Description: Description: Description: C:\Users\User\AHendry\standards\oasis\work\tc_admin\TCA995_kmip-spec-v1.1-cs01\kmip-spec-v1.1-cs01\kmip-spec-v1.1-cs01_files\image001.jpg

Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.1

Committee Specification 01

27 July 2012

Specification URIs

This version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/cs01/kmip-spec-v1.1-cs01.doc (Authoritative)

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/cs01/kmip-spec-v1.1-cs01.html

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/cs01/kmip-spec-v1.1-cs01.pdf

Previous version:

http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/44885/kmip-spec-v1.1-csprd01.zip

Latest version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/kmip-spec-v1.1.doc (Authoritative)

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/kmip-spec-v1.1.html

http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/kmip-spec-v1.1.pdf

Technical Committee:

OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC

Chairs:

Robert Griffin (robert.griffin@rsa.com), EMC Corporation

Subhash Sankuratripati (Subhash.Sankuratripati@netapp.com), NetApp

Editors:

Robert Haas (rha@zurich.ibm.com), IBM

Indra Fitzgerald (indra.fitzgerald@hp.com), HP

Related work:

This specification replaces or supersedes:

·         Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.0. 01 October 2010. OASIS Standard. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.0/os/kmip-spec-1.0-os.html

This specification is related to:

·         Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.1. Latest version http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/kmip-profiles-v1.1.html

·         Key Management Interoperability Protocol Test Cases Version 1.1. Latest version. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/testcases/v1.1/kmip-testcases-v1.1.html

·         Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.1. Latest version. http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.1/kmip-ug-v1.1.html

Abstract:

This document is intended for developers and architects who wish to design systems and applications that interoperate using the Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification.

Status:

This document was last revised or approved by the OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the “Latest version” location noted above for possible later revisions of this document.

Technical Committee members should send comments on this specification to the Technical Committee’s email list. Others should send comments to the Technical Committee by using the “Send A Comment” button on the Technical Committee’s web page at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/.

For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the Technical Committee web page (http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/kmip/ipr.php).

Citation format:

When referencing this specification the following citation format should be used:

[KMIP-Spec]

Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 1.1. 27 July 2012. OASIS Committee Specification 01.
http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/spec/v1.1/cs01/kmip-spec-v1.1-cs01.html.

Notices

Copyright © OASIS Open 2012. All Rights Reserved.

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The name "OASIS" is a trademark of OASIS, the owner and developer of this specification, and should be used only to refer to the organization and its official outputs. OASIS welcomes reference to, and implementation and use of, specifications, while reserving the right to enforce its marks against misleading uses. Please see http://www.oasis-open.org/policies-guidelines/trademark for above guidance.

 

Table of Contents

1        Introduction. 8

1.1 Terminology. 8

1.2 Normative References. 11

1.3 Non-Normative References. 14

2        Objects. 15

2.1 Base Objects. 15

2.1.1 Attribute. 15

2.1.2 Credential 16

2.1.3 Key Block. 16

2.1.4 Key Value. 18

2.1.5 Key Wrapping Data. 18

2.1.6 Key Wrapping Specification. 20

2.1.7 Transparent Key Structures. 21

2.1.8 Template-Attribute Structures. 25

2.1.9 Extension Information. 26

2.2 Managed Objects. 26

2.2.1 Certificate. 26

2.2.2 Symmetric Key. 26

2.2.3 Public Key. 27

2.2.4 Private Key. 27

2.2.5 Split Key. 27

2.2.6 Template. 28

2.2.7 Secret Data. 29

2.2.8 Opaque Object 29

3        Attributes. 31

3.1 Unique Identifier 32

3.2 Name. 33

3.3 Object Type. 33

3.4 Cryptographic Algorithm.. 34

3.5 Cryptographic Length. 34

3.6 Cryptographic Parameters. 35

3.7 Cryptographic Domain Parameters. 37

3.8 Certificate Type. 37

3.9 Certificate Length. 38

3.10 X.509 Certificate Identifier 38

3.11 X.509 Certificate Subject 39

3.12 X.509 Certificate Issuer 40

3.13 Certificate Identifier 40

3.14 Certificate Subject 41

3.15 Certificate Issuer 42

3.16 Digital Signature Algorithm.. 42

3.17 Digest 43

3.18 Operation Policy Name. 44

3.18.1 Operations outside of operation policy control 45

3.18.2 Default Operation Policy. 45

3.19 Cryptographic Usage Mask. 47

3.20 Lease Time. 49

3.21 Usage Limits. 49

3.22 State. 51

3.23 Initial Date. 52

3.24 Activation Date. 53

3.25 Process Start Date. 54

3.26 Protect Stop Date. 54

3.27 Deactivation Date. 55

3.28 Destroy Date. 56

3.29 Compromise Occurrence Date. 56

3.30 Compromise Date. 56

3.31 Revocation Reason. 57

3.32 Archive Date. 58

3.33 Object Group. 58

3.34 Fresh. 59

3.35 Link. 59

3.36 Application Specific Information. 60

3.37 Contact Information. 61

3.38 Last Change Date. 62

3.39 Custom Attribute. 62

4        Client-to-Server Operations. 64

4.1 Create. 64

4.2 Create Key Pair 65

4.3 Register 67

4.4 Re-key. 68

4.5 Re-key Key Pair 70

4.6 Derive Key. 73

4.7 Certify. 75

4.8 Re-certify. 76

4.9 Locate. 78

4.10 Check. 80

4.11 Get 81

4.12 Get Attributes. 82

4.13 Get Attribute List 83

4.14 Add Attribute. 83

4.15 Modify Attribute. 84

4.16 Delete Attribute. 84

4.17 Obtain Lease. 85

4.18 Get Usage Allocation. 86

4.19 Activate. 86

4.20 Revoke. 87

4.21 Destroy. 87

4.22 Archive. 88

4.23 Recover 88

4.24 Validate. 89

4.25 Query. 89

4.26 Discover Versions. 90

4.27 Cancel 91

4.28 Poll 92

5        Server-to-Client Operations. 93

5.1 Notify. 93

5.2 Put 93

6        Message Contents. 95

6.1 Protocol Version. 95

6.2 Operation. 95

6.3 Maximum Response Size. 95

6.4 Unique Batch Item ID.. 95

6.5 Time Stamp. 96

6.6 Authentication. 96

6.7 Asynchronous Indicator 96

6.8 Asynchronous Correlation Value. 96

6.9 Result Status. 97

6.10 Result Reason. 97

6.11 Result Message. 98

6.12 Batch Order Option. 98

6.13 Batch Error Continuation Option. 98

6.14 Batch Count 99

6.15 Batch Item.. 99

6.16 Message Extension. 99

7        Message Format 100

7.1 Message Structure. 100

7.2 Operations. 100

8        Authentication. 102

9        Message Encoding. 103

9.1 TTLV Encoding. 103

9.1.1 TTLV Encoding Fields. 103

9.1.2 Examples. 105

9.1.3 Defined Values. 106

10      Transport 127

11      Error Handling. 128

11.1 General 128

11.2 Create. 129

11.3 Create Key Pair 129

11.4 Register 130

11.5 Re-key. 131

11.6 Re-key Key Pair 131

11.7 Derive Key. 132

11.8 Certify. 133

11.9 Re-certify. 133

11.10 Locate. 133

11.11 Check. 134

11.12 Get 134

11.13 Get Attributes. 135

11.14 Get Attribute List 135

11.15 Add Attribute. 135

11.16 Modify Attribute. 136

11.17 Delete Attribute. 136

11.18 Obtain Lease. 137

11.19 Get Usage Allocation. 137

11.20 Activate. 137

11.21 Revoke. 138

11.22 Destroy. 138

11.23 Archive. 138

11.24 Recover 138

11.25 Validate. 138

11.26 Query. 139

11.27 Cancel 139

11.28 Poll 139

11.29 Batch Items. 139

12      KMIP Server and Client Implementation Conformance. 140

12.1 KMIP Server Implementation Conformance. 140

12.2 KMIP Client Implementation Conformance. 140

Appendix A.       Acknowledgments. 141

Appendix B.       Attribute Cross-Reference. 143

Appendix C.       Tag Cross-Reference. 145

Appendix D.       Operations and Object Cross-Reference. 151

Appendix E.       Acronyms. 153

Appendix F.        List of Figures and Tables. 156

Appendix G.       Revision History. 163

 

 


1      Introduction

This document is intended as a specification of the protocol used for the communication between clients and servers to perform certain management operations on objects stored and maintained by a key management system. These objects are referred to as Managed Objects in this specification. They include symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic keys, digital certificates, and templates used to simplify the creation of objects and control their use. Managed Objects are managed with operations that include the ability to generate cryptographic keys, register objects with the key management system, obtain objects from the system, destroy objects from the system, and search for objects maintained by the system. Managed Objects also have associated attributes, which are named values stored by the key management system and are obtained from the system via operations. Certain attributes are added, modified, or deleted by operations.

The protocol specified in this document includes several certificate-related functions for which there are a number of existing protocols – namely Validate (e.g., SCVP or XKMS), Certify (e.g. CMP, CMC, SCEP) and Re-certify (e.g. CMP, CMC, SCEP). The protocol does not attempt to define a comprehensive certificate management protocol, such as would be needed for a certification authority. However, it does include functions that are needed to allow a key server to provide a proxy for certificate management functions.

In addition to the normative definitions for managed objects, operations and attributes, this specification also includes normative definitions for the following aspects of the protocol:

·         The expected behavior of the server and client as a result of operations,

·         Message contents and formats,

·         Message encoding (including enumerations), and

·         Error handling.

This specification is complemented by three other documents. The Usage Guide  [KMIP-UG] provides illustrative information on using the protocol. The KMIP Profiles Specification [KMIP-Prof] provides a selected set of conformance profiles and authentication suites. The Test Specification [KMIP-UC] provides samples of protocol messages corresponding to a set of defined test cases.

This specification defines the KMIP protocol version major 1 and minor 1 (see 6.1).

1.1 Terminology

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

For acronyms used in this document, see Appendix Error! Reference source not found.For definitions not found in this document, see [SP800-57-1].

Archive

To place information not accessed frequently into long-term storage.

Asymmetric key pair

(key pair)

A public key and its corresponding private key; a key pair is used with a public key algorithm.

