PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Base Specification Version 2.40 Plus Errata 01

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Technical Committee:
OASIS PKCS 11 TC

Chairs:
Valerie Fenwick (valerie.fenwick@oracle.com), Oracle
Robert Relyea (rrelyea@redhat.com), Red Hat

Editors:
Susan Gleeson (susan.gleeson@oracle.com), Oracle
Chris Zimman (chris@wmpp.com), Individual
Robert Griffin (robert.griffin@emc.com), EMC Corporation
Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com), Cryptsoft Pty Ltd

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  - http://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-base/v2.40/errata01/os/include/pkcs11-v2.40/pkcs11t.h
  - http://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-base/v2.40/errata01/os/include/pkcs11-v2.40/pkcs11f.h
Related work:

This specification replaces or supersedes:


This specification is related to:


Abstract:

This document defines data types, functions and other basic components of the PKCS #11 Cryptoki interface.

Status:

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1 Introduction

This document describes the basic PKCS#11 token interface and token behavior. The PKCS#11 standard specifies an application programming interface (API), called “Cryptoki,” for devices that hold cryptographic information and perform cryptographic functions. Cryptoki follows a simple object based approach, addressing the goals of technology independence (any kind of device) and resource sharing (multiple applications accessing multiple devices), presenting to applications a common, logical view of the device called a “cryptographic token”.

This document specifies the data types and functions available to an application requiring cryptographic services using the ANSI C programming language. The supplier of a Cryptoki library implementation typically provides these data types and functions via ANSI C header files. Generic ANSI C header files for Cryptoki are available from the PKCS#11 web page. This document and up-to-date errata for Cryptoki will also be available from the same place.

Additional documents may provide a generic, language-independent Cryptoki interface and/or bindings between Cryptoki and other programming languages.

Cryptoki isolates an application from the details of the cryptographic device. The application does not have to change to interface to a different type of device or to run in a different environment; thus, the application is portable. How Cryptoki provides this isolation is beyond the scope of this document, although some conventions for the support of multiple types of device will be addressed here and possibly in a separate document.

Details of cryptographic mechanisms (algorithms) may be found in the associated PKCS#11 Mechanisms documents.

1.1 Terminology

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2 Definitions

For the purposes of this standard, the following definitions apply:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Application programming interface.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>Any computer program that calls the Cryptoki interface.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASN.1</td>
<td>Abstract Syntax Notation One, as defined in X.680.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute</td>
<td>A characteristic of an object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BER</td>
<td>Basic Encoding Rules, as defined in X.690.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cipher-Block Chaining mode, as defined in FIPS PUB 81.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td>A signed message binding a subject name and a public key, or a subject name and a set of attributes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Cryptographic Message Syntax (see RFC 5652)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Device</td>
<td>A device storing cryptographic information and possibly performing cryptographic functions. May be implemented as a smart card, smart disk, PCMCIA card, or with some other technology, including software-only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptoki</td>
<td>The Cryptographic Token Interface defined in this standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptoki library</td>
<td>A library that implements the functions specified in this standard.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**1.3 Symbols and abbreviations**

The following symbols are used in this standard:

**Table 1, Symbols**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/O</td>
<td>Read-only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>Read/write</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following prefixes are used in this standard:

**Table 2, Prefixes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefix</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C_</td>
<td>Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_</td>
<td>Data type or general constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_</td>
<td>Attribute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKC_</td>
<td>Certificate type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKD_</td>
<td>Key derivation function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_</td>
<td>Bit flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKG_</td>
<td>Mask generation function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKH_</td>
<td>Hardware feature type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKK_</td>
<td>Key type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKM_</td>
<td>Mechanism type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKN_</td>
<td>Notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KO_</td>
<td>Object class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKP_</td>
<td>Pseudo-random function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKS_</td>
<td>Session state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKR_</td>
<td>Return value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKU_</td>
<td>User type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKZ_</td>
<td>Salt/Encoding parameter source</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| h      | a handle                      |
| ul     | a CK_ULONG                    |
| p      | a pointer                     |
| pb     | a pointer to a CK_BYTE        |
| ph     | a pointer to a handle         |
| pul    | a pointer to a CK_ULONG       |

Cryptoki is based on ANSI C types, and defines the following data types:

```c
/* an unsigned 8-bit value */
typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE;

/* an unsigned 8-bit character */
typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR;

/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */
typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR;

/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */
typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL;

/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */
typedef unsigned long int CK_U Long;

/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_U Long */
typedef long int CK_LONG;

/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */
typedef CK_U Long CK_FLAGS;
```
Cryptoki also uses pointers to some of these data types, as well as to the type void, which are implementation-dependent. These pointer types are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CK_BYTE_PTR</td>
<td>Pointer to a CK_BYTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_CHAR_PTR</td>
<td>Pointer to a CK_CHAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR</td>
<td>Pointer to a CK_UTF8CHAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_ULONG_PTR</td>
<td>Pointer to a CK_ULONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_VOID_PTR</td>
<td>Pointer to a void</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cryptoki also defines a pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR, which is implementation-dependent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CK_VOID_PTR_PTR</td>
<td>Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, Cryptoki defines a C-style NULL pointer, which is distinct from any valid pointer:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NULL_PTR</td>
<td>A NULL pointer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It follows that many of the data and pointer types will vary somewhat from one environment to another (e.g., a CK_ULONG will sometimes be 32 bits, and sometimes perhaps 64 bits). However, these details should not affect an application, assuming it is compiled with Cryptoki header files consistent with the Cryptoki library to which the application is linked.

All numbers and values expressed in this document are decimal, unless they are preceded by "0x", in which case they are hexadecimal values.

The **CK_CHAR** data type holds characters from the following table, taken from ANSI C:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Characters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letters</td>
<td>A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphic characters</td>
<td>! * # % &amp; ' ( ) + , . / : ; &lt; = ? [ \ ] ^ _ {</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank character</td>
<td>‘ ’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The **CK_UTF8CHAR** data type holds UTF-8 encoded Unicode characters as specified in RFC2279. UTF-8 allows internationalization while maintaining backward compatibility with the Local String definition of PKCS #11 version 2.01.

In Cryptoki, the **CK_BBOOL** data type is a Boolean type that can be true or false. A zero value means false, and a nonzero value means true. Similarly, an individual bit flag, **CKF_...**, can also be set (true) or unset (false). For convenience, Cryptoki defines the following macros for use with values of type **CK_BBOOL**:

```c
#define CK_FALSE 0
#define CK_TRUE 1
```

For backwards compatibility, header files for this version of Cryptoki also define TRUE and FALSE as (CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE may be set by the application vendor):

```c
#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
#ifndef FALSE
#define FALSE CK_FALSE
#endif
#ifndef TRUE
#define TRUE CK_TRUE
#endif
#endif
```
1.4 Normative References


1.5 Non-Normative References


URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/CCPP-struct-vocab/


URL: http://jcp.org/jsr/detail/118.jsp

URL: http://www.mobiletransaction.org


2 Platform- and compiler-dependent directives for C or C++

There is a large array of Cryptoki-related data types that are defined in the Cryptoki header files. Certain packing and pointer-related aspects of these types are platform and compiler-dependent; these aspects are therefore resolved on a platform-by-platform (or compiler-by-compiler) basis outside of the Cryptoki header files by means of preprocessor directives.

