1 Introduction

For normative definition of the elements of KMIP see the KMIP Specification [KMIP-SPEC] and the KMIP Profiles [KMIP-PROF].

Illustrative guidance for the implementation of KMIP clients and servers is provided in the KMIP Usage Guide [KMIP-UG].

Suite B [SuiteB] requires that key establishment and signature algorithms be based upon Elliptic Curve Cryptography and that the encryption algorithm be AES [FIPS197]. Suite B includes:

Encryption	Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (key sizes of 128 and 256 bits)
Digital Signature	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) (using the curves with 256-bit and 384-bit prime moduli)
Key Exchange	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), (using the curves with 256-bit and 384-bit prime moduli)
Hashes	SHA-256 and SHA-384

Suite B provides for two levels of cryptographic security, namely a 128-bit minimum level of security (minLOS_128) and a 192-bit minimum level of security (minLOS_192). Each level defines a minimum strength that all cryptographic algorithms must provide. A KMIP product configured at a minimum level of security of 128 bits provides adequate protection for classified information up to the SECRET level. A KMIP product configured at a minimum level of security of 192 bits is required to protect classified information at the TOP SECRET level.

The Suite B non-signature primitives are divided into two columns as shown below.

	Column 1	Column 2
Encryption	AES-128	AES-256
Key Agreement	ECDH on P-256	ECDH on P-384
Hash for PRF/MAC	SHA-256	SHA-384

At the 128-bit minimum level of security, the non-signature primitives MUST either come exclusively from Column 1 or exclusively from Column 2.

At the 192-bit minimum level of security, the non-signature primitives MUST come exclusively from Column 2.

Digital signatures using ECDSA MUST be used for authentication. Following the direction of RFC 4754, ECDSA-256 represents an instantiation of the ECDSA algorithm using the P-256 curve and the SHA-256 hash function. ECDSA-384 represents an instantiation of the ECDSA algorithm using the P-384 curve and the SHA-384 hash function.

If configured at a minimum level of security of 128 bits, a KMIP product MUST use either ECDSA-256 or ECDSA-384 for authentication. It is allowable for one party to authenticate with ECDSA-256 and the other party to authenticate with ECDSA-384. This flexibility will allow interoperability between a KMIP client and server that have different sizes of ECDSA authentication keys. KMIP products configured at a minimum level of security of 128 bits MUST be able to verify ECDSA-256 signatures and SHOULD be able to verify ECDSA-384 signatures. If configured at a minimum level of security of 192 bits, ECDSA-384 MUST be used by both the KMIP client and server for authentication. KMIP products configured at a minimum level of security of 192 bits MUST be able to verify ECDSA-384 signatures.

KMIP products, at both minimum levels of security, MUST each use an X.509 certificate that complies with the "Suite B Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5759] and that contains an elliptic curve public key with the key usage bit set for digital signature.

1.1 Terminology

The key words “MUST”, “SHALL”, “SHOULD”, and “MAY” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2 Normative References

[CNSSP-15] N.S.A., “National Information Assurance Policy on the Use of Public Standards for the Secure Sharing of Information Among National Security Systems”, 1 October 2013, https://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/CNSSP_No%2015_minorUpdate1_Oct12012.pdf.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt.

[RFC4754] D. Fu and J. Solinas, IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), IETF RFC 4754, Jan 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4754.txt.

[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, August 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt.

[RFC6460] M. Salter and R. Housley, Suite B Profile for Transport Layer Security (TLS), IETF RFC 6460, January 2012, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6460.txt.

[KMIP-SPEC] One or more of [KMIP-SPEC-1_0], [KMIP-SPEC-1_1], [KMIP-SPEC-1_2]

[KMIP-SPEC-1_0] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.0,
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.0/os/kmip-spec-1.0-os.doc,
OASIS Standard, 1 October 2010.

[KMIP-SPEC-1_1] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.1,
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/os/kmip-spec-v1.1-os.doc,
OASIS Standard, 24 January 2013.

[KMIP-SPEC-1_2] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.2,
URL, Candidate OASIS Standard 01, DD MMM YYYY.

[KMIP-PROF] One or more of [KMIP-PROF-1_0], [KMIP-PROF-1_1], [KMIP-PROF-1_2]

[KMIP-PROF-1_0] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.0, http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.0/os/kmip-profiles-1.0-os.doc,
OASIS Standard, 1 October 2010.

[KMIP-PROF-1_1] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.1,
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/os/kmip-profiles-v1.1-os.doc,
OASIS Standard 01, 24 January 2013.

[KMIP-PROF-1_2] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.2,
URL, Candidate OASIS Standard 01, DD MMM YYYY.