Authentication

A process that establishes the origin of information, or determines an entity’s identity.

Authentication code

A cryptographic checksum based on a security function (also known as a Message Authentication Code).

Authorization

Access privileges that are granted to an entity; conveying an “official” sanction to perform a security function or activity.

Certificate length

The length (in bytes) of an X.509 public key certificate.

Certification authority

The entity in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is responsible for issuing certificates, and exacting compliance to a PKI policy.

Ciphertext

Data in its encrypted form.

Compromise

The unauthorized disclosure, modification, substitution or use of sensitive data (e.g., keying material and other security-related information).

Confidentiality

The property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized entities.

Cryptographic algorithm

A well-defined computational procedure that takes variable inputs, including a cryptographic key and produces an output.

Cryptographic key
(key)

A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that determines its operation in such a way that an entity with knowledge of the key can reproduce or reverse the operation, while an entity without knowledge of the key cannot. Examples include:

1. The transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data,

2. The transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data,

3. The computation of a digital signature from data,

4. The verification of a digital signature,

5. The computation of an authentication code from data,

6. The verification of an authentication code from data and a received authentication code.

Decryption

The process of changing ciphertext into plaintext using a cryptographic algorithm and key.

Digest (or hash)

The result of applying a hashing algorithm to information.

Digital signature
(signature)

The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that, when properly implemented with supporting infrastructure and policy, provides the services of:

1. origin authentication

2. data integrity, and

3. signer non-repudiation.

Digital Signature Algorithm

A cryptographic algorithm used for digital signature.

Encryption

The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext using a cryptographic algorithm and key.

Hashing algorithm (or hash algorithm, hash function)

An algorithm that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a fixed length bit string. Approved hashing algorithms satisfy the following properties:

1. (One-way) It is computationally infeasible to find any input that

maps to any pre-specified output, and

2. (Collision resistant) It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs that map to the same output.

Integrity

The property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorized and undetected manner.

Key derivation
(derivation)

A function in the lifecycle of keying material; the process by which one or more keys are derived from 1) either a shared secret from a key agreement computation or a pre-shared cryptographic key, and 2) other information.

Key management

The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other related security parameters (e.g., IVs and passwords) during the entire life cycle of the keys, including their generation, storage, establishment, entry and output, and destruction.

Key wrapping
(wrapping)

A method of encrypting and/or MACing/signing keys.

Message authentication code (MAC)

A cryptographic checksum on data that uses a symmetric key to detect both accidental and intentional modifications of data.

PGP certificate

A transferable public key in the OpenPGP Message Format (see [RFC4880]).

Private key

A cryptographic key, used with a public key cryptographic algorithm, that is uniquely associated with an entity and is not made public. The private key is associated with a public key. Depending on the algorithm, the private key may be used to:

1. Compute the corresponding public key,

2. Compute a digital signature that may be verified by the corresponding public key,

3. Decrypt data that was encrypted by the corresponding public key, or

4. Compute a piece of common shared data, together with other information.

Profile

A specification of objects, attributes, operations, message elements and authentication methods to be used in specific contexts of key management server and client interactions (see [KMIP-Prof]).

Public key

A cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and that may be made public. The public key is associated with a private key. The public key may be known by anyone and, depending on the algorithm, may be used to:

1. Verify a digital signature that is signed by the corresponding private key,

2. Encrypt data that can be decrypted by the corresponding private key, or

3. Compute a piece of shared data.

Public key certificate
(certificate)

A set of data that uniquely identifies an entity, contains the entity's public key and possibly other information, and is digitally signed by a trusted party, thereby binding the public key to the entity.

Public key cryptographic algorithm

A cryptographic algorithm that uses two related keys, a public key and a private key. The two keys have the property that determining the private key from the public key is computationally infeasible.

Public Key Infrastructure

A framework that is established to issue, maintain and revoke public key certificates.

Recover

To retrieve information that was archived to long-term storage.

Split knowledge

A process by which a cryptographic key is split into n multiple key components, individually providing no knowledge of the original key, which can be subsequently combined to recreate the original cryptographic key. If knowledge of k (where k is less than or equal to n) components is required to construct the original key, then knowledge of any k-1 key components provides no information about the original key other than, possibly, its length.

Symmetric key

A single cryptographic key that is used with a secret (symmetric) key algorithm.

Symmetric key algorithm

A cryptographic algorithm that uses the same secret (symmetric) key for an operation and its complement (e.g., encryption and decryption).

X.509 certificate

The ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard defined two types of certificates – the X.509 public key certificate, and the X.509 attribute certificate. Most commonly (including this document), an X.509 certificate refers to the X.509 public key certificate.

X.509 public key certificate

The public key for a user (or device) and a name for the user (or device), together with some other information, rendered un-forgeable by the digital signature of the certification authority that issued the certificate, encoded in the format defined in the ISO/ITU-T X.509 standard.

Table 1: Terminology

 

1.2 Normative References

 [FIPS186-3]            Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS PUB 186-3, Jun 2009, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf

[FIPS197]               Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, Nov 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf

[FIPS198-1]             The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), FIPS PUB 198-1, Jul 2008, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf

[IEEE1003-1]           IEEE Std 1003.1, Standard for information technology - portable operating system interface (POSIX). Shell and utilities, 2004.

[ISO16609]              ISO, Banking -- Requirements for message authentication using symmetric techniques, ISO 16609, 1991

[ISO9797-1]             ISO/IEC, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs) -- Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, ISO/IEC 9797-1, 1999

[KMIP-Prof]            Key Management Interoperability Protocol Profiles Version 1.0, OASIS Committee Specification 01, June 2010, http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/profiles/v1.1/csd01/kmip-profiles-1.1-csd-01.doc

[PKCS#1]                RSA Laboratories, PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Jun 14, 2002,  http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125

[PKCS#5]                RSA Laboratories, PKCS #5 v2.1: Password-Based Cryptography Standard, Oct 5, 2006, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2127

[PKCS#7]                RSA Laboratories, PKCS#7 v1.5: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard, Nov 1, 1993, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2129

[PKCS#8]                RSA Laboratories, PKCS#8 v1.2: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard, Nov 1, 1993, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2130

[PKCS#10]              RSA Laboratories, PKCS #10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax Standard, May 26, 2000, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2132

[RFC1319]               B. Kaliski, The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1319, Apr 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt

[RFC1320]               R. Rivest, The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1320, Apr 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt

[RFC1321]               R. Rivest, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1321, Apr 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt

[RFC1421]               J. Linn, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures, IETF RFC 1421, Feb 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1421.txt

[RFC1424]               B. Kaliski, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key Certification and Related Services, IETF RFC 1424, Feb 1993, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1424.txt

[RFC2104]               H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, IETF RFC 2104, Feb 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt

[RFC2119]               S. Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt, IETF RFC 2119, March 1997.

 [RFC 2246]             T. Dierks and C. Allen, The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0, IETF RFC 2246, Jan 1999, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt

[RFC2898]               B. Kaliski, PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0, IETF RFC 2898, Sep 2000, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt

[RFC 3394]              J. Schaad, R. Housley, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm, IETF RFC 3394, Sep 2002, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt

[RFC3447]               J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski, Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1, IETF RFC 3447, Feb 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt

[RFC3629]               F. Yergeau, UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646, IETF RFC 3629, Nov 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3629.txt

[RFC3647]               S. Chokhani, W. Ford, R. Sabett, C. Merrill, and S. Wu, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, IETF RFC 3647, Nov 2003, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3647.txt

[RFC4055]               J. Schadd, B. Kaliski, and R, Housley, HHAdditional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, IETF RFC 4055, June 2055, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4055.txt

[RFC4210]               C. Adams, S. Farrell, T. Kause and T. Mononen, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), IETF RFC 2510, Sep 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4210.txt

[RFC4211]               J. Schaad, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF), IETF RFC 4211, Sep 2005, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4211.txt

[RFC4868]               S. Kelly, S. Frankel, Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec, IETF RFC 4868, May 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4868.txt

[RFC4880]               J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, D. Shaw, and R. Thayer, OpenPGP Message Format, IETF RFC 4880, Nov 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt

[RFC4949]               R. Shirey, Internet Security Glossary, Version 2, IETF RFC 4949, Aug 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt

[RFC5272]               J. Schaad and M. Meyers, Certificate Management over CMS (CMC), IETF RFC 5272, Jun 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5272.txt

[RFC5280]               D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate, IETF RFC 5280, May 2008, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt

[RFC5649]               R. Housley, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm, IETF RFC 5649, Aug 2009, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt

[SHAMIR1979]        A. Shamir, How to share a secret, Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 612-613, Nov 1979

[SP800-38A]            M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation – Methods and Techniques, NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Dec 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf

[SP800-38B]            M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf

[SP800-38C]            M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, NIST Special Publication 800-38C, May 2004, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf

[SP800-38D]            M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, NIST Special Publication 800-38D, Nov 2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf

[SP800-38E]            M. Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Block-Oriented Storage Devices, NIST Special Publication 800-38E, Jan 2010, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf

[SP800-56A]            E. Barker, D. Johnson, and M. Smid, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), NIST Special Publication 800-56A, Mar 2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56A/SP800-56A_Revision1_Mar08-2007.pdf

[SP800-56B]            E. Barker, L. Chen, A. Regenscheid, and M. Smid, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, NIST Special Publication 800-56B, Aug 2009, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56B/sp800-56B.pdf

[SP800-57-1]           E. Barker, W. Barker, W. Burr, W. Polk, and M. Smid, Recommendations for Key Management - Part 1: General (Revised), NIST Special Publication 800-57 part 1, Mar 2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57-Part1-revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf

[SP800-67]              W. Barker, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, NIST Special Publication 800-67, Version 1.1, Revised 19 May 2008, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67/SP800-67.pdf

[SP800-108]            L. Chen, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), NIST Special Publication 800-108, Oct 2009, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf

[X.509]                    International Telecommunication Union (ITU)–T, X.509:  Information technology – Open systems interconnection – The Directory:  Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks, Aug 2005, http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509-200508-I/en

[X9.24-1]                 ANSI, X9.24 - Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management - Part 1: Using Symmetric Techniques, 2004.

[X9.31]                    ANSI, X9.31:Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), Sep 1998.