This means that when writing C or C++ code, certain preprocessor directives MUST be issued before including a Cryptoki header file. These directives are described in the remainder of Section 6.

2.1 Structure packing

Cryptoki structures are packed to occupy as little space as is possible. Cryptoki structures SHALL be packed with 1-byte alignment.

2.2 Pointer-related macros

Because different platforms and compilers have different ways of dealing with different types of pointers, the following 6 macros SHALL be set outside the scope of Cryptoki:

♦ CK_PTR

CK_PTR is the "indirection string" a given platform and compiler uses to make a pointer to an object. It is used in the following fashion:

```c
typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
```

➜ CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION

CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name), when followed by a parentheses-enclosed list of arguments and a function definition, defines a Cryptoki API function in a Cryptoki library. returnType is the return type of the function, and name is its name. It SHALL be used in the following fashion:

```c
CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
    CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
);
```

♦ CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name), when followed by a parentheses-enclosed list of arguments and a semicolon, declares a Cryptoki API function in a Cryptoki library. returnType is the return type of the function, and name is its name. It SHALL be used in the following fashion:

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
    CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
);
```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name), when followed by a parentheses-enclosed list of arguments and a semicolon, declares a variable or type which is a pointer to a Cryptoki API function in a Cryptoki library. returnType is the return type of the function, and name is its name. It SHALL be used in either of the following fashions to define a function pointer variable, myCInitialize, which can point to a C_Initialize function in a Cryptoki library (note that neither of the following code snippets actually assigns a value to myCInitialize):

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, myC_Initialize)(
    CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
);
```

or:

```c
typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, myC_InitializeType)(
    CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
);
myC_InitializeType myC_Initialize;
```

CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION

CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name), when followed by a parentheses-enclosed list of arguments and a semicolon, declares a variable or type which is a pointer to an application callback function that can be used by a Cryptoki API function in a Cryptoki library. returnType is the return type of the function, and name is its name. It SHALL be used in either of the following fashions to define a function pointer variable, myCallback, which can point to an application callback which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV (note that neither of the following code snippets actually assigns a value to myCallback):

```c
CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args);
```

or:

```c
typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args);
myCallbackType myCallback;
```

NULL_PTR

NULL_PTR is the value of a NULL pointer. In any ANSI C environment—and in many others as well—NULL_PTR SHALL be defined simply as 0.
## 3 General data types

The general Cryptoki data types are described in the following subsections. The data types for holding parameters for various mechanisms, and the pointers to those parameters, are not described here; these types are described with the information on the mechanisms themselves, in Section 12.

A C or C++ source file in a Cryptoki application or library can define all these types (the types described here and the types that are specifically used for particular mechanism parameters) by including the top-level Cryptoki include file, pkcs11.h. pkcs11.h, in turn, includes the other Cryptoki include files, pkcs11t.h and pkcs11f.h. A source file can also include just pkcs11t.h (instead of pkcs11.h); this defines most (but not all) of the types specified here.

When including either of these header files, a source file MUST specify the preprocessor directives indicated in Section 2.

### 3.1 General information

Cryptoki represents general information with the following types:

- **CK_VERSION; CK_VERSION_PTR**

  **CK_VERSION** is a structure that describes the version of a Cryptoki interface, a Cryptoki library, or an SSL implementation, or the hardware or firmware version of a slot or token. It is defined as follows:

  ```
  typedef struct CK_VERSION {
    CK_BYTE major;
    CK_BYTE minor;
  } CK_VERSION;
  ```

  The fields of the structure have the following meanings:
  - `major` major version number (the integer portion of the version)
  - `minor` minor version number (the hundredths portion of the version)

  Example: For version 1.0, `major = 1` and `minor = 0`. For version 2.10, `major = 2` and `minor = 10`. Table 4 below lists the major and minor version values for the officially published Cryptoki specifications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version</th>
<th>major</th>
<th>minor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>0x00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>0x01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>0x0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>0x0b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>0x14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>0x1e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>0x28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

  Minor revisions of the Cryptoki standard are always upwardly compatible within the same major version number.

  **CK_VERSION_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_VERSION**.

- **CK_INFO; CK_INFO_PTR**

  **CK_INFO** provides general information about Cryptoki. It is defined as follows:
```c
typedef struct CK_INFO {
    CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion;
    CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32];
    CK_FLAGS flags;
    CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32];
    CK_VERSION libraryVersion;
} CK_INFO;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

- **cryptokiVersion**: Cryptoki interface version number, for compatibility with future revisions of this interface.
- **manufacturerID**: ID of the Cryptoki library manufacturer. MUST be padded with the blank character (‘ ’). Should not be null-terminated.
- **flags**: bit flags reserved for future versions. MUST be zero for this version.
- **libraryDescription**: character-string description of the library. MUST be padded with the blank character (‘ ’). Should not be null-terminated.
- **libraryVersion**: Cryptoki library version number.

For libraries written to this document, the value of `cryptokiVersion` should match the version of this specification; the value of `libraryVersion` is the version number of the library software itself.

**CK_INFO_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_INFO**.

**CK_NOTIFICATION**

**CK_NOTIFICATION** holds the types of notifications that Cryptoki provides to an application. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION;
```

For this version of Cryptoki, the following types of notifications are defined:

- **CKN_SURRENDER**: Cryptoki is surrendering the execution of a function executing in a session so that the application may perform other operations. After performing any desired operations, the application should indicate to Cryptoki whether to continue or cancel the function (see Section 5.16.1).

