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Related work:

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- *PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Historical Mechanisms Specification Version 2.40*. Edited by Susan Gleeson and Chris Zimman. Latest version. <http://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-hist/v2.40/pkcs11-hist-v2.40.html>.
- *PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Usage Guide Version 2.40*. Edited by John Leiseboer and Robert Griffin. Latest version. <http://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-ug/v2.40/pkcs11-ug-v2.40.html>.

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Abstract:

This document defines mechanisms that are anticipated for use with the current version of PKCS #11.

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Table of Contents

1	Introduction.....	12
1.1	Terminology.....	12
1.2	Definitions.....	12
1.3	Normative References.....	14
1.4	Non-Normative References.....	15
2	Mechanisms.....	18
2.1	RSA.....	18
2.1.1	Definitions.....	19
2.1.2	RSA public key objects.....	20
2.1.3	RSA private key objects.....	20
2.1.4	PKCS #1 RSA key pair generation.....	22
2.1.5	X9.31 RSA key pair generation.....	23
2.1.6	PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA.....	23
2.1.7	PKCS #1 RSA OAEP mechanism parameters.....	24
2.1.8	PKCS #1 RSA OAEP.....	25
2.1.9	PKCS #1 RSA PSS mechanism parameters.....	26
2.1.10	PKCS #1 RSA PSS.....	26
2.1.11	ISO/IEC 9796 RSA.....	27
2.1.12	X.509 (raw) RSA.....	27
2.1.13	ANSI X9.31 RSA.....	28
2.1.14	PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, RIPE-MD 128 or RIPE-MD 160.....	29
2.1.15	PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-224.....	30
2.1.16	PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-224.....	30
2.1.17	PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512.....	30
2.1.18	ANSI X9.31 RSA signature with SHA-1.....	30
2.1.19	TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA.....	31
2.1.20	TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP.....	31
2.1.21	RSA AES KEY WRAP.....	32
2.1.22	RSA AES KEY WRAP mechanism parameters.....	33
2.1.23	FIPS 186-4.....	34
2.2	DSA.....	34
2.2.1	Definitions.....	34
2.2.2	DSA public key objects.....	35
2.2.3	DSA Key Restrictions.....	36
2.2.4	DSA private key objects.....	36
2.2.5	DSA domain parameter objects.....	37
2.2.6	DSA key pair generation.....	38
2.2.7	DSA domain parameter generation.....	38
2.2.8	DSA probabilistic domain parameter generation.....	38
2.2.9	DSA Shawe-Taylor domain parameter generation.....	39
2.2.10	DSA base domain parameter generation.....	39
2.2.11	DSA without hashing.....	39

2.2.12 DSA with SHA-1	40
2.2.13 FIPS 186-4	40
2.2.14 DSA with SHA-224	40
2.2.15 DSA with SHA-256	41
2.2.16 DSA with SHA-384	41
2.2.17 DSA with SHA-512	42
2.3 Elliptic Curve	42
2.3.1 EC Signatures	43
2.3.2 Definitions	44
2.3.3 ECDSA public key objects.....	44
2.3.4 Elliptic curve private key objects	45
2.3.5 Elliptic curve key pair generation.....	46
2.3.6 ECDSA without hashing	46
2.3.7 ECDSA with SHA-1	47
2.3.8 EC mechanism parameters.....	47
2.3.9 Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key derivation	50
2.3.10 Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman with cofactor key derivation	50
2.3.11 Elliptic curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone key derivation.....	51
2.3.12 ECDH AES KEY WRAP	51
2.3.13 ECDH AES KEY WRAP mechanism parameters	53
2.3.14 FIPS 186-4	53
2.4 Diffie-Hellman	53
2.4.1 Definitions.....	54
2.4.2 Diffie-Hellman public key objects	54
2.4.3 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key objects	55
2.4.4 Diffie-Hellman private key objects	56
2.4.5 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key objects	57
2.4.6 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter objects	58
2.4.7 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters objects	58
2.4.8 PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman key pair generation	59
2.4.9 PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter generation	59
2.4.10 PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman key derivation.....	60
2.4.11 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman mechanism parameters.....	60
2.4.12 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key pair generation.....	63
2.4.13 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter generation	64
2.4.14 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key derivation	64
2.4.15 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman hybrid key derivation	64
2.4.16 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Menezes-Qu-Vanstone key derivation	65
2.5 Wrapping/unwrapping private keys	66
2.6 Generic secret key	68
2.6.1 Definitions.....	68
2.6.2 Generic secret key objects	68
2.6.3 Generic secret key generation	69
2.7 HMAC mechanisms	69
2.8 AES.....	69

2.8.1 Definitions.....	70
2.8.2 AES secret key objects	70
2.8.3 AES key generation.....	71
2.8.4 AES-ECB.....	71
2.8.5 AES-CBC.....	72
2.8.6 AES-CBC with PKCS padding	73
2.8.7 AES-OFB.....	73
2.8.8 AES-CFB.....	74
2.8.9 General-length AES-MAC	74
2.8.10 AES-MAC	74
2.8.11 AES-XCBC-MAC.....	75
2.8.12 AES-XCBC-MAC-96.....	75
2.9 AES with Counter	75
2.9.1 Definitions.....	75
2.9.2 AES with Counter mechanism parameters	76
2.9.3 AES with Counter Encryption / Decryption.....	76
2.10 AES CBC with Cipher Text Stealing CTS.....	77
2.10.1 Definitions.....	77
2.10.2 AES CTS mechanism parameters	77
2.11 Additional AES Mechanisms	77
2.11.1 Definitions.....	77
2.12 AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption / Decryption.....	78
2.12.1 AES-CCM authenticated Encryption / Decryption.....	78
2.12.2 AES-GMAC	79
2.12.3 AES GCM and CCM Mechanism parameters.....	80
2.12.4 AES-GCM authenticated Encryption / Decryption.....	81
2.12.5 AES-CCM authenticated Encryption / Decryption.....	81
2.13 AES CMAC	82
2.13.1 Definitions.....	82
2.13.2 Mechanism parameters.....	83
2.13.3 General-length AES-CMAC.....	83
2.13.4 AES-CMAC.....	83
2.14 AES Key Wrap.....	83
2.14.1 Definitions.....	84
2.14.2 AES Key Wrap Mechanism parameters.....	84
2.14.3 AES Key Wrap	84
2.15 Key derivation by data encryption – DES & AES	84
2.15.1 Definitions.....	85
2.15.2 Mechanism Parameters	85
2.15.3 Mechanism Description	86
2.16 Double and Triple-length DES.....	86
2.16.1 Definitions.....	86
2.16.2 DES2 secret key objects	87
2.16.3 DES3 secret key objects	87
2.16.4 Double-length DES key generation.....	88

2.16.5 Triple-length DES Order of Operations	88
2.16.6 Triple-length DES in CBC Mode	88
2.16.7 DES and Triple length DES in OFB Mode	88
2.16.8 DES and Triple length DES in CFB Mode.....	89
2.17 Double and Triple-length DES CMAC	89
2.17.1 Definitions.....	90
2.17.2 Mechanism parameters.....	90
2.17.3 General-length DES3-MAC	90
2.17.4 DES3-CMAC	90
2.18 SHA-1	91
2.18.1 Definitions.....	91
2.18.2 SHA-1 digest	91
2.18.3 General-length SHA-1-HMAC	92
2.18.4 SHA-1-HMAC	92
2.18.5 SHA-1 key derivation.....	92
2.19 SHA-224	93
2.19.1 Definitions.....	93
2.19.2 SHA-224 digest	93
2.19.3 General-length SHA-224-HMAC	93
2.19.4 SHA-224-HMAC	94
2.19.5 SHA-224 key derivation.....	94
2.20 SHA-256	94
2.20.1 Definitions.....	94
2.20.2 SHA-256 digest	94
2.20.3 General-length SHA-256-HMAC	95
2.20.4 SHA-256-HMAC	95
2.20.5 SHA-256 key derivation.....	95
2.21 SHA-384	95
2.21.1 Definitions.....	95
2.21.2 SHA-384 digest	96
2.21.3 General-length SHA-384-HMAC	96
2.21.4 SHA-384-HMAC	96
2.21.5 SHA-384 key derivation.....	96
2.22 SHA-512	96
2.22.1 Definitions.....	96
2.22.2 SHA-512 digest	97
2.22.3 General-length SHA-512-HMAC	97
2.22.4 SHA-512-HMAC	97
2.22.5 SHA-512 key derivation.....	97
2.23 SHA-512/224	97
2.23.1 Definitions.....	97
2.23.2 SHA-512/224 digest	98
2.23.3 General-length SHA-512-HMAC	98
2.23.4 SHA-512/224-HMAC	98
2.23.5 SHA-512/224 key derivation.....	98

2.24	SHA-512/256	98
2.24.1	Definitions	99
2.24.2	SHA-512/256 digest	99
2.24.3	General-length SHA-512-HMAC	99
2.24.4	SHA-512/256-HMAC	99
2.24.5	SHA-512/256 key derivation.....	99
2.25	SHA-512/t	99
2.25.1	Definitions	100
2.25.2	SHA-512/t digest	100
2.25.3	General-length SHA-512-HMAC	100
2.25.4	SHA-512/t-HMAC	100
2.25.5	SHA-512/t key derivation.....	101
2.26	PKCS #5 and PKCS #5-style password-based encryption (PBE).....	101
2.26.1	Definitions	101
2.26.2	Password-based encryption/authentication mechanism parameters.....	101
2.26.3	PKCS #5 PBKDF2 key generation mechanism parameters	102
2.26.4	PKCS #5 PBKDF2 key generation	104
2.27	PKCS #12 password-based encryption/authentication mechanisms	104
2.27.1	SHA-1-PBE for 3-key triple-DES-CBC	105
2.27.2	SHA-1-PBE for 2-key triple-DES-CBC	105
2.27.3	SHA-1-PBE for SHA-1-HMAC.....	105
2.28	SSL	106
2.28.1	Definitions.....	106
2.28.2	SSL mechanism parameters	106
2.28.3	Pre-master key generation	108
2.28.4	Master key derivation	108
2.28.5	Master key derivation for Diffie-Hellman	109
2.28.6	Key and MAC derivation.....	110
2.28.7	MD5 MACing in SSL 3.0	111
2.28.8	SHA-1 MACing in SSL 3.0	111
2.29	TLS 1.2 Mechanisms	111
2.29.1	Definitions.....	112
2.29.2	TLS 1.2 mechanism parameters	112
2.29.3	TLS MAC	115
2.29.4	Master key derivation	115
2.29.5	Master key derivation for Diffie-Hellman	116
2.29.6	Key and MAC derivation.....	117
2.29.7	CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE.....	117
2.29.8	Generic Key Derivation using the TLS PRF	118
2.30	WTLS	118
2.30.1	Definitions.....	119
2.30.2	WTLS mechanism parameters.....	119
2.30.3	Pre master secret key generation for RSA key exchange suite.....	122
2.30.4	Master secret key derivation	122
2.30.5	Master secret key derivation for Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography	123

2.30.6	WTLS PRF (pseudorandom function)	124
2.30.7	Server Key and MAC derivation	124
2.30.8	Client key and MAC derivation	125
2.31	Miscellaneous simple key derivation mechanisms	126
2.31.1	Definitions	126
2.31.2	Parameters for miscellaneous simple key derivation mechanisms	126
2.31.3	Concatenation of a base key and another key	127
2.31.4	Concatenation of a base key and data	127
2.31.5	Concatenation of data and a base key	128
2.31.6	XORing of a key and data	129
2.31.7	Extraction of one key from another key	129
2.32	CMS	130
2.32.1	Definitions	131
2.32.2	CMS Signature Mechanism Objects	131
2.32.3	CMS mechanism parameters	131
2.32.4	CMS signatures	132
2.33	Blowfish	133
2.33.1	Definitions	134
2.33.2	BLOWFISH secret key objects	134
2.33.3	Blowfish key generation	135
2.33.4	Blowfish-CBC	135
2.33.5	Blowfish-CBC with PKCS padding	135
2.34	Twofish	136
2.34.1	Definitions	136
2.34.2	Twofish secret key objects	136
2.34.3	Twofish key generation	137
2.34.4	Twofish -CBC	137
2.34.5	Twofish-CBC with PKCS padding	137
2.35	CAMELLIA	137
2.35.1	Definitions	138
2.35.2	Camellia secret key objects	138
2.35.3	Camellia key generation	139
2.35.4	Camellia-ECB	139
2.35.5	Camellia-CBC	139
2.35.6	Camellia-CBC with PKCS padding	140
2.35.7	General-length Camellia-MAC	141
2.35.8	Camellia-MAC	141
2.36	Key derivation by data encryption - Camellia	142
2.36.1	Definitions	142
2.36.2	Mechanism Parameters	142
2.37	ARIA	142
2.37.1	Definitions	143
2.37.2	Aria secret key objects	143
2.37.3	ARIA key generation	144
2.37.4	ARIA-ECB	144

2.37.5 ARIA-CBC	144
2.37.6 ARIA-CBC with PKCS padding	145
2.37.7 General-length ARIA-MAC	146
2.37.8 ARIA-MAC	146
2.38 Key derivation by data encryption - ARIA	146
2.38.1 Definitions	147
2.38.2 Mechanism Parameters	147
2.39 SEED	147
2.39.1 Definitions	148
2.39.2 SEED secret key objects	149
2.39.3 SEED key generation	149
2.39.4 SEED-ECB	149
2.39.5 SEED-CBC	149
2.39.6 SEED-CBC with PKCS padding	150
2.39.7 General-length SEED-MAC	150
2.39.8 SEED-MAC	150
2.40 Key derivation by data encryption - SEED	150
2.40.1 Definitions	150
2.40.2 Mechanism Parameters	150
2.41 OTP	151
2.41.1 Usage overview	151
2.41.2 Case 1: Generation of OTP values	151
2.41.3 Case 2: Verification of provided OTP values	152
2.41.4 Case 3: Generation of OTP keys	152
2.41.5 OTP objects	153
2.41.6 OTP-related notifications	155
2.41.7 OTP mechanisms	156
2.41.8 RSA SecurID	161
2.41.9 RSA SecurID key generation	162
2.41.10 RSA SecurID OTP generation and validation	162
2.41.11 Return values	162
2.41.12 OATH HOTP	162
2.41.13 ActivIdentity ACTI	164
2.41.14 ACTI OTP generation and validation	165
2.42 CT-KIP	165
2.42.1 Principles of Operation	165
2.42.2 Mechanisms	166
2.42.3 Definitions	166
2.42.4 CT-KIP Mechanism parameters	166
2.42.5 CT-KIP key derivation	167
2.42.6 CT-KIP key wrap and key unwrap	167
2.42.7 CT-KIP signature generation	167
2.43 GOST	167
2.44 GOST 28147-89	168
2.44.1 Definitions	168

2.44.2 GOST 28147-89 secret key objects	168
2.44.3 GOST 28147-89 domain parameter objects	169
2.44.4 GOST 28147-89 key generation	170
2.44.5 GOST 28147-89-ECB	170
2.44.6 GOST 28147-89 encryption mode except ECB	171
2.44.7 GOST 28147-89-MAC	171
2.44.8 Definitions	172
2.44.9 GOST R 34.11-94 domain parameter objects	173
2.44.10 GOST R 34.11-94 digest	173
2.44.11 GOST R 34.11-94 HMAC	174
2.45 GOST R 34.10-2001	174
2.45.1 Definitions	174
2.45.2 GOST R 34.10-2001 public key objects	175
2.45.3 GOST R 34.10-2001 private key objects	176
2.45.4 GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameter objects	178
2.45.5 GOST R 34.10-2001 mechanism parameters	179
2.45.6 GOST R 34.10-2001 key pair generation	181
2.45.7 GOST R 34.10-2001 without hashing	181
2.45.8 GOST R 34.10-2001 with GOST R 34.11-94	181
2.45.9 GOST 28147-89 keys wrapping/unwrapping with GOST R 34.10-2001	182
3 PKCS #11 Implementation Conformance	183
Appendix A. Acknowledgments	184
Appendix B. Manifest Constants	187
B.1 OTP Definitions	187
B.2 Object classes	187
B.3 Key types	187
B.4 Mechanisms	188
B.5 Attributes	195
B.6 Attribute constants	197
B.7 Other constants	197
B.8 Notifications	198
B.9 Return values	198
Appendix C. Revision History	201

1 Introduction

This document defines mechanisms that are anticipated to be used with the current version of PKCS #11. All text is normative unless otherwise labeled.

1.1 Terminology

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]

1.2 Definitions

For the purposes of this standard, the following definitions apply. Please refer to the [PKCS#11-Base] for further definitions:

AES	<i>Advanced Encryption Standard, as defined in FIPS PUB 197.</i>
CAMELLIA	<i>The Camellia encryption algorithm, as defined in RFC 3713.</i>
BLOWFISH	<i>The Blowfish Encryption Algorithm of Bruce Schneier, www.schneier.com.</i>
CBC	<i>Cipher-Block Chaining mode, as defined in FIPS PUB 81.</i>
CDMF	<i>Commercial Data Masking Facility, a block encipherment method specified by International Business Machines Corporation and based on DES.</i>
CMAC	<i>Cipher-based Message Authenticate Code as defined in [NIST sp800-38b] and [RFC 4493].</i>
CMS	<i>Cryptographic Message Syntax (see RFC 2630)</i>
CT-KIP	<i>Cryptographic Token Key Initialization Protocol (as defined in [[CT-KIP]])</i>
DES	<i>Data Encryption Standard, as defined in FIPS PUB 46-3.</i>
DSA	<i>Digital Signature Algorithm, as defined in FIPS PUB 186-2.</i>
EC	<i>Elliptic Curve</i>
ECB	<i>Electronic Codebook mode, as defined in FIPS PUB 81.</i>
ECDH	<i>Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.</i>
ECDSA	<i>Elliptic Curve DSA, as in ANSI X9.62.</i>
ECMQV	<i>Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone</i>
GOST 28147-89	<i>The encryption algorithm, as defined in Part 2 [GOST 28147-89] and [RFC 4357] [RFC 4490], and RFC [4491].</i>

GOST R 34.11-94	<i>Hash algorithm, as defined in [GOST R 34.11-94] and [RFC 4357], [RFC 4490], and [RFC 4491].</i>
GOST R 34.10-2001	<i>The digital signature algorithm, as defined in [GOST R 34.10-2001] and [RFC 4357], [RFC 4490], and [RFC 4491].</i>
IV	<i>Initialization Vector.</i>
MAC	<i>Message Authentication Code.</i>
MQV	<i>Menezes-Qu-Vanstone</i>
OAEP	<i>Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding for RSA.</i>
PKCS	<i>Public-Key Cryptography Standards.</i>
PRF	<i>Pseudo random function.</i>
PTD	<i>Personal Trusted Device, as defined in MeT-PTD</i>
RSA	<i>The RSA public-key cryptosystem.</i>
SHA-1	<i>The (revised) Secure Hash Algorithm with a 160-bit message digest, as defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.</i>
SHA-224	<i>The Secure Hash Algorithm with a 224-bit message digest, as defined in RFC 3874. Also defined in FIPS PUB 180-2 with Change Notice 1.</i>
SHA-256	<i>The Secure Hash Algorithm with a 256-bit message digest, as defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.</i>
SHA-384	<i>The Secure Hash Algorithm with a 384-bit message digest, as defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.</i>
SHA-512	<i>The Secure Hash Algorithm with a 512-bit message digest, as defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.</i>
SSL	<i>The Secure Sockets Layer 3.0 protocol.</i>
SO	<i>A Security Officer user.</i>
TLS	<i>Transport Layer Security.</i>
WIM	<i>Wireless Identification Module.</i>
WTLS	<i>Wireless Transport Layer Security.</i>

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2 Mechanisms

A mechanism specifies precisely how a certain cryptographic process is to be performed. PKCS #11 implementations MAY use one or more mechanisms defined in this document.

The following table shows which Cryptoki mechanisms are supported by different cryptographic operations. For any particular token, of course, a particular operation may well support only a subset of the mechanisms listed. There is also no guarantee that a token which supports one mechanism for some operations supports any other mechanism for any other operation (or even supports that same mechanism for any other operation). For example, even if a token is able to create RSA digital signatures with the **CKM_RSA_PKCS** mechanism, it may or may not be the case that the same token can also perform RSA encryption with **CKM_RSA_PKCS**.

Each mechanism description is preceded by a table, of the following format, mapping mechanisms to API functions.

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive

¹ SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover.

² Single-part operations only.

³ Mechanism can only be used for wrapping, not unwrapping.

The remainder of this section will present in detail the mechanisms supported by Cryptoki and the parameters which are supplied to them.

In general, if a mechanism makes no mention of the ulMinKeyLen and ulMaxKeyLen fields of the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure, then those fields have no meaning for that particular mechanism.

2.1 RSA

Table 1, Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_RSA_PKCS	✓ ²	✓ ²	✓			✓	
CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP	✓ ²					✓	
CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓ ²					
CKM_RSA_9796		✓ ²	✓				
CKM_RSA_X_509	✓ ²	✓ ²	✓			✓	
CKM_RSA_X9_31		✓ ²					
CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS		✓					

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ₁	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31		✓					
CKM_RSA_PKCS_TPM_1_1	✓ ²					✓	
CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_TPM_1_1	✓ ²					✓	

2.1.1 Definitions

This section defines the RSA key type “CKK_RSA” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of RSA key objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN
- CKM_RSA_PKCS
- CKM_RSA_9796
- CKM_RSA_X_509
- CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS
- CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS
- CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS
- CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS
- CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS
- CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS
- CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS
- CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS
- CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS
- CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP
- CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN
- CKM_RSA_X9_31
- CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31
- CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS
- CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS
- CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS
- CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS
- CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS
- CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS
- CKM_RSA_PKCS_TPM_1_1
- CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_TPM_1_1
- CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP

2.1.2 RSA public key objects

RSA public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY**, key type **CKK_RSA**) hold RSA public keys. The following table defines the RSA public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 2, RSA Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_MODULUS ^{1,4}	Big integer	Modulus n
CKA_MODULUS_BITS ^{2,3}	CK_ULONG	Length in bits of modulus n
CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT ¹	Big integer	Public exponent e

¹ - Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of key components. See PKCS #1 for more information on RSA keys.

The following is a sample template for creating an RSA public key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An RSA public key object";
CK_BYTE modulus[] = {...};
CK_BYTE exponent[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_WRAP, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_MODULUS, modulus, sizeof(modulus)},
    {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, exponent, sizeof(exponent)}
};
```

2.1.3 RSA private key objects

RSA private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY**, key type **CKK_RSA**) hold RSA private keys. The following table defines the RSA private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 3, RSA Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_MODULUS ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Modulus n
CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT ^{4,6}	Big integer	Public exponent e
CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT ^{1,4,6,7}	Big integer	Private exponent d
CKA_PRIME_1 ^{4,6,7}	Big integer	Prime p
CKA_PRIME_2 ^{4,6,7}	Big integer	Prime q
CKA_EXPONENT_1 ^{4,6,7}	Big integer	Private exponent d modulo $p-1$
CKA_EXPONENT_2 ^{4,6,7}	Big integer	Private exponent d modulo $q-1$
CKA_COEFFICIENT ^{4,6,7}	Big integer	CRT coefficient $q^{-1} \bmod p$

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the key components. See PKCS #1 for more information on RSA keys.

Tokens vary in what they actually store for RSA private keys. Some tokens store all of the above attributes, which can assist in performing rapid RSA computations. Other tokens might store only the **CKA_MODULUS** and **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT** values. Effective with version 2.40, tokens **MUST** also store **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT**. This permits the retrieval of sufficient data to reconstitute the associated public key.

Because of this, Cryptoki is flexible in dealing with RSA private key objects. When a token generates an RSA private key, it stores whichever of the fields in Table 3 it keeps track of. Later, if an application asks for the values of the key's various attributes, Cryptoki supplies values only for attributes whose values it can obtain (*i.e.*, if Cryptoki is asked for the value of an attribute it cannot obtain, the request fails). Note that a Cryptoki implementation may or may not be able and/or willing to supply various attributes of RSA private keys which are not actually stored on the token. *E.g.*, if a particular token stores values only for the **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIME_1**, and **CKA_PRIME_2** attributes, then Cryptoki is certainly *able* to report values for all the attributes above (since they can all be computed efficiently from these three values). However, a Cryptoki implementation may or may not actually do this extra computation. The only attributes from Table 3 for which a Cryptoki implementation is *required* to be able to return values are **CKA_MODULUS** and **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT**.

If an RSA private key object is created on a token, and more attributes from Table 3 are supplied to the object creation call than are supported by the token, the extra attributes are likely to be thrown away. If an attempt is made to create an RSA private key object on a token with insufficient attributes for that particular token, then the object creation call fails and returns **CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE**.

Note that when generating an RSA private key, there is no **CKA_MODULUS_BITS** attribute specified. This is because RSA private keys are only generated as part of an RSA key *pair*, and the **CKA_MODULUS_BITS** attribute for the pair is specified in the template for the RSA public key.

The following is a sample template for creating an RSA private key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An RSA private key object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE modulus[] = {...};
CK_BYTE publicExponent[] = {...};
CK_BYTE privateExponent[] = {...};
CK_BYTE prime1[] = {...};
CK_BYTE prime2[] = {...};
CK_BYTE exponent1[] = {...};
CK_BYTE exponent2[] = {...};
CK_BYTE coefficient[] = {...};

```

```

CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
    {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
    {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_MODULUS, modulus, sizeof(modulus)},
    {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, publicExponent,
        sizeof(publicExponent)},
    {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, privateExponent,
        sizeof(privateExponent)},
    {CKA_PRIME_1, prime1, sizeof(prime1)},
    {CKA_PRIME_2, prime2, sizeof(prime2)},
    {CKA_EXPONENT_1, exponent1, sizeof(exponent1)},
    {CKA_EXPONENT_2, exponent2, sizeof(exponent2)},
    {CKA_COEFFICIENT, coefficient, sizeof(coefficient)}
};

```

2.1.4 PKCS #1 RSA key pair generation

The PKCS #1 RSA key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem, as defined in PKCS #1.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates RSA public/private key pairs with a particular modulus length in bits and public exponent, as specified in the **CKA_MODULUS_BITS** and **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** attributes of the template for the public key. The **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** may be omitted in which case the mechanism shall supply the public exponent attribute using the default value of 0x10001 (65537). Specific implementations may use a random value or an alternative default if 0x10001 cannot be used by the token.

Note: Implementations strictly compliant with version 2.11 or prior versions may generate an error if this attribute is omitted from the template. Experience has shown that many implementations of 2.11 and prior did allow the **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** attribute to be omitted from the template, and behaved as described above. The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_MODULUS**, and **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** attributes to the new public key.

CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT will be copied from the template if supplied.

CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT shall be returned if the implementation cannot use the supplied exponent value. It contributes the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attributes to the new private key; it may also contribute some of the following attributes to the new private key: **CKA_MODULUS**, **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIME_1**, **CKA_PRIME_2**, **CKA_EXPONENT_1**, **CKA_EXPONENT_2**, **CKA_COEFFICIENT**. Other attributes supported by the RSA public and private key types (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the keys support) may also be specified in the templates for the keys, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.5 X9.31 RSA key pair generation

The X9.31 RSA key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem, as defined in X9.31.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates RSA public/private key pairs with a particular modulus length in bits and public exponent, as specified in the **CKA_MODULUS_BITS** and **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** attributes of the template for the public key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_MODULUS**, and **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT** attributes to the new public key. It contributes the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attributes to the new private key; it may also contribute some of the following attributes to the new private key: **CKA_MODULUS**, **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIME_1**, **CKA_PRIME_2**, **CKA_EXPONENT_1**, **CKA_EXPONENT_2**, **CKA_COEFFICIENT**. Other attributes supported by the RSA public and private key types (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the keys support) may also be specified in the templates for the keys, or else are assigned default initial values. Unlike the **CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN** mechanism, this mechanism is guaranteed to generate p and q values, **CKA_PRIME_1** and **CKA_PRIME_2** respectively, that meet the strong primes requirement of X9.31.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.6 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA

The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS**, is a multi-purpose mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the block formats initially defined in PKCS #1 v1.5. It supports single-part encryption and decryption; single-part signatures and verification with and without message recovery; key wrapping; and key unwrapping. This mechanism corresponds only to the part of PKCS #1 v1.5 that involves RSA; it does not compute a message digest or a DigestInfo encoding as specified for the md2withRSAEncryption and md5withRSAEncryption algorithms in PKCS #1 v1.5 .

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key of appropriate length. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every appropriate-length secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the "input" to the encryption operation is the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped; similarly for unwrapping. The mechanism does not wrap the key type or any other information about the key, except the key length; the application must convey these separately. In particular, the mechanism contributes only the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_VALUE** (and **CKA_VALUE_LEN**, if the key has it) attributes to the recovered key during unwrapping; other attributes must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. For encryption, decryption, signatures and signature verification, the input and output data may begin at the same location in memory. In the table, k is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 4, PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt ¹	RSA public key	$\leq k-11$	k	block type 02
C_Decrypt ¹	RSA private key	k	$\leq k-11$	block type 02
C_Sign ¹	RSA private key	$\leq k-11$	k	block type 01
C_SignRecover	RSA private key	$\leq k-11$	k	block type 01
C_Verify ¹	RSA public key	$\leq k-11, k^2$	N/A	block type 01
C_VerifyRecover	RSA public key	k	$\leq k-11$	block type 01
C_WrapKey	RSA public key	$\leq k-11$	k	block type 02
C_UnwrapKey	RSA private key	k	$\leq k-11$	block type 02

¹ Single-part operations only.

² Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.7 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP mechanism parameters

◆ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE; CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR

CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme or the PKCS #1 PSS signature scheme. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE;
```

The following MGFs are defined in PKCS #1. The following table lists the defined functions.

Table 5, PKCS #1 Mask Generation Functions

Source Identifier	Value
CKG_MGF1_SHA1	0x00000001UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA224	0x00000005UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA256	0x00000002UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA384	0x00000003UL
CKG_MGF1_SHA512	0x00000004UL

CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE**.

◆ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE; CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR

CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE;
```

The following encoding parameter sources are defined in PKCS #1. The following table lists the defined sources along with the corresponding data type for the *pSourceData* field in the **CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS** structure defined below.

Table 6, PKCS #1 RSA OAEP: Encoding parameter sources

Source Identifier	Value	Data Type
CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED	0x00000001UL	Array of CK_BYTE containing the value of the encoding parameter. If the parameter is empty, <i>pSourceData</i> must be NULL and <i>ulSourceDataLen</i> must be zero.

CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE.

◆ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS; CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR

CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS {
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
    CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
    CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source;
    CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData;
    CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen;
} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>hashAlg</i>	<i>mechanism ID of the message digest algorithm used to calculate the digest of the encoding parameter</i>
<i>mgf</i>	<i>mask generation function to use on the encoded block</i>
<i>source</i>	<i>source of the encoding parameter</i>
<i>pSourceData</i>	<i>data used as the input for the encoding parameter source</i>
<i>ulSourceDataLen</i>	<i>length of the encoding parameter source input</i>

CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS.

