActivationDate", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"}
{"tag": "IVCounterNonce", "type":"ByteString", "value":"a1b2c3d4"}
{"tag": "PrivateKeyTemplateAttribute", "type":"Structure", "value":[]}
{"tag": "0x545352", "type":"TextString", "value":"This is an extension"}
{"tag": "WELL_KNOWN_EXTENSION", "type":"TextString", "value":"This is an extension"}
For JSON, value is an Array containing sub-items, or may be null.
{"tag": "ProtocolVersion", "type":"Structure", "value":[
{"tag": "ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":1},
{"tag": "ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":0}
]}
{"tag": "ProtocolVersion", "value":[
{"tag": "ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":1},
{"tag": "ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":0}
]}
The ‘type’ property / attribute is optional for a Structure.
For JSON, value is either a Number or a hex string.
{"tag": "BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":10}
{"tag": "BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x0000000A"}
(Cryptographic Usage Mask, Storage Status Mask):
Integer mask values can also be encoded as a String containing mask components. JSON uses ‘|’ as the separator. Components may be either the text of the enumeration value as defined in the KMIP Specification or a 32-bit unsigned big-endian hex string.
{"tag": "CryptographicUsageMask", "type":"Integer", "value": "0x0000100c"}
{"tag": "CryptographicUsageMask", "type":"Integer", "value": "Encrypt|Decrypt|CertificateSign"}
{"tag": "CryptographicUsageMask", "type":"Integer", "value": "CertificateSign|0x00000004|0x0000008"}
{"tag": "CryptographicUsageMask", "type":"Integer", "value": "CertificateSign|0x0000000c"}
For JSON, value is either a Number or a hex string. Note that JS Numbers are 64-bit floating point and can only represent 53-bits of precision, so any values >= 2^52 must be represented as hex strings.
{"tag": "0x540001", "type":"LongInteger", "value":"0xfffffffffffffffe"}
{"tag": "0x540001", "type":"LongInteger", "value":-2}
{"tag": "UsageLimitsCount", "type":"LongInteger", "value":"0x1000000000000000"}
Note that this value (2^60) is too large to be represented as a Number in JSON.
For JSON, value is either a Number or a hex string. Note that Big Integers must be sign extended to contain a multiple of 8 bytes, and as per LongInteger, JS numbers only support a limited range of values.
{"tag": "X", "type":"BigInteger", "value":0}
{"tag": "X", "type":"BigInteger", "value":"0x0000000000000000"}
For JSON, value may contain:
{"tag": "0x420057", "type":"Enumeration", "value":2}
{"tag": "ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"0x00000002"}
{"tag": "ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"SymmetricKey"}
For JSON, value must be either a hex string, or a JSON Boolean ‘true’ or ‘false’.
{"tag": "BatchOrderOption", "type":"Boolean", "value":true}
{"tag": "BatchOrderOption", "type":"Boolean", "value":"0x0000000000000001"}
For JSON, value must be a String
{"tag": "AttributeName", "type":"TextString", "value":"Cryptographic Algorithm"}
For JSON, value must be a hex string. Note Byte Strings do not include the ‘0x’ prefix, and do not have any leading bytes.
{"tag": "MACSignature", "type":"ByteString", "value":"C50F77"}
For JSON, value must be either a hex string, or an ISO8601 DateTime as used in XSD using format:
'-'? yyyy '-' mm '-' dd 'T' hh ':' mm ':' ss ('.' s+)? ((('+' | '-') hh ':' mm) | 'Z')?
Fractional seconds are not used in KMIP and should not generally be shown. If they are used, they should be ignored (truncated).
{"tag": "ArchiveDate", "type":"DateTime", "value":"0x000000003a505520"}
{"tag": "ArchiveDate", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2001-01-01T10:00:00+10:00"}
For JSON, value is either a Number or a hex string. Note that intervals are 32-bit unsigned big-endian values.
{"tag": "Offset", "type":"Interval", "value":27}
{"tag": "Offset", "type":"Interval", "value":"0x0000001b"}
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
Perform a Query operation, querying the Operations and Objects supported by the server, with a restriction on the Maximum Response Size set in the request header. Since the resulting Query response is too big, an error is returned. Increase the Maximum Response Size, resubmit the Query request, and get a successful response.
The specific list of operations and object types returned in the response MAY vary.
