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## WS-Trust 1.4

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OASIS Web Services Secure Exchange TC

#### Chair(s):

Kelvin Lawrence, IBM Chris Kaler, Microsoft

#### Editor(s):

Anthony Nadalin, IBM Marc Goodner, Microsoft Martin Gudgin, Microsoft Abbie Barbir, Nortel Hans Granqvist, VeriSign

### **Related work:**

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#### Abstract:

This specification defines extensions that build on [WS-Security] to provide a framework for requesting and issuing security tokens, and to broker trust relationships.

### Status:

This document was last revised or approved by the WS-SX TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the current location noted above for possible later revisions of this document. This document is updated periodically on no particular schedule.

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## 1 1 Introduction

[WS-Security] defines the basic mechanisms for providing secure messaging. This specification uses
 these base mechanisms and defines additional primitives and extensions for security token exchange to
 enable the issuance and dissemination of credentials within different trust domains.

5

In order to secure a communication between two parties, the two parties must exchange security
credentials (either directly or indirectly). However, each party needs to determine if they can "trust" the
asserted credentials of the other party.

- 9
- 10 In this specification we define extensions to [WS-Security] that provide:
- 11 Methods for issuing, renewing, and validating security tokens.
- Ways to establish assess the presence of, and broker trust relationships.
- 13
- Using these extensions, applications can engage in secure communication designed to work with the
   general Web services framework, including WSDL service descriptions, UDDI businessServices and
   bindingTemplates, and [SOAP] [SOAP2] messages.
- 17
- To achieve this, this specification introduces a number of elements that are used to request securitytokens and broker trust relationships.
- 20
- 21 Section 12 is non-normative.

## 22 **1.1 Goals and Non-Goals**

The goal of WS-Trust is to enable applications to construct trusted [SOAP] message exchanges. This trust is represented through the exchange and brokering of security tokens. This specification provides a protocol agnostic way to issue, renew, and validate these security tokens.

- 26
- This specification is intended to provide a flexible set of mechanisms that can be used to support a range of security protocols; this specification intentionally does not describe explicit fixed security protocols.
- 29
- As with every security protocol, significant efforts must be applied to ensure that specific profiles and
   message exchanges constructed using WS-Trust are not vulnerable to attacks (or at least that the attacks are understood).
- 33
- 34 The following are explicit non-goals for this document:
- 35 Password authentication
- 36 Token revocation
- 37 Management of trust policies
- 38
- 39 Additionally, the following topics are outside the scope of this document:
- Establishing a security context token

### 41 • Key derivation

### 42 **1.2 Requirements**

- The Web services trust specification must support a wide variety of security models. The following list
   identifies the key driving requirements for this specification:
- Requesting and obtaining security tokens
- Establishing, managing and assessing trust relationships

### 47 **1.3 Namespace**

- 48 Implementations of this specification MUST use the following [URI]s:
- 49http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/20051250http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200802
- 51 When using a URI to indicate that this version of Trust is being used http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-52 trust/200802 MUST be used.
- 53 Table 1 lists XML namespaces that are used in this specification. The choice of any namespace prefix is
- 54 arbitrary and not semantically significant.
- 55 Table 1: Prefixes and XML Namespaces used in this specification.

Prefix	Namespace	Specification(s)
S11	http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/	[SOAP]
S12	http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope	[SOAP12]
wsu	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss- wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd	[WS-Security]
wsse	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss- wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd	[WS-Security]
wsse11	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-wsecurity-secext- 1.1.xsd	[WS-Security]
wst	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512	This specification
wst14	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200802	This specification
ds	http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#	[XML-Signature]
xenc	http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#	[XML-Encrypt]
wsp	http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/09/policy or http://www.w3.org/ns/ws-policy	[WS-Policy]

wsa	http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing	[WS-Addressing]
xs	http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema	[XML-Schema1] [XML-Schema2]

#### 1.4 Schema and WSDL Files 56

57 The schema [XML-Schema1], [XML-Schema2] for this specification can be located at:

58 59 http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/ws-trust.xsd http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/v1.4/ws-trust.xsd

60

61 The WSDL for this specification can be located in Appendix II of this document as well as at:

62

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/v1.4/ws-trust.wsdl

63 In this document, reference is made to the wsu:Id attribute, wsu:Created and wsu:Expires

64 elements in the utility schema. These were added to the utility schema with the intent that other

65 specifications requiring such an ID or timestamp could reference it (as is done here).

#### 1.5 Terminology 66

- Claim A claim is a statement made about a client, service or other resource (e.g. name, identity, key, 67 68 group, privilege, capability, etc.).
- 69 **Security Token** – A security token represents a collection of claims.
- 70 Signed Security Token - A signed security token is a security token that is cryptographically endorsed
- 71 by a specific authority (e.g. an X.509 certificate or a Kerberos ticket).
- Proof-of-Possession Token A proof-of-possession (POP) token is a security token that contains 72

73 secret data that can be used to demonstrate authorized use of an associated security token. Typically,

74 although not exclusively, the proof-of-possession information is encrypted with a key known only to the 75 recipient of the POP token.

- 76 **Digest** – A *digest* is a cryptographic checksum of an octet stream.
- 77 **Signature** – A signature is a value computed with a cryptographic algorithm and bound to data in such a
- 78 way that intended recipients of the data can use the signature to verify that the data has not been altered
- 79 and/or has originated from the signer of the message, providing message integrity and authentication.
- 80 The signature can be computed and verified with symmetric key algorithms, where the same key is used

81 for signing and verifying, or with asymmetric key algorithms, where different keys are used for signing and

- 82 verifying (a private and public key pair are used).
- 83 **Trust Engine** – The *trust engine* of a Web service is a conceptual component that evaluates the security-84 related aspects of a message as described in section 2 below.
- 85 Security Token Service – A security token service (STS) is a Web service that issues security tokens

86 (see [WS-Security]). That is, it makes assertions based on evidence that it trusts, to whoever trusts it (or

87 to specific recipients). To communicate trust, a service requires proof, such as a signature to prove

- 88 knowledge of a security token or set of security tokens. A service itself can generate tokens or it can rely
- 89 on a separate STS to issue a security token with its own trust statement (note that for some security token 90
- formats this can just be a re-issuance or co-signature). This forms the basis of trust brokering.
- 91 **Trust** – Trust is the characteristic that one entity is willing to rely upon a second entity to execute a set of
- 92 actions and/or to make set of assertions about a set of subjects and/or scopes.

- Direct Trust Direct trust is when a relying party accepts as true all (or some subset of) the claims in the
   token sent by the requestor.
- 95 **Direct Brokered Trust** *Direct Brokered Trust* is when one party trusts a second party who, in turn,
- 96 trusts or vouches for, a third party.
- 97 Indirect Brokered Trust Indirect Brokered Trust is a variation on direct brokered trust where the
- 98 second party negotiates with the third party, or additional parties, to assess the trust of the third party.
- 99 Message Freshness Message freshness is the process of verifying that the message has not been
   100 replayed and is currently valid.
- We provide basic definitions for the security terminology used in this specification. Note that readers
   should be familiar with the [WS-Security] specification.

### 103 **1.5.1 Notational Conventions**

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
 NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described
 in [RFC2119].

107

- 108 Namespace URIs of the general form "some-URI" represents some application-dependent or context-109 dependent URI as defined in [URI].
- 110

117

- 111 This specification uses the following syntax to define outlines for messages:
- The syntax appears as an XML instance, but values in italics indicate data types instead of literal values.
- Characters are appended to elements and attributes to indicate cardinality:
- 115 o "?" (0 or 1)
- 116 o "\*" (0 or more)
  - "+" (1 or more)
- The character "|" is used to indicate a choice between alternatives.
- The characters "(" and ")" are used to indicate that contained items are to be treated as a group with respect to cardinality or choice.
- The characters "[" and "]" are used to call out references and property names.
- Ellipses (i.e., "...") indicate points of extensibility. Additional children and/or attributes MAY be
   added at the indicated extension points but MUST NOT contradict the semantics of the parent
   and/or owner, respectively. By default, if a receiver does not recognize an extension, the receiver
   SHOULD ignore the extension; exceptions to this processing rule, if any, are clearly indicated
   below.
- XML namespace prefixes (see Table 1) are used to indicate the namespace of the element being defined.
- 129
- Elements and Attributes defined by this specification are referred to in the text of this document using
   XPath 1.0 expressions. Extensibility points are referred to using an extended version of this syntax:
- An element extensibility point is referred to using {any} in place of the element name. This
   indicates that any element name can be used, from any namespace other than the namespace of
   this specification.

- An attribute extensibility point is referred to using @{any} in place of the attribute name. This
   indicates that any attribute name can be used, from any namespace other than the namespace of
   this specification.
- 138

139 In this document reference is made to the wsu:Id attribute and the wsu:Created and wsu:Expires 140 elements in a utility schema (http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-

- 141 1.0.xsd). The wsu:Id attribute and the wsu:Created and wsu:Expires elements were added to the
- 142 utility schema with the intent that other specifications requiring such an ID type attribute or timestamp
- 143 element could reference it (as is done here).
- 144

### 145 **1.6 Normative References**

146 147 148	[RFC2119]	S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, Harvard University, March 1997. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
149	[RFC2246]	IETF Standard, "The TLS Protocol", January 1999.
150		http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt
151	[SOAP]	W3C Note, "SOAP: Simple Object Access Protocol 1.1", 08 May 2000.
152		http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/NOTE-SOAP-20000508/
153 154	[SOAP12]	W3C Recommendation, "SOAP 1.2 Part 1: Messaging Framework", 24 June 2003.
155		http://www.w3.org/TR/2003/REC-soap12-part1-20030624/
156 157 158	[URI]	T. Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 3986, MIT/LCS, Day Software, Adobe Systems, January 2005.
159		http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3986.txt
160 161	[WS-Addressing]	W3C Recommendation, "Web Services Addressing (WS-Addressing)", 9 May 2006.
162		http://www.w3.org/TR/2006/REC-ws-addr-core-20060509
163 164	[WS-Policy]	W3C Recommendation, "Web Services Policy 1.5 - Framework", 04 September 2007.
165		http://www.w3.org/TR/2007/REC-ws-policy-20070904/
166 167		W3C Member Submission, "Web Services Policy 1.2 - Framework", 25 April 2006.
168		http://www.w3.org/Submission/2006/SUBM-WS-Policy-20060425/
169 170	[WS-PolicyAttachment]	W3C Recommendation, "Web Services Policy 1.5 - Attachment", 04 September 2007.
171		http://www.w3.org/TR/2007/REC-ws-policy-attach-20070904/
172 173		W3C Member Submission, "Web Services Policy 1.2 - Attachment", 25 April 2006.
174 175		http://www.w3.org/Submission/2006/SUBM-WS-PolicyAttachment-20060425/
176 177	[WS-Security]	OASIS Standard, "OASIS Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security 1.0 (WS-Security 2004)", March 2004.
178 179		http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0.pdf
180 181		OASIS Standard, "OASIS Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security 1.1 (WS-Security 2004)", February 2006.
182 183		http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/16790/wss-v1.1- spec-os-SOAPMessageSecurity.pdf

184	[XML-C14N]	W3C Recommendation, "Canonical XML Version 1.0", 15 March 2001.
185		http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315
186		W3C Recommendation, "Canonical XML Version 1.1", 2 May 2008.
187		http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xml-c14n11-20080502/
188		
189 190	[XML-Encrypt]	W3C Recommendation, "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing", 10 December 2002.
191		http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210/
192	[XML-Schema1]	W3C Recommendation, "XML Schema Part 1: Structures Second Edition",
193		28 October 2004.
194		http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-1-20041028/
195 196	[XML-Schema2]	W3C Recommendation, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes Second Edition", 28 October 2004.
197		http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-xmlschema-2-20041028/
198 199	[XML-Signature]	W3C Recommendation, "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", 12 February 2002.
200		http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210/
201		[W3C Recommendation, D. Eastlake et al. XML Signature Syntax and
202		Processing (Second Edition). 10 June 2008.
203		http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xmldsig-core-20080610/
204		

## 205 **1.7 Non-Normative References**

206 207	[Kerberos]	J. Kohl and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network 149 Authentication Service (V5)," RFC 1510, September 1993.
208		http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1510.txt
209 210	[WS-Federation]	"Web Services Federation Language," BEA, IBM, Microsoft, RSA Security, VeriSign, July 2003.
211	[WS-SecurityPolicy]	OASIS Committee Draft, "WS-SecurityPolicy 1.2", September 2006
212		http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-securitypolicy/200512
213 214	[X509]	S. Santesson, et al,"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates Profile."
215 216		http://www.itu.int/rec/recommendation.asp?type=items⟨=e&parent=T-REC-X.509-200003-I
217		

## 218 2 Web Services Trust Model

The Web service security model defined in WS-Trust is based on a process in which a Web service can require that an incoming message prove a set of claims (e.g., name, key, permission, capability, etc.). If a message arrives without having the required proof of claims, the service SHOULD ignore or reject the message. A service can indicate its required claims and related information in its policy as described by [WS-Policy] and [WS-PolicyAttachment] specifications.

224

Authentication of requests is based on a combination of OPTIONAL network and transport-provided security and information (claims) proven in the message. Requestors can authenticate recipients using network and transport-provided security, claims proven in messages, and encryption of the request using a key known to the recipient.


229

One way to demonstrate authorized use of a security token is to include a digital signature using the
 associated secret key (from a proof-of-possession token). This allows a requestor to prove a required set
 of claims by associating security tokens (e.g., PKIX, X.509 certificates) with the messages.

- If the requestor does not have the necessary token(s) to prove required claims to a service, it can contact appropriate authorities (as indicated in the service's policy) and request the needed tokens with the proper claims. These "authorities", which we refer to as *security token services*, may in turn require their own set of claims for authenticating and authorizing the request for security tokens.
   Security token services form the basis of trust by issuing a range of security tokens that can be used to broker trust relationships between different trust domains.
- This specification also defines a general mechanism for multi-message exchanges during token acquisition. One example use of this is a challenge-response protocol that is also defined in this specification. This is used by a Web service for additional challenges to a requestor to ensure message freshness and verification of authorized use of a security token.
- 243

This model is illustrated in the figure below, showing that any requestor may also be a service, and that the Security Token Service is a Web service (that is, it MAY express policy and require security tokens).

246



247

- 248 This general security model claims, policies, and security tokens subsumes and supports several
- 249 more specific models such as identity-based authorization, access control lists, and capabilities-based
- authorization. It allows use of existing technologies such as X.509 public-key certificates, XML-based

- tokens, Kerberos shared-secret tickets, and even password digests. The general model in combination
   with the [WS-Security] and [WS-Policy] primitives is sufficient to construct higher-level key exchange,
- authentication, policy-based access control, auditing, and complex trust relationships.
- 254

In the figure above the arrows represent possible communication paths; the requestor MAY obtain a token from the security token service, or it MAY have been obtained indirectly. The requestor then demonstrates authorized use of the token to the Web service. The Web service either trusts the issuing security token service or MAY request a token service to validate the token (or the Web service MAY validate the token itself).

260

In summary, the Web service has a policy applied to it, receives a message from a requestor that possibly
 includes security tokens, and MAY have some protection applied to it using [WS-Security] mechanisms.
 The following key steps are performed by the trust engine of a Web service (note that the order of
 processing is non-normative):

- Verify that the claims in the token are sufficient to comply with the policy and that the message conforms to the policy.
- 267
  2. Verify that the attributes of the claimant are proven by the signatures. In brokered trust models,
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- 3. Verify that the issuers of the security tokens (including all related and issuing security token) are
  trusted to issue the claims they have made. The trust engine MAY need to externally verify or
  broker tokens (that is, send tokens to a security token service in order to exchange them for other
  security tokens that it can use directly in its evaluation).
- 275

276 If these conditions are met, and the requestor is authorized to perform the operation, then the service can277 process the service request.

- 278 In this specification we define how security tokens are requested and obtained from security token
- 279 services and how these services MAY broker trust and trust policies so that services can perform step 3.
- 280 Network and transport protection mechanisms such as IPsec or TLS/SSL [RFC2246] can be used in
- conjunction with this specification to support different security requirements and scenarios. If available,
- requestors should consider using a network or transport security mechanism to authenticate the service
- 283 when requesting, validating, or renewing security tokens, as an added level of security.
- 284

The [WS-Federation] specification builds on this specification to define mechanisms for brokering and
 federating trust, identity, and claims. Examples are provided in [WS-Federation] illustrating different trust
 scenarios and usage patterns.

## 288 2.1 Models for Trust Brokering and Assessment

This section outlines different models for obtaining tokens and brokering trust. These methods depend on whether the token issuance is based on explicit requests (token acquisition) or if it is external to a message flow (out-of-band and trust management).

## 292 **2.2 Token Acquisition**

As part of a message flow, a request MAY be made of a security token service to exchange a security token (or some proof) of one form for another. The exchange request can be made either by a requestor or by another party on the requestor's behalf. If the security token service trusts the provided security
 token (for example, because it trusts the issuing authority of the provided security token), and the request
 can prove possession of that security token, then the exchange is processed by the security token
 service.

299

300 The previous paragraph illustrates an example of token acquisition in a direct trust relationship. In the

- 301 case of a delegated request (one in which another party provides the request on behalf of the requestor
- 302 rather than the requestor presenting it themselves), the security token service generating the new token
- 303 MAY NOT need to trust the authority that issued the original token provided by the original requestor
- 304 since it does trust the security token service that is engaging in the exchange for a new security token.
- 305 The basis of the trust is the relationship between the two security token services.

## 306 2.3 Out-of-Band Token Acquisition

The previous section illustrated acquisition of tokens. That is, a specific request is made and the token is obtained. Another model involves out-of-band acquisition of tokens. For example, the token may be sent from an authority to a party without the token having been explicitly requested or the token may have

- been obtained as part of a third-party or legacy protocol. In any of these cases the token is not received
- 311 in response to a direct SOAP request.

## 312 2.4 Trust Bootstrap

313 An administrator or other trusted authority MAY designate that all tokens of a certain type are trusted (e.g.

- all Kerberos tokens from a specific realm or all X.509 tokens from a specific CA). The security token
- 315 service maintains this as a trust axiom and can communicate this to trust engines to make their own trust
- 316 decisions (or revoke it later), or the security token service MAY provide this function as a service to 317 trusting services.
- 318 There are several different mechanisms that can be used to bootstrap trust for a service. These
- mechanisms are non-normative and are NOT REQUIRED in any way. That is, services are free to
- bootstrap trust and establish trust among a domain of services or extend this trust to other domains using
- 321 any mechanism.
- 322
- Fixed trust roots The simplest mechanism is where the recipient has a fixed set of trust relationships.
   It will then evaluate all requests to determine if they contain security tokens from one of the trusted roots.
- **Trust hierarchies** Building on the trust roots mechanism, a service MAY choose to allow hierarchies of trust so long as the trust chain eventually leads to one of the known trust roots. In some cases the recipient MAY require the sender to provide the full hierarchy. In other cases, the recipient MAY be able to dynamically fetch the tokens for the hierarchy from a token store.
- 330
- Authentication service Another approach is to use an authentication service. This can essentially be
   thought of as a fixed trust root where the recipient only trusts the authentication service. Consequently,
   the recipient forwards tokens to the authentication service, which replies with an authoritative statement
   (perhaps a separate token or a signed document) attesting to the authentication.

## **335 3 Security Token Service Framework**

- 336 This section defines the general framework used by security token services for token issuance.
- 337

A requestor sends a request, and if the policy permits and the recipient's requirements are met, then the requestor receives a security token response. This process uses the <wst:RequestSecurityToken> and <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> elements respectively. These elements are passed as the payload to specific WSDL ports (described in section 1.4) that are implemented by security token

- 342 services.
- 343
- 344 This framework does not define specific actions; each binding defines its own actions.
- 345 When requesting and returning security tokens additional parameters can be included in requests, or
- 346 provided in responses to indicate server-determined (or used) values. If a requestor specifies a specific
- 347 value that isn't supported by the recipient, then the recipient MAY fault with a wst:InvalidRequest (or
- a more specific fault code), or they MAY return a token with their chosen parameters that the requestor
- 349 MAY then choose to discard because it doesn't meet their needs.
- 350

The requesting and returning of security tokens can be used for a variety of purposes. Bindings define how this framework is used for specific usage patterns. Other specifications MAY define specific bindings and profiles of this mechanism for additional purposes.

