Web Services Security Kerberos Token Profile Version 1.1.1

Committee Specification Draft 02

18 May 2011

Specification URIs:

This version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd02/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd02.doc (Authoritative)

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd02/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd02.pdf

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd02/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd02.html

Previous version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd01.doc (Authoritative)

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd01.pdf

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd01.html

Latest version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1.doc (Authoritative)

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1.pdf

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1.html

Technical Committee:

OASIS Web Services Security Maintenance (WSS-M) TC

Chair:

David Turner, Microsoft

Editors:

Ronald Monzillo, Sun

Chris Kaler, Microsoft

Anthony Nadalin, IBM

Phillip Hallam-Baker, Verisign

Carlo Milono, Tibco

Related work:

This specification is one part of a multi-part Work Product.  The other parts include:

Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security Version 1.1.1

Web Services Security Rights Expression Language (REL) Token Profile Version 1.1.1

Web Services Security SOAP Messages with Attachments (SwA) Profile Version 1.1.1

Web Services Security Username Token Profile Version 1.1.1

Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile Version 1.1.1

Web Services Security SAML Token Profile Version 1.1.1

Schemas: http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd02/xsd/

This specification supersedes:

·         Web Services Security Kerberos Token Profile 1.1.  01 November 2006. OASIS Standard incorporating Approved Errata.

·         Web Services Security Kerberos Token Profile 1.1. 01 November 2006. OASIS Approved Errata.

Abstract:

This document describes how to use Kerberos [Kerb] tickets (specifically the AP-REQ packet) with the Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security 1.1.1.

Status:

This document was last revised or approved by the OASIS Web Services Security Maintenance (WSS-M) TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the “Latest Version” location noted above for possible later revisions of this document.

Technical Committee members should send comments on this specification to the Technical Committee’s email list. Others should send comments to the Technical Committee by using the “Send A Comment” button on the Technical Committee’s web page at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/wss-m/.

For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the Technical Committee web page (http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/wss-m/ipr.php).

This document integrates specific error corrections or editorial changes to the preceding specification, within the scope of the Web Services Security and this TC.

This document introduces a third digit in the numbering convention where the third digit represents a consolidation of error corrections, bug fixes or editorial formatting changes (e.g., 1.1.1); it does not add any new features beyond those of the base specifications (e.g., 1.1).

Citation Format:

[WSS-Kerberos-Token-Profile-V1.1.1]

Web Services Security Kerberos Token Profile Version 1.1.1. 18 May 2011. OASIS Committee Specification Draft 02. http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd02/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd02.doc.

Notices

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Table of Contents

1        Introduction. 5

2        Notations and Terminology. 6

2.1 Notational Conventions. 6

2.2 Namespaces. 6

2.3 Terminology. 7

3        Usage. 8

3.1 Processing Model 8

3.2 Attaching Security Tokens. 8

3.3 Identifying and Referencing Kerberos Tokens. 9

3.4 Authentication. 11

3.5 Encryption. 11

3.6 Principal Name. 11

3.7 Error Codes. 11

4        Threat Model and Countermeasures. 12

5        References. 13

6        Conformance. 14

A.      Acknowledgements. 15

B.      Revision History. 18

 

 


1      Introduction

This specification describes the use of Kerberos [RFC1510] tokens with respect to the WSS: SOAP Message Security specification [WSS].

Specifically, this document defines how to encode Kerberos tickets and attach them to SOAP messages.  As well, it specifies how to add signatures and encryption to the SOAP message, in accordance with WSS: SOAP Message Security, which uses and references the Kerberos tokens.

For interoperability concerns, and for some security concerns, the specification is limited to using the AP-REQ packet (service ticket and authenticator) defined by Kerberos as the Kerberos token.  This allows a service to authenticate the ticket and interoperate with existing Kerberos implementations.

It should be noted that how the AP-REQ is obtained is out of scope of this specification as are scenarios involving other ticket types and user-to-user interactions. 

Note that Sections 2.1, 2.2, all of 3, and indicated parts of 6 are normative.  All other sections are non-normative.

2      Notations and Terminology

This section specifies the notations, namespaces, and terminology used in this specification.

2.1 Notational Conventions

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [2119].