2.1.8 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP

The PKCS #1 RSA OAEP mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP**, is a multi-purpose mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the OAEP block format defined in PKCS #1. It supports single-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key of appropriate length. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every appropriate-length secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the “input” to the encryption operation is the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped; similarly for unwrapping. The mechanism does not wrap the key type or any other information about the key, except the key length; the application must convey these separately. In particular, the mechanism contributes only the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_VALUE** (and **CKA_VALUE_LEN**, if the key has it) attributes to the recovered key during unwrapping; other attributes must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. For encryption and decryption, the input and output data may begin at the same location in memory. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus, and *hLen* is the output length of the message digest algorithm specified by the *hashAlg* field of the **CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS** structure.

Table 7, PKCS #1 RSA OAEP: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt ¹	RSA public key	$\leq k-2-2hLen$	k
C_Decrypt ¹	RSA private key	k	$\leq k-2-2hLen$
C_WrapKey	RSA public key	$\leq k-2-2hLen$	k
C_UnwrapKey	RSA private key	k	$\leq k-2-2hLen$

¹ Single-part operations only.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.9 PKCS #1 RSA PSS mechanism parameters

◆ CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS; CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR

CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS** mechanism. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS {
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
    CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
    CK_ULONG sLen;
} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

hashAlg *hash algorithm used in the PSS encoding; if the signature mechanism does not include message hashing, then this value must be the mechanism used by the application to generate the message hash; if the signature mechanism includes hashing, then this value must match the hash algorithm indicated by the signature mechanism*

mgf *mask generation function to use on the encoded block*

sLen *length, in bytes, of the salt value used in the PSS encoding; typical values are the length of the message hash and zero*

CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS**.

2.1.10 PKCS #1 RSA PSS

The PKCS #1 RSA PSS mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, is a mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the PSS block format defined in PKCS #1. It supports single-part signature generation and verification without message recovery. This mechanism corresponds only to the part of PKCS #1 that involves block formatting and RSA, given a hash value; it does not compute a hash value on the message to be signed.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS** structure. The *sLen* field must be less than or equal to $k^*-2-hLen$ and *hLen* is the length of the input to the C_Sign or C_Verify function. k^* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus, except if the length in bits of the RSA modulus is one more than a multiple of 8, in which case k^* is one less than the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. In the table, k is the length in bytes of the RSA.

Table 8, PKCS #1 RSA PSS: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign ¹	RSA private key	<i>hLen</i>	<i>k</i>
C_Verify ¹	RSA public key	<i>hLen, k</i>	N/A

1 Single-part operations only.

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.11 ISO/IEC 9796 RSA

The ISO/IEC 9796 RSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_9796**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification with and without message recovery based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the block formats defined in ISO/IEC 9796 and its annex A.

This mechanism processes only byte strings, whereas ISO/IEC 9796 operates on bit strings. Accordingly, the following transformations are performed:

- Data is converted between byte and bit string formats by interpreting the most-significant bit of the leading byte of the byte string as the leftmost bit of the bit string, and the least-significant bit of the trailing byte of the byte string as the rightmost bit of the bit string (this assumes the length in bits of the data is a multiple of 8).
- A signature is converted from a bit string to a byte string by padding the bit string on the left with 0 to 7 zero bits so that the resulting length in bits is a multiple of 8, and converting the resulting bit string as above; it is converted from a byte string to a bit string by converting the byte string as above, and removing bits from the left so that the resulting length in bits is the same as that of the RSA modulus.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 9, ISO/IEC 9796 RSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign ¹	RSA private key	$\leq \lfloor k/2 \rfloor$	<i>k</i>
C_SignRecover	RSA private key	$\leq \lfloor k/2 \rfloor$	<i>k</i>
C_Verify ¹	RSA public key	$\leq \lfloor k/2 \rfloor, k^2$	N/A
C_VerifyRecover	RSA public key	<i>k</i>	$\leq \lfloor k/2 \rfloor$

1 Single-part operations only.

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.12 X.509 (raw) RSA

The X.509 (raw) RSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_X_509**, is a multi-purpose mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem. It supports single-part encryption and decryption; single-part signatures and verification with and without message recovery; key wrapping; and key unwrapping. All these operations are based on so-called “raw” RSA, as assumed in X.509.

“Raw” RSA as defined here encrypts a byte string by converting it to an integer, most-significant byte first, applying “raw” RSA exponentiation, and converting the result to a byte string, most-significant byte first. The input string, considered as an integer, must be less than the modulus; the output string is also less than the modulus.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key of appropriate length. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every appropriate-length secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the “input” to the encryption operation is the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped; similarly for unwrapping. The mechanism does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately, and supply them when unwrapping the key.

Unfortunately, X.509 does not specify how to perform padding for RSA encryption. For this mechanism, padding should be performed by prepending plaintext data with 0-valued bytes. In effect, to encrypt the sequence of plaintext bytes $b_1 b_2 \dots b_n$ ($n \leq k$), Cryptoki forms $P=2^{n-1}b_1+2^{n-2}b_2+\dots+b_n$. This number must be less than the RSA modulus. The k -byte ciphertext (k is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus) is produced by raising P to the RSA public exponent modulo the RSA modulus. Decryption of a k -byte ciphertext C is accomplished by raising C to the RSA private exponent modulo the RSA modulus, and returning the resulting value as a sequence of exactly k bytes. If the resulting plaintext is to be used to produce an unwrapped key, then however many bytes are specified in the template for the length of the key are taken *from the end* of this sequence of bytes.

Technically, the above procedures may differ very slightly from certain details of what is specified in X.509.

Executing cryptographic operations using this mechanism can result in the error returns **CKR_DATA_INVALID** (if plaintext is supplied which has the same length as the RSA modulus and is numerically at least as large as the modulus) and **CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID** (if ciphertext is supplied which has the same length as the RSA modulus and is numerically at least as large as the modulus).

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. In the table, k is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 10, X.509 (Raw) RSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt ¹	RSA public key	$\leq k$	k
C_Decrypt ¹	RSA private key	k	k
C_Sign ¹	RSA private key	$\leq k$	k
C_SignRecover	RSA private key	$\leq k$	k
C_Verify ¹	RSA public key	$\leq k, k^2$	N/A
C_VerifyRecover	RSA public key	k	k
C_WrapKey	RSA public key	$\leq k$	k
C_UnwrapKey	RSA private key	k	$\leq k$ (specified in template)

¹ Single-part operations only.

² Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

This mechanism is intended for compatibility with applications that do not follow the PKCS #1 or ISO/IEC 9796 block formats.

2.1.13 ANSI X9.31 RSA

The ANSI X9.31 RSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_X9_31**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification without message recovery based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the block formats defined in ANSI X9.31.

This mechanism applies the header and padding fields of the hash encapsulation. The trailer field must be applied by the application.

This mechanism processes only byte strings, whereas ANSI X9.31 operates on bit strings. Accordingly, the following transformations are performed:

- Data is converted between byte and bit string formats by interpreting the most-significant bit of the leading byte of the byte string as the leftmost bit of the bit string, and the least-significant bit of the trailing byte of the byte string as the rightmost bit of the bit string (this assumes the length in bits of the data is a multiple of 8).
- A signature is converted from a bit string to a byte string by padding the bit string on the left with 0 to 7 zero bits so that the resulting length in bits is a multiple of 8, and converting the resulting bit string as above; it is converted from a byte string to a bit string by converting the byte string as above, and removing bits from the left so that the resulting length in bits is the same as that of the RSA modulus.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. In the table, k is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus. For all operations, the k value must be at least 128 and a multiple of 32 as specified in ANSI X9.31.

Table 11, ANSI X9.31 RSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign ¹	RSA private key	$\leq k-2$	k
C_Verify ¹	RSA public key	$\leq k-2, k^2$	N/A

¹ Single-part operations only.

² Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.14 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, RIPE-MD 128 or RIPE-MD 160

The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with MD2 mechanism, denoted **CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS**, performs single- and multiple-part digital signatures and verification operations without message recovery. The operations performed are as described initially in PKCS #1 v1.5 with the object identifier *md2WithRSAEncryption*, and as in the scheme *RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5* in the current version of PKCS #1, where the underlying hash function is MD2.

Similarly, the PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with MD5 mechanism, denoted **CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS**, performs the same operations described in PKCS #1 with the object identifier *md5WithRSAEncryption*. The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS**, performs the same operations, except that it uses the hash function SHA-1 with object identifier *sha1WithRSAEncryption*.

Likewise, the PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 mechanisms, denoted **CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS**, **CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS**, and **CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS** respectively, perform the same operations using the SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 hash functions with the object identifiers *sha256WithRSAEncryption*, *sha384WithRSAEncryption* and *sha512WithRSAEncryption* respectively.

The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with RIPEMD-128 or RIPEMD-160, denoted **CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS** and **CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS** respectively, perform the same operations using the RIPE-MD 128 and RIPE-MD 160 hash functions.

None of these mechanisms has a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data for these mechanisms are summarized in the following table. In the table, k is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus. For the PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with MD2 and PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with MD5 mechanisms, k must be at least 27; for the PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-1 mechanism, k must be at least 31, and so on for other underlying hash functions, where the minimum is always 11 bytes more than the length of the hash value.

Table 12, PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA Signatures with Various Hash Functions: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Sign	RSA private key	any	k	block type 01
C_Verify	RSA public key	any, k^2	N/A	block type 01

² Data length, signature length.

For these mechanisms, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.15 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-224

The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS**, performs similarly as the other **CKM_SHAX_RSA_PKCS** mechanisms but uses the SHA-224 hash function.

2.1.16 PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-224

The PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, performs similarly as the other **CKM_SHAX_RSA_PSS** mechanisms but uses the SHA-224 hash function.

2.1.17 PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512

The PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, performs single- and multiple-part digital signatures and verification operations without message recovery. The operations performed are as described in PKCS #1 with the object identifier id-RSASSA-PSS, i.e., as in the scheme RSASSA-PSS in PKCS #1 where the underlying hash function is SHA-1.

The PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 mechanisms, denoted **CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, **CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, and **CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS** respectively, perform the same operations using the SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 hash functions.

The mechanisms have a parameter, a **CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS** structure. The *sLen* field must be less than or equal to $k^* - 2 \cdot hLen$ where *hLen* is the length in bytes of the hash value. k^* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus, except if the length in bits of the RSA modulus is one more than a multiple of 8, in which case k^* is one less than the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 13, PKCS #1 RSA PSS Signatures with Various Hash Functions: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	RSA private key	any	k
C_Verify	RSA public key	any, k^2	N/A

² Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.18 ANSI X9.31 RSA signature with SHA-1

The ANSI X9.31 RSA signature with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31**, performs single- and multiple-part digital signatures and verification operations without message recovery. The operations performed are as described in ANSI X9.31.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data for these mechanisms are summarized in the following table. In the table, k is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus. For all operations, the k value must be at least 128 and a multiple of 32 as specified in ANSI X9.31.

Table 14, ANSI X9.31 RSA Signatures with SHA-1: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	RSA private key	any	k
C_Verify	RSA public key	any, k^2	N/A

² Data length, signature length.

For these mechanisms, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.19 TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA

The TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS_TPM_1_1**, is a multi-use mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the block formats initially defined in PKCS #1 v1.5, with additional formatting rules defined in TCGA TPM Specification Version 1.1b. Additional formatting rules remained the same in TCG TPM Specification 1.2. The mechanism supports single-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

This mechanism does not have a parameter. It differs from the standard PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA encryption mechanism in that the plaintext is wrapped in a **TCPA_BOUND_DATA** (**TPM_BOUND_DATA** for TPM 1.2) structure before being submitted to the PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption process. On encryption, the version field of the **TCPA_BOUND_DATA** (**TPM_BOUND_DATA** for TPM 1.2) structure must contain 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00. On decryption, any structure of the form 0x01, 0x01, 0xXX, 0xYY may be accepted.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key of appropriate length. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every appropriate-length secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the “input” to the encryption operation is the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped; similarly for unwrapping. The mechanism does not wrap the key type or any other information about the key, except the key length; the application must convey these separately. In particular, the mechanism contributes only the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_VALUE** (and **CKA_VALUE_LEN**, if the key has it) attributes to the recovered key during unwrapping; other attributes must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. For encryption and decryption, the input and output data may begin at the same location in memory. In the table, k is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 15, TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt ¹	RSA public key	$\leq k-11-5$	k
C_Decrypt ¹	RSA private key	k	$\leq k-11-5$
C_WrapKey	RSA public key	$\leq k-11-5$	k
C_UnwrapKey	RSA private key	k	$\leq k-11-5$

¹ Single-part operations only.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.20 TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP

The TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_TPM_1_1**, is a multi-purpose mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the OAEP block format defined in PKCS #1, with additional formatting defined in TCGA

TPM Specification Version 1.1b. Additional formatting rules remained the same in TCG TPM Specification 1.2. The mechanism supports single-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

This mechanism does not have a parameter. It differs from the standard PKCS#1 OAEP RSA encryption mechanism in that the plaintext is wrapped in a `TCPA_BOUND_DATA` (`TPM_BOUND_DATA` for TPM 1.2) structure before being submitted to the encryption process and that all of the values of the parameters that are passed to a standard `CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP` operation are fixed. On encryption, the version field of the `TCPA_BOUND_DATA` (`TPM_BOUND_DATA` for TPM 1.2) structure must contain 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00. On decryption, any structure of the form 0x01, 0x01, 0xXX, 0xYY may be accepted.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key of appropriate length. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every appropriate-length secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the “input” to the encryption operation is the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped; similarly for unwrapping. The mechanism does not wrap the key type or any other information about the key, except the key length; the application must convey these separately. In particular, the mechanism contributes only the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_VALUE** (and **CKA_VALUE_LEN**, if the key has it) attributes to the recovered key during unwrapping; other attributes must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of the data are summarized in the following table. For encryption and decryption, the input and output data may begin at the same location in memory. In the table, *k* is the length in bytes of the RSA modulus.

Table 16, TPM 1.1b and TPM 1.2 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt ¹	RSA public key	$\leq k-2-40-5$	<i>k</i>
C_Decrypt ¹	RSA private key	<i>k</i>	$\leq k-2-40-5$
C_WrapKey	RSA public key	$\leq k-2-40-5$	<i>k</i>
C_UnwrapKey	RSA private key	<i>k</i>	$\leq k-2-40-5$

¹ Single-part operations only.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of RSA modulus sizes, in bits.

2.1.21 RSA AES KEY WRAP

The RSA AES key wrap mechanism, denoted **CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP**, is a mechanism based on the RSA public-key cryptosystem and the AES key wrap mechanism. It supports single-part key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

It has a parameter, a **CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS** structure.

The mechanism can wrap and unwrap a target asymmetric key of any length and type using an RSA key.

- A temporary AES key is used for wrapping the target key using `CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD` mechanism.
- The temporary AES key is wrapped with the wrapping RSA key using `CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP` mechanism.

For wrapping, the mechanism -

- Generates temporary random AES key of *ulAESKeyBits* length. This key is not accessible to the user - no handle is returned.
- Wraps the AES key with the wrapping RSA key using **CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP** with parameters of *OAEPParams*.

- Wraps the target key with the temporary AES key using **CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD** (RFC5649) .
- Zeroizes the temporary AES key
- Concatenates two wrapped keys and outputs the concatenated blob.

The recommended format for an asymmetric target key being wrapped is as a PKCS8 PrivateKeyInfo

The use of Attributes in the PrivateKeyInfo structure is OPTIONAL. In case of conflicts between the object attribute template, and Attributes in the PrivateKeyInfo structure, an error should be thrown

For unwrapping, the mechanism -

- Splits the input into two parts. The first is the wrapped AES key, and the second is the wrapped target key. The length of the first part is equal to the length of the unwrapping RSA key.
- Un-wraps the temporary AES key from the first part with the private RSA key using **CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP** with parameters of *OAEPParams*.
- Un-wraps the target key from the second part with the temporary AES key using **CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD** (RFC5649) .
- Zeroizes the temporary AES key.
- Returns the handle to the newly unwrapped target key.

Table 17, *CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP Mechanisms vs. Functions*

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP						✓	

¹SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover

2.1.22 RSA AES KEY WRAP mechanism parameters

◆ **CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS; CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG                ulAESKeyBits;
    CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR  pOAEPParams;
} CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

ulAESKeyBits *length of the temporary AES key in bits. Can be only 128, 192 or 256.*

pOAEPParams *pointer to the parameters of the temporary AES key wrapping. See also the description of PKCS #1 RSA OAEP mechanism parameters.*

CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS**.

2.1.23 FIPS 186-4

When CKM_RSA_PKCS is operated in FIPS mode, the length of the modulus SHALL only be 1024, 2048, or 3072 bits.

2.2 DSA

Table 18, DSA Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN					✓		
CKM_DSA_PROBABALISTIC_PARAMETER_GEN					✓		
CKM_DSA_SHAWE_TAYLOR_PARAMETER_GEN					✓		
CKM_DSA_FIPS_G_GEN					✓		
CKM_DSA		✓ ²					
CKM_DSA_SHA1		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA224		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA256		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA384		✓					
CKM_DSA_SHA512		✓					

2.2.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_DSA” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of DSA key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN
 CKM_DSA
 CKM_DSA_SHA1
 CKM_DSA_SHA224
 CKM_DSA_SHA256
 CKM_DSA_SHA384
 CKM_DSA_SHA512
 CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN
 CKM_DSA_PROBABLISTIC_PARAMETER_GEN
 CKM_DSA_SHAWE_TAYLOR_PARAMETER_GEN
 CKM_DSA_FIPS_G_GEN

- CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM

CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM is a structure which provides and returns parameters for the NIST FIPS 186-4 parameter generating algorithms.

```

typedef struct CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM {
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash;
    CK_BYTE_PTR      pSeed;
    CK_ULONG         ulSeedLen;
    CK_ULONG         ullIndex;
};

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>hash</i>	Mechanism value for the base hash used in PQG generation, Valid values are CKM_SHA1, CKM_SHA224, CKM_SHA256, CKM_SHA384, CKM_SHA512.
<i>pSeed</i>	Seed value used to generate PQ and G. This value is returned by CKM_DSA_PROBABLISTIC_PARAMETER_GEN, CKM_DSA_SHAWA_TAYLOR_PARAMETER_GEN, and passed into CKM_DSA_FIPS_G_GEN.
<i>ulSeedLen</i>	Length of seed value.
<i>ullIndex</i>	Index value for generating G. Input for CKM_DSA_FIPS_G_GEN. Ignored by CKM_DSA_PROBABALISTIC_PARAMETER_GEN and CKM_DSA_SHAWA_TAYLOR_PARAMETER_GEN.

2.2.2 DSA public key objects

DSA public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY**, key type **CKK_DSA**) hold DSA public keys. The following table defines the DSA public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 19, DSA Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME ^{1,3}	Big integer	Prime p (512 to 3072 bits, in steps of 64 bits)
CKA_SUBPRIME ^{1,3}	Big integer	Subprime q (160, 224 bits, or 256 bits)
CKA_BASE ^{1,3}	Big integer	Base g
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4}	Big integer	Public value y

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the “DSA domain parameters”. See FIPS PUB 186-4 for more information on DSA keys.

The following is a sample template for creating a DSA public key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A DSA public key object";
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
};

```

```

    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.2.3 DSA Key Restrictions

FIPS PUB 186-4 specifies permitted combinations of prime and sub-prime lengths. They are:

- Prime: 1024 bits, Subprime: 160
- Prime: 2048 bits, Subprime: 224
- Prime: 2048 bits, Subprime: 256
- Prime: 3072 bits, Subprime: 256

Earlier versions of FIPS 186 permitted smaller prime lengths, and those are included here for backwards compatibility. An implementation that is compliant to FIPS 186-4 does not permit the use of primes of any length less than 1024 bits.

2.2.4 DSA private key objects

DSA private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY**, key type **CKK_DSA**) hold DSA private keys. The following table defines the DSA private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 20, DSA Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Prime p (512 to 1024 bits, in steps of 64 bits)
CKA_SUBPRIME ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Subprime q (160 bits, 224 bits, or 256 bits)
CKA_BASE ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Base g
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Big integer	Private value x

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the “DSA domain parameters”. See FIPS PUB 186-4 for more information on DSA keys.

Note that when generating a DSA private key, the DSA domain parameters are *not* specified in the key’s template. This is because DSA private keys are only generated as part of a DSA key *pair*, and the DSA domain parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the DSA public key.

The following is a sample template for creating a DSA private key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A DSA private key object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},

```

```

    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
    {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
    {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.2.5 DSA domain parameter objects

DSA domain parameter objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS**, key type **CKK_DSA**) hold DSA domain parameters. The following table defines the DSA domain parameter object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 21, DSA Domain Parameter Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME ^{1,4}	Big integer	Prime p (512 to 1024 bits, in steps of 64 bits)
CKA_SUBPRIME ^{1,4}	Big integer	Subprime q (160 bits, 224 bits, or 256 bits)
CKA_BASE ^{1,4}	Big integer	Base g
CKA_PRIME_BITS ^{2,3}	CK_ULONG	Length of the prime value.

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the “DSA domain parameters”. See FIPS PUB 186-4 for more information on DSA domain parameters.

To ensure backwards compatibility, if **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** is not specified for a call to **C_GenerateKey**, it takes on a default based on the value of **CKA_PRIME_BITS** as follows:

- If **CKA_PRIME_BITS** is less than or equal to 1024 then **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** shall be 160 bits
- If **CKA_PRIME_BITS** equals 2048 then **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** shall be 224 bits
- If **CKA_PRIME_BITS** equals 3072 then **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** shall be 256 bits

The following is a sample template for creating a DSA domain parameter object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A DSA domain parameter object";
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
};

```

```

    {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
};

```

2.2.6 DSA key pair generation

The DSA key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-2.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates DSA public/private key pairs with a particular prime, subprime and base, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, and **CKA_BASE** attributes of the template for the public key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, **CKA_BASE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new private key. Other attributes supported by the DSA public and private key types (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the keys support) may also be specified in the templates for the keys, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

2.2.7 DSA domain parameter generation

The DSA domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN**, is a domain parameter generation mechanism based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-2.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates DSA domain parameters with a particular prime length in bits, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME_BITS** attribute of the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, **CKA_BASE** and **CKA_PRIME_BITS** attributes to the new object. Other attributes supported by the DSA domain parameter types may also be specified in the template, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

2.2.8 DSA probabilistic domain parameter generation

The DSA probabilistic domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_PROBABLISTIC_PARAMETER_GEN**, is a domain parameter generation mechanism based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, section Appendix A.1.1 Generation and Validation of Probable Primes..

This mechanism takes a **CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM** which supplies the base hash and returns the seed (*pSeed*) and the length (*ulSeedLen*).

The mechanism generates DSA the prime and subprime domain parameters with a particular prime length in bits, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME_BITS** attribute of the template and the subprime length as specified in the **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attribute of the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, **CKA_PRIME_BITS**, and **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attributes to the new object. **CKA_BASE** is not set by this call. Other attributes supported by the DSA domain parameter types may also be specified in the template, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

2.2.9 DSA Shawe-Taylor domain parameter generation

The DSA Shawe-Taylor domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHAWE_TAYLOR_PARAMETER_GEN**, is a domain parameter generation mechanism based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, section Appendix A.1.2 Construction and Validation of Provable Primes p and q .

This mechanism takes a **CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM** which supplies the base hash and returns the seed ($pSeed$) and the length ($ulSeedLen$).

The mechanism generates DSA the prime and subprime domain parameters with a particular prime length in bits, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME_BITS** attribute of the template and the subprime length as specified in the **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attribute of the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, **CKA_PRIME_BITS**, and **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attributes to the new object. **CKA_BASE** is not set by this call. Other attributes supported by the DSA domain parameter types may also be specified in the template, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

2.2.10 DSA base domain parameter generation

The DSA base domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_FIPS_G_GEN**, is a base parameter generation mechanism based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, section Appendix A.2 Generation of Generator G .

This mechanism takes a **CK_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN_PARAM** which supplies the base hash the seed ($pSeed$) and the length ($ulSeedLen$) and the index value.

The mechanism generates the DSA base with the domain parameter specified in the **CKA_PRIME** and **CKA_SUBPRIME** attributes of the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_BASE** attributes to the new object. Other attributes supported by the DSA domain parameter types may also be specified in the template, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

2.2.11 DSA without hashing

The DSA without hashing mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-2. (This mechanism corresponds only to the part of DSA that processes the 20-byte hash value; it does not compute the hash value.)

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a 40-byte string, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values r and s , each represented most-significant byte first.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 22, DSA: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign ¹	DSA private key	20, 28, 32, 48, or 64 bits	2*length of subprime
C_Verify ¹	DSA public key	(20, 28, 32, 48, or 64 bits), (2*length of subprime) ²	N/A

¹ Single-part operations only.

² Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

2.2.12 DSA with SHA-1

The DSA with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA1**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-2. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-1.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a 40-byte string, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 23, DSA with SHA-1: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length ²	N/A

² Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

2.2.13 FIPS 186-4

When CKM_DSA is operated in FIPS mode, only the following bit lengths of *p* and *q*, represented by *L* and *N*, SHALL be used:

L = 1024, N = 160

L = 2048, N = 224

L = 2048, N = 256

L = 3072, N = 256

2.2.14 DSA with SHA-224

The DSA with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA224**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-224.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 24, DSA with SHA-244: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length ²	N/A

² Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of DSA prime sizes, in bits.

2.2.15 DSA with SHA-256

The DSA with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA256**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-256.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 25, DSA with SHA-256: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length ²	N/A

² Data length, signature length.

2.2.16 DSA with SHA-384

The DSA with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA384**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-384.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 26, DSA with SHA-384: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length ²	N/A

² Data length, signature length.

2.2.17 DSA with SHA-512

The DSA with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_DSA_SHA512**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification based on the Digital Signature Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 186-4. This mechanism computes the entire DSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-512.

For the purposes of this mechanism, a DSA signature is a string of length 2*subprime, corresponding to the concatenation of the DSA values *r* and *s*, each represented most-significant byte first.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 27, DSA with SHA-512: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	DSA private key	any	2*subprime length
C_Verify	DSA public key	any, 2*subprime length ²	N/A

² Data length, signature length.

2.3 Elliptic Curve

The Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptosystem (also related to ECDSA) in this document is the one described in the ANSI X9.62 and X9.63 standards developed by the ANSI X9F1 working group.

Table 28, Elliptic Curve Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN (CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN)					✓		
CKM_ECDSA		✓ ²					
CKM_ECDSA_SHA1		✓					
CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE							✓
CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE							✓
CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE							✓
CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP						✓	

Table 29, Mechanism Information Flags

CKF_EC_F_P	0x00100000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with EC domain parameters over F_p
CKF_EC_F_2M	0x00200000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with EC domain parameters over F_{2^m}
CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS	0x00400000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with EC domain parameters of the choice ecParameters
CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE	0x00800000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with EC domain parameters of the choice namedCurve
CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS	0x01000000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with elliptic curve point uncompressed
CKF_EC_COMPRESS	0x02000000UL	True if the mechanism can be used with elliptic curve point compressed

In these standards, there are two different varieties of EC defined:

1. EC using a field with an odd prime number of elements (i.e. the finite field F_p).
2. EC using a field of characteristic two (i.e. the finite field F_{2^m}).

An EC key in Cryptoki contains information about which variety of EC it is suited for. It is preferable that a Cryptoki library, which can perform EC mechanisms, be capable of performing operations with the two varieties of EC, however this is not required. The **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure **CKF_EC_F_P** flag identifies a Cryptoki library supporting EC keys over F_p whereas the **CKF_EC_F_2M** flag identifies a Cryptoki library supporting EC keys over F_{2^m} . A Cryptoki library that can perform EC mechanisms must set either or both of these flags for each EC mechanism.

In these specifications there are also three representation methods to define the domain parameters for an EC key. Only the **ecParameters** and the **namedCurve** choices are supported in Cryptoki. The **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure **CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS** flag identifies a Cryptoki library supporting the **ecParameters** choice whereas the **CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE** flag identifies a Cryptoki library supporting the **namedCurve** choice. A Cryptoki library that can perform EC mechanisms must set either or both of these flags for each EC mechanism.

In these specifications, an EC public key (i.e. EC point Q) or the base point G when the **ecParameters** choice is used can be represented as an octet string of the uncompressed form or the compressed form. The **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure **CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS** flag identifies a Cryptoki library supporting the uncompressed form whereas the **CKF_EC_COMPRESS** flag identifies a Cryptoki library supporting the compressed form. A Cryptoki library that can perform EC mechanisms must set either or both of these flags for each EC mechanism.

Note that an implementation of a Cryptoki library supporting EC with only one variety, one representation of domain parameters or one form may encounter difficulties achieving interoperability with other implementations.

If an attempt to create, generate, derive or unwrap an EC key of an unsupported curve is made, the attempt should fail with the error code **CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED**. If an attempt to create, generate, derive, or unwrap an EC key with invalid or of an unsupported representation of domain parameters is made, that attempt should fail with the error code **CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID**. If an attempt to create, generate, derive, or unwrap an EC key of an unsupported form is made, that attempt should fail with the error code **CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT**.

2.3.1 EC Signatures

For the purposes of these mechanisms, an ECDSA signature is an octet string of even length which is at most two times $nLen$ octets, where $nLen$ is the length in octets of the base point order n . The signature octets correspond to the concatenation of the ECDSA values r and s , both represented as an octet string of equal length of at most $nLen$ with the most significant byte first. If r and s have different octet length,

the shorter of both must be padded with leading zero octets such that both have the same octet length. Loosely spoken, the first half of the signature is r and the second half is s . For signatures created by a token, the resulting signature is always of length $2nLen$. For signatures passed to a token for verification, the signature may have a shorter length but must be composed as specified before.

If the length of the hash value is larger than the bit length of n , only the leftmost bits of the hash up to the length of n will be used. Any truncation is done by the token.

Note: For applications, it is recommended to encode the signature as an octet string of length two times $nLen$ if possible. This ensures that the application works with PKCS#11 modules which have been implemented based on an older version of this document. Older versions required all signatures to have length two times $nLen$. It may be impossible to encode the signature with the maximum length of two times $nLen$ if the application just gets the integer values of r and s (i.e. without leading zeros), but does not know the base point order n , because r and s can have any value between zero and the base point order n .

2.3.2 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_ECDSA” and “CKK_EC” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

Note: CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11

CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN

CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN

CKM_ECDSA

CKM_ECDSA_SHA1

CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE

CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE

CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE

CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP

CKD_NULL

CKD_SHA1_KDF

2.3.3 ECDSA public key objects

EC (also related to ECDSA) public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY**, key type **CKK_EC** or **CKK_ECDSA**) hold EC public keys. The following table defines the EC public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 30, Elliptic Curve Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_EC_PARAMS ^{1,3} (CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS)	Byte array	DER-encoding of an ANSI X9.62 Parameters value
CKA_EC_POINT ^{1,4}	Byte array	DER-encoding of ANSI X9.62 ECPoint value Q

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The **CKA_EC_PARAMS** or **CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS** attribute value is known as the “EC domain parameters” and is defined in ANSI X9.62 as a choice of three parameter representation methods with the following syntax:

```
Parameters ::= CHOICE {
    ecParameters    ECParameters,
```

```

    namedCurve      CURVES.&id({CurveNames}),
    implicitlyCA    NULL
}

```

This allows detailed specification of all required values using choice **ecParameters**, the use of a **namedCurve** as an object identifier substitute for a particular set of elliptic curve domain parameters, or **implicitlyCA** to indicate that the domain parameters are explicitly defined elsewhere. The use of a **namedCurve** is recommended over the choice **ecParameters**. The choice **implicitlyCA** must not be used in Cryptoki.

