



PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Historical Mechanisms Specification Version 3.0

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- *PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Profiles Version 3.0*. Edited by Tim Hudson. Latest stage. <https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-profiles/v3.0/pkcs11-profiles-v3.0.html>.
- *PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Base Specification Version 3.0*. Edited by Chris Zimman and Dieter Bong. Latest stage. <https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-base/v3.0/pkcs11-base-v3.0.html>.
- *PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Current Mechanisms Specification Version 3.0*. Edited by Chris Zimman and Dieter Bong. Latest stage. <https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-curr/v3.0/pkcs11-curr-v3.0.html>.

Abstract:

This document defines mechanisms for PKCS #11 that are no longer in general use.

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Table of Contents

1	Introduction.....	8
1.1	IPR Policy	8
1.2	Description of this Document.....	8
1.3	Terminology	8
1.4	Definitions	8
1.5	Normative References	9
1.6	Non-Normative References	9
2	Mechanisms	12
2.1	PKCS #11 Mechanisms.....	12
2.2	FORTEZZA timestamp	14
2.3	KEA.....	15
2.3.1	Definitions.....	15
2.3.2	KEA mechanism parameters.....	15
2.3.2.1	CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS; CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR.....	15
2.3.3	KEA public key objects.....	16
2.3.4	KEA private key objects	16
2.3.5	KEA key pair generation.....	17
2.3.6	KEA key derivation	18
2.4	RC2.....	19
2.4.1	Definitions.....	19
2.4.2	RC2 secret key objects	19
2.4.3	RC2 mechanism parameters.....	20
2.4.3.1	CK_RC2_PARAMS; CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR	20
2.4.3.2	CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS; CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR	20
2.4.3.3	CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR	20
2.4.4	RC2 key generation.....	21
2.4.5	RC2-ECB.....	21
2.4.6	RC2-CBC.....	22
2.4.7	RC2-CBC with PKCS padding	22
2.4.8	General-length RC2-MAC	23
2.4.9	RC2-MAC	23
2.5	RC4.....	24
2.5.1	Definitions.....	24
2.5.2	RC4 secret key objects	24
2.5.3	RC4 key generation.....	24
2.5.4	RC4 mechanism.....	25
2.6	RC5.....	25
2.6.1	Definitions.....	25
2.6.2	RC5 secret key objects	25
2.6.3	RC5 mechanism parameters.....	26
2.6.3.1	CK_RC5_PARAMS; CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR	26
2.6.3.2	CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS; CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR	26
2.6.3.3	CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR	26
2.6.4	RC5 key generation.....	27

2.6.5 RC5-ECB.....	27
2.6.6 RC5-CBC.....	28
2.6.7 RC5-CBC with PKCS padding	28
2.6.8 General-length RC5-MAC	29
2.6.9 RC5-MAC	29
2.7 General block cipher	30
2.7.1 Definitions.....	30
2.7.2 DES secret key objects	31
2.7.3 CAST secret key objects	31
2.7.4 CAST3 secret key objects	32
2.7.5 CAST128 secret key objects	32
2.7.6 IDEA secret key objects	33
2.7.7 CDMF secret key objects	33
2.7.8 General block cipher mechanism parameters.....	34
2.7.8.1 CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR.....	34
2.7.9 General block cipher key generation.....	34
2.7.10 General block cipher ECB.....	35
2.7.11 General block cipher CBC.....	35
2.7.12 General block cipher CBC with PCKS padding.....	36
2.7.13 General-length general block cipher MAC	36
2.7.14 General block cipher MAC	37
2.8 SKIPJACK.....	37
2.8.1 Definitions.....	37
2.8.2 SKIPJACK secret key objects	38
2.8.3 SKIPJACK Mechanism parameters	39
2.8.3.1 CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS; CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR.....	39
2.8.3.2 CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS; CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR.....	39
2.8.4 SKIPJACK key generation	40
2.8.5 SKIPJACK-ECB64	41
2.8.6 SKIPJACK-CBC64	41
2.8.7 SKIPJACK-OFB64	41
2.8.8 SKIPJACK-CFB64.....	41
2.8.9 SKIPJACK-CFB32.....	42
2.8.10 SKIPJACK-CFB16.....	42
2.8.11 SKIPJACK-CFB8.....	42
2.8.12 SKIPJACK-WRAP	43
2.8.13 SKIPJACK-PRIVATE-WRAP	43
2.8.14 SKIPJACK-RELAYX.....	43
2.9 BATON.....	43
2.9.1 Definitions.....	43
2.9.2 BATON secret key objects	43
2.9.3 BATON key generation	44
2.9.4 BATON-ECB128	44
2.9.5 BATON-ECB96.....	45
2.9.6 BATON-CBC128	45
2.9.7 BATON-COUNTER	45

2.9.8 BATON-SHUFFLE	46
2.9.9 BATON WRAP	46
2.10 JUNIPER.....	46
2.10.1 Definitions.....	46
2.10.2 JUNIPER secret key objects	46
2.10.3 JUNIPER key generation	47
2.10.4 JUNIPER-ECB128	47
2.10.5 JUNIPER-CBC128	48
2.10.6 JUNIPER-COUNTER	48
2.10.7 JUNIPER-SHUFFLE	48
2.10.8 JUNIPER WRAP	49
2.11 MD2	49
2.11.1 Definitions.....	49
2.11.2 MD2 digest	49
2.11.3 General-length MD2-HMAC	49
2.11.4 MD2-HMAC	50
2.11.5 MD2 key derivation.....	50
2.12 MD5	50
2.12.1 Definitions.....	50
2.12.2 MD5 Digest.....	51
2.12.3 General-length MD5-HMAC	51
2.12.4 MD5-HMAC	51
2.12.5 MD5 key derivation.....	51
2.13 FASTHASH.....	52
2.13.1 Definitions.....	52
2.13.2 FASTHASH digest.....	52
2.14 PKCS #5 and PKCS #5-style password-based encryption (PBD)	52
2.14.1 Definitions.....	52
2.14.2 Password-based encryption/authentication mechanism parameters.....	53
2.14.2.1 CK_PBE_PARAMS; CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR	53
2.14.3 MD2-PBE for DES-CBC	53
2.14.4 MD5-PBE for DES-CBC	53
2.14.5 MD5-PBE for CAST-CBC.....	54
2.14.6 MD5-PBE for CAST3-CBC.....	54
2.14.7 MD5-PBE for CAST128-CBC.....	54
2.14.8 SHA-1-PBE for CAST128-CBC.....	54
2.15 PKCS #12 password-based encryption/authentication mechanisms	54
2.15.1 Definitions.....	54
2.15.2 SHA-1-PBE for 128-bit RC4	55
2.15.3 SHA-1_PBE for 40-bit RC4	56
2.15.4 SHA-1_PBE for 128-bit RC2-CBC	56
2.15.5 SHA-1_PBE for 40-bit RC2-CBC	56
2.16 RIPE-MD.....	56
2.16.1 Definitions.....	56
2.16.2 RIPE-MD 128 Digest	57
2.16.3 General-length RIPE-MD 128-HMAC	57

2.16.4 RIPE-MD 128-HMAC	57
2.16.5 RIPE-MD 160	57
2.16.6 General-length RIPE-MD 160-HMAC	57
2.16.7 RIPE-MD 160-HMAC	58
2.17 SET	58
2.17.1 Definitions	58
2.17.2 SET mechanism parameters	58
2.17.2.1 CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS; CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR	58
2.17.3 OAEP key wrapping for SET	58
2.18 LYNKS	59
2.18.1 Definitions	59
2.18.2 LYNKS key wrapping	59
3 PKCS #11 Implementation Conformance	60
Appendix A. Acknowledgments	61
Appendix B. Manifest constants	63
Appendix C. Revision History	64

1 Introduction

1.1 IPR Policy

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1.2 Description of this Document

This document defines historical PKCS#11 mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that were defined for earlier versions of PKCS #11 but are no longer in general use

All text is normative unless otherwise labeled.

1.3 Terminology

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.4 Definitions

For the purposes of this standard, the following definitions apply. Please refer to [PKCS#11-Base] for further definitions

BATON	MISSI's BATON block cipher.
CAST	Entrust Technologies' proprietary symmetric block cipher
CAST3	Entrust Technologies' proprietary symmetric block cipher
CAST128	Entrust Technologies' symmetric block cipher.
CDMF	Commercial Data Masking Facility, a block encipherment method specified by International Business Machines Corporation and based on DES.
CMS	Cryptographic Message Syntax (see RFC 3369)
DES	Data Encryption Standard, as defined in FIPS PUB 46-3
ECB	Electronic Codebook mode, as defined in FIPS PUB 81.
FASTHASH	MISSI's FASTHASH message-digesting algorithm.
IDEA	Ascom Systec's symmetric block cipher.
IV	Initialization Vector.
JUNIPER	MISSI's JUNIPER block cipher.
KEA	MISSI's Key Exchange Algorithm.
LYNKS	A smart card manufactured by SPYRUS.
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MD2	RSA Security's MD2 message-digest algorithm, as defined in RFC 6149.