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/MSGENC-JSON-M-1-13.xml
The informative corresponding wire encoding for the test case is:
Request Time 0 {"tag":"RequestMessage", "value":[ {"tag":"RequestHeader", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersion", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"}, {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMinor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000003"} ]}, {"tag":"MaximumResponseSize", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000100"}, {"tag":"BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"} ]}, {"tag":"BatchItem", "value":[ {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Query"}, {"tag":"RequestPayload", "value":[ {"tag":"QueryFunction", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"QueryOperations"}, {"tag":"QueryFunction", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"QueryObjects"} ]} ]} ]} |
Response Time 0 {"tag":"ResponseMessage", "value":[ {"tag":"ResponseHeader", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersion", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"}, {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMinor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000003"} ]}, {"tag":"TimeStamp", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2016-01-04T11:47:46+00:00"}, {"tag":"BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"} ]}, {"tag":"BatchItem", "value":[ {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Query"}, {"tag":"ResultStatus", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"OperationFailed"}, {"tag":"ResultReason", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ResponseTooLarge"}, {"tag":"ResultMessage", "type":"TextString", "value":"TOO_LARGE"} ]} ]} |
Request Time 1 {"tag":"RequestMessage", "value":[ {"tag":"RequestHeader", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersion", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"}, {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMinor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000003"} ]}, {"tag":"MaximumResponseSize", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000800"}, {"tag":"BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"} ]}, {"tag":"BatchItem", "value":[ {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Query"}, {"tag":"RequestPayload", "value":[ {"tag":"QueryFunction", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"QueryOperations"}, {"tag":"QueryFunction", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"QueryObjects"} ]} ]} ]} |
Response Time 1 {"tag":"ResponseMessage", "value":[ {"tag":"ResponseHeader", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersion", "value":[ {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMajor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"}, {"tag":"ProtocolVersionMinor", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000003"} ]}, {"tag":"TimeStamp", "type":"DateTime", "value":"2016-01-04T11:47:46+00:00"}, {"tag":"BatchCount", "type":"Integer", "value":"0x00000001"} ]}, {"tag":"BatchItem", "value":[ {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Query"}, {"tag":"ResultStatus", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Success"}, {"tag":"ResponsePayload", "value":[ {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Query"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Locate"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Destroy"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Get"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Create"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Register"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"GetAttributes"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"GetAttributeList"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"AddAttribute"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ModifyAttribute"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"DeleteAttribute"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Activate"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Revoke"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Poll"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Cancel"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Check"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"GetUsageAllocation"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"CreateKeyPair"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ReKey"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Archive"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Recover"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ObtainLease"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ReKeyKeyPair"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Certify"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"ReCertify"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"DiscoverVersions"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Notify"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Put"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"RNGRetrieve"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"RNGSeed"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Encrypt"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Decrypt"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Sign"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"SignatureVerify"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"MAC"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"MACVerify"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Hash"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"CreateSplitKey"}, {"tag":"Operation", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"JoinSplitKey"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Certificate"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"SymmetricKey"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"SecretData"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"PublicKey"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"PrivateKey"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"Template"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"OpaqueObject"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"SplitKey"}, {"tag":"ObjectType", "type":"Enumeration", "value":"PGPKey"} ]} ]} ]} |
The Symmetric Key Lifecycle Profile is a KMIP server performing symmetric key lifecycle operations based on requests received from a KMIP client.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Cryptographic Algorithm [KMIP-SPEC]
b. Object Type [KMIP-SPEC]
c. Process Start Date [KMIP-SPEC]
d. Protect Stop Date [KMIP-SPEC]
a. Create [KMIP-SPEC]
a. Cryptographic Algorithm [KMIP-SPEC] with values:
i. 3DES
ii. AES
b. Object Type [KMIP-SPEC] with value:
iii. Symmetric Key
c. Key Format Type [KMIP-SPEC] with value:
iv. Raw
v. Transparent Symmetric Key