### 3.2 Slot and token types

Cryptoki represents slot and token information with the following types:

- **CK_SLOT_ID; CK_SLOT_ID_PTR**

**CK_SLOT_ID** is a Cryptoki-assigned value that identifies a slot. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID;
```
A list of CK_SLOT_IDs is returned by \texttt{C_GetSlotList}. A priori, any value of \texttt{CK_SLOT_ID} can be a valid slot identifier—in particular, a system may have a slot identified by the value 0. It need not have such a slot, however.

\texttt{CK_SLOT_ID_PTR} is a pointer to a \texttt{CK SLOT_ID}.

\section*{\texttt{CK_SLOT_INFO}; \texttt{CK SLOT_INFO_PTR}}

\texttt{CK SLOT_INFO} provides information about a slot. It is defined as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
typedef struct CK SLOT_INFO {
    CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64];
    CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32];
    CK_FLAGS flags;
    CK_VERSION hardwareVersion;
    CK_VERSION firmwareVersion;
} CK_SLOT_INFO;
\end{verbatim}

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

\begin{itemize}
    \item \texttt{slotDescription} character-string description of the slot. MUST be padded with the blank character (" "). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
    \item \texttt{manufacturerID} ID of the slot manufacturer. MUST be padded with the blank character (" "). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
    \item \texttt{flags} bits flags that provide capabilities of the slot. The flags are defined below.
    \item \texttt{hardwareVersion} version number of the slot’s hardware
    \item \texttt{firmwareVersion} version number of the slot’s firmware
\end{itemize}

The following table defines the \texttt{flags} field:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Slot Information Flags}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Bit Flag & Mask & Meaning \\
\hline
CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT & 0x00000001 & True if a token is present in the slot (e.g., a device is in the reader) \\
\hline
CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE & 0x00000002 & True if the reader supports removable devices \\
\hline
CKF_HW_SLOT & 0x00000004 & True if the slot is a hardware slot, as opposed to a software slot implementing a "soft token"
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

For a given slot, the value of the \texttt{CKF REMOVABLE_DEVICE} flag never changes. In addition, if this flag is not set for a given slot, then the \texttt{CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT} flag for that slot is always set. That is, if a slot does not support a removable device, then that slot always has a token in it.

\texttt{CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR} is a pointer to a \texttt{CK SLOT_INFO}.

\section*{\texttt{CK_TOKEN_INFO}; \texttt{CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR}}

\texttt{CK_TOKEN_INFO} provides information about a token. It is defined as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO {
    CK_UTF8CHAR label[32];
\end{verbatim}
CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32];
CK_UTF8CHAR model[16];
CK_CHAR serialNumber[16];
CK_FLAGS flags;
CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount;
CK_ULONG ulSessionCount;
CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount;
CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount;
CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen;
CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen;
CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory;
CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory;
CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory;
CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory;
CK_VERSION hardwareVersion;
CK_VERSION firmwareVersion;
CK_CHAR utcTime[16];
} CK_TOKEN_INFO;

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

- **label**: application-defined label, assigned during token initialization. MUST be padded with the blank character (" "). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
- **manufacturerID**: ID of the device manufacturer. MUST be padded with the blank character (" "). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
- **model**: model of the device. MUST be padded with the blank character (" "). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
- **serialNumber**: character-string serial number of the device. MUST be padded with the blank character (" "). MUST NOT be null-terminated.
- **flags**: bit flags indicating capabilities and status of the device as defined below
- **ulMaxSessionCount**: maximum number of sessions that can be opened with the token at one time by a single application (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
- **ulSessionCount**: number of sessions that this application currently has open with the token (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
- **ulMaxRwSessionCount**: maximum number of read/write sessions that can be opened with the token at one time by a single application (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
- **ulRwSessionCount**: number of read/write sessions that this application currently has open with the token (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
- **ulMaxPinLen**: maximum length in bytes of the PIN
- **ulMinPinLen**: minimum length in bytes of the PIN
- **ulTotalPublicMemory**: the total amount of memory on the token in bytes in which public objects may be stored (see **CK_TOKEN_INFO Note** below)
The following table defines the flags field:
### Table 6, Token Information Flags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit Flag</th>
<th>Mask</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKF_RNG</td>
<td>0x00000001</td>
<td>True if the token has its own random number generator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED</td>
<td>0x00000002</td>
<td>True if the token is write-protected (see below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED</td>
<td>0x00000004</td>
<td>True if there are some cryptographic functions that a user MUST be logged in to perform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED</td>
<td>0x00000008</td>
<td>True if the normal user’s PIN has been initialized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED</td>
<td>0x00000020</td>
<td>True if a successful save of a session’s cryptographic operations state always contains all keys needed to restore the state of the session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN</td>
<td>0x00000040</td>
<td>True if token has its own hardware clock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH</td>
<td>0x00000100</td>
<td>True if token has a “protected authentication path”, whereby a user can log into the token without passing a PIN through the Cryptoki library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS</td>
<td>0x00000200</td>
<td>True if a single session with the token can perform dual cryptographic operations (see Section 5.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED</td>
<td>0x00000400</td>
<td>True if the token has been initialized using C_InitToken or an equivalent mechanism outside the scope of this standard. Calling C_InitToken when this flag is set will cause the token to be reinitialized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION</td>
<td>0x00000800</td>
<td>True if the token supports secondary authentication for private key objects. (Deprecated; new implementations MUST NOT set this flag)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW</td>
<td>0x00010000</td>
<td>True if an incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once since the last successful authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY</td>
<td>0x00020000</td>
<td>True if supplying an incorrect user PIN will cause it to become locked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED</td>
<td>0x00040000</td>
<td>True if the user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit Flag</td>
<td>Mask</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED</td>
<td>0x00080000</td>
<td>True if the user PIN value is the default value set by token initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been expired by the card.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW</td>
<td>0x00100000</td>
<td>True if an incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since the last successful authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY</td>
<td>0x00200000</td>
<td>True if supplying an incorrect SO PIN will cause it to become locked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED</td>
<td>0x00400000</td>
<td>True if the SO PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED</td>
<td>0x00800000</td>
<td>True if the SO PIN value is the default value set by token initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been expired by the card.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_ERROR_STATE</td>
<td>0x01000000</td>
<td>True if the token failed a FIPS 140-2 self-test and entered an error state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exactly what the `CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED` flag means is not specified in Cryptoki. An application may be unable to perform certain actions on a write-protected token; these actions can include any of the following, among others:

- Creating/modifying/deleting any object on the token.
- Creating/modifying/deleting a token object on the token.
- Changing the SO’s PIN.
- Changing the normal user’s PIN.

The token may change the value of the `CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED` flag depending on the session state to implement its object management policy. For instance, the token may set the `CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED` flag unless the session state is R/W SO or R/W User to implement a policy that does not allow any objects, public or private, to be created, modified, or deleted unless the user has successfully called `C_Login`.

The `CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW`, `CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW`, `CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY`, and `CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY` flags may always be set to false if the token does not support the functionality or will not reveal the information because of its security policy.

The `CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED` and `CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED` flags may always be set to false if the token does not support the functionality. If a PIN is set to the default value, or has expired, the appropriate `CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED` or `CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED` flag is set to true. When either of these flags are true, logging in with the corresponding PIN will succeed, but only the `C_SetPIN` function can be called. Calling any other function that required the user to be logged in will cause `CKR_PIN_EXPIRED` to be returned until `C_SetPIN` is called successfully.

**CK_TOKEN_INFO Note:** The fields `ulMaxSessionCount`, `ulSessionCount`, `ulMaxRwSessionCount`, `ulRwSessionCount`, `ulTotalPublicMemory`, `ulFreePublicMemory`, `ulTotalPrivateMemory`, and `ulFreePrivateMemory` can have the special value `CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION`, which means that the token and/or library is unable or unwilling to provide that information. In addition, the fields `ulMaxSessionCount` and `ulMaxRwSessionCount` can have the special value `CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE`, which means that there is no practical limit on the number of sessions (resp. R/W sessions) an application can have open with the token.
It is important to check these fields for these special values. This is particularly true for CK\_EFFECTIVELY\_INFINITE, since an application seeing this value in the ulMaxSessionCount or ulMaxRwSessionCount field would otherwise conclude that it can’t open any sessions with the token, which is far from being the case.

The upshot of all this is that the correct way to interpret (for example) the ulMaxSessionCount field is something along the lines of the following:

```c
CK_TOKEN_INFO info;

if ((CK_LONG) info.ulMaxSessionCount == CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION) {
    /* Token refuses to give value of ulMaxSessionCount */
} else if (info.ulMaxSessionCount == CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE) {
    /* Application can open as many sessions as it wants */
} else {
    /* ulMaxSessionCount really does contain what it should */
}
```

CK\_TOKEN\_INFO\_PTR is a pointer to a CK\_TOKEN\_INFO.

### 3.3 Session types

Cryptoki represents session information with the following types:

- **CK\_SESSION\_HANDLE; CK\_SESSION\_HANDLE\_PTR**

  CK\_SESSION\_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that identifies a session. It is defined as follows:

  ```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE;
```

  Valid session handles in Cryptoki always have nonzero values. For developers’ convenience, Cryptoki defines the following symbolic value:

  ```c
  CK_INVALID_HANDLE
  ```

  CK\_SESSION\_HANDLE\_PTR is a pointer to a CK\_SESSION\_HANDLE.

- **CK\_USER\_TYPE**

  CK\_USER\_TYPE holds the types of Cryptoki users described in [PKCS11-UG] and, in addition, a context-specific type described in Section 4.9. It is defined as follows:

  ```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE;
```

  For this version of Cryptoki, the following types of users are defined:

  ```c
  CKU_SO
  CKU_USER
  CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC
  ```
**CK_STATE**

**CK_STATE** holds the session state, as described in [PKCS11-UG]. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE;
```

For this version of Cryptoki, the following session states are defined:

- CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION
- CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS
- CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION
- CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS
- CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS

**CK_SESSION_INFO; CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR**

**CK_SESSION_INFO** provides information about a session. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO {
    CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
    CK_STATE state;
    CK_FLAGS flags;
    CK_ULONG ulDeviceError;
} CK_SESSION_INFO;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

- **slotID**  ID of the slot that interfaces with the token
- **state**  the state of the session
- **flags**  bit flags that define the type of session; the flags are defined below
- **ulDeviceError**  an error code defined by the cryptographic device. Used for errors not covered by Cryptoki.

The following table defines the **flags** field:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit Flag</th>
<th>Mask</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKF_RW_SESSION</td>
<td>0x00000002</td>
<td>True if the session is read/write; false if the session is read-only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_SERIAL_SESSION</td>
<td>0x00000004</td>
<td>This flag is provided for backward compatibility, and should always be set to true</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_SESSION_INFO**.

### 3.4 Object types

Cryptoki represents object information with the following types:

- **CK_OBJECT_HANDLE; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR**

**CK_OBJECT_HANDLE** is a token-specific identifier for an object. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE;
```
When an object is created or found on a token by an application, Cryptoki assigns it an object handle for that application’s sessions to use to access it. A particular object on a token does not necessarily have a handle which is fixed for the lifetime of the object; however, if a particular session can use a particular handle to access a particular object, then that session will continue to be able to use that handle to access that object as long as the session continues to exist, the object continues to exist, and the object continues to be accessible to the session.

*Valid object handles in Cryptoki always have nonzero values.* For developers’ convenience, Cryptoki defines the following symbolic value:

```
CK_INVALID_HANDLE
```

CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR is a pointer to a CK_OBJECT_HANDLE.

♦ **CK_OBJECT_CLASS; CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR**

CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS;
```

Object classes are defined with the objects that use them. The type is specified on an object through the CKA_CLASS attribute of the object.

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```
CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Object classes CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their object classes through the PKCS process.

CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_OBJECT_CLASS.

♦ **CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE**

CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a value that identifies a hardware feature type of a device. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_HWFEATURETYPE;
```

Hardware feature types are defined with the objects that use them. The type is specified on an object through the CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE attribute of the object.

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```
CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Feature types CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their feature types through the PKCS process.

♦ **CK_KEY_TYPE**

CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE;
```

Key types are defined with the objects and mechanisms that use them. The key type is specified on an object through the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of the object.
Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_UNSPECIFIED</td>
<td>0x00000000UL</td>
<td>No category specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_TOKEN_USER</td>
<td>0x00000001UL</td>
<td>Certificate belongs to owner of the token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_AUTHORITY</td>
<td>0x00000002UL</td>
<td>Certificate belongs to a certificate authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_OTHER_ENTITY</td>
<td>0x00000003UL</td>
<td>Certificate belongs to an end entity (i.e.: not a CA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key types CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their key types through the PKCS process.

♦ **CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE**

CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate type. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
```

Certificate types are defined with the objects and mechanisms that use them. The certificate type is specified on an object through the CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE attribute of the object.

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Certificate types CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their certificate types through the PKCS process.

♦ **CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY**

CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY is a value that identifies a certificate category. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATECATEGORY;
```

For this version of Cryptoki, the following certificate categories are defined:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CK_CERTIFICATECATEGORY_UNSPECIFIED</td>
<td>0x00000000UL</td>
<td>No category specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_CERTIFICATECATEGORY_TOKEN_USER</td>
<td>0x00000001UL</td>
<td>Certificate belongs to owner of the token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_CERTIFICATECATEGORY_AUTHORITY</td>
<td>0x00000002UL</td>
<td>Certificate belongs to a certificate authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_CERTIFICATECATEGORY_OTHER_ENTITY</td>
<td>0x00000003UL</td>
<td>Certificate belongs to an end entity (i.e.: not a CA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