38	MD5	RSA Security's MD5 message-digest algorithm, as defined in RFC
39		1321.
40	PRF	Pseudo random function.
41	RSA	The RSA public-key cryptosystem.
42	RC2	RSA Security's RC2 symmetric block cipher.
43	RC4	RSA Security's proprietary RC4 symmetric stream cipher.
44	RC5	RSA Security's RC5 symmetric block cipher.
45	SET	The Secure Electronic Transaction protocol.
46	SHA-1	The (revised) Secure Hash Algorithm with a 160-bit message digest,
47		as defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.
48	SKIPJACK	MISSI's SKIPJACK block cipher.
49		

50 1.5 Normative References

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2 Mechanisms

2.1 PKCS #11 Mechanisms

A mechanism specifies precisely how a certain cryptographic process is to be performed. PKCS #11 implementations MAY use one or more mechanisms defined in this document.

The following table shows which Cryptoki mechanisms are supported by different cryptographic operations. For any particular token, of course, a particular operation MAY support only a subset of the mechanisms listed. There is also no guarantee that a token which supports one mechanism for some operation supports any other mechanism for any other operation (or even supports that same mechanism for any other operation). For example, even if a token is able to create RSA digital signatures with the **CKM_RSA_PKCS** mechanism, it may or may not be the case that the same token MAY also perform RSA encryption with **CKM_RSA_PKCS**.

Table 1, Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_FORTezza_TIMESTAMP		X ²					
CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN					X		
CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE							X
CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_RC2_ECB	X					X	
CKM_RC2_CBC	X					X	
CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD	X					X	
CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_RC2_MAC		X					
CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_RC4	X						
CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_RC5_ECB	X					X	
CKM_RC5_CBC	X					X	
CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD	X					X	
CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_RC5_MAC		X					
CKM_DES_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_DES_ECB	X					X	
CKM_DES_CBC	X					X	
CKM_DES_CBC_PAD	X					X	
CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_DES_MAC		X					
CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_CAST_ECB	X					X	
CKM_CAST_CBC	X					X	
CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD	X					X	
CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_CAST_MAC		X					

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_CAST3_ECB	X					X	
CKM_CAST3_CBC	X					X	
CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD	X					X	
CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_CAST3_MAC		X					
CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_CAST128_ECB	X					X	
CKM_CAST128_CBC	X					X	
CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD	X					X	
CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_CAST128_MAC		X					
CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_IDEA_ECB	X					X	
CKM_IDEA_CBC	X					X	
CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD	X					X	
CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_IDEA_MAC		X					
CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_CDMF_ECB	X					X	
CKM_CDMF_CBC	X					X	
CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD	X					X	
CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_CDMF_MAC		X					
CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64	X						
CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64	X						
CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64	X						
CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64	X						
CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32	X						
CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16	X						
CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8	X						
CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP						X	
CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP						X	
CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX						X ³	
CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_BATON_ECB128	X						
CKM_BATON_ECB96	X						
CKM_BATON_CBC128	X						
CKM_BATON_COUNTER	X						
CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE	X						
CKM_BATON_WRAP						X	
CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN					X		
CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128	X						
CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128	X						

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER	X						
CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE	X						
CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP						X	
CKM_MD2				X			
CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_MD2_HMAC		X					
CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION							X
CKM_MD5				X			
CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_MD5_HMAC		X					
CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION							X
CKM_RIPEMD128				X			
CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC		X					
CKM_RIPEMD160				X			
CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL		X					
CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC		X					
CKM_FASTHASH				X			
CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC					X		
CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC					X		
CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC					X		
CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC					X		
CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC					X		
CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC					X		
CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128					X		
CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40					X		
CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC					X		
CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC					X		
CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC					X		
CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP						X	
CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS						X	

¹ SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover.

² Single-part operations only.

³ Mechanism MUST only be used for wrapping, not unwrapping.

The remainder of this section presents in detail the mechanisms supported by Cryptoki and the parameters which are supplied to them.

In general, if a mechanism makes no mention of the *ulMinKeyLen* and *ulMaxKeyLen* fields of the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure, then those fields have no meaning for that particular mechanism.

2.2 FORTEZZA timestamp

The FORTEZZA timestamp mechanism, denoted **CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification. The signatures it produces and verifies are DSA digital signatures over the provided hash value and the current time.

It has no parameters.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table. The input and output data MAY begin at the same location in memory.

Table 2, FORTEZZA Timestamp: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input Length	Output Length
C_Sign ¹	DSA private key	20	40
C_Verify ¹	DSA public key	20,40 ²	N/A

¹ Single-part operations only

² Data length, signature length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

2.3 KEA

2.3.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_KEA” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN

CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE

2.3.2 KEA mechanism parameters

2.3.2.1 CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS; CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR

CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_KEA_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS {  
    CK_BBOOL isSender;  
    CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB;  
    CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;  
} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

isSender Option for generating the key (called a TEK). The value is CK_TRUE if the sender (originator) generates the TEK, CK_FALSE if the recipient is regenerating the TEK

ulRandomLen the size of random Ra and Rb in bytes

pRandomA pointer to Ra data

pRandomB pointer to Rb data

ulPublicDataLen other party's KEA public key size

241 *pPublicData* pointer to other party's KEA public key value

242 **CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

243 2.3.3 KEA public key objects

244 KEA public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY**, key type **CKK_KEA**) hold KEA public keys.
245 The following table defines the KEA public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes
246 defined for this object class:

247 *Table 3, KEA Public Key Object Attributes*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME ^{1,3}	Big integer	Prime p (512 to 1024 bits, in steps of 64 bits)
CKA_SUBPRIME ^{1,3}	Big integer	Subprime q (160 bits)
CKA_BASE ^{1,3}	Big integer	Base g (512 to 1024 bits, in steps of 64 bits)
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4}	Big integer	Public value y

248 Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

249 The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the "KEA domain
250 parameters".

251 The following is a sample template for creating a KEA public key object:

```
252 CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;  
253 CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_KEA;  
254 CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A KEA public key object";  
255 CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};  
256 CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};  
257 CK_BYTE base[] = {...};  
258 CK_BYTE value[] = {...};  
259 CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {  
260     {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},  
261     {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},  
262     {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},  
263     {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},  
264     {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},  
265     {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},  
266     {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},  
267     {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}  
268 };
```

269

270 2.3.4 KEA private key objects

271 KEA private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY**, key type **CKK_KEA**) hold KEA private keys.
272 The following table defines the KEA private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes
273 defined for this object class:

274 *Table 4, KEA Private Key Object Attributes*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Prime p (512 to 1024 bits, in steps of 64 bits)
CKA_SUBPRIME ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Subprime q (160 bits)
CKA_BASE ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Base g (512 to 1024 bits, in steps of 64 bits)

CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Big integer	Private value x
------------------------------	-------------	-----------------

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the “KEA domain parameters”.

Note that when generating a KEA private key, the KEA parameters are *not* specified in the key’s template. This is because KEA private keys are only generated as part of a KEA key *pair*, and the KEA parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the KEA public key.

The following is a sample template for creating a KEA private key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_KEA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A KEA private key object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)}, Algorithm, as defined by NISTS
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label) - 1},
    {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
    {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
    {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.3.5 KEA key pair generation

The KEA key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, generates key pairs for the Key Exchange Algorithm, as defined by NIST’s “SKIPJACK and KEA Algorithm Specification Version 2.0”, 29 May 1998.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates KEA public/private key pairs with a particular prime, subprime and base, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, and **CKA_BASE** attributes of the template for the public key. Note that this version of Cryptoki does not include a mechanism for generating these KEA domain parameters.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE** and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, **CKA_BASE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new private key. Other attributes supported by the KEA public and private key types (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the keys support) MAY also be specified in the templates for the keys, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of KEA prime sizes, in bits.

2.3.6 KEA key derivation

The KEA key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_KEA_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based on KEA, the Key Exchange Algorithm, as defined by NIST's "SKIPJACK and KEA Algorithm Specification Version 2.0", 29 May 1998.

It has a parameter, a **CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

As defined in the Specification, KEA MAY be used in two different operational modes: full mode and e-mail mode. Full mode is a two-phase key derivation sequence that requires real-time parameter exchange between two parties. E-mail mode is a one-phase key derivation sequence that does not require real-time parameter exchange. By convention, e-mail mode is designated by use of a fixed value of one (1) for the KEA parameter R_b (*pRandomB*).

The operation of this mechanism depends on two of the values in the supplied **CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, as detailed in the table below. Note that in all cases, the data buffers pointed to by the parameter structure fields *pRandomA* and *pRandomB* must be allocated by the caller prior to invoking **C_DeriveKey**. Also, the values pointed to by *pRandomA* and *pRandomB* are represented as Cryptoki "Big integer" data (i.e., a sequence of bytes, most significant byte first).

Table 5, KEA Parameter Values and Operations

Value of boolean <i>isSender</i>	Value of big integer <i>pRandomB</i>	Token Action (after checking parameter and template values)
CK_TRUE	0	Compute KEA R_a value, store it in <i>pRandomA</i> , return CKR_OK. No derived key object is created.
CK_TRUE	1	Compute KEA R_a value, store it in <i>pRandomA</i> , derive key value using e-mail mode, create key object, return CKR_OK.
CK_TRUE	>1	Compute KEA R_a value, store it in <i>pRandomA</i> , derive key value using full mode, create key object, return CKR_OK
CK_FALSE	0	Compute KEA R_b value, store it in <i>pRandomB</i> , return CKR_OK. No derived key object is created.
CK_FALSE	1	Derive key value using e-mail mode, create key object, return CKR_OK.
CK_FALSE	>1	Derive key value using full mode, create key object, return CKR_OK.