1.3 Non-Normative References

[KMIP-UG] One or more of [KMIP-UG-1_0], [KMIP-UG-1_1], [KMIP-UG-1_2]

[KMIP-UG-1_0] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.0, http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.1/kmip-ug-v1.1-cnd01.doc,
Committee Note Draft, 1 December 2011.

[KMIP-UG-1_1] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.1, http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.1/kmip-ug-v1.1-cnd01.doc,
Committee Note Draft, 1 December 2011.

[KMIP-UG-1_2] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.2,
URL, Committee Note Draft, DD MMM YYYY.

[KMIP-TC-1_1] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Test Cases Version 1.1, http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/testcases/v1.1/cn01/kmip-testcases-v1.1-cn01.doc, Committee Note 01, 27 July 2012.

[KMIP-TC-1_2] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Test Cases Version 1.2,
URL, Committee Note Draft, DD MMM YYYY.

[KMIP-UC] Key Management Interoperability Protocol Use Cases Version 1.0, http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/usecases/v1.0/cs01/kmip-usecases-1.0-cs-01.doc, Committee Specification, 15 June 2010.

[SuiteB] Suite B Cryptography / Cryptographic Interoperability, http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/

2 Suite B minLOS_128 Profile

The Suite B minLOS_128 Profile describes a KMIP client interacting with a KMIP server as an information assurance product to provide a minimum level of security of 128 bits. (http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/)

2.1 Authentication Suite

Implementations conformant to this profile SHALL use TLS to negotiate a mutually-authenticated connection.

2.1.1 Protocols

Conformant KMIP clients and servers SHALL support:

TLS v1.2 [RFC5246]

2.1.2 Cipher Suites

Conformant KMIP servers SHALL support the following cipher suites:

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

2.1.3 Client Authenticity

Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle client authenticity in accordance with section 3.2.3 of the TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite [KMIP-PROF].

2.1.4 Object Owner

Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle object owner in accordance with section 3.2.4 of the TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite [KMIP-PROF].

2.1.5 KMIP Port Number

Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle the KMIP port number in in accordance with section 3.2.5 of the TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite [KMIP-PROF].

2.2 Suite B minLOS_128

KMIP clients conformant to this profile under [KMIP-SPEC]:

SHALL conform to the Baseline Client conformance clauses in [KMIP-PROF] and [KMIP-SPEC]
SHALL restrict use of the enumerated types listed in item 6 of the server list below to the values noted against each item
MAY support any clause within [KMIP-SPEC] provided it does not conflict with any other clause within this section 2.2.
MAY support extensions outside the scope of this standard (e.g., vendor extensions, conformance clauses) that do not conflict with any KMIP or [CNSSP-15] requirements.

KMIP servers conformant to this profile under [KMIP-SPEC]:

SHALL conform to the Baseline Server profile in [KMIP-PROF] and [KMIP-SPEC] and
SHALL support the following Objects [KMIP-SPEC]

Certificate [KMIP-SPEC]
Symmetric Key [KMIP-SPEC]
Public Key [KMIP-SPEC]
Private Key [KMIP-SPEC]

SHALL support the following Attributes [KMIP-SPEC]

Cryptographic Algorithm [KMIP-SPEC]
Cryptographic Length [KMIP-SPEC] value :

i. 128-bit (combined with AES)

ii. 256-bit (combined with SHA, ECDH or ECDSA)

MAY support the following Attributes [KMIP-SPEC]

Cryptographic Length [KMIP-SPEC] value :

i. 256-bit (combined with AES)

ii. 384-bit bit (combined with SHA, ECDH or ECDSA)

SHALL support the following Client-to-Server Operations [KMIP-SPEC]:

Create [KMIP-SPEC]
Create Key Pair [KMIP-SPEC]
Register [KMIP-SPEC]
Re-key [KMIP-SPEC]
Re-key Key Pair [KMIP-SPEC]

SHALL support the following Message Encoding [KMIP-SPEC]:

Recommended Curve Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. P-256 (SECP256R1)

Certificate Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. X.509

Cryptographic Algorithm Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. AES

ii. ECDSA

iii. ECDH

iv. HMAC-SHA256

Hashing Algorithm Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC]

i. SHA-256

Object Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. Certificate

ii. Symmetric Key

iii. Public Key

iv. Private Key

Key Format Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. Raw

ii. ECPrivateKey

iii. X.509

iv. Transparent ECDSA Private Key

v. Transparent ECDSA Public Key

vi. Transparent ECDH Private Key

vii. Transparent ECDH Public Key

Digital Signature Algorithm Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. ECDSA with SHA256 (on P-256)

MAY support the following Message Encoding [KMIP-SPEC]:

Recommended Curve [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. P-384 (SECP384R1)

Cryptographic Algorithm Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. HMAC-SHA384

Hashing Algorithm Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC]

i. SHA-384

Digital Signature Algorithm Enumeration

i. ECDSA with SHA384 (on P-384)

SHALL support the Suite B minLOS_128 Test Cases returning results in accordance with the test cases.
MAY support any clause within [KMIP-SPEC] provided it does not conflict with any other clause within this section 2.2.
MAY support extensions outside the scope of this standard (e.g., vendor extensions, conformance clauses) that do not conflict with any KMIP or [CNSSP-15] requirements.