- In general, it is RECOMMENDED that sources of requests be authenticated; however, in some cases an anonymous request MAY be appropriate. Requestors MAY make anonymous requests and it is up to the recipient's policy to determine if such requests are acceptable. If not a fault SHOULD be generated (but
- 357 is NOT REQUIRED to be returned for denial-of-service reasons).
- 358

The [WS-Security] specification defines and illustrates time references in terms of the *dateTime* type defined in XML Schema. It is RECOMMENDED that all time references use this type. It is further RECOMMENDED that all references be in UTC time. Requestors and receivers SHOULD NOT rely on other applications supporting time resolution finer than milliseconds. Implementations MUST NOT generate time instants that specify leap seconds. Also, any required clock synchronization is outside the scope of this document.

365

The following sections describe the basic structure of token request and response elements identifying the general mechanisms and most common sub-elements. Specific bindings extend these elements with binding-specific sub-elements. That is, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be viewed as patterns or templates on which specific bindings build.

## 370 3.1 Requesting a Security Token

371 The <wst:RequestSecurityToken> element (RST) is used to request a security token (for any

372 purpose). This element SHOULD be signed by the requestor, using tokens contained/referenced in the

373 request that are relevant to the request. If using a signed request, the requestor MUST prove any

374 required claims to the satisfaction of the security token service.

- 375 If a parameter is specified in a request that the recipient doesn't understand, the recipient SHOULD fault.
- The syntax for this element is as follows:

377 378 379 380 381 382	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken context="" xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
383	The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above:
384	/wst:RequestSecurityToken
385	This is a request to have a security token issued.
386	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/@Context
387 388 389 390	This OPTIONAL URI specifies an identifier/context for this request. All subsequent RSTR elements relating to this request MUST carry this attribute. This, for example, allows the request and subsequent responses to be correlated. Note that no ordering semantics are provided; that is left to the application/transport.
391	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:TokenType
392 393 394 395	This OPTIONAL element describes the type of security token requested, specified as a URI. That is, the type of token that will be returned in the <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse> message. Token type URIs are typically defined in token profiles such as those in the OASIS WSS TC.</wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse>
396	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:RequestType
397 398 399 400 401 402	The mandatory RequestType element is used to indicate, using a URI, the class of function that is being requested. The allowed values are defined by specific bindings and profiles of WS-Trust. Frequently this URI corresponds to the [WS-Addressing] Action URI provided in the message header as described in the binding/profile; however, specific bindings can use the Action URI to provide more details on the semantic processing while this parameter specifies the general class of operation (e.g., token issuance). This parameter is REQUIRED.
403	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:SecondaryParameters
404 405	If specified, this OPTIONAL element contains zero or more valid RST parameters (except wst:SecondaryParameters) for which the requestor is not the originator.
406 407 408 409 410	The STS processes parameters that are direct children of the <wst:requestsecuritytoken> element. If a parameter is not specified as a direct child, the STS MAY look for the parameter within the <wst:secondaryparameters> element (if present). The STS MAY filter secondary parameters if it doesn't trust them or feels they are inappropriate or introduce risk (or based on its own policy).</wst:secondaryparameters></wst:requestsecuritytoken>
411	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/{any}
412 413 414 415	This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional elements to be added. This allows requestors to include any elements that the service can use to process the token request. As well, this allows bindings to define binding-specific extensions. If an element is found that is not understood, the recipient SHOULD fault.
416	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/@{any}
417 418	This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added. If an attribute is found that is not understood, the recipient SHOULD fault.

## 419 **3.2 Returning a Security Token**

- 420 The <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> element (RSTR) is used to return a security token or
- 421 response to a security token request. The <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection>
- 422 element (RSTRC) MUST be used to return a security token or response to a security token request on the
- 423 final response.

424 425

426

427

428 In general, the returned token SHOULD be considered opague to the requestor. That is, the requestor 429 SHOULD NOT be required to parse the returned token. As a result, information that the requestor may 430 desire, such as token lifetimes, SHOULD be returned in the response. Specifically, any field that the requestor includes SHOULD be returned. If an issuer doesn't want to repeat all input parameters, then, at 431 432 a minimum, if the issuer chooses a value different from what was requested, the issuer SHOULD include 433 the parameters that were changed. 434 If a parameter is specified in a response that the recipient doesn't understand, the recipient SHOULD 435 fault. 436 In this specification the RSTR message is illustrated as being passed in the body of a message. 437 However, there are scenarios where the RSTR must be passed in conjunction with an existing application 438 message. In such cases the RSTR (or the RSTR collection) MAY be specified inside a header block. The exact location is determined by layered specifications and profiles; however, the RSTR MAY be 439 440 located in the <wsse:Security> header if the token is being used to secure the message (note that the 441 RSTR SHOULD occur before any uses of the token). The combination of which header block contains the RSTR and the value of the OPTIONAL @Context attribute indicate how the RSTR is processed. It 442 443 should be noted that multiple RSTR elements can be specified in the header blocks of a message. 444 It should be noted that there are cases where an RSTR is issued to a recipient who did not explicitly issue an RST (e.g. to propagate tokens). In such cases, the RSTR MAY be passed in the body or in a header 445 446 block. 447 The syntax for this element is as follows: 448 <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse Context="..." xmlns:wst="..."> 449 <wst:TokenType>...</wst:TokenType> 450 <wst:RequestedSecurityToken>...</wst:RequestedSecurityToken> 451 452 </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> 453 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above: /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse 454 455 This is the response to a security token request. 456 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/@Context 457 This OPTIONAL URI specifies the identifier from the original request. That is, if a context URI is specified on a RST, then it MUST be echoed on the corresponding RSTRs. For unsolicited 458 459 RSTRs (RSTRs that aren't the result of an explicit RST), this represents a hint as to how the 460 recipient is expected to use this token. No values are pre-defined for this usage; this is for use by specifications that leverage the WS-Trust mechanisms. 461 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:TokenType 462 463 This OPTIONAL element specifies the type of security token returned. /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:RequestedSecurityToken 464 465 This OPTIONAL element is used to return the requested security token. Normally the requested security token is the contents of this element but a security token reference MAY be used instead. 466 For example, if the requested security token is used in securing the message, then the security 467 468 token is placed into the <wsse:Security> header (as described in [WS-Security]) and a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element is placed inside of the 469 <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> element to reference the token in the <wsse:Security> 470 471 header. The response MAY contain a token reference where the token is located at a URI ws-trust-1.4-cd-02 29 October 2008 Copyright © OASIS® 1993-2008. All Rights Reserved .. Page 17 of 85

It should be noted that any type of parameter specified as input to a token request MAY be present on

response in order to specify the exact parameters used by the issuer. Specific bindings describe

appropriate restrictions on the contents of the RST and RSTR elements.

- 472 outside of the message. In such cases the recipient is assumed to know how to fetch the token
  473 from the URI address or specified endpoint reference. It should be noted that when the token is
  474 not returned as part of the message it cannot be secured, so a secure communication
  475 mechanism SHOULD be used to obtain the token.
- 476 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/{any}
- 477 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional elements to be added. If an element is 478 found that is not understood, the recipient SHOULD fault.
- 479 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/@{any}
- 480 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added. 481 If an attribute is found that is not understood, the recipient SHOULD fault.

### 482 **3.3 Binary Secrets**

It should be noted that in some cases elements include a key that is not encrypted. Consequently, the <xenc:EncryptedData> cannot be used. Instead, the <wst:BinarySecret> element can be used.
This SHOULD only be used when the message is otherwise protected (e.g. transport security is used or the containing element is encrypted). This element contains a base64 encoded value that represents an arbitrary octet sequence of a secret (or key). The general syntax of this element is as follows (note that the ellipses below represent the different containers in which this element MAY appear, for example, a <wst:Entropy> or <wst:RequestedProofToken> element):

- 490 .../wst:BinarySecret
- 491 This element contains a base64 encoded binary secret (or key). This can be either a symmetric 492 key, the private portion of an asymmetric key, or any data represented as binary octets.
- 493 .../wst:BinarySecret/@Type
- 494 This OPTIONAL attribute indicates the type of secret being encoded. The pre-defined values are 495 listed in the table below:

URI	Meaning
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws- trust/200512/AsymmetricKey	The private portion of a public key token is returned – this URI assumes both parties agree on the format of the octets; other bindings and profiles MAY define additional URIs with specific formats
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws- trust/200512/SymmetricKey	A symmetric key token is returned (default)
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws- trust/200512/Nonce	A raw nonce value (typically passed as entropy or key material)

### 496 .../wst:BinarySecret/@{any}

This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added.
If an attribute is found that is not understood, the recipient SHOULD fault.

### 499 **3.4 Composition**

500 The sections below, as well as other documents, describe a set of bindings using the model framework 501 described in the above sections. Each binding describes the amount of extensibility and composition with 502 other parts of WS-Trust that is permitted. Additional profile documents MAY further restrict what can be 503 specified in a usage of a binding.

## 504 **4 Issuance Binding**

505 Using the token request framework, this section defines bindings for requesting security tokens to be 506 issued:

507**Issue** – Based on the credential provided/proven in the request, a new token is issued, possibly508with new proof information.

509 For this binding, the following [WS-Addressing] actions are defined to enable specific processing context 510 to be conveyed to the recipient:

511 512

513

515

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RST/Issue http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/Issue http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTRC/IssueFinal

### 514 For this binding, the <wst:RequestType> element uses the following URI:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue

The mechanisms defined in this specification apply to both symmetric and asymmetric keys. As an example, a Kerberos KDC could provide the services defined in this specification to make tokens available; similarly, so can a public key infrastructure. In such cases, the issuing authority is the security token service. It should be noted that in practice, asymmetric key usage often differs as it is common to reuse existing asymmetric keys rather than regenerate due to the time cost and desire to map to a common public key. In such cases a request might be made for an asymmetric token providing the public key and provide token.

- key and proving ownership of the private key. The public key is then used in the issued token.
- 524 A public key directory is not really a security token service per se; however, such a service MAY
- 525 implement token retrieval as a form of issuance. It is also possible to bridge environments (security 526 technologies) using PKI for authentication or bootstrapping to a symmetric key.
- 527

528 This binding provides a general token issuance action that can be used for any type of token being 529 requested. Other bindings MAY use separate actions if they have specialized semantics.

530

531 This binding supports the OPTIONAL use of exchanges during the token acquisition process as well as 532 the OPTIONAL use of the key extensions described in a later section. Additional profiles are needed to 533 describe specific behaviors (and exclusions) when different combinations are used.

## 534 **4.1 Requesting a Security Token**

535 When requesting a security token to be issued, the following OPTIONAL elements MAY be included in 536 the request and MAY be provided in the response. The syntax for these elements is as follows (note that 537 the base elements described above are included here italicized for completeness):

```
538
               <wst:RequestSecurityToken xmlns:wst="...">
539
                   <wst:TokenType>...</wst:TokenType>
540
                   <wst:RequestType>...</wst:RequestType>
541
                   . . .
542
                   <wsp:AppliesTo>...</wsp:AppliesTo>
543
                   <wst:Claims Dialect="...">...</wst:Claims>
544
                   <wst:Entropy>
545
                         <wst:BinarySecret>...</wst:BinarySecret>
546
                    </wst:Entropy>
547
                   <wst:Lifetime>
```

548<wsu:Created>...</wsu:Created>549<wsu:Expires>...</wsu:Expires>550</wst:Lifetime>551</wst:RequestSecurityToken>

- 552 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above:
- 553 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:TokenType
- 554 If this OPTIONAL element is not specified in an issue request, it is RECOMMENDED that the OPTIONAL element <wsp:AppliesTo> be used to indicate the target where this token will be 555 used (similar to the Kerberos target service model). This assumes that a token type can be 556 557 inferred from the target scope specified. That is, either the <wst:TokenType> or the 558 <wsp:AppliesTo> element SHOULD be defined within a request. If both the 559 <wst:TokenType> and <wsp:AppliesTo> elements are defined, the <wsp:AppliesTo> element takes precedence (for the current request only) in case the target scope requires a 560 561 specific type of token.
- 562 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wsp:AppliesTo
- 563This OPTIONAL element specifies the scope for which this security token is desired for564example, the service(s) to which this token applies. Refer to [WS-PolicyAttachment] for more565information. Note that either this element or the <wst:TokenType> element SHOULD be566defined in a <wst:RequestSecurityToken> message. In the situation where BOTH fields567have values, the <wsp:AppliesTo> field takes precedence. This is because the issuing service568is more likely to know the type of token to be used for the specified scope than the requestor (and569because returned tokens should be considered opaque to the requestor).
- 570 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Claims
- 571 This OPTIONAL element requests a specific set of claims. Typically, this element contains 572 REQUIRED and/or OPTIONAL claim information identified in a service's policy.
- 573 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Claims/@Dialect
- 574 This REQUIRED attribute contains a URI that indicates the syntax used to specify the set of 575 requested claims along with how that syntax SHOULD be interpreted. No URIs are defined by 576 this specification; it is expected that profiles and other specifications will define these URIs and 577 the associated syntax.
- 578 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Entropy
- 579This OPTIONAL element allows a requestor to specify entropy that is to be used in creating the580key. The value of this element SHOULD be either a <xenc:EncryptedKey> or581<wst:BinarySecret> depending on whether or not the key is encrypted. Secrets SHOULD be582encrypted unless the transport/channel is already providing encryption.
- 583 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Entropy/wst:BinarySecret
- 584This OPTIONAL element specifies a base64 encoded sequence of octets representing the585requestor's entropy. The value can contain either a symmetric or the private key of an586asymmetric key pair, or any suitable key material. The format is assumed to be understood by587the requestor because the value space MAY be (a) fixed, (b) indicated via policy, (c) inferred from588the indicated token aspects and/or algorithms, or (d) determined from the returned token. (See589Section 3.3)
- 590 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Lifetime
- 591 This OPTIONAL element is used to specify the desired valid time range (time window during 592 which the token is valid for use) for the returned security token. That is, to request a specific time 593 interval for using the token. The issuer is not obligated to honor this range – they MAY return a 594 more (or less) restrictive interval. It is RECOMMENDED that the issuer return this element with 595 issued tokens (in the RSTR) so the requestor knows the actual validity period without having to 596 parse the returned token.

### 597 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Lifetime/wsu:Created

- 598 This OPTIONAL element represents the creation time of the security token. Within the SOAP 599 processing model, creation is the instant that the infoset is serialized for transmission. The 600 creation time of the token SHOULD NOT differ substantially from its transmission time. The 601 difference in time SHOULD be minimized. If this time occurs in the future then this is a request 602 for a postdated token. If this attribute isn't specified, then the current time is used as an initial 603 period.
- 604 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Lifetime/wsu:Expires
- 605This OPTIONAL element specifies an absolute time representing the upper bound on the validity606time period of the requested token. If this attribute isn't specified, then the service chooses the607lifetime of the security token. A Fault code (wsu:MessageExpired) is provided if the recipient608wants to inform the requestor that its security semantics were expired. A service MAY issue a609Fault indicating the security semantics have expired.
- 610

The following is a sample request. In this example, a username token is used as the basis for the request as indicated by the use of that token to generate the signature. The username (and password) is encrypted for the recipient and a reference list element is added. The <ds:KeyInfo> element refers to a <wsse:UsernameToken> element that has been encrypted to protect the password (note that the token has the *wsu:Id* of "myToken" prior to encryption). The request is for a custom token type to be returned.

617	<s11:envelope <="" th="" xmlns:s11="" xmlns:wsse="" xmlns:wsu=""></s11:envelope>
618	<pre>xmlns:xenc="" xmlns:wst=""&gt;</pre>
619	<s11:header></s11:header>
620	
621	<wsse:security></wsse:security>
622	<pre><xenc:referencelist></xenc:referencelist></pre>
623	<pre><xenc:encrypteddata id="encUsername"></xenc:encrypteddata></pre>
624	<ds:signature xmlns:ds=""></ds:signature>
625	
626	<ds:keyinfo></ds:keyinfo>
627	<pre><wsse:securitytokenreference></wsse:securitytokenreference></pre>
628	<pre><wsse:reference uri="#myToken"></wsse:reference></pre>
629	
630	
631	
632	
633	
634	
635	<s11:body wsu:id="req"></s11:body>
636	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
637	<wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype>
638	http://example.org/mySpecialToken
639	
640	<pre><wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype></pre>
641	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue
642	
643	
644	
645	

## 646 4.2 Request Security Token Collection

There are occasions where efficiency is important. Reducing the number of messages in a message

exchange pattern can greatly improve efficiency. One way to do this in the context of WS-Trust is to avoid
 repeated round-trips for multiple token requests. An example is requesting an identity token as well as
 tokens that offer other claims in a single batch request operation.

651

To give an example, imagine an automobile parts supplier that wishes to offer parts to an automobile manufacturer. To interact with the manufacturer web service the parts supplier may have to present a number of tokens, such as an identity token as well as tokens with claims, such as tokens indicating various certifications to meet supplier requirements.

656

It is possible for the supplier to authenticate to a trust server and obtain an identity token and then
subsequently present that token to obtain a certification claim token. However, it may be much more
efficient to request both in a single interaction (especially when more than two tokens are required).

660

662

661 Here is an example of a collection of authentication requests corresponding to this scenario:

663 <wst:RequestSecurityTokenCollection xmlns:wst="..."> 664 665 <!-- identity token request --> 666 <wst:RequestSecurityToken Context="http://www.example.com/1"> 667 <wst:TokenType> 668 http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-saml-token-profile-669 1.1#SAMLV2.0 670 </wst:TokenType> 671 <wst:RequestType>http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-672 trust/200512/BatchIssue</wst:RequestType> 673 <wsp:AppliesTo xmlns:wsp="..." xmlns:wsa="..."> 674 <wsa:EndpointReference> 675 <wsa:Address>http://manufacturer.example.com/</wsa:Address> 676 </wsa:EndpointReference> 677 </wsp:AppliesTo> 678 <wsp:PolicyReference xmlns:wsp="..." 679 URI='http://manufacturer.example.com/IdentityPolicy' /> 680 </wst:RequestSecurityToken> 681 682 <!-- certification claim token request --> 683 <wst:RequestSecurityToken Context="http://www.example.com/2"> 684 <wst:TokenType> 685 http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-saml-token-profile-686 1.1#SAMLV2.0 687 </wst:TokenType> 688 <wst:RequestType>http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512 689 /BatchIssue</wst:RequestType> 690 <wst:Claims xmlns:wsp="..."> 691 http://manufacturer.example.com/certification 692 </wst:Claims> 693 <wsp:PolicyReference 694 URI='http://certificationbody.example.org/certificationPolicy' /> 695 </wst:RequestSecurityToken> 696 </wst:RequestSecurityTokenCollection>

697

The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the overview above:

699

- 700 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenCollection
- 701The RequestSecurityTokenCollection (RSTC) element is used to provide multiple RST702requests. One or more RSTR elements in an RSTRC element are returned in the response to the703RequestSecurityTokenCollection.

## 704 4.2.1 Processing Rules

705		questSecurityTokenCollection (RSTC) element contains 2 or more
706	Reque	stSecurityToken elements.
707 708 709 710 711 712	1.	The single RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection response MUST contain at least one RSTR element corresponding to each RST element in the request. A RSTR element corresponds to an RST element if it has the same Context attribute value as the RST element. <b>Note:</b> Each request MAY generate more than one RSTR sharing the same Context attribute value
713		a. Specifically there is no notion of a deferred response
714 715		<ul> <li>If any RST request results in an error, then no RSTRs will be returned and a SOAP Fault will be generated as the entire response.</li> </ul>
716 717	2.	Every RST in the request MUST use an action URI value in the RequestType element that is a batch version corresponding to the non-batch version, in particular one of the following:
718		<ul> <li>http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/BatchIssue</li> </ul>
719		<ul> <li>http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/BatchValidate</li> </ul>
720		<ul> <li>http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/BatchRenew</li> </ul>
721		<ul> <li>http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/BatchCancel</li> </ul>
722		
723 724		These URIs MUST also be used for the [WS-Addressing] actions defined to enable specific processing context to be conveyed to the recipient.
725		
726 727		<b>Note:</b> that these operations require that the service can either succeed on all the RST requests or MUST NOT perform any partial operation.
728		
729 730	3.	All Signatures MUST reference the entire RSTC. One or more Signatures referencing the entire collection MAY be used.
731 732 733	4.	No negotiation or other multi-leg authentication mechanisms are allowed in batch requests or responses to batch requests; the communication with STS is limited to one RSTC request and one RSTRC response.
734 735 736	5.	This mechanism requires that every RST in a RSTC is to be handled by the single endpoint processing the RSTC.
737 738 739		error occurs in the processing of the RSTC or one of its contained RSTs, a SOAP fault MUST be ted for the entire batch request so no RSTC element will be returned.

