Web Services Security
X.509 Certificate Token Profile 1.1
OASIS Standard Specification, 251
February August 2006
OASIS Identifier:
wss-v1.1-spec-oserrata-X509TokenProfile
Document Location:
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/v1.1/
Technical Committee:
Web Service Security (WSS)
Chairs:
Kelvin Lawrence, IBM
Chris
Kaler, Microsoft
Editors:
Anthony Nadalin, IBM
Chris
Kaler, Microsoft
Ronald
Monzillo, Sun
Phillip Hallam-Baker, Verisign
Abstract:
This document describes how to use X.509
Certificates with the Web Services Security:
Status:
This is an OASIS Standard document produced
by the Web Services Security Technical Committee. It was approved by the OASIS
membership on 1 February 2006. Check the current location noted above for possible
errata to this document.
Technical Committee members should send comments on
this specification to the technical Committee’s email list. Others should send
comments to the Technical Committee by using the “Send A Comment” button on the
Technical Committee’s web page at www.oasisopen.org/committees/wss.
For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the WS-Security TC web page (http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/wss/ipr.php).
OASIS takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be vailable; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on
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Copyright (C) OASIS Open 2002-2006. All Rights Reserved.
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This section is non-normative.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction (Non-Normative)
2 Notations and Terminology (Normative)
3.1.2
X509PKIPathv1 Token Type
3.2.1
Reference to an X.509 Subject Key Identifier
3.2.2
Reference to a Security Token
3.2.3
Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number
3.3.2
Reference to a Binary Security Token
3.3.3
Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number
4 Threat Model and Countermeasures (Non-Normative)
This specification describes the use of the X.509
authentication framework with the Web Services Security:
An X.509 certificate specifies a binding between a public key and a set of attributes that includes (at least) a subject name, issuer name, serial number and validity interval. This binding may be subject to subsequent revocation advertised by mechanisms that include issuance of CRLs, OCSP tokens or mechanisms that are outside the X.509 framework, such as XKMS.
An X.509 certificate may be used to validate a public key that may be used to authenticate a SOAP message or to identify the public key with a SOAP message that has been encrypted.
Note that Sections 2.1, 2.2, all of 3, and indicated parts of 5 are normative. All other sections are non-normative.
2
Notations and
Terminology (Normative)
This section specifies the notations, namespaces and terminology used in this specification.
2.1 Notational
Conventions
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT",
"REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "
When describing abstract data models, this specification uses the notational convention used by the XML Infoset. Specifically, abstract property names always appear in square brackets (e.g., [some property]).
When describing concrete XML schemas, this specification
uses a convention where each member of an element’s [children] or [attributes]
property is described using an XPath-like notation (e.g.,
/x:MyHeader/x:SomeProperty/@value1). The
use of {any} indicates the presence of an element wildcard (<xs:any/>).
The use of @{any} indicates the presence of an attribute wildcard
(<xs:anyAttribute/>).
2.2 Namespaces
Namespace URIs (of the general form "some-URI") represents some application-dependent or context-dependent URI as defined in RFC 3986 [URI]. This specification is designed to work with the general SOAP [SOAP11, SOAP12] message structure and message processing model, and should be applicable to any version of SOAP. The current SOAP 1.1 namespace URI is used herein to provide detailed examples, but there is no intention to limit the applicability of this specification to a single version of SOAP.
The namespaces used in this document are shown in the following table (note that for brevity, the examples use the prefixes listed below but do not include the URIs – those listed below are assumed).
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.1.xsd
The following namespace prefixes are used in this document:
|
Prefix |
Namespace |
|
S11 |
|
|
S12 |
|
|
ds |
http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#
|
|
xenc |
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#
|
|
wsse |
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd |
|
wsse11 |
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.1.xsd |
|
wsu |
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd |
Table 1- Namespace prefixes
URI
fragments defined in this specification are relative to the following base URI unless
otherwise stated:
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0
The following table lists the full URI for each URI fragment referred to in this specification.
|
URI Fragment |
Full URI |
|||
|
#Base64Binary |
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary |
|||
|
#STR-Transform |
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#STR-Transform |
|||
|
#PKCS7 |
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#PKCS7 |
|||
|
#X509v3 |
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509v3 |
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier |
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier |
|||
2.3 Terminology
This specification adopts the terminology defined in Web
Services Security:
Readers are presumed to be familiar with the definitions of terms in the Internet Security Glossary [Glossary].