Note that the parameter value *pRandomB* == 0 is a flag that the KEA mechanism is being invoked to compute the party's public random value (R_a or R_b , for sender or recipient, respectively), not to derive a key. In these cases, any object template supplied as the **C_DeriveKey** *pTemplate* argument should be ignored.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability*:

* Note that the rules regarding the **CKA_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE**, **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE**, and **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes have changed in version

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key MAY both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key MUST as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key MUST, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of KEA prime sizes, in bits.

2.4 RC2

2.4.1 Definitions

RC2 is a block cipher which is trademarked by RSA Security. It has a variable keysize and an additional parameter, the “effective number of bits in the RC2 search space”, which MAY take on values in the range 1-1024, inclusive. The effective number of bits in the RC2 search space is sometimes specified by an RC2 “version number”; this “version number” is *not* the same thing as the “effective number of bits”, however. There is a canonical way to convert from one to the other.

This section defines the key type “CKK_RC2” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN
CKM_RC2_ECB
CKM_RC2_CBC
CKM_RC2_MAC
CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL
CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD

2.4.2 RC2 secret key objects

RC2 secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_RC2**) hold RC2 keys. The following table defines the RC2 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 6, RC2 Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (1 to 128 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

2.11 to match the policy used by other key derivation mechanisms such as **CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE**.

384 The following is a sample template for creating an RC2 secret key object:

```
385 CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
386 CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RC2;
387 CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An RC2 secret key object";
388 CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
389 CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
390 CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
391     {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
392     {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
393     {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
394     {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
395     {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
396     {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
397 };
```

398 2.4.3 RC2 mechanism parameters

399 2.4.3.1 CK_RC2_PARAMS; CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR

400 **CK_RC2_PARAMS** provides the parameters to the **CKM_RC2_ECB** and **CKM_RC2_MAC** mechanisms.
401 It holds the effective number of bits in the RC2 search space. It is defined as follows:

```
402 typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS;
```

403 **CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_RC2_PARAMS**.

404 2.4.3.2 CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS; CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR

405 **CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS** is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_RC2_CBC** and
406 **CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD** mechanisms. It is defined as follows:

```
407 typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS {
408     CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits;
409     CK_BYTE iv[8];
410 } CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS;
```

411 The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

412	<i>ulEffectiveBits</i>	the effective number of bits in the RC2 search space
413	<i>iv</i>	the initialization vector (IV) for cipher block chaining
414		mode

415 **CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS**.

416 2.4.3.3 CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; 417 CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR

418 **CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** is a structure that provides the parameters to the
419 **CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
420 typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
421     CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits;
422     CK_ULONG ulMacLength;
423 } CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
```

424 The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

425	<i>ulEffectiveBits</i>	the effective number of bits in the RC2 search space
426	<i>ulMacLength</i>	length of the MAC produced, in bytes

CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**.

2.4.4 RC2 key generation

The RC2 key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for RSA Security's block cipher RC2.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates RC2 keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the RC2 key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) MAY be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC2 key sizes, in bits.

2.4.5 RC2-ECB

RC2-ECB, denoted **CKM_RC2_ECB**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on RSA Security's block cipher RC2 and electronic codebook mode as defined in FIPS PUB 81.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RC2_PARAMS**, which indicates the effective number of bits in the RC2 search space.

This mechanism MAY wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token MAY not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to seven null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of eight. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 7 RC2-ECB: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	RC2	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	RC2	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part
C_WrapKey	RC2	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of 8	
C_UnwrapKey	RC2	Multiple of 8	Determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC2 effective number of bits.

2.4.6 RC2-CBC

RC2_CBC, denoted **CKM_RC2_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on RSA Security's block cipher RC2 and cipher-block chaining mode as defined in FIPS PUB 81.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS** structure, where the first field indicates the effective number of bits in the RC2 search space, and the next field is the initialization vector for cipher block chaining mode.

This mechanism MAY wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token MAY not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to seven null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of eight. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 8, RC2-CBC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	RC2	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	RC2	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part
C_WrapKey	RC2	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of 8	
C_UnwrapKey	RC2	Multiple of 8	Determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC2 effective number of bits.

2.4.7 RC2-CBC with PKCS padding

RC2-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on RSA Security's block cipher RC2; cipher-block chaining mode as defined in FIPS PUB 81; and the block cipher padding method detailed in PKCS #7.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS** structure, where the first field indicates the effective number of bits in the RC2 search space, and the next field is the initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

In addition to being able to wrap and unwrap secret keys, this mechanism MAY wrap and unwrap RSA, Diffie-Hellman, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman, EC (also related to ECDSA) and DSA private keys (see **[PKCS #11-Curr]**, **Miscellaneous simple key derivation mechanisms** for details). The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 9, RC2-CBC with PKCS Padding: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	RC2	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of 8
C_Decrypt	RC2	Multiple of 8	Between 1 and 8 bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	RC2	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of 8
C_UnwrapKey	RC2	Multiple of 8	Between 1 and 8 bytes shorter than input length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC2 effective number of bits.

2.4.8 General-length RC2-MAC

General-length RC2-MAC, denoted **CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single-and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on RSA Security's block cipher RC2 and data authorization as defined in FIPS PUB 113.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the effective number of bits in the RC2 search space and the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final RC2 cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 10, General-length RC2-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	RC2	Any	0-8, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	RC2	Any	0-8, as specified in parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC2 effective number of bits.

2.4.9 RC2-MAC

RC2-MAC, denoted by **CKM_RC2_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length RC2-MAC mechanism (see Section 2.4.8). Instead of taking a **CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** parameter, it takes a **CK_RC2_PARAMS** parameter, which only contains the effective number of bits in the RC2 search space. RC2-MAC produces and verifies 4-byte MACs.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 11, RC2-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	RC2	Any	4
C_Verify	RC2	Any	4

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC2 effective number of bits.

2.5 RC4

2.5.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_RC4” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms

CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN

CKM_RC4

2.5.2 RC4 secret key objects

RC4 secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_RC4**) hold RC4 keys. The following table defines the RC4 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 12, RC4 Secret Key Object

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (1 to 256 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3,6}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an RC4 secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RC4;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An RC4 secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

2.5.3 RC4 key generation

The RC4 key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for RSA Security's proprietary stream cipher RC4.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates RC4 keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the RC4 key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) MAY be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC4 key sizes, in bits.

2.5.4 RC4 mechanism

RC4, denoted **CKM_RC4**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption based on RSA Security's proprietary stream cipher RC4.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table:

Table 13, RC4: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	RC4	Any	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	RC4	Any	Same as input length	No final part

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC4 key sizes, in bits.

2.6 RC5

2.6.1 Definitions

RC5 is a parameterizable block cipher patented by RSA Security. It has a variable wordsize, a variable keysize, and a variable number of rounds. The blocksize of RC5 is equal to twice its wordsize.

This section defines the key type "CKK_RC5" for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN

CKM_RC5_ECB

CKM_RC5_CBC

CKM_RC5_MAC

CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL

CMK_RC5_CBC_PAD

2.6.2 RC5 secret key objects

RC5 secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_RC5**) hold RC5 keys. The following table defines the RC5 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class.

Table 14, RC5 Secret Key Object

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (0 to 255 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3,6}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an RC5 secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RC5;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An RC5 secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
```

```

592 CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
593     {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
594     {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
595     {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
596     {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
597     {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
598     {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
599 };

```

600 2.6.3 RC5 mechanism parameters

601 2.6.3.1 CK_RC5_PARAMS; CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR

602 **CK_RC5_PARAMS** provides the parameters to the **CKM_RC5_ECB** and **CKM_RC5_MAC** mechanisms.
603 It is defined as follows:

```

604 typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS {
605     CK_ULONG ulWordsize;
606     CK_ULONG ulRounds;
607 } CK_RC5_PARAMS;

```

608 The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

609	<i>ulWordsize</i>	wordsize of RC5 cipher in bytes
610	<i>ulRounds</i>	number of rounds of RC5 encipherment

611 **CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_RC5_PARAMS**.

612 2.6.3.2 CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS; CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR

613 **CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS** is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_RC5_CBC** and
614 **CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD** mechanisms. It is defined as follows:

```

615 typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS {
616     CK_ULONG ulWordsize;
617     CK_ULONG ulRounds;
618     CK_BYTE_PTR pIv;
619     CK_ULONG ulIvLen;
620 } CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS;

```

621 The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

622	<i>ulwordSize</i>	wordsize of RC5 cipher in bytes
623	<i>ulRounds</i>	number of rounds of RC5 encipherment
624	<i>pIV</i>	pointer to initialization vector (IV) for CBC encryption
625	<i>ulIVLen</i>	length of initialization vector (must be same as
626		blocksize)

627 **CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS**.