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKLC-M-1-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKLC-M-2-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKLC-M-3-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/optional/SKLC-O-1-13.xml
The Symmetric Key Lifecycle Profile is a KMIP server performing symmetric key lifecycle operations based on requests received from a KMIP client. The use of algorithms within this profile set has been limited to those permitted under the NIST FIPS 140 validation program.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Symmetric Key [KMIP-SPEC]
b. Key Format Type [KMIP-SPEC]
a. Cryptographic Algorithm [KMIP-SPEC]
b. Cryptographic Length [KMIP-SPEC] with values:
i. 168 (3DES)
ii. 128 (AES)
iii. 192 (AES
iv. 256 (AES)
c. Object Type [KMIP-SPEC]
d. Process Start Date [KMIP-SPEC]
e. Protect Stop Date [KMIP-SPEC]
b. Create [KMIP-SPEC]
d. Cryptographic Algorithm [KMIP-SPEC] with values:
i. 3DES
ii. AES
e. Object Type [KMIP-SPEC] with value:
i. Symmetric Key
f. Key Format Type [KMIP-SPEC] with value:
i. Raw
ii. Transparent Symmetric Key
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-1-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-2-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-3-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-4-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-5-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-6-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-7-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-8-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-9-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-10-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-11-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SKFF-M-12-13.xml
The Asymmetric Key Lifecycle Profile is a KMIP server performing symmetric key lifecycle operations based on requests received from a KMIP client.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Symmetric Key [KMIP-SPEC]
b. Key Format Type [KMIP-SPEC]
a. Cryptographic Algorithm [KMIP-SPEC]
b. Object Type [KMIP-SPEC]
c. Process Start Date [KMIP-SPEC]
d. Process Stop Date [KMIP-SPEC]
a. Cryptographic Algorithm [KMIP-SPEC] with values:
i. RSA
b. Object Type [KMIP-SPEC] with value:
i. Public Key
ii. Private Key
c. Key Format Type [KMIP-SPEC] with value:
i. PKCS#1
ii. PKCS#8
iii. Transparent RSA Public Key
iv. Transparent RSA Private Key
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/AKLC-M-1-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/AKLC-M-2-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/AKLC-M-3-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/optional/AKLC-O-1-13.xml
The Basic Cryptographic Client and Server profiles specify the use of KMIP to request encryption and decryption operations from a KMIP server.
The Advanced Cryptographic Client and Server profiles specify the use of KMIP to request encryption, decryption, signature, and verification operations from a KMIP server.
The RNG Cryptographic Client and Server profiles specify the use of KMIP to request random number generator operations from a KMIP server.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-1-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-2-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-3-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-4-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-5-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-6-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-7-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-8-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-9-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-10-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-11-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-12-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-13-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-BC-M-14-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-AC-M-1-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-AC-M-2-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-AC-M-3-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-AC-M-4-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-AC-M-5-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-AC-M-6-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-AC-M-7-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-AC-M-8-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-RNG-M-1-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-RNG-O-1-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-RNG-O-2-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-RNG-O-3-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/CS-RNG-O-4-13.xml
The Opaque Managed Object Store Profile is a KMIP server performing storage related operations on opaque objects based on requests received from a KMIP client.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Opaque Object [KMIP-SPEC]
a. Object Type [KMIP-SPEC]
a. Register [KMIP-SPEC]
a. Opaque Data Type [KMIP-SPEC]
b. Object Type [KMIP-SPEC] with value:
i. Opaque Object
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/OMOS-M-1-13.xml
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/optional/OMOS-O-1-13.xml
The Storage Array with Self-Encrypting Drives Profile is a storage array containing self-encrypting drives operating as a KMIP client interacting with a KMIP server.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Custom Attribute [KMIP SPEC]
a. Register [KMIP-SPEC]
a. Secret Data Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:
i. Password
b. Object Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] values:
i. Secret Data
ii. Template
c. Name Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:
i. Uninterpreted Text String
a. TextString
Determine server configuration details including operations supported (only the mandatory operations are listed in the response example), objects supported (only the mandatory objects types are listed in the response example), and optional server information.
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SASED-M-1-13.xml
A template is created and the secret data for the authentication key is then registered. The server must allow the registration of managed objects for Object Groups either by allowed arbitrary values for Object Groups or by pre-configuration of specific Object Groups prior to the storage array registering the authentication key. The authentication key may be a new authentication key or a replacement authentication key.
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SASED-M-2-13.xml
Locate and retrieve the previously registered authentication key and finally destroy both the authentication key and the template.
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SASED-M-3-13.xml
The Tape Library Profile specifies the behavior of a tape library operating as a KMIP client interacting with a KMIP server.