## 740 **4.3 Returning a Security Token Collection**

The <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> element (RSTRC) MUST be used to return a
 security token or response to a security token request on the final response. Security tokens can only be

returned in the RSTRC on the final leg. One or more <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> elements

are returned in the RSTRC.

745 The syntax for this element is as follows:

- 746 747 748
   <sup>748</sup>
   <sup>748</sup>
   <sup>748</sup>
   <sup>749</sup> The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above:
   <sup>750</sup> /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection
   <sup>751</sup> This element contains one or more <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> elements for a
- 752 security token request on the final response.
- 753 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection/wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse
- 754 See section 4.4 for the description of the <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> element.

## 755 4.4 Returning a Security Token

When returning a security token, the following OPTIONAL elements MAY be included in the response.
Security tokens can only be returned in the RSTRC on the final leg. The syntax for these elements is as
follows (note that the base elements described above are included here italicized for completeness):

759	<wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse>
760	<pre><wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype></pre>
761	<pre><wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken></pre>
762	
763	<pre><wsp:appliesto xmlns:wsp=""></wsp:appliesto></pre>
764	<pre><wst:requestedattachedreference></wst:requestedattachedreference></pre>
765	
766	
767	<pre><wst:requestedunattachedreference></wst:requestedunattachedreference></pre>
768	
769	
770	<pre><wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken></pre>
771	<wst:entropy></wst:entropy>
772	<pre><wst:binarysecret></wst:binarysecret></pre>
773	
774	<wst:lifetime></wst:lifetime>
775	

- The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above:
- 777 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wsp:AppliesTo
- 778This OPTIONAL element specifies the scope to which this security token applies. Refer to [WS-779PolicyAttachment] for more information. Note that if an <wsp:AppliesTo> was specified in the780request, the same scope SHOULD be returned in the response (if a <wsp:AppliesTo> is781returned).
- 782 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:RequestedSecurityToken
- 783This OPTIONAL element is used to return the requested security token. This element is784OPTIONAL, but it is REQUIRED that at least one of <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> or785<wst:RequestedProofToken> be returned unless there is an error or part of an on-going786message exchange (e.g. negotiation). If returning more than one security token see section 4.3,787Returning Multiple Security Tokens.
- 788 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:RequestedAttachedReference
- Since returned tokens are considered opaque to the requestor, this OPTIONAL element is
   specified to indicate how to reference the returned token when that token doesn't support
   references using URI fragments (XML ID). This element contains a
   <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element that can be used *verbatim* to reference the token
   (when the token is placed inside a message). Typically tokens allow the use of *wsu:Id* so this
- relement isn't required. Note that a token MAY support multiple reference mechanisms; this
- 795 indicates the issuer's preferred mechanism. When encrypted tokens are returned, this element is

- not needed since the <xenc:EncryptedData> element supports an ID reference. If this
   element is not present in the RSTR then the recipient can assume that the returned token (when
   present in a message) supports references using URI fragments.
- 799 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:RequestedUnattachedReference
- 800In some cases tokens need not be present in the message. This OPTIONAL element is specified801to indicate how to reference the token when it is not placed inside the message. This element802contains a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element that can be used verbatim to803reference the token (when the token is not placed inside a message) for replies. Note that a token804MAY support multiple external reference mechanisms; this indicates the issuer's preferred805mechanism.
- 806 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:RequestedProofToken
- This OPTIONAL element is used to return the proof-of-possession token associated with the requested security token. Normally the proof-of-possession token is the contents of this element but a security token reference MAY be used instead. The token (or reference) is specified as the contents of this element. For example, if the proof-of-possession token is used as part of the
- 811 securing of the message, then it is placed in the <wsse:Security> header and a
- 812 <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element is used inside of the
- 813 <wst:RequestedProofToken> element to reference the token in the <wsse:Security>
- 814 header. This element is OPTIONAL, but it is REQUIRED that at least one of
- 815 <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> or <wst:RequestedProofToken> be returned unless
  816 there is an error.
- 817 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:Entropy
- 818 This OPTIONAL element allows an issuer to specify entropy that is to be used in creating the key.
- 819 The value of this element SHOULD be either a <xenc:EncryptedKey> or
- 820 <wst:BinarySecret> depending on whether or not the key is encrypted (it SHOULD be unless 821 the transport/channel is already encrypted).
- 822 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:Entropy/wst:BinarySecret
- This OPTIONAL element specifies a base64 encoded sequence of octets represent the responder's entropy. (See Section 3.3)
- 825 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:Lifetime
- 826This OPTIONAL element specifies the lifetime of the issued security token. If omitted the lifetime827is unspecified (not necessarily unlimited). It is RECOMMENDED that if a lifetime exists for a828token that this element be included in the response.

### 829 **4.4.1 wsp:AppliesTo in RST and RSTR**

- 830 Both the requestor and the issuer can specify a scope for the issued token using the <wsp:AppliesTo> 831 element. If a token issuer cannot provide a token with a scope that is at least as broad as that requested 832 by the requestor then it SHOULD generate a fault. This section defines some rules for interpreting the 833 various combinations of provided scope:
- If neither the requestor nor the issuer specifies a scope then the scope of the issued token is
   implied.
- If the requestor specifies a scope and the issuer does not then the scope of the token is assumed to be that specified by the requestor.
- If the requestor does not specify a scope and the issuer does specify a scope then the scope of
   the token is as defined by the issuers scope
- If both requestor and issuer specify a scope then there are two possible outcomes:
- 841oIf both the issuer and requestor specify the same scope then the issued token has that842scope.

- 843oIf the issuer specifies a wider scope than the requestor then the issued token has the<br/>scope specified by the issuer.
- The requestor and issuer MUST agree on the version of [WS-Policy] used to specify the scope of
   the issued token. The Trust13 assertion in [WS-SecurityPolicy] provides a mechanism to
   communicate which version of [WS-Policy] is to be used.
- 848
- 849 The following table summarizes the above rules:

Requestor wsp:AppliesTo	Issuer wsp:AppliesTo	Results
Absent	Absent	OK. Implied scope.
Present	Absent	OK. Issued token has scope specified by requestor.
Absent	Present	OK. Resulting token has scope specified by issuer.
Present	Present and matches Requestor	OK.
Present	Present and specifies a scope greater than specified by the requestor	OK. Issuer scope.

### 850 4.4.2 Requested References

851 The token issuer can OPTIONALLY provide <wst:RequestedAttachedReference> and/or <wst:RequestedUnattachedReference> elements in the RSTR. It is assumed that all token types can be referred to directly when present in a message. This section outlines the expected behaviour on behalf of clients and servers with respect to various permutations:

- If a <wst:RequestedAttachedReference> element is NOT returned in the RSTR then the client
   SHOULD assume that the token can be referenced by ID. Alternatively, the client MAY use token specific knowledge to construct an STR.
- If a <wst:RequestedAttachedReference> element is returned in the RSTR then the token cannot be referred to by ID. The supplied STR MUST be used to refer to the token.
- If a <wst:RequestedUnattachedReference> element is returned then the server MAY reference
   the token using the supplied STR when sending responses back to the client. Thus the client
   MUST be prepared to resolve the supplied STR to the appropriate token. Note: the server
   SHOULD NOT send the token back to the client as the token is often tailored specifically to the
   server (i.e. it may be encrypted for the server). References to the token in subsequent messages,
   whether sent by the client or the server, that omit the token MUST use the supplied STR.

### 866 **4.4.3 Keys and Entropy**

867 The keys resulting from a request are determined in one of three ways: specific, partial, and omitted.

- In the case of specific keys, a <wst:RequestedProofToken> element is included in the
   response which indicates the specific key(s) to use unless the key was provided by the requestor
   (in which case there is no need to return it).
- In the case of partial, the <wst:Entropy> element is included in the response, which indicates partial key material from the issuer (not the full key) that is combined (by each party) with the requestor's entropy to determine the resulting key(s). In this case a <wst:ComputedKey>

874element is returned inside the <wst:RequestedProofToken> to indicate how the key is875computed.

- In the case of omitted, an existing key is used or the resulting token is not directly associated with a key.
- 878

The decision as to which path to take is based on what the requestor provides, what the issuer provides, and the issuer's policy.

If the requestor does not provide entropy or issuer rejects the requestor's entropy, a proof-of possession token MUST be returned with an issuer-provided key.

If the requestor provides entropy and the responder doesn't (issuer uses the requestor's key),
 then a proof-of-possession token need not be returned.

- If both the requestor and the issuer provide entropy, then the partial form is used. Ideally both
   entropies are specified as encrypted values and the resultant key is never used (only keys
   derived from it are used). As noted above, the <wst:ComputedKey> element is returned inside
   the <wst:RequestedProofToken> to indicate how the key is computed.
- 889

Requestor	Issuer	Results
Provide Entropy	Uses requestor entropy as key	No proof-of-possession token is returned.
	Provides entropy	No keys returned, key(s) derived using entropy from both sides according to method identified in response
	Issues own key (rejects requestor's entropy)	Proof-of-possession token contains issuer's key(s)
No Entropy provided	Issues own key	Proof-of-possession token contains issuer's key(s)
	Does not issue key	No proof-of-possession token

890 The following table illustrates the rules described above:

### 891 **4.4.4 Returning Computed Keys**

As previously described, in some scenarios the key(s) resulting from a token request are not directly returned and must be computed. One example of this is when both parties provide entropy that is combined to make the shared secret. To indicate a computed key, the <wst:ComputedKey> element MUST be returned inside the <wst:RequestedProofToken> to indicate how the key is computed. The following illustrates a syntax overview of the <wst:ComputedKey> element:

897	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
898	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
899	<pre><wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken></pre>
900	<pre><wst:computedkey></wst:computedkey></pre>
901	
902	
903	

904

905 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above:

### 906 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:RequestedProofToken/wst:ComputedKey

907 908

909

The value of this element is a URI describing how to compute the key. While this can be extended by defining new URIs in other bindings and profiles, the following URI pre-defines one computed key mechanism:

URI	Meaning
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws- trust/200512/CK/PSHA1	The key is computed using P_SHA1 from the TLS specification to generate a bit stream using entropy from both sides. The exact form is: key = P_SHA1 (Ent <sub>REQ</sub> , Ent <sub>RES</sub> )
	It is RECOMMENDED that EntREQ be a string of length at least 128 bits.

910

This element MUST be returned when key(s) resulting from the token request are computed.

### 911 **4.4.5 Sample Response with Encrypted Secret**

912 The following illustrates the syntax of a sample security token response. In this example the token 913 requested in section 4.1 is returned. Additionally a proof-of-possession token element is returned 914 containing the secret key associated with the <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> encrypted for the 915 requestor (note that this assumes that the requestor has a shared secret with the issuer or a public key).

916 917	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst="">     <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
918	<wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken>
919	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
920	
921	
922	
923	<wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken>
924	<pre><xenc:encryptedkey id="newProof" xmlns:xenc=""></xenc:encryptedkey></pre>
925	
926	
927	
928	
929	
	,

### 930 4.4.6 Sample Response with Unencrypted Secret

The following illustrates the syntax of an alternative form where the secret is passed in the clear because the transport is providing confidentiality:

933	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
934	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
935	<pre><wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken></pre>
936	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
937	
938	
939	
940	<pre><wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken></pre>
941	<pre><wst:binarysecret></wst:binarysecret></pre>
942	
943	
944	

### 945 4.4.7 Sample Response with Token Reference

946 If the returned token doesn't allow the use of the *wsu:Id* attribute, then a

947 <wst:RequestedAttachedReference> is returned as illustrated below. The following illustrates the 948 syntax of the returned token has a URI which is referenced.

0.40	
949	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
950	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
951	<wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken>
952	<pre><xyz:customtoken id="urn:fabrikam123:5445" xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken></pre>
953	· · · · ·
954	
955	
956	<pre><wst:requestedattachedreference></wst:requestedattachedreference></pre>
957	<pre><wsse:securitytokenreference xmlns:wsse=""></wsse:securitytokenreference></pre>
958	<wsse:reference uri="urn:fabrikam123:5445"></wsse:reference>
959	
960	
961	
962	
963	

964

In the example above, the recipient may place the returned custom token directly into a message and
 include a signature using the provided proof-of-possession token. The specified reference is then placed
 into the <ds:KeyInfo> of the signature and directly references the included token without requiring the
 requestor to understand the details of the custom token format.

### 969 4.4.8 Sample Response without Proof-of-Possession Token

970 The following illustrates the syntax of a response that doesn't include a proof-of-possession token. For 971 example, if the basis of the request were a public key token and another public key token is returned with 972 the same public key, the proof-of-possession token from the original token is reused (no new proof-of-973 possession token is required).

974 975 976	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
977	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
978	
979	
980	
981	
982	

983

## 984 **4.4.9 Zero or One Proof-of-Possession Token Case**

In the zero or single proof-of-possession token case, a primary token and one or more tokens are
returned. The returned tokens either use the same proof-of-possession token (one is returned), or no
proof-of-possession token is returned. The tokens are returned (one each) in the response. The
following example illustrates this case. The following illustrates the syntax of a supporting security token
is returned that has no separate proof-of-possession token as it is secured using the same proof-ofpossession token that was returned.

991 992

993

994

<wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection xmlns:wst="...">
 <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
 <wst:RequestedSecurityToken>

995	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
996	
997	
998	
999	<pre><wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken></pre>
1000	<pre><xenc:encryptedkey id="newProof" xmlns:xenc=""></xenc:encryptedkey></pre>
1001	
1002	
1003	
1004	
1005	

## 1006 **4.4.10 More Than One Proof-of-Possession Tokens Case**

The second case is where multiple security tokens are returned that have separate proof-of-possession
tokens. As a result, the proof-of-possession tokens, and possibly lifetime and other key parameters
elements, MAY be different. To address this scenario, the body MAY be specified using the syntax
illustrated below:

1010	
1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
1020	The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above:
1021	/wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection
1022 1023 1024	This element is used to provide multiple RSTR responses, each of which has separate key information. One or more RSTR elements are returned in the collection. This MUST always be used on the final response to the RST.
1025	/wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection/wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse
1026	Each RequestSecurityTokenResponse element is an individual RSTR.
1027	/wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection/{any}
1028	This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional elements, based on schemas, to be added.
1029	/wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection/@{any}
1030	This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added.
1031 1032	The following illustrates the syntax of a response that includes multiple tokens each, in a separate RSTR, each with their own proof-of-possession token.
1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1046	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
1046	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>

1047 1048	<pre><wst:requestedsecuritytoken>         <abc:customtoken xmlns:abc=""></abc:customtoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken></pre>
1049	
1050	
1051	
1052	<pre><wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken></pre>
1053	<pre><xenc:encryptedkey "="" id="newProofB xmlns:xenc="></xenc:encryptedkey></pre>
1054	
1055	
1056	
1057	
1058	

## 1059 **4.5 Returning Security Tokens in Headers**

In certain situations it is useful to issue one or more security tokens as part of a protocol other than
RST/RSTR. This typically requires that the tokens be passed in a SOAP header. The tokens present in
that element can then be referenced from elsewhere in the message. This section defines a specific
header element, whose type is the same as that of the <wst:RequestSecurityTokenCollection>
element (see Section 4.3), that can be used to carry issued tokens (and associated proof tokens,
references etc.) in a message.

1066 1067 1068 1069 1070	<pre><wst:issuedtokens xmlns:wst="">     <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse>      </wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse>+     </wst:issuedtokens></pre>
1071	
1072	The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above:
1073	/wst:lssuedTokens
1074 1075	This header element carries one or more issued security tokens. This element schema is defined using the RequestSecurityTokenResponse schema type.
1076	/wst:lssuedTokens/wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse
1077	This element MUST appear at least once. Its meaning and semantics are as defined in Section 4.2.
1078	/wst:lssuedTokens/{any}
1079	This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional elements, based on schemas, to be addec
1080	/wst:lssuedTokens/@{any}
1081	This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added
1082	
1083 1084 1085 1086 1087	There MAY be multiple instances of the <wst:issuedtokens> header in a given message. Such instances MAY be targeted at the same actor/role. Intermediaries MAY add additional <wst:issuedtokens> header elements to a message. Intermediaries SHOULD NOT modify any <wst:issuedtokens> header already present in a message.</wst:issuedtokens></wst:issuedtokens></wst:issuedtokens>
1088 1089 1090 1091 1092 1093	It is RECOMMENDED that the <wst:issuedtokens> header be signed to protect the integrity of the issued tokens and of the issuance itself. If confidentiality protection of the <wst:issuedtokens> header REQUIRED then the entire header MUST be encrypted using the <wsel1:encryptedheader> construe This helps facilitate re-issuance by the receiving party as that party can re-encrypt the entire header for another party rather than having to extract and re-encrypt portions of the header.</wsel1:encryptedheader></wst:issuedtokens></wst:issuedtokens>

```
1094
1095
            <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
1096
            <S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="..." xmlns:wst="..." xmlns:wsp="..." xmlns:ds="..."
1097
            xmlns:x="...">
1098
               <S11:Header>
1099
                <wst:IssuedTokens>
1100
                  <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
1101
                    <wsp:AppliesTo>
1102
                      <x:SomeContext1 />
1103
                    </wsp:AppliesTo>
1104
                    <wst:RequestedSecurityToken>
1105
                    . . .
1106
                    </wst:RequestedSecurityToken>
1107
                    . . .
1108
                  </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
1109
                  <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
1110
                    <wsp:AppliesTo>
1111
                      <x:SomeContext1 />
1112
                    </wsp:AppliesTo>
1113
                    <wst:RequestedSecurityToken>
1114
                    . . .
1115
                    </wst:RequestedSecurityToken>
1116
                    . . .
1117
                  </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
1118
                </wst:IssuedTokens>
1119
                <wst:IssuedTokens S11:role="http://example.org/somerole" >
1120
                  <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
1121
                    <wsp:AppliesTo>
1122
                        <x:SomeContext2 />
1123
                    </wsp:AppliesTo>
1124
                    <wst:RequestedSecurityToken>
1125
                    . . .
1126
                    </wst:RequestedSecurityToken>
1127
                    . . .
1128
                  </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
1129
                </wst:IssuedTokens>
1130
              </S11:Header>
1131
              <S11:Body>
1132
1133
              </S11:Body>
1134
            </S11:Envelope>
```

The following example illustrates a response that includes multiple <wst:lssuedTokens> headers.