 

Namespace URIs (of the general form "some-URI") represent some application-dependent or context-dependent URI as defined in RFC2396 [URI].

 

This specification is designed to work with the general SOAP [S11, S12] message structure and message processing model, and should be applicable to any version of SOAP. The current SOAP 1.2 namespace URI is used herein to provide detailed examples, but there is no intention to limit the applicability of this specification to a single version of SOAP.

2.2 Namespaces

The XML namespace [XML-ns] URIs that MUST be used by implementations of this specification are as follows (note that different elements in this specification are from different namespaces):

 

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.1.xsd

Note that this specification does not introduce new schema elements.

The following namespaces are used in this document:

Prefix

Namespace

S11

http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/

S12

http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope

wsse

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd

wsse11

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.1.xsd

wsu

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd

ds

http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#

xenc

http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#

 

The URLs provided for the wsse and wsu namespaces can be used to obtain the schema files. URI fragments defined in this specification are relative to the following base URI unless otherwise specified:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1

2.3  Terminology

Readers are presumed to be familiar with the terms in the Internet Security Glossary [ISG].

 

This specification employs the terminology defined in the WSS: SOAP Message Security Core Specification [WSS].

 

The following (non-normative) table defines additional acronyms and abbreviations for this document.

Term

Definition

SHA

Secure Hash Algorithm

SOAP

Simple Object Access Protocol

URI

Uniform Resource Identifier

XML

Extensible Markup Language

 

3      Usage

This section describes the profile (specific mechanisms and procedures) for the Kerberos binding of WSS: SOAP Message Security.

Identification: http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1

3.1 Processing Model

The processing model for WSS: SOAP Message Security with Kerberos tokens is no different from that of WSS: SOAP Message Security with other token formats as described in WSS: SOAP Message Security

3.2 Attaching Security Tokens

Kerberos tokens are attached to SOAP messages using WSS: SOAP Message Security by using the <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> described in WSS: SOAP Message Security.  When using this element, the @ValueType attribute MUST be specified.  This specification defines six values for this attribute as defined in the table below:

URI

Description

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#Kerberosv5_AP_REQ

Kerberos v5 AP-REQ as defined in the  Kerberos specification [Kerb]. This ValueType is used when the ticket is an AP Request.

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#GSS_Kerberosv5_AP_REQ

A GSS-API Kerberos V5 mechanism token containing an KRB_AP_REQ message as defined in RFC-1964 [1964], Sec. 1.1 and its successor RFC-4121 [4121], Sec. 4.1. This ValueType is used when the ticket is an AP Request (ST + Authenticator).

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#Kerberosv5_AP_REQ1510

Kerberos v5 AP-REQ as defined in RFC1510. This ValueType is
used when the ticket is an AP Request per RFC1510.

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#GSS_Kerberosv5_AP_REQ1510

A GSS-API Kerberos V5 mechanism token containing an KRB_AP_REQ message as defined in RFC-1964, Sec. 1.1 and its successor RFC-4121, Sec. 4.1. This ValueType is used when the ticket is an AP Request
(ST + Authenticator) per RFC1510.

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#Kerberosv5_AP_REQ4120

Kerberos v5 AP-REQ as defined in RFC4120. This ValueType is
used when the ticket is an AP Request per RFC4120

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#GSS_Kerberosv5_AP_REQ4120

A GSS-API Kerberos V5 mechanism token containing an KRB_AP_REQ message as defined in RFC-1964, Sec. 1.1 and its successor RFC-4121, Sec. 4.1. This ValueType is used when the ticket is an AP Request
(ST + Authenticator) per RFC4120.

It should be noted that the URIs in the table above also serve as the official URIs identifying the Kerberos tokens defined in this specification.

 

All token types defined in this section use the type 0x8003 defined in RFC1964 for the checksum field of the authenticator inside the AP_REQ.

 

The octet sequence of either the GSS-API framed KRB_AP_REQ token or an unwrapped AP_REQ is encoded using the indicated encoding (e.g. base 64) and the result is placed inside of the <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element.

The following example illustrates a SOAP message with a Kerberos token.

<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="..." xmlns:wsu="...">

    <S11:Header>

        <wsse:Security xmlns:wsse="...">

            <wsse:BinarySecurityToken EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary" ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#Kerberosv5_AP_REQ" wsu:Id="MyToken">boIBxDCCAcCgAwIBBaEDAgEOogcD...