3 Suite B minLOS_128 Test Cases

3.1 Mandatory Test Cases

This section documents the test cases that a client or server conformant to this profile SHALL support.

N/A

4 Suite B minLOS_192 Profile

The Suite B minLOS_192 Profile describes a KMIP client interacting with a KMIP server as an information assurance product to provide a minimum level of security of 192 bits. (http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/)

4.1 Authentication Suite

Implementations conformant to this profile SHALL use TLS to negotiate a mutually-authenticated connection.

4.1.1 Protocols

Conformant KMIP clients and servers SHALL support:

TLS v1.2 [RFC5246]

4.1.2 Cipher Suites

Conformant KMIP servers SHALL support the following cipher suites:

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

4.1.3 Client Authenticity

Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle client authenticity in accordance with section 3.2.3 of the TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite [KMIP-PROF].

4.1.4 Object Owner

Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle object owner in accordance with section 3.2.4 of the TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite [KMIP-PROF].

4.1.5 KMIP Port Number

Conformant KMIP servers and clients SHALL handle the KMIP port number in in accordance with section 3.2.5 of the TLS 1.2 Authentication Suite [KMIP-PROF].

4.2 Suite B minLOS_192

KMIP clients conformant to this profile under [KMIP-SPEC]:

SHALL conform to the Baseline Client conformance clauses in [KMIP-PROF] and [KMIP-SPEC]
SHALL restrict use of the enumerated types listed in item 5 of the server list below to the values noted against each item
MAY support any clause within [KMIP-SPEC] provided it does not conflict with any other clause within this section 4.2.
MAY support extensions outside the scope of this standard (e.g., vendor extensions, conformance clauses) that do not conflict with any KMIP or [CNSSP-15] requirements.

KMIP servers conformant to this profile under [KMIP-SPEC]:

SHALL conform to the Baseline Server profile in [KMIP-PROF] and [KMIP-SPEC] and
SHALL support the following Objects [KMIP-SPEC]

Certificate [KMIP-SPEC]
Symmetric Key [KMIP-SPEC]
Public Key [KMIP-SPEC]
Private Key [KMIP-SPEC]

SHALL support the following Attributes [KMIP-SPEC]

Cryptographic Algorithm [KMIP-SPEC]
Cryptographic Length [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. 384-bit bit (combined with SHA, ECDH or ECDSA)

SHALL support the following Client-to-Server Operations [KMIP-SPEC]:

Create [KMIP-SPEC]
Create Key Pair [KMIP-SPEC]
Register [KMIP-SPEC]
Re-key [KMIP-SPEC]
Re-key Key Pair [KMIP-SPEC]

SHALL support the following Message Encoding [KMIP-SPEC]:

Recommended Curve Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. P-384 (SECP384R1)

Certificate Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. X.509

Cryptographic Algorithm Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. AES

ii. ECDSA

iii. ECDH

iv. HMAC-SHA384

Hashing Algorithm Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC]

i. SHA-384

Object Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. Certificate

ii. Symmetric Key

iii. Public Key

iv. Private Key

Key Format Type Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. Raw

ii. ECPrivateKey

iii. X.509

iv. Transparent ECDSA Private Key

v. Transparent ECDSA Public Key

vi. Transparent ECDH Private Key

vii. Transparent ECDH Public Key

Digital Signature Algorithm Enumeration [KMIP-SPEC] value:

i. ECDSA with SHA384 (on P-384)

SHALL support the Suite B minLOS_192 Test Cases returning results in accordance with the test cases.
MAY support any clause within [KMIP-SPEC] provided it does not conflict with any other clause within this section 4.2.
MAY support extensions outside the scope of this standard (e.g., vendor extensions, conformance clauses) that do not conflict with any KMIP or [CNSSP-15] requirements.

5 Suite B minLOS_192 Test Cases

5.1 Mandatory Test Cases

This section documents the test cases that a client or server conformant to this profile SHALL support.