Key Associated Data (KAD) |
Part of the tape format. May be segmented into authenticated and unauthenticated fields. KAD usage is detailed in the SCSI SSC-3 standard from the T10 organization available as ANSI INCITS 335-2000. |
Hexadecimal Numeric Characters |
Case-sensitive, printable, single byte ASCII characters representing the numbers 0 through 9 and uppercase alpha A through F. (US-ASCII characters 30h-39h and 41h-46h). Each byte (single 8-bit numeric value) is represented as two hexadecimal numeric characters with the high-nibble represented by the first (left-most) hexadecimal numeric character and the low-nibble represented by the second (right-most) hexadecimal numeric character. |
N(a) |
The maximum number of bytes in the tape authenticated KAD field. For LTO4, N(a) is 12 bytes. For LTO5, N(a) is 60 bytes. For LTO6, N(a) is 60 bytes. |
N(u) |
The maximum number of bytes in the tape unauthenticated KAD field. For LTO4, N(u) is 32 bytes. For LTO5, N(u) is 32 bytes. For LTO6, N(u) is 32 bytes. |
N(k) |
The maximum number of bytes in the tape format KAD fields – i.e. N(a) + N(u). For LTO4, N(k) is 44 bytes. For LTO5, N(k) is 92 bytes. For LTO6, N(k) is 92 bytes. |
This information applies to Tape Libraries that use the Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] attribute to store key identifiers. KMIP clients are not required to use Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] however KMIP servers conforming to the Tape Library Profiles are required to support KMIP clients that use Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] and KMIP clients that do not use Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC].
The Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] MAY be used to store data that is specific to the application (Tape Library) using the object.
The following Application Namespaces SHOULD be used in the Application Namespace field of the Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC]:
· LIBRARY-LTO, LIBRARY-LTO4, LIBRARY-LTO5, LIBRARY-LTO6, LIBRARY-LTO7
For backwards compatibility with deployed Tape Library implementations, servers MAY support VENDOR-LIBRARY-LTO as an Application Namespace, where VENDOR is an ASCII string that SHALL NOT be further interpreted and SHALL be handled by the server as if the Application Namespace was set to LIBRARY-LTO.
Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] supports key identifiers being created either on the server or on the client (Tape Library), but not both. This profile specifies use of key identifiers created by the client.
The Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] method of key identification relies on the ability to uniquely identify a key based only on its Application Data (preferably), or (alternatively) on some combination of Application Data and Custom Attributes [KMIP-SPEC], which the key creator guarantees to be unique within the Application Namespace.
Key identifiers stored in the KMIP server's Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] are in ASCII format. Key identifiers stored in the KMIP client's tape format KAD fields are numeric format. The specific algorithm for converting between text and numeric formats is specified below.
All information contained in the tape format’s KAD fields is converted to an ASCII string consisting of hexadecimal numeric character pairs as follows:
If the implementation uses client-created key identifiers, then the client generates a new identifier in ASCII format that SHALL be unique within the chosen namespace. The source material for generating the string is dependent on client policy. The numeric representation of this identifier SHALL be no larger than the N(k) bytes of the KAD for the tape media being used.
For KMIP clients and servers conforming to this profile, Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] SHALL be created by the Tape Library KMIP client based on the tape format's KAD fields as follows:
1. Define an empty output buffer sufficient to contain a string with a maximum length of 2*N(k) bytes.
2. Copy the tape format’s unauthenticated KAD (if present) to the output buffer, converting each byte value to exactly two Hexadecimal Numeric Characters. The first byte (i.e., byte 0) of the output buffer is the first byte of unauthenticated KAD.
3. Concatenate the tape format’s authenticated KAD to the output buffer, converting each byte value to exactly two Hexadecimal Numeric Characters.
Note: the contents of the unauthenticated KAD and authenticated KAD fields may be less than the maximum permitted lengths; the implementation provides the correct length values to use in the algorithm rather than using fixed maximum length fields.
If Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] is supported, then it SHALL be used by the client for locating the object for the purpose of encrypting and decrypting data on tape. The Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] value SHALL solely be used for this purpose.
The Tape Library client SHALL assign a text (i.e., human-readable) representation of the media barcode to the Alternative Name [KMIP-SPEC] of the object. This SHALL occur on first use of the object for encryption, which normally is when the library requests the server to create the object.