5	Renewal Binding
	ng the token request framework, this section defines bindings for requesting security tokens to be eved:
	<b>Renew</b> – A previously issued token with expiration is presented (and possibly proven) and the same token is returned with new expiration semantics.
	this binding, the following actions are defined to enable specific processing context to be conveyed t recipient:
	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RST/Renew http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/Renew http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/RenewFinal
For	this binding, the <wst:requesttype> element uses the following URI:</wst:requesttype>
	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Renew
	this binding the token to be renewed is identified in the <wst:renewtarget> element and the FIONAL <wst:lifetime> element MAY be specified to request a specified renewal duration.</wst:lifetime></wst:renewtarget>
algo opp	er extensions MAY be specified in the request (and the response), but the key semantics (size, type, withms, scope, etc.) MUST NOT be altered during renewal. Token services MAY use renewal as an ortunity to rekey, so the renewal responses MAY include a new proof-of-possession token as well as opy and key exchange elements.
requ	request MUST prove authorized use of the token being renewed unless the recipient trusts the lestor to make third-party renewal requests. In such cases, the third-party requestor MUST prove its tity to the issuer so that appropriate authorization occurs.
The	original proof information SHOULD be proven during renewal.
	renewal binding allows the use of exchanges during the renewal process. Subsequent profiles MAN ne restriction around the usage of exchanges.
All r	ng renewal, all key bearing tokens used in the renewal request MUST have an associated signature non-key bearing tokens MUST be signed. Signature confirmation is RECOMMENDED on the renewa nonse.
for t	renewal binding also defines several extensions to the request and response elements. The syntax hese extension elements is as follows (note that the base elements described above are included e italicized for completeness):
	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst="">     <wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype>     <wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype>      <wst:renewtarget></wst:renewtarget>     <wst:allowpostdating></wst:allowpostdating></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>

1178 1179	<pre><wst:renewing allow="" ok=""></wst:renewing> </pre>
1180	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:RenewTarget
1181 1182 1183	This REQUIRED element identifies the token being renewed. This MAY contain a <pre><wsse:securitytokenreference> pointing at the token to be renewed or it MAY directly contain the token to be renewed.</wsse:securitytokenreference></pre>
1184	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:AllowPostdating
1185 1186 1187	This OPTIONAL element indicates that returned tokens SHOULD allow requests for postdated tokens. That is, this allows for tokens to be issued that are not immediately valid (e.g., a token that can be used the next day).
1188	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Renewing
1189	This OPTIONAL element is used to specify renew semantics for types that support this operation.
1190	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Renewing/@Allow
1191 1192 1193 1194	This OPTIONAL Boolean attribute is used to request a renewable token. If not specified, the default value is <i>true</i> . A renewable token is one whose lifetime can be extended. This is done using a renewal request. The recipient MAY allow renewals without demonstration of authorized use of the token or they MAY fault.
1195	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Renewing/@OK
1196 1197 1198 1199 1200 1201 1202	This OPTIONAL Boolean attribute is used to indicate that a renewable token is acceptable if the requested duration exceeds the limit of the issuance service. That is, if <i>true</i> then tokens can be renewed after their expiration. It should be noted that the token is NOT valid after expiration for any operation except renewal. The default for this attribute is <i>false</i> . It NOT RECOMMENDED to use this as it can leave you open to certain types of security attacks. Issuers MAY restrict the period after expiration during which time the token can be renewed. This window is governed by the issuer's policy.
1203	The following example illustrates a request for a custom token that can be renewed.
1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst="">     <wst:tokentype>         http://example.org/mySpecialToken     </wst:tokentype>         wst:RequestType&gt;         http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue          <wst:requesttype>         <wst:renewing></wst:renewing>     </wst:requesttype></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
1213	
1214 1215 1216	The following example illustrates a subsequent renewal request and response (note that for brevity only the request and response are illustrated). Note that the response includes an indication of the lifetime of the renewed token.
1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>

1229	<wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse>
1230	<wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype>
1231	http://example.org/mySpecialToken
1232	
1233	<pre><wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken></pre>
1234	<wst:lifetime></wst:lifetime>
1235	
1236	

#### 6 Cancel Binding 1237 Using the token request framework, this section defines bindings for requesting security tokens to be 1238 1239 cancelled: 1240 Cancel – When a previously issued token is no longer needed, the Cancel binding can be used to cancel the token, terminating its use. After canceling a token at the issuer, a STS MUST not 1241 validate or renew the token. A STS MAY initiate the revocation of a token, however, revocation is 1242 1243 out of scope of this specification and a client MUST NOT rely on it. If a client needs to ensure the validity of a token, it MUST validate the token at the issuer. 1244 1245 1246 For this binding, the following actions are defined to enable specific processing context to be conveyed to 1247 the recipient: 1248 http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RST/Cancel 1249 http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/Cancel 1250 http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/CancelFinal 1251 For this binding, the <wst:RequestType> element uses the following URI: 1252 http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Cancel 1253 Extensions MAY be specified in the request (and the response), but the semantics are not defined by this 1254 binding. 1255 1256 The request MUST prove authorized use of the token being cancelled unless the recipient trusts the 1257 requestor to make third-party cancel requests. In such cases, the third-party requestor MUST prove its 1258 identity to the issuer so that appropriate authorization occurs. 1259 In a cancel request, all key bearing tokens specified MUST have an associated signature. All non-key 1260 bearing tokens MUST be signed. Signature confirmation is RECOMMENDED on the closure response. 1261 1262 A cancelled token is no longer valid for authentication and authorization usages. 1263 On success a cancel response is returned. This is an RSTR message with the 1264 <wst:RequestedTokenCancelled> element in the body. On failure, a Fault is raised. It should be 1265 noted that the cancel RSTR is informational. That is, the security token is cancelled once the cancel 1266 request is processed. 1267 1268 The syntax of the request is as follows: 1269 <wst:RequestSecurityToken xmlns:wst="..."> 1270 <wst:RequestType>...</wst:RequestType> 1271 1272 <wst:CancelTarget>...</wst:CancelTarget> 1273 </wst:RequestSecurityToken> 1274 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:CancelTarget 1275 This REQUIRED element identifies the token being cancelled. Typically this contains a 1276 <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> pointing at the token, but it could also carry the token 1277 directly. 1278 The following example illustrates a request to cancel a custom token. 1279 <S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="..." xmlns:wst="..." xmlns:wsse="...">

1280	<s11:header></s11:header>
1281	<pre><wsse:security></wsse:security></pre>
1282	
1283	
1284	
1285	<s11:body></s11:body>
1286	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
1287	<pre><wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype></pre>
1288	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Cancel
1289	<pre></pre>
1290	<pre></pre>
1291	
1292	<pre>/wst:CancelTarget&gt;</pre>
1293	
1294	
1295	
1235	
1296 The	following example illustrates a response to cancel a custom token.
1297	<s11:envelope xmlns:s11="" xmlns:wsse="" xmlns:wst=""></s11:envelope>
1298	<s11:header></s11:header>
1299	<wsse:security></wsse:security>
1300	
1301	
1302	
1303	<s11:body></s11:body>
1304	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
1305	<pre><wst:requestedtokencancelled></wst:requestedtokencancelled></pre>

# 1308 </S11:Envelope> 1309 6.1 STS-initiated Cancel Binding

</S11:Body>

</wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>

1310 Using the token request framework, this section defines an OPTIONAL binding for requesting security1311 tokens to be cancelled by the STS:

- 1312STS-initiated Cancel When a previously issued token becomes invalid on the STS, the STS-1313initiated Cancel binding can be used to cancel the token, terminating its use. After canceling a1314token, a STS MUST not validate or renew the token. This binding can be only used when STS1315can send one-way messages to the original token requestor.
- 1316

1306

1307

1317 For this binding, the following actions are defined to enable specific processing context to be conveyed to 1318 the recipient:

1319	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RST/STSCancel	
1320	For this binding, the <wst:requesttype> element uses the following URI:</wst:requesttype>	
1321	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/STSCancel	
1322	Extensions MAY be specified in the request, but the semantics are not defined by this binding.	
1323		
1224	The request MUST prove authorized use of the token being cancelled unless the recipient trusts the	

- The request MUST prove authorized use of the token being cancelled unless the recipient trusts the requestor to make third-party cancel requests. In such cases, the third-party requestor MUST prove its identity to the issuer so that appropriate authorization occurs.
- 1327 In a cancel request, all key bearing tokens specified MUST have an associated signature. All non-key1328 bearing tokens MUST be signed.
- 1329

1330 1331	A cancelled token is no longer valid for authentication and authorization usages.	
1332 1333 1334 1335 1336	The mechanism to determine the availability of STS-initiated Cancel binding on the STS is out of scope o this specification. Similarly, how the client communicates its endpoint address to the STS so that it can send the STSCancel messages to the client is out of scope of this specification. This functionality is implementation specific and can be solved by different mechanisms that are not in scope for this specification.	
1337		
1338	This is a one-way operation, no response is returned from the recipient of the message.	
1339		
1340	The syntax of the request is as follows:	
1341 1342 1343 1344 1345	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>	
1346	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:CancelTarget	
1347 1348 1349	This REQUIRED element identifies the token being cancelled. Typically this contains a <pre><wsse:securitytokenreference> pointing at the token, but it could also carry the token directly.</wsse:securitytokenreference></pre>	
1350	The following example illustrates a request to cancel a custom token.	
1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367	xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"? <s11:envelope xmlns:s11="" xmlns:wsse="" xmlns:wst=""> <s11:header> <wsse:security>  </wsse:security></s11:header> <s11:body> <wst:requestsecuritytoken> <wst:requesttype> http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/STSCancel </wst:requesttype>     </wst:requestsecuritytoken> </s11:body></s11:envelope>	
1368		

1369	7 Validation Binding
1370 1371	Using the token request framework, this section defines bindings for requesting security tokens to be validated:
1372 1373	<b>Validate</b> – The validity of the specified security token is evaluated and a result is returned. The result MAY be a status, a new token, or both.
1374	
1375 1376 1377 1378	It should be noted that for this binding, a SOAP Envelope MAY be specified as a "security token" if the requestor desires the envelope to be validated. In such cases the recipient SHOULD understand how to process a SOAP envelope and adhere to SOAP processing semantics (e.g., mustUnderstand) of the version of SOAP used in the envelope. Otherwise, the recipient SHOULD fault.
1379 1380	For this binding, the following actions are defined to enable specific processing context to be conveyed to the recipient:
1381 1382 1383	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RST/Validate http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/Validate http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/ValidateFinal
1384	
1385	For this binding, the <wst:requesttype> element contains the following URI:</wst:requesttype>
1386	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Validate
1387	
1388 1389 1390	The request provides a token upon which the request is based and OPTIONAL tokens. As well, the OPTIONAL <wst:tokentype> element in the request can indicate desired type response token. This MAY be any supported token type or it MAY be the following URI indicating that only status is desired:</wst:tokentype>
1391	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/Status
1392	
1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398	For some use cases a status token is returned indicating the success or failure of the validation. In other cases a security token MAY be returned and used for authorization. This binding assumes that the validation requestor and provider are known to each other and that the general issuance parameters beyond requesting a token type, which is OPTIONAL, are not needed (note that other bindings and profiles could define different semantics).
1399 1400 1401 1402	For this binding an applicability scope (e.g., <wsp:appliesto>) need not be specified. It is assumed that the applicability of the validation response relates to the provided information (e.g. security token) as understood by the issuing service.</wsp:appliesto>
1403	The validation binding does not allow the use of exchanges.
1404 1405 1406	The RSTR for this binding carries the following element even if a token is returned (note that the base elements described above are included here italicized for completeness):
1407 1408 1409 1410 1411	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst="">     <wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype>     <wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype>     <wst:validatetarget></wst:validatetarget></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>

1412		
1413		
1414	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse xmlns:wst="&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;."></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>	
1415	<wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype>	
1416	<pre><wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken></pre>	stedSecurityToken>
1417		
1418 1419	<pre><wst:status></wst:status></pre>	
1419	<pre><wst.code></wst.code> <wst:reason></wst:reason></pre>	
1421		
1422		
1423		
1 1 2 1	(untributed to a unity Taken (untributed to Target	
1424	/wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:ValidateTarget	
1425	This REQUIRED element identifies the token being validated. Typically this contains a	
1426	<pre><wsse:securitytokenreference> pointing at the tok</wsse:securitytokenreference></pre>	en, but could also carry the token
1427	directly.	
1428	/wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:Status	
1429	When a validation request is made, this element MUST be	e in the response. The code value
1430	indicates the results of the validation in a machine-readab	
1431	element allows for human textual display.	
1432	/wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:Status/wst:Code	
1433	This REQUIRED URI value provides a machine-readable	status code. The following URIs are
1434	predefined, but others MAY be used.	Ū.
	URI	Description
	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/status/valid	The Trust service

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/status/valid	The Trust service successfully validated the input
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/status/invalid	The Trust service did not successfully validate the input

- 1435 /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/wst:Status/wst:Reason
  - This OPTIONAL string provides human-readable text relating to the status code.
- 1436 1437

1438 The following illustrates the syntax of a validation request and response. In this example no token is 1439 requested, just a status.

1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
1448	
1449 1450 1451 1452	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>

1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459	<pre><wst:status></wst:status></pre>
	following illustrates the syntax of a validation request and response. In this example a custom token quested indicating authorized rights in addition to the status.
1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
1470	
1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>


# 1483 8 Negotiation and Challenge Extensions

The general security token service framework defined above allows for a simple request and response for
security tokens (possibly asynchronous). However, there are many scenarios where a set of exchanges
between the parties is REQUIRED prior to returning (e.g., issuing) a security token. This section
describes the extensions to the base WS-Trust mechanisms to enable exchanges for negotiation and
challenges.

#### 1489

1490 There are potentially different forms of exchanges, but one specific form, called "challenges", provides 1491 mechanisms in addition to those described in [WS-Security] for authentication. This section describes 1492 how general exchanges are issued and responded to within this framework. Other types of exchanges 1493 include, but are not limited to, negotiation, tunneling of hardware-based processing, and tunneling of 1494 legacy protocols.

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- 1495
- 1496 The process is straightforward (illustrated here using a challenge):
- 1497



- 14991. A requestor sends, for example, a <wst:RequestSecurityToken> message with a1500timestamp.
- The recipient does not trust the timestamp and issues a
   swst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> message with an embedded challenge.
- 15033. The requestor sends a <wst:RequestSecurityTokenReponse> message with an answer to1504the challenge.
- 15054. The recipient issues a <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> message with1506the issued security token and OPTIONAL proof-of-possession token.
- 1507
- 1508 It should be noted that the requestor might challenge the recipient in either step 1 or step 3. In which
- 1509 case, step 2 or step 4 contains an answer to the initiator's challenge. Similarly, it is possible that steps 21510 and 3 could iterate multiple times before the process completes (step 4).
- 1511
- 1512 The two services can use [WS-SecurityPolicy] to state their requirements and preferences for security
- 1513 tokens and encryption and signing algorithms (general policy intersection). This section defines
- 1514 mechanisms for legacy and more sophisticated types of negotiations.

#### 1515 8.1 Negotiation and Challenge Framework

1516 1517	-	neral mechanisms defined for requesting and returning security tokens are extensible. This describes the general model for extending these to support negotiations and challenges.
1518		
1519	The ex	change model is as follows:
1520 1521	1.	A request is initiated with a <wst:requestsecuritytoken> that identifies the details of the request (and MAY contain initial negotiation/challenge information)</wst:requestsecuritytoken>
1522 1523 1524 1525	2.	A response is returned with a <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse> that contains additional negotiation/challenge information. Optionally, this MAY return token information in the form of a <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection> (if the exchange is two legs long).</wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse>
1526 1527 1528	3.	If the exchange is not complete, the requestor uses a <pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse> that contains additional negotiation/challenge information.</wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
1529 1530 1531 1532	4.	The process repeats at step 2 until the negotiation/challenge is complete (a token is returned or a Fault occurs). In the case where token information is returned in the final leg, it is returned in the form of a <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection>.</wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection>
1533 1534 1535		gotiation/challenge information is passed in binding/profile-specific elements that are placed inside <wst:requestsecuritytoken> and <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse> elements.</wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytoken>
1536	It is RE	COMMENDED that at least the <wsu:timestamp> element be included in messages (as per</wsu:timestamp>

1536 It is RECOMMENDED that at least the <wsu:Timestamp> element be included in messages (as per 1537 [WS-Security]) as a way to ensure freshness of the messages in the exchange. Other types of

1538 challenges MAY also be included. For example, a <wsp:Policy> element may be used to negotiate

1539 desired policy behaviors of both parties. Multiple challenges and responses MAY be included.

## 1540 8.2 Signature Challenges

1541 Exchange requests are issued by including an element that describes the exchange (e.g. challenge) and 1542 responses contain an element describing the response. For example, signature challenges are 1543 processed using the <wst:SignChallenge> element. The response is returned in a 1544 <wst:SignChallengeResponse> element. Both the challenge and the response elements are 1545 specified within the <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> element. Some forms of negotiation 1546 MAY specify challenges along with responses to challenges from the other party. It should be noted that 1547 the requestor MAY provide exchange information (e.g. a challenge) to the recipient in the initial request. 1548 Consequently, these elements are also allowed within a <wst:RequestSecurityToken> element.

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1550 The syntax of these elements is as follows:

- 1559 The following describes the attributes and tags listed in the schema above:
- 1560 .../wst:SignChallenge
- 1561 This OPTIONAL element describes a challenge that requires the other party to sign a specified 1562 set of information.

#### 1563 .../wst:SignChallenge/wst:Challenge

1564 This REQUIRED string element describes the value to be signed. In order to prevent certain types of attacks (such as man-in-the-middle), it is strongly RECOMMENDED that the challenge 1565 1566 be bound to the negotiation. For example, the challenge SHOULD track (such as using a digest 1567 of) any relevant data exchanged such as policies, tokens, replay protection, etc. As well, if the 1568 challenge is happening over a secured channel, a reference to the channel SHOULD also be included. Furthermore, the recipient of a challenge SHOULD verify that the data tracked 1569 1570 (digested) matches their view of the data exchanged. The exact algorithm MAY be defined in profiles or agreed to by the parties. 1571

- 1572 .../SignChallenge/{any}
- 1573 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional negotiation types to be used.
- 1574 .../wst:SignChallenge/@{any}
- 1575This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added1576to the element.
- 1577 .../wst:SignChallengeResponse
- 1578 This OPTIONAL element describes a response to a challenge that requires the signing of a 1579 specified set of information.
- 1580 .../wst:SignChallengeResponse/wst:Challenge
- 1581If a challenge was issued, the response MUST contain the challenge element exactly as1582received. As well, while the RSTR response SHOULD always be signed, if a challenge was1583issued, the RSTR MUST be signed (and the signature coupled with the message to prevent1584replay).
- 1585 .../wst:SignChallengeResponse/{any}
- 1586 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional negotiation types to be used.
- 1587 .../wst:SignChallengeResponse/@{any}
- 1588This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added1589to the element.

#### 1590 8.3 User Interaction Challenge

1591 User interaction challenge requests are issued by including the <InteractiveChallenge> element. The

- response is returned in a <InteractiveChallengeResponse> element. Both the challenge and response elements are specified within the <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> element. In some instances, the
- requestor may issue a challenge to the recipient or provide a response to an anticipated challenge from
- 1595 the recipient in the initial request. Consequently, these elements are also allowed within a
- 1596 <wst:RequestSecurityToken> element. The challenge/response exchange between client and server
- 1597 MAY be iterated over multiple legs before a final response is issued.
- 1598 Implementations SHOULD take into account the possibility that messages in either direction may be lost
- 1599 or duplicated. In the absence of a lower level protocol guaranteeing delivery of every message in order
- and exactly once, which retains the ordering of requests and responses traveling in opposite directions,
- 1601 implementations SHOULD observe the following procedures:
- 1602 The STS SHOULD:
- 1603 1. Never send a new request while an existing request is pending,

- 1604 2. Timeout requests and retransmit them.
- 1605 3. Silently discard responses when no request is pending.
- 1606

1607 The service consumer MAY:

- 1608 1. Respond to a repeated request with the same information
- 1609 2. Retain user input until the Challenge Interation is complete in case it is necessary to repeat the1610 response.
- 1611 Note that the xml:lang attribute may be used where allowed via attribute extensibility to specify a
- 1612 language of localized elements and attributes using the language codes specified in [RFC 3066].

#### 1613 8.3.1 Challenge Format

1614 The syntax of the user interaction challenge element is as follows:

1615	<pre><wst14:interactivechallenge xmlns:wst14=""></wst14:interactivechallenge></pre>
1616	<pre><wst14:title> xs:string </wst14:title> ?</pre>
1617	<pre><wstl4:textchallenge ?<="" label="xs:string" pre="" refid="xs:anyURI"></wstl4:textchallenge></pre>
1618	<pre>MaxLen="xs:int"? HideText="xs:boolean"?&gt;</pre>
1619	<pre><wstl4:image mimetype="xs:string"> xs:base64Binary </wstl4:image> ?</pre>
1620	*
1621	<pre><wstl4:choicechallenge ?<="" label="xs:string" pre="" refid="xs:anyURI"></wstl4:choicechallenge></pre>
1622	<pre>ExactlyOne="xs:boolean"?&gt;</pre>
1623	<pre><wst14:choice ?="" label="xs:string" refid="xs:anyURI"></wst14:choice></pre>
1624	<pre><wst14:image mimetype="xs:string"> xs:base64Binary </wst14:image> ?</pre>
1625	+
1626	*
1627	< wstl4:ContextData RefId="xs:anyURI"> xs:any  *
1628	
1629	

- 1630 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema outlined above:
- 1631

1633

- 1632 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge
  - A container element for a challenge that requires interactive user input.
- 1634 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:Title
- 1635An OPTIONAL element that specifies an overall title text to be displayed to the user (e.g. a title1636describing the purpose or nature of the challenge). How the preferred language of the requestor1637is communicated to the STS is left up to implementations.
- 1638 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:TextChallenge

1639 An OPTIONAL element that specifies a challenge that requires textual input from the user.

- 1640 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:TextChallenge/@RefId
- 1641A REQUIRED attribute that specifies a reference identifier for this challenge element which is1642used to correlate the corresponding element in the response to the challenge.
- 1643 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:TextChallenge/@MaxLen
- An OPTIONAL attribute that specifies the maximum length of the text string that is sent as the response to this text challenge. This value serves as a hint for the user interface software at the requestor which manifests the end-user experience for this challenge.