N/A

6 Conformance

6.1 Suite B minLOS_128 Profile Conformance

KMIP client and server implementations conformant to this profile:

SHALL support the Authentication Suite conditions as specified in Section 2.1 of this profile.
SHALL support the conditions as specified in Section 2.2 of this profile.

6.2 Suite B minLOS_192 Profile Conformance

KMIP client and server implementations conformant to this profile:

SHALL support the Authentication Suite conditions as specified in Section 4.1 of this profile.
SHALL support the conditions as specified in Section 4.2 of this profile.

6.3 Permitted Test Case Variations

Whilst the test cases provided in this Profile define the allowed request and response content, some inherent variations MAY occur and are permitted within a successfully completed test case.

Each test case MAY include allowed variations in the description of the test case in addition to the variations noted in this section.

Other variations not explicitly noted in this Profile SHALL be deemed non-conformant.

6.3.1 Variable Items

An implementation conformant to this Profile MAY vary the following values:

UniqueIdentifier
PrivateKeyUniqueIdentifier
PublicKeyUniqueIdentifier
UniqueBatchItemIdentifier
AsynchronousCorrelationValue
TimeStamp
KeyValue / KeyMaterial including:

key material content returned for managed cryptographic objects which are generated by the server
wrapped versions of keys where the wrapping key is dynamic or the wrapping contains variable output for each wrap operation

For response containing the output of cryptographic operation in Data / SignatureData/ MACData / IVCounterNonce where:

the managed object is generated by the server; or
the operation inherently contains variable output

For the following DateTime attributes where the value is not specified in the request as a fixed DateTime value:

ActivationDate
ArchiveDate
CompromiseDate
CompromiseOccurrenceDate
DeactivationDate
DestroyDate
InitialDate
LastChangeDate
ProtectStartDate
ProcessStopDate
ValidityDate
OriginalCreationDate

LinkedObjectIdentifier
DigestValue

For those managed cryptographic objects which are dynamically generated

KeyFormatType

The key format type selected by the server when it creates managed objects

Digest

a. The HashingAlgorithm selected by the server when it calculates the digest for a managed object for which it has access to the key material

b. The Digest Value

Extensions reported in Query for ExtensionList and ExtensionMap
Application Namespaces reported in Query
Object Types reported in Query other than those noted as required in this profile
Operation Types reported in Query other than those noted as required in this profile (or any referenced profile documents)
For TextString attribute values containing test identifiers:

a. Additional vendor or application prefixes

Additional attributes beyond those noted in the response

An implementation conformant to this Profile MAY allow the following response variations:

Object Group values – May or may not return one or more Object Group values not included in the requests
y-CustomAttributes – May or may not include additional server-specific associated attributes not included in requests
Message Extensions – May or may not include additional (non-critical) vendor extensions
TemplateAttribute – May or may not be included in responses where the Template Attribute response is noted as optional in [KMIP-SPEC]
AttributeIndex – May or may not include Attribute Index value where the Attribute Index value is 0 for Protocol Versions 1.1 and above.
ResultMessage – May or may not be included in responses and the value (if included) may vary from the text contained within the test case.
The list of Protocol Versions returned in a DiscoverVersion response may include additional protocol versions if the request has not specified a list of client supported Protocol Versions.
VendorIdentification - The value (if included) may vary from the text contained within the test case.

6.3.2 Variable behavior

An implementation conformant to this Profile SHALL allow variation of the following behavior:

A test may omit the clean-up requests and responses (containing Revoke and/or Destroy) at the end of the test provided there is a separate mechanism to remove the created objects during testing.
A test may omit the test identifiers if the client is unable to include them in requests. This includes the following attributes:

Name; and
x-ID

Appendix A. Acknowledgments

The following individuals have participated in the creation of this specification and are gratefully acknowledged:

Participants:

Hal Aldridge, Sypris Electronics

Mike Allen, Symantec

Gordon Arnold, IBM

Todd Arnold, IBM

Richard Austin, Hewlett-Packard

Lars Bagnert, PrimeKey

Elaine Barker, NIST

Peter Bartok, Venafi, Inc.

Tom Benjamin, IBM

Anthony Berglas, Cryptsoft

Mathias Björkqvist, IBM

Kevin Bocket, Venafi

Anne Bolgert, IBM

Alan Brown, Thales e-Security

Tim Bruce, CA Technologies

Chris Burchett, Credant Technologies, Inc.

Kelley Burgin, National Security Agency

Robert Burns, Thales e-Security

Chuck Castleton, Venafi

Kenli Chong, QuintessenceLabs

John Clark, Hewlett-Packard

Tom Clifford, Symantec Corp.