The following is a sample template for creating an EC (ECDSA) public key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_EC;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An EC public key object";
CK_BYTE ecParams[] = {...};
CK_BYTE ecPoint[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecParams, sizeof(ecParams)},
    {CKA_EC_POINT, ecPoint, sizeof(ecPoint)}
};

```

2.3.4 Elliptic curve private key objects

EC (also related to ECDSA) private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY**, key type **CKK_EC** or **CKK_ECDSA**) hold EC private keys. See Section 2.3 for more information about EC. The following table defines the EC private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 31, Elliptic Curve Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_EC_PARAMS ^{1,4,6} (CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS)	Byte array	DER-encoding of an ANSI X9.62 Parameters value
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Big integer	ANSI X9.62 private value <i>d</i>

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The **CKA_EC_PARAMS** or **CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS** attribute value is known as the “EC domain parameters” and is defined in ANSI X9.62 as a choice of three parameter representation methods with the following syntax:

```

Parameters ::= CHOICE {
    ecParameters      ECPParameters,
    namedCurve        CURVES.&id({CurveNames}),
    implicitlyCA      NULL
}

```

This allows detailed specification of all required values using choice **ecParameters**, the use of a **namedCurve** as an object identifier substitute for a particular set of elliptic curve domain parameters, or

implicitlyCA to indicate that the domain parameters are explicitly defined elsewhere. The use of a **namedCurve** is recommended over the choice **ecParameters**. The choice **implicitlyCA** must not be used in Cryptoki.

Note that when generating an EC private key, the EC domain parameters are *not* specified in the key's template. This is because EC private keys are only generated as part of an EC key *pair*, and the EC domain parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the EC public key.

The following is a sample template for creating an EC (ECDSA) private key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_EC;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An EC private key object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE ecParams[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
    {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
    {CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecParams, sizeof(ecParams)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

2.3.5 Elliptic curve key pair generation

The EC (also related to ECDSA) key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN** or **CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism for EC.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates EC public/private key pairs with particular EC domain parameters, as specified in the **CKA_EC_PARAMS** or **CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS** attribute of the template for the public key. Note that this version of Cryptoki does not include a mechanism for generating these EC domain parameters.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_EC_POINT** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_EC_PARAMS** or **CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS** and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new private key. Other attributes supported by the EC public and private key types (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the keys support) may also be specified in the templates for the keys, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only ECDSA using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements, then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation, the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

2.3.6 ECDSA without hashing

Refer section 2.3.1 for signature encoding.

The ECDSA without hashing mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECDSA**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification for ECDSA. (This mechanism corresponds only to the part of ECDSA that processes the hash value, which should not be longer than 1024 bits; it does not compute the hash value.)

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 32, ECDSA: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign ¹	ECDSA private key	any ³	2nLen
C_Verify ¹	ECDSA public key	any ³ , ≤2nLen ²	N/A

1 Single-part operations only.

2 Data length, signature length.

3 Input the entire raw digest. Internally, this will be truncated to the appropriate number of bits.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only ECDSA using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements (inclusive), then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation, the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

2.3.7 ECDSA with SHA-1

Refer to section 2.3.1 for signature encoding.

The ECDSA with SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECDSA_SHA1**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification for ECDSA. This mechanism computes the entire ECDSA specification, including the hashing with SHA-1.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 33, ECDSA with SHA-1: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	ECDSA private key	any	2nLen
C_Verify	ECDSA public key	any, ≤2nLen ²	N/A

2 Data length, signature length.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only ECDSA using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements, then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation, the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

2.3.8 EC mechanism parameters

◆ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE, CK_EC_KDF_TYPE_PTR

CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is used to indicate the Key Derivation Function (KDF) applied to derive keying data from a shared secret. The key derivation function will be used by the EC key agreement schemes. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE;
```


The following table lists the defined functions.

Table 34, EC: Key Derivation Functions

Source Identifier
CKD_NULL
CKD_SHA1_KDF
CKD_SHA224_KDF
CKD_SHA256_KDF
CKD_SHA384_KDF
CKD_SHA512_KDF

The key derivation function **CKD_NULL** produces a raw shared secret value without applying any key derivation function whereas the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF**, which is based on SHA-1, derives keying data from the shared secret value as defined in ANSI X9.63.

CK_EC_KDF_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_EC_KDF_TYPE**.

◆ **CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS, CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters for the **CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE** and **CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE** key derivation mechanisms, where each party contributes one key pair. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
    CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
    CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
    CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>kdf</i>	<i>key derivation function used on the shared secret value</i>
<i>ulSharedDataLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the shared info</i>
<i>pSharedData</i>	<i>some data shared between the two parties</i>
<i>ulPublicDataLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the other party's EC public key</i>
<i>pPublicData</i> ¹	<i>pointer to other party's EC public key value. A token MUST be able to accept this value encoded as a raw octet string (as per section A.5.2 of [ANSI X9.62]). A token MAY, in addition, support accepting this value as a DER-encoded ECPoint (as per section E.6 of [ANSI X9.62]) i.e. the same as a CKA_EC_POINT encoding. The calling application is responsible for converting the offered public key to the</i>

¹ The encoding in V2.20 was not specified and resulted in different implementations choosing different encodings. Applications relying only on a V2.20 encoding (e.g. the DER variant) other than the one specified now (raw) may not work with all V2.30 compliant tokens.

compressed or uncompressed forms of these encodings if the token does not support the offered form.

With the key derivation function **CKD_NULL**, *pSharedData* must be NULL and *ulSharedDataLen* must be zero. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF**, an optional *pSharedData* may be supplied, which consists of some data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. Otherwise, *pSharedData* must be NULL and *ulSharedDataLen* must be zero.

CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

◆ **CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS, CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE** key derivation mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
    CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
    CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
    CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
    CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
    CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>kdf</i>	<i>key derivation function used on the shared secret value</i>
<i>ulSharedDataLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the shared info</i>
<i>pSharedData</i>	<i>some data shared between the two parties</i>
<i>ulPublicDataLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the other party's first EC public key</i>
<i>pPublicData</i>	<i>pointer to other party's first EC public key value. Encoding rules are as per pPublicData of CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS</i>
<i>ulPrivateDataLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the second EC private key</i>
<i>hPrivateData</i>	<i>key handle for second EC private key value</i>
<i>ulPublicDataLen2</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the other party's second EC public key</i>
<i>pPublicData2</i>	<i>pointer to other party's second EC public key value. Encoding rules are as per pPublicData of CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS</i>
<i>publicKey</i>	<i>Handle to the first party's ephemeral public key</i>

With the key derivation function **CKD_NULL**, *pSharedData* must be NULL and *ulSharedDataLen* must be zero. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF**, an optional *pSharedData* may be supplied,

which consists of some data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. Otherwise, *pSharedData* must be NULL and *ulSharedDataLen* must be zero.

CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

2.3.9 Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key derivation

The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based on the Diffie-Hellman version of the elliptic curve key agreement scheme, as defined in ANSI X9.63, where each party contributes one key pair all using the same EC domain parameters.

It has a parameter, a **CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only EC using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements, then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation, the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

2.3.10 Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman with cofactor key derivation

The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) with cofactor key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based on the cofactor Diffie-Hellman version of the elliptic curve key agreement scheme, as defined in ANSI X9.63, where each party contributes one key pair all using the same EC domain parameters. Cofactor multiplication is computationally efficient and helps to prevent security problems like small group attacks.

It has a parameter, a **CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.

- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only EC using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements, then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation, the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

2.3.11 Elliptic curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone key derivation

The elliptic curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based the MQV version of the elliptic curve key agreement scheme, as defined in ANSI X9.63, where each party contributes two key pairs all using the same EC domain parameters.

It has a parameter, a **CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the minimum and maximum supported number of bits in the field sizes, respectively. For example, if a Cryptoki library supports only EC using a field of characteristic 2 which has between 2^{200} and 2^{300} elements, then *ulMinKeySize* = 201 and *ulMaxKeySize* = 301 (when written in binary notation, the number 2^{200} consists of a 1 bit followed by 200 0 bits. It is therefore a 201-bit number. Similarly, 2^{300} is a 301-bit number).

2.3.12 ECDH AES KEY WRAP

The ECDH AES KEY WRAP mechanism, denoted **CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP**, is a mechanism based on elliptic curve public-key crypto-system and the AES key wrap mechanism. It supports single-part key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

It has a parameter, a **CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS** structure.

The mechanism can wrap and un-wrap an asymmetric target key of any length and type using an EC key.

- A temporary AES key is derived from a temporary EC key and the wrapping EC key using the **CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE** mechanism.
- The derived AES key is used for wrapping the target key using the **CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD** mechanism.

For wrapping, the mechanism -

- Generates a temporary random EC key (transport key) having the same parameters as the wrapping EC key (and domain parameters). Saves the transport key public key material.
- Performs ECDH operation using **CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE** with parameters of kdf, ulSharedDataLen and pSharedData using the private key of the transport EC key and the public key of wrapping EC key and gets the first ulAESKeyBits bits of the derived key to be the temporary AES key
- Wraps the target key with the temporary AES key using **CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD (RFC5649)**.
- Zeroizes the temporary AES key and EC transport private key
- Concatenates public key material of the transport key and output the concatenated blob.

The recommended format for an asymmetric target key being wrapped is as a PKCS8 PrivateKeyInfo

The use of Attributes in the PrivateKeyInfo structure is OPTIONAL. In case of conflicts between the object attribute template, and Attributes in the PrivateKeyInfo structure, an error should be thrown.

For unwrapping, the mechanism -

- Splits the input into two parts. The first part is the public key material of the transport key and the second part is the wrapped target key. The length of the first part is equal to the length of the public key material of the unwrapping EC key
- Note: since the transport key and the wrapping EC key share the same domain, the length of the public key material of the transport key is the same length of the public key material of the unwrapping EC key.*
- Performs ECDH operation using **CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE** with parameters of kdf, ulSharedDataLen and pSharedData using the private part of unwrapping EC key and the public part of the transport EC key and gets first ulAESKeyBits bits of the derived key to be the temporary AES key
 - Un-wraps the target key from the second part with the temporary AES key using **CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD (RFC5649)**.
 - Zeroizes the temporary AES key

Table 35, CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP						✓	
¹ SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover							

2.3.13 ECDH AES KEY WRAP mechanism parameters

◆ CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS; CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR

CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG          ulAESKeyBits;
    CK_EC_KDF_TYPE    kdf;
    CK_ULONG          ulSharedDataLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR       pSharedData;
} CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

ulAESKeyBits length of the temporary AES key in bits. Can be only 128, 192 or 256.

Kdf key derivation function used on the shared secret value to generate AES key.

ulSharedDataLen the length in bytes of the shared info

pSharedData Some data shared between the two parties

CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS**.

2.3.14 FIPS 186-4

When **CKM_ECDSA** is operated in FIPS mode, the curves SHALL either be NIST recommended curves (with a fixed set of domain parameters) or curves with domain parameters generated as specified by ANSI X9.64. The NIST recommended curves are:

P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521

K-163, B-163, K-233, B-233

K-283, B-283, K-409, B-409

K-571, B-571

2.4 Diffie-Hellman

Table 36, Diffie-Hellman Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN					✓		
CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE							✓
CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_X9_42_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN					✓		
CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE							✓
CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE							✓
CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE							✓

2.4.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_DH” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of [DH] key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN
 CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE
 CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN
 CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE
 CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE
 CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE
 CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN
 CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN

2.4.2 Diffie-Hellman public key objects

Diffie-Hellman public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY**, key type **CKK_DH**) hold Diffie-Hellman public keys. The following table defines the Diffie-Hellman public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 37, Diffie-Hellman Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME ^{1,3}	Big integer	Prime p
CKA_BASE ^{1,3}	Big integer	Base g
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4}	Big integer	Public value y

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the “Diffie-Hellman domain parameters”. Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the key components. See PKCS #3 for more information on Diffie-Hellman keys.

The following is a sample template for creating a Diffie-Hellman public key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DH;

```

```

CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A Diffie-Hellman public key object";
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.4.3 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key objects

X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY**, key type **CKK_X9_42_DH**) hold X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public keys. The following table defines the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 38, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME ^{1,3}	Big integer	Prime p (≥ 1024 bits, in steps of 256 bits)
CKA_BASE ^{1,3}	Big integer	Base g
CKA_SUBPRIME ^{1,3}	Big integer	Subprime q (≥ 160 bits)
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4}	Big integer	Public value y

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE** and **CKA_SUBPRIME** attribute values are collectively the "X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters". See the ANSI X9.42 standard for more information on X9.42 Diffie-Hellman keys.

The following is a sample template for creating a X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_X9_42_DH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key
    object";
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
    {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
};

```

```

    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.4.4 Diffie-Hellman private key objects

Diffie-Hellman private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY**, key type **CKK_DH**) hold Diffie-Hellman private keys. The following table defines the Diffie-Hellman private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 39, Diffie-Hellman Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Prime p
CKA_BASE ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Base g
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Big integer	Private value x
CKA_VALUE_BITS ^{2,6}	CK_ULONG	Length in bits of private value x

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the “Diffie-Hellman domain parameters”. Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the key components. See PKCS #3 for more information on Diffie-Hellman keys.

Note that when generating a Diffie-Hellman private key, the Diffie-Hellman parameters are *not* specified in the key’s template. This is because Diffie-Hellman private keys are only generated as part of a Diffie-Hellman key *pair*, and the Diffie-Hellman parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the Diffie-Hellman public key.

The following is a sample template for creating a Diffie-Hellman private key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A Diffie-Hellman private key object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
    {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
    {CKA_SENSITIVE, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_DERIVE, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```


2.4.5 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key objects

X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY**, key type **CKK_X9_42_DH**) hold X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private keys. The following table defines the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 40, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Prime p (≥ 1024 bits, in steps of 256 bits)
CKA_BASE ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Base g
CKA_SUBPRIME ^{1,4,6}	Big integer	Subprime q (≥ 160 bits)
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Big integer	Private value x

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE** and **CKA_SUBPRIME** attribute values are collectively the “X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters”. Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the key components. See the ANSI X9.42 standard for more information on X9.42 Diffie-Hellman keys.

Note that when generating a X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key, the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters are *not* specified in the key’s template. This is because X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private keys are only generated as part of a X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key *pair*, and the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key.

The following is a sample template for creating a X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_X9_42_DH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
    {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
    {CKA_SENSITIVE, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_DERIVE, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
    {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

2.4.6 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter objects

Diffie-Hellman domain parameter objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS**, key type **CKK_DH**) hold Diffie-Hellman domain parameters. The following table defines the Diffie-Hellman domain parameter object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 41, Diffie-Hellman Domain Parameter Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME ^{1,4}	Big integer	Prime p
CKA_BASE ^{1,4}	Big integer	Base g
CKA_PRIME_BITS ^{2,3}	CK_ULONG	Length of the prime value.

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attribute values are collectively the “Diffie-Hellman domain parameters”. Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the key components. See PKCS #3 for more information on Diffie-Hellman domain parameters.

The following is a sample template for creating a Diffie-Hellman domain parameter object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A Diffie-Hellman domain parameters
    object";
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
};
```

2.4.7 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters objects

X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS**, key type **CKK_X9_42_DH**) hold X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters. The following table defines the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 42, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Domain Parameters Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_PRIME ^{1,4}	Big integer	Prime p (≥ 1024 bits, in steps of 256 bits)
CKA_BASE ^{1,4}	Big integer	Base g
CKA_SUBPRIME ^{1,4}	Big integer	Subprime q (≥ 160 bits)
CKA_PRIME_BITS ^{2,3}	CK_ULONG	Length of the prime value.
CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS ^{2,3}	CK_ULONG	Length of the subprime value.

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE** and **CKA_SUBPRIME** attribute values are collectively the “X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters”. Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the domain

parameters components. See the ANSI X9.42 standard for more information on X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters.

The following is a sample template for creating a X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_X9_42_DH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain
    parameters object";
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subprime[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)},
    {CKA_SUBPRIME, subprime, sizeof(subprime)},
};
```

2.4.8 PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman key pair generation

The PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, as defined in PKCS #3. This is what PKCS #3 calls “phase I”. It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Diffie-Hellman public/private key pairs with a particular prime and base, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME** and **CKA_BASE** attributes of the template for the public key. If the **CKA_VALUE_BITS** attribute of the private key is specified, the mechanism limits the length in bits of the private value, as described in PKCS #3.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE**, and **CKA_VALUE** (and the **CKA_VALUE_BITS** attribute, if it is not already provided in the template) attributes to the new private key; other attributes required by the Diffie-Hellman public and private key types must be specified in the templates.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits.

2.4.9 PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter generation

The PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN**, is a domain parameter generation mechanism based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, as defined in PKCS #3.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Diffie-Hellman domain parameters with a particular prime length in bits, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME_BITS** attribute of the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE**, and **CKA_PRIME_BITS** attributes to the new object. Other attributes supported by the Diffie-Hellman domain parameter types may also be specified in the template, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits.

2.4.10 PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman key derivation

The PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, as defined in PKCS #3. This is what PKCS #3 calls “phase II”.

It has a parameter, which is the public value of the other party in the key agreement protocol, represented as a Cryptoki “Big integer” (*i.e.*, a sequence of bytes, most-significant byte first).

This mechanism derives a secret key from a Diffie-Hellman private key and the public value of the other party. It computes a Diffie-Hellman secret value from the public value and private key according to PKCS #3, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability²:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either **CK_TRUE** or **CK_FALSE**. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits.

2.4.11 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman mechanism parameters

◆ **CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE, CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR**

CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE is used to indicate the Key Derivation Function (KDF) applied to derive keying data from a shared secret. The key derivation function will be used by the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemes. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE;
```

The following table lists the defined functions.

Table 43, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Key Derivation Functions

Source Identifier
CKD_NULL
CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1
CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE

The key derivation function **CKD_NULL** produces a raw shared secret value without applying any key derivation function whereas the key derivation functions **CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1** and

² Note that the rules regarding the **CKA_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE**, **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE**, and **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes have changed in version 2.11 to match the policy used by other key derivation mechanisms such as **CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE**.

CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE, which are both based on SHA-1, derive keying data from the shared secret value as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard.

CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE**.

◆ **CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS, CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE** key derivation mechanism, where each party contributes one key pair. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
    CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
    CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
    CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>kdf</i>	<i>key derivation function used on the shared secret value</i>
<i>ulOtherInfoLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the other info</i>
<i>pOtherInfo</i>	<i>some data shared between the two parties</i>
<i>ulPublicDataLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the other party's X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key</i>
<i>pPublicData</i>	<i>pointer to other party's X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key value</i>

With the key derivation function **CKD_NULL**, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1**, *pOtherInfo* must be supplied, which contains an octet string, specified in ASN.1 DER encoding, consisting of mandatory and optional data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE**, an optional *pOtherInfo* may be supplied, which consists of some data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. Otherwise, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero.

CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

● **CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS, CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE** and **CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE** key derivation mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
    CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
    CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
    CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
    CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
}
```

```

    CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>kdf</i>	<i>key derivation function used on the shared secret value</i>
<i>ulOtherInfoLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the other info</i>
<i>pOtherInfo</i>	<i>some data shared between the two parties</i>
<i>ulPublicDataLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the other party's first X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key</i>
<i>pPublicData</i>	<i>pointer to other party's first X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key value</i>
<i>ulPrivateDataLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key</i>
<i>hPrivateData</i>	<i>key handle for second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key value</i>
<i>ulPublicDataLen2</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the other party's second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key</i>
<i>pPublicData2</i>	<i>pointer to other party's second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key value</i>

With the key derivation function **CKD_NULL**, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1**, *pOtherInfo* must be supplied, which contains an octet string, specified in ASN.1 DER encoding, consisting of mandatory and optional data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE**, an optional *pOtherInfo* may be supplied, which consists of some data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. Otherwise, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero.

CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

- **CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS, CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE** key derivation mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. The structure is defined as follows:

```

typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
    CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
    CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
    CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
    CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
    CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>kdf</i>	<i>key derivation function used on the shared secret value</i>
<i>ulOtherInfoLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the other info</i>
<i>pOtherInfo</i>	<i>some data shared between the two parties</i>
<i>ulPublicDataLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the other party's first X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key</i>
<i>pPublicData</i>	<i>pointer to other party's first X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key value</i>
<i>ulPrivateDataLen</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key</i>
<i>hPrivateData</i>	<i>key handle for second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private key value</i>
<i>ulPublicDataLen2</i>	<i>the length in bytes of the other party's second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key</i>
<i>pPublicData2</i>	<i>pointer to other party's second X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public key value</i>
<i>publicKey</i>	<i>Handle to the first party's ephemeral public key</i>

With the key derivation function **CKD_NULL**, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1**, *pOtherInfo* must be supplied, which contains an octet string, specified in ASN.1 DER encoding, consisting of mandatory and optional data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. With the key derivation function **CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE**, an optional *pOtherInfo* may be supplied, which consists of some data shared by the two parties intending to share the shared secret. Otherwise, *pOtherInfo* must be NULL and *ulOtherInfoLen* must be zero.

CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

2.4.12 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key pair generation

The X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public/private key pairs with a particular prime, base and subprime, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE** and **CKA_SUBPRIME** attributes of the template for the public key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new private key; other attributes required by the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman public and private key types must be specified in the templates.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of X9.42 Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits, for the **CKA_PRIME** attribute.

2.4.13 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter generation

The X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN**, is a domain parameters generation mechanism based on X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key agreement, as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters with particular prime and subprime length in bits, as specified in the **CKA_PRIME_BITS** and **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attributes of the template for the domain parameters.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_PRIME**, **CKA_BASE**, **CKA_SUBPRIME**, **CKA_PRIME_BITS** and **CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS** attributes to the new object. Other attributes supported by the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameter types may also be specified in the template for the domain parameters, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of X9.42 Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits.

2.4.14 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key derivation

The X9.42 Diffie-Hellman key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme, as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard, where each party contributes one key pair, all using the same X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters.

It has a parameter, a **CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template. Note that in order to validate this mechanism it may be required to use the **CKA_VALUE** attribute as the key of a general-length MAC mechanism (e.g. **CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL**) over some test data.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either **CK_TRUE** or **CK_FALSE**. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of X9.42 Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits, for the **CKA_PRIME** attribute.

2.4.15 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman hybrid key derivation

The X9.42 Diffie-Hellman hybrid key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based on the Diffie-Hellman hybrid key agreement scheme, as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard, where each party contributes two key pair, all using the same X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters.

It has a parameter, a **CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template. Note that in order to validate this mechanism it may be required to use the **CKA_VALUE** attribute as the key of a general-length MAC mechanism (e.g. **CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL**) over some test data.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either **CK_TRUE** or **CK_FALSE**. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of X9.42 Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits, for the **CKA_PRIME** attribute.

2.4.16 X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Menezes-Qu-Vanstone key derivation

The X9.42 Diffie-Hellman Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (MQV) key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation based the MQV scheme, as defined in the ANSI X9.42 standard, where each party contributes two key pairs, all using the same X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters.

It has a parameter, a **CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure.

This mechanism derives a secret value, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. (The truncation removes bytes from the leading end of the secret value.) The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template. Note that in order to validate this mechanism it may be required to use the **CKA_VALUE** attribute as the key of a general-length MAC mechanism (e.g. **CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL**) over some test data.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either **CK_TRUE** or **CK_FALSE**. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of X9.42 Diffie-Hellman prime sizes, in bits, for the **CKA_PRIME** attribute.

2.5 Wrapping/unwrapping private keys

Cryptoki Versions 2.01 and up allow the use of secret keys for wrapping and unwrapping RSA private keys, Diffie-Hellman private keys, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private keys, EC (also related to ECDSA) private keys and DSA private keys. For wrapping, a private key is BER-encoded according to PKCS #8's PrivateKeyInfo ASN.1 type. PKCS #8 requires an algorithm identifier for the type of the private key. The object identifiers for the required algorithm identifiers are as follows:

```
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }

dhKeyAgreement OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-3 1 }

dhpublicnumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1 }

id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) ansi-x9-62(10045) publicKeyType(2) 1 }

id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1 }
```

where

```
pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }

pkcs-3 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 3 }
```

These parameters for the algorithm identifiers have the following types, respectively:

NULL

```
DHParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
    prime          INTEGER, -- p
    base           INTEGER, -- g
    privateValueLength INTEGER OPTIONAL
}

DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
    prime          INTEGER, -- p
    base           INTEGER, -- g
    subprime       INTEGER, -- q
    cofactor       INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- j
    validationParms ValidationParms OPTIONAL
}

ValidationParms ::= SEQUENCE {
    Seed          BIT STRING, -- seed
    PGenCounter   INTEGER -- parameter verification
}
```

```

Parameters ::= CHOICE {
    ecParameters      ECParameters,
    namedCurve        CURVES.&id({CurveNames}),
    implicitlyCA       NULL
}

Dss-Parms ::= SEQUENCE {
    p INTEGER,
    q INTEGER,
    g INTEGER
}

```

For the X9.42 Diffie-Hellman domain parameters, the **cofactor** and the **validationParms** optional fields should not be used when wrapping or unwrapping X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private keys since their values are not stored within the token.

For the EC domain parameters, the use of **namedCurve** is recommended over the choice **ecParameters**. The choice **implicitlyCA** must not be used in Cryptoki.

Within the PrivateKeyInfo type:

- RSA private keys are BER-encoded according to PKCS #1's RSAPrivateKey ASN.1 type. This type requires values to be present for *all* the attributes specific to Cryptoki's RSA private key objects. In other words, if a Cryptoki library does not have values for an RSA private key's **CKA_MODULUS**, **CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT**, **CKA_PRIME_1**, **CKA_PRIME_2**, **CKA_EXPONENT_1**, **CKA_EXPONENT2**, and **CKA_COEFFICIENT** values, it must not create an RSAPrivateKey BER-encoding of the key, and so it must not prepare it for wrapping.
- Diffie-Hellman private keys are represented as BER-encoded ASN.1 type INTEGER.
- X9.42 Diffie-Hellman private keys are represented as BER-encoded ASN.1 type INTEGER.
- EC (also related with ECDSA) private keys are BER-encoded according to SECG SEC 1 ECPrivateKey ASN.1 type:

```

ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
    Version          INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) }
                    (ecPrivkeyVer1),
    privateKey       OCTET STRING,
    parameters       [0] Parameters OPTIONAL,
    publicKey        [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL
}

```

Since the EC domain parameters are placed in the PKCS #8's privateKeyAlgorithm field, the optional **parameters** field in an ECPrivateKey must be omitted. A Cryptoki application must be able to unwrap an ECPrivateKey that contains the optional **publicKey** field; however, what is done with this **publicKey** field is outside the scope of Cryptoki.

- DSA private keys are represented as BER-encoded ASN.1 type INTEGER.

Once a private key has been BER-encoded as a PrivateKeyInfo type, the resulting string of bytes is encrypted with the secret key. This encryption must be done in CBC mode with PKCS padding.

Unwrapping a wrapped private key undoes the above procedure. The CBC-encrypted ciphertext is decrypted, and the PKCS padding is removed. The data thereby obtained are parsed as a PrivateKeyInfo type, and the wrapped key is produced. An error will result if the original wrapped key does not decrypt properly, or if the decrypted unpadded data does not parse properly, or its type does not match the key type specified in the template for the new key. The unwrapping mechanism contributes

only those attributes specified in the PrivateKeyInfo type to the newly-unwrapped key; other attributes must be specified in the template, or will take their default values.

Earlier drafts of PKCS #11 Version 2.0 and Version 2.01 used the object identifier

```

DSA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { algorithm 12 }
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) identifier-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
        algorithm(2) }

```

with associated parameters

```

DSAParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
    prime1 INTEGER, -- modulus p
    prime2 INTEGER, -- modulus q
    base INTEGER -- base g
}

```

for wrapping DSA private keys. Note that although the two structures for holding DSA domain parameters appear identical when instances of them are encoded, the two corresponding object identifiers are different.

2.6 Generic secret key

Table 44, Generic Secret Key Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN					✓		

2.6.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_GENERIC_SECRET” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN

2.6.2 Generic secret key objects

Generic secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**) hold generic secret keys. These keys do not support encryption or decryption; however, other keys can be derived from them and they can be used in HMAC operations. The following table defines the generic secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

These key types are used in several of the mechanisms described in this section.

Table 45, Generic Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (arbitrary length)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating a generic secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A generic secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_DERIVE, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

CKA_CHECK_VALUE: The value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of the SHA-1 hash of the generic secret key object's CKA_VALUE attribute.

2.6.3 Generic secret key generation

The generic secret key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN**, is used to generate generic secret keys. The generated keys take on any attributes provided in the template passed to the **C_GenerateKey** call, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute specifies the length of the key to be generated.

It does not have a parameter.