[X9.42]                    ANSI, X9-42: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Agreement of Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, 2003.

[X9-57]                    ANSI, X9-57: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Certificate Management, 1997.

[X9.62]                    ANSI, X9-62: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005.

[X9-63]                    ANSI, X9-63: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2001.

[X9-102]                  ANSI, X9-102: Symmetric Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Wrapping of Keys and Associated Data, 2008.

[X9 TR-31]              ANSI, X9 TR-31: Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block Specification for Symmetric Algorithms, 2005.

 

1.3 Non-Normative References

 [KMIP-UG]             Key Management Interoperability Protocol Usage Guide Version 1.1, OASIS Committee Specification 01, December 2011, http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/ug/v1.1/kmip-ug-v1.1-cnd-01.doc

[KMIP-UC]              Key Management Interoperability Protocol Use Cases Version 1.0, OASIS Committee Specification 01, June 2010, http://docs.oasis-open.org/kmip/usecases/v1.1/kmip-usecases-v1.1-cnd-01.doc

[ISO/IEC 9945-2]     The Open Group, Regular Expressions, The Single UNIX Specification version 2, 1997, ISO/IEC 9945-2:1993, http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007908799/xbd/re.html

 

 

 

2      Objects

The following subsections describe the objects that are passed between the clients and servers of the key management system. Some of these object types, called Base Objects, are used only in the protocol itself, and are not considered Managed Objects. Key management systems MAY choose to support a subset of the Managed Objects. The object descriptions refer to the primitive data types of which they are composed. These primitive data types are (see Section 9.1.1.4):

·         Integer

·         Long Integer

·         Big Integer

·         Enumeration –  choices from a predefined list of values

·         Boolean

·         Text String – string of characters representing human-readable text

·         Byte String –  sequence of unencoded byte values

·         Date-Time –  date and time, with a granularity of one second

·         Interval –  a length of time expressed in seconds

Structures are composed of ordered lists of primitive data types or sub-structures.

2.1 Base Objects

These objects are used within the messages of the protocol, but are not objects managed by the key management system. They are components of Managed Objects.

2.1.1 Attribute

An Attribute object is a structure (see Table 2) used for sending and receiving Managed Object attributes. The Attribute Name is a text-string that is used to identify the attribute. The Attribute Index is an index number assigned by the key management server. The Attribute Index is used to identify the particular instance. Attribute Indices SHALL start with 0. The Attribute Index of an attribute SHALL NOT change when other instances are added or deleted. Single-instance Attributes (attributes which an object MAY only have at most one instance thereof)  SHALL have an Attribute Index of 0. The Attribute Value is either a primitive data type or structured object, depending on the attribute.

When an Attribute structure is used to specify or return a particular instance of an Attribute and the Attribute Index is not specified it SHALL be assumed to be 0.[d1] 

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Attribute

Structure

 

Attribute Name

Text String

Yes

Attribute Index

Integer

No[d2] 

Attribute Value

Varies, depending on attribute. See Section 3

Yes, except for the Notify operation (see Section 5.1)

Table 2: Attribute Object Structure

2.1.2 Credential

A Credential is a structure (see Table 3) used for client identification purposes and is not managed by the key management system (e.g., user id/password pairs, Kerberos tokens, etc). It MAY be used for authentication purposes as indicated in [KMIP-Prof].

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Credential

Structure

 

Credential Type

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.1

Yes

Credential Value

Varies. Structure for Username and Password Credential Type.

Yes

Table 3: Credential Object Structure

If the Credential Type in the Credential is Username and Password, then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 4. The Username field identifies the client, and the Password field is a secret that authenticates the client.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Credential Value

Structure

 

Username

Text String

Yes

Password

Text String

No

Table 4: Credential Value Structure for the Username and Password Credential

If the Credential Type in the Credential is Device, then Credential Value is a structure as shown in Table 5. One or a combination of the Device Serial Number, Network Identifier, Machine Identifier, and Media Identifier SHALL be unique. Server implementations MAY enforce policies on uniqueness for individual fields.  Optionally a shared secret or password MAY also be used to authenticate the client.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Credential Value

Structure

 

Device Serial Number

Text String

No

Password

Text String

No

Device Identifier

Text String

No

Network Identifier

Text String

No

Machine Identifier

Text String

No

Media Identifier

Text String

No

Table 5: Credential Value Structure for the Device Credential

 

2.1.3 Key Block

A Key Block object is a structure (see Table 6) used to encapsulate all of the information that is closely associated with a cryptographic key. It contains a Key Value of one of the following Key Format Types:

·         Raw – This is a key that contains only cryptographic key material, encoded as a string of bytes.

·         Opaque – This is an encoded key for which the encoding is unknown to the key management system. It is encoded as a string of bytes.

·         PKCS1 – This is an encoded private key, expressed as a DER-encoded ASN.1 PKCS#1 object.

·         PKCS8 – This is an encoded private key, expressed as a DER-encoded ASN.1 PKCS#8 object, supporting both the RSAPrivateKey syntax and EncryptedPrivateKey.

·         X.509 – This is an encoded object, expressed as a DER-encoded ASN.1 X.509 object.

·         ECPrivateKey – This is an ASN.1 encoded elliptic curve private key.

·         Several Transparent Key types – These are algorithm-specific structures containing defined values for the various key types, as defined in Section 2.1.7

·         Extensions – These are vendor-specific extensions to allow for proprietary or legacy key formats.

The Key Block MAY contain the Key Compression Type, which indicates the format of the elliptic curve public key. By default, the public key is uncompressed.

The Key Block also has the Cryptographic Algorithm and the Cryptographic Length of the key contained in the Key Value field. Some example values are:

·         RSA keys are typically 1024, 2048 or 3072 bits in length

·         3DES keys are typically from 112 to 192 bits (depending upon key length and the presence of parity bits)

·         AES keys are 128, 192 or 256 bits in length

The Key Block SHALL contain a Key Wrapping Data structure if the key in the Key Value field is wrapped (i.e., encrypted, or MACed/signed, or both).

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Block

Structure

 

Key Format Type

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.3

Yes

Key Compression Type

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.2

No

Key Value

Byte String: for wrapped Key Value; Structure: for plaintext Key Value, see 2.1.4

Yes

Cryptographic Algorithm

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13

Yes, MAY be omitted only if this information is available from the Key Value. Does not apply to Secret Data or Opaque Objects. If present, the Cryptographic Length SHALL also be present.

Cryptographic Length

Integer

Yes, MAY be omitted only if this information is available from the Key Value. Does not apply to Secret Data or Opaque Objects. If present, the Cryptographic Algorithm SHALL also be present.

Key Wrapping Data

Structure, see 2.1.5

No, SHALL only be present if the key is wrapped.

Table 6: Key Block Object Structure

2.1.4 Key Value

The Key Value is used only inside a Key Block and is either a Byte String or a structure (see Table 7):

·         The Key Value structure contains the key material, either as a byte string or as a Transparent Key structure (see Section 2.1.7), and OPTIONAL attribute information that is associated and encapsulated with the key material. This attribute information differs from the attributes associated with Managed Objects, and which is obtained via the Get Attributes operation, only by the fact that it is encapsulated with (and possibly wrapped with) the key material itself.

·         The Key Value Byte String is either the wrapped TTLV-encoded (see Section 9.1) Key Value structure, or the wrapped un-encoded value of the Byte String Key Material field.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Value

Structure

 

Key Material

Byte String: for Raw, Opaque, PKCS1, PKCS8, ECPrivateKey, or Extension Key Format types;

Structure: for Transparent, or Extension Key Format Types

Yes

Attribute

Attribute Object, see Section 2.1.1

No. MAY be repeated

Table 7: Key Value Object Structure

2.1.5 Key Wrapping Data

The Key Block MAY also supply OPTIONAL information about a cryptographic key wrapping mechanism used to wrap the Key Value. This consists of a Key Wrapping Data structure (see Table 8). It is only used inside a Key Block.

This structure contains fields for:

·         A Wrapping Method, which indicates the method used to wrap the Key Value.

·         Encryption Key Information, which contains the Unique Identifier (see 3.1) value of the encryption key and associated cryptographic parameters.

·         MAC/Signature Key Information, which contains the Unique Identifier value of the MAC/signature key and associated cryptographic parameters.

·         A MAC/Signature, which contains a MAC or signature of the Key Value.

·         An IV/Counter/Nonce, if REQUIRED by the wrapping method.

·         An Encoding Option, specifying the encoding of the Key Value Byte String that has been wrapped. If No Encoding is specified, then the Key Value SHALL NOT contain any attributes.

If wrapping is used, then the whole Key Value structure is wrapped unless otherwise specified by the Wrapping Method. The algorithms used for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic Algorithm attributes of the encryption key and/or MAC/signature key; the block-cipher mode, padding method, and hashing algorithm used for wrapping are given by the Cryptographic Parameters in the Encryption Key Information and/or MAC/Signature Key Information, or, if not present, from the Cryptographic Parameters attribute of the respective key(s). At least one of the Encryption Key Information and the MAC/Signature Key Information SHALL be specified.

The following wrapping methods are currently defined:

·         Encrypt only (i.e., encryption using a symmetric key or public key, or authenticated encryption algorithms that use a single key)

·         MAC/sign only (i.e., either MACing the Key Value with a symmetric key, or signing the Key Value with a private key)

·         Encrypt then MAC/sign

·         MAC/sign then encrypt

·         TR-31

·         Extensions

The following encoding options are currently defined:

·         No Encoding (i.e., the wrapped un-encoded value of the Byte String Key Material field)

·         TTLV Encoding (i.e., the wrapped TTLV-encoded Key Value structure).

 

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Wrapping Data

Structure

 

Wrapping Method

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.4

Yes

Encryption Key Information

Structure, see below

No. Corresponds to the key that was used to encrypt the Key Value.

MAC/Signature Key Information

Structure, see below

No. Corresponds to the symmetric key used to MAC the Key Value or the private key used to sign the Key Value

MAC/Signature

Byte String

No

IV/Counter/Nonce

Byte String

No

Encoding Option

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.32

No. Specifies the encoding of the Key Value Byte String. If not present, the wrapped Key Value SHALL be TTLV encoded.