Doron Cohen, SafeNet, Inc

Tony Cox, Cryptsoft

Russell Dietz, SafeNet, Inc

Graydon Dodson, Lexmark International Inc.

Vinod Duggirala, EMC Corporation

Chris Dunn, SafeNet, Inc.

Michael Duren, Sypris Electronics

James Dzierzanowski, American Express CCoE

Faisal Faruqui, Thales e-Security

Stan Feather, Hewlett-Packard

David Finkelstein, Symantec Corp.

James Fitzgerald, SafeNet, Inc.

Indra Fitzgerald, Hewlett-Packard

Judith Furlong, EMC Corporation

Susan Gleeson, Oracle

Robert Griffin, EMC Corporation

Paul Grojean, Individual

Robert Haas, IBM

Thomas Hardjono, M.I.T.

ChengDong He, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.

Steve He, Vormetric

Kurt Heberlein, Hewlett-Packard

Larry Hofer, Emulex Corporation

Maryann Hondo, IBM

Walt Hubis, NetApp

Tim Hudson, Cryptsoft

Jonas Iggbom, Venafi, Inc.

Sitaram Inguva, American Express CCoE

Jay Jacobs, Target Corporation

Glen Jaquette, IBM

Mahadev Karadiguddi, NetApp

Greg Kazmierczak, Wave Systems Corp.

Marc Kenig, SafeNet, Inc.

Mark Knight, Thales e-Security

Kathy Kriese, Symantec Corporation

Mark Lambiase, SecureAuth

John Leiseboer, Quintenssence Labs

Hal Lockhart, Oracle Corporation

Robert Lockhart, Thales e-Security

Anne Luk, Cryptsoft

Sairam Manidi, Freescale

Luther Martin, Voltage Security

Neil McEvoy, iFOSSF

Marina Milshtein, Individual

Dale Moberg, Axway Software

Jishnu Mukeri, Hewlett-Packard

Bryan Olson, Hewlett-Packard

John Peck, IBM

Rob Philpott, EMC Corporation

Denis Pochuev, SafeNet, Inc.

Reid Poole, Venafi, Inc.

Ajai Puri, SafeNet, Inc.

Saravanan Ramalingam, Thales e-Security

Peter Reed, SafeNet, Inc.

Bruce Rich, IBM

Christina Richards, American Express CCoE

Warren Robbins, Dell

Peter Robinson, EMC Corporation

Scott Rotondo, Oracle

Saikat Saha, SafeNet, Inc.

Anil Saldhana, Red Hat

Subhash Sankuratripati, NetApp

Boris Schumperli, Cryptomathic

Greg Singh, QuintessenceLabs

David Smith, Venafi, Inc

Brian Spector, Certivox

Terence Spies, Voltage Security

Deborah Steckroth, RouteOne LLC

Michael Stevens, QuintessenceLabs

Marcus Streets, Thales e-Security

Satish Sundar, IBM

Kiran Thota, VMware

Somanchi Trinath, Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.

Nathan Turajski, Thales e-Security

Sean Turner, IECA, Inc.

Paul Turner, Venafi, Inc.

Rod Wideman, Quantum Corporation

Steven Wierenga, Hewlett-Packard

Jin Wong, QuintessenceLabs

Sameer Yami, Thales e-Security

Peter Yee, EMC Corporation

Krishna Yellepeddy, IBM

Catherine Ying, SafeNet, Inc.

Tatu Ylonen, SSH Communications Security (Tectia Corp)

Michael Yoder, Vormetric. Inc.

Magda Zdunkiewicz, Cryptsoft

Peter Zelechoski, Election Systems & Software

Appendix B. KMIP Specification Cross Reference

Reference Term	KMIP 1.0	KMIP 1.1	KMIP 1.2
1 Introduction
Non-Normative References	1.3.	1.3.	1.3.
Normative References	1.2.	1.2.	1.2.
Terminology	1.1.	1.1.	1.1.