The relationship between key identifiers in Application Specific Information [KMIP-SPEC] and Alternative Name [KMIP-SPEC] is as follows:
a) The values for both are provided by the client
b) The identifier in Alternative Name [KMIP-SPEC] (i.e., the barcode) SHALL be used by the server administrator for finding keys associated with specific tape media (e.g., a server administrator may want to find the key(s) associated with a missing tape cartridge, where the barcode of that tape cartridge is known).
c) The Alternative Name [KMIP-SPEC] SHALL NOT be used by a client for locating the object to encrypt or decrypt data, since the value (barcode) is not required to be unique and therefore does not ensure retrieval of the correct key.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
a. Alternative Name Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC-1_2] value:
i. Uninterpreted Text String
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
a. Name [KMIP-SPEC]
b. Cryptographic Algorithm [KMIP-SPEC]
c. Custom Attribute [KMIP SPEC]
d. Application Specific Information [KMIP SPEC]
a. Create [KMIP-SPEC]
a. Batch Order Option [KMIP-SPEC] value:
i. True
b. Batch Count [KMIP-SPEC] value:
i. 1 to 32
a. Cryptographic Algorithm Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:
i. AES
b. Object Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:
i. Symmetric Key
c. Key Format Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:
i. Raw
d. Cryptographic Length [KMIP-SPEC] value :
i. 256-bit
e. Name Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:
i. Uninterpreted Text String
a. Text String
b. Integer
c. Date Time
a. Alternative Name Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC-1_2] value:
i. Uninterpreted Text String
Determine server configuration details including operations supported (only the mandatory operations are listed in the response example), objects supported (only the mandatory objects types are listed in the response example), optional server information, and optional list of application name spaces. Additional information MAY be returned by tape library clients and servers.
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/TL-M-1-13.xml
This case may occur when the Write operation starts with the first block on a tape. The implementation may choose which Write operations qualify for creation of a new key. Regardless of the initiating circumstances, the Tape Library requests the server to create a new AES-256 symmetric key with appropriate identifying information which is unique within the Application Namespace.
Additional custom attributes MAY be specified in order to:
- ensure uniqueness of the key identifier when later Locating the key via Application Specific Information
- provide human-readable information (such as the tape Barcode value)
- provide information to support client-specific purposes
Tape Library implementations are not required to use custom attributes and custom attributes within the create request MAY be omitted.
A Tape Library client MAY elect to perform the steps in separate requests. A Tape Library server SHALL support both requests containing multiple batch items and multiple equivalent requests containing single batch items within each request.
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/TL-M-2-13.xml
The Tape Library constructs an identifier string based on the method in Tape Library Application Specific Information (5.12.2), and requests the server to locate the matching managed object for that Application Specific Information value. A Get is then requested based on the key's unique identifier. The Tape Library MAY update attributes associated with the Symmetric Key Managed Object. The following test case shows extensive use of custom attributes. Custom attributes are not required if the Application Name is unique within the Application Namespace. An implementation may also use custom attributes for vendor-unique purposes, or to improve usability.
Tape Library implementations are not required to use custom attributes and those steps within the test case that refer to custom attribute setting and update are optional and MAY be omitted. The steps using Get Attribute List, Get Attributes and Modify Attribute are optional for a client to use but remain mandatory for a server to support for those clients that elect to use the custom attributes.
A Tape Library client MAY elect to perform the steps in separate requests. A Tape Library server SHALL support both requests containing multiple batch items and multiple equivalent requests containing single batch items within each request.
The test case destroys the key created in the previous test case to clean up after the test. Tape Library implementations MAY elect to not perform this step.
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/TL-M-3-13.xml
Suite B [SuiteB] requires that key establishment and signature algorithms be based upon Elliptic Curve Cryptography and that the encryption algorithm be AES [FIPS197]. Suite B includes:
Encryption
|
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (key sizes of 128 and 256 bits) |
Digital Signature |
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) (using the curves with 256-bit and 384-bit prime moduli) |
Key Exchange |
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), (using the curves with 256-bit and 384-bit prime moduli) |
Hashes |
SHA-256 and SHA-384 |
Suite B provides for two levels of cryptographic security, namely a 128-bit minimum level of security (minLOS_128) and a 192-bit minimum level of security (minLOS_192). Each level defines a minimum strength that all cryptographic algorithms must provide. A KMIP product configured at a minimum level of security of 128 bits provides adequate protection for classified information up to the SECRET level. A KMIP product configured at a minimum level of security of 192 bits is required to protect classified information at the TOP SECRET level.