1647 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:TextChallenge/@HideText

1648An OPTIONAL attribute that specifies that the response to this text challenge MUST receive1649treatment as hidden text in any user interface. For example, the text entry may be displayed as a

- 1650series of asterisks in the user interface. This attribute serves as a hint for the user interface1651software at the requestor which manifests the end-user experience for this challenge.
- 1652 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:TextChallenge/@Label
- 1653 An OPTIONAL attribute that specifies a label for the text challenge item (e.g. a label for a text 1654 entry field) which will be shown to the user. How the preferred language of the requestor is 1655 communicated to the STS is left up to implementations.

#### 1656 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:TextChallenge/Image

- 1657An OPTIONAL element that contains a base64 encoded inline image specific to the text1658challenge item to be shown to the user (e.g. an image that the user must see to respond1659successfully to the challenge). The image presented is intended as an additional label to a1660challenge element which could be CAPTCHA, selection of a previously established image secret1661or any other means by which images can be used to challenge a user to interact in a way to1662satisfy a challenge.
- 1663 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:TextChallenge/Image/@MimeType
- 1664A REQUIRED attribute that specifies a MIME type (e.g., image/gif, image/jpg) indicating the1665format of the image.
- 1666 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:ChoiceChallenge
- 1667An OPTIONAL element that specifies a challenge that requires a choice among multiple items by1668the user.
- 1669 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:ChoiceChallenge/@Refld
- 1670 A REQUIRED attribute that specifies a reference identifier for this challenge element which is 1671 used to correlate the corresponding element in the response to the challenge.
- 1672 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:ChoiceChallenge/@Label
- 1673An OPTIONAL attribute that specifies a title label for the choice challenge item (e.g., a text1674header describing the list of choices as a whole) which will be shown to the user. How the1675preferred language of the requestor is communicated to the STS is left up to implementations.
- 1676 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:ChoiceChallenge/@ExactlyOne
- 1677An OPTIONAL attribute that specifies if exactly once choice must be selected by the user from1678among the child element choices. The absence of this attribute implies the value "false" which1679means multiple choices can be selected.
- 1680 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:ChoiceChallenge/wst14:Choice
- 1681 A REQUIRED element that specifies a single choice item within the choice challenge.
- 1682 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:ChoiceChallenge/wst14:Choice/@Refld
- 1683 A REQUIRED attribute that specifies a reference identifier for this specific choice item which is 1684 used to correlate the corresponding element in the response to the challenge.
- 1685 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:ChoiceChallenge/wst14:Choice/@Label
- 1686An OPTIONAL attribute that specifies a text label for the choice item (e.g., text describing the1687individual choice) which will be shown to the user. How the preferred language of the requestor is1688communicated to the STS is left up to implementations.
- 1689 .../wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:ChoiceChallenge/wst14:Choice/wst14:Image

1690An OPTIONAL element that contains a base64 encoded inline image specific to the choice item1691to be shown to the user (e.g. an image that the user must see to respond successfully to the1692challenge). The image presented is intended as an additional label to a challenge element which1693could be CAPTCHA, selection of a previously established image secret or any other means by1694which images can be used to challenge a user to interact in a way to satisfy a challenge.

1695	/wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:ChoiceChallenge/wst14:Choice/wst14:Image/@MimeType
1696 1697	A REQUIRED attribute that specifies a MIME type (e.g., image/gif, image/jpg) indicating the format of the image.
1698	/wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:ContextData
1699 1700 1701 1702 1703	An OPTIONAL element that specifies a value that MUST be reflected back in the response to the challenge (e.g., cookie). The element may contain any value. The actual content is opaque to the requestor; it is not required to understand its structure or semantics. This can be used by an STS, for instance, to store information between the challenge/response exchanges that would otherwise be lost if the STS were to remain stateless.
1704	/wst14:InteractiveChallenge/wst14:ContextData/@RefId
1705 1706	A REQUIRED attribute that specifies a reference identifier for this context element which is used to correlate the corresponding element in the response to the challenge.
1707	/wst14:InteractiveChallenge/{any}
1708	This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional elements to be specified.
1709	/wst14:InteractiveChallenge/@{any}
1710	This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes to be specified.
1711	
1712	The syntax of the user interaction challenge response element is as follows:
1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721	<pre><wstl4:interactivechallengeresponse xmlns:wstl4=""> <wstl4:textchallengeresponse refid="xs:anyURI"> xs:string </wstl4:textchallengeresponse> * <wstl4:choicechallengeresponse refid="xs:anyURI"> * <wstl4:choiceselected refid="xs:anyURI"></wstl4:choiceselected> * </wstl4:choicechallengeresponse> <wstl4:choicechallengeresponse> <wstl4:choicechallengeresponse> <wstl4:choicechallengeresponse> <wstl4:choicechallengeresponse> <wstl4:choicechallengeresponse> </wstl4:choicechallengeresponse> </wstl4:choicechallengeresponse> </wstl4:choicechallengeresponse> </wstl4:choicechallengeresponse> </wstl4:choicechallengeresponse>                              </wstl4:interactivechallengeresponse></pre>
1722	
1723	The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema outlined above:
1724	
1725	/wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse
1726	A container element for the response to a challenge that requires interactive user input.
1727	/wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse/wst14:TextChallengeResponse
1728	This element value contains the user input as the response to the original text challenge issued.
1729	/wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse/wst14:TextChallengeResponse/@RefId
1730 1731	A required attribute that specifies the identifier for the text challenge element in the original challenge which can be used for correlation.
1732	/wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse/wst14:ChoiceChallengeResponse
1733	A container element for the response to a choice challenge.
1734	/wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse/wst14:ChoiceChallengeResponse/@RefId
1735 1736	A required attribute that specifies the reference identifier for the choice challenge element in the original challenge which can be used for correlation.
1737	/wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse/wst14:ChoiceChallengeResponse/wst14:ChoiceSelected
1738	A required element that specifies a choice item selected by the user from the choice challenge.
1739	/wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse/wst14:ChoiceChallengeResponse/wst14:ChoiceSelected/@RefId
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- 1740 A required attribute that specifies the reference identifier for the choice item in the original choice 1741 challenge which can be used for correlation.
- 1742 .../wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse/wst14:ContextData
- 1743 An optional element that carries a context data item from the original challenge that is simply 1744 reflected back.
- 1745 .../wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse/wst14:ContextData/@Refld
- 1746 A required attribute that specifies the reference identifier for the context data element in the 1747 original challenge which can be used for correlation.
- 1748 .../wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse/{any}
- 1749 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional elements to be specified.
- 1750 .../wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse/@{any}
- 1751 This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes to be specified.
- 1752 In order to prevent certain types of attacks, such as man-in-the-middle or replay of response, the
- 1753 challenge SHOULD be bound to the response. For example, an STS may use the <ContextData>
- element in the challenge to include a digest of any relevant replay protection data and verify that thesame data is reflected back by the requestor.
- 1756 Text provided by the STS which is intended for display SHOULD NOT contain script, markup or other
  1757 unprintable characters. Image data provided by the STS SHOULD NOT contain imbedded commands or
  1758 other content except an image to be displayed.
- 1759 Service consumers MUST ignore any script, markup or other unprintable characters when displaying text
- 1760 sent by the STS. Service consumers MUST insure that image data does not contain imbedded
- 1761 commands or other content before displaying the image.

#### 1762 8.3.2 PIN and OTP Challenges

- 1763 In some situations, some additional authentication step may be required, but the Consumer cannot1764 determine this in advance of making the request. Two common cases that require user interaction are:
- a challenge for a secret PIN,
- a challenge for a one-time-password (OTP).
- 1767

1768 This challenge may be issued by an STS using the "text challenge" format within a user interaction 1769 challenge specified in the section above. A requestor responds to the challenge with the PIN/OTP value 1770 along with the corresponding @RefId attribute value for the text challenge which is used by the STS to 1771 correlate the response to the original challenge. This pattern of exchange requires that the requestor 1772 must receive the challenge first and thus learn the @RefId attribute value to include in the response.

1773

1774 There are cases where a requestor may know a priori that the STS challenges for a single PIN/OTP and, 1775 as an optimization, provide the response to the anticipated challenge in the initial request. The following

- 1776 distinguished URIs are defined for use as the value of the @RefId attribute of a
- 1777 <TextChallengeResponse> element to represent PIN and OTP responses using the optimization pattern.
   1778
- 1779http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200802/challenge/PIN1780http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200802/challenge/OTP

1781

1782 An STS may choose not to support the optimization pattern above for PIN/OTP response. In some cases,

an OTP challenge from the STS may include a dynamic random value that the requestor must feed into

the OTP generating module before an OTP response is computed. In such cases, the optimized responsepattern may not be usable.

## 1786 8.4 Binary Exchanges and Negotiations

Exchange requests MAY also utilize existing binary formats passed within the WS-Trust framework. A
generic mechanism is provided for this that includes a URI attribute to indicate the type of binary
exchange.

- 1790
- 1791 The syntax of this element is as follows:
- 1792<wst:BinaryExchange ValueType="..." EncodingType="..." xmlns:wst="...">1793</wst:BinaryExchange>
- The following describes the attributes and tags listed in the schema above (note that the ellipses below
   indicate that this element MAY be placed in different containers. For this specification, these are limited
   to <wst:RequestSecurityToken> and <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>):
- 1797 .../wst:BinaryExchange
- 1798This OPTIONAL element is used for a security negotiation that involves exchanging binary blobs1799as part of an existing negotiation protocol. The contents of this element are blob-type-specific1800and are encoded using base64 (unless otherwise specified).
- 1801 .../wst:BinaryExchange/@ValueType
- 1802This REQUIRED attribute specifies a URI to identify the type of negotiation (and the value space1803of the blob the element's contents).
- 1804 .../wst:BinaryExchange/@EncodingType
- 1805This REQUIRED attribute specifies a URI to identify the encoding format (if different from base64)1806of the negotiation blob. Refer to [WS-Security] for sample encoding format URIs.
- 1807 .../wst:BinaryExchange/@{any}
- 1808This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added1809to the element.
- 1810 Some binary exchanges result in a shared state/context between the involved parties. It is
- 1811 RECOMMENDED that at the conclusion of the exchange, a new token and proof-of-possession token be
- 1812 returned. A common approach is to use the negotiated key as a "secure channel" mechanism to secure
- 1813 the new token and proof-of-possession token.
- 1814 For example, an exchange might establish a shared secret Sx that can then be used to sign the final
- 1815 response and encrypt the proof-of-possession token.

### 1816 8.5 Key Exchange Tokens

- 1817 In some cases it MAY be necessary to provide a key exchange token so that the other party (either
- 1818 requestor or issuer) can provide entropy or key material as part of the exchange. Challenges MAY NOT 1819 always provide a usable key as the signature may use a signing-only certificate.
- 1820
- The section describes two OPTIONAL elements that can be included in RST and RSTR elements toindicate that a Key Exchange Token (KET) is desired, or to provide a KET.
- 1823 The syntax of these elements is as follows (Note that the ellipses below indicate that this element MAY be 1824 placed in different containers. For this specification, these are limited to



<wst:RequestKET xmlns:wst="..." />

<wst:KeyExchangeToken xmlns:wst="...">...</wst:KeyExchangeToken>

- 1830 The following describes the attributes and tags listed in the schema above:
- 1831 .../wst:RequestKET
- 1832 This OPTIONAL element is used to indicate that the receiving party (either the original requestor 1833 or issuer) SHOULD provide a KET to the other party on the next leg of the exchange.
- 1834 .../wst:KeyExchangeToken
- 1835This OPTIONAL element is used to provide a key exchange token. The contents of this element1836either contain the security token to be used for key exchange or a reference to it.

#### 1837 8.6 Custom Exchanges

Using the extensibility model described in this specification, any custom XML-based exchange can be
defined in a separate binding/profile document. In such cases elements are defined which are carried in
the RST and RSTR elements.

1841

1842 It should be noted that it is NOT REQUIRED that exchange elements be symmetric. That is, a specific
1843 exchange mechanism MAY use multiple elements at different times, depending on the state of the
1844 exchange.

#### 1845 8.7 Signature Challenge Example

Here is an example exchange involving a signature challenge. In this example, a service requests a
custom token using a X.509 certificate for authentication. The issuer uses the exchange mechanism to
challenge the requestor to sign a random value (to ensure message freshness). The requestor provides
a signature of the requested data and, once validated, the issuer then issues the requested token.

1850

1851 The first message illustrates the initial request that is signed with the private key associated with the 1852 requestor's X.509 certificate:

```
1853
            <S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="..." xmlns:wsse="..."
1854
                    xmlns:wsu="..." xmlns:wst="...">
1855
                <S11:Header>
1856
1857
                    <wsse:Security>
1858
                        <wsse:BinarySecurityToken
1859
                                wsu:Id="reqToken"
1860
                                ValueType="...X509v3">
1861
                            MIIEZzCCA9CgAwIBAgIQEmtJZc0...
1862
                        </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
1863
                        <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="...">
1864
                             . . .
1865
                          <ds:KeyInfo>
1866
                            <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
1867
                                 <wsse:Reference URI="#reqToken"/>
1868
                            </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
1869
                          </ds:KeyInfo>
1870
                        </ds:Signature>
1871
                    </wsse:Security>
1872
1873
                </S11:Header>
1874
                <S11:Body>
1875
                    <wst:RequestSecurityToken>
1876
                        <wst:TokenType>
```

```
http://example.org/mySpecialToken
1878
                        </wst:TokenType>
1879
                        <wst:RequestType>
1880
                            http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue
1881
                        </wst:RequestType>
1882
                    </wst:RequestSecurityToken>
1883
                </S11:Body>
1884
            </S11:Envelope>
```

1885

1886 The issuer (recipient) service doesn't trust the sender's timestamp (or one wasn't specified) and issues a 1887 challenge using the exchange framework defined in this specification. This message is signed using the 1888 private key associated with the issuer's X.509 certificate and contains a random challenge that the 1889 requestor must sign:

```
1890
            <S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="..." xmlns:wsse="..." xmlns:wsu="..."
1891
                    xmlns:wst="...">
1892
                <S11:Header>
1893
                    . . .
1894
                    <wsse:Security>
1895
                        <wsse:BinarySecurityToken
1896
                                wsu:Id="issuerToken"
1897
                                ValueType="...X509v3">
1898
                            DFJHuedsujfnrnv45JZc0...
1899
                        </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
1900
                        <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="...">
1901
1902
                        </ds:Signature>
1903
                   </wsse:Security>
1904
                   . . .
1905
                </S11:Header>
1906
                <S11:Body>
1907
                    <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
1908
                        <wst:SignChallenge>
1909
                            <wst:Challenge>Huehf...</wst:Challenge>
1910
                        </wst:SignChallenge>
1911
                    </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
1912
                </S11:Body>
1913
            </S11:Envelope>
```

1914

1915 The requestor receives the issuer's challenge and issues a response that is signed using the requestor's 1916 X.509 certificate and contains the challenge. The signature only covers the non-mutable elements of the 1917 message to prevent certain types of security attacks:

```
1918
            <S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="..." xmlns:wsse="..." xmlns:wsu="..."
1919
                    xmlns:wst="...">
1920
                <S11:Header>
1921
                    . . .
1922
                    <wsse:Security>
1923
                        <wsse:BinarySecurityToken
1924
                                wsu:Id="reqToken"
1925
                                ValueType="...X509v3">
1926
                            MIIEZzCCA9CgAwIBAgIQEmtJZc0...
1927
                        </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
1928
                        <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="...">
1929
1930
                        </ds:Signature>
1931
                    </wsse:Security>
1932
1933
                </S11:Header>
1934
                <S11:Body>
1935
                    <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
```

1936	<wst:signchallengeresponse></wst:signchallengeresponse>
1937	<wst:challenge>Huehf</wst:challenge>
1938	
1939	
1940	
1941	

The issuer validates the requestor's signature responding to the challenge and issues the requested
token(s) and the associated proof-of-possession token. The proof-of-possession token is encrypted for
the requestor using the requestor's public key.

1946	<s11:envelope <="" th="" xmlns:s11="" xmlns:wsse="" xmlns:wsu=""></s11:envelope>
1947	xmlns:wst="" xmlns:xenc="">
1948	<s11:header></s11:header>
1949	
1950	<wsse:security></wsse:security>
1951	<wsse:binarysecuritytoken< th=""></wsse:binarysecuritytoken<>
1952	wsu:Id="issuerToken"
1953	ValueType="X509v3">
1954	DFJHuedsujfnrnv45JZc0
1955	
1956	<ds:signature xmlns:ds=""></ds:signature>
1957	
1958	
1959	
1960	
1961	
1962	<s11:body></s11:body>
1963	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
1964	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
1965	<pre><wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken></pre>
1966	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
1967	
1968	
1969	
1970	<wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken>
1971	<pre><xenc:encryptedkey id="newProof"></xenc:encryptedkey></pre>
1972	
1973	
1974	
1975	
1976	
1977	
1978	

## 1979 8.8 Challenge Examples

### 1980 8.8.1 Text and choice challenge

Here is an example of a user interaction challenge using both text and choice challenges. In this example,
a user requests a custom token using a username/password for authentication. The STS uses the
challenge mechanism to challenge the user for additional information in the form of a secret question (i.e.,
Mother's maiden name) and an age group choice. The challenge additionally includes one contextual
data item that needs to be reflected back in the response. The user interactively provides the requested
data and, once validated, the STS issues the requested token. All messages are sent over a protected
transport using SSLv3.

1988

1990

1989 The requestor sends the initial request that includes the username/password for authentication as follows.

1991	<s11:envelope></s11:envelope>
1992	<s11:header></s11:header>
1993	
1994	<wsse:security></wsse:security>
1995	<wsse:usernametoken></wsse:usernametoken>
1996	<wsse:username>Zoe</wsse:username>
1997	<wsse:password< th=""></wsse:password<>
1998	Type="http://#PasswordText">ILoveDogs
1999	
2000	
2001	
2002	<s11:body></s11:body>
2003	<wst:requestsecuritytoken></wst:requestsecuritytoken>
2004	<pre><wst:tokentype>http://example.org/customToken</wst:tokentype></pre>
2005	<wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype>
2006	
2007	
2008	
2009	

The STS issues a challenge for additional information using the user interaction challenge mechanism as follows.

2012

2013	<s11:envelope></s11:envelope>
2014	<s11:header></s11:header>
2015	
2016	
2017	<s11:body></s11:body>
2018	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
2019	<pre><wst14:interactivechallenge xmlns:wst14=""></wst14:interactivechallenge></pre>
2020	<wstl4:title></wstl4:title>
2021	Please answer the following additional questions to login.
2022	
2023	<pre><wst14:textchallenge refid="http:///ref#text1&lt;/pre"></wst14:textchallenge></pre>
2024	Label="Mother's Maiden Name" MaxLen=80 />
2025	<pre><wst14:choicechallenge <="" pre="" refid="http:///ref#choiceGroupA"></wst14:choicechallenge></pre>
2026	Label="Your Age Group:" ExactlyOne="true">
2027	<pre><wst14:choice label="18-30" refid="http:///ref#choice1"></wst14:choice></pre>
2028	<pre><wst14:choice label="31-40" refid="http:///ref#choice2"></wst14:choice></pre>
2029	<pre><wst14:choice label="41-50" refid="http:///ref#choice3"></wst14:choice></pre>
2030	<pre><wst14:choice label="50+" refid="http:///ref#choice4"></wst14:choice></pre>
2031	
2032	<pre><wst14:contextdata refid="http:///ref#cookiel"></wst14:contextdata></pre>
2033	
2034	
2035	
2036	
2037	
2038	
2030	

2039

The requestor receives the challenge, provides the necessary user experience for soliciting the required inputs, and sends a response to the challenge back to the STS as follows.

```
2043 <Sl1:Envelope ...>
2044 <Sl1:Header>
2045 ...
2046 </Sl1:Header>
2047 <Sl1:Body>
2048 <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
2049 <wst14:InteractiveChallengeResponse xmlns:wst14="..." >
```

2050 2051	<pre><wst14:textchallengeresponse refid="http:///ref#text1"> Goldstein</wst14:textchallengeresponse></pre>
2052	
2053	<pre><wst14:choicechallengeresponse refid="http:///ref#choiceGroupA"></wst14:choicechallengeresponse></pre>
2054	<pre><wst14:choiceselected refid="http:///ref#choice3"></wst14:choiceselected></pre>
2055	
2056	<pre><wstl4:contextdata refid="http:///ref#cookiel"></wstl4:contextdata></pre>
2057	
2058	
2059	
2060	
2061	
2062	
2002	

The STS validates the response containing the inputs from the user, and issues the requested token as follows.