2 Objects
Attribute	2.1.1.	2.1.1.	2.1.1.
Base Objects	2.1.	2.1.	2.1.
Certificate	2.2.1.	2.2.1.	2.2.1.
Credential	2.1.2.	2.1.2.	2.1.2.
Data	-	-	2.1.10.
Data Length	-	-	2.1.11.
Extension Information	-	2.1.9.	2.1.9.
Key Block	2.1.3.	2.1.3.	2.1.3.
Key Value	2.1.4.	2.1.4.	2.1.4.
Key Wrapping Data	2.1.5.	2.1.5.	2.1.5.
Key Wrapping Specification	2.1.6.	2.1.6.	2.1.6.
MAC Data	-	-	2.1.13.
Managed Objects	2.2.	2.2.	2.2.
Nonce	-	-	2.1.14.
Opaque Object	2.2.8.	2.2.8.	2.2.8.
PGP Key	-	-	2.2.9.
Private Key	2.2.4.	2.2.4.	2.2.4.
Public Key	2.2.3.	2.2.3.	2.2.3.
Secret Data	2.2.7.	2.2.7.	2.2.7.
Signature Data	-	-	2.1.12.
Split Key	2.2.5.	2.2.5.	2.2.5.
Symmetric Key	2.2.2.	2.2.2.	2.2.2.
Template	2.2.6.	2.2.6.	2.2.6.
Template-Attribute Structures	2.1.8.	2.1.8.	2.1.8.
Transparent DH Private Key	2.1.7.6.	2.1.7.6.	2.1.7.6.
Transparent DH Public Key	2.1.7.7.	2.1.7.7.	2.1.7.7.
Transparent DSA Private Key	2.1.7.2.	2.1.7.2.	2.1.7.2.
Transparent DSA Public Key	2.1.7.3.	2.1.7.3.	2.1.7.3.
Transparent ECDH Private Key	2.1.7.10.	2.1.7.10.	2.1.7.10.
Transparent ECDH Public Key	2.1.7.11.	2.1.7.11.	2.1.7.11.
Transparent ECDSA Private Key	2.1.7.8.	2.1.7.8.	2.1.7.8.
Transparent ECDSA Public Key	2.1.7.9.	2.1.7.9.	2.1.7.9.
Transparent ECMQV Private Key	2.1.7.12.	2.1.7.12.	2.1.7.12.
Transparent ECMQV Public Key	2.1.7.13.	2.1.7.13.	2.1.7.13.
Transparent Key Structures	2.1.7.	2.1.7.	2.1.7.
Transparent RSA Private Key	2.1.7.4.	2.1.7.4.	2.1.7.4.
Transparent RSA Public Key	2.1.7.5.	2.1.7.5.	2.1.7.5.
Transparent Symmetric Key	2.1.7.1.	2.1.7.1.	2.1.7.1.

3 Attributes
Activation Date	3.19.	3.24.	3.24.
Alternative Name	-	-	3.40.
Application Specific Information	3.30.	3.36.	3.36.
Archive Date	3.27.	3.32.	3.32.
Attributes	3	3	3
Certificate Identifier	3.9.	3.13.	3.13.
Certificate Issuer	3.11.	3.15.	3.15.
Certificate Length	-	3.9.	3.9.
Certificate Subject	3.10.	3.14.	3.14.
Certificate Type	3.8.	3.8.	3.8.
Compromise Date	3.25.	3.30.	3.30.
Compromise Occurrence Date	3.24.	3.29.	3.29.
Contact Information	3.31.	3.37.	3.37.
Cryptographic Algorithm	3.4.	3.4.	3.4.
Cryptographic Domain Parameters	3.7.	3.7.	3.7.
Cryptographic Length	3.5.	3.5.	3.5.
Cryptographic Parameters	3.6.	3.6.	3.6.
Custom Attribute	3.33.	3.39.	3.39.
Deactivation Date	3.22.	3.27.	3.27.
Default Operation Policy	3.13.2.	3.18.2.	3.18.2.
Default Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects	3.13.2.2.	3.18.2.2.	3.18.2.2.
Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects	3.13.2.1.	3.18.2.1.	3.18.2.1.
Default Operation Policy for Template Objects	3.13.2.3.	3.18.2.3.	3.18.2.3.
Destroy Date	3.23.	3.28.	3.28.
Digest	3.12.	3.17.	3.17.
Digital Signature Algorithm	-	3.16.	3.16.
Fresh	-	3.34.	3.34.
Initial Date	3.18.	3.23.	3.23.
Key Value Location	-	-	3.42.
Key Value Present	-	-	3.41.
Last Change Date	3.32.	3.38.	3.38.
Lease Time	3.15.	3.20.	3.20.
Link	3.29.	3.35.	3.35.
Name	3.2.	3.2.	3.2.
Object Group	3.28.	3.33.	3.33.
Object Type	3.3.	3.3.	3.3.
Operation Policy Name	3.13.	3.18.	3.18.
Operations outside of operation policy control	3.13.1.	3.18.1.	3.18.1.
Original Creation Date	-	-	3.43.
Process Start Date	3.20.	3.25.	3.25.
Protect Stop Date	3.21.	3.26.	3.26.
Revocation Reason	3.26.	3.31.	3.31.
State	3.17.	3.22.	3.22.
Unique Identifier	3.1.	3.1.	3.1.
Usage Limits	3.16.	3.21.	3.21.
X.509 Certificate Identifier	-	3.10.	3.10.
X.509 Certificate Issuer	-	3.12.	3.12.
X.509 Certificate Subject	-	3.11.	3.11.