The Suite B non-signature primitives are divided into two columns as shown below.
|
Column 1 |
Column 2 |
Encryption |
AES-128 |
AES-256 |
Key Agreement |
ECDH on P-256 |
ECDH on P-384 |
Hash for PRF/MAC |
SHA-256 |
SHA-384 |
At the 128-bit minimum level of security, the non-signature primitives MUST either come exclusively from Column 1 or exclusively from Column 2.
At the 192-bit minimum level of security, the non-signature primitives MUST come exclusively from Column 2.
Digital signatures using ECDSA MUST be used for authentication. Following the direction of RFC 4754, ECDSA-256 represents an instantiation of the ECDSA algorithm using the P-256 curve and the SHA-256 hash function. ECDSA-384 represents an instantiation of the ECDSA algorithm using the P-384 curve and the SHA-384 hash function.
If configured at a minimum level of security of 128 bits, a KMIP product MUST use either ECDSA-256 or ECDSA-384 for authentication. It is allowable for one party to authenticate with ECDSA-256 and the other party to authenticate with ECDSA-384. This flexibility will allow interoperability between a KMIP client and server that have different sizes of ECDSA authentication keys. KMIP products configured at a minimum level of security of 128 bits MUST be able to verify ECDSA-256 signatures and SHOULD be able to verify ECDSA-384 signatures. If configured at a minimum level of security of 192 bits, ECDSA-384 MUST be used by both the KMIP client and server for authentication. KMIP products configured at a minimum level of security of 192 bits MUST be able to verify ECDSA-384 signatures.
KMIP products, at both minimum levels of security, MUST each use an X.509 certificate that complies with the "Suite B Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5759] and that contains an elliptic curve public key with the key usage bit set for digital signature.
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
i. 128-bit (combined with AES)
ii. 256-bit (combined with SHA, ECDH or ECDSA)
i. 256-bit (combined with AES)
ii. 384-bit bit (combined with SHA, ECDH or ECDSA)
i. P-256 (SECP256R1)
i. X.509
i. AES
ii. ECDSA
iii. ECDH
iv. HMAC-SHA256
i. SHA-256
i. Certificate
ii. Symmetric Key
iii. Public Key
iv. Private Key
i. Raw
ii. ECPrivateKey
iii. X.509
iv. Transparent ECDSA Private Key
v. Transparent ECDSA Public Key
vi. Transparent ECDH Private Key
vii. Transparent ECDH Public Key
viii. Transparent EC Private Key
ix. Transparent EC Public Key
i. ECDSA with SHA256 (on P-256)
i. P-384 (SECP384R1)
i. HMAC-SHA384
i. SHA-384
i. ECDSA with SHA384 (on P-384)
Perform a Query operation, querying the Operations and Objects supported by the server, and get a successful response.
The specific list of operations and object types returned in the response MAY vary.
The TLS protocol version and cipher suite SHALL be as specified in Suite B minLOS_128 Cipher Suites (3.3.2)
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SUITEB_128-M-1-13.xml
KMIP clients conformant to this profile:
KMIP servers conformant to this profile:
i. 256-bit (combined with AES)
ii. 384-bit (combined with SHA, ECDH or ECDSA)
i. P-384 (SECP384R1)
i. X.509
i. AES
ii. ECDSA
iii. ECDH
iv. HMAC-SHA384
i. SHA-384
i. Certificate
ii. Symmetric Key
iii. Public Key
iv. Private Key
i. Raw
ii. ECPrivateKey
iii. X.509
iv. Transparent ECDSA Private Key
v. Transparent ECDSA Public Key
vi. Transparent ECDH Private Key
vii. Transparent ECDH Public Key
viii. Transparent EC Private Key
ix. Transparent EC Public Key
i. ECDSA with SHA384 (on P-384)
Perform a Query operation, querying the Operations and Objects supported by the server, and get a successful response.
The specific list of operations and object types returned in the response MAY vary.