Table 8: Key Wrapping Data Object Structure

The structures of the Encryption Key Information (see Table 9) and the MAC/Signature Key Information (see Table 10) are as follows:

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Encryption Key Information

Structure

 

Unique Identifier

Text string, see 3.1

Yes

Cryptographic Parameters

Structure, see 3.6

No

Table 9: Encryption Key Information Object Structure

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

MAC/Signature Key Information

Structure

 

Unique Identifier

Text string, see 3.1

Yes. It SHALL be either the Unique Identifier of the Symmetric Key used to MAC, or of the Private Key (or its corresponding Public Key) used to sign.

Cryptographic Parameters

Structure, see 3.6

No

Table 10: MAC/Signature Key Information Object Structure

2.1.6 Key Wrapping Specification

This is a separate structure (see Table 11) that is defined for operations that provide the option to return wrapped keys. The Key Wrapping Specification SHALL be included inside the operation request if clients request the server to return a wrapped key. If Cryptographic Parameters are specified in the Encryption Key Information and/or the MAC/Signature Key Information of the Key Wrapping Specification, then the server SHALL verify that they match one of the instances of the Cryptographic Parameters attribute of the corresponding key. If Cryptographic Parameters are omitted, then the server SHALL use the Cryptographic Parameters attribute with the lowest Attribute Index of the corresponding key. If the corresponding key does not have any Cryptographic Parameters attribute, or if no match is found, then an error is returned.

This structure contains:

·         A Wrapping Method that indicates the method used to wrap the Key Value.

·         Encryption Key Information with the Unique Identifier value of the encryption key and associated cryptographic parameters.

·         MAC/Signature Key Information with the Unique Identifier value of the MAC/signature key and associated cryptographic parameters.

·         Zero or more Attribute Names to indicate the attributes to be wrapped with the key material.

·         An Encoding Option, specifying the encoding of the Key Value before wrapping. If No Encoding is specified, then the Key Value SHALL NOT contain any attributes

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Wrapping Specification

Structure

 

Wrapping Method

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.4

Yes

Encryption Key Information

Structure, see 2.1.5

No, SHALL be present if MAC/Signature Key Information is omitted

MAC/Signature Key Information

Structure, see 2.1.5

No, SHALL be present if Encryption Key Information is omitted

Attribute Name

Text String

No, MAY be repeated

Encoding Option

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.32

No. If Encoding Option is not present, the wrapped Key Value SHALL be TTLV encoded.

Table 11: Key Wrapping Specification Object Structure

2.1.7 Transparent Key Structures

Transparent Key structures describe the necessary parameters to obtain the key material. They are used in the Key Value structure. The mapping to the parameters specified in other standards is shown in Table 12.

Object

Description

Mapping

P

For DSA and DH, the (large) prime field order.

 

For RSA, a prime factor of the modulus.

p in  [FIPS186-3], [X9.42], [SP800-56A]

p in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]

Q

For DSA and DH, the (small) prime multiplicative subgroup order.

For RSA, a prime factor of the modulus.

q in  [FIPS186-3], [X9.42], [SP800-56A]

q in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]

G

The generator of the subgroup of order Q.

g in  [FIPS186-3], [X9.42], [SP800-56A]

X

DSA or DH private key.

x in  [FIPS186-3]

x, xu, xv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for static private keys

r, ru, rv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for ephemeral private keys

Y

DSA or DH public key.

y in  [FIPS186-3]

y, yu, yv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for static public keys

t, tu, tv in [X9.42], [SP800-56A] for ephemeral public keys

J

DH cofactor integer, where P = JQ + 1.

j in [X9.42]

Modulus

RSA modulus PQ, where P and Q are distinct primes.

n in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]

Private Exponent

RSA private exponent.

d in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]

Public Exponent

RSA public exponent.

e in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]

Prime Exponent P

RSA private exponent for the prime factor P in the CRT format, i.e., Private Exponent (mod (P-1)).

dP in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]

Prime Exponent Q

RSA private exponent for the prime factor Q in the CRT format, i.e., Private Exponent (mod (Q-1)).

dQ in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]

CRT Coefficient

The (first) CRT coefficient, i.e., Q-1 mod P.

qInv in [PKCS#1], [SP800-56B]

Recommended Curve

NIST Recommended Curves (e.g., P-192).

See Appendix D of  [FIPS186-3]

D

Elliptic curve private key.

d; de,U,de,V (ephemeral private keys); ds,U,ds,V  (static private keys) in [X9-63], [SP800-56A]

Q String

Elliptic curve public key.

Q; Qe,U,Qe,V  (ephemeral public keys); Qs,U,Qs,V (static public keys) in [X9-63], [SP800-56A]

Table 12: Parameter mapping.

2.1.7.1 Transparent Symmetric Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent Symmetric Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 13.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

Key

Byte String

Yes

Table 13: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent Symmetric Keys

2.1.7.2 Transparent DSA Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 14.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

P

Big Integer

Yes

Q

Big Integer

Yes

G

Big Integer

Yes

X

Big Integer

Yes

Table 14: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Private Keys

2.1.7.3 Transparent DSA Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 15.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

P

Big Integer

Yes

Q

Big Integer

Yes

G

Big Integer

Yes

Y

Big Integer

Yes

Table 15: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DSA Public Keys

2.1.7.4 Transparent RSA Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent RSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 16.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

Modulus

Big Integer

Yes

Private Exponent

Big Integer

No

Public Exponent

Big Integer

No

P

Big Integer

No

Q

Big Integer

No

Prime Exponent P

Big Integer

No

Prime Exponent Q

Big Integer

No

CRT Coefficient

Big Integer

No

Table 16: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Private Keys

One of the following SHALL be present (refer to [PKCS#1]):

·         Private Exponent

·         P and Q (the first two prime factors of Modulus)

·         Prime Exponent P and Prime Exponent Q.

2.1.7.5 Transparent RSA Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent RSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 17.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

Modulus

Big Integer

Yes

Public Exponent

Big Integer

Yes

Table 17: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent RSA Public Keys

2.1.7.6 Transparent DH Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DH Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 18.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

P

Big Integer

Yes

Q

Big Integer

No

G

Big Integer

Yes

J

Big Integer

No

X

Big Integer

Yes

Table 18: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Private Keys

2.1.7.7 Transparent DH Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent DH Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 19.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

P

Big Integer

Yes

Q

Big Integer

No

G

Big Integer

Yes

J

Big Integer

No

Y

Big Integer

Yes

Table 19: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent DH Public Keys

2.1.7.8 Transparent ECDSA Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDSA Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 20.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

Recommended Curve

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5

Yes

D

Big Integer

Yes

Table 20: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Private Keys

2.1.7.9 Transparent ECDSA Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDSA Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 21.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

Recommended Curve

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5

Yes

Q String

Byte String

Yes

Table 21: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDSA Public Keys

2.1.7.10 Transparent ECDH Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDH Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 22.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

Recommended Curve

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5

Yes

D

Big Integer

Yes

Table 22: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Private Keys

2.1.7.11 Transparent ECDH Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECDH Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 23.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

Recommended Curve

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5

Yes

Q String

Byte String

Yes

Table 23: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECDH Public Keys

2.1.7.12 Transparent ECMQV Private Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECMQV Private Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 24.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

Recommended Curve

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5

Yes

D

Big Integer

Yes

Table 24: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECMQV Private Keys

2.1.7.13 Transparent ECMQV Public Key

If the Key Format Type in the Key Block is Transparent ECMQV Public Key, then Key Material is a structure as shown in Table 25.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Key Material

Structure

 

Recommended Curve

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5

Yes

Q String

Byte String

Yes

Table 25: Key Material Object Structure for Transparent ECMQV Public Keys

2.1.8 Template-Attribute Structures

These structures are used in various operations to provide the desired attribute values and/or template names in the request and to return the actual attribute values in the response.

The Template-Attribute, Common Template-Attribute, Private Key Template-Attribute, and Public Key Template-Attribute structures are defined identically as follows:

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Template-Attribute,

Common Template-Attribute, Private Key Template-Attribute,

Public Key Template-Attribute

Structure

 

Name

Structure, see 3.2

No, MAY be repeated.

Attribute

Attribute Object, see 2.1.1

No, MAY be repeated

Table 26: Template-Attribute Object Structure

Name is the Name attribute of the Template object defined in Section 2.2.6.

2.1.9 Extension Information

An Extension Information object is a structure (see Table 27) describing Objects with Item Tag values in the Extensions range. The Extension Name is a Text String that is used to name the Object (first column of Table 213). The Extension Tag is the Item Tag Value of the Object (see Table 213). The Extension Type is the Item Type Value of the Object (see Table 211).

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Extension Information

Structure

 

Extension Name

Text String

Yes

Extension Tag

Integer

No

Extension Type

Integer

No

Table 27: Extension Information Structure

2.2 Managed Objects

Managed Objects are objects that are the subjects of key management operations, which are described in Sections 4 and 5. Managed Cryptographic Objects are the subset of Managed Objects that contain cryptographic material (e.g. certificates, keys, and secret data).

2.2.1 Certificate

A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a digital certificate. Its[d3]  is a DER-encoded X.509 public key certificate. For PGP certificates, it is a transferable public key in the OpenPGP message format.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Certificate

Structure

 

Certificate Type

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.6

Yes

Certificate Value

Byte String

Yes

Table 28: Certificate Object Structure

2.2.2 Symmetric Key

A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a symmetric key.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Symmetric Key

Structure

 

Key Block

Structure, see 2.1.3

Yes

Table 29: Symmetric Key Object Structure

2.2.3 Public Key

A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the public portion of an asymmetric key pair. This is only a public key, not a certificate.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Public Key

Structure

 

Key Block

Structure, see 2.1.3

Yes

Table 30: Public Key Object Structure

2.2.4 Private Key

A Managed Cryptographic Object that is the private portion of an asymmetric key pair.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Private Key

Structure

 

Key Block

Structure, see 2.1.3

Yes

Table 31: Private Key Object Structure

2.2.5 Split Key

A Managed Cryptographic Object that is a Split Key. A split key is a secret, usually a symmetric key or a private key that has been split into a number of parts, each of which MAY then be distributed to several key holders, for additional security. The Split Key Parts field indicates the total number of parts, and the Split Key Threshold field indicates the minimum number of parts needed to reconstruct the entire key. The Key Part Identifier indicates which key part is contained in the cryptographic object, and SHALL be at least 1 and SHALL be less than or equal to Split Key Parts.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Split Key

Structure

 

Split Key Parts

Integer

Yes

Key Part Identifier

Integer

Yes

Split Key Threshold

Integer

Yes

Split Key Method

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.7

Yes

Prime Field Size

Big Integer

No, REQUIRED only if Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing Prime Field.