4 Client-to-Server Operations
Activate	4.18.	4.19.	4.19.
Add Attribute	4.13.	4.14.	4.14.
Archive	4.21.	4.22.	4.22.
Cancel	4.25.	4.27.	4.27.
Certify	4.6.	4.7.	4.7.
Check	4.9.	4.10.	4.10.
Create	4.1.	4.1.	4.1.
Create Key Pair	4.2.	4.2.	4.2.
Create Split Key	-	-	4.38.
Decrypt	-	-	4.30.
Delete Attribute	4.15.	4.16.	4.16.
Derive Key	4.5.	4.6.	4.6.
Destroy	4.20.	4.21.	4.21.
Discover Versions	-	4.26.	4.26.
Encrypt	-	-	4.29.
Get	4.10.	4.11.	4.11.
Get Attribute List	4.12.	4.13.	4.13.
Get Attributes	4.11.	4.12.	4.12.
Get Usage Allocation	4.17.	4.18.	4.18.
Hash	-	-	4.37.
Join Split Key	-	-	4.39.
Locate	4.8.	4.9.	4.9.
MAC	-	-	4.33.
MAC Verify	-	-	4.34.
Modify Attribute	4.14.	4.15.	4.15.
Obtain Lease	4.16.	4.17.	4.17.
Poll	4.26.	4.28.	4.28.
Query	4.24.	4.25.	4.25.
Re-certify	4.7.	4.8.	4.8.
Recover	4.22.	4.23.	4.23.
Register	4.3.	4.3.	4.3.
Re-key	4.4.	4.4.	4.4.
Re-key Key Pair	-	4.5.	4.5.
Revoke	4.19.	4.20.	4.20.
RNG Retrieve	-	-	4.35.
RNG Seed	-	-	4.36.
Sign	-	-	4.31.
Signature Verify	-	-	4.32.
Validate	4.23.	4.24.	4.24.

5 Server-to-Client Operations
Notify	5.1.	5.1.	5.1.
Put	5.2.	5.2.	5.2.

6 Message Contents
Asynchronous Correlation Value	6.8.	6.8.	6.8.
Asynchronous Indicator	6.7.	6.7.	6.7.
Attestation Capable Indicator	-	-	6.17.
Batch Count	6.14.	6.14.	6.14.
Batch Error Continuation Option	6.13.	6.13.	6.13.
Batch Item	6.15.	6.15.	6.15.
Batch Order Option	6.12.	6.12.	6.12.
Maximum Response Size	6.3.	6.3.	6.3.
Message Extension	6.16.	6.16.	6.16.
Operation	6.2.	6.2.	6.2.
Protocol Version	6.1.	6.1.	6.1.
Result Message	6.11.	6.11.	6.11.
Result Reason	6.10.	6.10.	6.10.
Result Status	6.9.	6.9.	6.9.
Time Stamp	6.5.	6.5.	6.5.
Unique Batch Item ID	6.4.	6.4.	6.4.