The template supplied must specify a value for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute. If the template specifies an object type and a class, they must have the following values:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;

```

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes, in bits.

2.7 HMAC mechanisms

Refer to **RFC2104** and **FIPS 198** for HMAC algorithm description.. The HMAC secret key shall correspond to the PKCS11 generic secret key type or the mechanism specific key types (see mechanism definition). Such keys, for use with HMAC operations can be created using **C_CreateObject** or **C_GenerateKey**.

The RFC also specifies test vectors for the various hash function based HMAC mechanisms described in the respective hash mechanism descriptions. The RFC should be consulted to obtain these test vectors.

2.8 AES

For the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) see [FIPS PUB 197].

Table 46, AES Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_AES_ECB	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_AES_MAC		✓					
CKM_AES_OFB	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CFB64	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CFB8	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CFB128	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CFB1	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC		✓					
CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96		✓					

2.8.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_AES” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_AES_KEY_GEN
- CKM_AES_ECB
- CKM_AES_CBC
- CKM_AES_MAC
- CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL
- CKM_AES_CBC_PAD
- CKM_AES_OFB
- CKM_AES_CFB64
- CKM_AES_CFB8
- CKM_AES_CFB128
- CKM_AES_CFB1
- CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC
- CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96

2.8.2 AES secret key objects

AES secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_AES**) hold AES keys. The following table defines the AES secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 47, AES Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (16, 24, or 32 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3,6}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an AES secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_AES;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An AES secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

CKA_CHECK_VALUE: The value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of the ECB encryption of a single block of null (0x00) bytes, using the default cipher associated with the key type of the secret key object.

2.8.3 AES key generation

The AES key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_AES_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates AES keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the AES key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

2.8.4 AES-ECB

AES-ECB, denoted **CKM_AES_ECB**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on NIST Advanced Encryption Standard and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 48, AES-ECB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	AES	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	AES	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	AES	any	input length rounded up to multiple of block size	
C_UnwrapKey	AES	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

2.8.5 AES-CBC

AES-CBC, denoted **CKM_AES_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard and cipher-block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 49, AES-CBC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	AES	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	AES	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	AES	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size	
C_UnwrapKey	AES	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

2.8.6 AES-CBC with PKCS padding

AES-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_AES_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard; cipher-block chaining mode; and the block cipher padding method detailed in PKCS #7.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

In addition to being able to wrap and unwrap secret keys, this mechanism can wrap and unwrap RSA, Diffie-Hellman, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman, EC (also related to ECDSA) and DSA private keys (see Section 2.5 for details). The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 50, AES-CBC with PKCS Padding: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	AES	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	AES	multiple of block size	between 1 and block size bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	AES	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	AES	multiple of block size	between 1 and block length bytes shorter than input length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

2.8.7 AES-OFB

AES-OFB, denoted **CKM_AES_OFB**. It is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption with AES. AES-OFB mode is described in [NIST sp800-38a].

It has a parameter, an initialization vector for this mode. The initialization vector has the same length as the block size.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 51, AES-OFB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	AES	any	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	AES	any	same as input length	no final part

For this mechanism the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure is as specified for CBC mode.

2.8.8 AES-CFB

Cipher AES has a cipher feedback mode, AES-CFB, denoted CKM_AES_CFB8, CKM_AES_CFB64, and CKM_AES_CFB128. It is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption with AES. AES-OFB mode is described [NIST sp800-38a].

It has a parameter, an initialization vector for this mode. The initialization vector has the same length as the block size.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 52, AES-CFB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	AES	any	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	AES	any	same as input length	no final part

For this mechanism the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure is as specified for CBC mode.

2.8.9 General-length AES-MAC

General-length AES-MAC, denoted **CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on NIST Advanced Encryption Standard as defined in FIPS PUB 197 and data authentication as defined in FIPS PUB 113.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final AES cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 53, General-length AES-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	AES	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	AES	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

2.8.10 AES-MAC

AES-MAC, denoted by **CKM_AES_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length AES-MAC mechanism. AES-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are half the block size in length.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 54, AES-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	AES	Any	½ block size (8 bytes)
C_Verify	AES	Any	½ block size (8 bytes)

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

2.8.11 AES-XCBC-MAC

AES-XCBC-MAC, denoted **CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC**, is a mechanism for single and multiple part signatures and verification; based on NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard and [RFC 3566].

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 55, AES-XCBC-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	AES	Any	16 bytes
C_Verify	AES	Any	16 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

2.8.12 AES-XCBC-MAC-96

AES-XCBC-MAC-96, denoted **CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC-96**, is a mechanism for single and multiple part signatures and verification; based on NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard and [RFC 3566].

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 56, AES-XCBC-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	AES	Any	12 bytes
C_Verify	AES	Any	12 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

2.9 AES with Counter

Table 57, AES with Counter Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_CTR	✓					✓	

2.9.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_CTR

2.9.2 AES with Counter mechanism parameters

◆ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR


CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_AES_CTR** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
    CK_BYTE cb[16];
} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS;
```

`ulCounterBits` specifies the number of bits in the counter block (`cb`) that shall be incremented. This number shall be such that $0 < ulCounterBits \leq 128$. For any values outside this range the mechanism shall return **CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID**.

It's up to the caller to initialize all of the bits in the counter block including the counter bits. The counter bits are the least significant bits of the counter block (`cb`). They are a big-endian value usually starting with 1. The rest of 'cb' is for the nonce, and maybe an optional IV.

E.g. as defined in [RFC 3686]:



This construction permits each packet to consist of up to $2^{32}-1$ blocks = 4,294,967,295 blocks = 68,719,476,720 octets.

CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS**.

2.9.3 AES with Counter Encryption / Decryption

Generic AES counter mode is described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A and in RFC 3686. These describe encryption using a counter block which may include a nonce to guarantee uniqueness of the counter block. Since the nonce is not incremented, the mechanism parameter must specify the number of counter bits in the counter block.

The block counter is incremented by 1 after each block of plaintext is processed. There is no support for any other increment functions in this mechanism.

If an attempt to encrypt/decrypt is made which will cause an overflow of the counter block's counter bits, then the mechanism shall return **CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE**. Note that the mechanism should allow the final post increment of the counter to overflow (if it implements it this way) but not allow any further processing after this point. E.g. if `ulCounterBits = 2` and the counter bits start as 1 then only 3 blocks of data can be processed.

2.10 AES CBC with Cipher Text Stealing CTS

Ref [NIST AES CTS]

This mode allows unpadding data that has length that is not a multiple of the block size to be encrypted to the same length of cipher text.

Table 58, AES CBC with Cipher Text Stealing CTS Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_CTS	✓					✓	

2.10.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_CTS

2.10.2 AES CTS mechanism parameters

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

Table 59, AES-CTS: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	AES	Any, ≥ block size (16 bytes)	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	AES	any, ≥ block size (16 bytes)	same as input length	no final part

2.11 Additional AES Mechanisms

Table 60, Additional AES Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_GCM	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CCM	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_GMAC		✓					✓

2.11.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_GCM

CKM_AES_CCM

CKM_AES_GMAC

2.12 AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption / Decryption

Generic GCM mode is described in [GCM]. To set up for AES-GCM use the following process, where *K* (key) and *AAD* (additional authenticated data) are as described in [GCM].

Encrypt:

- Set the IV length *ullvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIV* in the parameter block. *pIV* may be NULL if *ullvLen* is 0.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *uAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *uAADLen* is 0.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Call `C_EncryptInit()` for **CKM_AES_GCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call `C_Encrypt()`, or `C_EncryptUpdate()`^{*3} `C_EncryptFinal()`, for the plaintext obtaining ciphertext and authentication tag output.

Decrypt:

- . Set the IV length *ullvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIV* in the parameter block. *pIV* may be NULL if *ullvLen* is 0.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *uAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *uAADLen* is 0.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Call `C_DecryptInit()` for **CKM_AES_GCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call `C_Decrypt()`, or `C_DecryptUpdate()`^{*1} `C_DecryptFinal()`, for the ciphertext, including the appended tag, obtaining plaintext output. Note: since **CKM_AES_GCM** is an AEAD cipher, no data should be returned until `C_Decrypt()` or `C_DecryptFinal()`.

In *pIV* the least significant bit of the initialization vector is the rightmost bit. *ullvLen* is the length of the initialization vector in bytes.

The tag is appended to the cipher text and the least significant bit of the tag is the rightmost bit and the tag bits are the rightmost *ulTagBits* bits.

The key type for *K* must be compatible with **CKM_AES_ECB** and the `C_EncryptInit/C_DecryptInit` calls shall behave, with respect to *K*, as if they were called directly with **CKM_AES_ECB**, *K* and NULL parameters.

2.12.1 AES-CCM authenticated Encryption / Decryption

For IPsec (RFC 4309) and also for use in ZFS encryption. Generic CCM mode is described in [RFC 3610].

To set up for AES-CCM use the following process, where *K* (key), nonce and additional authenticated data are as described in [RFC 3610].

Encrypt:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block.

- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block. *pNonce* may be NULL if *ulNonceLen* is 0.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Call `C_EncryptInit()` for **CKM_AES_CCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call `C_Encrypt()`, `C_DecryptUpdate()`, or `C_EncryptFinal()`, for the plaintext obtaining ciphertext output obtaining the final ciphertext output and the MAC. The total length of data processed must be *ulDataLen*. *The output length will be ulDataLen + ulMACLen.*

Decrypt:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block. This length should not include the length of the MAC that is appended to the cipher text.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block. *pNonce* may be NULL if *ulNonceLen* is 0.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Call `C_DecryptInit()` for **CKM_AES_CCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call `C_Decrypt()`, `C_DecryptUpdate()`, or `C_DecryptFinal()`, for the ciphertext, including the appended MAC, obtaining plaintext output. The total length of data processed must be *ulDataLen + ulMACLen*. *Note: since CKM_AES_CCM is an AEAD cipher, no data should be returned until C_Decrypt() or C_DecryptFinal().*

The key type for *K* must be compatible with **CKM_AES_ECB** and the `C_EncryptInit/C_DecryptInit` calls shall behave, with respect to *K*, as if they were called directly with **CKM_AES_ECB**, *K* and NULL parameters.

2.12.2 AES-GMAC

AES-GMAC, denoted **CKM_AES_GMAC**, is a mechanism for single and multiple-part signatures and verification. It is described in NIST Special Publication 800-38D [GMAC]. GMAC is a special case of GCM that authenticates only the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) part of the GCM mechanism parameters. When HMAC is used with `C_Sign` or `C_Verify`, *pData* points to the AAD. HMAC does not use plaintext or ciphertext.

The signature produced by HMAC, also referred to as a Tag, is 16 bytes long.

Its single mechanism parameter is a 12 byte initialization vector (IV).

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 61, AES-GMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
<code>C_Sign</code>	CKK_AES	< 2 ⁶⁴	16 bytes
<code>C_Verify</code>	CKK_AES	< 2 ⁶⁴	16 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

2.12.3 AES GCM and CCM Mechanism parameters

◆ CK_GCM_PARAMS; CK_GCM_PARAMS_PTR

CK_GCM_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the CKM_AES_GCM mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_GCM_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE_PTR pIv;
    CK_ULONG ulIvLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pAAD;
    CK_ULONG ulAADLen;
    CK_ULONG ulTagBits;
} CK_GCM_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>pIv</i>	<i>pointer to initialization vector</i>
<i>ulIvLen</i>	<i>length of initialization vector in bytes. The length of the initialization vector can be any number between 1 and 256. 96-bit (12 byte) IV values can be processed more efficiently, so that length is recommended for situations in which efficiency is critical.</i>
<i>pAAD</i>	<i>pointer to additional authentication data. This data is authenticated but not encrypted.</i>
<i>ulAADLen</i>	<i>length of pAAD in bytes.</i>
<i>ulTagBits</i>	<i>length of authentication tag (output following cipher text) in bits. Can be any value between 0 and 128.</i>

CK_GCM_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_GCM_PARAMS.

◆ CK_CCM_PARAMS; CK_CCM_PARAMS_PTR

CK_CCM_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the CKM_AES_CCM mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_CCM_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG ulDataLen; /*plaintext or ciphertext*/
    CK_BYTE_PTR pNonce;
    CK_ULONG ulNonceLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pAAD;
    CK_ULONG ulAADLen;
    CK_ULONG ulMACLen;
} CK_CCM_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings, where L is the size in bytes of the data length's length ($2 < L < 8$):

<i>ulDataLen</i>	<i>length of the data where $0 \leq ulDataLen < 28L$.</i>
<i>pNonce</i>	<i>the nonce.</i>
<i>ulNonceLen</i>	<i>length of pNonce ($\leq 15-L$) in bytes.</i>

<i>pAAD</i>	<i>Additional authentication data. This data is authenticated but not encrypted.</i>
<i>ulAADLen</i>	<i>length of pAuthData in bytes.</i>
<i>ulMACLen</i>	<i>length of the MAC (output following cipher text) in bytes. Valid values are 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16.</i>

CK_CCM_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_CCM_PARAMS.

2.12.4 AES-GCM authenticated Encryption / Decryption

Generic GCM mode is described in [GCM]. To set up for AES-GCM use the following process, where *K* (key) and *AAD* (additional authenticated data) are as described in [GCM].

Encrypt:

- Set the IV length *ullvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIV* in the parameter block. *pIV* may be NULL if *ullvLen* is 0.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Call C_EncryptInit() for **CKM_AES_GCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C_Encrypt(), or C_EncryptUpdate()*⁴ C_EncryptFinal(), for the plaintext obtaining ciphertext and authentication tag output.

Decrypt:

- . Set the IV length *ullvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIV* in the parameter block. *pIV* may be NULL if *ullvLen* is 0.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Call C_DecryptInit() for **CKM_AES_GCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C_Decrypt(), or C_DecryptUpdate()*¹ C_DecryptFinal(), for the ciphertext, including the appended tag, obtaining plaintext output.

In *pIV* the least significant bit of the initialization vector is the rightmost bit. *ullvLen* is the length of the initialization vector in bytes.

The tag is appended to the cipher text and the least significant bit of the tag is the rightmost bit and the tag bits are the rightmost *ulTagBits* bits.

The key type for *K* must be compatible with **CKM_AES_ECB** and the C_EncryptInit/C_DecryptInit calls shall behave, with respect to *K*, as if they were called directly with **CKM_AES_ECB**, *K* and NULL parameters.

2.12.5 AES-CCM authenticated Encryption / Decryption

For IPsec (RFC 4309) and also for use in ZFS encryption. Generic CCM mode is described in [RFC 3610].

To set up for AES-CCM use the following process, where *K* (key), nonce and additional authenticated data are as described in [RFC 3610].

⁴ "*" indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

Encrypt:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block. *pNonce* may be NULL if *ulNonceLen* is 0.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Call C_EncryptInit() for **CKM_AES_CCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C_Encrypt(), or C_DecryptUpdate()*⁴ C_EncryptFinal(), for the plaintext obtaining ciphertext output obtaining the final ciphertext output and the MAC. The total length of data processed must be *ulDataLen*. The output length will be *ulDataLen* + *ulMACLen*.

Decrypt:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block. This length should not include the length of the MAC that is appended to the cipher text.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block. *pNonce* may be NULL if *ulNonceLen* is 0.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Call C_DecryptInit() for **CKM_AES_CCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C_Decrypt(), or C_DecryptUpdate()*⁴ C_DecryptFinal(), for the ciphertext, including the appended MAC, obtaining plaintext output. The total length of data processed must be *ulDataLen* + *ulMACLen*.

The key type for *K* must be compatible with **CKM_AES_ECB** and the C_EncryptInit/C_DecryptInit calls shall behave, with respect to *K*, as if they were called directly with **CKM_AES_ECB**, *K* and NULL parameters.

2.13 AES CMAC

Table 62, Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_AES_CMAC		✓					

¹ SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover

2.13.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL

CKM_AES_CMAC

2.13.2 Mechanism parameters

CKM_AES_CMACE_GENERAL uses the existing CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS structure. CKM_AES_CMACE does not use a mechanism parameter.

2.13.3 General-length AES-CMAC

General-length AES-CMAC, denoted CKM_AES_CMACE_GENERAL, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on [NIST SP800-38B] and [RFC 4493].

It has a parameter, a CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final AES cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 63, General-length AES-CMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_AES	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	CKK_AES	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters

References [NIST SP800-38B] and [RFC 4493] recommend that the output MAC is not truncated to less than 64 bits. The MAC length must be specified before the communication starts, and must not be changed during the lifetime of the key. It is the caller's responsibility to follow these rules.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

2.13.4 AES-CMAC

AES-CMAC, denoted CKM_AES_CMACE, is a special case of the general-length AES-CMAC mechanism. AES-CMAC always produces and verifies MACs that are a full block size in length, the default output length specified by [RFC 4493].

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 64, AES-CMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_AES	any	Block size (16 bytes)
C_Verify	CKK_AES	any	Block size (16 bytes)

References [NIST SP800-38B] and [RFC 4493] recommend that the output MAC is not truncated to less than 64 bits. The MAC length must be specified before the communication starts, and must not be changed during the lifetime of the key. It is the caller's responsibility to follow these rules.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure specify the supported range of AES key sizes, in bytes.

2.14 AES Key Wrap

Table 65, AES Key Wrap Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP						✓	
CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD	✓						

¹SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover

2.14.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP

CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD

2.14.2 AES Key Wrap Mechanism parameters

The mechanisms will accept an optional mechanism parameter as the Initialization vector which, if present, must be a fixed size array of 8 bytes, and, if NULL, will use the default initial value defined in Section 2.2.3.1 of [AES KEYWRAP].

The type of this parameter is CK_BYTE_PTR and the pointer points to the array of 8 bytes to be used as the initial value. The length shall be either 0 and the pointer NULL, or 8, and the pointer non-NULL.

2.14.3 AES Key Wrap

The mechanisms support only single-part operations, single part wrapping and unwrapping, and single-part encryption and decryption.

The CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP mechanism can wrap a key of any length. A key whose length is not a multiple of the AES Key Wrap block size (8 bytes) will be zero padded to fit. The CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP mechanism can only encrypt a block of data whose size is an exact multiple of the AES Key Wrap algorithm block size.

The CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD mechanism can wrap a key or block of data of any length. It does the usual padding of inputs (keys or data blocks) that are not multiples of the AES Key Wrap algorithm block size, always producing wrapped output that is larger than the input key/data to be wrapped. This padding is done by the token before being passed to the AES key wrap algorithm, which adds an 8 byte AES Key Wrap algorithm block of data.

2.15 Key derivation by data encryption – DES & AES

These mechanisms allow derivation of keys using the result of an encryption operation as the key value. They are for use with the C_DeriveKey function.

Table 66, Key derivation by data encryption Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓

2.15.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA
 CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA
 CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA
 CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA
 CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA
 CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA

```
typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE      iv[8];
    CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
    CK_ULONG     length;
} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR
      CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;

typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE      iv[16];
    CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
    CK_ULONG     length;
} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR
      CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
```

2.15.2 Mechanism Parameters

Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA as defined in section 2.31.2

Table 67, Mechanism Parameters

CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 8 bytes long.
CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 16 long.
CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS. Parameter is an 8 byte IV value followed by the data.

	The data value part must be a multiple of 8 bytes long.
CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS. Parameter is an 16 byte IV value followed by the data. The data value part must be a multiple of 16 bytes long.

2.15.3 Mechanism Description

The mechanisms will function by performing the encryption over the data provided using the base key. The resulting cipher text shall be used to create the key value of the resulting key. If not all the cipher text is used then the part discarded will be from the trailing end (least significant bytes) of the cipher text data. The derived key shall be defined by the attribute template supplied but constrained by the length of cipher text available for the key value and other normal PKCS11 derivation constraints.

Attribute template handling, attribute defaulting and key value preparation will operate as per the SHA-1 Key Derivation mechanism in section 2.18.5.

If the data is too short to make the requested key then the mechanism returns CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE.

2.16 Double and Triple-length DES

Table 68, Double and Triple-Length DES Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_DES3_ECB	✓					✓	
CKM_DES3_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	
CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_DES3_MAC		✓					

2.16.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_DES2” and “CKK_DES3” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN
- CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN
- CKM_DES3_ECB
- CKM_DES3_CBC
- CKM_DES3_MAC
- CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL
- CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD

2.16.2 DES2 secret key objects

DES2 secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_DES2**) hold double-length DES keys. The following table defines the DES2 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 69, DES2 Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (always 16 bytes long)

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

DES2 keys must always have their parity bits properly set as described in FIPS PUB 46-3 (*i.e.*, each of the DES keys comprising a DES2 key must have its parity bits properly set). Attempting to create or unwrap a DES2 key with incorrect parity will return an error.

The following is a sample template for creating a double-length DES secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES2;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A DES2 secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[16] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

CKA_CHECK_VALUE: The value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of the ECB encryption of a single block of null (0x00) bytes, using the default cipher associated with the key type of the secret key object.

2.16.3 DES3 secret key objects

DES3 secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_DES3**) hold triple-length DES keys. The following table defines the DES3 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 70, DES3 Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (always 24 bytes long)

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

DES3 keys must always have their parity bits properly set as described in FIPS PUB 46-3 (*i.e.*, each of the DES keys comprising a DES3 key must have its parity bits properly set). Attempting to create or unwrap a DES3 key with incorrect parity will return an error.

The following is a sample template for creating a triple-length DES secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES3;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A DES3 secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[24] = {...};
```



```

CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

CKA_CHECK_VALUE: The value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of the ECB encryption of a single block of null (0x00) bytes, using the default cipher associated with the key type of the secret key object.

2.16.4 Double-length DES key generation

The double-length DES key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for double-length DES keys. The DES keys making up a double-length DES key both have their parity bits set properly, as specified in FIPS PUB 46-3.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the double-length DES key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

Double-length DES keys can be used with all the same mechanisms as triple-DES keys:

CKM_DES3_ECB, **CKM_DES3_CBC**, **CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD**, **CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL**, and **CKM_DES3_MAC**. Triple-DES encryption with a double-length DES key is equivalent to encryption with a triple-length DES key with $K1=K3$ as specified in FIPS PUB 46-3.

When double-length DES keys are generated, it is token-dependent whether or not it is possible for either of the component DES keys to be “weak” or “semi-weak” keys.

2.16.5 Triple-length DES Order of Operations

Triple-length DES encryptions are carried out as specified in FIPS PUB 46-3: encrypt, decrypt, encrypt. Decryptions are carried out with the opposite three steps: decrypt, encrypt, decrypt. The mathematical representations of the encrypt and decrypt operations are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{DES3-E}(\{K1, K2, K3\}, P) &= E(K3, D(K2, E(K1, P))) \\
 \text{DES3-D}(\{K1, K2, K3\}, C) &= D(K1, E(K2, D(K3, P)))
 \end{aligned}$$

2.16.6 Triple-length DES in CBC Mode

Triple-length DES operations in CBC mode, with double or triple-length keys, are performed using outer CBC as defined in X9.52. X9.52 describes this mode as TCBC. The mathematical representations of the CBC encrypt and decrypt operations are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{DES3-CBC-E}(\{K1, K2, K3\}, P) &= E(K3, D(K2, E(K1, P + I))) \\
 \text{DES3-CBC-D}(\{K1, K2, K3\}, C) &= D(K1, E(K2, D(K3, P))) + I
 \end{aligned}$$

The value *I* is either an 8-byte initialization vector or the previous block of cipher text that is added to the current input block. The addition operation is used is addition modulo-2 (XOR).

2.16.7 DES and Triple length DES in OFB Mode

Table 71, DES and Triple Length DES in OFB Mode Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_DES_OFB64	✓						
CKM_DES_OFB8	✓						
CKM_DES_CFB64	✓						
CKM_DES_CFB8	✓						

Cipher DES has a output feedback mode, DES-OFB, denoted **CKM_DES_OFB8** and **CKM_DES_OFB64**. It is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption with DES. It has a parameter, an initialization vector for this mode. The initialization vector has the same length as the block size.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 72, OFB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_DES, CKK_DES2, CKK_DES3	any	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_DES, CKK_DES2, CKK_DES3	any	same as input length	no final part

For this mechanism the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure is as specified for CBC mode.

2.16.8 DES and Triple length DES in CFB Mode

Cipher DES has a cipher feedback mode, DES-CFB, denoted **CKM_DES_CFB8** and **CKM_DES_CFB64**. It is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption with DES.

It has a parameter, an initialization vector for this mode. The initialization vector has the same length as the block size.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 73, CFB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_DES, CKK_DES2, CKK_DES3	any	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_DES, CKK_DES2, CKK_DES3	any	same as input length	no final part

For this mechanism the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure is as specified for CBC mode.

2.17 Double and Triple-length DES CMAC

Table 74, Double and Triple-length DES CMAC Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_DES3_CMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_DES3_CMAC		✓					

¹ SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover.

The following additional DES3 mechanisms have been added.

2.17.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_DES3_CMAC_GENERAL

CKM_DES3_CMAC

2.17.2 Mechanism parameters

CKM_DES3_CMAC_GENERAL uses the existing **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure.

CKM_DES3_CMAC does not use a mechanism parameter.

2.17.3 General-length DES3-MAC

General-length DES3-CMAC, denoted **CKM_DES3_CMAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification with DES3 or DES2 keys, based on [NIST sp800-38b].

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final DES3 cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 75, General-length DES3-CMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_DES3 CKK_DES2	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	CKK_DES3 CKK_DES2	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters

Reference [NIST sp800-38b] recommends that the output MAC is not truncated to less than 64 bits (which means using the entire block for DES). The MAC length must be specified before the communication starts, and must not be changed during the lifetime of the key. It is the caller's responsibility to follow these rules.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used

2.17.4 DES3-CMAC

DES3-CMAC, denoted **CKM_DES3_CMAC**, is a special case of the general-length DES3-CMAC mechanism. DES3-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are a full block size in length, since the DES3 block length is the minimum output length recommended by [NIST sp800-38b].

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 76, DES3-CMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_DES3 CKK_DES2	any	Block size (8 bytes)
C_Verify	CKK_DES3 CKK_DES2	any	Block size (8 bytes)

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

2.18 SHA-1

Table 77, SHA-1 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA_1				✓			
CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA_1_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION							✓

2.18.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

- CKM_SHA_1
- CKM_SHA_1_HMAC
- CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL
- CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION
- CKK_SHA_1_HMAC

2.18.2 SHA-1 digest

The SHA-1 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA_1**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm with a 160-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 80, SHA-1: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	20

2.18.3 General-length SHA-1-HMAC

The general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for signatures and verification. It uses the HMAC construction, based on the SHA-1 hash function. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA_1_HMAC.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 0-20 (the output size of SHA-1 is 20 bytes). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be taken from the start of the full 20-byte HMAC output.

Table 78, General-length SHA-1-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret	any	0-20, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret	any	0-20, depending on parameters

2.18.4 SHA-1-HMAC

The SHA-1-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA_1_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 2.18.3.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 20.

2.18.5 SHA-1 key derivation

SHA-1 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION**, is a mechanism which provides the capability of deriving a secret key by digesting the value of another secret key with SHA-1.

The value of the base key is digested once, and the result is used to make the value of derived secret key.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key. Its length will be 20 bytes (the output size of SHA-1).
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length was provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more than 20 bytes, such as DES3, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to

CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

2.19 SHA-224

Table 79, SHA-224 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA224				✓			
CKM_SHA224_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION							✓

2.19.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_SHA224
 CKM_SHA224_HMAC
 CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL
 CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION
 CKK_SHA224_HMAC

2.19.2 SHA-224 digest

The SHA-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm with a 224-bit message digest defined in 0.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 83, SHA-224: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	28

2.19.3 General-length SHA-224-HMAC

The general-length SHA-224-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-224 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 0-28. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and CKK_SHA224_HMAC. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 14 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA-224 hash output.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 0-28 (the output size of SHA-224 is 28 bytes). FIPS-198 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 14 (half the maximum length).

Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be taken from the start of the full 28-byte HMAC output.

Table 80, General-length SHA-224-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret	Any	0-28, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret	Any	0-28, depending on parameters

2.19.4 SHA-224-HMAC

The SHA-224-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-224-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 28.

2.19.5 SHA-224 key derivation

SHA-224 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 12.21.5 except that it uses the SHA-224 hash function and the relevant length is 28 bytes.

2.20 SHA-256

Table 81, SHA-256 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA256				✓			
CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA256_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION							✓

2.20.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

- CKM_SHA256
- CKM_SHA256_HMAC
- CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL
- CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION
- CKK_SHA256_HMAC

2.20.2 SHA-256 digest

The SHA-256 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA256**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm with a 256-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 82, SHA-256: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	32

2.20.3 General-length SHA-256-HMAC

The general-length SHA-256-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 2.18.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-256 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 0-32. The keys it uses are generic secret keys and **CKK_SHA256_HMAC**. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 16 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA-256 hash output.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 0-32 (the output size of SHA-256 is 32 bytes). FIPS-198 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 16 (half the maximum length). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be taken from the start of the full 32-byte HMAC output.

Table 83, General-length SHA-256-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret	Any	0-32, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret	Any	0-32, depending on parameters

2.20.4 SHA-256-HMAC

The SHA-256-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA256_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-256-HMAC mechanism in Section 2.20.3.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 32.

2.20.5 SHA-256 key derivation

SHA-256 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 2.18.5, except that it uses the SHA-256 hash function and the relevant length is 32 bytes.

2.21 SHA-384

Table 84, SHA-384 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA384				✓			
CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA384_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION							✓

2.21.1 Definitions

CKM_SHA384

CKM_SHA384_HMAC

CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL

CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION

CKK_SHA384_HMAC

2.21.2 SHA-384 digest

The SHA-384 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA384**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm with a 384-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 85, SHA-384: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	48

2.21.3 General-length SHA-384-HMAC

The general-length SHA-384-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 2.18.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-384 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 0-48.

2.21.4 SHA-384-HMAC

The SHA-384-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA384_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-384-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 48.

2.21.5 SHA-384 key derivation

SHA-384 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 2.18.5, except that it uses the SHA-384 hash function and the relevant length is 48 bytes.

2.22 SHA-512

Table 86, SHA-512 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA512				✓			
CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA512_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION							✓

2.22.1 Definitions

CKM_SHA512

CKM_SHA512_HMAC

CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL
CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION

CKK_SHA512_HMAC

2.22.2 SHA-512 digest

The SHA-512 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm with a 512-bit message digest defined in FIPS PUB 180-2.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 87, SHA-512: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	64

2.22.3 General-length SHA-512-HMAC

The general-length SHA-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 2.18.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-512 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 0-64.

2.22.4 SHA-512-HMAC

The SHA-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-512-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 64.

2.22.5 SHA-512 key derivation

SHA-512 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 2.18.5, except that it uses the SHA-512 hash function and the relevant length is 64 bytes.

2.23 SHA-512/224

Table 88, SHA-512/224 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA512_224				✓			
CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA512_224_KEY_DERIVATION							✓

2.23.1 Definitions

CKM_SHA512_224

CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC
 CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC_GENERAL
 CKM_SHA512_224_KEY_DERIVATION

CKK_SHA512_224_HMAC

2.23.2 SHA-512/224 digest

The SHA-512/224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_224**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 180-4, section 5.3.6. It is based on a 512-bit message digest with a distinct initial hash value and truncated to 224 bits. **CKM_SHA512_224** is the same as **CKM_SHA512_T** with a parameter value of 224.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 89, SHA-512/224: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	28

2.23.3 General-length SHA-512-HMAC

The general-length SHA-512/224-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 2.18.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-512/224 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 0-28.

2.23.4 SHA-512/224-HMAC

The SHA-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-512/224-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 28.

2.23.5 SHA-512/224 key derivation

The SHA-512/224 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA512_224_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-512 key derivation mechanism in section 2.25.5, except that it uses the SHA-512/224 hash function and the relevant length is 28 bytes.

2.24 SHA-512/256

Table 90, SHA-512/256 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA512_256				✓			
CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA512_256_KEY_DERIVATION							✓

2.24.1 Definitions

CKM_SHA512_256
CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC
CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC_GENERAL
CKM_SHA512_256_KEY_DERIVATION

CKK_SHA512_256_HMAC

2.24.2 SHA-512/256 digest

The SHA-512/256 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_256**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 180-4, section 5.3.6. It is based on a 512-bit message digest with a distinct initial hash value and truncated to 256 bits. **CKM_SHA512_256** is the same as **CKM_SHA512_T** with a parameter value of 256.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 91, SHA-512/256: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	32

2.24.3 General-length SHA-512-HMAC

The general-length SHA-512/256-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 2.18.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-512/256 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 0-32.

2.24.4 SHA-512/256-HMAC

The SHA-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-512/256-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 32.

2.24.5 SHA-512/256 key derivation

The SHA-512/256 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA512_256_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-512 key derivation mechanism in section 2.25.5, except that it uses the SHA-512/256 hash function and the relevant length is 32 bytes.