628 2.6.3.3 CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; 629 CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR

630 **CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** is a structure that provides the parameters to the
631 **CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```

typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG ulWordSize;
    CK_ULONG ulRounds;
    CK_ULONG ulMacLength;
} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

ulwordSize wordsize of RC5 cipher in bytes

ulRounds number of rounds of RC5 encipherment

ulMacLength length of the MAC produced, in bytes

CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**.

2.6.4 RC5 key generation

The RC5 key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for RSA Security's block cipher RC5.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates RC5 keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the RC5 key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) MAY be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC5 key sizes, in bytes.

2.6.5 RC5-ECB

RC5-ECB, denoted **CKM_RC5_ECB**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on RSA Security's block cipher RC5 and electronic codebook mode as defined in FIPS PUB 81.

It has a parameter, **CK_RC5_PARAMS**, which indicates the wordsize and number of rounds of encryption to use.

This mechanism MAY wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token MAY not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the cipher blocksize (twice the wordsize). The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attributes of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 15, RC5-ECB Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	RC5	Multiple of blocksize	Same as input length	No final part

C_Decrypt	RC5	Multiple of blocksize	Same as input length	No final part
C_WrapKey	RC5	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of blocksize	
C_UnwrapKey	RC5	Multiple of blocksize	Determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC5 key sizes, in bytes.

2.6.6 RC5-CBC

RC5-CBC, denoted **CKM_RC5_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on RSA Security's block cipher RC5 and cipher-block chaining mode as defined in FIPS PUB 81.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the wordsize and number of rounds of encryption to use, as well as the initialization vector for cipher block chaining mode.

This mechanism MAY wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token MAY not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to seven null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of eight. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute for the template, and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 16, RC5-CBC Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	RC5	Multiple of blocksize	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	RC5	Multiple of blocksize	Same as input length	No final part
C_WrapKey	RC5	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of blocksize	
C_UnwrapKey	RC5	Multiple of blocksize	Determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC5 key sizes, in bytes.

2.6.7 RC5-CBC with PKCS padding

RC5-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on RSA Security's block cipher RC5; cipher block chaining mode as defined in FIPS PUB 81; and the block cipher padding method detailed in PKCS #7.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the wordsize and number of rounds of encryption to use, as well as the initialization vector for cipher block chaining mode.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

In addition to being able to wrap an unwrap secret keys, this mechanism MAY wrap and unwrap RSA, Diffie-Hellman, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman, EC (also related to ECDSA) and DSA private keys. The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 17, RC5-CBC with PKCS Padding; Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	RC5	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of blocksize
C_Decrypt	RC5	Multiple of blocksize	Between 1 and blocksize bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	RC5	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of blocksize
C_UnwrapKey	RC5	Multiple of blocksize	Between 1 and blocksize bytes shorter than input length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC5 key sizes, in bytes.

2.6.8 General-length RC5-MAC

General-length RC5-MAC, denoted **CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on RSA Security's block cipher RC5 and data authentication as defined in FIPS PUB 113.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the wordsize and number of rounds of encryption to use and the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final RC5 cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 18, General-length RC2-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	RC5	Any	0-blocksize, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	RC5	Any	0-blocksize, as specified in parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC5 key sizes, in bytes.

2.6.9 RC5-MAC

RC5-MAC, denoted by **CKM_RC5_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length RC5-MAC mechanism. Instead of taking a **CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** parameter, it takes a **CK_RC5_PARAMS** parameter. RC5-MAC produces and verifies MACs half as large as the RC5 blocksize.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 19, RC5-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	RC5	Any	RC5 wordsize = [blocksize/2]
C_Verify	RC5	Any	RC5 wordsize = [blocksize/2]

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RC5 key sizes, in bytes.

2.7 General block cipher

2.7.1 Definitions

For brevity's sake, the mechanisms for the DES, CAST, CAST3, CAST128, IDEA and CDMF block ciphers are described together here. Each of these ciphers has the following mechanisms, which are described in a templated form.

This section defines the key types "CKK_DES", "CKK_CAST", "CKK_CAST3", "CKK_CAST128", "CKK_IDEA" and "CKK_CDMF" for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_DES_KEY_GEN
- CKM_DES_ECB
- CKM_DES_CBC
- CKM_DES_MAC
- CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL
- CKM_DES_CBC_PAD
- CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN
- CKM_CDMF_ECB
- CKM_CDMF_CBC
- CKM_CDMF_MAC
- CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL
- CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD
- CKM_DES_OFB64
- CKM_DES_OFB8
- CKM_DES_CFB64
- CKM_DES_CFB8
- CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN
- CKM_CAST_ECB
- CKM_CAST_CBC
- CKM_CAST_MAC
- CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL
- CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD
- CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN
- CKM_CAST3_ECB
- CKM_CAST3_CBC
- CKM_CAST3_MAC

766 CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL
 767 CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD
 768 CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN
 769 CKM_CAST128_ECB
 770 CKM_CAST128_CBC
 771 CKM_CAST128_MAC
 772 CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL
 773 CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD
 774 CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN
 775 CKM_IDEA_ECB
 776 CKM_IDEA_MAC
 777 CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL
 778 CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD

779 2.7.2 DES secret key objects

780 DES secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_DES**) hold single-length DES
 781 keys. The following table defines the DES secret key object attributes, in addition to the common
 782 attributes defined for this object class:

783 *Table 20, DES Secret Key Object*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (8 bytes long)

784 Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

785 DES keys MUST have their parity bits properly set as described in FIPS PUB 46-3. Attempting to create
 786 or unwrap a DES key with incorrect parity MUST return an error.

787 The following is a sample template for creating a DES secret key object:

```
788 CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
789 CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES;
790 CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A DES secret key object";
791 CK_BYTE value[8] = {...};
792 CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
793 CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
794     {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
795     {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
796     {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
797     {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
798     {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
799     {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
800 };
```

801 CKA_CHECK_VALUE: The value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three
 802 bytes of the ECB encryption of a single block of null (0x00) bytes, using the default cipher associated with
 803 the key type of the secret key object.

804 2.7.3 CAST secret key objects

805 CAST secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_CAST**) hold CAST keys.
 806 The following table defines the CAST secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes
 807 defined for this object class:

Table 21, CAST Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (1 to 8 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3,6}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating a CAST secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_CAST;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A CAST secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.7.4 CAST3 secret key objects

CAST3 secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_CAST3**) hold CAST3 keys. The following table defines the CAST3 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defines for this object class:

Table 22, CAST3 Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (1 to 8 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3,6}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating a CAST3 secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_CAST3;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A CAST3 secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.7.5 CAST128 secret key objects

CAST128 secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_CAST128**) hold CAST128 keys. The following table defines the CAST128 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defines for this object class:

Table 23, CAST128 Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (1 to 16 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3,6}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating a CAST128 secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_CAST128;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A CAST128 secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.7.6 IDEA secret key objects

IDEA secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_IDEA**) hold IDEA keys. The following table defines the IDEA secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defines for this object class:

Table 24, IDEA Secret Key Object

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (16 bytes long)

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an IDEA secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_IDEA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An IDEA secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[16] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.7.7 CDMF secret key objects

IDEA secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_CDMF**) hold CDMF keys. The following table defines the CDMF secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defines for this object class:

Table 25, CDMF Secret Key Object

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (8 bytes long)

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

CDMF keys MUST have their parity bits properly set in exactly the same fashion described for DES keys in FIPS PUB 46-3. Attempting to create or unwrap a CDMF key with incorrect parity MUST return an error.

The following is a sample template for creating a CDMF secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_CDMF;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A CDMF secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[8] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