Key Block

Structure, see 2.1.3

Yes

Table 32: Split Key Object Structure

There are three Split Key Methods for secret sharing: the first one is based on XOR, and the other two are based on polynomial secret sharing, according to [SHAMIR1979].

Let L be the minimum number of bits needed to represent all values of the secret.

·         When the Split Key Method is XOR, then the Key Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is of length L bits. The number of split keys is Split Key Parts (identical to Split Key Threshold), and the secret is reconstructed by XORing all of the parts.

·         When the Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing Prime Field, then secret sharing is performed in the field GF(Prime Field Size), represented as integers, where Prime Field Size is a prime bigger than 2L.

·         When the Split Key Method is Polynomial Sharing GF(216), then secret sharing is performed in the field GF(216). The Key Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is a bit string of length L, and when L is bigger than 216, then secret sharing is applied piecewise in pieces of 16 bits each. The Key Material in the Key Value of the Key Block is the concatenation of the corresponding shares of all pieces of the secret.

Secret sharing is performed in the field GF(216), which is represented as an algebraic extension of GF(28):

GF(216) ≈ GF(28) [y]/(y2+y+m),    where m is defined later.

An element of this field then consists of a linear combination uy + v, where u and v are elements of the smaller field GF(28).

The representation of field elements and the notation in this section rely on [FIPS197], Sections 3 and 4. The field GF(28) is as described in [FIPS197],

GF(28) ≈ GF(2) [x]/(x8+x4+x3+x+1).

An element of GF(28) is represented as a byte. Addition and subtraction in GF(28) is performed as a bit-wise XOR of the bytes. Multiplication and inversion are more complex (see [FIPS197] Section 4.1 and 4.2 for details).

An element of GF(216) is represented as a pair of bytes (u, v). The element m is given by

m = x5+x4+x3+x,

which is represented by the byte 0x3A (or {3A} in notation according to [FIPS197]).

Addition and subtraction in GF(216) both correspond to simply XORing the bytes. The product of two elements ry + s and uy + v  is given by

(ry + s) (uy + v) = ((r + s)(u + v) + sv)y  + (ru + svm).

The inverse of an element uy + v is given by

(uy + v)-1 = ud-1y + (u + v)d-1,  where  d = (u + v)v + mu2.

2.2.6 Template

A Template is a named Managed Object containing the client-settable attributes of a Managed Cryptographic Object (i.e., a stored, named list of attributes). A Template is used to specify the attributes of a new Managed Cryptographic Object in various operations. It is intended to be used to specify the cryptographic attributes of new objects in a standardized or convenient way. None of the client-settable attributes specified in a Template except the Name attribute apply to the template object itself, but instead apply to any object created using the Template.

The Template MAY be the subject of the Register, Locate, Get, Get Attributes, Get Attribute List, Add Attribute, Modify Attribute, Delete Attribute, and Destroy operations.

An attribute specified in a Template is applicable either to the Template itself or to objects created using the Template.

Attributes applicable to the Template itself are: Unique Identifier, Object Type, Name, Initial Date, Archive Date, and Last Change Date.

Attributes applicable to objects created using the Template are:

·         Cryptographic Algorithm

·         Cryptographic Length

·         Cryptographic Domain Parameters

·         Cryptographic Parameters

·         Certificate Length

·         Operation Policy Name

·         Cryptographic Usage Mask

·         Digital Signature Algorithm

·         Usage Limits

·         Activation Date

·         Process Start Date

·         Protect Stop Date

·         Deactivation Date

·         Object Group

·         Application Specific Information

·         Contact Information

·         Custom Attribute

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Template

Structure

 

Attribute

Attribute Object, see 2.1.1

Yes. MAY be repeated.

Table 33: Template Object Structure

2.2.7 Secret Data

A Managed Cryptographic Object containing a shared secret value that is not a key or certificate (e.g., a password). The Key Block of the Secret Data object contains a Key Value of the Opaque type. The Key Value MAY be wrapped.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Secret Data

Structure

 

Secret Data Type

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.9

Yes

Key Block

Structure, see 2.1.3

Yes

Table 34: Secret Data Object Structure

2.2.8 Opaque Object

A Managed Object that the key management server is possibly not able to interpret. The context information for this object MAY be stored and retrieved using Custom Attributes.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Opaque Object

Structure

 

Opaque Data Type

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.10

Yes

Opaque Data Value

Byte String

Yes

Table 35: Opaque Object Structure


3      Attributes

The following subsections describe the attributes that are associated with Managed Objects. Attributes that an object MAY have multiple instances of are referred to as multi-instance attributes. All instances of an attribute SHOULD have a different value. Similarly, attributes which an object SHALL[d4]  only have at most one instance of are referred to as single-instance attributes. Attributes are able to be obtained by a client from the server using the Get Attribute operation. Some attributes are able to be set by the Add Attribute operation or updated by the Modify Attribute operation, and some are able to be deleted by the Delete Attribute operation if they no longer apply to the Managed Object. Read-only attributes are attributes that SHALL NOT be modified by either server or client, and that SHALL NOT be deleted by a client.

When attributes are returned by the server (e.g., via a Get Attributes operation), the attribute value returned MAY differ for different clients (e.g., the Cryptographic Usage Mask value MAY be different for different clients, depending on the policy of the server).

The first table in each subsection contains the attribute name in the first row. This name is the canonical name used when managing attributes using the Get Attributes, Get Attribute List, Add Attribute, Modify Attribute, and Delete Attribute operations.

A server SHALL NOT delete attributes without receiving a request from a client until the object is destroyed. After an object is destroyed, the server MAY retain all, some or none of the object attributes, depending on the object type and server policy.

The second table in each subsection lists certain attribute characteristics (e.g., “SHALL always have a value”): Table 36 below explains the meaning of each characteristic that may appear in those tables. The server policy MAY further restrict these attribute characteristics.

SHALL always have a value

All Managed Objects that are of the Object Types for which this attribute applies, SHALL always have this attribute set once the object has been created or registered, up until the object has been destroyed.

Initially set by

Who is permitted to initially set the value of the attribute (if the attribute has never been set, or if all the attribute values have been deleted)?

Modifiable by server

Is the server allowed to change an existing value of the attribute without receiving a request from a client?

Modifiable by client

Is the client able to change an existing value of the attribute value once it has been set?

Deletable by client

Is the client able to delete an instance of the attribute?

Multiple instances permitted

Are multiple instances of the attribute permitted?

When implicitly set

Which operations MAY cause this attribute to be set even if the attribute is not specified in the operation request itself?

Applies to Object Types

Which Managed Objects MAY have this attribute set?

Table 36: Attribute Rules

3.1 Unique Identifier

The Unique Identifier is generated by the key management system to uniquely identify a Managed Object. It is only REQUIRED to be unique within the identifier space managed by a single key management system, however it is RECOMMENDED that this identifier be globally unique in order to allow for a key management domain export of such objects. This attribute SHALL be assigned by the key management system at creation or registration time, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

 

Unique Identifier

Text String

 

Table 37: Unique Identifier Attribute

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

All Objects

Table 38: Unique Identifier Attribute Rules

3.2 Name

The Name attribute is a structure (see Table 39) used to identify and locate the object. This attribute is assigned by the client, and the Name Value is intended to be in a form that humans are able to interpret. The key management system MAY specify rules by which the client creates valid names. Clients are informed of such rules by a mechanism that is not specified by this standard. Names SHALL be unique within a given key management domain, but are not REQUIRED to be globally unique.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Name

Structure

 

Name Value

Text String

Yes

Name Type

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.11

Yes

Table 39: Name Attribute Structure

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Client

Modifiable by server

Yes

Modifiable by client

Yes

Deletable by client

Yes

Multiple instances permitted

Yes

When implicitly set

Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify

Applies to Object Types

All Objects

Table 40: Name Attribute Rules

3.3 Object Type

The Object Type of a Managed Object (e.g., public key, private key, symmetric key, etc) SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

 

Object Type

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.12

 

Table 41: Object Type Attribute

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

All Objects

Table 42: Object Type Attribute Rules

3.4 Cryptographic Algorithm

The Cryptographic Algorithm of an object (e.g., RSA, DSA, DES, 3DES, AES, etc). The Cryptographic Algorithm of a Certificate object identifies the algorithm for the public key contained within the Certificate. The digital signature algorithm used to sign the Certificate is identified in the Digital Signature Algorithm attribute defined in Section 3.16. This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

 

Cryptographic Algorithm

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.13

 

Table 43: Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Certify, Create, Create Key Pair, Re-certify, Register, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

Keys, Certificates, Templates

Table 44: Cryptographic Algorithm Attribute Rules

3.5 Cryptographic Length

For keys, Cryptographic Length is the length in bits of the clear-text cryptographic key material of the Managed Cryptographic Object. For certificates, Cryptographic Length is the length in bits of the public key contained within the Certificate. This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

 

Cryptographic Length

Integer

 

Table 45: Cryptographic Length Attribute

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Certify, Create, Create Key Pair, Re-certify, Register, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

Keys, Certificates, Templates

Table 46: Cryptographic Length Attribute Rules

3.6 Cryptographic Parameters

The Cryptographic Parameters attribute is a structure (see Table 47) that contains a set of OPTIONAL fields that describe certain cryptographic parameters to be used when performing cryptographic operations using the object. Specific fields MAY pertain only to certain types of Managed Cryptographic Objects. The Cryptographic Parameters attribute of a Certificate object identifies the cryptographic parameters of the public key contained within the Certificate.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Cryptographic Parameters

Structure

 

Block Cipher Mode

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.14

No

Padding Method

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.15

No

Hashing Algorithm

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.16

No

Key Role Type

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.17

No

Table 47: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Structure

 

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Client

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

Yes

Deletable by client

Yes

Multiple instances permitted

Yes

When implicitly set

Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Re-certify

Applies to Object Types

Keys, Certificates, Templates

Table 48: Cryptographic Parameters Attribute Rules

Key Role Type definitions match those defined in ANSI X9 TR-31 [X9 TR-31] and are defined in Table 49:

BDK

Base Derivation Key (ANSI X9.24 DUKPT key derivation)

CVK

Card Verification Key (CVV/signature strip number validation)

DEK

Data Encryption Key (General Data Encryption)

MKAC

EMV/chip card Master Key: Application Cryptograms

MKSMC

EMV/chip card Master Key: Secure Messaging for Confidentiality

MKSMI

EMV/chip card Master Key: Secure Messaging for Integrity

MKDAC

EMV/chip card Master Key: Data Authentication Code

MKDN

EMV/chip card Master Key: Dynamic Numbers

MKCP

EMV/chip card Master Key: Card Personalization

MKOTH

EMV/chip card Master Key: Other

KEK

Key Encryption or Wrapping Key

MAC16609

ISO16609 MAC Algorithm 1

MAC97971

ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 1

MAC97972

ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 2

MAC97973

ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 3 (Note this is commonly known as X9.19 Retail MAC)

MAC97974

ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 4

MAC97975

ISO9797-1 MAC Algorithm 5

ZPK

PIN Block Encryption Key

PVKIBM

PIN Verification Key, IBM 3624 Algorithm

PVKPVV

PIN Verification Key, VISA PVV Algorithm

PVKOTH

PIN Verification Key, Other Algorithm

Table 49: Key Role Types

Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. - Financial Industry Standards (www.x9.org) contributed to Table 49. Key role names and descriptions are derived from material in the Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc's Technical Report "TR-31 2005 Interoperable Secure Key Exchange Key Block Specification for Symmetric Algorithms" and used with the permission of Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. in an effort to improve interoperability between X9 standards and OASIS KMIP. The complete ANSI X9 TR-31 is available at www.x9.org.

3.7 Cryptographic Domain Parameters

The Cryptographic Domain Parameters attribute is a structure (see Table 50) that contains a set of OPTIONAL fields that MAY need to be specified in the Create Key Pair Request Payload. Specific fields MAY only pertain to certain types of Managed Cryptographic Objects.

The domain parameter Qlength correponds to the bit length of parameter Q (refer to  [FIPS186-3] and [SP800-56A]). Qlength applies to algorithms such as DSA and DH. The bit length of parameter P (refer to  [FIPS186-3] and [SP800-56A]) is specified separately by setting the Cryptographic Length attribute.

Recommended Curve is applicable to elliptic curve algorithms such as ECDSA, ECDH, and ECMQV.

Object

Encoding

Required

Cryptographic Domain Parameters

Structure

Yes

Qlength

Integer

No

Recommended Curve

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.5

No

Table 50: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute Structure

 

Shall always have a value

No

Initially set by

Client

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

Asymmetric Keys, Templates

Table 51: Cryptographic Domain Parameters Attribute Rules

3.8 Certificate Type

The type of a certificate (e.g., X.509, PGP, etc). The Certificate Type value SHALL be set by the server when the certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

 

Certificate Type

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.6

 

Table 52: Certificate Type Attribute

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Register, Certify, Re-certify

Applies to Object Types

Certificates

Table 53: Certificate Type Attribute Rules

3.9 Certificate Length

The length in bytes of the Certificate object. The Certificate Length SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

 

Certificate Length

Integer

 

Table 54: Certificate Length Attribute

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Register, Certify, Re-certify

Applies to Object Types

Certificates

Table 55: Certificate Length Attribute Rules

 

3.10 X.509 Certificate Identifier

The X.509 Certificate Identifier attribute is a structure (see Table 56) used to provide the identification of an X.509 public key certificate. The X.509 Certificate Identifier contains the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the X.509 certificate) and the Certificate Serial Number (i.e., from the Serial Number field of the X.509 certificate).  The X.509 Certificate Identifier SHALL be set by the server when the X.509 certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

X.509 Certificate Identifier

Structure

 

Issuer Distinguished Name

Byte String

Yes

Certificate Serial Number

Byte String

Yes

Table 56: X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute Structure

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Register, Certify, Re-certify

Applies to Object Types

X.509 Certificates

Table 57: X.509 Certificate Identifier Attribute Rules

3.11 X.509 Certificate Subject

The X.509 Certificate Subject attribute is a structure (see Table 58) used to identify the subject of a X.509 certificate. The X.509 Certificate Subject contains the Subject Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Subject field of the X.509 certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the subject of the X.509 certificate (i.e., from the Subject Alternative Name extension within the X.509 certificate).  The X.509 Certificate Subject SHALL be set by the server based on the information it extracts from the X.509 certificate that is created (as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation) or registered (as part of a Register operation) and SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

If the Subject Alternative Name extension is included in the X.509 certificate and is marked critical within the X.509 certificate itself, then an X.509 certificate MAY be issued with the subject field left blank. Therefore an empty string is an acceptable value for the Subject Distinguished Name.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

X.509 Certificate Subject

Structure

 

Subject Distinguished Name

Byte String

Yes, but MAY be the empty string

Subject Alternative Name

Byte String

Yes, if the Subject Distinguished Name is an empty string. MAY be repeated

Table 58: X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute Structure

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Register, Certify, Re-certify

Applies to Object Types

X.509 Certificates

Table 59: X.509 Certificate Subject Attribute Rules

3.12 X.509 Certificate Issuer

The X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute is a structure (see Table 64) used to identify the issuer of a X.509 certificate, containing the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the X.509 certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the issuer of the certificate (i.e., from the Issuer Alternative Name extension within the X.509 certificate). The server SHALL set these values based on the information it extracts from a X.509 certificate that is created as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation or is sent as part of a Register operation. These values SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

X.509 Certificate Issuer

Structure

 

Issuer Distinguished Name

Byte String

Yes

Issuer Alternative Name

Byte String

No, MAY be repeated

Table 60: X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Register, Certify, Re-certify

Applies to Object Types

X.509 Certificates

Table 61: X.509 Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules

3.13 Certificate Identifier

This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this specification. The X.509 Certificate Identifier attribute (see Section 3.10) SHOULD be used instead.

The Certificate Identifier attribute is a structure (see Table 62) used to provide the identification of a certificate. For X.509 certificates, it contains the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the certificate) and the Certificate Serial Number (i.e., from the Serial Number field of the certificate). For PGP certificates, the Issuer contains the OpenPGP Key ID of the key issuing the signature (the signature that represents the certificate). The Certificate Identifier SHALL be set by the server when the certificate is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Certificate Identifier

Structure

 

Issuer

Text String

Yes

Serial Number

Text String

Yes (for X.509 certificates) / No (for PGP certificates since they do not contain a serial number)

Table 62: Certificate Identifier Attribute Structure

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Register, Certify, Re-certify

Applies to Object Types

Certificates

Table 63: Certificate Identifier Attribute Rules

3.14 Certificate Subject

This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this specification. The X.509 Certificate Subject attribute (see Section 3.11) SHOULD be used instead.

The Certificate Subject attribute is a structure (see Table 64) used to identify the subject of a certificate. For X.509 certificates, it contains the Subject Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Subject field of the certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the subject of the certificate (i.e., from the Subject Alternative Name extension within the certificate). For PGP certificates, the Certificate Subject Distinguished Name contains the content of the first User ID packet in the PGP certificate (that is, the first User ID packet after the Public-Key packet in the transferable public key that forms the PGP certificate). These values SHALL be set by the server based on the information it extracts from the certificate that is created (as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation) or registered (as part of a Register operation) and SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

If the Subject Alternative Name extension is included in the certificate and is marked CRITICAL (i.e., within the certificate itself), then it is possible to issue an X.509 certificate where the subject field is left blank. Therefore an empty string is an acceptable value for the Certificate Subject Distinguished Name.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Certificate Subject

Structure

 

Certificate Subject Distinguished Name

Text String

Yes, but MAY be the empty string

Certificate Subject Alternative Name

Text String

No, MAY be repeated

Table 64: Certificate Subject Attribute Structure

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Register, Certify, Re-certify

Applies to Object Types

Certificates

Table 65: Certificate Subject Attribute Rules

3.15 Certificate Issuer

This attribute is deprecated as of version 1.1 of this specification and MAY be removed from subsequent versions of this specification. The X.509 Certificate Issuer attribute (see Section 3.12) SHOULD be used instead.

The Certificate Issuer attribute is a structure (see Table 67) used to identify the issuer of a certificate, containing the Issuer Distinguished Name (i.e., from the Issuer field of the certificate). It MAY include one or more alternative names (e.g., email address, IP address, DNS name) for the issuer of the certificate (i.e., from the Issuer Alternative Name extension within the certificate). The server SHALL set these values based on the information it extracts from a certificate that is created as a result of a Certify or a Re-certify operation or is sent as part of a Register operation. These values SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Certificate Issuer

Structure

 

Certificate Issuer Distinguished Name

Text String

Yes

Certificate Issuer Alternative Name

Text String

No, MAY be repeated

Table 66: Certificate Issuer Attribute Structure

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Register, Certify, Re-certify

Applies to Object Types

Certificates

Table 67: Certificate Issuer Attribute Rules

3.16 Digital Signature Algorithm

The Digital Signature Algorithm identifies the digital signature algorithm associated with a digitally signed object (e.g., Certificate).  This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

 

Object

Encoding

 

Digital Signature Algorithm

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.7

 

Table 68: Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

Yes for PGP certificates. No for X.509 certificates.

When implicitly set

Certify, Re-certify, Register

Applies to Object Types

Certificates

Table 69: Digital Signature Algorithm Attribute Rules

3.17 Digest

The Digest attribute is a structure (see Table 70) that contains the digest value of the key or secret data (i.e., digest of the Key Material), certificate (i.e., digest of the Certificate Value), or opaque object (i.e., digest of the Opaque Data Value). If the Key Material is a Byte String, then the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on this Byte String. If the Key Material is a structure, then the Digest Value SHALL be calculated on the TTLV-encoded (see Section 9.1) Key Material structure. The Key Format Type field in the Digest attribute indicates the format of the Managed Object from which the Digest Value was calculated. Multiple digests MAY be calculated using different algorithms listed in Section 9.1.3.2.16 and/or key format types listed in Section 9.1.3.2.3. If this attribute exists, then it SHALL have a mandatory attribute instance computed with the SHA-256 hashing algorithm. For objects registered by a client, the server SHALL compute the digest of the mandatory attribute instance using the Key Format Type of the registered object. In all other cases, the server MAY use any Key Format Type when computing the digest of the mandatory attribute instance, provided it is able to serve the object to clients in that same format. The digest(s) are static and SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, provided that the server has access to the Key Material or the Digest Value (possibly obtained via out-of-band mechanisms).