♦ **CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE**

CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute type. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE;
```

Attributes are defined with the objects and mechanisms that use them. Attributes are specified on an object as a list of type, length value items. These are often specified as an attribute template.

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attribute types CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their attribute types through the PKCS process.
**CK_ATTRIBUTE; CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR**

**CK_ATTRIBUTE** is a structure that includes the type, value, and length of an attribute. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE {
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type;
    CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
    CK_ULONG ulValueLen;
} CK_ATTRIBUTE;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:
- **type**: the attribute type
- **pValue**: pointer to the value of the attribute
- **ulValueLen**: length in bytes of the value

If an attribute has no value, then **ulValueLen** = 0, and the value of **pValue** is irrelevant. An array of **CK_ATTRIBUTE**s is called a “template” and is used for creating, manipulating and searching for objects. The order of the attributes in a template *never* matters, even if the template contains vendor-specific attributes. Note that **pValue** is a “void” pointer, facilitating the passing of arbitrary values. Both the application and Cryptoki library MUST ensure that the pointer can be safely cast to the expected type (i.e., without word-alignment errors).

The constant **CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION** is used in the **ulValueLen** field to denote an invalid or unavailable value. See C_GetAttributeValue for further details.

**CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_ATTRIBUTE**.

**CK_DATE**

**CK_DATE** is a structure that defines a date. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef struct CK_DATE {
    CK_CHAR year[4];
    CK_CHAR month[2];
    CK_CHAR day[2];
} CK_DATE;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:
- **year**: the year (“1900” - “9999”)
- **month**: the month (“01” - “12”)
- **day**: the day (“01” - “31”)

The fields hold numeric characters from the character set in Table 3, not the literal byte values. When a Cryptoki object carries an attribute of this type, and the default value of the attribute is specified to be “empty,” then Cryptoki libraries SHALL set the attribute’s **ulValueLen** to 0.

Note that implementations of previous versions of Cryptoki may have used other methods to identify an “empty” attribute of type **CK_DATE**, and applications that need to interoperate with these libraries therefore have to be flexible in what they accept as an empty value.
♦ **CK_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN**

**CK_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN** is a value that identifies the Java MIDP security domain of a certificate. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN;
```

For this version of Cryptoki, the following security domains are defined. See the Java MIDP specification for further information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_UNSPECIFIED</td>
<td>0x00000000UL</td>
<td>No domain specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_MANUFACTURER</td>
<td>0x00000001UL</td>
<td>Manufacturer protection domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_OPERATOR</td>
<td>0x00000002UL</td>
<td>Operator protection domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_THIRD_PARTY</td>
<td>0x00000003UL</td>
<td>Third party protection domain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.5 Data types for mechanisms

Cryptoki supports the following types for describing mechanisms and parameters to them:

♦ **CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR**

**CK_MECHANISM_TYPE** is a value that identifies a mechanism type. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
```

Mechanism types are defined with the objects and mechanism descriptions that use them. Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```c
CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Mechanism types **CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED** and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their mechanism types through the PKCS process.

**CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_MECHANISM_TYPE**.

♦ **CK_MECHANISM; CK_MECHANISM_PTR**

**CK_MECHANISM** is a structure that specifies a particular mechanism and any parameters it requires. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef struct CK_MECHANISM {
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
    CK_VOID_PTR pParameter;
    CK_ULONG ulParameterLen;
} CK_MECHANISM;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

- `mechanism` the type of mechanism
Parameter pointer to the parameter if required by the mechanism

ulParameterLen length in bytes of the parameter

Note that \textit{pParameter} is a "void" pointer, facilitating the passing of arbitrary values. Both the application and the Cryptoki library MUST ensure that the pointer can be safely cast to the expected type \textit{(i.e., without word-alignment errors)}.

\textbf{CK\_MECHANISM\_PTR} is a pointer to a \textbf{CK\_MECHANISM}.

\textbf{CK\_MECHANISM\_INFO; CK\_MECHANISM\_INFO\_PTR}

\textbf{CK\_MECHANISM\_INFO} is a structure that provides information about a particular mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO {
    CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize;
    CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize;
    CK_FLAGS flags;
} CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textit{ulMinKeySize} the minimum size of the key for the mechanism (whether this is measured in bits or in bytes is mechanism-dependent)
    \item \textit{ulMaxKeySize} the maximum size of the key for the mechanism (whether this is measured in bits or in bytes is mechanism-dependent)
    \item \textit{flags} bit flags specifying mechanism capabilities
\end{itemize}

For some mechanisms, the \textit{ulMinKeySize} and \textit{ulMaxKeySize} fields have meaningless values.

The following table defines the \textit{flags} field:
Table 8, Mechanism Information Flags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit Flag</th>
<th>Mask</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKF_HW</td>
<td>0x00000001</td>
<td>True if the mechanism is performed by the device; false if the mechanism is performed in software</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_ENCRYPT</td>
<td>0x00000100</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_EncryptInit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_DECRYPT</td>
<td>0x00000200</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_DecryptInit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_DIGEST</td>
<td>0x00000400</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_DigestInit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_SIGN</td>
<td>0x00000800</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_SignInit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_SIGN_RECOVER</td>
<td>0x00001000</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_SignRecoverInit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_VERIFY</td>
<td>0x00002000</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_VerifyInit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER</td>
<td>0x00004000</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_VerifyRecoverInit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_GENERATE</td>
<td>0x00008000</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_GenerateKey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR</td>
<td>0x00010000</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_GenerateKeyPair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_WRAP</td>
<td>0x00020000</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_WrapKey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_UNWRAP</td>
<td>0x00040000</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_UnwrapKey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_DERIVE</td>
<td>0x00080000</td>
<td>True if the mechanism can be used with C_DeriveKey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_EXTENSION</td>
<td>0x80000000</td>
<td>True if there is an extension to the flags; false if no extensions. MUST be false for this version.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR is a pointer to a CK_MECHANISM_INFO.

3.6 Function types

Cryptoki represents information about functions with the following data types:

♦ CK_RV

CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a Cryptoki function. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV;
```

Vendor defined values for this type may also be specified.

```c
CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED
```

Section 5.1 defines the meaning of each CK_RV value. Return values CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED and above are permanently reserved for token vendors. For interoperability, vendors should register their return values through the PKCS process.
CK_NOTIFY

CK_NOTIFY is the type of a pointer to a function used by Cryptoki to perform notification callbacks. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_NOTIFICATION event,
    CK_VOID_PTR pApplication
);
```

The arguments to a notification callback function have the following meanings:

- **hSession**: The handle of the session performing the callback
- **event**: The type of notification callback
- **pApplication**: An application-defined value. This is the same value as was passed to `C_OpenSession` to open the session performing the callback

CK_C_XXX

Cryptoki also defines an entire family of other function pointer types. For each function C_XXX in the Cryptoki API (see Section 4.12 for detailed information about each of them), Cryptoki defines a type CK_C_XXX, which is a pointer to a function with the same arguments and return value as C_XXX has. An appropriately-set variable of type CK_C_XXX may be used by an application to call the Cryptoki function C_XXX.

CK_FUNCTION_LIST; CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR

CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure which contains a Cryptoki version and a function pointer to each function in the Cryptoki API. It is defined as follows:

```c
typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST { 
    CK_VERSION version;
    CK_C_Initialize C_Initialize;
    CK_C_Finalize C_Finalize;
    CK_C_GetInfo C_GetInfo;
    CK_C_GetFunctionList C_GetFunctionList;
    CK_C_GetSlotList C_GetSlotList;
    CK_C_GetSlotInfo C_GetSlotInfo;
    CK_C_GetTokenInfo C_GetTokenInfo;
    CK_C_GetMechanismList C_GetMechanismList;
    CK_C_GetMechanismInfo C_GetMechanismInfo;
    CK_C_InitToken C_InitToken;
    CK_C_InitPIN C_InitPIN;
    CK_C_SetPIN C_SetPIN;
    CK_C_OpenSession C_OpenSession;
    CK_C_CloseSession C_CloseSession;
    CK_C_CloseAllSessions C_CloseAllSessions;
    CK_C_GetSessionInfo C_GetSessionInfo;
    CK_C_GetOperationState C_GetOperationState;
    CK_C_SetOperationState C_SetOperationState;
    CK_C_Login C_Login;
    CK_C_Logout C_Logout;
    CK_C_CreateObject C_CreateObject;
    CK_C_CopyObject C_CopyObject;
    CK_C_DestroyObject C_DestroyObject;
    CK_C_GetObjectSize C_GetObjectSize;
}
```
Each Cryptoki library has a static **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** structure, and a pointer to it (or to a copy of it which is also owned by the library) may be obtained by the **C_GetFunctionList** function (see Section 5.2). The value that this pointer points to can be used by an application to quickly find out where the executable code for each function in the Cryptoki API is located. Every function in the Cryptoki API MUST have an entry point defined in the Cryptoki library's **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** structure. If a particular function in the Cryptoki API is not supported by a library, then the function pointer for that function in the library's **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** structure should point to a function stub which simply returns **CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED**.

In this structure ‘version’ is the cryptoki specification version number. It should match the value of ‘cryptokiVersion’ returned in the **CK_INFO** structure.

An application may or may not be able to modify a Cryptoki library's static **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** structure. Whether or not it can, it should never attempt to do so.

**CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_FUNCTION_LIST**.

**CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR**.
3.7 Locking-related types

The types in this section are provided solely for applications which need to access Cryptoki from multiple threads simultaneously. *Applications which will not do this need not use any of these types.*

- **CK_CREATEMUTEX**

  **CK_CREATEMUTEX** is the type of a pointer to an application-supplied function which creates a new mutex object and returns a pointer to it. It is defined as follows:

  ```c
  typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX) (
      CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex
  );
  ```

  Calling a CK_CREATEMUTEX function returns the pointer to the new mutex object in the location pointed to by ppMutex. Such a function should return one of the following values:

  - CKR_OK
  - CKR_GENERAL_ERROR
  - CKR_HOST_MEMORY

- **CK_DESTROYMUTEX**

  **CK_DESTROYMUTEX** is the type of a pointer to an application-supplied function which destroys an existing mutex object. It is defined as follows:

  ```c
  typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX) (
      CK_VOID_PTR pMutex
  );
  ```

  The argument to a CK_DESTROYMUTEX function is a pointer to the mutex object to be destroyed. Such a function should return one of the following values:

  - CKR_OK
  - CKR_GENERAL_ERROR
  - CKR_HOST_MEMORY
  - CKR_MUTEX_BAD

- **CK_LOCKMUTEX** and **CK_UNLOCKMUTEX**

  **CK_LOCKMUTEX** is the type of a pointer to an application-supplied function which locks an existing mutex object. **CK_UNLOCKMUTEX** is the type of a pointer to an application-supplied function which unlocks an existing mutex object. The proper behavior for these types of functions is as follows:
  
  - If a CK_LOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is not locked, the calling thread obtains a lock on that mutex and returns.
  - If a CK_LOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is locked by some thread other than the calling thread, the calling thread blocks and waits for that mutex to be unlocked.
  - If a CK_LOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is locked by the calling thread, the behavior of the function call is undefined.
  - If a CK_UNLOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is locked by the calling thread, that mutex is unlocked and the function call returns. Furthermore:
    - If exactly one thread was blocking on that particular mutex, then that thread stops blocking, obtains a lock on that mutex, and its CK_LOCKMUTEX call returns.
    - If more than one thread was blocking on that particular mutex, then exactly one of the blocking threads is selected somehow. That lucky thread stops blocking, obtains a lock on the mutex, and its CK_LOCKMUTEX call returns. All other threads blocking on that particular mutex continue to block.
- If a CK_UNLOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is not locked, then the function call returns the error code CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED.
- If a CK_UNLOCKMUTEX function is called on a mutex which is locked by some thread other than the calling thread, the behavior of the function call is undefined.

**CK_LOCKMUTEX** is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)(
    CK_VOID_PTR pMutex
);
```

The argument to a CK_LOCKMUTEX function is a pointer to the mutex object to be locked. Such a function should return one of the following values:

- CKR_OK
- CKR_GENERAL_ERROR
- CKR_HOST_MEMORY
- CKR_MUTEX_BAD

**CK_UNLOCKMUTEX** is defined as follows:

```c
typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)(
    CK_VOID_PTR pMutex
);
```

The argument to a CK_UNLOCKMUTEX function is a pointer to the mutex object to be unlocked. Such a function should return one of the following values:

- CKR_OK
- CKR_GENERAL_ERROR
- CKR_HOST_MEMORY
- CKR_MUTEX_BAD
- CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED

**CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR**

**CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS** is a structure containing the optional arguments for the C_Initialize function. For this version of Cryptoki, these optional arguments are all concerned with the way the library deals with threads. **CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS** is defined as follows:

```c
typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS {
    CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex;
    CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex;
    CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex;
    CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex;
    CK_FLAGS flags;
    CK_VOID_PTR pReserved;
} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

- **CreateMutex**: pointer to a function to use for creating mutex objects
- **DestroyMutex**: pointer to a function to use for destroying mutex objects
- **LockMutex**: pointer to a function to use for locking mutex objects
- **UnlockMutex**: pointer to a function to use for unlocking mutex objects
- **flags**: bit flags specifying options for C_Initialize; the flags are defined below
The following table defines the flags field:

Table 9, C_Initailize Parameter Flags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit Flag</th>
<th>Mask</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS</td>
<td>0x00000001</td>
<td>True if application threads which are executing calls to the library may not use native operating system calls to spawn new threads; false if they may</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK</td>
<td>0x00000002</td>
<td>True if the library can use the native operation system threading model for locking; false otherwise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR is a pointer to a CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS.
4 Objects

Cryptoki recognizes a number of classes of objects, as defined in the `CK_OBJECT_CLASS` data type. An object consists of a set of attributes, each of which has a given value. Each attribute that an object possesses has precisely one value. The following figure illustrates the high-level hierarchy of the Cryptoki objects and some of the attributes they support:

![Object Attribute Hierarchy](image)

Cryptoki provides functions for creating, destroying, and copying objects in general, and for obtaining and modifying the values of their attributes. Some of the cryptographic functions (e.g., `C_GenerateKey`) also create key objects to hold their results.

Objects are always “well-formed” in Cryptoki—that is, an object always contains all required attributes, and the attributes are always consistent with one another from the time the object is created. This contrasts with some object-based paradigms where an object has no attributes other than perhaps a class when it is created, and is uninitialized for some time. In Cryptoki, objects are always initialized.

Tables throughout most of Section 4 define each Cryptoki attribute in terms of the data type of the attribute value and the meaning of the attribute, which may include a default initial value. Some of the data types are defined explicitly by Cryptoki (e.g., `CK_OBJECT_CLASS`). Attribute values may also take the following types:

- **Byte array**: an arbitrary string (array) of `CK_BYTE`s
- **Big integer**: a string of `CK_BYTE`s representing an unsigned integer of arbitrary size, most-significant byte first (e.g., the integer 32768 is represented as the 2-byte string 0x80 0x00)
- **Local string**: an unpadded string of `CK_CHAR`s (see Table 3) with no null-termination
A token can hold several identical objects, *i.e.*, it is permissible for two or more objects to have exactly the same values for all their attributes.

In most cases each type of object in the Cryptoki specification possesses a completely well-defined set of Cryptoki attributes. Some of these attributes possess default values, and need not be specified when creating an object; some of these default values may even be the empty string ("""). Nonetheless, the object possesses these attributes. A given object has a single value for each attribute it possesses, even if the attribute is a vendor-specific attribute whose meaning is outside the scope of Cryptoki.

In addition to possessing Cryptoki attributes, objects may possess additional vendor-specific attributes whose meanings and values are not specified by Cryptoki.

### 4.1 Creating, modifying, and copying objects

All Cryptoki functions that create, modify, or copy objects take a template as one of their arguments, where the template specifies attribute values. Cryptographic functions that create objects (see Section 5.13) may also contribute some additional attribute values themselves; which attributes have values contributed by a cryptographic function call depends on which cryptographic mechanism is being performed (see [PKCS11-Curr] and [PKCS11-Hist] for specification of mechanisms for PKCS #11). In any case, all the required attributes supported by an object class that do not have default values MUST be specified when an object is created, either in the template or by the function itself.

#### 4.1.1 Creating objects

Objects may be created with the Cryptoki functions **C_CreateObject** (see Section 5.7), **C_GenerateKey**, **C_GenerateKeyPair**, **C_UnwrapKey**, and **C_DeriveKey** (see Section 5.13). In addition, copying an existing object (with the function **C_CopyObject**) also creates a new object, but we consider this type of object creation separately in Section 4.1.3.

Attempting to create an object with any of these functions requires an appropriate template to be supplied.

1. If the supplied template specifies a value for an invalid attribute, then the attempt should fail with the error code CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID. An attribute is valid if it is either one of the attributes described in the Cryptoki specification or an additional vendor-specific attribute supported by the library and token.

2. If the supplied template specifies an invalid value for a valid attribute, then the attempt should fail with the error code CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID. The valid values for Cryptoki attributes are described in the Cryptoki specification.

3. If the supplied template specifies a value for a read-only attribute, then the attempt should fail with the error code CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY. Whether or not a given Cryptoki attribute is read-only is explicitly stated in the Cryptoki specification; however, a particular library and token may be even more restrictive than Cryptoki specifies. In other words, an attribute which Cryptoki says is not read-only may nonetheless be read-only under certain circumstances (*i.e.*, in conjunction with some combinations of other attributes) for a particular library and token. Whether or not a given non-Cryptoki attribute is read-only is obviously outside the scope of Cryptoki.

4. If the attribute values in the supplied template, together with any default attribute values and any attribute values contributed to the object by the object-creation function itself, are insufficient to fully specify the object to create, then the attempt should fail with the error code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE.

5. If the attribute values in the supplied template, together with any default attribute values and any attribute values contributed to the object by the object-creation function itself, are inconsistent, then the attempt should fail with the error code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT. A set of attribute values is inconsistent if not all of its members can be satisfied simultaneously *by the token*, although
each value individually is valid in Cryptoki. One example of an inconsistent template would be using a template which specifies two different values for the same attribute. Another example would be trying to create a secret key object with an attribute which is appropriate for various types of public keys or private keys, but not for secret keys. A final example would be a template with an attribute that violates some token specific requirement. Note that this final example of an inconsistent template is token-dependent—on a different token, such a template might not be inconsistent.

6. If the supplied template specifies the same value for a particular attribute more than once (or the template specifies the same value for a particular attribute that the object-creation function itself contributes to the object), then the behavior of Cryptoki is not completely specified. The attempt to create an object can either succeed—thereby creating the same object that would have been created if the multiply-specified attribute had only appeared once—or it can fail with error code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT. Library developers are encouraged to make their libraries behave as though the attribute had only appeared once in the template; application developers are strongly encouraged never to put a particular attribute into a particular template more than once.

If more than one of the situations listed above applies to an attempt to create an object, then the error code returned from the attempt can be any of the error codes from above that applies.

4.1.2 Modifying objects

Objects may be modified with the Cryptoki function C_SetAttributeValue (see Section 5.7). The template supplied to C_SetAttributeValue can contain new values for attributes which the object already possesses; values for attributes which the object does not yet possess; or both. Some attributes of an object may be modified after the object has been created, and some may not. In addition, attributes which Cryptoki specifies are modifiable may actually not be modifiable on some tokens. That is, if a Cryptoki attribute is described as being modifiable, that really means only that it is modifiable insofar as the Cryptoki specification is concerned. A particular token might not actually support modification of some such attributes. Furthermore, whether or not a particular attribute of an object on a particular token is modifiable might depend on the values of certain attributes of the object. For example, a secret key object's CKA_SENSITIVE attribute can be changed from CK_FALSE to CK_TRUE, but not the other way around.