2.7.8 General block cipher mechanism parameters

2.7.8.1 CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR

CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to the general-length MACing mechanisms of the DES, DES3 (triple-DES), CAST, CAST3, CAST128, IDEA, CDMF and AES ciphers. It also provides the parameters to the general-length HMACing mechanisms (i.e., MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, RIPEMD-128 and RIPEMD-160) and the two SSL 3.0 MACing mechanisms, (i.e., MD5 and SHA-1). It holds the length of the MAC that these mechanisms produce. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
```

CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**.

2.7.9 General block cipher key generation

Cipher <NAME> has a key generation mechanism, "<NAME> key generation", denoted by **CKM_<NAME>_KEY_GEN**.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) MAY be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

When DES keys or CDMF keys are generated, their parity bits are set properly, as specified in FIPS PUB 46-3. Similarly, when a triple-DES key is generated, each of the DES keys comprising it has its parity bits set properly.

When DES or CDMF keys are generated, it is token-dependent whether or not it is possible for "weak" or "semi-weak" keys to be generated. Similarly, when triple-DES keys are generated, it is token-dependent whether or not it is possible for any of the component DES keys to be "weak" or "semi-weak" keys.

When CAST, CAST3, or CAST128 keys are generated, the template for the secret key must specify a **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure MAY be used. The CAST, CAST3, and CAST128 ciphers have variable key sizes, and so for the key generation mechanisms for these ciphers, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes, in bytes. For the DES, DES3 (triple-DES), IDEA and CDMF ciphers, these fields are not used.

2.7.10 General block cipher ECB

Cipher <NAME> has an electronic codebook mechanism, "<NAME>-ECB", denoted **CKM_<NAME>_ECB**. It is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping with <NAME>.

It does not have a parameter.

This mechanism MAY wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token MAY not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of <NAME>'s blocksize. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 26, General Block Cipher ECB: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	<NAME>	Multiple of blocksize	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	<NAME>	Multiple of blocksize	Same as input length	No final part
C_WrapKey	<NAME>	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of blocksize	
C_UnwrapKey	<NAME>	Any	Determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure MAY be used. The CAST, CAST3, and CAST128 ciphers have variable key sizes, and so for these ciphers, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes, in bytes. For the DES, DES3 (triple-DES), IDEA and CDMF ciphers, these fields are not used.

2.7.11 General block cipher CBC

Cipher <NAME> has a cipher-block chaining mode, "<NAME>-CBC", denoted **CKM_<NAME>_CBC**. It is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping with <NAME>.

It has a parameter, an initialization vector for cipher block chaining mode. The initialization vector has the same length as <NAME>'s blocksize.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 27, General Block Cipher CBC; Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	<NAME>	Multiple of blocksize	Same as input length	No final part

C_Decrypt	<NAME>	Multiple of blocksize	Same as input length	No final part
C_WrapKey	<NAME>	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of blocksize	
C_UnwrapKey	<NAME>	Any	Determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure MAY be used. The CAST, CAST3, and CAST128 ciphers have variable key sizes, and so for these ciphers, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes, in bytes. For the DES, DES3 (triple-DES), IDEA, and CDMF ciphers, these fields are not used.

2.7.12 General block cipher CBC with PKCS padding

Cipher <NAME> has a cipher-block chaining mode with PKCS padding, “<NAME>-CBC with PKCS padding”, denoted **CKM_<NAME>_CBC_PAD**. It is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping with <NAME>. All ciphertext is padded with PKCS padding.

It has a parameter, an initialization vector for cipher block chaining mode. The initialization vector has the same length as <NAME>’s blocksize.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

In addition to being able to wrap and unwrap secret keys, this mechanism MAY wrap and unwrap RSA, Diffie-Hellman, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman, EC (also related to ECDSA) and DSA private keys. The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 28, General Block Cipher CBC with PKCS Padding: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	<NAME>	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of blocksize
C_Decrypt	<NAME>	Multiple of blocksize	Between 1 and blocksize bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	<NAME>	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of blocksize
C_UnwrapKey	<NAME>	Multiple of blocksize	Between 1 and blocksize bytes shorter than input length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure MAY be used. The CAST, CAST3 and CAST128 ciphers have variable key sizes, and so for these ciphers, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes, in bytes. For the DES, DES3 (triple-DES), IDEA, and CDMF ciphers, these fields are not used.

2.7.13 General-length general block cipher MAC

Cipher <NAME> has a general-length MACing mode, “General-length <NAME>-MAC”, denoted **CKM_<NAME>_MAC_GENERAL**. It is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and

verification, based on the <NAME> encryption algorithm and data authentication as defined in FIPS PUB 113.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which specifies the size of the output.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table:

Table 29, General-length General Block Cipher MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	<NAME>	Any	0-blocksize, depending on parameters
C_Verify	<NAME>	Any	0-blocksize, depending on parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure MAY be used. The CAST, CAST3, and CAST128 ciphers have variable key sizes, and so for these ciphers, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes, in bytes. For the DES, DES3 (triple-DES), IDEA and CDMF ciphers, these fields are not used.

2.7.14 General block cipher MAC

Cipher <NAME> has a MACing mechanism, "<NAME>-MAC", denoted **CKM_<NAME>_MAC**. This mechanism is a special case of the **CKM_<NAME>_MAC_GENERAL** mechanism described above. It produces an output of size half as large as <NAME>'s blocksize.

This mechanism has no parameters.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 30, General Block cipher MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	<NAME>	Any	[blocksize/2]
C_Verify	<NAME>	Any	[blocksize/2]

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure MAY be used. The CAST, CAST3, and CAST128 ciphers have variable key sizes, and so for these ciphers, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes, in bytes. For the DES, DES3 (triple-DES), IDEA and CDMF ciphers, these fields are not used.

2.8 SKIPJACK

2.8.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type "CKK_SKIPJACK" for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN

CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64

CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64

CKM_SKIPJACK_OF64

CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64

- 1030 CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32
- 1031 CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16
- 1032 CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8
- 1033 CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP
- 1034 CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP
- 1035 CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX

1036 **2.8.2 SKIPJACK secret key objects**

1037 SKIPJACK secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_SKIPJACK**) holds a
1038 single-length MEK or a TEK. The following table defines the SKIPJACK secret object attributes, in
1039 addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

1040 *Table 31, SKIPJACK Secret Key Object*

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (12 bytes long)

1041 Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

1042

1043 SKIPJACK keys have 16 checksum bits, and these bits must be properly set. Attempting to create or
1044 unwrap a SKIPJACK key with incorrect checksum bits MUST return an error.

1045 It is not clear that any tokens exist (or ever will exist) which permit an application to create a SKIPJACK
1046 key with a specified value. Nonetheless, we provide templates for doing so.

1047 The following is a sample template for creating a SKIPJACK MEK secret key object:

```
1048 CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;  
1049 CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_SKIPJACK;  
1050 CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A SKIPJACK MEK secret key object";  
1051 CK_BYTE value[12] = {...};  
1052 CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;  
1053 CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {  
1054     {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},  
1055     {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},  
1056     {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},  
1057     {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},  
1058     {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},  
1059     {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}  
1060 };
```

1061 The following is a sample template for creating a SKIPJACK TEK secret key object:

```
1062 CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;  
1063 CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_SKIPJACK;  
1064 CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A SKIPJACK TEK secret key object";  
1065 CK_BYTE value[12] = {...};  
1066 CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;  
1067 CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {  
1068     {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},  
1069     {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},  
1070     {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},  
1071     {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},  
1072     {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},  
1073     {CKA_WRAP, &true, sizeof(true)},  
1074     {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}  
1075 };
```


2.8.3 SKIPJACK Mechanism parameters

2.8.3.1 CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS; CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR

CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS {  
    CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword;  
    CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;  
    CK_ULONG ulPandGLen;  
    CK_ULONG ulQLen;  
    CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ;  
} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>ulPasswordLen</i>	length of the password
<i>pPassword</i>	pointer to the buffer which contains the user-supplied password
<i>ulPublicDataLen</i>	other party's key exchange public key size
<i>pPublicData</i>	pointer to other party's key exchange public key value
<i>ulPandGLen</i>	length of prime and base values
<i>ulQLen</i>	length of subprime value
<i>ulRandomLen</i>	size of random Ra, in bytes
<i>pPrimeP</i>	pointer to Prime, p, value
<i>pBaseG</i>	pointer to Base, b, value
<i>pSubprimeQ</i>	pointer to Subprime, q, value

CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS**.

2.8.3.2 CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS; CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR

CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS {  
    CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX;
```

```

1115     CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen;
1116     CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword;
1117     CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen;
1118     CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData;
1119     CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen;
1120     CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA;
1121     CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen;
1122     CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword;
1123     CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen;
1124     CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData;
1125     CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen;
1126     CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA;
1127 } CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS;

```

1128 The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

1129	<i>ulOldWrappedLen</i>	length of old wrapped key in bytes
1130	<i>pOldWrappedX</i>	pointer to old wrapper key
1131	<i>ulOldPasswordLen</i>	length of the old password
1132	<i>pOldPassword</i>	pointer to the buffer which contains the old user-supplied password
1133		
1134	<i>ulOldPublicDataLen</i>	old key exchange public key size
1135	<i>pOldPublicData</i>	pointer to old key exchange public key value
1136	<i>ulOldRandomLen</i>	size of old random Ra in bytes
1137	<i>pOldRandomA</i>	pointer to old Ra data
1138	<i>ulNewPasswordLen</i>	length of the new password
1139	<i>pNewPassword</i>	pointer to the buffer which contains the new user-supplied password
1140		
1141	<i>ulNewPublicDataLen</i>	new key exchange public key size
1142	<i>pNewPublicData</i>	pointer to new key exchange public key value
1143	<i>ulNewRandomLen</i>	size of new random Ra in bytes
1144	<i>pNewRandomA</i>	pointer to new Ra data

1145 **CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS**.

1146 2.8.4 SKIPJACK key generation

1147 The SKIPJACK key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation
1148 mechanism for SKIPJACK. The output of this mechanism is called a Message Encryption Key (MEK).