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Digest

Structure

 

Hashing Algorithm

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.16

Yes

Digest Value

Byte String

Yes, if the server has access to the Digest Value or the Key Material (for keys and secret data), the Certificate Value (for certificates) or the Opaque Data Value (for opaque objects).

Key Format Type

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.3

Yes, if the Managed Object is a key or secret data object.

Table 70: Digest Attribute Structure

SHALL always have a value

Yes, if the server has access to the Digest Value or the Key Material (for keys and secret data), the Certificate Value (for certificates) or the Opaque Data Value (for opaque objects).

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

Yes

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Objects

Table 71: Digest Attribute Rules

3.18 Operation Policy Name

An operation policy controls what entities MAY perform which key management operations on the object. The content of the Operation Policy Name attribute is the name of a policy object known to the key management system and, therefore, is server dependent. The named policy objects are created and managed using mechanisms outside the scope of the protocol. The policies determine what entities MAY perform specified operations on the object, and which of the object’s attributes MAY be modified or deleted. The Operation Policy Name attribute SHOULD be set when operations that result in a new Managed Object on the server are executed. It is set either explicitly or via some default set by the server, which then applies the named policy to all subsequent operations on the object.

Object

Encoding

 

Operation Policy Name

Text String

 

Table 72: Operation Policy Name Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server or Client

Modifiable by server

Yes

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

All Objects

Table 73: Operation Policy Name Attribute Rules

3.18.1 Operations outside of operation policy control

Some of the operations SHOULD be allowed for any client at any time, without respect to operation policy. These operations are:

·         Create

·         Create Key Pair

·         Register

·         Certify

·         Re-certify

·         Validate

·         Query

·         Cancel

·         Poll

3.18.2 Default Operation Policy

A key management system implementation SHALL implement at least one named operation policy, which is used for objects when the Operation Policy attribute is not specified by the Client in operations that result in a new Managed Object on the server, or in a template specified in these operations. This policy is named default. It specifies the following rules for operations on objects created or registered with this policy, depending on the object type. For the profiles defined in [KMIP-Prof], the creator SHALL be as defined in [KMIP-Prof].

3.18.2.1  Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects

This policy applies to Symmetric Keys, Private Keys, Split Keys, Secret Data, and Opaque Objects.

Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects

Operation

Policy

Re-key

Allowed to creator only

Re-key Key Pair

Allowed to creator only

Derive Key

Allowed to creator only

Locate

Allowed to creator only

Check

Allowed to creator only

Get

Allowed to creator only

Get Attributes

Allowed to creator only

Get Attribute List

Allowed to creator only

Add Attribute

Allowed to creator only

Modify Attribute

Allowed to creator only

Delete Attribute

Allowed to creator only

Obtain Lease

Allowed to creator only

Get Usage Allocation

Allowed to creator only

Activate

Allowed to creator only

Revoke

Allowed to creator only

Destroy

Allowed to creator only

Archive

Allowed to creator only

Recover

Allowed to creator only

Table 74: Default Operation Policy for Secret Objects

3.18.2.2 Default Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects

This policy applies to Certificates and Public Keys.

Default Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects

Operation

Policy

Locate

Allowed to all

Check

Allowed to all

Get

Allowed to all

Get Attributes

Allowed to all

Get Attribute List

Allowed to all

Add Attribute

Allowed to creator only

Modify Attribute

Allowed to creator only

Delete Attribute

Allowed to creator only

Obtain Lease

Allowed to all

Activate

Allowed to creator only

Revoke

Allowed to creator only

Destroy

Allowed to creator only

Archive

Allowed to creator only

Recover

Allowed to creator only

Table 75: Default Operation Policy for Certificates and Public Key Objects

3.18.2.3 Default Operation Policy for Template Objects

The operation policy specified as an attribute in the Register operation for a template object is the operation policy used for objects created using that template, and is not the policy used to control operations on the template itself. There is no mechanism to specify a policy used to control operations on template objects, so the default policy for template objects is always used for templates created by clients using the Register operation to create template objects.

Default Operation Policy for Private Template Objects

Operation

Policy

Locate

Allowed to creator only

Get

Allowed to creator only

Get Attributes

Allowed to creator only

Get Attribute List

Allowed to creator only

Add Attribute

Allowed to creator only

Modify Attribute

Allowed to creator only

Delete Attribute

Allowed to creator only

Destroy

Allowed to creator only

Any operation referencing the Template using a Template-Attribute

Allowed to creator only

Table 76: Default Operation Policy for Private Template Objects

In addition to private template objects (which are controlled by the above policy, and which MAY be created by clients or the server), publicly known and usable templates MAY be created and managed by the server, with a default policy different from private template objects.

Default Operation Policy for Public Template Objects

Operation

Policy

Locate

Allowed to all

Get

Allowed to all

Get Attributes

Allowed to all

Get Attribute List

Allowed to all

Add Attribute

Disallowed to all

Modify Attribute

Disallowed to all

Delete Attribute

Disallowed to all

Destroy

Disallowed to all

Any operation referencing the Template using a Template-Attribute

Allowed to all

Table 77: Default Operation Policy for Public Template Objects

3.19 Cryptographic Usage Mask

The Cryptographic Usage Mask defines the cryptographic usage of a key. This is a bit mask that indicates to the client which cryptographic functions MAY be performed using the key, and which ones SHALL NOT be performed.

·         Sign

·         Verify

·         Encrypt

·         Decrypt

·         Wrap Key

·         Unwrap Key

·         Export

·         MAC Generate

·         MAC Verify

·         Derive Key

·         Content Commitment

·         Key Agreement

·         Certificate Sign

·         CRL Sign

·         Generate Cryptogram

·         Validate Cryptogram

·         Translate Encrypt

·         Translate Decrypt

·         Translate Wrap

·         Translate Unwrap

This list takes into consideration values that MAY appear in the Key Usage extension in an X.509 certificate. However, the list does not consider the additional usages that MAY appear in the Extended Key Usage extension.

X.509 Key Usage values SHALL be mapped to Cryptographic Usage Mask values in the following manner:

X.509 Key Usage to Cryptographic Usage Mask Mapping

X.509 Key Usage Value

Cryptographic Usage Mask Value

digitalSignature

Sign or Verify

contentCommitment

Content Commitment

(Non Repudiation)

keyEncipherment

Wrap Key or Unwrap Key

dataEncipherment

Encrypt or Decrypt

keyAgreement

Key Agreement

keyCertSign

Certificate Sign

cRLSign

CRL Sign

encipherOnly

Encrypt

decipherOnly

Decrypt

Table 78: X.509 Key Usage to Cryptographic Usage Mask Mapping

 

Object

Encoding

 

Cryptographic Usage Mask

Integer

 

Table 79: Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server or Client

Modifiable by server

Yes

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

All Cryptographic Objects, Templates

Table 80: Cryptographic Usage Mask Attribute Rules

3.20 Lease Time

The Lease Time attribute defines a time interval for a Managed Cryptographic Object beyond which the client SHALL NOT use the object without obtaining another lease. This attribute always holds the initial length of time allowed for a lease, and not the actual remaining time. Once its lease expires, the client is only able to renew the lease by calling Obtain Lease. A server SHALL store in this attribute the maximum Lease Time it is able to serve and a client obtains the lease time (with Obtain Lease) that is less than or equal to the maximum Lease Time. This attribute is read-only for clients. It SHALL be modified by the server only.

Object

Encoding

 

Lease Time

Interval

 

Table 81: Lease Time Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

Yes

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

All Cryptographic Objects

Table 82: Lease Time Attribute Rules

3.21 Usage Limits

The Usage Limits attribute is a mechanism for limiting the usage of a Managed Cryptographic Object. It only applies to Managed Cryptographic Objects that are able to be used for applying cryptographic protection and it SHALL only reflect their usage for applying that protection (e.g., encryption, signing, etc.). This attribute does not necessarily exist for all Managed Cryptographic Objects, since some objects are able to be used without limit for cryptographically protecting data, depending on client/server policies. Usage for processing cryptographically-protected data (e.g., decryption, verification, etc.) is not limited. The Usage Limits attribute has the three following fields:

·         Usage Limits Total – the total number of Usage Limits Units allowed to be protected. This is the total value for the entire life of the object and SHALL NOT be changed once the object begins to be used for applying cryptographic protection.

·         Usage Limits Count – the currently remaining number of Usage Limits Units allowed to be protected by the object.

·         Usage Limits Unit – The type of quantity for which this structure specifies a usage limit (e.g., byte, object).

When the attribute is initially set (usually during object creation or registration), the Usage Limits Count is set to the Usage Limits Total value allowed for the useful life of the object, and are decremented when the object is used. The server SHALL ignore the Usage Limits Count value if the attribute is specified in an operation that creates a new object. Changes made via the Modify Attribute operation reflect corrections to the Usage Limits Total value, but they SHALL NOT be changed once the Usage Limits Count value has changed by a Get Usage Allocation operation. The Usage Limits Count value SHALL NOT be set or modified by the client via the Add Attribute or Modify Attribute operations.

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Usage Limits

Structure

 

Usage Limits Total

Long Integer

Yes

Usage Limits Count

Long Integer

Yes

Usage Limits Unit

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.31

Yes

Table 83: Usage Limits Attribute Structure

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server (Total, Count, and Unit) or Client (Total and/or Unit only)

Modifiable by server

Yes

Modifiable by client

Yes (Total and/or Unit only, as long as Get Usage Allocation has not been performed)

Deletable by client

Yes, as long as Get Usage Allocation has not been performed

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair, Get Usage Allocation

Applies to Object Types

Keys, Templates

Table 84: Usage Limits Attribute Rules

3.22 State

This attribute is an indication of the State of an object as known to the key management server. The State SHALL NOT be changed by using the Modify Attribute operation on this attribute. The state SHALL only be changed by the server as a part of other operations or other server processes. An object SHALL be in one of the following states at any given Description: Description: Description: C:\Users\User\AHendry\standards\oasis\work\tc_admin\TCA995_kmip-spec-v1.1-cs01\kmip-spec-v1.1-cs01\kmip-spec-v1.1-cs01_files\image002.giftime. (Note: These states correspond to those described in [SP800-57-1]).

