



WS-Trust 1.3 Errata

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This specification errata is related to WS-Trust v1.3.

Abstract:

This document lists errata for **WS-Trust 1.3 OASIS Standard** [WS-Trust] produced by the WS-SX Technical Committee. The standard was approved by the OASIS membership on 1 March 2007.

Status:

This document was last revised or approved by the WS-SX TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the "Latest Approved Version" location noted above for possible later revisions of this document.

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1 Issues Addressed

2 The following issues related to WS-Trust 1.3 as recorded in the [WS-SX Issues] have been addressed in
3 this document.

Issue	Description
ER012	Review normative RFC 2119 language in WS-Trust
i169	Sample wsdI in conflict w WS-I BSP in WS-Trust1.3, 1.4
i170	Update XML Signature references to refer to XML Signature, Second Edition, update c14n reference in ws-trust
i171	Incorrect URI provided for Canonical XML 1.0 when defining C14n abbreviation

4

2 Typographical/Editorial Errors

2.1 Normative references

Insert after line 185

W3C Recommendation, "Canonical XML Version 1.1", 2 May 2008.
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xml-c14n11-20080502/>

Insert after line 201

[W3C Recommendation, D. Eastlake et al. XML Signature Syntax and Processing (Second Edition). 10 June 2008.
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xmldsig-core-20080610/>

2.2 Normative language capitalization changes

The following changes do not affect the normative meaning of the text, they are only to properly capitalize 2119 terms. The changes listed below document the changes as they appear in the text. There were many instances of the terms OPTIONAL and REQUIRED in the schema exemplar descriptions that appeared un-capitalized that are not captured below but that have also been addressed. All other 2119 terms that remain un-capitalized are used in their English sense.

Line 212

Authentication of requests is based on a combination of OPTIONAL network and transport-provided security and information (claims) proven in the message

Line 231

This model is illustrated in the figure below, showing that any requestor MAY also be a service, and that the Security Token Service is a Web service (that is, it MAY express policy and require security tokens).

Line 242

In the figure above the arrows represent possible communication paths; the requestor MAY obtain a token from the security token service, or it MAY have been obtained indirectly. The requestor then demonstrates authorized use of the token to the Web service. The Web service either trusts the issuing security token service or MAY request a token service to validate the token (or the Web service MAY validate the token itself).

In summary, the Web service has a policy applied to it, receives a message from a requestor that possibly includes security tokens, and MAY have some protection applied to it using [WS-Security] mechanisms.

Line 254

In brokered trust models, the signature MAY NOT verify the identity of the claimant – it MAY verify the identity of the intermediary, who MAY simply assert the identity of the claimant.

Line 259

The trust engine MAY need to externally verify or broker tokens

Line 265

47 In this specification we define how security tokens are requested and obtained from security token
48 services and how these services MAY broker trust and trust policies so that services can perform step 3.

49

50 Line 280

51 As part of a message flow, a request MAY be made of a security token service to exchange a security
52 token (or some proof) of one form for another

53

54 Line 289

55 the security token service generating the new token MAY NOT need to trust the authority that issued the
56 original token provided by the original requestor since it does trust the security token service that is
57 engaging in the exchange for a new security token

58

59 Line 300

60 An administrator or other trusted authority MAY designate that all tokens of a certain type are

61

62 Line 303

63 or the security token service MAY provide this function as a service to trusting services.

64

65 Line 306

66 These mechanisms are non-normative and are NOT REQUIRED in any way.

67

68 Line 313

69 Trust hierarchies – Building on the trust roots mechanism, a service MAY choose to allow hierarchies of
70 trust so long as the trust chain eventually leads to one of the known trust roots. In some cases the
71 recipient MAY require the sender to provide the full hierarchy. In other cases, the recipient MAY be able
72 to dynamically fetch the tokens for the hierarchy from a token store.

73

74 Line 335

75 or they MAY return a token with their chosen parameters that the requestor MAY then choose to discard
76 because it doesn't meet their needs

77

78 Line 339

79 Other specifications MAY define specific bindings and profiles of this mechanism for additional purposes.

80

81 Line 341

82 in some cases an anonymous request MAY be appropriate

83

84 Line 343

85 If not a fault SHOULD be generated (but is NOT REQUIRED to be returned for denial-of-service reasons).

86

87 Line 415 (this one changes a "shouldn't")

88 In general, the returned token SHOULD be considered opaque to the requestor. That is, the requestor
89 SHOULD NOT be required to parse the returned token.

90

91 Line 429
92 and the value of the OPTIONAL @Context attribute
93
94 Line 432
95 In such cases, the RSTR MAY be passed in the body or in a header block.
96
97 Line 475
98 the ellipses below represent the different containers in which this element MAY appear
99
100 Line 518
101 This binding supports the OPTIONAL use of exchanges during the token acquisition process as well as
102 the OPTIONAL use of the key extensions described in a later section.
103
104 Line 522
105 the following OPTIONAL elements
106
107 Line 561
108 This REQUIRED attribute contains a URI that indicates the syntax used to specify the set of requested
109 claims along with how that syntax SHOULD be interpreted.
110
111 Line 574
112 The format is assumed to be understood by the requestor because the value space MAY be
113
114 Line 580
115 The issuer is not obligated to honor this range – they MAY
116
117 Line 587
118 The difference in time SHOULD be minimized.
119
120 Line 697
121 Each request MAY generate more than one RSTR sharing the same Context attribute value
122
123 Line 711
124 Note: that these operations require that the service can either succeed on all the RST requests or MUST
125 NOT perform any partial operation.
126
127 Line 722
128 If any error occurs in the processing of the RSTC or one of its contained RSTs, a SOAP fault MUST be
129 generated for the entire batch request so no RSTC element will be returned.
130
131 Line 741
132 the following OPTIONAL elements
133