1149 It does not have a parameter.

1150 The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new
1151 key.

2.8.5 SKIPJACK-ECB64

SKIPJACK-ECB64, denoted **CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with SKIPJACK in 64-bit electronic codebook mode as defined in FIPS PUB 185.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application can't specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 32, SKIPJACK-ECB64: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part

2.8.6 SKIPJACK-CBC64

SKIPJACK-CBC64, denoted **CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with SKIPJACK in 64-bit output feedback mode as defined in FIPS PUB 185.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 33, SKIPJACK-CBC64: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part

2.8.7 SKIPJACK-OFB64

SKIPJACK-OFB64, denoted **CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with SKIPJACK in 64-bit output feedback mode as defined in FIPS PUB 185.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 34, SKIPJACK-OFB64: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part

2.8.8 SKIPJACK-CFB64

SKIPJACK-CFB64, denoted **CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with SKIPJACK in 64-bit cipher feedback mode as defined in FIPS PUB 185.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 35, SKIPJACK-CFB64: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 8	Same as input length	No final part

2.8.9 SKIPJACK-CFB32

SKIPJACK-CFB32, denoted **CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with SKIPJACK in 32-bit cipher feedback mode as defined in FIPS PUB 185.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 36, SKIPJACK-CFB32: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 4	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 4	Same as input length	No final part

2.8.10 SKIPJACK-CFB16

SKIPJACK-CFB16, denoted **CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with SKIPJACK in 16-bit cipher feedback mode as defined in FIPS PUB 185.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 37, SKIPJACK-CFB16: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 4	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 4	Same as input length	No final part

2.8.11 SKIPJACK-CFB8

SKIPJACK-CFB8, denoted **CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with SKIPJACK in 8-bit cipher feedback mode as defined in FIPS PUB 185.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

1208 *Table 38, SKIPJACK-CFB8: Data and Length*

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 4	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	SKIPJACK	Multiple of 4	Same as input length	No final part

1209 2.8.12 SKIPJACK-WRAP

1210 The SKIPJACK-WRAP mechanism, denoted **CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP**, is used to wrap and unwrap a
 1211 secret key (MEK). It MAY wrap or unwrap SKIPJACK, BATON, and JUNIPER keys.
 1212 It does not have a parameter.

1213 2.8.13 SKIPJACK-PRIVATE-WRAP

1214 The SKIPJACK-PRIVATE-WRAP mechanism, denoted **CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP**, is used to
 1215 wrap and unwrap a private key. It MAY wrap KEA and DSA private keys.
 1216 It has a parameter, a **CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS** structure.

1217 2.8.14 SKIPJACK-RELAYX

1218 The SKIPJACK-RELAYX mechanism, denoted **CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX**, is used with the **C_WrapKey**
 1219 function to “change the wrapping” on a private key which was wrapped with the SKIPJACK-PRIVATE-
 1220 WRAP mechanism (See Section 2.8.13).
 1221 It has a parameter, a **CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS** structure.
 1222 Although the SKIPJACK-RELAYX mechanism is used with **C_WrapKey**, it differs from other key-
 1223 wrapping mechanisms. Other key-wrapping mechanisms take a key handle as one of the arguments to
 1224 **C_WrapKey**; however for the SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism, the [always invalid] value 0 should be
 1225 passed as the key handle for **C_WrapKey**, and the already-wrapped key should be passed in as part of
 1226 the **CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS** structure.

1227 2.9 BATON

1228 2.9.1 Definitions

1229 This section defines the key type “CKK_BATON” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the
 1230 CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

1231 Mechanisms:

- 1232 CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN
- 1233 CKM_BATON_ECB128
- 1234 CKM_BATON_ECB96
- 1235 CKM_BATON_CBC128
- 1236 CKM_BATON_COUNTER
- 1237 CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE
- 1238 CKM_BATON_WRAP

1239 2.9.2 BATON secret key objects

1240 BATON secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_BATON**) hold single-length
 1241 BATON keys. The following table defines the BATON secret key object attributes, in addition to the
 1242 common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 39, BATON Secret Key Object

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (40 bytes long)

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

BATON keys have 160 checksum bits, and these bits must be properly set. Attempting to create or unwrap a BATON key with incorrect checksum bits MUST return an error.

It is not clear that any tokens exist (or will ever exist) which permit an application to create a BATON key with a specified value. Nonetheless, we provide templates for doing so.

The following is a sample template for creating a BATON MEK secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_BATON;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A BATON MEK secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[40] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

The following is a sample template for creating a BATON TEK secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_BATON;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A BATON TEK secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[40] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_WRAP, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

2.9.3 BATON key generation

The BATON key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for BATON. The output of this mechanism is called a Message Encryption Key (MEK).

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key.

2.9.4 BATON-ECB128

BATON-ECB128, denoted **CKM_BATON_ECB128**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with BATON in 128-bit electronic codebook mode.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 40, BATON-ECB128: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	BATON	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	BATON	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part

2.9.5 BATON-ECB96

BATON-ECB96, denoted **CKM_BATON_ECB96**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with BATON in 96-bit electronic codebook mode.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 41, BATON-ECB96: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	BATON	Multiple of 12	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	BATON	Multiple of 12	Same as input length	No final part

2.9.6 BATON-CBC128

BATON-CBC128, denoted **CKM_BATON_CBC128**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with BATON in 128-bit cipher-block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 42, BATON-CBC128

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	BATON	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	BATON	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part

2.9.7 BATON-COUNTER

BATON-COUNTER, denoted **CKM_BATON_COUNTER**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with BATON in counter mode.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 43, BATON-COUNTER: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	BATON	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	BATON	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part

2.9.8 BATON-SHUFFLE

BATON-SHUFFLE, denoted **CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with BATON in shuffle mode.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 44, BATON-SHUFFLE: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	BATON	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	BATON	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part

2.9.9 BATON WRAP

The BATON wrap and unwrap mechanism, denoted **CKM_BATON_WRAP**, is a function used to wrap and unwrap a secret key (MEK). It MAY wrap and unwrap SKIPJACK, BATON and JUNIPER keys.

It has no parameters.

When used to unwrap a key, this mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to it.

2.10 JUNIPER

2.10.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_JUNIPER” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN
- CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128
- CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128
- CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER
- CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE
- CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP

2.10.2 JUNIPER secret key objects

JUNIPER secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_JUNIPER**) hold single-length JUNIPER keys. The following table defines the BATON secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 45, JUNIPER Secret Key Object

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (40 bytes long)

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 11 for footnotes

JUNIPER keys have 160 checksum bits, and these bits must be properly set. Attempting to create or unwrap a BATON key with incorrect checksum bits MUST return an error.

It is not clear that any tokens exist (or will ever exist) which permit an application to create a BATON key with a specified value. Nonetheless, we provide templates for doing so.

The following is a sample template for creating a JUNIPER MEK secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_JUNIPER;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A JUNIPER MEK secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[40] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

The following is a sample template for creating a JUNIPER TEK secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_JUNIPER;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A JUNIPER TEK secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[40] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_WRAP, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

2.10.3 JUNIPER key generation

The JUNIPER key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for JUNIPER. The output of this mechanism is called a Message Encryption Key (MEK).

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key.

2.10.4 JUNIPER-ECB128

JUNIPER-ECB128, denoted **CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with JUNIPER in 128-bit electronic codebook mode.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table. For encryption and decryption, the input and output data (parts) MAY begin at the same location in memory.

Table 46, JUNIPER-ECB128: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	JUNIPER	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	JUNIPER	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part

2.10.5 JUNIPER-CBC128

JUNIPER-CBC128, denoted **CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with JUNIPER in 128-bit cipher block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table. For encryption and decryption, the input and output data (parts) MAY begin at the same location in memory.

Table 47, JUNIPER-CBC128: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	JUNIPER	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	JUNIPER	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part

2.10.6 JUNIPER-COUNTER

JUNIPER-COUNTER, denoted **CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with JUNIPER in counter mode.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table. For encryption and decryption, the input and output data (parts) MAY begin at the same location in memory.

Table 48, JUNIPER-COUNTER: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	JUNIPER	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	JUNIPER	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part

2.10.7 JUNIPER-SHUFFLE

JUNIPER-SHUFFLE, denoted **CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with JUNIPER in shuffle mode.

It has a parameter, a 24-byte initialization vector. During an encryption operation, this IV is set to some value generated by the token – in other words, the application MAY NOT specify a particular IV when encrypting. It MAY, of course, specify a particular IV when decrypting.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table. For encryption and decryption, the input and output data (parts) MAY begin at the same location in memory.

Table 49, JUNIPER-SHUFFLE: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	JUNIPER	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part
C_Decrypt	JUNIPER	Multiple of 16	Same as input length	No final part

2.10.8 JUNIPER WRAP

The JUNIPER wrap and unwrap mechanism, denoted **CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP**, is a function used to wrap and unwrap an MEK. It MAY wrap or unwrap SKIPJACK, BATON and JUNIPER keys.

It has no parameters.

When used to unwrap a key, this mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to it.

2.11 MD2

2.11.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_MD2

CKM_MD2_HMAC

CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION

2.11.2 MD2 digest

The MD2 mechanism, denoted **CKM_MD2**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the MD2 message-digest algorithm defined in RFC 6149.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 50, MD2: Data Length

Function	Data length	Digest Length
C_Digest	Any	16

2.11.3 General-length MD2-HMAC

The general-length MD2-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for signatures and verification. It uses the HMAC construction, based on the MD2 hash function. The keys it uses are generic secret keys.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 0-16 (the output size of MD2 is 16 bytes). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism MUST be taken from the start of the full 16-byte HMAC output.