2.25 SHA-512/t

Table 92, SHA-512 / t Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA512_T				✓			
CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA512_T_KEY_DERIVATION							✓

2.25.1 Definitions

CKM_SHA512_T
 CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC
 CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC_GENERAL
 CKM_SHA512_T_KEY_DERIVATION

CKK_SHA512_T_HMAC

2.25.2 SHA-512/t digest

The SHA-512/t mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_T**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm defined in FIPS PUB 180-4, section 5.3.6. It is based on a 512-bit message digest with a distinct initial hash value and truncated to t bits.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the value of t in bits. The length in bytes of the desired output should be in the range of $0 - \lceil t/8 \rceil$, where $0 < t < 512$, and $t \neq 384$.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 93, SHA-512/256: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	$\lceil t/8 \rceil$, where $0 < t < 512$, and $t \neq 384$

2.25.3 General-length SHA-512-HMAC

The general-length SHA-512/256-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism in Section 2.18.3, except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-512/t hash function and length of the output should be in the range $0 - \lceil t/8 \rceil$, where $0 < t < 512$, and $t \neq 384$.

2.25.4 SHA-512/t-HMAC

The SHA-512-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-512/256-HMAC mechanism.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the value of t in bits. The length in bytes of the desired output should be in the range of $0 - \lceil t/8 \rceil$, where $0 < t < 512$, and $t \neq 384$.

2.25.5 SHA-512/t key derivation

The SHA-512/256 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA512_T_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-512 key derivation mechanism in section 2.25.5, except that it uses the SHA-512/256 hash function and the relevant length is $\lceil t/8 \rceil$ bytes, where $0 < t < 512$, and $t \neq 384$.

2.26 PKCS #5 and PKCS #5-style password-based encryption (PBE)

The mechanisms in this section are for generating keys and IVs for performing password-based encryption. The method used to generate keys and IVs is specified in PKCS #5.

Table 94, PKCS 5 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC					✓		
CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC					✓		
CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC					✓		
CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2					✓		

2.26.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC
CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC
CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2
CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC

2.26.2 Password-based encryption/authentication mechanism parameters

◆ CK_PBE_PARAMS; CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR

CK_PBE_PARAMS is a structure which provides all of the necessary information required by the CKM_PBE mechanisms (see PKCS #5 and PKCS #12 for information on the PBE generation mechanisms) and the CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector;
    CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
    CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt;
    CK_ULONG ulSaltLen;
    CK_ULONG ulIteration;
} CK_PBE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pInitVector pointer to the location that receives the 8-byte initialization vector (IV), if an IV is required;

pPassword points to the password to be used in the PBE key generation;

ulPasswordLen length in bytes of the password information;

pSalt points to the salt to be used in the PBE key generation;

ulSaltLen length in bytes of the salt information;

ullteration number of iterations required for the generation.

CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_PBE_PARAMS.

2.26.3 PKCS #5 PBKDF2 key generation mechanism parameters

◆ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE; CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR

CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE;
```

The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.1. The following table lists the defined functions.

Table 95, PKCS #5 PBKDF2 Key Generation: Pseudo-random functions

PRF Identifier	Value	Parameter Type
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1	0x00000001UL	No Parameter. <i>pPrfData</i> must be NULL and <i>ulPrfDataLen</i> must be zero.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_GOSTR3411	0x00000002UL	This PRF uses GOST R34.11-94 hash to produce secret key value. <i>pPrfData</i> should point to DER-encoded OID, indicating GOSTR34.11-94 parameters. <i>ulPrfDataLen</i> holds encoded OID length in bytes. If <i>pPrfData</i> is set to NULL_PTR, then <i>id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet</i> parameters will be used (RFC 4357, 11.2), and <i>ulPrfDataLen</i> must be 0.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA224	0x00000003UL	No Parameter. <i>pPrfData</i> must be NULL and <i>ulPrfDataLen</i> must be zero.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA256	0x00000004UL	No Parameter. <i>pPrfData</i> must be NULL and <i>ulPrfDataLen</i> must be zero.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA384	0x00000005UL	No Parameter. <i>pPrfData</i> must be NULL and <i>ulPrfDataLen</i> must be zero.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512	0x00000006UL	No Parameter. <i>pPrfData</i> must be NULL and <i>ulPrfDataLen</i> must be zero.

CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512_224	0x00000007UL	No Parameter. <i>pPrfData</i> must be NULL and <i>ulPrfDataLen</i> must be zero.
CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512_256	0x00000008UL	No Parameter. <i>pPrfData</i> must be NULL and <i>ulPrfDataLen</i> must be zero.

CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE.

◆ **CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE;
CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR**

CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE;
```

The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.1. The following table lists the defined sources along with the corresponding data type for the *pSaltSourceData* field in the CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAM structure defined below.

Table 96, PKCS #5 PBKDF2 Key Generation: Salt sources

Source Identifier	Value	Data Type
CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED	0x00000001	Array of CK_BYTE containing the value of the salt value.

CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR is a pointer to a CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE.

◆ **CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS; CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS {
    CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource;
    CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData;
    CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen;
    CK_ULONG iterations;
    CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf;
    CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData;
    CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen;
    CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
    CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen;
} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

saltSource *source of the salt value*

pSaltSourceData *data used as the input for the salt source*

ulSaltSourceDataLen *length of the salt source input*

<i>iterations</i>	<i>number of iterations to perform when generating each block of random data</i>
<i>prf</i>	<i>pseudo-random function used to generate the key</i>
<i>pPrfData</i>	<i>data used as the input for PRF in addition to the salt value</i>
<i>ulPrfDataLen</i>	<i>length of the input data for the PRF</i>
<i>pPassword</i>	<i>points to the password to be used in the PBE key generation</i>
<i>ulPasswordLen</i>	<i>length in bytes of the password information</i>

CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS.

2.26.4 PKCS #5 PBKD2 key generation

PKCS #5 PBKDF2 key generation, denoted **CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2**, is a mechanism used for generating a secret key from a password and a salt value. This functionality is defined in PKCS#5 as PBKDF2.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the salt value source, pseudo-random function, and iteration count used to generate the new key.

Since this mechanism can be used to generate any type of secret key, new key templates must contain the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** and **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attributes. If the key type has a fixed length the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute may be omitted.

2.27 PKCS #12 password-based encryption/authentication mechanisms

The mechanisms in this section are for generating keys and IVs for performing password-based encryption or authentication. The method used to generate keys and IVs is based on a method that was specified in PKCS #12.

We specify here a general method for producing various types of pseudo-random bits from a password, p ; a string of salt bits, s ; and an iteration count, c . The “type” of pseudo-random bits to be produced is identified by an identification byte, ID , the meaning of which will be discussed later.

Let H be a hash function built around a compression function $f: \mathbf{Z}_2^u \times \mathbf{Z}_2^v \rightarrow \mathbf{Z}_2^u$ (that is, H has a chaining variable and output of length u bits, and the message input to the compression function of H is v bits). For MD2 and MD5, $u=128$ and $v=512$; for SHA-1, $u=160$ and $v=512$.

We assume here that u and v are both multiples of 8, as are the lengths in bits of the password and salt strings and the number n of pseudo-random bits required. In addition, u and v are of course nonzero.

1. Construct a string, D (the “diversifier”), by concatenating $v/8$ copies of ID .
2. Concatenate copies of the salt together to create a string S of length $v \lceil s/v \rceil$ bits (the final copy of the salt may be truncated to create S). Note that if the salt is the empty string, then so is S .
3. Concatenate copies of the password together to create a string P of length $v \lceil p/v \rceil$ bits (the final copy of the password may be truncated to create P). Note that if the password is the empty string, then so is P .
4. Set $I=S||P$ to be the concatenation of S and P .
5. Set $j=\lceil n/u \rceil$.
6. For $i=1, 2, \dots, j$, do the following:
 - a. Set $A_i=H^c(D||I)$, the c^{th} hash of $D||I$. That is, compute the hash of $D||I$; compute the hash of that hash; etc.; continue in this fashion until a total of c hashes have been computed, each on the result of the previous hash.

- b. Concatenate copies of A_i to create a string B of length v bits (the final copy of A_i may be truncated to create B).
 - c. Treating I as a concatenation I_0, I_1, \dots, I_{k-1} of v -bit blocks, where $k = \lceil s/v \rceil + \lceil p/v \rceil$, modify I by setting $I_j = (I_j + B + 1) \bmod 2^v$ for each j . To perform this addition, treat each v -bit block as a binary number represented most-significant bit first.
7. Concatenate A_1, A_2, \dots, A_j together to form a pseudo-random bit string, A .
 8. Use the first n bits of A as the output of this entire process.

When the password-based encryption mechanisms presented in this section are used to generate a key and IV (if needed) from a password, salt, and an iteration count, the above algorithm is used. To generate a key, the identifier byte ID is set to the value 1; to generate an IV, the identifier byte ID is set to the value 2.

When the password based authentication mechanism presented in this section is used to generate a key from a password, salt, and an iteration count, the above algorithm is used. The identifier byte ID is set to the value 3.

2.27.1 SHA-1-PBE for 3-key triple-DES-CBC

SHA-1-PBE for 3-key triple-DES-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC**, is a mechanism used for generating a 3-key triple-DES secret key and IV from a password and a salt value by using the SHA-1 digest algorithm and an iteration count. The method used to generate the key and IV is described above. Each byte of the key produced will have its low-order bit adjusted, if necessary, so that a valid 3-key triple-DES key with proper parity bits is obtained.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of the application-supplied buffer which will receive the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism.

The key and IV produced by this mechanism will typically be used for performing password-based encryption.

2.27.2 SHA-1-PBE for 2-key triple-DES-CBC

SHA-1-PBE for 2-key triple-DES-CBC, denoted **CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC**, is a mechanism used for generating a 2-key triple-DES secret key and IV from a password and a salt value by using the SHA-1 digest algorithm and an iteration count. The method used to generate the key and IV is described above. Each byte of the key produced will have its low-order bit adjusted, if necessary, so that a valid 2-key triple-DES key with proper parity bits is obtained.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process and the location of the application-supplied buffer which will receive the 8-byte IV generated by the mechanism.

The key and IV produced by this mechanism will typically be used for performing password-based encryption.

2.27.3 SHA-1-PBA for SHA-1-HMAC

SHA-1-PBA for SHA-1-HMAC, denoted **CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC**, is a mechanism used for generating a 160-bit generic secret key from a password and a salt value by using the SHA-1 digest algorithm and an iteration count. The method used to generate the key is described above.

It has a parameter, a **CK_PBE_PARAMS** structure. The parameter specifies the input information for the key generation process. The parameter also has a field to hold the location of an application-supplied buffer which will receive an IV; for this mechanism, the contents of this field are ignored, since authentication with SHA-1-HMAC does not require an IV.

The key generated by this mechanism will typically be used for computing a SHA-1 HMAC to perform password-based authentication (not *password-based encryption*). At the time of this writing, this is primarily done to ensure the integrity of a PKCS #12 PDU.

2.28 SSL

Table 97, SSL Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE							✓
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH							✓
CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE							✓
CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC		✓					
CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC		✓					

2.28.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

- CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN
- CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE
- CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE
- CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
- CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC
- CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC

2.28.2 SSL mechanism parameters

◆ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA

CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA is a structure which provides information about the random data of a client and a server in an SSL context. This structure is used by both the **CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE** and the **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanisms. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA {  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;  
    CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;  
    CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen;  
} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pClientRandom *pointer to the client's random data*

ulClientRandomLen *length in bytes of the client's random data*

pServerRandom *pointer to the server's random data*

ulServerRandomLen *length in bytes of the server's random data*

◆ **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {  
    CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;  
    CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;  
} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>RandomInfo</i>	<i>client's and server's random data information.</i>
<i>pVersion</i>	<i>pointer to a CK_VERSION structure which receives the SSL protocol version information</i>

CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

◆ **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT; CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR**

CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT is a structure that contains the resulting key handles and initialization vectors after performing a **C_DeriveKey** function with the **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT {  
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret;  
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret;  
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey;  
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer;  
} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>hClientMacSecret</i>	<i>key handle for the resulting Client MAC Secret key</i>
<i>hServerMacSecret</i>	<i>key handle for the resulting Server MAC Secret key</i>
<i>hClientKey</i>	<i>key handle for the resulting Client Secret key</i>
<i>hServerKey</i>	<i>key handle for the resulting Server Secret key</i>
<i>pIVClient</i>	<i>pointer to a location which receives the initialization vector (IV) created for the client (if any)</i>
<i>pIVServer</i>	<i>pointer to a location which receives the initialization vector (IV) created for the server (if any)</i>

CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT**.

◆ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR

CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
    CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
    CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
    CK_BBOOL bIsExport;
    CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
    CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>ulMacSizeInBits</i>	<i>the length (in bits) of the MACing keys agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase</i>
<i>ulKeySizeInBits</i>	<i>the length (in bits) of the secret keys agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase</i>
<i>ulIVSizeInBits</i>	<i>the length (in bits) of the IV agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase. If no IV is required, the length should be set to 0</i>
<i>bIsExport</i>	<i>a Boolean value which indicates whether the keys have to be derived for an export version of the protocol</i>
<i>RandomInfo</i>	<i>client's and server's random data information.</i>
<i>pReturnedKeyMaterial</i>	<i>points to a CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT structures which receives the handles for the keys generated and the IVs</i>

CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS**.

2.28.3 Pre-master key generation

Pre-master key generation in SSL 3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN**, is a mechanism which generates a 48-byte generic secret key. It is used to produce the "pre_master" key used in SSL version 3.0 for RSA-like cipher suites.

It has one parameter, a **CK_VERSION** structure, which provides the client's SSL version number.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_GenerateKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 48. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

For this mechanism, the **ulMinKeySize** and **ulMaxKeySize** fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 48 bytes.

2.28.4 Master key derivation

Master key derivation in SSL 3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive one 48-byte generic secret key from another 48-byte generic secret key. It is used to produce

the "master_secret" key used in the SSL protocol from the "pre_master" key. This mechanism returns the value of the client version, which is built into the "pre_master" key as well as a handle to the derived "master_secret" key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data to the token as well as the returning of the protocol version number which is part of the pre-master key. This structure is defined in Section 2.28.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template; otherwise they are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 48. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either **CK_TRUE** or **CK_FALSE**. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the **ulMinKeySize** and **ulMaxKeySize** fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 48 bytes.

Note that the **CK_VERSION** structure pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure's *pVersion* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, when the call returns, this structure will hold the SSL version associated with the supplied pre_master key.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for cipher suites that use a 48-byte "pre_master" secret with an embedded version number. This includes the RSA cipher suites, but excludes the Diffie-Hellman cipher suites.

2.28.5 Master key derivation for Diffie-Hellman

Master key derivation for Diffie-Hellman in SSL 3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH**, is a mechanism used to derive one 48-byte generic secret key from another arbitrary length generic secret key. It is used to produce the "master_secret" key used in the SSL protocol from the "pre_master" key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data to the token. This structure is defined in Section 2.28. The *pVersion* field of the structure must be set to **NULL_PTR** since the version number is not embedded in the "pre_master" key as it is for RSA-like cipher suites.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 48. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 48 bytes.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for cipher suites that do not use a fixed length 48-byte "pre_master" secret with an embedded version number. This includes the Diffie-Hellman cipher suites, but excludes the RSA cipher suites.

2.28.6 Key and MAC derivation

Key, MAC and IV derivation in SSL 3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive the appropriate cryptographic keying material used by a "CipherSuite" from the "master_secret" key and random data. This mechanism returns the key handles for the keys generated in the process, as well as the IVs created.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data as well as the characteristic of the cryptographic material for the given CipherSuite and a pointer to a structure which receives the handles and IVs which were generated. This structure is defined in Section 2.28.

This mechanism contributes to the creation of four distinct keys on the token and returns two IVs (if IVs are requested by the caller) back to the caller. The keys are all given an object class of **CKO_SECRET_KEY**.

The two MACing keys ("client_write_MAC_secret" and "server_write_MAC_secret") are always given a type of **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**. They are flagged as valid for signing, verification, and derivation operations.

The other two keys ("client_write_key" and "server_write_key") are typed according to information found in the template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** function call. By default, they are flagged as valid for encryption, decryption, and derivation operations.

IVs will be generated and returned if the *ulIVSizeInBits* field of the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** field has a nonzero value. If they are generated, their length in bits will agree with the value in the *ulIVSizeInBits* field.

All four keys inherit the values of the **CKA_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE**, and **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes from the base key. The template provided to **C_DeriveKey** may not specify values for any of these attributes which differ from those held by the base key.

Note that the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure's *pReturnedKeyMaterial* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, the four key handle fields in the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure will be modified to hold handles to the newly-created keys; in addition, the buffers pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure's *pIVClient* and *pIVServer* fields will have IVs returned in them (if IVs are requested by the caller). Therefore, these two fields must point to buffers with sufficient space to hold any IVs that will be returned.

This mechanism departs from the other key derivation mechanisms in Cryptoki in its returned information. For most key-derivation mechanisms, **C_DeriveKey** returns a single key handle as a result of a successful completion. However, since the **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism returns all of its key handles in the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the

CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS structure specified as the mechanism parameter, the parameter *phKey* passed to **C_DeriveKey** is unnecessary, and should be a **NULL_PTR**.

If a call to **C_DeriveKey** with this mechanism fails, then *none* of the four keys will be created on the token.

2.28.7 MD5 MACing in SSL 3.0

MD5 MACing in SSL3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures (data authentication) and verification using MD5, based on the SSL 3.0 protocol. This technique is very similar to the HMAC technique.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which specifies the length in bytes of the signatures produced by this mechanism.

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table:

Table 98, MD5 MACing in SSL 3.0: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret	any	4-8, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret	any	4-8, depending on parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of generic secret key sizes, in bits.

2.28.8 SHA-1 MACing in SSL 3.0

SHA-1 MACing in SSL3.0, denoted **CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures (data authentication) and verification using SHA-1, based on the SSL 3.0 protocol. This technique is very similar to the HMAC technique.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which specifies the length in bytes of the signatures produced by this mechanism.

Constraints on key types and the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table:

Table 99, SHA-1 MACing in SSL 3.0: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret	any	4-8, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret	any	4-8, depending on parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of generic secret key sizes, in bits.

2.29 TLS 1.2 Mechanisms

Details for TLS 1.2 and its key derivation and MAC mechanisms can be found in [TLS 1.2]. TLS 1.2 mechanisms differ from TLS 1.0 and 1.1 mechanisms in that the base hash used in the underlying TLS PRF (pseudo-random function) can be negotiated. Therefore each mechanism parameter for the TLS 1.2 mechanisms contains a new value in the parameters structure to specify the hash function.

This section also specifies **CKM_TLS_MAC** which should be used in place of **CKM_TLS_PRF** to calculate the *verify_data* in the TLS "finished" message.

This section also specifies **CKM_TLS_KDF** that can be used in place of **CKM_TLS_PRF** to implement key material exporters.

Table 100, TLS 1.2 Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE							✓
CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH							✓
CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE							✓
CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE							✓
CKM_TLS10_MAC_SERVER		✓					
CKM_TLS10_MAC_CLIENT		✓					
CKM_TLS_KDF							✓
CKM_TLS12_MAC		✓					

2.29.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE
 CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
 CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE
 CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE
 CKM_TLS10_MAC_SERVER
 CKM_TLS10_MAC_CLIENT
 CKM_TLS_KDF
 CKM_TLS12_MAC

2.29.2 TLS 1.2 mechanism parameters

◆ CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR

CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
    CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
    CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism;
} CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

RandomInfo *client's and server's random data information.*

pVersion *pointer to a **CK_VERSION** structure which receives the SSL protocol version information*

prfHashMechanism *base hash used in the underlying TLS1.2 PRF operation used to derive the master key.*

CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

◆ **CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
    CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
    CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
    CK_BBOOL bIsExport;
    CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
    CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism;
} CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>ulMacSizeInBits</i>	<i>the length (in bits) of the MACing keys agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase. If no MAC key is required, the length should be set to 0.</i>
<i>ulKeySizeInBits</i>	<i>the length (in bits) of the secret keys agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase</i>
<i>ulIVSizeInBits</i>	<i>the length (in bits) of the IV agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase. If no IV is required, the length should be set to 0</i>
<i>bIsExport</i>	<i>must be set to CK_FALSE because export cipher suites must not be used in TLS 1.1 and later.</i>
<i>RandomInfo</i>	<i>client's and server's random data information.</i>
<i>pReturnedKeyMaterial</i>	<i>points to a CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT structures which receives the handles for the keys generated and the IVs</i>
<i>prfHashMechanism</i>	<i>base hash used in the underlying TLS1.2 PRF operation used to derive the master key.</i>

CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS**.

◆ **CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS; CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_TLS_KDF** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```

typedef struct CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS {
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfMechanism;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
    CK_ULONG ulLabelLength;
    CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pContextData;
    CK_ULONG ulContextDataLength;
} CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS;

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>prfMechanism</i>	<i>the hash mechanism used in the TLS1.2 PRF construct or CKM_TLS_PRF to use with the TLS1.0 and 1.1 PRF construct.</i>
<i>pLabel</i>	<i>a pointer to the label for this key derivation</i>
<i>ulLabelLength</i>	<i>length of the label in bytes</i>
<i>RandomInfo</i>	<i>the random data for the key derivation</i>
<i>pContextData</i>	<i>a pointer to the context data for this key derivation. NULL_PTR if not present</i>
<i>ulContextDataLength</i>	<i>length of the context data in bytes. 0 if not present.</i>

◆ **CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS; CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_TLS_MAC** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```

typedef struct CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS {
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfMechanism;
    CK_ULONG ulMacLength;
    CK_ULONG ulServerOrClient;
} CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS;

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>prfMechanism</i>	<i>the hash mechanism used in the TLS1.2 PRF construct or CKM_TLS_PRF to use with the TLS1.0 and 1.1 PRF construct.</i>
<i>ulMacLength</i>	<i>the length of the MAC tag required or offered. Always 12 octets in TLS 1.0 and 1.1. Generally 12 octets, but may be negotiated to a longer value in TLS1.2.</i>
<i>ulServerOrClient</i>	<i>1 to use the label "server finished", 2 to use the label "client finished". All other values are invalid.</i>

CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS**.

2.29.3 TLS MAC

The TLS MAC mechanism is used to generate integrity tags for the TLS "finished" message. It replaces the use of the **CKM_TLS_PRF** function for TLS1.0 and 1.1 and that mechanism is deprecated.

CKM_TLS_MAC takes a parameter of **CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS**. To use this mechanism with TLS1.0 and TLS1.1, use **CKM_TLS_PRF** as the value for *prfMechanism* in place of a hash mechanism. Note: Although **CKM_TLS_PRF** is deprecated as a mechanism for **C_DeriveKey**, the manifest value is retained for use with this mechanism to indicate the use of the TLS1.0/1.1 pseudo-random function.

In TLS1.0 and 1.1 the "finished" message *verify_data* (i.e. the output signature from the MAC mechanism) is always 12 bytes. In TLS1.2 the "finished" message *verify_data* is a minimum of 12 bytes, defaults to 12 bytes, but may be negotiated to longer length.

Table 101, General-length TLS MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret	any	>=12 bytes
C_Verify	generic secret	any	>=12 bytes

2.29.4 Master key derivation

Master key derivation in TLS 1.0, denoted **CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive one 48-byte generic secret key from another 48-byte generic secret key. It is used to produce the "master_secret" key used in the TLS protocol from the "pre_master" key. This mechanism returns the value of the client version, which is built into the "pre_master" key as well as a handle to the derived "master_secret" key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data to the token as well as the returning of the protocol version number which is part of the pre-master key. This structure is defined in Section 2.28.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The mechanism also contributes the **CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS** attribute consisting only of **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, **CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE**, **CKM_TLS12_KDF** and **CKM_TLS12_MAC**.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 48. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either **CK_TRUE** or **CK_FALSE**. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE**, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.

- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 48 bytes.

Note that the **CK_VERSION** structure pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure's *pVersion* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, when the call returns, this structure will hold the SSL version associated with the supplied pre_master key.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for cipher suites that use a 48-byte "pre_master" secret with an embedded version number. This includes the RSA cipher suites, but excludes the Diffie-Hellman cipher suites.

2.29.5 Master key derivation for Diffie-Hellman

Master key derivation for Diffie-Hellman in TLS 1.0, denoted **CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH**, is a mechanism used to derive one 48-byte generic secret key from another arbitrary length generic secret key. It is used to produce the "master_secret" key used in the TLS protocol from the "pre_master" key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data to the token. This structure is defined in Section 2.28. The *pVersion* field of the structure must be set to NULL_PTR since the version number is not embedded in the "pre_master" key as it is for RSA-like cipher suites.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The mechanism also contributes the **CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS** attribute consisting only of **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, **CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE**, **CKM_TLS12_KDF** and **CKM_TLS12_MAC**.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 48. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.
- If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 48 bytes.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for cipher suites that do not use a fixed length 48-byte "pre_master" secret with an embedded version number. This includes the Diffie-Hellman cipher suites, but excludes the RSA cipher suites.

2.29.6 Key and MAC derivation

Key, MAC and IV derivation in TLS 1.0, denoted **CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive the appropriate cryptographic keying material used by a "CipherSuite" from the "master_secret" key and random data. This mechanism returns the key handles for the keys generated in the process, as well as the IVs created.

It has a parameter, a **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of random data as well as the characteristic of the cryptographic material for the given CipherSuite and a pointer to a structure which receives the handles and IVs which were generated. This structure is defined in Section 2.28.

This mechanism contributes to the creation of four distinct keys on the token and returns two IVs (if IVs are requested by the caller) back to the caller. The keys are all given an object class of **CKO_SECRET_KEY**.

The two MACing keys ("client_write_MAC_secret" and "server_write_MAC_secret") (if present) are always given a type of **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**. They are flagged as valid for signing and verification.

The other two keys ("client_write_key" and "server_write_key") are typed according to information found in the template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** function call. By default, they are flagged as valid for encryption, decryption, and derivation operations.

For **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, IVs will be generated and returned if the *ullVSizeInBits* field of the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** field has a nonzero value. If they are generated, their length in bits will agree with the value in the *ullVSizeInBits* field.

Note Well: **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** produces both private (key) and public (IV) data. It is possible to "leak" private data by the simple expedient of decreasing the length of private data requested. E.g. Setting *ulMacSizeInBits* and *ulKeySizeInBits* to 0 (or other lengths less than the key size) will result in the private key data being placed in the destination designated for the IV's. Repeated calls with the same master key and same RandomInfo but with differing lengths for the private key material will result in different data being leaked.<

All four keys inherit the values of the **CKA_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE**, and **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes from the base key. The template provided to **C_DeriveKey** may not specify values for any of these attributes which differ from those held by the base key.

Note that the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure's *pReturnedKeyMaterial* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, the four key handle fields in the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure will be modified to hold handles to the newly-created keys; in addition, the buffers pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure's *pIVClient* and *pIVServer* fields will have IVs returned in them (if IVs are requested by the caller). Therefore, these two fields must point to buffers with sufficient space to hold any IVs that will be returned.

This mechanism departs from the other key derivation mechanisms in Cryptoki in its returned information. For most key-derivation mechanisms, **C_DeriveKey** returns a single key handle as a result of a successful completion. However, since the **CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism returns all of its key handles in the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure specified as the mechanism parameter, the parameter *phKey* passed to **C_DeriveKey** is unnecessary, and should be a **NULL_PTR**.

If a call to **C_DeriveKey** with this mechanism fails, then *none* of the four keys will be created on the token.

2.29.7 CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE

CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE is identical to **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** except that it shall never produce IV data, and the *ullVSizeInBits* field of **CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** is ignored and treated as 0. All of the other conditions and behavior described for

CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, with the exception of the black box warning, apply to this mechanism.

CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE is provided as a separate mechanism to allow a client to control the export of IV material (and possible leaking of key material) through the use of the CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS key attribute.

2.29.8 Generic Key Derivation using the TLS PRF

CKM_TLS_KDF is the mechanism defined in RFC5705. It uses the TLS key material and TLS PRF function to produce additional key material for protocols that want to leverage the TLS key negotiation mechanism. **CKM_TLS_KDF** has a parameter of **CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS**. If the protocol using this mechanism does not use context information, the *pContextData* field shall be set to NULL_PTR and the *ulContextDataLength* field shall be set to 0.

To use this mechanism with TLS1.0 and TLS1.1, use **CKM_TLS_PRF** as the value for *prfMechanism* in place of a hash mechanism. Note: Although **CKM_TLS_PRF** is deprecated as a mechanism for C_DeriveKey, the manifest value is retained for use with this mechanism to indicate the use of the TLS1.0/1.1 Pseudo-random function.

This mechanism can be used to derive multiple keys (e.g. similar to **CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**) by first deriving the key stream as a **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET** of the necessary length and doing subsequent derives against that derived key stream using the **CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY** mechanism to split the key stream into the actual operational keys.

The mechanism should not be used with the labels defined for use with TLS, but the token does not enforce this behavior.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If the original key has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from the original key.
- Similarly, if the original key has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from the original key.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the original key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the original key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

2.30 WTLS

Details can be found in [WTLS].

When comparing the existing TLS mechanisms with these extensions to support WTLS one could argue that there would be no need to have distinct handling of the client and server side of the handshake. However, since in WTLS the server and client use different sequence numbers, there could be instances (e.g. when WTLS is used to protect asynchronous protocols) where sequence numbers on the client and server side differ, and hence this motivates the introduced split.

Table 102, WTLS Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE							✓
CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC							✓
CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE							✓
CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE							✓
CKM_WTLS_PRF							✓

2.30.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN
 CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE
 CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC
 CKM_WTLS_PRF
 CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE
 CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE

2.30.2 WTLS mechanism parameters

◆ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA; CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR

CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA is a structure, which provides information about the random data of a client and a server in a WTLS context. This structure is used by the **CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA {
    CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
    CK_ULONG    ulClientRandomLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
    CK_ULONG    ulServerRandomLen;
} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pClientRandom pointer to the client's random data
pClientRandomLen length in bytes of the client's random data
pServerRaandom pointer to the server's random data
ulServerRandomLen length in bytes of the server's random data

CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA**.

◆ **CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure, which provides the parameters to the **CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {  
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE    DigestMechanism;  
    CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA  RandomInfo;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR          pVersion;  
} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>DigestMechanism</i>	the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used (possible types can be found in [WTLS])
<i>RandomInfo</i>	Client's and server's random data information
<i>pVersion</i>	pointer to a CK_BYTE which receives the WTLS protocol version information

CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS**.

◆ **CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS; CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS is a structure, which provides the parameters to the **CKM_WTLS_PRF** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS {  
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE    DigestMechanism;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR          pSeed;  
    CK_ULONG             ulSeedLen;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR          pLabel;  
    CK_ULONG             ulLabelLen;  
    CK_BYTE_PTR          pOutput;  
    CK_ULONG_PTR         pulOutputLen;  
} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>Digest Mechanism</i>	the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used (possible types can be found in [WTLS])
<i>pSeed</i>	pointer to the input seed
<i>ulSeedLen</i>	length in bytes of the input seed
<i>pLabel</i>	pointer to the identifying label
<i>ulLabelLen</i>	length in bytes of the identifying label
<i>pOutput</i>	pointer receiving the output of the operation

pulOutputLen pointer to the length in bytes that the output to be created shall have, has to hold the desired length as input and will receive the calculated length as output

CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS.