This specification
describes the syntax and processing rules for the use of the X.509
authentication framework with the Web Services Security:
3.1 Token types
This profile defines
the syntax of, and processing rules for, three types of binary security token using
the
If the ValueType
attribute is missing, the receiver may interpret it either based on a prior
agreement or by parsing the content.
|
Token |
ValueType |
Description |
||||
|
Single certificate |
#X509v3 |
An X.509 v3 certificate capable of signature-verification
at a minimum |
||||
|
|
|
|
||||
|
Certificate Path |
#X509PKIPathv1 |
An ordered list of X.509 certificates packaged in a PKIPath |
||||
|
Set of certificates and CRLs |
#PKCS7 |
A list of X.509 certificates and (optionally) CRLs packaged in a PKCS#7 wrapper |
||||
Table 2 – Token types
3.1.1 X509v3 Token Type
The type of the end-entity that is authenticated by a certificate used in this manner is a matter of policy that is outside the scope of this specification.
3.1.2 X509PKIPathv1 Token Type
The X509PKIPathv1 token type
3.1.3 PKCS7 Token Type
The PKCS7 token type
The order of the certificates in a PKCS#7 data structure is not significant. If an ordered certificate path is converted to PKCS#7 encoded bytes and then converted back, the order of the certificates may not be preserved. Processors SHALL NOT assume any significance to the order of the certificates in the data structure. See [PKCS7] for more information.
3.2 Token
References
In order to ensure a
consistent processing model across all the token types supported by WSS:
A <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element
·
Reference to a Subject Key Identifier
The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
element contains a <wsse:KeyIdentifier>
element that specifies the token data by means of a X.509 SubjectKeyIdentifier
reference. A subject key identifier MAYmay
only be used to reference an X.509v3 certificate.”
·
Reference to a Binary Security Token
The
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element contains a wsse:Reference> element that references a
local <wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
element or a remote data source that contains the token data itself.
·
Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number
The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
element contains a <ds:X509Data> element that
contains a <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element
that uniquely identifies an end entity certificate by its X.509 Issuer and
Serial Number.
3.2.1 Reference to an X.509 Subject Key Identifier
The <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element is used to
specify a reference to an X.509v3 certificate by means of a reference to its
X.509 SubjectKeyIdentifier attribute. This profile defines the syntax of, and
processing rules for referencing a Subject Key Identifier using the
|
Subject Key Identifier |
ValueType |
Description |
|
Certificate Key Identifier |
#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier |
Value of the
certificate’s X.509 SubjectKeyIdentifier |
Table 3 – Subject Key Identifier
The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element from which the reference is made contains the <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element. The <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element MUST have a ValueType attribute with the value #X509SubjectKeyIdentifier and its contents MUST be the value of the certificate’s X.509v3 SubjectKeyIdentifier extension, encoded as per the <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element’s EncodingType attribute. For the purposes of this specification, the value of the SubjectKeyIdentifier extension is the contents of the KeyIdentifier octet string, excluding the encoding of the octet string prefix.
3.2.2 Reference to a Security Token
The <wsse:Reference>
element is used to reference an X.509 security token value by means of a
The
3.2.3 Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number
The <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element is used to specify a reference to an X.509 security token by means of the certificate issuer name and serial number.
The <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element is a direct child of the <ds:X509Data> element that is in turn a direct child of the <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element in which the reference is made
3.3 Signature
Signed data
An X.509 certificate specifies a binding between a public key and a set of attributes that includes (at least) a subject name, issuer name, serial number and validity interval. Other attributes may specify constraints on the use of the certificate or affect the recourse that may be open to a relying party that depends on the certificate. A given public key may be specified in more than one X.509 certificate; consequently a given public key may be bound to two or more distinct sets of attributes.
It is therefore necessary to ensure that a signature created under an X.509 certificate token uniquely and irrefutably specifies the certificate under which the signature was created.
Implementations SHOULD protect against a certificate substitution attack by including either the certificate itself or an immutable and unambiguous reference to the certificate within the scope of the signature according to the method used to reference the certificate as described in the following sections.
3.3.1 Key Identifier
The <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element does not guarantee an immutable and unambiguous reference to the certificate referenced. Consequently implementations that use this form of reference within a signature SHOULD employ the STR Dereferencing Transform within a reference to the signature key information in order to ensure that the referenced certificate is signed, and not just the ambiguous reference. The form of the reference is a bare name reference as defined by the XPointer specification [XPointer].
The following example shows a certificate referenced by means of a KeyIdentifier. The scope of the signature is the <ds:SignedInfo> element which includes both the message body (#body) and the signing certificate by means of a reference to the <ds:KeyInfo> element which references it (#keyinfo). Since the <ds:KeyInfo> element only contains a mutable reference to the certificate rather than the certificate itself, a transformation is specified which replaces the reference to the certificate with the certificate. The <ds:KeyInfo> element specifies the signing key by means of a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which contains a <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element which specifies the X.509 subject key identifier of the signing certificate.