Figure 1: Cryptographic Object States and Transitions

·         Pre-Active: The object exists but is not yet usable for any cryptographic purpose.

·         Active: The object MAY be used for all cryptographic purposes that are allowed by its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute and, if applicable, by its Process Start Date (see 3.25) and Protect Stop Date (see 3.26) attributes.

·         Deactivated: The object SHALL NOT be used for applying cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption or signing), but, if permitted by the Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute, then the object MAY be used to process cryptographically-protected information (e.g., decryption or verification), but only under extraordinary circumstances and when special permission is granted.

·         Compromised: It is possible that the object has been compromised, and SHOULD only be used to process cryptographically-protected information in a client that is trusted to use managed objects that have been compromised.

·         Destroyed: The object is no longer usable for any purpose.

·         Destroyed Compromised: The object is no longer usable for any purpose; however its compromised status MAY be retained for audit or security purposes.

State transitions occur as follows:

1.     The transition from a non-existent key to the Pre-Active state is caused by the creation of the object. When an object is created or registered, it automatically goes from non-existent to Pre-Active. If, however, the operation that creates or registers the object contains an Activation Date that has already occurred, then the state immediately transitions from Pre-Active to Active. In this case, the server SHALL set the Activation Date attribute to the value specified in the request,[d5]  or fail the request attempting to create or register the object, depending on server policy. If the operation contains an Activation Date attribute that is in the future, or contains no Activation Date, then the Cryptographic Object is initialized in the key management system in the Pre-Active state.

2.     The transition from Pre-Active to Destroyed is caused by a client issuing a Destroy operation. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.

3.     The transition from Pre-Active to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.

4.     The transition from Pre-Active to Active SHALL occur in one of three ways:

·         The Activation Date is reached.

·         A client successfully issues a Modify Attribute operation, modifying the Activation Date to a date in the past, or the current date.

·         A client issues an Activate operation on the object. The server SHALL set the Activation Date to the time the Activate operation is received.

5.     The transition from Active to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.

6.     The transition from Active to Deactivated SHALL occur in one of three ways:

·         The object's Deactivation Date is reached.

·         A client issues a Revoke operation, with a Revocation Reason other than Compromised.

·         The client successfully issues a Modify Attribute operation, modifying the Deactivation Date to a date in the past, or the current date.

7.     The transition from Deactivated to Destroyed is caused by a client issuing a Destroy operation, or by a server, both in accordance with server policy. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.

8.     The transition from Deactivated to Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.

9.     The transition from Compromised to Destroyed Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Destroy operation, or by a server, both in accordance with server policy. The server destroys the object when (and if) server policy dictates.

10.  The transition from Destroyed to Destroyed Compromised is caused by a client issuing a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised.

Only the transitions described above are permitted.

Object

Encoding

 

State

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.18

 

Table 85: State Attribute

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

Yes

Modifiable by client

No, but only by the server in response to certain requests (see above)

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate, Revoke, Destroy, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

All Cryptographic Objects

Table 86: State Attribute Rules

3.23 Initial Date

The Initial Date is the date and time when the Managed Object was first created or registered at the server. This time corresponds to state transition 1 (see Section 3.22). This attribute SHALL be set by the server when the object is created or registered, and then SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed. This attribute is also set for non-cryptographic objects (e.g., templates) when they are first registered with the server.

Object

Encoding

 

Initial Date

Date-Time

 

Table 87: Initial Date Attribute

SHALL always have a value

Yes

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

All Objects

Table 88: Initial Date Attribute Rules

3.24 Activation Date

This is the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object MAY begin to be used. This time corresponds to state transition 4 (see Section 3.22). The object SHALL NOT be used for any cryptographic purpose before the Activation Date has been reached. Once the state transition from Pre-Active has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

 

Activation Date

Date-Time

 

Table 89: Activation Date Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server or Client

Modifiable by server

Yes, only while in Pre-Active state

Modifiable by client

Yes, only while in Pre-Active state

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Activate Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

All Cryptographic Objects, Templates

Table 90: Activation Date Attribute Rules

3.25 Process Start Date

This is the date and time when a Managed Symmetric Key Object MAY begin to be used to process cryptographically-protected information (e.g., decryption or unwrapping), depending on the value of its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. The object SHALL NOT be used for these cryptographic purposes before the Process Start Date has been reached. This value MAY be equal to or later than, but SHALL NOT precede, the Activation Date. Once the Process Start Date has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

 

Process Start Date

Date-Time

 

Table 91: Process Start Date Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server or Client

Modifiable by server

Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the Process Start Date has been not reached.

Modifiable by client

Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the Process Start Date has been not reached.

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Register, Derive Key, Re-key

Applies to Object Types

Symmetric Keys, Split Keys of symmetric keys, Templates

Table 92: Process Start Date Attribute Rules

3.26 Protect Stop Date

This is the date and time when a Managed Symmetric Key Object SHALL NOT be used for applying cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption or wrapping), depending on the value of its Cryptographic Usage Mask attribute. This value MAY be equal to or earlier than, but SHALL NOT be later than the Deactivation Date. Once the Protect Stop Date has occurred, then this attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed.

Object

Encoding

 

Protect Stop Date

Date-Time

 

Table 93: Protect Stop Date Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server or Client

Modifiable by server

Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the Protect Stop Date has not been reached.

Modifiable by client

Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state and as long as the Protect Stop Date has not been reached.

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Register, Derive Key, Re-key

Applies to Object Types

Symmetric Keys, Split Keys of symmetric keys, Templates

Table 94: Protect Stop Date Attribute Rules

3.27 Deactivation Date

The Deactivation Date is the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object SHALL NOT be used for any purpose, except for decryption, signature verification, or unwrapping, but only under extraordinary circumstances and only when special permission is granted. This time corresponds to state transition 6 (see Section 3.22). This attribute SHALL NOT be changed or deleted before the object is destroyed, unless the object is in the Pre-Active or Active state.

Object

Encoding

 

Deactivation Date

Date-Time

 

Table 95: Deactivation Date Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server or Client

Modifiable by server

Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state

Modifiable by client

Yes, only while in Pre-Active or Active state

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Revoke Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

All Cryptographic Objects, Templates

Table 96: Deactivation Date Attribute Rules

3.28 Destroy Date

The Destroy Date is the date and time when the Managed Object was destroyed. This time corresponds to state transitions 2, 7, or 9 (see Section 3.22). This value is set by the server when the object is destroyed due to the reception of a Destroy operation, or due to server policy or out-of-band administrative action.

Object

Encoding

 

Destroy Date

Date-Time

 

Table 97: Destroy Date Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Destroy

Applies to Object Types

All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Objects

Table 98: Destroy Date Attribute Rules

3.29 Compromise Occurrence Date

The Compromise Occurrence Date is the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object was first believed to be compromised. If it is not possible to estimate when the compromise occurred, then this value SHOULD be set to the Initial Date for the object.

Object

Encoding

 

Compromise Occurrence Date

Date-Time

 

Table 99: Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Revoke

Applies to Object Types

All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object

Table 100: Compromise Occurrence Date Attribute Rules

3.30 Compromise Date

The Compromise Date is the date and time when the Managed Cryptographic Object entered into the compromised state. This time corresponds to state transitions 3, 5, 8, or 10 (see Section 3.22). This time indicates when the key management system was made aware of the compromise, not necessarily when the compromise occurred. This attribute is set by the server when it receives a Revoke operation with a Revocation Reason of Compromised, or due to server policy or out-of-band administrative action.

Object

Encoding

 

Compromise Date

Date-Time

 

Table 101: Compromise Date Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Revoke

Applies to Object Types

All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object

Table 102: Compromise Date Attribute Rules

3.31 Revocation Reason

The Revocation Reason attribute is a structure (see Table 103) used to indicate why the Managed Cryptographic Object was revoked (e.g., “compromised”, “expired”, “no longer used”, etc). This attribute is only set by the server as a part of the Revoke Operation.

The Revocation Message is an OPTIONAL field that is used exclusively for audit trail/logging purposes and MAY contain additional information about why the object was revoked (e.g., “Laptop stolen”, or “Machine decommissioned”).

Object

Encoding

REQUIRED

Revocation Reason

Structure

 

Revocation Reason Code

Enumeration, see 9.1.3.2.19

Yes

Revocation Message

Text String

No

Table 103: Revocation Reason Attribute Structure

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

Yes

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Revoke

Applies to Object Types

All Cryptographic Objects, Opaque Object

Table 104: Revocation Reason Attribute Rules

3.32 Archive Date

The Archive Date is the date and time when the Managed Object was placed in archival storage. This value is set by the server as a part of the Archive operation. The server SHALL delete this attribute whenever a Recover operation is performed.

Object

Encoding

 

Archive Date

Date-Time

 

Table 105: Archive Date Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Server

Modifiable by server

No

Modifiable by client

No

Deletable by client

No

Multiple instances permitted

No

When implicitly set

Archive

Applies to Object Types

All Objects

Table 106: Archive Date Attribute Rules

3.33 Object Group

An object MAY be part of a group of objects. An object MAY belong to more than one group of objects. To assign an object to a group of objects, the object group name SHOULD be set into this attribute. “default” is a reserved Text String for Object Group.

Object

Encoding

 

Object Group

Text String

 

Table 107: Object Group Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Client or Server

Modifiable by server

Yes

Modifiable by client

Yes

Deletable by client

Yes

Multiple instances permitted

Yes

When implicitly set

Create, Create Key Pair, Register, Derive Key, Certify, Re-certify, Re-key, Re-key Key Pair

Applies to Object Types

All Objects

Table 108: Object Group Attribute Rules

3.34 Fresh

The Fresh attribute is a Boolean attribute that indicates if the object has not yet been served to a client. The Fresh attribute SHOULD be set to True when a new object is created on the server. The server SHALL change the attribute value to False as soon as the object has been served to a client.

Object

Encoding

 

Fresh

Boolean

 

Table 109: Fresh Attribute

SHALL always have a value

No

Initially set by

Client or Server

Modifiable by server

Yes

Modifiable by client