The TLS protocol version and cipher suite SHALL be as specified in Suite B minLOS_192 Cipher Suites (3.4.2)
See test-cases/kmip-v1.3/mandatory/SUITEB_192-M-1-13.xml
The baseline server and client profiles provide the most basic functionality that is expected of a conformant KMIP client or server. The complete server profile defines a KMIP server that implements the entire specification. A KMIP implementation conformant to this specification (the Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles) SHALL meet all the conditions documented in one or more of the following sections.
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP server implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
KMIP client implementations conformant to this profile:
The following individuals have participated in the creation of this specification and are gratefully acknowledged:
Participants:
Warren Armstrong, QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd.
Rinkesh Bansal, IBM
Lina Baquero, Fornetix
Jeff Bartell, Fornetix
Tom Benjamin, IBM
Anthony Berglas, Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Mathias Bjorkqvist, IBM
Todd Bottger, Oracle
Joseph Brand, Semper Fortis Solutions
Alan Brown, Thales e-Security
Robert Burns, Thales e-Security
Andrew Byrne, EMC
Hai-May Chao, Oracle
Chye-Lin Chee, Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE)
Tim Chevalier, NetApp
Kenli Chong, QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd.
Justin Corlett, Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Tony Cox, Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
DINESH DIALANI, SafeNet, Inc.
Michael Dong, Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE)
Alex Downey, Futurex
Kevin Driver, IBM
Stephen Edwards, Fornetix
James Espinoza, Futurex
Faisal Faruqui, Thales e-Security
Stan Feather, Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE)
Indra Fitzgerald, NetApp
Judith Furlong, EMC
Michael Gardiner, SafeNet, Inc.
Jonathan Geater, Thales e-Security
Susan Gleeson, Oracle
Saheem Granados, IBM
John Green, QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd.
Robert Griffin, EMC
Robert Haas, IBM
Steve He, Vormetric, Inc.
Christopher Hiller, Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE)
Hao Hoang, Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE)
Tim Hudson, Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Michael Jenkins, National Security Agency
Elysa Jones, Individual
Mark Joseph, P6R, Inc
Mahadev Karadigudda, NetApp
Jason Katonica, IBM
Tim Kelsey, Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE)
Hyun-jin Kim, Hancom Secure, Inc.
Stephen Kingston, SafeNet, Inc.
Kathy Kriese, Symantec Corp.
Leonardo Ladeira, SafeNet, Inc.
Sun-ho Lee, Hancom Secure, Inc.
John Leiseboer, QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd.
Hal Lockhart, Oracle
Robert Lockhart, Thales e-Security
Martin Luther, Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE)
Jane Melia, QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd.
Prashant Mestri, IBM
Trisha Paine, SafeNet, Inc.
Incheon Park, Hancom Secure, Inc.
John Peck, IBM
Michael Phillips, Dell
Stefan Pingel, EMC
Ajai Puri, SafeNet, Inc.
Saravanan Ramalingam, Thales e-Security
Bruce Rich, Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Warren Robbins, Dell
Peter Robinson, EMC
Rick Robinson, IBM
Saikat Saha, Oracle
Boris Schumperli, Cryptomathic
Greg Scott, Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Amit Sinha, SafeNet, Inc.
Radhika Siravara, Oracle
Curtis Smith, Futurex
Ryan Smith, Futurex
Amruta Soman, Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
Gerald Stueve, Fornetix
Jim Susoy, P6R, Inc
Kiran Thota, VMware, Inc.
Peter Tsai, Vormetric, Inc.
Nathan Turajski, Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE)
Charles White, Fornetix
Steve Wierenga, Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE)
Thomas Xuelin, Watchdata Technologies Pte Ltd.
Krishna Yellepeddy, IBM
Magda, Zdunkiewicz, Cryptsoft Pty Ltd.
yuan zhang, Watchdata Technologies Pte Ltd.
Joshua Zhu, Vormetric, Inc.
Revision |
Date |
Editor |
Changes Made |
wd02 |
4-Jan-2016 |
Tim Hudson |
Added in the remainder of the existing KMIP 1.2 profiles updated for KMIP 1.3 incorporating feedback to date on the existing profiles. |
wd01 |
5-Nov-2015 |
Tim Hudson |
Initial revision based on the KMIP 1.2 equivalent documents and TC discussions and TC admin feedback on computer readable files |