<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="...">
<S11:Header>
<wsse:Security
xmlns:wsse="..."
xmlns:wsu="...">
<ds:Signature
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<ds:SignedInfo>…
<ds:Reference
<ds:Reference
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="...#STR-Transform">
<wsse:TransformationParameters>
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="…"/>
</wsse:TransformationParameters>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>…
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue>HFLP…</ds:SignatureValue>
<ds:KeyInfo Id="keyinfo">
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
<wsse:KeyIdentifier EncodingType="...#Base64Binary"
ValueType="...#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier">
MIGfMa0GCSq…
</wsse:KeyIdentifier>
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</ds:Signature>
</wsse:Security>
</S11:Header>
<S11:Body wsu:Id="body"
xmlns:wsu=".../">
…
</S11:Body>
</S11:Envelope>
3.3.2 Reference to a Binary Security Token
The signed data SHOULD contain a core bare name reference (as defined by the XPointer specification [XPointer]) to the<wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element that contains the security token referenced, or a core reference to the external data source containing the security token.
The following example
shows a certificate embedded in a <wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
element and referenced by
<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="...">
<S11:Header>
<wsse:Security
xmlns:wsse="..."
xmlns:wsu="...">
<wsse:BinarySecurityToken
wsu:Id="binarytoken"
ValueType="…#X509v3"
EncodingType="…#Base64Binary">
MIIEZzCCA9CgAwIBAgIQEmtJZc0…
</wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
<ds:Signature
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<ds:SignedInfo>…
<ds:Reference
URI="#body">...…</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference
URI="#binarytoken">...…</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue>HFLP…</ds:SignatureValue>
<ds:KeyInfo>
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
<wsse:Reference
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</ds:Signature>
</wsse:Security>
</S11:Header>
<S11:Body wsu:Id="body"
xmlns:wsu="...">
…
</S11:Body>
</S11:Envelope>
3.3.3 Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number
The signed data SHOULD contain a core bare name reference (as defined by the XPointer specification [XPointer]) to the <ds:KeyInfo> element that contains the security token reference.
The following example shows a certificate referenced by means of its issuer name and serial number. In this example the certificate is not included in the message. The scope of the signature defined by the <ds:SignedInfo> element includes both the message body (#body) and the key information element (#keyInfo). The <ds:KeyInfo> element contains a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which specifies the issuer and serial number of the specified certificate by means of the <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element.
<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="...">
<S11:Header>
<wsse:Security
xmlns:wsse="..."
xmlns:wsu="...">
<ds:Signature
xmlns:ds="...">
<ds:SignedInfo>…
<ds:Reference URI="#body">...</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#keyinfo">...</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue>HFLP…</ds:SignatureValue>
<ds:KeyInfo Id="keyinfo">
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
<ds:X509Data>
<ds:X509IssuerSerial>
<ds:X509IssuerName>
DC=
</ds:X509IssuerName>
<ds:X509SerialNumber>12345678</ds:X509SerialNumber>
</ds:X509IssuerSerial>
</ds:X509Data>
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</ds:Signature>
</wsse:Security>
</S11:Header>
<S11:Body wsu:Id="body"
xmlns:wsu="...">
…
</S11:Body>
</S11:Envelope>
3.4 Encryption
Encrypted keys or
data
Since the sole purpose is to identify the decryption key it is not necessary to specify either a trust path or the specific contents of the certificate itself.
The following example shows a decryption key referenced by means of the issuer name and serial number of an associated certificate. In this example the certificate is not included in the message. The <ds:KeyInfo> element contains a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which specifies the issuer and serial number of the specified certificate by means of the <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element.
<S11:Envelope
xmlns:S11="..."
xmlns:ds="..."
xmlns:wsse="..."
xmlns:xenc="...">
<S11:Header>
<wsse:Security>
<xenc:EncryptedKey>
<xenc:EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="...…"/>
<ds:KeyInfo>
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
<ds:X509Data>
<ds:X509IssuerSerial>
<ds:X509IssuerName>
DC=
</ds:X509IssuerName>
<ds:X509SerialNumber>12345678</ds:X509SerialNumber>
</ds:X509IssuerSerial>
</ds:X509Data>
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>…</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:ReferenceList>
<xenc:DataReference
</xenc:ReferenceList>
</xenc:EncryptedKey>
</wsse:Security>
</S11:Header>
<S11:Body>
<xenc:EncryptedData Id="encrypted" Type="…">
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>…</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</xenc:EncryptedData>
</S11:Body>
</S11:Envelope>
The following example shows a decryption key referenced by means of the Thumbprint of an associated certificate. In this example the certificate is not included in the message. The <ds:KeyInfo> element contains a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which specifies the Thumbprint of the specified certificate by means of the http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1 attribute of the <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element.