Table 51, General-length MD2-HMAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	Generic secret	Any	0-16, depending on parameters

C_Verify Generic secret Any 0-16, depending on parameters

2.11.4 MD2-HMAC

The MD2-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_MD2_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length MD2-HMAC mechanism in Section 2.11.3.

It has no parameter, and produces an output of length 16.

2.11.5 MD2 key derivation

MD2 key derivation, denoted **CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION**, is a mechanism which provides the capability of deriving a secret key by digesting the value of another secret key with MD2.

The value of the base key is digested once, and the result is used to make the value of the derived secret key.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism **MUST** be a generic secret key. Its length **MUST** be 16 bytes (the output size of MD2)..
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism **MUST** be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length was provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism **MUST** be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error **MUST** be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism **MUST** be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key **MUST** be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more than 16 bytes, such as DES2, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key **MAY** both be specified to be either **CK_TRUE** or **CK_FALSE**. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key **MUST** as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key **MUST**, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

2.12 MD5

2.12.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_MD5

CKM_MD5_HMAC

CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION

2.12.2 MD5 Digest

The MD5 mechanism, denoted **CKM_MD5**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the MD5 message-digest algorithm defined in RFC 1321.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest MAY begin at the same location in memory.

Table 52, MD5: Data Length

Function	Data length	Digest length
C_Digest	Any	16

2.12.3 General-length MD5-HMAC

The general-length MD5-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for signatures and verification. It uses the HMAC construction, based on the MD5 hash function. The keys it uses are generic secret keys.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 0-16 (the output size of MD5 is 16 bytes). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism MUST be taken from the start of the full 16-byte HMAC output.

Table 53, General-length MD5-HMAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	Generic secret	Any	0-16, depending on parameters
C_Verify	Generic secret	Any	0-16, depending on parameters

2.12.4 MD5-HMAC

The MD5-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_MD5_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length MD5-HMAC mechanism in Section 2.12.3.

It has no parameter, and produces an output of length 16.

2.12.5 MD5 key derivation

MD5 key derivation denoted **CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION**, is a mechanism which provides the capability of deriving a secret key by digesting the value of another secret key with MD5.

The value of the base key is digested once, and the result is used to make the value of derived secret key.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism MUST be a generic secret key. Its length MUST be 16 bytes (the output size of MD5).
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism MUST be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length was provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism MUST be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error MUST be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism MUST be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key MUST be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more than 16 bytes, such as DES3, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability.

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key MAY both be specified to either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key MUST as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key MUST, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

2.13 FASTHASH

2.13.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_FASTHASH

2.13.2 FASTHASH digest

The FASTHASH mechanism, denoted **CKM_FASTHASH**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the U.S. government's algorithm.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table:

Table 54, FASTHASH: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	Any	40

2.14 PKCS #5 and PKCS #5-style password-based encryption (PBD)

2.14.1 Definitions

The mechanisms in this section are for generating keys and IVs for performing password-based encryption. The method used to generate keys and IVs is specified in PKCS #5.

Mechanisms:

CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC
CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC
CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC
CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC
CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC
CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC
CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128
CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40
CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC
CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC

2.14.2 Password-based encryption/authentication mechanism parameters

2.14.2.1 CK_PBE_PARAMS; CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR

CK_PBE_PARAMS is a structure which provides all of the necessary information required by the CKM_PBE mechanisms (see PKCS #5 and PKCS #12 for information on the PBE generation mechanisms) and the CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS {  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector;  
    CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;  
    CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt;  
    CK_ULONG ulSaltLen;  
    CK_ULONG ulIteration;  
} CK_PBE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pInitVector pointer to the location that receives the 8-byte initialization vector (IV), if an IV is required

pPassword points to the password to be used in the PBE key generation

ulPasswordLen length in bytes of the password information

pSalt points to the salt to be used in the PBE key generation

ulSaltLen length in bytes of the salt information

ulIteration number of iterations required for the generation

CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_PBE_PARAMS**.

2.14.3 MD2-PBE for DES-CBC

MD2-PBE for DES-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC**, is a mechanism used for generating a DES secret key and an IV from a password and a salt value by using the MD2 digest algorithm and an iteration count. This functionality is defined in PKCS #5 as PBKDF1.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of the application-supplied buffer which receives the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism.

2.14.4 MD5-PBE for DES-CBC

MD5-PBE for DES-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC**, is a mechanism used for generating a DES secret key and an IV from a password and a salt value by using the MD5 digest algorithm and an iteration count. This functionality is defined in PKCS #5 as PBKDF1.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of the application-supplied buffer which receives the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism.

2.14.5 MD5-PBE for CAST-CBC

MD5-PBE for CAST-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC**, is a mechanism used for generating a CAST secret key and an IV from a password and a salt value by using the MD5 digest algorithm and an iteration count. This functionality is analogous to that defined in PKCS #5 PBKDF1 for MD5 and DES.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of the application-supplied buffer which receives the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism

The length of the CAST key generated by this mechanism MAY be specified in the supplied template; if it is not present in the template, it defaults to 8 bytes.

2.14.6 MD5-PBE for CAST3-CBC

MD5-PBE for CAST3-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC**, is a mechanism used for generating a CAST3 secret key and an IV from a password and a salt value by using the MD5 digest algorithm and an iteration count. This functionality is analogous to that defined in PKCS #5 PBKDF1 for MD5 and DES.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of the application-supplied buffer which receives the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism

The length of the CAST3 key generated by this mechanism MAY be specified in the supplied template; if it is not present in the template, it defaults to 8 bytes.

2.14.7 MD5-PBE for CAST128-CBC

MD5-PBE for CAST128-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC**, is a mechanism used for generating a CAST128 secret key and an IV from a password and a salt value by using the MD5 digest algorithm and an iteration count. This functionality is analogous to that defined in PKCS #5 PBKDF1 for MD5 and DES.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of the application-supplied buffer which receives the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism

The length of the CAST128 key generated by this mechanism MAY be specified in the supplied template; if it is not present in the template, it defaults to 8 bytes.

2.14.8 SHA-1-PBE for CAST128-CBC

SHA-1-PBE for CAST128-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_**, is a mechanism used for generating a CAST128 secret key and an IV from a password and salt value using the SHA-1 digest algorithm and an iteration count. This functionality is analogous to that defined in PKCS #5 PBKDF1 for MD5 and DES.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of the application-supplied buffer which receives the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism

The length of the CAST128 key generated by this mechanism MAY be specified in the supplied template; if it is not present in the template, it defaults to 8 bytes

2.15 PKCS #12 password-based encryption/authentication mechanisms

2.15.1 Definitions

The mechanisms in this section are for generating keys and IVs for performing password-based encryption or authentication. The method used to generate keys and IVs is based on a method that was specified in PKCS #12.

We specify here a general method for producing various types of pseudo-random bits from a password, p ; a string of salt bits, s ; and an iteration count, c . The “type” of pseudo-random bits to be produced is identified by an identification byte, ID , described at the end of this section.

Let H be a hash function built around a compression function $f: \mathbb{Z}_2^u \times \mathbb{Z}_2^v \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_2^u$ (that is, H has a chaining variable and output of length u bits, and the message input to the compression function of H is v bits). For MD2 and MD5, $u=128$ and $v=512$; for SHA-1, $u=160$ and $v=512$.

We assume here that u and v are both multiples of 8, as are the lengths in bits of the password and salt strings and the number n of pseudo-random bits required. In addition, u and v are of course nonzero.

1. Construct a string, D (the “diversifier”), by concatenating $v/8$ copies of ID .
2. Concatenate copies of the salt together to create a string S of length $v \cdot \lceil s/v \rceil$ bits (the final copy of the salt MAY be truncated to create S). Note that if the salt is the empty string, then so is S .
3. Concatenate copies of the password together to create a string P of length $v \cdot \lceil p/v \rceil$ bits (the final copy of the password MAY be truncated to create P). Note that if the password is the empty string, then so is P .
4. Set $I = S || P$ to be the concatenation of S and P .
5. Set $j = \lceil n/u \rceil$.
6. For $i=1, 2, \dots, j$, do the following:
 - a. Set $A_i = H_c(D || I)$, the c th hash of $D || I$. That is, compute the hash of $D || I$; compute the hash of that hash; etc.; continue in this fashion until a total of c hashes have been computed, each on the result of the previous hash.
 - b. Concatenate copies of A_i to create a string B of length v bits (the final copy of A_i MAY be truncated to create B).
 - c. Treating I as a concatenation I_0, I_1, \dots, I_{k-1} of v -bit blocks, where $k = \lceil s/v \rceil + \lceil p/v \rceil$, modify I by setting $I_j = (I_j + B + 1) \bmod 2^v$ for each j . To perform this addition, treat each v -bit block as a binary number represented most-significant bit first.
7. Concatenate A_1, A_2, \dots, A_j together to form a pseudo-random bit string, A .
8. Use the first n bits of A as the output of this entire process

When the password-based encryption mechanisms presented in this section are used to generate a key and IV (if needed) from a password, salt, and an iteration count, the above algorithm is used. To generate a key, the identifier byte ID is set to the value 1; to generate an IV, the identifier byte ID is set to the value 2.