2066

2000	
2067	<s11:envelope></s11:envelope>
2068	<s11:header></s11:header>
2069	
2070	
2071	<s11:body></s11:body>
2072	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
2073	<wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse>
2074	<wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken>
2075	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
2076	
2077	
2078	
2079	<wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken>
2080	
2081	
2082	
2083	
2084	
2085	

2086

#### 2087 8.8.2 PIN challenge

Here is an example of a user interaction challenge using a text challenge for a secret PIN. In this example, a user requests a custom token using a username/password for authentication. The STS uses the text challenge mechanism for an additional PIN. The user interactively provides the PIN and, once validated, the STS issues the requested token. All messages are sent over a protected transport using SSLv3.

2093

2094 The requestor sends the initial request that includes the username/password for authentication as follows.

```
2096
            <S11:Envelope ...>
2097
              <S11:Header>
2098
                . . .
2099
                <wsse:Security>
2100
                  <wsse:UsernameToken>
2101
                    <wsse:Username>Zoe</wsse:Username>
2102
                    <wsse:Password Type="http://...#PasswordText">
2103
                      ILoveDogs
2104
                    </wsse:Password>
```

2105 2106 2107 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114	   <s11:body> <wst:requestsecuritytoken> <wst:tokentype>http://example.org/customToken</wst:tokentype> <wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype> </wst:requestsecuritytoken> </s11:body> 
2115	
2116	The STS issues a challenge for a secret PIN using the text challenge mechanism as follows.
2117	
2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2128 2129 2130 2131 2132	<s11:envelope> <s11:header>  </s11:header> <s11:body> <wst14:interactivechallenge xmlns:wst14=""> <wst14:textchallenge RefId="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200802/challenge/PIN" Label="Please enter your PIN" /&gt;  </wst14:textchallenge </wst14:interactivechallenge>  </s11:body> </s11:envelope>
2134 2135 2136	The requestor receives the challenge, provides the necessary user experience for soliciting the PIN, and sends a response to the challenge back to the STS as follows.
2137 2138 2139 2140 2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148 2149 2150 2151	<pre><s11:envelope> <s11:header> </s11:header>  <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse> <wst14:interactivechallengeresponse xmlns:wst14=""> <wst14:textchallengeresponse refid="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200802/challenge/PIN"> 9988 </wst14:textchallengeresponse> </wst14:interactivechallengeresponse>  </wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></s11:envelope></pre>
2152 2153 2154	The STS validates the PIN response, and issues the requested token as follows.
2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160	<s11:envelope> <s11:header>  </s11:header> <s11:body> <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></s11:body></s11:envelope>

2161	<wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse>
2162	<pre><wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken></pre>
2163	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
2164	
2165	
2166	
2167	<wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken>
2168	
2169	
2170	
2171	
2172	
2173	
	, or 1

#### 2175 8.8.3 PIN challenge with optimized response

The following example illustrates using the optimized PIN response pattern for the same exact challenge as in the previous section. This reduces the number of message exchanges to two instead of four. All messages are sent over a protected transport using SSLv3.

2179

The requestor sends the initial request that includes the username/password for authentication as well as the response to the anticipated PIN challenge as follows.

#### 2182

2183	<s11:envelope></s11:envelope>
2184	<s11:header></s11:header>
2185	
2186	<wsse:security></wsse:security>
2187	<wsse:usernametoken></wsse:usernametoken>
2188	<pre><wsse:username>Zoe</wsse:username></pre>
2189	<pre><wsse:password type="http://#PasswordText"></wsse:password></pre>
2190	ILoveDogs
2191	
2192	
2193	
2194	
2195	<s11:body></s11:body>
2196	<wst:requestsecuritytoken></wst:requestsecuritytoken>
2197	<wst:tokentype>http://example.org/customToken</wst:tokentype>
2198	<wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype>
2199	<wst14:interactivechallengeresponse xmlns:wst14=""></wst14:interactivechallengeresponse>
2200	<wstl4:textchallengeresponse< td=""></wstl4:textchallengeresponse<>
2201	RefId="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200802/challenge/PIN">
2202	9988
2203	
2204	
2205	
2206	
2207	

2208

The STS validates the authentication credential as well as the optimized PIN response, and issues the requested token as follows.

<s11:envelope></s11:envelope>
<s11:header></s11:header>

2216	<s11:body></s11:body>
2217	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
2218	<wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse>
2219	<pre><wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken></pre>
2220	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
2221	
2222	
2223	
2224	<wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken>
2225	
2226	
2227	
2228	
2229	
2230	
-	

## 2232 8.9 Custom Exchange Example

Here is another illustrating the syntax for a token request using a custom XML exchange. For brevity,
only the RST and RSTR elements are illustrated. Note that the framework allows for an arbitrary number
of exchanges, although this example illustrates the use of four legs. The request uses a custom
exchange element and the requestor signs only the non-mutable element of the message:

```
2237
                <wst:RequestSecurityToken xmlns:wst="...">
2238
                    <wst:TokenType>
2239
                        http://example.org/mySpecialToken
2240
                    </wst:TokenType>
2241
                    <wst:RequestType>
2242
                        http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue
2243
                    </wst:RequestType>
2244
                    <xyz:CustomExchange xmlns:xyz="...">
2245
                        . . .
2246
                    </xyz:CustomExchange>
2247
                </wst:RequestSecurityToken>
```

2248

The issuer service (recipient) responds with another leg of the custom exchange and signs the response (non-mutable aspects) with its token:

2251 <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse "="" xmlns:wst="&lt;/th&gt;2252&lt;xyz:CustomExchange xmlns:xyz=">225322542255</wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse>	">
--	----

2256

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2262 2263

The requestor receives the issuer's exchange and issues a response that is signed using the requestor's
 token and continues the custom exchange. The signature covers all non-mutable aspects of the
 message to prevent certain types of security attacks:

The issuer processes the exchange and determines that the exchange is complete and that a token
should be issued. Consequently it issues the requested token(s) and the associated proof-of-possession
token. The proof-of-possession token is encrypted for the requestor using the requestor's public key.

2269	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
2270	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
2271	<pre><wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken></pre>
2272	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
2273	
2274	
2275	
2276	<pre><wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken></pre>
2277	<pre><xenc:encryptedkey id="newProof" xmlns:xenc=""></xenc:encryptedkey></pre>
2278	
2279	
2280	
2281	<pre><wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken></pre>
2282	<pre><xenc:encryptedkey xmlns:xenc=""></xenc:encryptedkey></pre>
2283	
2284	
2285	

It should be noted that other example exchanges include the issuer returning a final custom exchangeelement, and another example where a token isn't returned.

## 2288 8.10 Protecting Exchanges

There are some attacks, such as forms of man-in-the-middle, that can be applied to token requests involving exchanges. It is RECOMMENDED that the exchange sequence be protected. This MAY be built into the exchange messages, but if metadata is provided in the RST or RSTR elements, then it is subject to attack.

2293

Consequently, it is RECOMMENDED that keys derived from exchanges be linked cryptographically to the exchange. For example, a hash can be computed by computing the SHA1 of the exclusive canonicalization [XML-C14N] of all RST and RSTR elements in messages exchanged. This value can then be combined with the exchanged secret(s) to create a new master secret that is bound to the data both parties sent/received.

- 2299
- 2300 To this end, the following computed key algorithm is defined to be OPTIONALLY used in these scenarios:

URI	Meaning
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws- trust/200512/CK/HASH	The key is computed using P_SHA1 as follows:
	H=SHA1(ExclC14N(RSTRSTRs))
	X=encrypting H using negotiated key and mechanism
	Key=P_SHA1(X,H+"CK-HASH")
	The octets for the "CK-HASH" string are the UTF-8 octets.

#### 2301 8.11 Authenticating Exchanges

After an exchange both parties have a shared knowledge of a key (or keys) that can then be used to secure messages. However, in some cases it may be desired to have the issuer prove to the requestor that it knows the key (and that the returned metadata is valid) prior to the requestor using the data.
However, until the exchange is actually completed it MAY be (and is often) inappropriate to use the
computed keys. As well, using a token that hasn't been returned to secure a message may complicate
processing since it crosses the boundary of the exchange and the underlying message security. This
means that it MAY NOT be appropriate to sign the final leg of the exchange using the key derived from
the exchange.

2310

For this reason an authenticator is defined that provides a way for the issuer to verify the hash as part of the token issuance. Specifically, when an authenticator is returned, the

<wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> element is returned. This contains one
 RSTR with the token being returned as a result of the exchange and a second RSTR that contains the
 authenticator (this order SHOULD be used). When an authenticator is used, RSTRs MUST use the
 @Context element so that the authenticator can be correlated to the token issuance. The authenticator is
 separated from the RSTR because otherwise computation of the RST/RSTR hash becomes more
 complex. The authenticator is represented using the <wst:Authenticator> element as illustrated
 below:

2320	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
2321	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse context=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
2322	
2323	
2324	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse context=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
2325	<pre><wst:authenticator></wst:authenticator></pre>
2326	<wst:combinedhash></wst:combinedhash>
2327	
2328	
2329	
2330	

2331

The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above (the ... notation below represents the path RSTRC/RSTR and is used for brevity):

- 2334 .../wst:Authenticator
- 2335 This OPTIONAL element provides verification (authentication) of a computed hash.
- 2336 .../wst:Authenticator/wst:CombinedHash

2337This OPTIONAL element proves the hash and knowledge of the computed key. This is done by2338providing the base64 encoding of the first 256 bits of the P\_SHA1 digest of the computed key and2339the concatenation of the hash determined for the computed key and the string "AUTH-HASH".2340Specifically, P\_SHA1(computed-key, H + "AUTH-HASH")\_{0-255}. The octets for the "AUTH-HASH"2341string are the UTF-8 octets.

2342

2343This <wst:CombinedHash> element is OPTIONAL (and an open content model is used) to allow for2344different authenticators in the future.

# 2345 9 Key and Token Parameter Extensions

2346 This section outlines additional parameters that can be specified in token requests and responses.

Typically they are used with issuance requests, but since all types of requests MAY issue security tokens they could apply to other bindings.

## 2349 9.1 On-Behalf-Of Parameters

In some scenarios the requestor is obtaining a token on behalf of another party. These parameters
specify the issuer and original requestor of the token being used as the basis of the request. The syntax
is as follows (note that the base elements described above are included here italicized for completeness):

```
<wst:RequestSecurityToken xmlns:wst="...">
    <wst:TokenType>...</wst:TokenType>
    <wst:RequestType>...</wst:RequestType>
    ...
    <wst:OnBehalfOf>...</wst:OnBehalfOf>
    <wst:Issuer>...</wst:Issuer>
    </wst:RequestSecurityToken>
```

#### 2359 2360

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2358

2361 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above:

2362 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:OnBehalfOf

2363 This OPTIONAL element indicates that the requestor is making the request on behalf of another. 2364 The identity on whose behalf the request is being made is specified by placing a security token, 2365 <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element, or <wsa:EndpointReference> element within the <wst:OnBehalfOf> element. The requestor MAY provide proof of possession of the 2366 2367 key associated with the OnBehalfOf identity by including a signature in the RST security header 2368 generated using the OnBehalfOf token that signs the primary signature of the RST (i.e. endorsing supporting token concept from WS-SecurityPolicy). Additional signed supporting tokens 2369 2370 describing the OnBehalfOf context MAY also be included within the RST security header.

- 2371 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Issuer
- This OPTIONAL element specifies the issuer of the security token that is presented in the message. This element's type is an endpoint reference as defined in [WS-Addressing].
- 23742375 In the following illustrates the syntax for a proxy that is requesting a security token on behalf of another2376 requestor or end-user.

```
2377<wst:RequestSecurityToken xmlns:wst="...">2378<wst:TokenType>...</wst:TokenType>2379<wst:RequestType>...</wst:RequestType>2380...2381<wst:OnBehalfOf>endpoint-reference</wst:OnBehalfOf>2382</wst:RequestSecurityToken>
```

## 2383 9.2 Key and Encryption Requirements

This section defines extensions to the <wst:RequestSecurityToken> element for requesting specific types of keys or algorithms or key and algorithms as specified by a given policy in the return token(s). In some cases the service may support a variety of key types, sizes, and algorithms. These parameters allow a requestor to indicate its desired values. It should be noted that the issuer's policy indicates if input values must be adhered to and faults generated for invalid inputs, or if the issuer will provide alterativevalues in the response.

2390

Although illustrated using the <wst:RequestSecurityToken> element, these options can also be returned in a <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> element.

The syntax for these OPTIONAL elements is as follows (note that the base elements described above are included here italicized for completeness):

2395	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
2396	<pre><wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype></pre>
2397	<pre><wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype></pre>
2398	
	••••
2399	<wst:authenticationtype></wst:authenticationtype>
2400	<pre><wst:keytype></wst:keytype></pre>
2401	<pre><wst:keysize></wst:keysize></pre>
2402	<pre><wst:signaturealgorithm></wst:signaturealgorithm></pre>
2403	<pre><wst:encryptionalgorithm></wst:encryptionalgorithm></pre>
2404	<pre><wst:canonicalizationalgorithm></wst:canonicalizationalgorithm></pre>
2405	<pre><wst:computedkeyalgorithm></wst:computedkeyalgorithm></pre>
2406	<pre><wst:encryption></wst:encryption></pre>
2407	<pre><wst:proofencryption></wst:proofencryption></pre>
2408	<pre><wst:keywrapalgorithm></wst:keywrapalgorithm></pre>
2409	<wst:usekey sig=""> </wst:usekey>
2410	<wst:signwith></wst:signwith>
2411	<pre><wst:encryptwith></wst:encryptwith></pre>
2412	
	·,

#### 2413

- 2414 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above:
- 2415 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:AuthenticationType

2416This OPTIONAL URI element indicates the type of authentication desired, specified as a URI.2417This specification does not predefine classifications; these are specific to token services as is the2418relative strength evaluations. The relative assessment of strength is up to the recipient to2419determine. That is, requestors SHOULD be familiar with the recipient policies. For example, this2420might be used to indicate which of the four U.S. government authentication levels is REQUIRED.

2421 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:KeyType

2422This OPTIONAL URI element indicates the type of key desired in the security token. The2423predefined values are identified in the table below. Note that some security token formats have2424fixed key types. It should be noted that new algorithms can be inserted by defining URIs in other2425specifications and profiles.

URI	Meaning
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws- trust/200512/PublicKey	A public key token is requested
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws- trust/200512/SymmetricKey	A symmetric key token is requested (default)
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws- sx/wstrust/200512/Bearer	A bearer token is requested. This key type can be used by requestors to indicate that they want a security token to be issued that does not require proof of possession.

2426 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:KeySize

2427This OPTIONAL integer element indicates the size of the key REQUIRED specified in number of2428bits. This is a request, and, as such, the requested security token is not obligated to use the2429requested key size. That said, the recipient SHOULD try to use a key at least as strong as the2430specified value if possible. The information is provided as an indication of the desired strength of2431the security.

- 2432 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:SignatureAlgorithm
- 2433This OPTIONAL URI element indicates the desired signature algorithm used within the returned2434token. This is specified as a URI indicating the algorithm (see [XML-Signature] for typical signing2435algorithms).
- 2436 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:EncryptionAlgorithm
- 2437This OPTIONAL URI element indicates the desired encryption algorithm used within the returned2438token. This is specified as a URI indicating the algorithm (see [XML-Encrypt] for typical2439encryption algorithms).
- 2440 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:CanonicalizationAlgorithm
- 2441This OPTIONAL URI element indicates the desired canonicalization method used within the2442returned token. This is specified as a URI indicating the method (see [XML-Signature] for typical2443canonicalization methods).
- 2444 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:ComputedKeyAlgorithm
- 2445 This OPTIONAL URI element indicates the desired algorithm to use when computed keys are 2446 used for issued tokens.
- 2447 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Encryption
- 2448 This OPTIONAL element indicates that the requestor desires any returned secrets in issued 2449 security tokens to be encrypted for the specified token. That is, so that the owner of the specified 2450 token can decrypt the secret. Normally the security token is the contents of this element but a 2451 security token reference MAY be used instead. If this element isn't specified, the token used as 2452 the basis of the request (or specialized knowledge) is used to determine how to encrypt the key.
- 2453 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:ProofEncryption
- 2454This OPTIONAL element indicates that the requestor desires any returned secrets in proof-of-2455possession tokens to be encrypted for the specified token. That is, so that the owner of the2456specified token can decrypt the secret. Normally the security token is the contents of this element2457but a security token reference MAY be used instead. If this element isn't specified, the token2458used as the basis of the request (or specialized knowledge) is used to determine how to encrypt2459the key.
- 2460 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:KeyWrapAlgorithm
- 2461This OPTIONAL URI element indicates the desired algorithm to use for key wrapping when STS2462encrypts the issued token for the relying party using an asymmetric key.
- 2463 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:UseKey
- 2464If the requestor wishes to use an existing key rather than create a new one, then this OPTIONAL2465element can be used to reference the security token containing the desired key. This element2466either contains a security token or a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element that2467references the security token containing the key that SHOULD be used in the returned token. If2468<wst:KeyType> is not defined and a key type is not implicitly known to the service, it MAY be2469determined from the token (if possible). Otherwise this parameter is meaningless and is ignored.2470Requestors SHOULD demonstrate authorized use of the public key provided.
- 2471 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:UseKey/@Sig
- 2472 In order to *authenticate* the key referenced, a signature MAY be used to prove the referenced 2473 token/key. If specified, this OPTIONAL attribute indicates the ID of the corresponding signature

- 2474 (by URI reference). When this attribute is present, a key need not be specified inside the element 2475 since the referenced signature will indicate the corresponding token (and key).
- 2476 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:SignWith
- 2477This OPTIONAL URI element indicates the desired signature algorithm to be used with the issued2478security token (typically from the policy of the target site for which the token is being requested.2479While any of these OPTIONAL elements MAY be included in RSTRs, this one is a likely2480candidate if there is some doubt (e.g., an X.509 cert that can only use DSS).
- 2481 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:EncryptWith
- 2482This OPTIONAL URI element indicates the desired encryption algorithm to be used with the2483issued security token (typically from the policy of the target site for which the token is being2484requested.) While any of these OPTIONAL elements MAY be included in RSTRs, this one is a2485likely candidate if there is some doubt.
- The following summarizes the various algorithm parameters defined above. T is the issued token, P is the proof key.
- 2488
- 2489 **SignatureAlgorithm** The signature algorithm to use to sign T
- 2490 EncryptionAlgorithm The encryption algorithm to use to encrypt T
- 2491 **CanonicalizationAlgorithm** The canonicalization algorithm to use when signing T
- 2492 **ComputedKeyAlgorithm** The key derivation algorithm to use if using a symmetric key for P 2493 where P is computed using client, server, or combined entropy
- 2494 **Encryption** The token/key to use when encrypting T
- 2495 **ProofEncryption** The token/key to use when encrypting P
- 2496 UseKey This is P. This is generally used when the client supplies a public-key that it wishes to2497 be embedded in T as the proof key
- 2498 **SignWith** The signature algorithm the client intends to employ when using P to
- 2499 sign
- The encryption algorithms further differ based on whether the issued token contains asymmetric key or symmetric key. Furthermore, they differ based on what type of key is used to protect the issued token from the STS to the relying party. The following cases can occur:
- 2503 T contains symmetric key/STS uses symmetric key to encrypt T for RP
- EncryptWith used to indicate symmetric algorithm that client will use to protect message to RP
   when using the proof key (e.g. AES256)
- 2506 **EncryptionAlgorithm** used to indicate the symmetric algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to 2507 encrypt the T (e.g. AES256)
- 2508
- 2509 T contains symmetric key/STS uses asymmetric key to encrypt T for RP
- EncryptWith used to indicate symmetric algorithm that client will use to protect message to RP
   when using the proof key (e.g. AES256)
- 2512 **EncryptionAlgorithm** used to indicate the symmetric algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to 2513 encrypt T for RP (e.g. AES256)
- 2514 **KeyWrapAlgorithm** used to indicate the KeyWrap algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to 2515 wrap the generated key that is used to encrypt the T for RP
- 2516
- 2517 T contains asymmetric key/STS uses symmetric key to encrypt T for RP
- 2518 **EncryptWith** used to indicate the KeyWrap algorithm that the client will use to