7 Message Format
Message Structure	7.1.	7.1.	7.1.
Operations	7.2.	7.2.	7.2.

8 Authentication
Authentication	8	8	8

9 Message Encoding
Alternative Name Type Enumeration	-	-	9.1.3.2.34.
Attestation Type Enumeration	-	-	9.1.3.2.36.
Batch Error Continuation Option Enumeration	9.1.3.2.29.	9.1.3.2.30.	9.1.3.2.30.
Bit Masks	9.1.3.3.	9.1.3.3.	9.1.3.3.
Block Cipher Mode Enumeration	9.1.3.2.13.	9.1.3.2.14.	9.1.3.2.14.
Cancellation Result Enumeration	9.1.3.2.24.	9.1.3.2.25.	9.1.3.2.25.
Certificate Request Type Enumeration	9.1.3.2.21.	9.1.3.2.22.	9.1.3.2.22.
Certificate Type Enumeration	9.1.3.2.6.	9.1.3.2.6.	9.1.3.2.6.
Credential Type Enumeration	9.1.3.2.1.	9.1.3.2.1.	9.1.3.2.1.
Cryptographic Algorithm Enumeration	9.1.3.2.12.	9.1.3.2.13.	9.1.3.2.13.
Cryptographic Usage Mask	9.1.3.3.1.	9.1.3.3.1.	9.1.3.3.1.
Defined Values	9.1.3.	9.1.3.	9.1.3.
Derivation Method Enumeration	9.1.3.2.20.	9.1.3.2.21.	9.1.3.2.21.
Digital Signature Algorithm Enumeration	-	9.1.3.2.7.	9.1.3.2.7.
Encoding Option Enumeration	-	9.1.3.2.32.	9.1.3.2.32.
Enumerations	9.1.3.2.	9.1.3.2.	9.1.3.2.
Examples	9.1.2.	9.1.2.	9.1.2.
Hashing Algorithm Enumeration	9.1.3.2.15.	9.1.3.2.16.	9.1.3.2.16.
Item Length	9.1.1.3.	9.1.1.3.	9.1.1.3.
Item Tag	9.1.1.1.	9.1.1.1.	9.1.1.1.
Item Type	9.1.1.2.	9.1.1.2.	9.1.1.2.
Item Value	9.1.1.4.	9.1.1.4.	9.1.1.4.
Key Compression Type Enumeration	9.1.3.2.2.	9.1.3.2.2.	9.1.3.2.2.
Key Format Type Enumeration	9.1.3.2.3.	9.1.3.2.3.	9.1.3.2.3.
Key Role Type Enumeration	9.1.3.2.16.	9.1.3.2.17.	9.1.3.2.17.
Key Value Location Type Enumeration	-	-	9.1.3.2.35.
Link Type Enumeration	9.1.3.2.19.	9.1.3.2.20.	9.1.3.2.20.
Name Type Enumeration	9.1.3.2.10.	9.1.3.2.11.	9.1.3.2.11.
Object Group Member Enumeration	-	9.1.3.2.33.	9.1.3.2.33.
Object Type Enumeration	9.1.3.2.11.	9.1.3.2.12.	9.1.3.2.12.
Opaque Data Type Enumeration	9.1.3.2.9.	9.1.3.2.10.	9.1.3.2.10.
Operation Enumeration	9.1.3.2.26.	9.1.3.2.27.	9.1.3.2.27.
Padding Method Enumeration	9.1.3.2.14.	9.1.3.2.15.	9.1.3.2.15.
Put Function Enumeration	9.1.3.2.25.	9.1.3.2.26.	9.1.3.2.26.
Query Function Enumeration	9.1.3.2.23.	9.1.3.2.24.	9.1.3.2.24.
Recommended Curve Enumeration for ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV	9.1.3.2.5.	9.1.3.2.5.	9.1.3.2.5.
Result Reason Enumeration	9.1.3.2.28.	9.1.3.2.29.	9.1.3.2.29.
Result Status Enumeration	9.1.3.2.27.	9.1.3.2.28.	9.1.3.2.28.
Revocation Reason Code Enumeration	9.1.3.2.18.	9.1.3.2.19.	9.1.3.2.19.
Secret Data Type Enumeration	9.1.3.2.8.	9.1.3.2.9.	9.1.3.2.9.
Split Key Method Enumeration	9.1.3.2.7.	9.1.3.2.8.	9.1.3.2.8.
State Enumeration	9.1.3.2.17.	9.1.3.2.18.	9.1.3.2.18.
Storage Status Mask	9.1.3.3.2.	9.1.3.3.2.	9.1.3.3.2.
Tags	9.1.3.1.	9.1.3.1.	9.1.3.1.
TTLV Encoding	9.1.	9.1.	9.1.
TTLV Encoding Fields	9.1.1.	9.1.1.	9.1.1.
Usage Limits Unit Enumeration	9.1.3.2.30.	9.1.3.2.31.	9.1.3.2.31.
Validity Indicator Enumeration	9.1.3.2.22.	9.1.3.2.23.	9.1.3.2.23.
Wrapping Method Enumeration	9.1.3.2.4.	9.1.3.2.4.	9.1.3.2.4.
XML Encoding	9.2.	-	-

10 Transport
Transport	10	10	10

12 KMIP Server and Client Implementation Conformance
Conformance clauses for a KMIP Server	12.1.	-	-
KMIP Client Implementation Conformance	-	12.2.	12.2.
KMIP Server Implementation Conformance	-	12.1.	12.1.

Appendix C. Revision History

Revision	Date	Editor	Changes Made
wd01	10 July 2013	Kelley Burgin / Tim Hudson	Initial Draft
wd02	8 August 2013	Kelley Burgin	Editorial updates and inclusion of a corresponding restriction on client enumeration usage
wd03	10 August 2013	Tim Hudson	Updated Permitted Test Case Variations
wd03a	24-October-2013	Tim Hudson	Editorial update to include VendorIdentification in the list of allowed variations as per TC motion.