When the password-based authentication mechanism presented in this section is used to generate a key from a password, salt and an iteration count, the above algorithm is used. The identifier ID is set to the value 3.

2.15.2 SHA-1-PBE for 128-bit RC4

SHA-1-PBE for 128-bit RC4, denoted **CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128**, is a mechanism used for generating a 128-bit RC4 secret key from a password and a salt value by using the SHA-1 digest algorithm and an iteration count. The method used to generate the key is described above.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process. The parameter also has a field to hold the location of an application-supplied buffer which receives an IV; for this mechanism, the contents of this field are ignored, since RC4 does not require an IV.

The key produced by this mechanism will typically be used for performing password-based encryption.

2.15.3 SHA-1_PBE for 40-bit RC4

SHA-1-PBE for 40-bit RC4, denoted **CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40**, is a mechanism used for generating a 40-bit RC4 secret key from a password and a salt value by using the SHA-1 digest algorithm and an iteration count. The method used to generate the key is described above.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process. The parameter also has a field to hold the location of an application-supplied buffer which receives an IV; for this mechanism, the contents of this field are ignored, since RC4 does not require an IV.

The key produced by this mechanism will typically be used for performing password-based encryption.

2.15.4 SHA-1_PBE for 128-bit RC2-CBC

SHA-1-PBE for 128-bit RC2-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC**, is a mechanism used for generating a 128-bit RC2 secret key from a password and a salt value by using the SHA-1 digest algorithm and an iteration count. The method used to generate the key and IV is described above.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of an application-supplied buffer which receives the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism.

When the key and IV generated by this mechanism are used to encrypt or decrypt, the effective number of bits in the RC2 search space should be set to 128. This ensures compatibility with the ASN.1 Object Identifier `pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC`.

The key and IV produced by this mechanism will typically be used for performing password-based encryption.

2.15.5 SHA-1_PBE for 40-bit RC2-CBC

SHA-1-PBE for 40-bit RC2-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC**, is a mechanism used for generating a 40-bit RC2 secret key from a password and a salt value by using the SHA-1 digest algorithm and an iteration count. The method used to generate the key and IV is described above.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of an application-supplied buffer which receives the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism.

When the key and IV generated by this mechanism are used to encrypt or decrypt, the effective number of bits in the RC2 search space should be set to 40. This ensures compatibility with the ASN.1 Object Identifier `pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC`.

The key and IV produced by this mechanism will typically be used for performing password-based encryption

2.16 RIPE-MD

2.16.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_RIPEMD128

CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC

CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_RIPEMD160

CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC

CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL

2.16.2 RIPE-MD 128 Digest

The RIPE-MD 128 mechanism, denoted **CKM_RIPEMD128**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the RIPE-MD 128 message-digest algorithm.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 55, RIPE-MD 128: Data Length

Function	Data length	Digest length
C_Digest	Any	16

2.16.3 General-length RIPE-MD 128-HMAC

The general-length RIPE-MD 128-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for signatures and verification. It uses the HMAC construction, based on the RIPE-MD 128 hash function. The keys it uses are generic secret keys.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 0-16 (the output size of RIPE-MD 128 is 16 bytes). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism MUST be taken from the start of the full 16-byte HMAC output.

Table 56, General-length RIPE-MD 128-HMAC

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	Generic secret	Any	0-16, depending on parameters
C_Verify	Generic secret	Any	0-16, depending on parameters

2.16.4 RIPE-MD 128-HMAC

The RIPE-MD 128-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length RIPE-MD 128-HMAC mechanism in Section 2.16.3.

It has no parameter, and produces an output of length 16.

2.16.5 RIPE-MD 160

The RIPE-MD 160 mechanism, denoted **CKM_RIPEMD160**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the RIPE-MD 160 message-digest defined in ISO-10118.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 57, RIPE-MD 160: Data Length

Function	Data length	Digest length
C_Digest	Any	20

2.16.6 General-length RIPE-MD 160-HMAC

The general-length RIPE-MD 160-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for signatures and verification. It uses the HMAC construction, based on the RIPE-MD 160 hash function. The keys it uses are generic secret keys.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 0-20 (the output size of RIPE-MD 160 is 20 bytes). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism MUST be taken from the start of the full 20-byte HMAC output.

Table 58, General-length RIPE-MD 160-HMAC: Data and Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	Generic secret	Any	0-20, depending on parameters
C_Verify	Generic secret	Any	0-20, depending on parameters

2.16.7 RIPE-MD 160-HMAC

The RIPE-MD 160-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length RIPE-MD 160HMAC mechanism in Section 2.16.6.

It has no parameter, and produces an output of length 20.

2.17 SET

2.17.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP

2.17.2 SET mechanism parameters

2.17.2.1 CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS; CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR

CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE bBC;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pX;
    CK_ULONG ulXLen;
} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

bBC block contents byte

pX concatenation of hash of plaintext data (if present) and extra data (if present)

ulXLen length in bytes of concatenation of hash of plaintext data (if present) and extra data (if present). 0 if neither is present.

CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS**.

2.17.3 OAEP key wrapping for SET

The OAEP key wrapping for SET mechanism, denoted **CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP**, is a mechanism for wrapping and unwrapping a DES key with an RSA key. The hash of some plaintext data and/or some

extra data MAY be wrapped together with the DES key. This mechanism is defined in the SET protocol specifications.

It takes a parameter, a **CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS** structure. This structure holds the "Block Contents" byte of the data and the concatenation of the hash of plaintext data (if present) and the extra data to be wrapped (if present). If neither the hash nor the extra data is present, this is indicated by the *ulXLen* field having the value 0.

When this mechanism is used to unwrap a key, the concatenation of the hash of plaintext data (if present) and the extra data (if present) is returned following the convention described [PKCS #11-Curr], **Miscellaneous simple key derivation mechanisms**. Note that if the inputs to **C_UnwrapKey** are such that the extra data is not returned (e.g. the buffer supplied in the **CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS** structure is **NULL_PTR**), then the unwrapped key object **MUST** NOT be created, either.

Be aware that when this mechanism is used to unwrap a key, the *bBC* and *pX* fields of the parameter supplied to the mechanism MAY be modified.

If an application uses **C_UnwrapKey** with **CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP**, it may be preferable for it simply to allocate a 128-byte buffer for the concatenation of the hash of plaintext data and the extra data (this concatenation **MUST** NOT be larger than 128 bytes), rather than calling **C_UnwrapKey** twice. Each call of **C_UnwrapKey** with **CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP** requires an RSA decryption operation to be performed, and this computational overhead MAY be avoided by this means.

2.18 LYNKS

2.18.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS

2.18.2 LYNKS key wrapping

The LYNKS key wrapping mechanism, denoted **CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS**, is a mechanism for wrapping and unwrapping secret keys with DES keys. It MAY wrap any 8-byte secret key, and it produces a 10-byte wrapped key, containing a cryptographic checksum.

It does not have a parameter.

To wrap an 8-byte secret key *K* with a DES key *W*, this mechanism performs the following steps:

1. Initialize two 16-bit integers, *sum*₁ and *sum*₂, to 0
2. Loop through the bytes of *K* from first to last.
3. Set *sum*₁ = *sum*₁ + the key byte (treat the key byte as a number in the range 0-255).
4. Set *sum*₂ = *sum*₂ + *sum*₁.
5. Encrypt *K* with *W* in ECB mode, obtaining an encrypted key, *E*.
6. Concatenate the last 6 bytes of *E* with *sum*₂, representing *sum*₂ most-significant bit first. The result is an 8-byte block, *T*
7. Encrypt *T* with *W* in ECB mode, obtaining an encrypted checksum, *C*.
8. Concatenate *E* with the last 2 bytes of *C* to obtain the wrapped key.

When unwrapping a key with this mechanism, if the cryptographic checksum does not check out properly, an error is returned. In addition, if a DES key or CDMF key is unwrapped with this mechanism, the parity bits on the wrapped key must be set appropriately. If they are not set properly, an error is returned.

3 PKCS #11 Implementation Conformance

1834

1835 An implementation is a conforming implementation if it meets the conditions specified in one or more
1836 server profiles specified in **[PKCS #11-Prof]**.

1837 A PKCS #11 implementation SHALL be a conforming PKCS #11 implementation.

1838 If a PKCS #11 implementation claims support for a particular profile, then the implementation SHALL
1839 conform to all normative statements within the clauses specified for that profile and for any subclauses to
1840 each of those clauses .

Appendix A. Acknowledgments

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Appendix B. Manifest constants

The definitions for manifest constants specified in this document can be found in the following normative computer language definition files:

- include/pkcs11-v3.0/pkcs11.h
- include/pkcs11-v3.0/pkcs11t.h
- include/pkcs11-v3.0/pkcs11f.h

These files are linked from the "[Additional artifacts](#)" section at the top of this specification.

Appendix C. Revision History

Revision	Date	Editor	Changes Made
wd01	20 April 2019	Dieter Bong	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- All CAST5 definitions removed- Replaced reference to [PKCS11-Base] table 10 by [PKCS11-Base] table 11 throughout whole document
wd02	May 28, 2019	Tony Cox	Final cleanup of front introductory texts and links prior to CSPRD