134 Line 833
135 The token issuer can OPTIONALLY provide
136
137 Line 990
138 As a result, the proof-of-possession tokens, and possibly lifetime and other key parameters elements,
139 MAY be different
140
141 Line 1071
142 If confidentiality protection of the <wst:IssuedTokens> header is REQUIRED then the entire header
143 MUST be encrypted using the <wsse11:EncryptedHeader> construct.
144
145 Line 1131
146 and the OPTIONAL <wst:Lifetime> element
147
148 Line 1167
149 This OPTIONAL element indicates that returned tokens SHOULD allow requests for postdated tokens.
150
151 Line 1225
152 If a client needs to ensure the validity of a token, it MUST validate the token at the issuer.
153
154 Line 1292
155 this section defines an OPTIONAL binding
156
157 Line 1354
158 The result MAY be a status, a new token, or both.
159
160 Line 1370
161 The request provides a token upon which the request is based and OPTIONAL tokens. As well, the
162 OPTIONAL <wst:TokenType> element
163
164 Line 1371
165 This MAY be any supported token type or it MAY be the following URI indicating that only status is
166 desired:
167
168 Line 1378
169 which is OPTIONAL
170
171 Line 1467
172 However, there are many scenarios where a set of exchanges between the parties is REQUIRED prior to
173 returning (e.g., issuing) a security token.
174
175 Line 1487
176 with the issued security token and OPTIONAL proof-of-possession token

177
178 Line 1502
179 (and MAY contain initial negotiation/challenge information)
180
181 Line 1504
182 Optionally, this MAY return token information
183
184 Line 1572
185 Exchange requests MAY also utilize existing binary formats
186
187 Line 1579
188 ellipses below indicate that this element MAY be placed in different containers
189
190 Line 1602
191 In some cases it MAY be necessary to provide a key exchange token so that the other party (either
192 requestor or issuer) can provide entropy or key material as part of the exchange. Challenges MAY NOT
193 always provide a usable key as the signature may use a signing-only certificate.
194
195 Line 1606
196 The section describes two OPTIONAL elements
197
198 Line 1608
199 ellipses below indicate that this element MAY be placed in different containers
200
201 Line 1617
202 This OPTIONAL element is used to indicate that the receiving party (either the original requestor or
203 issuer) SHOULD provide a KET to the other party on the next leg of the exchange.
204
205 Line 1822
206 This MAY be built into the exchange messages
207
208 Line 1832
209 To this end, the following computed key algorithm is defined to be OPTIONALLY used in these scenarios
210
211 Line 1837
212 However, until the exchange is actually completed it MAY be (and is often) inappropriate to use the
213 computed keys. As well, using a token that hasn't been returned to secure a message may (no change,
214 English) complicate processing since it crosses the boundary of the exchange and the underlying
215 message security. This means that it MAY NOT be appropriate to sign the final leg of the exchange using
216 the key derived from the exchange.
217
218 Line 1874
219 This <wst:CombinedHash> element is OPTIONAL
220

221 Line 1878
222 since all types of requests MAY issue security tokens they could apply to other bindings
223
224 Line 1924
225 The syntax for these OPTIONAL elements is as follows
226
227 Line 1950
228 That is, requestors SHOULD be familiar with the recipient policies
229
230 Line 1996
231 This element either contains a security token or a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element that
232 references the security token containing the key that SHOULD be used in the returned token.
233
234 Line 2037
235 EncryptionAlgorithm – used to indicate the symmetric algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to encrypt the
236 T (e.g. AES256)
237
238 Line 2043
239 EncryptionAlgorithm – used to indicate the symmetric algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to encrypt T
240 for RP (e.g. AES256)
241 KeyWrapAlgorithm – used to indicate the KeyWrap algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to wrap the
242 generated key that is used to encrypt the T for RP
243
244 Line 2052
245 EncryptionAlgorithm – used to indicate the symmetric algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to encrypt T
246 for RP (e.g. AES256)
247
248 Line 2059
249 EncryptionAlgorithm - used to indicate the symmetric algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to encrypt T
250 for RP (e.g. AES256)
251 KeyWrapAlgorithm – used to indicate the KeyWrap algorithm that the STS SHOULD use to wrap the
252 generated key that is used to encrypt the T for RP
253
254 Line 2140
255 This OPTIONAL element, of type xs:boolean, specifies whether the requested security token SHOULD be
256 marked as "Forwardable"
257
258 Line 2145
259 This OPTIONAL element, of type xs:boolean, specifies whether the requested security token SHOULD be
260 marked as "Delegatable".
261
262 Line 2224
263 Arbitrary types MAY be used to specify participants
264

265 Line 2248
266 OPTINALLY the <wst:TokenType> element can be specified in the request and can indicate
267
268 Line 2363
269 Other specifications and profiles MAY provide additional details on key exchange
270
271 Line 2376
272 In these cases both parties SHOULD contribute entropy to the key exchange by means of the
273 <wst:entropy> element
274
275 Line 2403
276 If the requestor provides key material that the recipient doesn't accept, then the issuer SHOULD reject the
277 request.
278
279 Line 2492
280 A third party MAY also act as a broker to transfer keys
281
282 Line 2631
283 The perfect forward secrecy property MAY be achieved by

284 **2.3 WSDL changes**
285 The WSDL was replaced with a more representative example that better illustrates usage of the protocol.

286 **3 Normative Errors**

287 None.

288 **4 References**

- 289 [WS-SX Issues] WS-SX TC Issues List
290 <http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/issues/Issues.xml>
291 [WS-Trust] OASIS Standard, "WS-Trust 1.3", March 2007
292 <http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512>

293 **Appendix A. Acknowledgements**

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296

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