2519 2520	protect the symmetric key that is used to protect messages to RP when using the proof key (e.g. RSA-OAEP-MGF1P)
2521 2522	<b>EncryptionAlgorithm</b> – used to indicate the symmetric algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to encrypt T for RP (e.g. AES256)
2523	
2524	T contains asymmetric key/STS uses asymmetric key to encrypt T for RP
2525	EncryptWith - used to indicate the KeyWrap algorithm that the client will use to
2526	protect symmetric key that is used to protect message to RP when using the proof
2527	key (e.g. RSA-OAEP-MGF1P)
2528 2529	EncryptionAlgorithm - used to indicate the symmetric algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to encrypt T for RP (e.g. AES256)
2530 2531	<b>KeyWrapAlgorithm</b> – used to indicate the KeyWrap algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to wrap the generated key that is used to encrypt the T for RP
2532	
2533 2534 2535 2536 2537	The example below illustrates a request that utilizes several of these parameters. A request is made for a custom token using a username and password as the basis of the request. For security, this token is encrypted (see "encUsername") for the recipient using the recipient's public key and referenced in the encryption manifest. The message is protected by a signature using a public key from the sender and authorized by the username and password.
2538	
2539 2540	The requestor would like the custom token to contain a 1024-bit public key whose value can be found in the key provided with the "proofSignature" signature (the key identified by "requestProofToken"). The
2541 2542 2543	token should be signed using RSA-SHA1 and encrypted for the token identified by "requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".
2542 2543 2544	"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken". <sll:envelope <="" td="" xmlns:sll="" xmlns:wsse="" xmlns:wsu=""></sll:envelope>
2542 2543 2544 2545	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".</pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547	"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken". <sll:envelope <="" td="" xmlns:sll="" xmlns:wsse="" xmlns:wsu=""></sll:envelope>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre>     </pre> <pre>     <!--</td--></pre></pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> &lt;</pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> &lt;</pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre< td=""></pre<></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561 2562	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <pr< td=""></pr<></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre>  </pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561 2562 2563 2564 2565	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561 2562 2563 2564 2565 2566	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561 2562 2563 2564 2565	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561 2562 2563 2564 2565 2566 2567 2568 2569	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> </pre> <pre> <!--</td--></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>
2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561 2562 2563 2564 2565 2566 2567 2568	<pre>"requestEncryptionToken". The proof should be encrypted using the token identified by "requestProofToken".  <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> <pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </pre> </td

2572 2573 2574	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue  <wst:keytype></wst:keytype>
2575	
	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/PublicKey
2576	
2577	<pre><wst:keysize>1024</wst:keysize></pre>
2578	<pre><wst:signaturealgorithm></wst:signaturealgorithm></pre>
2579	http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1
2580	
2581	<wst:encryption></wst:encryption>
2582	<reference uri="#requestEncryptionToken"></reference>
2583	
2584	<pre><wst:proofencryption></wst:proofencryption></pre>
2585	<pre><wsse:reference uri="#requestProofToken"></wsse:reference></pre>
2586	
2587	<pre><wst:usekey sig="#proofSignature"></wst:usekey></pre>
2588	
2589	
2590	

## 2591 9.3 Delegation and Forwarding Requirements

This section defines extensions to the <wst:RequestSecurityToken> element for indicating delegation and forwarding requirements on the requested security token(s).

The syntax for these extension elements is as follows (note that the base elements described above are included here italicized for completeness):

2596 2597 2598 2599	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst="">     <wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype>     <wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
2599 2600	<pre> <wst:delegateto></wst:delegateto></pre>
2601	<pre><wst:belegatero></wst:belegatero> <wst:forwardable></wst:forwardable></pre>
2602	<wst:delegatable></wst:delegatable>
2603	<wst:actas></wst:actas>
2604	

2605 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:DelegateTo

2606This OPTIONAL element indicates that the requested or issued token be delegated to another2607identity. The identity receiving the delegation is specified by placing a security token or2608<usee:SecurityTokenReference> element within the <uset:DelegateTo> element.

2609 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Forwardable

2610This OTPIONAL element, of type xs:boolean, specifies whether the requested security token2611SHOULD be marked as "Forwardable". In general, this flag is used when a token is normally2612bound to the requestor's machine or service. Using this flag, the returned token MAY be used2613from any source machine so long as the key is correctly proven. The default value of this flag is2614true.

2615 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Delegatable

2616This OPTIONAL element, of type xs:boolean, specifies whether the requested security token2617SHOULD be marked as "Delegatable". Using this flag, the returned token MAY be delegated to2618another party. This parameter SHOULD be used in conjunction with <wst:DelegateTo>. The2619default value of this flag is false.

2620 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:ActAs

2621This OTPIONAL element indicates that the requested token is expected to contain information2622about the identity represented by the content of this element and the token requestor intends to2623use the returned token to act as this identity. The identity that the requestor wants to act-as is

2624specified by placing a security token or <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element within the2625<wst:ActAs> element.

The following illustrates the syntax of a request for a custom token that can be delegated to the indicated recipient (specified in the binary security token) and used in the specified interval.

2628	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
2629	<pre><wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype></pre>
2630	http://example.org/mySpecialToken
2631	
2632	<wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype>
2633	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue
2634	
2635	<wst:delegateto></wst:delegateto>
2636	<pre><wsse:binarysecuritytoken xmlns:wsse=""></wsse:binarysecuritytoken></pre>
2637	
2638	
2639	
2640	<wst:delegatable>true</wst:delegatable>
2641	

#### 2642 **9.4 Policies**

2643 This section defines extensions to the <wst:RequestSecurityToken> element for passing policies.

#### 2644

The syntax for these extension elements is as follows (note that the base elements described above are included here italicized for completeness):

- 2655 The following describes the attributes and elements listed in the schema overview above:
- 2656 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wsp:Policy
- 2657This OPTIONAL element specifies a policy (as defined in [WS-Policy]) that indicates desired2658settings for the requested token. The policy specifies defaults that can be overridden by the2659elements defined in the previous sections.

2660 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wsp:PolicyReference

2661This OPTIONAL element specifies a reference to a policy (as defined in [WS-Policy]) that2662indicates desired settings for the requested token. The policy specifies defaults that can be2663overridden by the elements defined in the previous sections.

2664

The following illustrates the syntax of a request for a custom token that provides a set of policy statements about the token or its usage requirements.

2667	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
2668	<pre><wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype></pre>
2669	http://example.org/mySpecialToken
2670	
2671	<wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype>
2672	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue
2673	
2674	<wsp:policy xmlns:wsp=""></wsp:policy>

20/5	
2676	
2677	

#### 2678 9.5 Authorized Token Participants

This section defines extensions to the <wst:RequestSecurityToken> element for passing information about which parties are authorized to participate in the use of the token. This parameter is typically used when there are additional parties using the token or if the requestor needs to clarify the actual parties involved (for some profile-specific reason).

2683 It should be noted that additional participants will need to prove their identity to recipients in addition to
 2684 proving their authorization to use the returned token. This typically takes the form of a second signature
 2685 or use of transport security.

2686

0075

The syntax for these extension elements is as follows (note that the base elements described above are included here italicized for completeness):

2689 2690 2691 2692 2693 2694 2695 2696	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst="">     <wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype>     <wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype>      <wst:participants>         <wst:primary></wst:primary>         <wst:participant></wst:participant>         </wst:participants></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
	- · · · ·

- 2699 The following describes elements and attributes used in a <wsc:SecurityContextToken> element.
- 2700 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Participants/
- 2701This OPTIONAL element specifies the participants sharing the security token. Arbitrary types2702MAY be used to specify participants, but a typical case is a security token or an endpoint2703reference (see [WS-Addressing]).
- 2704 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Participants/wst:Primary
- 2705 This OPTIONAL element specifies the primary user of the token (if one exists).
- 2706 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Participants/wst:Participant
- 2707 This OPTIONAL element specifies participant (or multiple participants by repeating the element) 2708 that play a (profile-dependent) role in the use of the token or who are allowed to use the token.
- 2709 /wst:RequestSecurityToken/wst:Participants/{any}
- 2710This is an extensibility option to allow other types of participants and profile-specific elements to<br/>be specified.

# 2712 **10 Key Exchange Token Binding**

2713 2714 2715	Using the token request framework, this section defines a binding for requesting a key exchange token (KET). That is, if a requestor desires a token that can be used to encrypt key material for a recipient.
2716 2717	For this binding, the following actions are defined to enable specific processing context to be conveyed to the recipient:
2718 2719 2720	<pre>http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RST/KET http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/KET http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/KETFinal</pre>
2721	
2722	For this binding, the RequestType element contains the following URI:
2723	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/KET
2724	
2725 2726 2727	For this binding very few parameters are specified as input. OPTIONALLY the <wst:tokentype> element can be specified in the request can indicate desired type response token carrying the key for key exchange; however, this isn't commonly used.</wst:tokentype>
2728 2729	The applicability scope (e.g. <wsp:appliesto>) MAY be specified if the requestor desires a key exchange token for a specific scope.</wsp:appliesto>
2730 2731 2732	It is RECOMMENDED that the response carrying the key exchange token be secured (e.g., signed by the issuer or someone who can speak on behalf of the target for which the KET applies).
2733 2734 2735 2736	Care should be taken when using this binding to prevent possible man-in-the-middle and substitution attacks. For example, responses to this request SHOULD be secured using a token that can speak for the desired endpoint.
2737	
2738 2739	The RSTR for this binding carries the <requestedsecuritytoken> element even if a token is returned (note that the base elements described above are included here italicized for completeness):</requestedsecuritytoken>
2740 2741 2742 2743 2744	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst="">     <wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype>     <wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype>  </wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
2745	
2746 2747 2748 2749 2750 2751 2752	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst="">   <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
	<pre>/wsc.weduescoccr.relivesbousecorrectrons</pre>
2753	The following illustrates the eventor for requesting a low such as so taken. In this even when the MET's
2754	The following illustrates the syntax for requesting a key exchange token. In this example, the KET is

returned encrypted for the requestor since it had the credentials available to do that. Alternatively the

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2756 2757	request could be made using transport security (e.g. TLS) and the key could be returned directly using <wst:binarysecret>.</wst:binarysecret>
2758 2759 2760 2761 2762	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
2763	
2764 2765 2766 2767 2768 2769 2770	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>

# 2771 **11 Error Handling**

There are many circumstances where an error can occur while processing security information. Errors 2772 2773 use the SOAP Fault mechanism. Note that the reason text provided below is RECOMMENDED, but 2774 alternative text MAY be provided if more descriptive or preferred by the implementation. The tables 2775 below are defined in terms of SOAP 1.1. For SOAP 1.2, the Fault/Code/Value is env:Sender (as defined 2776 in SOAP 1.2) and the Fault/Code/Subcode/Value is the faultcode below and the Fault/Reason/Text is the 2777 faultstring below. It should be noted that profiles MAY provide second-level detail fields, but they should 2778 be careful not to introduce security vulnerabilities when doing so (e.g., by providing too detailed 2779 information).

Error that occurred (faultstring)	Fault code (faultcode)
The request was invalid or malformed	wst:InvalidRequest
Authentication failed	wst:FailedAuthentication
The specified request failed	wst:RequestFailed
Security token has been revoked	wst:InvalidSecurityToken
Insufficient Digest Elements	wst:AuthenticationBadElements
The specified RequestSecurityToken is not understood.	wst:BadRequest
The request data is out-of-date	wst:ExpiredData
The requested time range is invalid or unsupported	wst:InvalidTimeRange
The request scope is invalid or unsupported	wst:InvalidScope
A renewable security token has expired	wst:RenewNeeded
The requested renewal failed	wst:UnableToRenew

## 2780 12 Security Considerations

2781 As stated in the Goals section of this document, this specification is meant to provide extensible 2782 framework and flexible syntax, with which one could implement various security mechanisms. This 2783 framework and syntax by itself does not provide any guarantee of security. When implementing and using 2784 this framework and syntax, one must make every effort to ensure that the result is not vulnerable to any 2785 one of a wide range of attacks. 2786 2787 It is not feasible to provide a comprehensive list of security considerations for such an extensible set of 2788 mechanisms. A complete security analysis must be conducted on specific solutions based on this 2789 specification. Below we illustrate some of the security concerns that often come up with protocols of this 2790 type, but we stress that this is not an exhaustive list of concerns. 2791 2792 The following statements about signatures and signing apply to messages sent on unsecured channels. 2793 2794 It is critical that all the security-sensitive message elements must be included in the scope of the 2795 message signature. As well, the signatures for conversation authentication must include a timestamp, 2796 nonce, or sequence number depending on the degree of replay prevention required as described in [WS-2797 Security] and the UsernameToken Profile. Also, conversation establishment should include the policy so 2798 that supported algorithms and algorithm priorities can be validated. 2799 2800 It is required that security token issuance messages be signed to prevent tampering. If a public key is 2801 provided, the request should be signed by the corresponding private key to prove ownership. As well, 2802 additional steps should be taken to eliminate replay attacks (refer to [WS-Security] for additional 2803 information). Similarly, all token references should be signed to prevent any tampering. 2804 2805 Security token requests are susceptible to denial-of-service attacks. Care should be taken to mitigate 2806 such attacks as is warranted by the service. 2807 2808 For security, tokens containing a symmetric key or a password should only be sent to parties who have a 2809 need to know that key or password. 2810 2811 For privacy, tokens containing personal information (either in the claims, or indirectly by identifying who is 2812 currently communicating with whom) should only be sent according to the privacy policies governing 2813 these data at the respective organizations. 2814 2815 For some forms of multi-message exchanges, the exchanges are susceptible to attacks whereby 2816 signatures are altered. To address this, it is suggested that a signature confirmation mechanism be used. 2817 In such cases, each leg should include the confirmation of the previous leg. That is, leg 2 includes 2818 confirmation for leg 1, leg 3 for leg 2, leg 4 for leg 3, and so on. In doing so, each side can confirm the 2819 correctness of the message outside of the message body. 2820 2821 There are many other security concerns that one may need to consider in security protocols. The list 2822 above should not be used as a "check list" instead of a comprehensive security analysis.

2824 It should be noted that use of unsolicited RSTRs implies that the recipient is prepared to accept such
2825 issuances. Recipients should ensure that such issuances are properly authorized and recognize their
2826 use could be used in denial-of-service attacks.

In addition to the consideration identified here, readers should also review the security considerations in[WS-Security].

2829

Both token cancellation bindings defined in this specification require that the STS MUST NOT validate or renew the token after it has been successfully canceled. The STS must take care to ensure that the token is properly invalidated before confirming the cancel request or sending the cancel notification to the client. This can be more difficult if the token validation or renewal logic is physically separated from the issuance and cancellation logic. It is out of scope of this spec how the STS propagates the token cancellation to its other components. If STS cannot ensure that the token was properly invalidated it MUST NOT send the cancel notification or confirm the cancel request to the client.

# 2838 13 Conformance

2839

An implementation conforms to this specification if it satisfies all of the MUST or REQUIRED level
 requirements defined within this specification. A SOAP Node MUST NOT use the XML namespace
 identifier for this specification (listed in Section 1.3) within SOAP Envelopes unless it is compliant with this

2843 specification.

This specification references a number of other specifications (see the table above). In order to comply with this specification, an implementation MUST implement the portions of referenced specifications necessary to comply with the required provisions of this specification. Additionally, the implementation of the portions of the referenced specifications that are specifically cited in this specification MUST comply

- with the rules for those portions as established in the referenced specification.
- 2849 Additionally normative text within this specification takes precedence over normative outlines (as
- 2850 described in section 1.5.1), which in turn take precedence over the XML Schema [XML Schema Part 1,
- 2851 Part 2] and WSDL [WSDL 1.1] descriptions. That is, the normative text in this specification further

constrains the schemas and/or WSDL that are part of this specification; and this specification containsfurther constraints on the elements defined in referenced schemas.

This specification defines a number of extensions; compliant services are NOT REQUIRED to implement OPTIONAL features defined in this specification. However, if a service implements an aspect of the specification, it MUST comply with the requirements specified (e.g. related "MUST" statements). If an

- 2857 OPTIONAL message is not supported, then the implementation SHOULD Fault just as it would for any
- other unrecognized/unsupported message. If an OPTIONAL message is supported, then the
- 2859 implementation MUST satisfy all of the MUST and REQUIRED sections of the message.

# 2860 A. Key Exchange

Key exchange is an integral part of token acquisition. There are several mechanisms by which keys are
 exchanged using [WS-Security] and WS-Trust. This section highlights and summarizes these
 mechanisms. Other specifications and profiles MAY provide additional details on key exchange.

2865 Care must be taken when employing a key exchange to ensure that the mechanism does not provide an 2866 attacker with a means of discovering information that could only be discovered through use of secret 2867 information (such as a private key).

2868

2869 It is therefore important that a shared secret should only be considered as trustworthy as its source. A

shared secret communicated by means of the direct encryption scheme described in section I.1 is

2871 acceptable if the encryption key is provided by a completely trustworthy key distribution center (this is the

- case in the Kerberos model). Such a key would not be acceptable for the purposes of decrypting
- 2873 information from the source that provided it since an attacker might replay information from a prior
- transaction in the hope of learning information about it.
- 2875

In most cases the other party in a transaction is only imperfectly trustworthy. In these cases both parties
 SHOULD contribute entropy to the key exchange by means of the <wst:entropy> element.

### 2878 A.1 Ephemeral Encryption Keys

The simplest form of key exchange can be found in [WS-Security] for encrypting message data. As described in [WS-Security] and [XML-Encrypt], when data is encrypted, a temporary key can be used to perform the encryption which is, itself, then encrypted using the <xenc:EncryptedKey> element. 2882

The illustrates the syntax for encrypting a temporary key using the public key in an issuer name and serial number:

2885	<pre><xenc:encryptedkey xmlns:xenc=""></xenc:encryptedkey></pre>
2886	
2887	<ds:keyinfo xmlns:ds=""></ds:keyinfo>
2888	<wsse:securitytokenreference xmlns:wsse=""></wsse:securitytokenreference>
2889	<ds:x509issuerserial></ds:x509issuerserial>
2890	<ds:x509issuername></ds:x509issuername>
2891	DC=ACMECorp, DC=com
2892	
2893	<pre><ds:x509serialnumber>12345678</ds:x509serialnumber></pre>
2894	
2895	
2896	
2897	
2898	

### 2899 A.2 Requestor-Provided Keys

When a request sends a message to an issuer to request a token, the client can provide proposed key material using the <wst:Entropy> element. If the issuer doesn't contribute any key material, this is used as the secret (key). This information is encrypted for the issuer either using recipient doesn't accept, then the issuer SHUOLD reject the request. Note that the issuer need not return the key provided by the requestor.

2906

The following illustrates the syntax of a request for a custom security token and includes a secret that is to be used for the key. In this example the entropy is encrypted for the issuer (if transport security was used for confidentiality then the <wst:Entropy> element would contain a <wst:BinarySecret> element):

2911	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytoken xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytoken></pre>
2912	<wst:tokentype></wst:tokentype>
2913	http://example.org/mySpecialToken
2914	
2915	<wst:requesttype></wst:requesttype>
2916	http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue
2917	
2918	<wst:entropy></wst:entropy>
2919	<pre><xenc:encrypteddata xmlns:xenc=""></xenc:encrypteddata></pre>
2920	
2921	

### 2922 A.3 Issuer-Provided Keys

2923If a requestor fails to provide key material, then issued proof-of-possession tokens contain an issuer-2924provided secret that is encrypted for the requestor (either using <xenc:EncryptedKey> or by using a2925transport security).