◆ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT; CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR

CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT is a structure that contains the resulting key handles and initialization vectors after performing a C_DeriveKey function with the **CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** or with the **CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT {
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
    CK_BYTE_PTR      pIV;
} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>hMacSecret</i>	Key handle for the resulting MAC secret key
<i>hKey</i>	Key handle for the resulting secret key
<i>pIV</i>	Pointer to a location which receives the initialization vector (IV) created (if any)

CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR is a pointer to a CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT.

◆ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR

CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** and the **CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanisms. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE      DigestMechanism;
    CK_ULONG               ulMacSizeInBits;
    CK_ULONG               ulKeySizeInBits;
    CK_ULONG               ulIVSizeInBits;
    CK_ULONG               ulSequenceNumber;
    CK_BBOOL               bIsExport;
    CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA    RandomInfo;
    CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>Digest Mechanism</i>	the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used (possible types can be found in [WTLS])
<i>ulMacSizeInBits</i>	the length (in bits) of the MACing key agreed upon during the protocol handshake phase

<i>ulKeySizeInBits</i>	the length (in bits) of the secret key agreed upon during the handshake phase
<i>ullIVSizeInBits</i>	the length (in bits) of the IV agreed upon during the handshake phase. If no IV is required, the length should be set to 0.
<i>ulSequenceNumber</i>	the current sequence number used for records sent by the client and server respectively
<i>blsExport</i>	a boolean value which indicates whether the keys have to be derives for an export version of the protocol. If this value is true (i.e., the keys are exportable) then <i>ulKeySizeInBits</i> is the length of the key in bits before expansion. The length of the key after expansion is determined by the information found in the template sent along with this mechanism during a C_DeriveKey function call (either the CKA_KEY_TYPE or the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute).
<i>RandomInfo</i>	client's and server's random data information
<i>pReturnedKeyMaterial</i>	points to a CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT structure which receives the handles for the keys generated and the IV

CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS**.

2.30.3 Pre master secret key generation for RSA key exchange suite

Pre master secret key generation for the RSA key exchange suite in WTLS denoted **CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN**, is a mechanism, which generates a variable length secret key. It is used to produce the pre master secret key for RSA key exchange suite used in WTLS. This mechanism returns a handle to the pre master secret key.

It has one parameter, a **CK_BYTE**, which provides the client's WTLS version.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE** and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_GenerateKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute indicates the length of the pre master secret key.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* field of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure shall indicate 20 bytes.

2.30.4 Master secret key derivation

Master secret derivation in WTLS, denoted **CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive a 20 byte generic secret key from variable length secret key. It is used to produce the master secret key used in WTLS from the pre master secret key. This mechanism returns the value of the client version, which is built into the pre master secret key as well as a handle to the derived master secret key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for passing the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used as well as the passing of random data to the token as well as the returning of the protocol version number which is part of the pre master secret key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN**

attribute has value 20. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.

If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.

Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the ulMinKeySize and ulMaxKeySize fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 20 bytes.

Note that the **CK_BYTE** pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure's *pVersion* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, when the call returns, this byte will hold the WTLS version associated with the supplied pre master secret key.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for key exchange suites that use a 20-byte pre master secret key with an embedded version number. This includes the RSA key exchange suites, but excludes the Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography key exchange suites.

2.30.5 Master secret key derivation for Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Master secret derivation for Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography in WTLS, denoted **CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC**, is a mechanism used to derive a 20 byte generic secret key from variable length secret key. It is used to produce the master secret key used in WTLS from the pre master secret key. This mechanism returns a handle to the derived master secret key.

It has a parameter, a **CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used as well as random data to the token. The *pVersion* field of the structure must be set to NULL_PTR since the version number is not embedded in the pre master secret key as it is for RSA-like key exchange suites.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key (as well as the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute, if it is not supplied in the template). Other attributes may be specified in the template, or else are assigned default values.

The template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** call may indicate that the object class is **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, the key type is **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**, and the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute has value 20. However, since these facts are all implicit in the mechanism, there is no need to specify any of them.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

The **CKA_SENSITIVE** and **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attributes in the template for the new key can both be specified to be either CK_TRUE or CK_FALSE. If omitted, these attributes each take on some default value.

If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will as well. If the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to the same value as its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute.

Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, then the derived key will, too. If the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, then the derived key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to the *opposite* value from its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute.

For this mechanism, the `ulMinKeySize` and `ulMaxKeySize` fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure both indicate 20 bytes.

Note that this mechanism is only useable for key exchange suites that do not use a fixed length 20-byte pre master secret key with an embedded version number. This includes the Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography key exchange suites, but excludes the RSA key exchange suites.

2.30.6 WTLS PRF (pseudorandom function)

PRF (pseudo random function) in WTLS, denoted **CKM_WTLS_PRF**, is a mechanism used to produce a securely generated pseudo-random output of arbitrary length. The keys it uses are generic secret keys.

It has a parameter, a **CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS** structure, which allows for passing the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used, the passing of the input seed and its length, the passing of an identifying label and its length and the passing of the length of the output to the token and for receiving the output.

This mechanism produces securely generated pseudo-random output of the length specified in the parameter.

This mechanism departs from the other key derivation mechanisms in Cryptoki in not using the template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** function call, which means the template shall be a `NULL_PTR`. For most key-derivation mechanisms, **C_DeriveKey** returns a single key handle as a result of a successful completion. However, since the **CKM_WTLS_PRF** mechanism returns the requested number of output bytes in the **CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS** structure specified as the mechanism parameter, the parameter *phKey* passed to **C_DeriveKey** is unnecessary, and should be a `NULL_PTR`.

If a call to **C_DeriveKey** with this mechanism fails, then no output will be generated.

2.30.7 Server Key and MAC derivation

Server key, MAC and IV derivation in WTLS, denoted **CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive the appropriate cryptographic keying material used by a cipher suite from the master secret key and random data. This mechanism returns the key handles for the keys generated in the process, as well as the IV created.

It has a parameter, a **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used, random data, the characteristic of the cryptographic material for the given cipher suite, and a pointer to a structure which receives the handles and IV which were generated.

This mechanism contributes to the creation of two distinct keys and returns one IV (if an IV is requested by the caller) back to the caller. The keys are all given an object class of **CKO_SECRET_KEY**.

The MACing key (server write MAC secret) is always given a type of **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**. It is flagged as valid for signing, verification and derivation operations.

The other key (server write key) is typed according to information found in the template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** function call. By default, it is flagged as valid for encryption, decryption, and derivation operations.

An IV (server write IV) will be generated and returned if the *ullVSizeInBits* field of the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** field has a nonzero value. If it is generated, its length in bits will agree with the value in the *ullVSizeInBits* field

Both keys inherit the values of the **CKA_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE**, and **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes from the base key. The template provided to **C_DeriveKey** may not specify values for any of these attributes that differ from those held by the base key.

Note that the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure's *pReturnedKeyMaterial* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, the two key handle fields in the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure will be modified to hold handles to the newly-created keys; in addition, the buffer pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure's *pIV* field will

have the IV returned in them (if an IV is requested by the caller). Therefore, this field must point to a buffer with sufficient space to hold any IV that will be returned.

This mechanism departs from the other key derivation mechanisms in Cryptoki in its returned information. For most key-derivation mechanisms, **C_DeriveKey** returns a single key handle as a result of a successful completion. However, since the **CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism returns all of its key handles in the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure specified as the mechanism parameter, the parameter *phKey* passed to **C_DeriveKey** is unnecessary, and should be a **NULL_PTR**.

If a call to **C_DeriveKey** with this mechanism fails, then *none* of the two keys will be created.

2.30.8 Client key and MAC derivation

Client key, MAC and IV derivation in WTLS, denoted **CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE**, is a mechanism used to derive the appropriate cryptographic keying material used by a cipher suite from the master secret key and random data. This mechanism returns the key handles for the keys generated in the process, as well as the IV created.

It has a parameter, a **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure, which allows for the passing of the mechanism type of the digest mechanism to be used, random data, the characteristic of the cryptographic material for the given cipher suite, and a pointer to a structure which receives the handles and IV which were generated.

This mechanism contributes to the creation of two distinct keys and returns one IV (if an IV is requested by the caller) back to the caller. The keys are all given an object class of **CKO_SECRET_KEY**.

The MACing key (client write MAC secret) is always given a type of **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET**. It is flagged as valid for signing, verification and derivation operations.

The other key (client write key) is typed according to information found in the template sent along with this mechanism during a **C_DeriveKey** function call. By default, it is flagged as valid for encryption, decryption, and derivation operations.

An IV (client write IV) will be generated and returned if the *ullVSizeInBits* field of the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** field has a nonzero value. If it is generated, its length in bits will agree with the value in the *ullVSizeInBits* field.

Both keys inherit the values of the **CKA_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE**, **CKA_EXTRACTABLE**, and **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes from the base key. The template provided to **C_DeriveKey** may not specify values for any of these attributes that differ from those held by the base key.

Note that the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure's *pReturnedKeyMaterial* field will be modified by the **C_DeriveKey** call. In particular, the two key handle fields in the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure will be modified to hold handles to the newly-created keys; in addition, the buffer pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure's *pIV* field will have the IV returned in them (if an IV is requested by the caller). Therefore, this field must point to a buffer with sufficient space to hold any IV that will be returned.

This mechanism departs from the other key derivation mechanisms in Cryptoki in its returned information. For most key-derivation mechanisms, **C_DeriveKey** returns a single key handle as a result of a successful completion. However, since the **CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE** mechanism returns all of its key handles in the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT** structure pointed to by the **CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS** structure specified as the mechanism parameter, the parameter *phKey* passed to **C_DeriveKey** is unnecessary, and should be a **NULL_PTR**.

If a call to **C_DeriveKey** with this mechanism fails, then *none* of the two keys will be created.

2.31 Miscellaneous simple key derivation mechanisms

Table 103, Miscellaneous simple key derivation Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY							✓
CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA							✓
CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE							✓
CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA							✓
CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY							✓

2.31.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA
 CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE
 CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA
 CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY
 CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY

2.31.2 Parameters for miscellaneous simple key derivation mechanisms

◆ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA; CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR

CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA provides the parameters for the CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA, CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE, and CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA mechanisms. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA {
    CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
    CK_ULONG ulLen;
} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pData pointer to the byte string
ulLen length of the byte string

CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR is a pointer to a CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA.

◆ CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS; CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR

CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS provides the parameter to the CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit of the base key should be used as the first bit of the derived key. It is defined as follows:


```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS;
```

CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS.

2.31.3 Concatenation of a base key and another key

This mechanism, denoted **CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY**, derives a secret key from the concatenation of two existing secret keys. The two keys are specified by handles; the values of the keys specified are concatenated together in a buffer.

This mechanism takes a parameter, a **CK_OBJECT_HANDLE**. This handle produces the key value information which is appended to the end of the base key's value information (the base key is the key whose handle is supplied as an argument to **C_DeriveKey**).

For example, if the value of the base key is 0x01234567, and the value of the other key is 0x89ABCDEF, then the value of the derived key will be taken from a buffer containing the string 0x0123456789ABCDEF.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key. Its length will be equal to the sum of the lengths of the values of the two original keys.
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length is provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, DES3, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more bytes than are available by concatenating the two original keys' values, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If either of the two original keys has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- Similarly, if either of the two original keys has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if both of the original keys have their **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attributes set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if both of the original keys have their **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attributes set to CK_TRUE.

2.31.4 Concatenation of a base key and data

This mechanism, denoted **CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA**, derives a secret key by concatenating data onto the end of a specified secret key.

This mechanism takes a parameter, a **CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA** structure, which specifies the length and value of the data which will be appended to the base key to derive another key.

For example, if the value of the base key is 0x01234567, and the value of the data is 0x89ABCDEF, then the value of the derived key will be taken from a buffer containing the string 0x0123456789ABCDEF.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key. Its length will be equal to the sum of the lengths of the value of the original key and the data.
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length is provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, DES3, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more bytes than are available by concatenating the original key's value and the data, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If the base key has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

2.31.5 Concatenation of data and a base key

This mechanism, denoted **CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE**, derives a secret key by prepending data to the start of a specified secret key.

This mechanism takes a parameter, a **CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA** structure, which specifies the length and value of the data which will be prepended to the base key to derive another key.

For example, if the value of the base key is 0x01234567, and the value of the data is 0x89ABCDEF, then the value of the derived key will be taken from a buffer containing the string 0x89ABCDEF01234567.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key. Its length will be equal to the sum of the lengths of the data and the value of the original key.
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length is provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, DES3, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more bytes than are available by concatenating the data and the original key's value, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If the base key has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

2.31.6 XORing of a key and data

XORing key derivation, denoted **CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA**, is a mechanism which provides the capability of deriving a secret key by performing a bit XORing of a key pointed to by a base key handle and some data.

This mechanism takes a parameter, a **CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA** structure, which specifies the data with which to XOR the original key's value.

For example, if the value of the base key is 0x01234567, and the value of the data is 0x89ABCDEF, then the value of the derived key will be taken from a buffer containing the string 0x88888888.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key. Its length will be equal to the minimum of the lengths of the data and the value of the original key.
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length is provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, DES3, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more bytes than are available by taking the shorter of the data and the original key's value, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If the base key has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

2.31.7 Extraction of one key from another key

Extraction of one key from another key, denoted **CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY**, is a mechanism which provides the capability of creating one secret key from the bits of another secret key.

This mechanism has a parameter, a CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS, which specifies which bit of the original key should be used as the first bit of the newly-derived key.

We give an example of how this mechanism works. Suppose a token has a secret key with the 4-byte value 0x329F84A9. We will derive a 2-byte secret key from this key, starting at bit position 21 (i.e., the value of the parameter to the CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism is 21).

1. We write the key's value in binary: 0011 0010 1001 1111 1000 0100 1010 1001. We regard this binary string as holding the 32 bits of the key, labeled as b0, b1, ..., b31.
2. We then extract 16 consecutive bits (i.e., 2 bytes) from this binary string, starting at bit b21. We obtain the binary string 1001 0101 0010 0110.
3. The value of the new key is thus 0x9526.

Note that when constructing the value of the derived key, it is permissible to wrap around the end of the binary string representing the original key's value.

If the original key used in this process is sensitive, then the derived key must also be sensitive for the derivation to succeed.

- If no length or key type is provided in the template, then an error will be returned.
- If no key type is provided in the template, but a length is, then the key produced by this mechanism will be a generic secret key of the specified length.
- If no length is provided in the template, but a key type is, then that key type must have a well-defined length. If it does, then the key produced by this mechanism will be of the type specified in the template. If it doesn't, an error will be returned.
- If both a key type and a length are provided in the template, the length must be compatible with that key type. The key produced by this mechanism will be of the specified type and length.

If a DES, DES2, DES3, or CDMF key is derived with this mechanism, the parity bits of the key will be set properly.

If the requested type of key requires more bytes than the original key has, an error is generated.

This mechanism has the following rules about key sensitivity and extractability:

- If the base key has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- Similarly, if the base key has its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_FALSE, so does the derived key. If not, then the derived key's **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set either from the supplied template or from a default value.
- The derived key's **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.
- Similarly, the derived key's **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is set to CK_TRUE if and only if the base key has its **CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

2.32 CMS

Table 104, CMS Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_CMS_SIG		✓	✓				

2.32.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_CMS_SIG

2.32.2 CMS Signature Mechanism Objects

These objects provide information relating to the CKM_CMS_SIG mechanism. CKM_CMS_SIG mechanism object attributes represent information about supported CMS signature attributes in the token. They are only present on tokens supporting the **CKM_CMS_SIG** mechanism, but must be present on those tokens.

Table 105, CMS Signature Mechanism Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES	Byte array	Attributes the token always will include in the set of CMS signed attributes
CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES	Byte array	Attributes the token will include in the set of CMS signed attributes in the absence of any attributes specified by the application
CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES	Byte array	Attributes the token may include in the set of CMS signed attributes upon request by the application

The contents of each byte array will be a DER-encoded list of CMS **Attributes** with optional accompanying values. Any attributes in the list shall be identified with its object identifier, and any values shall be DER-encoded. The list of attributes is defined in ASN.1 as:

```
Attributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
    attrType      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    attrValues SET OF ANY DEFINED BY OBJECT IDENTIFIER
                OPTIONAL
}
```

The client may not set any of the attributes.

2.32.3 CMS mechanism parameters

- **CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS, CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_CMS_SIG** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS {
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE      certificateHandle;
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR      pSigningMechanism;
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR      pDigestMechanism;
    CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR       pContentType;
    CK_BYTE_PTR           pRequestedAttributes;
    CK_ULONG               ulRequestedAttributesLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR           pRequiredAttributes;
    CK_ULONG               ulRequiredAttributesLen;
} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>certificateHandle</i>	Object handle for a certificate associated with the signing key. The token may use information from this certificate to identify the signer in the SignerInfo result value. CertificateHandle may be NULL_PTR if the certificate is not available as a PKCS #11 object or if the calling application leaves the choice of certificate completely to the token.
<i>pSigningMechanism</i>	Mechanism to use when signing a constructed CMS SignedAttributes value. E.g. CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS .
<i>pDigestMechanism</i>	Mechanism to use when digesting the data. Value shall be NULL_PTR when the digest mechanism to use follows from the pSigningMechanism parameter.
<i>pContentType</i>	NULL-terminated string indicating complete MIME Content-type of message to be signed; or the value NULL_PTR if the message is a MIME object (which the token can parse to determine its MIME Content-type if required). Use the value "application/octet-stream" if the MIME type for the message is unknown or undefined. Note that the pContentType string shall conform to the syntax specified in RFC 2045, i.e. any parameters needed for correct presentation of the content by the token (such as, for example, a non-default "charset") must be present. The token must follow rules and procedures defined in RFC 2045 when presenting the content.
<i>pRequestedAttributes</i>	Pointer to DER-encoded list of CMS Attributes the caller requests to be included in the signed attributes. Token may freely ignore this list or modify any supplied values.
<i>ulRequestedAttributesLen</i>	Length in bytes of the value pointed to by pRequestedAttributes
<i>pRequiredAttributes</i>	Pointer to DER-encoded list of CMS Attributes (with accompanying values) required to be included in the resulting signed attributes. Token must not modify any supplied values. If the token does not support one or more of the attributes, or does not accept provided values, the signature operation will fail. The token will use its own default attributes when signing if both the pRequestedAttributes and pRequiredAttributes field are set to NULL_PTR.
<i>ulRequiredAttributesLen</i>	Length in bytes, of the value pointed to by pRequiredAttributes.

2.32.4 CMS signatures

The CMS mechanism, denoted **CKM_CMS_SIG**, is a multi-purpose mechanism based on the structures defined in PKCS #7 and RFC 2630. It supports single- or multiple-part signatures with and without message recovery. The mechanism is intended for use with, e.g., PTDs (see MeT-PTD) or other capable tokens. The token will construct a CMS **SignedAttributes** value and compute a signature on this value. The content of the **SignedAttributes** value is decided by the token, however the caller can suggest some attributes in the parameter *pRequestedAttributes*. The caller can also require some attributes to be present through the parameters *pRequiredAttributes*. The signature is computed in accordance with the parameter *pSigningMechanism*.

When this mechanism is used in successful calls to **C_Sign** or **C_SignFinal**, the *pSignature* return value will point to a DER-encoded value of type **SignerInfo**. **SignerInfo** is defined in ASN.1 as follows (for a complete definition of all fields and types, see RFC 2630):

```
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
```

```

    version CMSVersion,
    sid SignerIdentifier,
    digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
    signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
    signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
    signature SignatureValue,
    unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes
    OPTIONAL }

```

The *certificateHandle* parameter, when set, helps the token populate the **sid** field of the **SignerInfo** value. If *certificateHandle* is `NULL_PTR` the choice of a suitable certificate reference in the **SignerInfo** result value is left to the token (the token could, e.g., interact with the user).

This mechanism shall not be used in calls to **C_Verify** or **C_VerifyFinal** (use the *pSigningMechanism* mechanism instead).

For the *pRequiredAttributes* field, the token may have to interact with the user to find out whether to accept a proposed value or not. The token should never accept any proposed attribute values without some kind of confirmation from its owner (but this could be through, e.g., configuration or policy settings and not direct interaction). If a user rejects proposed values, or the signature request as such, the value `CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED` shall be returned.

When possible, applications should use the **CKM_CMS_SIG** mechanism when generating CMS-compatible signatures rather than lower-level mechanisms such as **CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS**. This is especially true when the signatures are to be made on content that the token is able to present to a user. Exceptions may include those cases where the token does not support a particular signing attribute. Note however that the token may refuse usage of a particular signature key unless the content to be signed is known (i.e. the **CKM_CMS_SIG** mechanism is used).

When a token does not have presentation capabilities, the PKCS #11-aware application may avoid sending the whole message to the token by electing to use a suitable signature mechanism (e.g. **CKM_RSA_PKCS**) as the *pSigningMechanism* value in the **CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS** structure, and digesting the message itself before passing it to the token.

PKCS #11-aware applications making use of tokens with presentation capabilities, should attempt to provide messages to be signed by the token in a format possible for the token to present to the user. Tokens that receive multipart MIME-messages for which only certain parts are possible to present may fail the signature operation with a return value of **CKR_DATA_INVALID**, but may also choose to add a signing attribute indicating which parts of the message were possible to present.

2.33 Blowfish

Blowfish, a secret-key block cipher. It is a Feistel network, iterating a simple encryption function 16 times. The block size is 64 bits, and the key can be any length up to 448 bits. Although there is a complex initialization phase required before any encryption can take place, the actual encryption of data is very efficient on large microprocessors.

Table 106, Blowfish Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	

2.33.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_BLOWFISH” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN
CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC_PAD

2.33.2 BLOWFISH secret key objects

Blowfish secret key objects (object class CKO_SECRET_KEY, key type CKK_BLOWFISH) hold Blowfish keys. The following table defines the Blowfish secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 107, BLOWFISH Secret Key Object

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value the key can be any length up to 448 bits. Bit length restricted to a byte array.
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an Blowfish secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_BLOWFISH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A blowfish secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[16] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```


2.33.3 Blowfish key generation

The Blowfish key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism Blowfish.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Blowfish keys with a particular length, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes in bytes.

2.33.4 Blowfish-CBC

Blowfish-CBC, denoted **CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

It has a parameter, a 8-byte initialization vector.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 108, BLOWFISH-CBC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input Length	Output Length
C_Encrypt	BLOWFISH	Multiple of block size	Same as input length
C_Decrypt	BLOWFISH	Multiple of block size	Same as input length
C_WrapKey	BLOWFISH	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	BLOWFISH	Multiple of block size	Determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of BLOWFISH key sizes, in bytes.

2.33.5 Blowfish-CBC with PKCS padding

Blowfish-CBC-PAD, denoted **CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption, key wrapping and key unwrapping, cipher-block chaining mode and the block cipher padding method detailed in PKCS #7.

It has a parameter, a 8-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 109, BLOWFISH-CBC with PKCS Padding: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input Length	Output Length
C_Encrypt	BLOWFISH	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	BLOWFISH	Multiple of block size	Between 1 and block length block size bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	BLOWFISH	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	BLOWFISH	Multiple of block size	Between 1 and block length block size bytes shorter than input length

2.34 Twofish

Ref. <https://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>

2.34.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_TWOFISH” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN
- CKM_TWOFISH_CBC
- CKM_TWOFISH_CBC_PAD

2.34.2 Twofish secret key objects

Twofish secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_TWOFISH**) hold Twofish keys. The following table defines the Twofish secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 110, Twofish Secret Key Object

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value 128-, 192-, or 256-bit key
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an TWOFISH secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_TWOFISH;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A twofish secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[16] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
```



```

    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.34.3 Twofish key generation

The Twofish key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism Twofish.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Blowfish keys with a particular length, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of key sizes, in bytes.

2.34.4 Twofish -CBC

Twofish-CBC, denoted **CKM_TWOFISH_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

2.34.5 Twofish-CBC with PKCS padding

Twofish-CBC-PAD, denoted **CKM_TWOFISH_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption, key wrapping and key unwrapping, cipher-block chaining mode and the block cipher padding method detailed in PKCS #7.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

2.35 CAMELLIA

Camellia is a block cipher with 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys, similar to AES. Camellia is described e.g. in IETF RFC 3713.

Table 111, Camellia Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB	✓					✓	
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC		✓					
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓

2.35.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_CAMELLIA” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN
- CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB
- CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC
- CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC
- CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL
- CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD

2.35.2 Camellia secret key objects

Camellia secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_CAMELLIA**) hold Camellia keys. The following table defines the Camellia secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 112, Camellia Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (16, 24, or 32 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3,6}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes.

The following is a sample template for creating a Camellia secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_CAMELLIA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A Camellia secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}

```

};

2.35.3 Camellia key generation

The Camellia key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for Camellia.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Camellia keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the Camellia key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

2.35.4 Camellia-ECB

Camellia-ECB, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Camellia and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 113, Camellia-ECB: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

2.35.5 Camellia-CBC

Camellia-CBC, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Camellia and cipher-block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 114, *Camellia-CBC: Key and Data Length*

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

2.35.6 Camellia-CBC with PKCS padding

Camellia-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Camellia; cipher-block chaining mode; and the block cipher padding method detailed in PKCS #7.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

In addition to being able to wrap and unwrap secret keys, this mechanism can wrap and unwrap RSA, Diffie-Hellman, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman, EC (also related to ECDSA) and DSA private keys (see Section TBA for details). The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 115, *Camellia-CBC with PKCS Padding: Key and Data Length*

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block size bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block length bytes shorter than input length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

2.35.7 General-length Camellia-MAC

General-length Camellia -MAC, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on Camellia and data authentication as defined in [CAMELLIA].

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final Camellia cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 116, General-length Camellia-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

2.35.8 Camellia-MAC

Camellia-MAC, denoted by **CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length Camellia-MAC mechanism. Camellia-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are half the block size in length.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 117, Camellia-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)
C_Verify	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

2.36 Key derivation by data encryption - Camellia

These mechanisms allow derivation of keys using the result of an encryption operation as the key value. They are for use with the C_DeriveKey function.

2.36.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

```
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA
```

```
typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE      iv[16];
    CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
    CK_ULONG     length;
} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
```

```
typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR
CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
```

2.36.2 Mechanism Parameters

Uses CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS, and CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA.

Table 118, Mechanism Parameters for Camellia-based key derivation

CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 16 long.
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS. Parameter is an 16 byte IV value followed by the data. The data value part must be a multiple of 16 bytes long.

2.37 ARIA

ARIA is a block cipher with 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys, similar to AES. ARIA is described in NSRI "Specification of ARIA".

Table 119, ARIA Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_ARIA_ECB	✓					✓	
CKM_ARIA_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	
CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL		✓					

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_ARIA_MAC		✓					
CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓

2.37.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_ARIA” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN
- CKM_ARIA_ECB
- CKM_ARIA_CBC
- CKM_ARIA_MAC
- CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL
- CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD

2.37.2 Aria secret key objects

ARIA secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_ARIA**) hold ARIA keys. The following table defines the ARIA secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 120, ARIA Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (16, 24, or 32 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3,6}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes.

The following is a sample template for creating an ARIA secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_ARIA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An ARIA secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```


2.37.3 ARIA key generation

The ARIA key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for Aria.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates ARIA keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the ARIA key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

2.37.4 ARIA-ECB

ARIA-ECB, denoted **CKM_ARIA_ECB**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Aria and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 121, ARIA-ECB: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

2.37.5 ARIA-CBC

ARIA-CBC, denoted **CKM_ARIA_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on ARIA and cipher-block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the

CKA_VALUE attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 122, ARIA-CBC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the `ulMinKeySize` and `ulMaxKeySize` fields of the `CK_MECHANISM_INFO` structure specify the supported range of Aria key sizes, in bytes.

2.37.6 ARIA-CBC with PKCS padding

ARIA-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on ARIA; cipher-block chaining mode; and the block cipher padding method detailed in PKCS #7.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

In addition to being able to wrap and unwrap secret keys, this mechanism can wrap and unwrap RSA, Diffie-Hellman, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman, EC (also related to ECDSA) and DSA private keys (see Section TBA for details). The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 123, ARIA-CBC with PKCS Padding: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block size bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block length bytes shorter than input length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

2.37.7 General-length ARIA-MAC

General-length ARIA -MAC, denoted **CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on ARIA and data authentication as defined in [FIPS 113]. It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final ARIA cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 124, General-length ARIA-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_ARIA	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	CKK_ARIA	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

2.37.8 ARIA-MAC

ARIA-MAC, denoted by **CKM_ARIA_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length ARIA-MAC mechanism. ARIA-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are half the block size in length.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 125, ARIA-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_ARIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)
C_Verify	CKK_ARIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

2.38 Key derivation by data encryption - ARIA

These mechanisms allow derivation of keys using the result of an encryption operation as the key value. They are for use with the C_DeriveKey function.

2.38.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA

CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA

```
typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE      iv[16];
    CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
    CK_ULONG     length;
} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR
CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
```

2.38.2 Mechanism Parameters

Uses CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS, and CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA.

Table 126, Mechanism Parameters for Aria-based key derivation

CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 16 long.
CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS. Parameter is an 16 byte IV value followed by the data. The data value part must be a multiple of 16 bytes long.

2.39 SEED

SEED is a symmetric block cipher developed by the South Korean Information Security Agency (KISA). It has a 128-bit key size and a 128-bit block size.

Its specification has been published as Internet [RFC 4269].

RFCs have been published defining the use of SEED in

TLS <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc4162.txt>

IPsec <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc4196.txt>

CMS <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc4010.txt>

TLS cipher suites that use SEED include:

```
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00,
    0x96};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA   = { 0x00,
    0x97};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA   = { 0x00,
    0x98};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  = { 0x00,
    0x99};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA  = { 0x00,
```