<S11:Envelope
xmlns:S11="..."
xmlns:ds="..."
xmlns:wsse="..."
xmlns:xenc="...">
<S11:Header>
<wsse:Security>
<xenc:EncryptedKey>
<xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="…"/>
<ds:KeyInfo>
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
<wsse:KeyIdentifier
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-
soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbpPrintSHA1"
>LKiQ/CmFrJDJqCLFcjlhIsmZ/+0=
</wsse:KeyIdentifier>
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>…</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:ReferenceList>
<xenc:DataReference
</xenc:ReferenceList>
</xenc:EncryptedKey>
</wsse:Security>
</S11:Header>
<S11:Body>
<xenc:EncryptedData
Id="encrypted" Type="...…">
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>…</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</xenc:EncryptedData>
</S11:Body>
</S11:Envelope>
3.5 Error Codes
When using X.509
certificates, the error codes defined in the WSS:
If an implementation
requires the use of a custom error it is recommended that a sub-code be defined
as an extension of one of the codes defined in the WSS:
The use of X.509 certificate token introduces no new threats beyond those identified in WSS: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security].
Message alteration
and eavesdropping can be addressed by using the integrity and confidentiality
mechanisms described in WSS:
It is strongly RECOMMENDED that all relevant and immutable message data be signed.
It should be noted
that a transport-level security protocol such as SSL or
The following are normative
references
[Glossary] Informational RFC 2828, Internet Security Glossary,
May 2000. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2828.txt
[KEYWORDS] S. Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels, RFC 2119,
[RFC2246] T. Dierks, C. Allen., The
[
[SOAP12] W3C
Recommendation, "SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1: Messaging Framework", 23
June 2003.
[URI] T.
Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URI): Generic Syntax," RFC 3986, MIT/LCS, Day Software, Adobe Systems,
January 2005.
[WS-Security] A.
Nadalin et al., Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security 1.1 (WS-Security
2004), OASIS Standard, http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.1.pdf.
[PKCS7] PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard RSA Laboratories, November 1, 1993. http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-7/index.html
[PKIPATH] http://www.itu.int/rec/recommendation.asp?type=items&lang=e&parent=T-REC-X.509-200110-S!Cor1
[X509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509
(1997 E): Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The
Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997.
The following are non-normative references
[XML-ns] T. Bray, D. Hollander, A. Layman. Namespaces in XML. W3C
Recommendation. January 1999. http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xml-names-19990114
[XML Encrypt] W3C Recommendation, "XML Encryption Syntax
andProcessing," 10 December 2002
[XML Signature] D.
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Ganesh |
Vaideeswaran |
Documentum |
|
Tim |
Moses |
Entrust |
|
|
Canales-Valenzuela |
Ericsson |
|
Tom |
Rutt |
Fujitsu |
|
Yutaka |
Kudo |
|
|
Jason |
Rouault |
HP |
|
Bob |
Blakley |
IBM |
|
Joel |
Farrell |
IBM |
|
Satoshi |
Hada |
IBM |
|
Hiroshi |
Maruyama |
IBM |
|
David |
Melgar |
IBM |
|
|
Tamura |
IBM |
|
|
Vicknair |
IBM |
|
Phil |
|
Individual |
|
Mark |
Hayes |
Individual |
|
John |
Hughes |
Individual |
|
Peter |
Rostin |
Individual |
|
Davanum |
Srinivas |
Individual |
|
Bob |
Morgan |
Individual/Internet2 |
|
Bob |
Atkinson |
Microsoft |
|
Keith |
Ballinger |
Microsoft |
|
Allen |
Brown |
Microsoft |
|
Giovanni |
Della-Libera |
Microsoft |
|
Alan |
Geller |
Microsoft |
|
Johannes |
Klein |
Microsoft |
|
Scott |
Konersmann |
Microsoft |
|
Chris |
Kurt |
Microsoft |
|
Brian |
LaMacchia |
Microsoft |
|
Paul |
Leach |
Microsoft |
|
John |
Manferdelli |
Microsoft |
|
John |
Shewchuk |
Microsoft |
|
Dan |
Simon |
Microsoft |
|
Hervey |
|
Microsoft |
|
Jeff |
Hodges |
Neustar |
|
Senthil |
Sengodan |
Nokia |
|
Lloyd |
Burch |
Novell |
|
Ed |
Reed |
Novell |
|
Charles |
Knouse |
Oblix |
|
Vipin |
|
Oracle |
|
Jerry |
Schwarz |
Oracle |
|
Eric |
Gravengaard |
Reactivity |
|
Andrew |
Nash |
Reactivity |
|
Stuart |
King |
Reed Elsevier |
|
Martijn |
de Boer |
SAP |
|
Jonathan |
Tourzan |
Sony |
|
Yassir |
Elley |
Sun |
|
Michael |
Nguyen |
The IDA of |
|
Don |
|
TIBCO |
|
Morten |
Jorgensen |
Vordel |
|
Rev |
Date |
By Whom |
What |
|
errata |
08-25-2006 |
Anthony
Nadalin |
Issue
457, 458, 460 |