            </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>

            ...

        </wsse:Security>

    </S11:Header>

    <S11:Body>

        ...

    </S11:Body>

</S11:Envelope>

 

3.3 Identifying and Referencing Kerberos Tokens

A Kerberos Token is referenced by means of the <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element.  This mechanism, defined in WSS: SOAP Message Security, provides different referencing mechanisms.  The following list identifies the supported and unsupported mechanisms:

The wsu:Id MAY be specified on the <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element allowing the token to be directly referenced.

A <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element MAY be used which specifies the identifier for the Kerberos ticket.  This value is computed as the SHA1 of the pre-encoded octets that were used to form the contents of the <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element.  The <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element contains the encoded form the of the KeyIdentifier which is defined as  the base64 encoding of the SHA1 result.

Key Name references MUST NOT be used.

When a Kerberos Token is referenced using <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> the @wsse11:TokenType attribute SHOULD be specified. If the @wsse11:TokenType is specified its value MUST be the URI that identifies the Kerberos token type as defined for a corresponding BinarySecurityToken/@ValueType attribute.  The Reference/@ValueType attribute is not required. If specified, its value MUST be equivalent to that of the @wsse11:TokenType attribute..

The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element from which the reference is made contains the <wsse:KeyIdentifier>  element. The <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element MUST have a ValueType attribute on the <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element with the value #Kerberosv5APREQSHA1 and its contents MUST be the SHA1 of GSS-API framed KRB_AP_REQ token or unwrapped AP-REQ, as appropriate, encoded as per the <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element’s EncodingType attribute.

 

Reference Identifier

ValueType URI

Description

Kerberos v5 AP-REQ

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#Kerberosv5APREQSHA1

SHA1 of the v5 AP-REQ octets, either GSS-API framed KRB_AP_REQ token or just the Kerberos AP-REQ.

 

The following example illustrates using ID references to a Kerberos token:

 

<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="..." xmlns:wsse="..." xmlns:wsu="...">

    <S11:Header>

        <wsse:Security>

            <wsse:BinarySecurityToken EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary" ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#Kerberosv5_AP_REQ" wsu:Id="MyToken">

                  boIBxDCCAcCgAwIBBaEDAgEOogcD...

            </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>

            ...

               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference TokenType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#Kerberosv5_AP_REQ">

                   <wsse:Reference URI="#MyToken" ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#Kerberosv5_AP_REQ">

                   </wsse:Reference>

               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

            ...

        </wsse:Security>

    </S11:Header>

    <S11:Body>

        ...

    </S11:Body>

</S11:Envelope>

 

 

The AP-REQ packet is included in the initial message to the service, but need not be attached to subsequent messages exchanged between the involved parties.  Consequently, the KeyIdentifier reference mechanism SHOULD be used on subsequent exchanges as illustrated in the example below:

 

<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="..." xmlns:wsse="..." xmlns:wsu="...">

    <S11:Header>

        <wsse:Security>

            ...

               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference wsse11:TokenType=http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#Kerberosv5_AP_REQ>

                 <wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-kerberos-token-profile-1.1#Kerberosv5APREQSHA1">

                    GbsDt+WmD9XlnUUWbY/nhBveW8I=

                 </wsse:KeyIdentifier>

               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

            ...

        </wsse:Security>

    </S11:Header>

    <S11:Body>

        ...

    </S11:Body>

</S11:Envelope>

 

3.4 Authentication

When a Kerberos ticket is referenced as a signature key, the signature algorithm [DSIG] MUST be a hashed message authentication code.

 

When a Kerberos ticket is referenced as an encryption key, the encryption algorithm MUST be a symmetric encryption algorithm.

 

The value of the signature or encryption key is constructed from the value of the Kerberos sub-key when it is present in the authenticator or a session key from the ticket if the sub-key is absent, either by using the Kerberos sub-key or session key directly or using a key derived from that key using a mechanism agreed to by the communicating parties.

3.5 Encryption

When a Kerberos ticket is referenced as an encryption key, the encryption algorithm MUST be a symmetric encryption algorithm.