```

    0x9A};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = { 0x00,
    0x9B};

```

As with any block cipher, it can be used in the ECB, CBC, OFB and CFB modes of operation, as well as in a MAC algorithm such as HMAC.

OIDs have been published for all these uses. A list may be seen at <http://www.alvestrand.no/objectid/1.2.410.200004.1.html>

Table 127, SEED Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_SEED_ECB			✓				
CKM_SEED_CBC			✓				
CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	
CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL			✓				
CKM_SEED_MAC				✓			
CKM_SEED_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓

2.39.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_SEED” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN
- CKM_SEED_ECB
- CKM_SEED_CBC
- CKM_SEED_MAC
- CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL
- CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD

For all of these mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** are always 16.

2.39.2 SEED secret key objects

SEED secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_SEED**) hold SEED keys. The following table defines the secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 128, SEED Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (always 16 bytes long)

- Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] table 10 for footnotes.

The following is a sample template for creating a SEED secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_SEED;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A SEED secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

2.39.3 SEED key generation

The SEED key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for SEED.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates SEED keys.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the SEED key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

2.39.4 SEED-ECB

SEED-ECB, denoted **CKM_SEED_ECB**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on SEED and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

2.39.5 SEED-CBC

SEED-CBC, denoted **CKM_SEED_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on SEED and cipher-block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

2.39.6 SEED-CBC with PKCS padding

SEED-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on SEED; cipher-block chaining mode; and the block cipher padding method detailed in PKCS #7.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

2.39.7 General-length SEED-MAC

General-length SEED-MAC, denoted **CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on SEED and data authentication as defined in 0.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final cipher block produced in the MACing process.

2.39.8 SEED-MAC

SEED-MAC, denoted by **CKM_SEED_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length SEED-MAC mechanism. SEED-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are half the block size in length.

It does not have a parameter.

2.40 Key derivation by data encryption - SEED

These mechanisms allow derivation of keys using the result of an encryption operation as the key value. They are for use with the C_DeriveKey function.

2.40.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_SEED_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA

CKM_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA

```
typedef struct CK_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS
    CK_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
typedef CK_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR
CK_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
```

2.40.2 Mechanism Parameters

Table 129, Mechanism Parameters for SEED-based key derivation

CKM_SEED_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 16 long.
CKM_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS . Parameter is an 16 byte IV value followed by the data. The data value part must be a multiple of 16 bytes long.

2.41 OTP

2.41.1 Usage overview

OTP tokens represented as PKCS #11 mechanisms may be used in a variety of ways. The usage cases can be categorized according to the type of sought functionality.

2.41.2 Case 1: Generation of OTP values




Figure 1: Retrieving OTP values through `C_Sign`

Figure 1 shows an integration of PKCS #11 into an application that needs to authenticate users holding OTP tokens. In this particular example, a connected hardware token is used, but a software token is equally possible. The application invokes `C_Sign` to retrieve the OTP value from the token. In the example, the application then passes the retrieved OTP value to a client API that sends it via the network to an authentication server. The client API may implement a standard authentication protocol such as RADIUS [RFC 2865] or EAP [RFC 3748], or a proprietary protocol such as that used by RSA Security's ACE/Agent[®] software.

2.41.3 Case 2: Verification of provided OTP values




Figure 2: Server-side verification of OTP values

Figure 2 illustrates the server-side equivalent of the scenario depicted in Figure 1. In this case, a server application invokes **C_Verify** with the received OTP value as the signature value to be verified.

2.41.4 Case 3: Generation of OTP keys




Figure 3: Generation of an OTP key

Figure 3 shows an integration of PKCS #11 into an application that generates OTP keys. The application invokes **C_GenerateKey** to generate an OTP key of a particular type on the token. The key may subsequently be used as a basis to generate OTP values.

2.41.5 OTP objects

2.41.5.1 Key objects

OTP key objects (object class **CKO_OTP_KEY**) hold secret keys used by OTP tokens. The following table defines the attributes common to all OTP keys, in addition to the attributes defined for secret keys, all of which are inherited by this class:

Table 130: Common OTP key attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_OTP_FORMAT	CK_ULONG	Format of OTP values produced with this key: CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL = Decimal (default) (UTF8-encoded) CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADecimal = Hexadecimal (UTF8-encoded) CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC = Alphanumeric (UTF8-encoded) CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY = Only binary values.
CKA_OTP_LENGTH ⁹	CK_ULONG	Default length of OTP values (in the CKA_OTP_FORMAT) produced with this key.
CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE ⁹	CK_BBOOL	Set to CK_TRUE when the token is capable of returning OTPs suitable for human consumption. See the description of CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP below.
CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT ⁹	CK_ULONG	Parameter requirements when generating or verifying OTP values with this key: CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY = A challenge must be supplied. CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL = A challenge may be supplied but need not be. CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED = A challenge, if supplied, will be ignored.
CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT ⁹	CK_ULONG	Parameter requirements when generating or verifying OTP values with this key: CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY = A time value must be supplied. CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL = A time value may be supplied but need not be. CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED = A time value, if supplied, will be ignored.
CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT ⁹	CK_ULONG	Parameter requirements when generating or verifying OTP values with this key: CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY = A counter value must be supplied. CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL = A counter value may be supplied but need not be. CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED = A counter value, if supplied, will be ignored.

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT ⁹	CK_ULONG	Parameter requirements when generating or verifying OTP values with this key: CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY = A PIN value must be supplied. CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL = A PIN value may be supplied but need not be (if not supplied, then library will be responsible for collecting it) CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED = A PIN value, if supplied, will be ignored.
CKA_OTP_COUNTER	Byte array	Value of the associated internal counter. Default value is empty (i.e. <i>ulValueLen</i> = 0).
CKA_OTP_TIME	RFC 2279 string	Value of the associated internal UTC time in the form YYYYMMDDhhmmss. Default value is empty (i.e. <i>ulValueLen</i> = 0).
CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER	RFC 2279 string	Text string that identifies a user associated with the OTP key (may be used to enhance the user experience). Default value is empty (i.e. <i>ulValueLen</i> = 0).
CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER	RFC 2279 string	Text string that identifies a service that may validate OTPs generated by this key. Default value is empty (i.e. <i>ulValueLen</i> = 0).
CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO	Byte array	Logotype image that identifies a service that may validate OTPs generated by this key. Default value is empty (i.e. <i>ulValueLen</i> = 0).
CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE	RFC 2279 string	MIME type of the CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO attribute value. Default value is empty (i.e. <i>ulValueLen</i> = 0).
CKA_VALUE ^{1, 4, 6, 7}	Byte array	Value of the key.
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2, 3}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value.

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] Table 15 for table footnotes..

Note: A Cryptoki library may support PIN-code caching in order to reduce user interactions. An OTP-PKCS #11 application should therefore always consult the state of the CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT attribute before each call to **C_SignInit**, as the value of this attribute may change dynamically.

For OTP tokens with multiple keys, the keys may be enumerated using **C_FindObjects**. The **CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER** and/or the **CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO** attribute may be used to distinguish between keys. The actual choice of key for a particular operation is however application-specific and beyond the scope of this document.

For all OTP keys, the CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS attribute should be set as required.

2.41.6 OTP-related notifications

This document extends the set of defined notifications as follows:

CKN_OTP_CHANGED

Cryptoki is informing the application that the OTP for a key on a connected token just changed. This notification is particularly useful when applications wish to display the current OTP value for time-based mechanisms.

2.41.7 OTP mechanisms

The following table shows, for the OTP mechanisms defined in this document, their support by different cryptographic operations. For any particular token, of course, a particular operation may well support only a subset of the mechanisms listed. There is also no guarantee that a token that supports one mechanism for some operation supports any other mechanism for any other operation (or even supports that same mechanism for any other operation).

Table 131: OTP mechanisms vs. applicable functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_SECURID		✓					
CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_HOTP		✓					
CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_ACTI		✓					

The remainder of this section will present in detail the OTP mechanisms and the parameters that are supplied to them.

2.41.7.1 OTP mechanism parameters

◆ CK_PARAM_TYPE

CK_PARAM_TYPE is a value that identifies an OTP parameter type. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_PARAM_TYPE;
```

The following **CK_PARAM_TYPE** types are defined:

Table 132, OTP parameter types

Parameter	Data type	Meaning
CK_OTP_PIN	RFC 2279 string	A UTF8 string containing a PIN for use when computing or verifying PIN-based OTP values.
CK_OTP_CHALLENGE	Byte array	Challenge to use when computing or verifying challenge-based OTP values.
CK_OTP_TIME	RFC 2279 string	UTC time value in the form YYYYMMDDhhmmss to use when computing or verifying time-based OTP values.
CK_OTP_COUNTER	Byte array	Counter value to use when computing or verifying counter-based OTP values.
CK_OTP_FLAGS	CK_FLAGS	Bit flags indicating the characteristics of the sought OTP as defined below.
CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH	CK_ULONG	Desired output length (overrides any default value). A Cryptoki library will return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if a provided length value is not supported.
CK_OTP_FORMAT	CK_ULONG	Returned OTP format (allowed values are the same as for CKA_OTP_FORMAT). This parameter is only intended for C_Sign output, see paragraphs below. When not present, the returned OTP format will be the same as the value of the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute for the key in question.
CK_OTP_VALUE	Byte array	An actual OTP value. This parameter type is intended for C_Sign output, see paragraphs below.

The following table defines the possible values for the CK_OTP_FLAGS type:

Table 133: OTP Mechanism Flags

Bit flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_NEXT_OTP	0x00000001	True (i.e. set) if the OTP computation shall be for the next OTP, rather than the current one (current being interpreted in the context of the algorithm, e.g. for the current counter value or current time window). A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if the CKF_NEXT_OTP flag is set and the OTP mechanism in question does not support the concept of "next" OTP or the library is not capable of generating the next OTP ⁵ .
CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME	0x00000002	True (i.e. set) if the OTP computation must not include a time value. Will have an effect only on mechanisms that do include a time value in the OTP computation and then only if the mechanism (and token) allows exclusion of this value. A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if exclusion of the value is not allowed.
CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER	0x00000004	True (i.e. set) if the OTP computation must not include a counter value. Will have an effect only on mechanisms that do include a counter value in the OTP computation and then only if the mechanism (and token) allows exclusion of this value. A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if exclusion of the value is not allowed.
CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE	0x00000008	True (i.e. set) if the OTP computation must not include a challenge. Will have an effect only on mechanisms that do include a challenge in the OTP computation and then only if the mechanism (and token) allows exclusion of this value. A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if exclusion of the value is not allowed.

5 Applications that may need to retrieve the next OTP should be prepared to handle this situation. For example, an application could store the OTP value returned by C_Sign so that, if a next OTP is required, it can compare it to the OTP value returned by subsequent calls to C_Sign should it turn out that the library does not support the CKF_NEXT_OTP flag.

Bit flag	Mask	Meaning
CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN	0x00000010	True (i.e. set) if the OTP computation must not include a PIN value. Will have an effect only on mechanisms that do include a PIN in the OTP computation and then only if the mechanism (and token) allows exclusion of this value. A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if exclusion of the value is not allowed.
CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP	0x00000020	True (i.e. set) if the OTP returned shall be in a form suitable for human consumption. If this flag is set, and the call is successful, then the returned CK_OTP_VALUE shall be a UTF8-encoded printable string. A Cryptoki library shall return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID if this flag is set when CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE for the key in question is CK_FALSE.

Note: Even if CKA_OTP_FORMAT is not set to CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY, then there may still be value in setting the CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP flag (assuming CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE is CK_TRUE, of course) if the intent is for a human to read the generated OTP value, since it may become shorter or otherwise better suited for a user. Applications that do not intend to provide a returned OTP value to a user should not set the CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP flag.

◆ CK_OTP_PARAM; CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR

CK_OTP_PARAM is a structure that includes the type, value, and length of an OTP parameter. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM {
    CK_PARAM_TYPE type;
    CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
    CK_ULONG ulValueLen;
} CK_OTP_PARAM;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

type the parameter type

pValue pointer to the value of the parameter

ulValueLen length in bytes of the value

If a parameter has no value, then *ulValueLen* = 0, and the value of *pValue* is irrelevant. Note that *pValue* is a “void” pointer, facilitating the passing of arbitrary values. Both the application and the Cryptoki library must ensure that the pointer can be safely cast to the expected type (*i.e.*, without word-alignment errors).

CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR is a pointer to a CK_OTP_PARAM.

CK_OTP_PARAMS; CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR

CK_OTP_PARAMS is a structure that is used to provide parameters for OTP mechanisms in a generic fashion. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS {
    CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
    CK_ULONG ulCount;
} CK_OTP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pParams pointer to an array of OTP parameters
ulCount the number of parameters in the array

CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_OTP_PARAMS**.

When calling **C_SignInit** or **C_VerifyInit** with a mechanism that takes a **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure as a parameter, the **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure shall be populated in accordance with the **CKA_OTP_X_REQUIREMENT** key attributes for the identified key, where *X* is PIN, CHALLENGE, TIME, or COUNTER.

For example, if **CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT** = **CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY**, then the **CK_OTP_TIME** parameter shall be present. If **CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT** = **CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL**, then a **CK_OTP_TIME** parameter may be present. If it is not present, then the library may collect it (during the **C_Sign** call). If **CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT** = **CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED**, then a provided **CK_OTP_TIME** parameter will always be ignored. Additionally, a provided **CK_OTP_TIME** parameter will always be ignored if **CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME** is set in a **CK_OTP_FLAGS** parameter. Similarly, if this flag is set, a library will not attempt to collect the value itself, and it will also instruct the token not to make use of any internal value, subject to token policies. It is an error (**CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID**) to set the **CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME** flag when the **CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT** attribute is **CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY**.

The above discussion holds for all **CKA_OTP_X_REQUIREMENT** attributes (*i.e.*, **CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT**, **CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT**, **CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT**, **CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT**). A library may set a particular **CKA_OTP_X_REQUIREMENT** attribute to **CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL** even if it is required by the mechanism as long as the token (or the library itself) has the capability of providing the value to the computation. One example of this is a token with an on-board clock.

In addition, applications may use the **CK_OTP_FLAGS**, the **CK_OTP_FORMAT** and the **CKA_OTP_LENGTH** parameters to set additional parameters.

CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO, **CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR**

CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO is a structure that is returned by all OTP mechanisms in successful calls to **C_Sign** (**C_SignFinal**). The structure informs applications of actual parameter values used in particular OTP computations in addition to the OTP value itself. It is used by all mechanisms for which the key belongs to the class **CKO_OTP_KEY** and is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO {
    CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
    CK_ULONG ulCount;
} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pParams pointer to an array of OTP parameter values
ulCount the number of parameters in the array

After successful calls to **C_Sign** or **C_SignFinal** with an OTP mechanism, the *pSignature* parameter will be set to point to a **CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO** structure. One of the parameters in this structure will be the OTP value itself, identified with the **CK_OTP_VALUE** tag. Other parameters may be present for informational purposes, e.g. the actual time used in the OTP calculation. In order to simplify OTP validations, authentication protocols may permit authenticating parties to send some or all of these parameters in addition to OTP values themselves. Applications should therefore check for their presence in returned **CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO** values whenever such circumstances apply.

Since **C_Sign** and **C_SignFinal** follows the convention described in Section 11.2 on producing output, a call to **C_Sign** (or **C_SignFinal**) with *pSignature* set to **NULL_PTR** will return (in the *pulSignatureLen* parameter) the required number of bytes to hold the **CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO** structure as well as all

the data in all its **CK_OTP_PARAM** components. If an application allocates a memory block based on this information, it shall therefore not subsequently de-allocate components of such a received value but rather de-allocate the complete **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure itself. A Cryptoki library that is called with a non-NULL *pSignature* pointer will assume that it points to a *contiguous* memory block of the size indicated by the *pulSignatureLen* parameter.

When verifying an OTP value using an OTP mechanism, *pSignature* shall be set to the OTP value itself, e.g. the value of the **CK_OTP_VALUE** component of a **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure returned by a call to **C_Sign**. The **CK_OTP_PARAMS** value supplied in the **C_VerifyInit** call sets the values to use in the verification operation.

CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR points to a **CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO**.

2.41.8 RSA SecurID

2.41.8.1 RSA SecurID secret key objects

RSA SecurID secret key objects (object class **CKO_OTP_KEY**, key type **CKK_SECURID**) hold RSA SecurID secret keys. The following table defines the RSA SecurID secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 134, RSA SecurID secret key object attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL ¹	CK_ULONG	Interval between OTP values produced with this key, in seconds. Default is 60.

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] Table 15 for table footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an RSA SecurID secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_OTP_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_SECURID;
CK_DATE endDate = {...};
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "RSA SecurID secret key object";
CK_BYTE keyId[] = {...};
CK_ULONG outputFormat = CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL;
CK_ULONG outputLength = 6;
CK_ULONG needPIN = CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY;
CK_ULONG timeInterval = 60;
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_END_DATE, &endDate, sizeof(endDate)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_SENSITIVE, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_SIGN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VERIFY, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_ID, keyId, sizeof(keyId)},
    {CKA_OTP_FORMAT, &outputFormat, sizeof(outputFormat)},
    {CKA_OTP_LENGTH, &outputLength, sizeof(outputLength)},
    {CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT, &needPIN, sizeof(needPIN)},
    {CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL, &timeInterval,

```

```

        sizeof(timeInterval)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.41.9 RSA SecurID key generation

The RSA SecurID key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for the RSA SecurID algorithm.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates RSA SecurID keys with a particular set of attributes as specified in the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes at least the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_VALUE_LEN**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the RSA SecurID key type may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of SecurID key sizes, in bytes.

2.41.10 RSA SecurID OTP generation and validation

CKM_SECURID is the mechanism for the retrieval and verification of RSA SecurID OTP values.

The mechanism takes a pointer to a **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure as a parameter.

When signing or verifying using the **CKM_SECURID** mechanism, *pData* shall be set to **NULL_PTR** and *ulDataLen* shall be set to 0.

2.41.11 Return values

Support for the **CKM_SECURID** mechanism extends the set of return values for **C_Verify** with the following values:

- **CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE**: The supplied OTP was not accepted and the library requests a new OTP computed using a new PIN. The new PIN is set through means out of scope for this document.
- **CKR_NEXT_OTP**: The supplied OTP was correct but indicated a larger than normal drift in the token's internal state (e.g. clock, counter). To ensure this was not due to a temporary problem, the application should provide the next one-time password to the library for verification.

2.41.12 OATH HOTP

2.41.12.1 OATH HOTP secret key objects

HOTP secret key objects (object class **CKO_OTP_KEY**, key type **CKK_HOTP**) hold generic secret keys and associated counter values.

The **CKA_OTP_COUNTER** value may be set at key generation; however, some tokens may set it to a fixed initial value. Depending on the token's security policy, this value may not be modified and/or may not be revealed if the object has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE** or its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**.

For HOTP keys, the **CKA_OTP_COUNTER** value shall be an 8 bytes unsigned integer in big endian (i.e. network byte order) form. The same holds true for a **CK_OTP_COUNTER** value in a **CK_OTP_PARAM** structure.

The following is a sample template for creating a HOTP secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_OTP_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_HOTP;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "HOTP secret key object";
CK_BYTE keyId[] = {...};

```

```

CK_ULONG outputFormat = CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL;
CK_ULONG outputLength = 6;
CK_DATE endDate = {...};
CK_BYTE counterValue[8] = {0};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
    CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_END_DATE, &endDate, sizeof(endDate)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_SENSITIVE, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_SIGN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VERIFY, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_ID, keyId, sizeof(keyId)},
    {CKA_OTP_FORMAT, &outputFormat, sizeof(outputFormat)},
    {CKA_OTP_LENGTH, &outputLength, sizeof(outputLength)},
    {CKA_OTP_COUNTER, counterValue, sizeof(counterValue)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.41.12.2 HOTP key generation

The HOTP key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for the HOTP algorithm.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates HOTP keys with a particular set of attributes as specified in the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes at least the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_OTP_COUNTER**, **CKA_VALUE** and **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the HOTP key type may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of HOTP key sizes, in bytes.

2.41.12.3 HOTP OTP generation and validation

CKM_HOTP is the mechanism for the retrieval and verification of HOTP OTP values based on the current internal counter, or a provided counter.

The mechanism takes a pointer to a **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure as a parameter.

As for the **CKM_SECURID** mechanism, when signing or verifying using the **CKM_HOTP** mechanism, *pData* shall be set to **NULL_PTR** and *ulDataLen* shall be set to 0.

For verify operations, the counter value **CK_OTP_COUNTER** must be provided as a **CK_OTP_PARAM** parameter to **C_VerifyInit**. When verifying an OTP value using the **CKM_HOTP** mechanism, *pSignature* shall be set to the OTP value itself, e.g. the value of the **CK_OTP_VALUE** component of a **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure in the case of an earlier call to **C_Sign**.

2.41.13 ActivIdentity ACTI

2.41.13.1 ACTI secret key objects

ACTI secret key objects (object class **CKO_OTP_KEY**, key type **CKK_ACTI**) hold ActivIdentity ACTI secret keys.

For ACTI keys, the **CKA_OTP_COUNTER** value shall be an 8 bytes unsigned integer in big endian (i.e. network byte order) form. The same holds true for the **CK_OTP_COUNTER** value in the **CK_OTP_PARAM** structure.

The **CKA_OTP_COUNTER** value may be set at key generation; however, some tokens may set it to a fixed initial value. Depending on the token's security policy, this value may not be modified and/or may not be revealed if the object has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE** or its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**.

The **CKA_OTP_TIME** value may be set at key generation; however, some tokens may set it to a fixed initial value. Depending on the token's security policy, this value may not be modified and/or may not be revealed if the object has its **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute set to **CK_TRUE** or its **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to **CK_FALSE**.

The following is a sample template for creating an ACTI secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_OTP_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_ACTI;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "ACTI secret key object";
CK_BYTE keyId[] = {...};
CK_ULONG outputFormat = CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL;
CK_ULONG outputLength = 6;
CK_DATE endDate = {...};
CK_BYTE counterValue[8] = {0};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_END_DATE, &endDate, sizeof(endDate)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_SENSITIVE, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_SIGN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VERIFY, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_ID, keyId, sizeof(keyId)},
    {CKA_OTP_FORMAT, &outputFormat,
    sizeof(outputFormat)},
    {CKA_OTP_LENGTH, &outputLength,
    sizeof(outputLength)},
    {CKA_OTP_COUNTER, counterValue,
    sizeof(counterValue)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

2.41.13.2 ACTI key generation

The ACTI key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for the ACTI algorithm.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates ACTI keys with a particular set of attributes as specified in the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes at least the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_VALUE** and **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the ACTI key type may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ACTI key sizes, in bytes.

2.41.14 ACTI OTP generation and validation

CKM_ACTI is the mechanism for the retrieval and verification of ACTI OTP values.

The mechanism takes a pointer to a **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure as a parameter.

When signing or verifying using the **CKM_ACTI** mechanism, *pData* shall be set to **NULL_PTR** and *ulDataLen* shall be set to 0.

When verifying an OTP value using the **CKM_ACTI** mechanism, *pSignature* shall be set to the OTP value itself, e.g. the value of the **CK_OTP_VALUE** component of a **CK_OTP_PARAMS** structure in the case of an earlier call to **C_Sign**.

2.42 CT-KIP

2.42.1 Principles of Operation




Figure 4: PKCS #11 and CT-KIP integration

Figure 3 shows an integration of PKCS #11 into an application that generates cryptographic keys through the use of CT-KIP. The application invokes **C_DeriveKey** to derive a key of a particular type on the token. The key may subsequently be used as a basis to e.g., generate one-time password values. The application communicates with a CT-KIP server that participates in the key derivation and stores a copy of the key in its database. The key is transferred to the server in wrapped form, after a call to **C_WrapKey**. The server authenticates itself to the client and the client verifies the authentication by calls to **C_Verify**.

2.42.2 Mechanisms

The following table shows, for the mechanisms defined in this document, their support by different cryptographic operations. For any particular token, of course, a particular operation may well support only a subset of the mechanisms listed. There is also no guarantee that a token that supports one mechanism for some operation supports any other mechanism for any other operation (or even supports that same mechanism for any other operation).

Table 135: CT-KIP Mechanisms vs. applicable functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_KIP_DERIVE							✓
CKM_KIP_WRAP						✓	
CKM_KIP_MAC		✓					

The remainder of this section will present in detail the mechanisms and the parameters that are supplied to them.

2.42.3 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_KIP_DERIVE
 CKM_KIP_WRAP
 CKM_KIP_MAC

2.42.4 CT-KIP Mechanism parameters

◆ CK_KIP_PARAMS; CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR

CK_KIP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to all the CT-KIP related mechanisms: The **CKM_KIP_DERIVE** key derivation mechanism, the **CKM_KIP_WRAP** key wrap and key unwrap mechanism, and the **CKM_KIP_MAC** signature mechanism. The structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS {
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey;
    CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed;
    CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen;
} CK_KIP_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pMechanism pointer to the underlying cryptographic mechanism (e.g. AES, SHA-256), see further 0, Appendix D

<i>hKey</i>	handle to a key that will contribute to the entropy of the derived key (CKM_KIP_DERIVE) or will be used in the MAC operation (CKM_KIP_MAC)
<i>pSeed</i>	pointer to an input seed
<i>ulSeedLen</i>	length in bytes of the input seed

CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_KIP_PARAMS** structure.

2.42.5 CT-KIP key derivation

The CT-KIP key derivation mechanism, denoted **CKM_KIP_DERIVE**, is a key derivation mechanism that is capable of generating secret keys of potentially any type, subject to token limitations.

It takes a parameter of type **CK_KIP_PARAMS** which allows for the passing of the desired underlying cryptographic mechanism as well as some other data. In particular, when the *hKey* parameter is a handle to an existing key, that key will be used in the key derivation in addition to the *hBaseKey* of **C_DeriveKey**. The *pSeed* parameter may be used to seed the key derivation operation.

The mechanism derives a secret key with a particular set of attributes as specified in the attributes of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS** and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the key type may be specified in the template for the key, or else will be assigned default initial values. Since the mechanism is generic, the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute should be set in the template, if the key is to be used with a particular mechanism.

2.42.6 CT-KIP key wrap and key unwrap

The CT-KIP key wrap and unwrap mechanism, denoted **CKM_KIP_WRAP**, is a key wrap mechanism that is capable of wrapping and unwrapping generic secret keys.

It takes a parameter of type **CK_KIP_PARAMS**, which allows for the passing of the desired underlying cryptographic mechanism as well as some other data. It does not make use of the *hKey* parameter of **CK_KIP_PARAMS**.

2.42.7 CT-KIP signature generation

The CT-KIP signature (MAC) mechanism, denoted **CKM_KIP_MAC**, is a mechanism used to produce a message authentication code of arbitrary length. The keys it uses are secret keys.

It takes a parameter of type **CK_KIP_PARAMS**, which allows for the passing of the desired underlying cryptographic mechanism as well as some other data. The mechanism does not make use of the *pSeed* and the *ulSeedLen* parameters of **CT_KIP_PARAMS**.

This mechanism produces a MAC of the length specified by *pulSignatureLen* parameter in calls to **C_Sign**.

If a call to **C_Sign** with this mechanism fails, then no output will be generated.

2.43 GOST

The remainder of this section will present in detail the mechanisms and the parameters which are supplied to them.

Table 136, GOST Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions
-----------	-----------

	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_GOST28147_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_GOST28147_ECB	✓					✓	
CKM_GOST28147	✓					✓	
CKM_GOST28147_MAC		✓					
CKM_GOST28147_KEY_WRAP						✓	
CKM_GOSTR3411				✓			
CKM_GOSTR3411_HMAC		✓					
CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_PAIR_GEN					✓		
CKM_GOSTR3410		✓ ¹					
CKM_GOSTR3410_WITH_GOST3411		✓					
CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP						✓	
CKM_GOSTR3410_DERIVE							✓

1 Single-part operations only

2.44 GOST 28147-89

GOST 28147-89 is a block cipher with 64-bit block size and 256-bit keys.

2.44.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_GOST28147” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects and domain parameter objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_GOST28147_KEY_GEN
 CKM_GOST28147_ECB
 CKM_GOST28147
 CKM_GOST28147_MAC
 CKM_GOST28147_KEY_WRAP

2.44.2 GOST 28147-89 secret key objects

GOST 28147-89 secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_GOST28147**) hold GOST 28147-89 keys. The following table defines the GOST 28147-89 secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 137, GOST 28147-89 Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	32 bytes in little endian order
CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS ^{1,3,5}	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST 28147-89. When key is used the domain parameter

		object of key type CKK_GOST28147 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID
--	--	--

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] Table 10 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating a GOST 28147-89 secret key object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOST28147;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST 28147-89 secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[32] = {...};
CK_BYTE params_oid[] = {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02,
                        0x02, 0x1f, 0x00};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS, params_oid, sizeof(params_oid)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
```

2.44.3 GOST 28147-89 domain parameter objects

GOST 28147-89 domain parameter objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS**, key type **CKK_GOST28147**) hold GOST 28147-89 domain parameters.

The following table defines the GOST 28147-89 domain parameter object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 138, GOST 28147-89 Domain Parameter Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ¹	Byte array	DER-encoding of the domain parameters as it was introduced in [4] section 8.1 (type <i>Gost28147-89-ParamSetParameters</i>)
CKA_OBJECT_ID ¹	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the domain parameters

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] Table 10 for footnotes

For any particular token, there is no guarantee that a token supports domain parameters loading up and/or fetching out. Furthermore, applications, that make direct use of domain parameters objects, should take in account that **CKA_VALUE** attribute may be inaccessible.

The following is a sample template for creating a GOST 28147-89 domain parameter object:

```
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOST28147;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST 28147-89 cryptographic
                        parameters object";
CK_BYTE oid[] = {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02,
                0x1f, 0x00};
CK_BYTE value[] = {
    0x30, 0x62, 0x04, 0x40, 0x4c, 0xde, 0x38, 0x9c, 0x29, 0x89, 0xef, 0xb
```

```

        6, 0xff, 0xeb, 0x56,
        0xc5, 0x5e, 0xc2, 0x9b, 0x02, 0x98, 0x75, 0x61, 0x3b, 0x11, 0x3f, 0x8
        9, 0x60, 0x03, 0x97,
        0x0c, 0x79, 0x8a, 0xa1, 0xd5, 0x5d, 0xe2, 0x10, 0xad, 0x43, 0x37, 0x5
        d, 0xb3, 0x8e, 0xb4,
        0x2c, 0x77, 0xe7, 0xcd, 0x46, 0xca, 0xfa, 0xd6, 0x6a, 0x20, 0x1f, 0x7
        0, 0xf4, 0x1e, 0xa4,
        0xab, 0x03, 0xf2, 0x21, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x44, 0xd8, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0
        2, 0x01, 0x40,
        0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x0
        5, 0x00
};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_OBJECT_ID, oid, sizeof(oid)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.44.4 GOST 28147-89 key generation

The GOST 28147-89 key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_GOST28147_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for GOST 28147-89.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the GOST 28147-89 key type may be specified for objects of object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** are not used.

2.44.5 GOST 28147-89-ECB

GOST 28147-89-ECB, denoted **CKM_GOST28147_ECB**, is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on GOST 28147-89 and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports.

For wrapping (**C_WrapKey**), the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size.

For unwrapping (**C_UnwrapKey**), the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 139, GOST 28147-89-ECB: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	CKK_GOST28147	Multiple of block size	Same as input length
C_Decrypt	CKK_GOST28147	Multiple of block size	Same as input length
C_WrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	Any	Input length rounded up to multiple of block size
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	Multiple of block size	Determined by type of key being unwrapped

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

2.44.6 GOST 28147-89 encryption mode except ECB

GOST 28147-89 encryption mode except ECB, denoted **CKM_GOST28147**, is a mechanism for single and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on [GOST 28147-89] and CFB, counter mode, and additional CBC mode defined in [RFC 4357] section 2. Encryption's parameters are specified in object identifier of attribute **CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS**.