2926

The following illustrates the syntax of a token being returned with an associated proof-of-possession token that is encrypted using the requestor's public key.

2929 2930 2931 2932 2933	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""> <wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
2934 2935	 
2936	<pre><wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken></pre>
2937 2938	<pre><xenc:encryptedkey id="newProof" xmlns:xenc=""></xenc:encryptedkey></pre>
2938	<pre> </pre>
2940	
2941	
2942	

## 2943 A.4 Composite Keys

The safest form of key exchange/generation is when both the requestor and the issuer contribute to the key material. In this case, the request sends encrypted key material. The issuer then returns additional encrypted key material. The actual secret (key) is computed using a function of the two pieces of data. Ideally this secret is never used and, instead, keys derived are used for message protection.

2948

The following example illustrates a server, having received a request with requestor entropy returning its own entropy, which is used in conjunction with the requestor's to generate a key. In this example the entropy is not encrypted because the transport is providing confidentiality (otherwise the vest:Entropy> element would have an <xenc:EncryptedData> element.

2953	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
2954	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
2955	<pre><wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken></pre>
2956	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
2957	
2958	
2959	
2960	<wst:entropy></wst:entropy>
2961	<pre><wst:binarysecret>UIH</wst:binarysecret></pre>
2962	
2963	
2964	

#### 2965 A.5 Key Transfer and Distribution

2966 There are also a few mechanisms where existing keys are transferred to other parties.

#### 2967 A.5.1 Direct Key Transfer

2968 If one party has a token and key and wishes to share this with another party, the key can be directly
2969 transferred. This is accomplished by sending an RSTR (either in the body or header) to the other party.
2970 The RSTR contains the token and a proof-of-possession token that contains the key encrypted for the
2971 recipient.

2972

In the following example a custom token and its associated proof-of-possession token are known to party
A who wishes to share them with party B. In this example, A is a member in a secure on-line chat
session and is inviting B to join the conversation. After authenticating B, A sends B an RSTR. The RSTR
contains the token and the key is communicated as a proof-of-possession token that is encrypted for B:

2977	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection></pre>
2978	<wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse>
2979	<wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken>
2980	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
2981	
2982	
2983	
2984	<wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken>
2985	<pre><xenc:encryptedkey id="newProof" xmlns:xenc=""></xenc:encryptedkey></pre>
2986	
2987	
2988	
2989	
2990	

#### 2991 A.5.2 Brokered Key Distribution

A third party MAY also act as a broker to transfer keys. For example, a requestor may obtain a token and proof-of-possession token from a third-party STS. The token contains a key encrypted for the target service (either using the service's public key or a key known to the STS and target service). The proof-ofpossession token contains the same key encrypted for the requestor (similarly this can use public or symmetric keys).

2997

In the following example a custom token and its associated proof-of-possession token are returned from a
 broker B to a requestor R for access to service S. The key for the session is contained within the custom
 token encrypted for S using either a secret known by B and S or using S's public key. The same secret is
 encrypted for R and returned as the proof-of-possession token:

3002	<wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection xmlns:wst=""></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponsecollection>
3003	<pre><wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></wst:requestsecuritytokenresponse></pre>
3004	<wst:requestedsecuritytoken></wst:requestedsecuritytoken>
3005	
	<xyz:customtoken xmlns:xyz=""></xyz:customtoken>
3006	
3007	<pre><xenc:encryptedkey xmlns:xenc=""></xenc:encryptedkey></pre>
3008	
3009	
3010	
3011	
3012	
3013	<wst:requestedprooftoken></wst:requestedprooftoken>
3014	<pre><xenc:encryptedkey id="newProof"></xenc:encryptedkey></pre>
3015	
3016	
3017	
3018	
3019	

#### 3020 A.5.3 Delegated Key Transfer

Key transfer can also take the form of delegation. That is, one party transfers the right to use a key without actually transferring the key. In such cases, a delegation token, e.g. XrML, is created that identifies a set of rights and a delegation target and is secured by the delegating party. That is, one key indicates that another key can use a subset (or all) of its rights. The delegate can provide this token and prove itself (using its own key – the delegation target) to a service. The service, assuming the trust relationships have been established and that the delegator has the right to delegate, can then authorize requests sent subject to delegation rules and trust policies.

3028

In this example a custom token is issued from party A to party B. The token indicates that B (specifically
B's key) has the right to submit purchase orders. The token is signed using a secret key known to the
target service T and party A (the key used to ultimately authorize the requests that B makes to T), and a
new session key that is encrypted for T. A proof-of-possession token is included that contains the
session key encrypted for B. As a result, B is *effectively* using A's key, but doesn't actually know the key.

```
3034
              <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection xmlns:wst="...">
3035
                <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
3036
                    <wst:RequestedSecurityToken>
3037
                        <xyz:CustomToken xmlns:xyz="...">
3038
3039
                            <xyz:DelegateTo>B</xyz:DelegateTo>
3040
                            <xyz:DelegateRights>
3041
                                SubmitPurchaseOrder
3042
                            </xyz:DelegateRights>
3043
                            <xenc:EncryptedKey xmlns:xenc="...">
3044
3045
                            </xenc:EncryptedKey>
3046
                            <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="...">...</ds:Signature>
3047
                            . . .
3048
                        </xyz:CustomToken>
3049
                    </wst:RequestedSecurityToken>
3050
                    <wst:RequestedProofToken>
3051
                        <xenc:EncryptedKey xmlns:xenc="..." Id="newProof">
3052
                            . . .
3053
                        </xenc:EncryptedKey>
3054
                    </wst:RequestedProofToken>
3055
                </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
3056
              </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection>
```

3057	A.5.4	Authenticated Request/Reply Key Transfer
3058 3059 3060	reques	e cases the RST/RSTR mechanism is not used to transfer keys because it is part of a simple t/reply. However, there may be a desire to ensure mutual authentication as part of the key er. The mechanisms of [WS-Security] can be used to implement this scenario.
3061		
3062	Specifi	cally, the sender wishes the following:
3063	•	Transfer a key to a recipient that they can use to secure a reply
3064	•	Ensure that only the recipient can see the key
3065	•	Provide proof that the sender issued the key
3066		
3067 3068		cenario could be supported by encrypting and then signing. This would result in roughly the ng steps:
3069	1.	Encrypt the message using a generated key
3070	2.	Encrypt the key for the recipient
3071	3.	Sign the encrypted form, any other relevant keys, and the encrypted key
3072		
3073	Howev	rer, if there is a desire to sign prior to encryption then the following general process is used:
3074	1.	Sign the appropriate message parts using a random key (or ideally a key derived from a random
3075		key)
3076 3077	2.	Encrypt the appropriate message parts using the random key (or ideally another key derived from the random key)
3078	3.	Encrypt the random key for the recipient
3079	4.	Sign just the encrypted key
3080		
3081	This w	ould result in a <wsse:security> header that looks roughly like the following:</wsse:security>
3082 3083 3084 3085 3086 3087 3088 3089 3090 3091 3092 3093 3094 3095 3096 3097 3098 3099		<pre><wsse:security <="" td="" xmlns:wsse="" xmlns:wsu=""></wsse:security></pre>
3100		
3101 3102		l, instead of an <xenc:encryptedkey> element, the actual token could be passed using :EncryptedData&gt;. The result might look like the following:</xenc:encryptedkey>
3103 3104		<pre><wsse:security xmlns:ds="" xmlns:wsse="" xmlns:wsu="" xmlns:xenc=""></wsse:security></pre>

3105	<wsse:binarysecuritytoken wsu:id="myToken"></wsse:binarysecuritytoken>
3106	
3107	
3108	<ds:signature></ds:signature>
3109	signature over #secret or #Esecret using token #myToken
3110	
3111	<pre><xenc:encrypteddata id="Esecret"></xenc:encrypteddata></pre>
3112	Encrypted version of a token with Id="secret"
3113	
3114	<pre><xenc:refrencelist></xenc:refrencelist></pre>
3115	manifest of encrypted parts using token #secret
3116	
3117	<ds:signature></ds:signature>
3118	signature over key message parts using token #secret
3119	
3120	

#### 3121 A.6 Perfect Forward Secrecy

In some situations it is desirable for a key exchange to have the property of perfect forward secrecy. This
means that it is impossible to reconstruct the shared secret even if the private keys of the parties are
disclosed.

3125

The most straightforward way to attain perfect forward secrecy when using asymmetric key exchange is to dispose of one's key exchange key pair periodically (or even after every key exchange), replacing it with a fresh one. Of course, a freshly generated public key must still be authenticated (using any of the methods normally available to prove the identity of a public key's owner).

3130

The perfect forward secrecy property MAY be achieved by specifying a <wst:entropy> element that contains an <xenc:EncryptedKey> that is encrypted under a public key pair created for use in a single key agreement. The public key does not require authentication since it is only used to provide additional entropy. If the public key is modified, the key agreement will fail. Care should be taken, when using this method, to ensure that the now-secret entropy exchanged via the <wst:entropy> element is not revealed elsewhere in the protocol (since such entropy is often assumed to be publicly revealed plaintext, and treated accordingly).

3138

3139 Although any public key scheme might be used to achieve perfect forward secrecy (in either of the above

3140 methods) it is generally desirable to use an algorithm that allows keys to be generated quickly. The Diffie-

- 3141 Hellman key exchange is often used for this purpose since generation of a key only requires the
- 3142 generation of a random integer and calculation of a single modular exponent.

# 3143 **B. WSDL**

The WSDL below does not fully capture all the possible message exchange patterns, but captures the typical message exchange pattern as described in this document.

```
3146
           <?xml version="1.0"?>
3147
           <wsdl:definitions
3148
                    targetNamespace="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
3149
           trust/200512/wsdl"
3150
                   xmlns:tns="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/wsdl"
3151
                   xmlns:wst="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512"
3152
                   xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/"
3153
                   xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
3154
                   xmlns:wsam="http://www.w3.org/2007/05/addressing/metadata"
3155
3156
           <!-- this is the WS-I BP-compliant way to import a schema -->
3157
               <wsdl:types>
3158
                   <xs:schema>
3159
                        <xs:import
3160
                 namespace="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512"
3161
                 schemaLocation="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/ws-
3162
           trust.xsd"/>
3163
                    </xs:schema>
3164
                </wsdl:types>
3165
3166
           <!-- WS-Trust defines the following GEDs -->
3167
                <wsdl:message name="RequestSecurityTokenMsg">
3168
                    <wsdl:part name="request" element="wst:RequestSecurityToken" />
3169
                </wsdl:message>
3170
                <wsdl:message name="RequestSecurityTokenResponseMsg">
3171
                    <wsdl:part name="response"
3172
                            element="wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse" />
3173
               </wsdl:message>
3174
                <wsdl:message name="RequestSecurityTokenCollectionMsg">
3175
                    <wsdl:part name="requestCollection"
3176
                            element="wst:RequestSecurityTokenCollection"/>
3177
               </wsdl:message>
3178
               <wsdl:message name="RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollectionMsg">
3179
                    <wsdl:part name="responseCollection"
3180
                            element="wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection"/>
3181
               </wsdl:message>
3182
3183
               <!-- This portType an example of a Requestor (or other) endpoint that
3184
                    Accepts SOAP-based challenges from a Security Token Service -->
3185
               <wsdl:portType name="WSSecurityRequestor">
3186
                  <wsdl:operation name="Challenge">
3187
                   <wsdl:input message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenResponseMsg"/>
3188
                   <wsdl:output message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenResponseMsg"/>
3189
                  </wsdl:operation>
3190
               </wsdl:portType>
3191
3192
               <!-- This portType is an example of an STS supporting full protocol -->
3193
               <wsdl:portType name="SecurityTokenService">
3194
                  <wsdl:operation name="Cancel">
3195
                    <wsdl:input wsam:Action="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
3196
           trust/200512/RST/Cancel" message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenMsg"/>
3197
                    <wsdl:output wsam:Action="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-</pre>
3198
           trust/200512/RSTR/CancelFinal" message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenResponseMsg"/>
3199
                  </wsdl:operation>
3200
                  <wsdl:operation name="Issue">
```

```
3201
                    <wsdl:input wsam:Action="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
3202
           trust/200512/RST/Issue" message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenMsg"/>
3203
                    <wsdl:output wsam:Action="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
3204
           trust/200512/RSTRC/IssueFinal"
3205
           message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollectionMsg"/>
3206
                  </wsdl:operation>
3207
                  <wsdl:operation name="Renew">
3208
                    <wsdl:input wsam:Action="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
3209
           trust/200512/RST/Renew" message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenMsg"/>
3210
                    <wsdl:output wsam:Action="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
3211
           trust/200512/RSTR/RenewFinal message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenResponseMsg"/>
3212
                  </wsdl:operation>
3213
                  <wsdl:operation name="Validate">
3214
                    <wsdl:input wsam:Action="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
3215
           trust/200512/RST/Validate" message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenMsg"/>
3216
                    <wsdl:output wsam:Action=http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-</pre>
3217
           trust/200512/RSTR/ValidateFinal
3218
           message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenResponseMsg"/>
3219
                  </wsdl:operation>
3220
                  <wsdl:operation name="KeyExchangeToken">
3221
                    <wsdl:input wsam:Action="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
3222
           trust/200512/RST/KET" message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenMsg"/>
3223
                    <wsdl:output wsam:Action="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
3224
           trust/200512/RSTR/KETFinal" message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenResponseMsg"/>
3225
                 </wsdl:operation>
3226
                  <wsdl:operation name="RequestCollection">
3227
                    <wsdl:input message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenCollectionMsg"/>
3228
                    <wsdl:output message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollectionMsg"/>
3229
                  </wsdl:operation>
3230
                </wsdl:portType>
3231
3232
               <!-- This portType is an example of an endpoint that accepts
3233
                     Unsolicited RequestSecurityTokenResponse messages -->
3234
                <wsdl:portType name="SecurityTokenResponseService">
3235
                  <wsdl:operation name="RequestSecurityTokenResponse">
3236
                    <wsdl:input message="tns:RequestSecurityTokenResponseMsg"/>
3237
                  </wsdl:operation>
3238
                </wsdl:portType>
3239
3240
           </wsdl:definitions>
3241
```

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3293 3294	Steve Millet, Microsoft Birgit Pfitzmann, IBM
3295	Fumiko Satoh, IBM
3296	Keith Stobie, Microsoft
3297	T.R. Vishwanath, Microsoft
3298	Richard Ward, Microsoft
3299	Hervey Wilson, Microsoft
3300	
3301	TC Members during the development of this specification:
3302	Don Adams, Tibco Software Inc.
3303	Jan Alexander, Microsoft Corporation
3304	Steve Anderson, BMC Software
3305	Donal Arundel, IONA Technologies
3306	Howard Bae, Oracle Corporation
3307	Abbie Barbir, Nortel Networks Limited
3308	Charlton Barreto, Adobe Systems
3309	Mighael Botha, Software AG, Inc.
3310	Toufic Boubez, Layer 7 Technologies Inc.
3311	Norman Brickman, Mitre Corporation
3312	Melissa Brumfield, Booz Allen Hamilton
3313	Lloyd Burch, Novell
3314	Geoff Bullen, Microsoft Corporation
3315	Scott Cantor, Internet2
3316	Greg Carpenter, Microsoft Corporation
3317	Steve Carter, Novell
3318	Ching-Yun (C.Y.) Chao, IBM
3319	Martin Chapman, Oracle Corporation
3320	Kate Cherry, Lockheed Martin
3321	Henry (Hyenvui) Chung, IBM
3322	Luc Clement, Systinet Corp.
3323	Paul Cotton, Microsoft Corporation
3324	Glen Daniels, Sonic Software Corp.
3325	Peter Davis, Neustar, Inc.
3326	Martijn de Boer, SAP AG
3327	Duane DeCouteau, Veterans Health Administration
3328	Werner Dittmann, Siemens AG
3329	Abdeslem DJAOUI, CCLRC-Rutherford Appleton Laboratory
3330	Fred Dushin, IONA Technologies
3331	Petr Dvorak, Systinet Corp.
3332	Colleen Evans, Microsoft Corporation

3335 Vijay Gajjala, Microsoft Corporation 3336 Marc Goodner, Microsoft Corporation 3337 Hans Granqvist, VeriSign 3338 Martin Gudgin, Microsoft Corporation 3339 Tony Gullotta, SOA Software Inc. 3340 Jiandong Guo, Sun Microsystems 3341 Phillip Hallam-Baker, VeriSign 3342 Patrick Harding, Ping Identity Corporation 3343 Heather Hinton, IBM 3344 Frederick Hirsch, Nokia Corporation 3345 Jeff Hodges, Neustar, Inc. 3346 Will Hopkins, BEA Systems, Inc. 3347 Alex Hristov, Otecia Incorporated 3348 John Hughes, PA Consulting 3349 Diane Jordan, IBM 3350 Venugopal K, Sun Microsystems 3351 Chris Kaler, Microsoft Corporation 3352 Dana Kaufman, Forum Systems, Inc. 3353 Paul Knight, Nortel Networks Limited 3354 Ramanathan Krishnamurthy, IONA Technologies 3355 Christopher Kurt, Microsoft Corporation 3356 Kelvin Lawrence, IBM 3357 Hubert Le Van Gong, Sun Microsystems 3358 Jong Lee, BEA Systems, Inc. 3359 Rich Levinson, Oracle Corporation 3360 Tommy Lindberg, Dajeil Ltd. 3361 Mark Little, JBoss Inc. 3362 Hal Lockhart, BEA Systems, Inc. 3363 Mike Lyons, Layer 7 Technologies Inc.

Ruchith Fernando, WSO2

Mark Fussell, Microsoft Corporation

3333

3334

- 3364 Eve Maler, Sun Microsystems
- 3365 Ashok Malhotra, Oracle Corporation
- 3366 Anand Mani, CrimsonLogic Pte Ltd
- 3367 Jonathan Marsh, Microsoft Corporation
- 3368 Robin Martherus, Oracle Corporation
- 3369 Miko Matsumura, Infravio, Inc.
- 3370 Gary McAfee, IBM
- 3371 Michael McIntosh, IBM
- 3372 John Merrells, Sxip Networks SRL
- 3373 Jeff Mischkinsky, Oracle Corporation
- 3374 Prateek Mishra, Oracle Corporation

- 3375 Bob Morgan, Internet2
- 3376 Vamsi Motukuru, Oracle Corporation
- 3377 Raajmohan Na, EDS
- 3378 Anthony Nadalin, IBM
- 3379 Andrew Nash, Reactivity, Inc.
- 3380 Eric Newcomer, IONA Technologies
- 3381 Duane Nickull, Adobe Systems
- 3382 Toshihiro Nishimura, Fujitsu Limited
- 3383 Rob Philpott, RSA Security
- 3384 Denis Pilipchuk, BEA Systems, Inc.
- 3385 Darren Platt, Ping Identity Corporation
- 3386 Martin Raepple, SAP AG
- 3387 Nick Ragouzis, Enosis Group LLC
- 3388 Prakash Reddy, CA
- 3389 Alain Regnier, Ricoh Company, Ltd.
- 3390 Irving Reid, Hewlett-Packard
- 3391 Bruce Rich, IBM
- 3392 Tom Rutt, Fujitsu Limited
- 3393 Maneesh Sahu, Actional Corporation
- 3394 Frank Siebenlist, Argonne National Laboratory
- 3395 Joe Smith, Apani Networks
- 3396 Davanum Srinivas, WSO2
- 3397 David Staggs, Veterans Health Administration
- 3398 Yakov Sverdlov, CA
- 3399 Gene Thurston, AmberPoint
- 3400 Victor Valle, IBM
- 3401 Asir Vedamuthu, Microsoft Corporation
- 3402 Greg Whitehead, Hewlett-Packard
- 3403 Ron Williams, IBM
- 3404 Corinna Witt, BEA Systems, Inc.
- 3405 Kyle Young, Microsoft Corporation
- 3406