 

The value of the signature or encryption key is constructed from the value of the Kerberos sub-key when it is present in the authenticator or a session key from the ticket if the sub-key is absent, either by using the Kerberos sub-key or session key directly or using a key derived from that key using a mechanism agreed to by the communicating parties..

3.6 Principal Name

Kerberos principal name definition and mapping of non-Kerberos names to Kerberos V principal names are out of scope of this document.

3.7 Error Codes

When using Kerberos tokens, it is RECOMMENDED to use the error codes defined in the WSS: SOAP Message Security specification.  However, implementations MAY use custom errors, defined in private namespaces if they desire.  Care should be taken not to introduce security vulnerabilities in the errors returned.

4      Threat Model and Countermeasures

The use of Kerberos assertion tokens with WSS: SOAP Message Security introduces no new message-level threats beyond those identified for Kerberos itself or by WSS: SOAP Message Security with other types of security tokens.

 

One potential threat is that of key re-use.  The mechanisms described in WSS: SOAP Message Security can be used to prevent replay of the message; however, it is possible that for some service scopes, there are host security concerns of key hijacking within a Kerberos infrastructure.  The use of the AP-REQ and its associated authenticator and sequencer mitigate this threat.

 

Message alteration and eavesdropping can be addressed by using the integrity and confidentiality mechanisms described in WSS: SOAP Message Security.  Replay attacks can be addressed by using message timestamps and caching, as well as other application-specific tracking mechanisms.  For Kerberos tokens ownership is verified by use of keys, so man-in-the-middle attacks are generally mitigated.

 

It is strongly recommended that GSS wrapped AP-REQ be used or that unwrapped AP-REQ be combined with timestamp be used to prevent replay attack.

 

It is strongly recommended that all relevant and immutable message data be signed to prevent replay attacks.

 

It should be noted that transport-level security MAY be used to protect the message and the security token in cases where neither a GSS-API framed KRB_AP_REQ token or an unwrapped AP-REQ combined with timestamp and signature are being used.

The last numbered section in the specification must be the Conformance section. Conformance Statements/Clauses go here.

5      References

The following are normative references

[2119]                     S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels," RFC 2119, Harvard University, March 1997

[Kerb]                     J. Kohl and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)," RFC 1510, September 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1510.txt .

[KEYWORDS]         S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels," RFC 2119, Harvard University, March 1997

[S11]                      W3C Note, "SOAP: Simple Object Access Protocol 1.1," 08 May 2000.

[S12]                      W3C Recommendation, "SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1: Messaging Framework", 23 June 2003.

[URI]                       T. Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax," RFC 3986, MIT/LCS, Day Software, Adobe Systems, January 2005.

[WSS]                     A. Nadalin et al., Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security 1.1.1 http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-SOAPMessageSecurity-v1.1.1-csd01.pdf.

[1964]                     J. Linn , The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism, RFC 1964, June 1996.

[4121]                     L, Zhu, K. Jaganathan, S. Hartman, The Kerberos Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2, RFC 4121, July 2005.

The following are non-normative references

[ISG]                      Informational RFC 2828, "Internet Security Glossary," May 2000.

[XML-ns]                W3C Recommendation, "Namespaces in XML," 14 January 1999.

[DSIG]                    D. Eastlake, J. R., D. Solo, M. Bartel, J. Boyer , B. Fox , E. Simon. XML-Signature Syntax and Processing, W3C Recommendation, 12 February 2002. http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/.

6      Conformance

An implementation conforms to this specification if it meets the requirements in Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 3.

 

A.  Acknowledgements

The following individuals have participated in the creation of this specification and are gratefully acknowledged:

Participants:

Current Contributors:

Tom

Rutt

Fujitsu Limited

Jacques

Durand

Fujitsu Limited

Calvin

Powers

IBM

Kelvin

Lawrence

IBM

Michael

McIntosh

Individual

Thomas

Hardjono

M.I.T.

David

Turner

Microsoft Corporation

Anthony

Nadalin

Microsoft Corporation

Monica

Martin

Microsoft Corporation

Marc

Goodner

Microsoft Corporation

Peter

Davis

Neustar

Hal

Lockhart

Oracle Corporation

Rich

Levinson

Oracle Corporation

Anil

Saldhana

Red Hat

Martin

Raepple

SAP AG

Federico

Rossini

Telecom Italia S.p.a.