It has a parameter, which is an 8-byte initialization vector. This parameter may be omitted then a zero initialization vector is used.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports.

For wrapping (**C_WrapKey**), the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped.

For unwrapping (**C_UnwrapKey**), the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 140, GOST 28147-89 encryption modes except ECB: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	CKK_GOST28147	Any	For counter mode and CFB is the same as input length. For CBC is the same as input length padded on the trailing end with up to block size so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	CKK_GOST28147	Any	
C_WrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	Any	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	Any	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

2.44.7 GOST 28147-89-MAC

GOST 28147-89-MAC, denoted **CKM_GOST28147_MAC**, is a mechanism for data integrity and authentication based on GOST 28147-89 and key meshing algorithms [RFC 4357] section 2.3.

MACing parameters are specified in object identifier of attribute **CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS**.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final GOST 28147-89 cipher block produced in the MACing process.

It has a parameter, which is an 8-byte MAC initialization vector. This parameter may be omitted then a zero initialization vector is used.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 141, GOST28147-89-MAC: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_GOST28147	Any	4 bytes
C_Verify	CKK_GOST28147	Any	4 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

GOST 28147-89 keys wrapping/unwrapping with GOST 28147-89

GOST 28147-89 keys as a KEK (key encryption keys) for encryption GOST 28147-89 keys, denoted by **CKM_GOST28147_KEY_WRAP**, is a mechanism for key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on GOST 28147-89. Its purpose is to encrypt and decrypt keys have been generated by key generation mechanism for GOST 28147-89.

For wrapping (**C_WrapKey**), the mechanism first computes MAC from the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped and then encrypts in ECB mode the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped. The result is 32 bytes of the key that is wrapped and 4 bytes of MAC.

For unwrapping (**C_UnwrapKey**), the mechanism first decrypts in ECB mode the 32 bytes of the key that was wrapped and then computes MAC from the unwrapped key. Then compared together 4 bytes MAC has computed and 4 bytes MAC of the input. If these two MACs do not match the wrapped key is disallowed. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the unwrapped key.

It has a parameter, which is an 8-byte MAC initialization vector. This parameter may be omitted then a zero initialization vector is used.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 142, GOST 28147-89 keys as KEK: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_WrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	32 bytes	36 bytes
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_GOST28147	32 bytes	36 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

GOST R 34.11-94

GOST R 34.11-94 is a mechanism for message digesting, following the hash algorithm with 256-bit message digest defined in [GOST R 34.11-94].

2.44.8 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_GOSTR3411” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of domain parameter objects.

Mechanisms:

CKM_GOSTR3411

2.44.9 GOST R 34.11-94 domain parameter objects

GOST R 34.11-94 domain parameter objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS**, key type **CKK_GOSTR3411**) hold GOST R 34.11-94 domain parameters.

The following table defines the GOST R 34.11-94 domain parameter object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 143, GOST R 34.11-94 Domain Parameter Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ¹	Byte array	DER-encoding of the domain parameters as it was introduced in [4] section 8.2 (type <i>GostR3411-94-ParamSetParameters</i>)
CKA_OBJECT_ID ¹	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the domain parameters

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] Table 10 for footnotes

For any particular token, there is no guarantee that a token supports domain parameters loading up and/or fetching out. Furthermore, applications, that make direct use of domain parameters objects, should take in account that **CKA_VALUE** attribute may be inaccessible.

The following is a sample template for creating a GOST R 34.11-94 domain parameter object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOSTR3411;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST R34.11-94 cryptographic parameters object";
CK_BYTE oid[] = {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x00};
CK_BYTE value[] = {
    0x30, 0x64, 0x04, 0x40, 0x4e, 0x57, 0x64, 0xd1, 0xab, 0x8d, 0xcb, 0xbf, 0x94, 0x1a,
    0x7a,
    0x4d, 0x2c, 0xd1, 0x10, 0x10, 0xd6, 0xa0, 0x57, 0x35, 0x8d, 0x38, 0xf2, 0xf7, 0x0f,
    0x49,
    0xd1, 0x5a, 0xea, 0x2f, 0x8d, 0x94, 0x62, 0xee, 0x43, 0x09, 0xb3, 0xf4, 0xa6, 0xa2,
    0x18,
    0xc6, 0x98, 0xe3, 0xc1, 0x7c, 0xe5, 0x7e, 0x70, 0x6b, 0x09, 0x66, 0xf7, 0x02, 0x3c,
    0x8b,
    0x55, 0x95, 0xbf, 0x28, 0x39, 0xb3, 0x2e, 0xcc, 0x04, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_OBJECT_ID, oid, sizeof(oid)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.44.10 GOST R 34.11-94 digest

GOST R 34.11-94 digest, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3411**, is a mechanism for message digesting based on GOST R 34.11-94 hash algorithm [GOST R 34.11-94].

As a parameter this mechanism utilizes a DER-encoding of the object identifier. A mechanism parameter may be missed then parameters of the object identifier *id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet* [RFC 4357] (section 11.2) must be used.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 144, GOST R 34.11-94: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	Any	32 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

2.44.11 GOST R 34.11-94 HMAC

GOST R 34.11-94 HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3411_HMAC**, is a mechanism for signatures and verification. It uses the HMAC construction, based on the GOST R 34.11-94 hash function [GOST R 34.11-94] and core HMAC algorithm [RFC 2104]. The keys it uses are of generic key type **CKK_GENERIC_SECRET** or **CKK_GOST28147**.

To be conformed to GOST R 34.11-94 hash algorithm [GOST R 34.11-94] the block length of core HMAC algorithm is 32 bytes long (see [RFC 2104] section 2, and [RFC 4357] section 3).

As a parameter this mechanism utilizes a DER-encoding of the object identifier. A mechanism parameter may be missed then parameters of the object identifier *id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet* [RFC 4357] (section 11.2) must be used.

Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism are of 32 bytes long.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table:

Table 145, GOST R 34.11-94 HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_GENERIC_SECRET or CKK_GOST28147	Any	32 byte
C_Verify	CKK_GENERIC_SECRET or CKK_GOST28147	Any	32 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

2.45 GOST R 34.10-2001

GOST R 34.10-2001 is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, following the digital signature algorithm defined in [GOST R 34.10-2001].

2.45.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_GOSTR3410” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects and domain parameter objects.

Mechanisms:

- CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_PAIR_GEN
- CKM_GOSTR3410
- CKM_GOSTR3410_WITH_GOSTR3411
- CKM_GOSTR3410
- CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP

2.45.2 GOST R 34.10-2001 public key objects

GOST R 34.10-2001 public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY**, key type **CKK_GOSTR3410**) hold GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys.

The following table defines the GOST R 34.10-2001 public key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 146, GOST R 34.10-2001 Public Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4}	Byte array	64 bytes for public key; 32 bytes for each coordinates X and Y of elliptic curve point P(X, Y) in little endian order
CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS ^{1,3}	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST R 34.10-2001. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOSTR3410 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID
CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS ^{1,3,8}	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST R 34.11-94. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOSTR3411 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID
CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS ⁸	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST 28147-89. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOST28147 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID. The attribute value may be omitted

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] Table 10 for footnotes

The following is a sample template for creating an GOST R 34.10-2001 public key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOSTR3410;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST R34.10-2001 public key object";
CK_BYTE gostr3410params_oid[] =
    {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x23, 0x00};
CK_BYTE gostr3411params_oid[] =
    {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x00};
CK_BYTE gost28147params_oid[] =
    {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x1f, 0x00};
CK_BYTE value[64] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {

```



```

{CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
{CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS, gostR3410params_oid,
 sizeof(gostR3410params_oid)},
{CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS, gostR3411params_oid,
 sizeof(gostR3411params_oid)},
{CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS, gost28147params_oid,
 sizeof(gost28147params_oid)},
{CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.45.3 GOST R 34.10-2001 private key objects

GOST R 34.10-2001 private key objects (object class **CKO_PRIVATE_KEY**, key type **CKK_GOSTR3410**) hold GOST R 34.10-2001 private keys.

The following table defines the GOST R 34.10-2001 private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 147, GOST R 34.10-2001 Private Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	32 bytes for private key in little endian order
CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS ^{1,4,6}	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST R 34.10-2001. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOSTR3410 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID
CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS ^{1,4,6,8}	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST R 34.11-94. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOSTR3411 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID
CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS ^{4,6,8}	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST 28147-89. When key is used the domain parameter object of key type CKK_GOST28147 must be specified with the same attribute CKA_OBJECT_ID. The attribute value may be omitted

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] Table 10 for footnotes

Note that when generating an GOST R 34.10-2001 private key, the GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameters are *not* specified in the key's template. This is because GOST R 34.10-2001 private keys are only generated as part of an GOST R 34.10-2001 key *pair*, and the GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameters for the pair are specified in the template for the GOST R 34.10-2001 public key.

The following is a sample template for creating an GOST R 34.10-2001 private key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOSTR3410;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST R34.10-2001 private key
    object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE gostR3410params_oid[] =
    {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x23, 0x00};
CK_BYTE gostR3411params_oid[] =
    {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x00};
CK_BYTE gost28147params_oid[] =
    {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x1f, 0x00};
CK_BYTE value[32] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {

```

```

{CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
{CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
{CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
{CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS, gostR3410params_oid,
 sizeof(gostR3410params_oid)},
{CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS, gostR3411params_oid,
 sizeof(gostR3411params_oid)},
{CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS, gost28147params_oid,
 sizeof(gost28147params_oid)},
{CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.45.4 GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameter objects

GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameter objects (object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS**, key type **CKK_GOSTR3410**) hold GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameters.

The following table defines the GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameter object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 148, GOST R 34.10-2001 Domain Parameter Object Attributes

Attribute	Data Type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ¹	Byte array	DER-encoding of the domain parameters as it was introduced in [4] section 8.4 (type <i>GostR3410-2001-ParamSetParameters</i>)
CKA_OBJECT_ID ¹	Byte array	DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the domain parameters

Refer to [PKCS #11-Base] Table 10 for footnotes

For any particular token, there is no guarantee that a token supports domain parameters loading up and/or fetching out. Furthermore, applications, that make direct use of domain parameters objects, should take in account that **CKA_VALUE** attribute may be inaccessible.

The following is a sample template for creating a GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameter object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GOSTR3410;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A GOST R34.10-2001 cryptographic
    parameters object";
CK_BYTE oid[] =
    {0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x23, 0x00};
CK_BYTE value[] = {
    0x30, 0x81, 0x90, 0x02, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, 0x20, 0x5f, 0xbf, 0xf4, 0x9
    8,
    0xaa, 0x93, 0x8c, 0xe7, 0x39, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0x22, 0xfb, 0xaf, 0xef, 0x4
    0,
    0x56, 0x3f, 0x6e, 0x6a, 0x34, 0x72, 0xfc, 0x2a, 0x51, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0xe

```

```

    9,
    0xda, 0xe2, 0x3b, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0,
    0x00, 0x04, 0x31, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x50, 0xfe,
    e,
    0x8a, 0x18, 0x92, 0x97, 0x61, 0x54, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0xfc, 0x19, 0x3a, 0xcc,
    c,
    0xf5, 0xb3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x20, 0x08, 0xe2, 0xa8, 0xa0, 0xe6,
    6,
    0x51, 0x47, 0xd4, 0xbd, 0x63, 0x16, 0x03, 0x0e, 0x16, 0xd1, 0x9c, 0x85,
    5,
    0xc9, 0x7f, 0x0a, 0x9c, 0xa2, 0x67, 0x12, 0x2b, 0x96, 0xab, 0xbc, 0xea,
    a,
    0x7e, 0x8f, 0xc8
};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_OBJECT_ID, oid, sizeof(oid)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

2.45.5 GOST R 34.10-2001 mechanism parameters

◆ CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS

CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```

typedef struct CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE_PTR      pWrapOID;
    CK_ULONG         ulWrapOIDLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR      pUKM;
    CK_ULONG         ulUKMLen;
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
} CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS;

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>pWrapOID</i>	pointer to a data with DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of
-----------------	---

	GOST 28147-89. If pointer takes NULL_PTR value in C_WrapKey operation then parameters are specified in object identifier of attribute CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS must be used. For C_UnwrapKey operation the pointer is not used and must take NULL_PTR value anytime
<i>ulWrapOIDLen</i>	length of data with DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type of GOST 28147-89
<i>pUKM</i>	pointer to a data with UKM. If pointer takes NULL_PTR value in C_WrapKey operation then random value of UKM will be used. If pointer takes non-NULL_PTR value in C_UnwrapKey operation then the pointer value will be compared with UKM value of wrapped key. If these two values do not match the wrapped key will be rejected
<i>ulUKMLen</i>	length of UKM data. If <i>pUKM</i> -pointer is different from NULL_PTR then equal to 8
<i>hKey</i>	key handle. Key handle of a sender for C_WrapKey operation. Key handle of a receiver for C_UnwrapKey operation. When key handle takes CK_INVALID_HANDLE value then an ephemeral (one time) key pair of a sender will be used

◆ CK_GOSTR3410_DERIVE_PARAMS

CK_GOSTR3410_DERIVE_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_GOSTR3410_DERIVE** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_GOSTR3410_DERIVE_PARAMS {
    CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
    CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pUKM;
    CK_ULONG ulUKMLen;
} CK_GOSTR3410_DERIVE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<i>kdf</i>	additional key diversification algorithm identifier. Possible values are CKD_NULL and CKD_CPDIVERSIFY_KDF. In case of CKD_NULL, result of the key derivation function described in [RFC 4357], section 5.2 is used directly; In case of CKD_CPDIVERSIFY_KDF, the resulting key value is additionally processed with algorithm from [RFC 4357], section 6.5.
<i>pPublicData</i> ¹	pointer to data with public key of a receiver
<i>ulPublicDataLen</i>	length of data with public key of a receiver (must be 64)
<i>pUKM</i>	pointer to a UKM data
<i>ulUKMLen</i>	length of UKM data in bytes (must be 8)

¹ Public key of a receiver is an octet string of 64 bytes long. The public key octets correspond to the concatenation of X and Y coordinates of a point. Any one of them is 32 bytes long and represented in little endian order.

2.45.6 GOST R 34.10-2001 key pair generation

The GOST R 34.10-2001 key pair generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_PAIR_GEN**, is a key pair generation mechanism for GOST R 34.10-2001.

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates GOST R 34.10-2001 public/private key pairs with particular GOST R 34.10-2001 domain parameters, as specified in the **CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS**, **CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS**, and **CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS** attributes of the template for the public key. Note that **CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS** attribute may not be present in the template.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new public key and the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, **CKA_VALUE**, and **CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS**, **CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS**, **CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS** attributes to the new private key.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

2.45.7 GOST R 34.10-2001 without hashing

The GOST R 34.10-2001 without hashing mechanism, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3410**, is a mechanism for single-part signatures and verification for GOST R 34.10-2001. (This mechanism corresponds only to the part of GOST R 34.10-2001 that processes the 32-bytes hash value; it does not compute the hash value.)

This mechanism does not have a parameter.

For the purposes of these mechanisms, a GOST R 34.10-2001 signature is an octet string of 64 bytes long. The signature octets correspond to the concatenation of the GOST R 34.10-2001 values s and r' , both represented as a 32 bytes octet string in big endian order with the most significant byte first [RFC 4490] section 3.2, and [RFC 4491] section 2.2.2.

The input for the mechanism is an octet string of 32 bytes long with digest has computed by means of GOST R 34.11-94 hash algorithm in the context of signed or should be signed message.

Table 149, GOST R 34.10-2001 without hashing: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign ¹	CKK_GOSTR3410	32 bytes	64 bytes
C_Verify ¹	CKK_GOSTR3410	32 bytes	64 bytes

¹ Single-part operations only.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

2.45.8 GOST R 34.10-2001 with GOST R 34.11-94

The GOST R 34.10-2001 with GOST R 34.11-94, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3410_WITH_GOSTR3411**, is a mechanism for signatures and verification for GOST R 34.10-2001. This mechanism computes the entire GOST R 34.10-2001 specification, including the hashing with GOST R 34.11-94 hash algorithm.

As a parameter this mechanism utilizes a DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating GOST R 34.11-94 data object type. A mechanism parameter may be missed then parameters are specified in object identifier of attribute **CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS** must be used.

For the purposes of these mechanisms, a GOST R 34.10-2001 signature is an octet string of 64 bytes long. The signature octets correspond to the concatenation of the GOST R 34.10-2001 values s and r' , both represented as a 32 bytes octet string in big endian order with the most significant byte first [RFC 4490] section 3.2, and [RFC 4491] section 2.2.2.

The input for the mechanism is signed or should be signed message of any length. Single- and multiple-part signature operations are available.

Table 150, GOST R 34.10-2001 with GOST R 34.11-94: Key and Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Sign	CKK_GOSTR3410	Any	64 bytes
C_Verify	CKK_GOSTR3410	Any	64 bytes

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

2.45.9 GOST 28147-89 keys wrapping/unwrapping with GOST R 34.10-2001

GOST R 34.10-2001 keys as a KEK (key encryption keys) for encryption GOST 28147 keys, denoted by **CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP**, is a mechanism for key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on GOST R 34.10-2001. Its purpose is to encrypt and decrypt keys have been generated by key generation mechanism for GOST 28147-89. An encryption algorithm from [RFC 4490] (section 5.2) must be used. Encrypted key is a DER-encoded structure of ASN.1 *GostR3410-KeyTransport* type [RFC 4490] section 4.2.

It has a parameter, a **CK_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP_PARAMS** structure defined in section 2.45.5.

For unwrapping (**C_UnwrapKey**), the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure are not used.

2.45.9.1 Common key derivation with assistance of GOST R 34.10-2001 keys

Common key derivation, denoted **CKM_GOSTR3410_DERIVE**, is a mechanism for key derivation with assistance of GOST R 34.10-2001 private and public keys. The key of the mechanism must be of object class **CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS** and key type **CKK_GOSTR3410**. An algorithm for key derivation from [RFC 4357] (section 5.2) must be used.

The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new private key. All other attributes must be specified in a template for creating private key object.

3 PKCS #11 Implementation Conformance

An implementation is a conforming implementation if it meets the conditions specified in one or more server profiles specified in **[PKCS #11-Prof]**.

If a PKCS #11 implementation claims support for a particular profile, then the implementation SHALL conform to all normative statements within the clauses specified for that profile and for any subclauses to each of those clauses .

Appendix A. Acknowledgments

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James Wang, Vormetric
Jeff Webb, Dell

Peng Yu, Feitian Technologies
Magda Zdunkiewicz, Cryptsoft
Chris Zimman, Individual

Appendix B. Manifest Constants

The following definitions can be found in [PKCS11_T_H].

/*

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All capitalized terms in the following text have the meanings assigned to them in the OASIS Intellectual Property Rights Policy (the "OASIS IPR Policy").

*/

Also, refer [PKCS #11-Base] and [PKCS #11-Hist] for additional definitions.

B.1 OTP Definitions

Note: A C or C++ source file in a Cryptoki application or library can define all the types, mechanisms, and other constants described here by including the header file otp-pkcs11.h. When including the otp-pkcs11.h header file, it should be preceded by an inclusion of the top-level Cryptoki header file pkcs11.h, and the source file must also specify the preprocessor directives indicated in Section 8 of [PKCS #11-B].

B.2 Object classes

```
#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000
#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001
#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002
#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003
#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004
#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005
#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006
#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007
#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008

#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
```

B.3 Key types

```
#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000
#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001
#define CKK_DH 0x00000002
#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003
#define CKK_EC 0x00000003
#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004
#define CKK_KEY 0x00000005
#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010
#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011
#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012
#define CKK_DES 0x00000013
#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014
#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015
```

```

#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016
#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017
#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018
#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018
#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019
#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A
#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B
#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C
#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D
#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E
#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F
#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020
#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021
#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022
#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023
#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024
#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025
#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026
#define CKK_SHA512_224_HMAC 0x00000027
#define CKK_SHA512_256_HMAC 0x00000028
#define CKK_SHA512_T_HMAC 0x00000029
#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000

```

B.4 Mechanisms

```

#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000
#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001
#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002
#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003
#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004
#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005
#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006
#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007
#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008
#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009
#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A
#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B
#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C
#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D
#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E
#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010
#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011
#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012
#define CKM_DSA_FIPS_G_GEN 0x00000013
#define CKM_DSA_SHA224 0x00000014
#define CKM_DSA_SHA256 0x00000015
#define CKM_DSA_SHA384 0x00000016
#define CKM_DSA_SHA512 0x00000017
#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020

```

```

#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021
#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030
#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031
#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032
#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033
#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040
#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041
#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042
#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043
#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044
#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045
#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046
#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047
#define CKM_SHA512_224 0x00000048
#define CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC 0x00000049
#define CKM_SHA512_224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x0000004A
#define CKM_SHA512_224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x0000004B
#define CKM_SHA512_256 0x0000004C
#define CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC 0x0000004D
#define CKM_SHA512_256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x0000004E
#define CKM_SHA512_256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x0000004F
#define CKM_SHA512_T 0x00000050
#define CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC 0x00000051
#define CKM_SHA512_T_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000052
#define CKM_SHA512_T_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000053
#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100
#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101
#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102
#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103
#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104
#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105
#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110
#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111
#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120
#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121
#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122
#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123
#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124
#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125
#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130
#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131
#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132
#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133
#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134
#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135
#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136
#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140
#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141

```

```

#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142
#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143
#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144
#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145
#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150
#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151
#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152
#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153
#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200
#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201
#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202
#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210
#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211
#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212
#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220
#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221
#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222
#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230
#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231
#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232
#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240
#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241
#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242
#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250
#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251
#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252
#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255
#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256
#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257
#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260
#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261
#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262
#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270
#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271
#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272
#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280
#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282
#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290
#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291
#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0
#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1
#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300
#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301
#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302
#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303
#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304
#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305
#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310

```

```

#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311
#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312
#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313
#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314
#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315
#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321
#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321
#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322
#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322
#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323
#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323
#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330
#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331
#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332
#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333
#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334
#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335
#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340
#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341
#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342
#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343
#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344
#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345
#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350
#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360
#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362
#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363
#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364
#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365
#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370
#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371
#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372
#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373
#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374
#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375
#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376
#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377
#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378
#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380
#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381
#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390
#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391

```

```

#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392
#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393
#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394
#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395
#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396
#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0
#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1
#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2
#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3
#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4
#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4
#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5
#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5
#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6
#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7
#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8
#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9
#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA
#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB
#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0
#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0
#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0
#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1
#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2
#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3
#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4
#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5
#define CKM_TLS10_MAC_SERVER 0x000003D6
#define CKM_TLS10_MAC_CLIENT 0x000003D7
#define CKM_TLS12_MAC 0x000003D8
#define CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003E0
#define CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003E1
#define CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x000003E2
#define CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE 0x000003E3
#define CKM_TLS_MAC 0x000003E4
#define CKM_TLS_KDF 0x000003E5
#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400
#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401
#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500
#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510
#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511
#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555

```



```

#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558
#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560
#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561
#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562
#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563
#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564
#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565
#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566
#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567
#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000
#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001
#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002
#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003
#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004
#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005
#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006
#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007
#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008
#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009
#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a
#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010
#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011
#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020
#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030
#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031
#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032
#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033
#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034
#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035
#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036
#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041
#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042
#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050
#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051
#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052
#define CKM_ECDH_AES_KEY_WRAP 0x00001053
#define CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP 0x00001054
#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060
#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061
#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062
#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063
#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064
#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065
#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070

```

```

#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080
#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081
#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082
#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083
#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084
#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085
#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086
#define CKM_AES_GCM 0x00001087
#define CKM_AES_CCM 0x00001088
#define CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL 0x00001089
#define CKM_AES_CMAC 0x0000108A
#define CKM_AES_CTS 0x0000108B
#define CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC 0x0000108C
#define CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96 0x0000108D
#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090
#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091
#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092
#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093
#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC_PAD 0x00001094
#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC_PAD 0x00001095
#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100
#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101
#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102
#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103
#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104
#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105
#define CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001200
#define CKM_GOSTR3410 0x00001201
#define CKM_GOSTR3410_WITH_GOSTR3411 0x00001202
#define CKM_GOSTR3410_KEY_WRAP 0x00001203
#define CKM_GOSTR3410_DERIVE 0x00001204
#define CKM_GOSTR3411 0x00001210
#define CKM_GOSTR3411_HMAC 0x00001211
#define CKM_GOST28147_KEY_GEN 0x00001220
#define CKM_GOST28147_ECB 0x00001221
#define CKM_GOST28147 0x00001222
#define CKM_GOST28147_MAC 0x00001223
#define CKM_GOST28147_KEY_WRAP 0x00001224
#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000
#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001
#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002
#define CKM_DSA_PROBABLISTIC_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002003
#define CKM_DSA_SHAW_TAYLOR_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002004
#define CKM_AES_OFB 0x00002104
#define CKM_AES_CFB64 0x00002105
#define CKM_AES_CFB8 0x00002106
#define CKM_AES_CFB128 0x00002107
#define CKM_AES_CFB1 0x00002108

```

```

#define CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP                0x00002109
#define CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD            0x0000210A
#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_TPM_1_1            0x00004001
#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_TPM_1_1      0x00004002

#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED              0x80000000

```

B.5 Attributes

```

#define CKA_CLASS                        0x00000000
#define CKA_TOKEN                        0x00000001
#define CKA_PRIVATE                      0x00000002
#define CKA_LABEL                        0x00000003
#define CKA_APPLICATION                  0x00000010
#define CKA_VALUE                        0x00000011
#define CKA_OBJECT_ID                    0x00000012
#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE            0x00000080
#define CKA_ISSUER                       0x00000081
#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER                 0x00000082
#define CKA_AC_ISSUER                    0x00000083
#define CKA_OWNER                         0x00000084
#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES                    0x00000085
#define CKA_TRUSTED                      0x00000086
#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY         0x00000087
#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN    0x00000088
#define CKA_URL                           0x00000089
#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY   0x0000008A
#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY    0x0000008B
#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE                   0x00000090
#define CKA_KEY_TYPE                      0x00000100
#define CKA_SUBJECT                       0x00000101
#define CKA_ID                            0x00000102
#define CKA_SENSITIVE                     0x00000103
#define CKA_ENCRYPT                        0x00000104
#define CKA_DECRYPT                        0x00000105
#define CKA_WRAP                          0x00000106
#define CKA_UNWRAP                        0x00000107
#define CKA_SIGN                          0x00000108
#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER                  0x00000109
#define CKA_VERIFY                        0x0000010A
#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER                 0x0000010B
#define CKA_DERIVE                        0x0000010C
#define CKA_START_DATE                    0x00000110
#define CKA_END_DATE                      0x00000111
#define CKA_MODULUS                       0x00000120
#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS                  0x00000121
#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT               0x00000122
#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT              0x00000123
#define CKA_PRIME_1                       0x00000124

```

```

#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125
#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126
#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127
#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128
#define CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO 0x00000129
#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130
#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131
#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132
#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133
#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134
#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS
#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160
#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161
#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162
#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163
#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164
#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165
#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166
#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170
#define CKA_DESTROYABLE 0x00000172
#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180
#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180
#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181
#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200
#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201
#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202

#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210
#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211)
#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212)
#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220
#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221
#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222
#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223
#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224
#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225
#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226
#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227
#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A
#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B
#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C
#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D
#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E
#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F
#define CKA_GOSTR3410_PARAMS 0x00000250
#define CKA_GOSTR3411_PARAMS 0x00000251
#define CKA_GOST28147_PARAMS 0x00000252
#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300

```

```

#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301
#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302
#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400
#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401
#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402
#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403
#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404
#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405
#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406
#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480
#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481
#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482
#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500
#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501
#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502
#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503
#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS
    (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600)

#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000

```

B.6 Attribute constants

```

#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0UL
#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADecimal 1UL
#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2UL
#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3UL
#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0UL
#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1UL
#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2UL

```

B.7 Other constants

```

#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0UL
#define CK_OTP_PIN 1UL
#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2UL
#define CK_OTP_TIME 3UL
#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4UL
#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5UL
#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6UL
#define CK_OTP_FORMAT 7UL
#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001UL
#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002UL
#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004UL
#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008UL
#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010UL
#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020UL

```

B.8 Notifications

```
#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1UL
```

B.9 Return values

```
#define CKR_OK 0x00000000
#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001
#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002
#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003
#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005
#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006
#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007
#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008
#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009
#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A
#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010
#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011
#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012
#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013
#define CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED 0x0000001B
#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020
#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021
#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030
#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031
#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032
#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040
#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041
#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050
#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051
#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054
#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060

#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062
#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063
#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064
#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065
#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066
#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067
#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068
#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069
#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A
#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070
#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071
#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082
#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090
#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091
#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0
#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1
```

```

#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2
#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3
#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4
#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0
#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1
#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3
#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4
#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5
#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6
#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7
#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8

#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0
#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1
#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0
#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1
#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0
#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1
#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2
#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0
#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1
#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2
#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100
#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101
#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102
#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103
#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104
#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105

#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110
#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112
#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113
#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114
#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115
#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120
#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121
#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130
#define CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000140
#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150
#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160
#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170
#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180
#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190
#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191
#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0
#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1
#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0
#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1

```

```
#define CKR_EXCEEDED_MAX_ITERATIONS      0x000001C0
#define CKR_FIPS_SELF_TEST_FAILED        0x000001C1
#define CKR_LIBRARY_LOAD_FAILED          0x000001C2
#define CKR_PIN_TOO_WEAK                 0x000001C3
#define CKR_PUBLIC_KEY_INVALID           0x000001C4
#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED            0x00000200
#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED               0x80000000
```


Appendix C. Revision History

Revision	Date	Editor	Changes Made
wd01	Apr 29, 2013	Chris Zimman	Initial Template Import
wd02	July 7, 2013	Chris Zimman	2 nd Working Draft
wd03	Aug 16, 2013	Chris Zimman	3 rd Working Draft
wd04	Oct 1, 2013	Chris Zimman	Incorporation of ballot items, prep for Committee Specification Draft promotion
wd05	Oct 7, 2013	Chris Zimman	Reviewed for typos and proof. Candidate for Committee Specification Draft promotion.
wd06	Oct 27, 2013	Robert Griffin	Final participants list and other editorial changes for Committee Specification Draft
Cds01	Oct. 30, 2013	OASIS	Committee Specification Draft
wd07	Feb 18, 2014	Chris Zimman	Incorporation of changes and feedback from public review
wd08	Feb 27, 2014	Chris Zimman	Incorporation of changes and feedback from public review
wd09	Mar 10, 2014	Chris Zimman	Incorporation of voted upon changes from last meeting
csd02	Apr. 23, 2014	OASIS	Committee Specification Draft
wd10	Jun 11, 2014	Chris Zimman	Removed AES-XTS mechanism
wd11	Jul. 2, 2014	Chris Zimman	Corrections to manifest constants
csd03	Jul. 16, 2014	OASIS	Committee Specification Draft
csd03a	Sep 3 2013	Robert Griffin	Updated revision history and participant list in preparation for Committee Specification ballot