Carlo

Milono

TIBCO Software Inc.

Don

Adams

TIBCO Software Inc.

Jerry

Smith

US Department of Defense (DoD)

 

Previous Contributors:

Michael

Hu

Actional

Maneesh

Sahu

Actional

Duane

Nickull

Adobe Systems

Gene

Thurston

AmberPoint

Frank

Siebenlist

Argonne National Laboratory

Hal

Lockhart

BEA Systems

Denis

Pilipchuk

BEA Systems

Corinna

Witt

BEA Systems

Steve

Anderson

BMC Software

Rich

Levinson

Computer Associates

Thomas

DeMartini

ContentGuard

Merlin

Hughes

Cybertrust

Dale

Moberg

Cyclone Commerce

Rich

Salz

Datapower

Sam

Wei

EMC

Dana S.

Kaufman

Forum Systems

Toshihiro

Nishimura

Fujitsu

Kefeng

Chen

GeoTrust

Irving

Reid

Hewlett-Packard

Kojiro

Nakayama

Hitachi

Paula

Austel

IBM

Derek

Fu

IBM

Maryann

Hondo

IBM

Kelvin

Lawrence

IBM

Michael

McIntosh

IBM

Anthony

Nadalin

IBM

Nataraj

Nagaratnam

IBM

Bruce

Rich

IBM

Ron

Williams

IBM

Don

Flinn

Individual

Kate

Cherry

Lockheed Martin

Paul

Cotton

Microsoft

Vijay

Gajjala

Microsoft

Martin

Gudgin

Microsoft

Chris

Kaler

Microsoft

Frederick

Hirsch

Nokia

Abbie

Barbir

Nortel

Prateek

Mishra

Oracle

Vamsi

Motukuru

Oracle

Ramana

Turlapi

Oracle

Ben

Hammond

RSA Security

Rob

Philpott

RSA Security

Blake

Dournaee

Sarvega

Sundeep

Peechu

Sarvega

Coumara

Radja

Sarvega

Pete

Wenzel

SeeBeyond

Manveen

Kaur

Sun Microsystems

Ronald

Monzillo

Sun Microsystems

Jan

Alexander

Systinet

Symon

Chang

TIBCO Software

John

Weiland

US Navy

Hans

Granqvist

VeriSign

Phillip

Hallam-Baker

VeriSign

Hemma

Prafullchandra

VeriSign

 

Peter

Dapkus

BEA

Guillermo

Lao

ContentGuard

TJ

Pannu

ContentGuard

Xin

Wang

ContentGuard

Shawn

Sharp

Cyclone Commerce

Ganesh

Vaideeswaran

Documentum

Tim

Moses

Entrust

Carolina

Canales-Valenzuela

Ericsson

Tom

Rutt

Fujitsu

Yutaka

Kudo

Hitachi

Jason

Rouault

HP

Bob

Blakley

IBM

Joel

Farrell

IBM

Satoshi

Hada

IBM

Hiroshi

Maruyama

IBM

David

Melgar

IBM

Kent

Tamura

IBM

Wayne

Vicknair

IBM

Phil

Griffin

Individual

Mark

Hayes

Individual

John

Hughes

Individual

Peter

Rostin

Individual

Davanum

Srinivas

Individual

Bob

Morgan

Individual/Internet2

Bob

Atkinson

Microsoft

Keith

Ballinger

Microsoft

Allen

Brown

Microsoft

Giovanni

Della-Libera

Microsoft

Alan

Geller

Microsoft

Johannes

Klein

Microsoft

 

B.  Revision History

 

Revision

Date

Editor

Changes Made

WD01

17-January-2011

Carlo Milono

Corrected/added hyperlinks where missing; added Status section

WD02

8-February-2011

Carlo Milono

Added Related Work to reflect v1.1.1 of the specs; changed References for SOAP Message Security to reflect v1.1.1; Changed WD# to 2; Added Date; Changed the Acknowledgements from Participants to reflect them as Current Contributors and Previous Contributors

WD03

16-March-2011

David Turner

Corrected and updated links

CSD01

2-May-2011

TC Admin

Generated from WD03

CSD02-draft

16-May-11

David Turner

Added conformance statement and corrected a few formatting issues.