All the scenarios in Section 4.1.1—and the error codes they return—apply to modifying objects with C_SetAttributeValue, except for the possibility of a template being incomplete.

4.1.3 Copying objects

Unless an object's CKA_COPYABLE (see table 21) attribute is set to CK_FALSE, it may be copied with the Cryptoki function C_CopyObject (see Section 5.7). In the process of copying an object, C_CopyObject also modifies the attributes of the newly-created copy according to an application-supplied template.

The Cryptoki attributes which can be modified during the course of a C_CopyObject operation are the same as the Cryptoki attributes which are described as being modifiable, plus the three special attributes CKA_TOKEN, CKA_PRIVATE, CKA_MODIFIABLE and CKA_DESTROYABLE. To be more precise, these attributes are modifiable during the course of a C_CopyObject operation insofar as the Cryptoki specification is concerned. A particular token might not actually support modification of some such attributes during the course of a C_CopyObject operation. Furthermore, whether or not a particular attribute of an object on a particular token is modifiable during the course of a C_CopyObject operation might depend on the values of certain attributes of the object. For example, a secret key object's CKA_SENSITIVE attribute can be changed from CK_FALSE to CK_TRUE during the course of a C_CopyObject operation, but not the other way around.

If the CKA_COPYABLE attribute of the object to be copied is set to CK_FALSE, C_CopyObject returns CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED. Otherwise, the scenarios described in 10.1.1 - and the error codes they return - apply to copying objects with C_CopyObject, except for the possibility of a template being incomplete.
4.2 Common attributes

Table 10, Common footnotes for object attribute tables

1 MUST be specified when object is created with C_CreateObject.
2 MUST not be specified when object is created with C_CreateObject.
3 MUST be specified when object is generated with C_GenerateKey or C_GenerateKeyPair.
4 MUST not be specified when object is generated with C_GenerateKey or C_GenerateKeyPair.
5 MUST be specified when object is unwrapped with C_UnwrapKey.
6 MUST not be specified when object is unwrapped with C_UnwrapKey.
7 Cannot be revealed if object has its CKA_SENSITIVE attribute set to CK_TRUE or its CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute set to CK_FALSE.
8 May be modified after object is created with a C_SetAttributeValue call, or in the process of copying object with a C_CopyObject call. However, it is possible that a particular token may not permit modification of the attribute during the course of a C_CopyObject call.
9 Default value is token-specific, and may depend on the values of other attributes.
10 Can only be set to CK_TRUE by the SO user.
11 Attribute cannot be changed once set to CK_TRUE. It becomes a read only attribute.
12 Attribute cannot be changed once set to CK_FALSE. It becomes a read only attribute.

Table 11, Common Object Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_CLASS</td>
<td>CK_OBJECT_CLASS</td>
<td>Object class (type)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Refer to Table 10 for footnotes

The above table defines the attributes common to all objects.

4.3 Hardware Feature Objects

4.3.1 Definitions

This section defines the object class CKO_HW_FEATURE for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

4.3.2 Overview

Hardware feature objects (CKO_HW_FEATURE) represent features of the device. They provide an easily expandable method for introducing new value-based features to the Cryptoki interface.

When searching for objects using C_FindObjectsInit and C_FindObjects, hardware feature objects are not returned unless the CKA_CLASS attribute in the template has the value CKO_HW_FEATURE. This protects applications written to previous versions of Cryptoki from finding objects that they do not understand.

Table 12, Hardware Feature Common Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE</td>
<td>CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE</td>
<td>Hardware feature (type)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Refer to Table 10 for footnotes
4.3.3 Clock

4.3.3.1 Definition

The CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE attribute takes the value CKH_CLOCK of type CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE.

4.3.3.2 Description

Clock objects represent real-time clocks that exist on the device. This represents the same clock source as the utcTime field in the CK_TOKEN_INFO structure.

Table 13, Clock Object Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_VALUE</td>
<td>CK_CHAR[16]</td>
<td>Current time as a character-string of length 16, represented in the format YYYYMMDDhhmmssxx (4 characters for the year; 2 characters each for the month, the day, the hour, the minute, and the second; and 2 additional reserved ‘0’ characters).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CKA_VALUE attribute may be set using the C_SetAttributeValue function if permitted by the device. The session used to set the time MUST be logged in. The device may require the SO to be the user logged in to modify the time value. C_SetAttributeValue will return the error CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN to indicate that a different user type is required to set the value.

4.3.4 Monotonic Counter Objects

4.3.4.1 Definition

The CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE attribute takes the value CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER of type CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE.

4.3.4.2 Description

Monotonic counter objects represent hardware counters that exist on the device. The counter is guaranteed to increase each time its value is read, but not necessarily by one. This might be used by an application for generating serial numbers to get some assurance of uniqueness per token.

Table 14, Monotonic Counter Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_RESET_ON_INIT(^1)</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>The value of the counter will reset to a previously returned value if the token is initialized using C_InitToken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_HAS_RESET(^1)</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>The value of the counter has been reset at least once at some point in time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_VALUE(^1)</td>
<td>Byte Array</td>
<td>The current version of the monotonic counter. The value is returned in big endian order.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Read Only

The CKA_VALUE attribute may not be set by the client.

4.3.5 User Interface Objects

4.3.5.1 Definition

The CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE attribute takes the value CKH_USER_INTERFACE of type CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE.
4.3.5.2 Description

User interface objects represent the presentation capabilities of the device.

Table 15, User Interface Object Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_PIXEL_X</td>
<td>CK_ULONG</td>
<td>Screen resolution (in pixels) in X-axis (e.g. 1280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_PIXEL_Y</td>
<td>CK_ULONG</td>
<td>Screen resolution (in pixels) in Y-axis (e.g. 1024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_RESOLUTION</td>
<td>CK_ULONG</td>
<td>DPI, pixels per inch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_CHAR_ROWS</td>
<td>CK_ULONG</td>
<td>For character-oriented displays; number of character rows (e.g. 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS</td>
<td>CK_ULONG</td>
<td>For character-oriented displays: number of character columns (e.g. 80). If display is of proportional-font type, this is the width of the display in &quot;em&quot;-s (letter &quot;M&quot;), see CC/PP Struct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_COLOR</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>Color support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL</td>
<td>CK_ULONG</td>
<td>The number of bits of color or grayscale information per pixel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_CHAR_SETS</td>
<td>RFC 2279 string</td>
<td>String indicating supported character sets, as defined by IANA MIBenum sets (<a href="http://www.iana.org">www.iana.org</a>). Supported character sets are separated with &quot;;&quot;. E.g. a token supporting iso-8859-1 and US-ASCII would set the attribute value to &quot;4;3&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_ENCODING_METHODS</td>
<td>RFC 2279 string</td>
<td>String indicating supported content transfer encoding methods, as defined by IANA (<a href="http://www.iana.org">www.iana.org</a>). Supported methods are separated with &quot;;&quot;. E.g. a token supporting 7bit, 8bit and base64 could set the attribute value to &quot;7bit;8bit;base64&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_MIME_TYPES</td>
<td>RFC 2279 string</td>
<td>String indicating supported (presentable) MIME-types, as defined by IANA (<a href="http://www.iana.org">www.iana.org</a>). Supported types are separated with &quot;;&quot;. E.g. a token supporting MIME types &quot;a/b&quot;, &quot;a/c&quot; and &quot;a/d&quot; would set the attribute value to &quot;a/b;a/c;a/d&quot;.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The selection of attributes, and associated data types, has been done in an attempt to stay as aligned with RFC 2534 and CC/PP Struct as possible. The special value CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION may be used for CK_ULONG-based attributes when information is not available or applicable.

None of the attribute values may be set by an application.

The value of the CKA_ENCODING_METHODS attribute may be used when the application needs to send MIME objects with encoded content to the token.

4.4 Storage Objects

This is not an object class; hence no CKO_ definition is required. It is a category of object classes with common attributes for the object classes that follow.
Table 16, Common Storage Object Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_TOKEN</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if object is a token object; CK_FALSE if object is a session object. Default is CK_FALSE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_PRIVATE</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if object is a private object; CK_FALSE if object is a public object. Default value is token-specific, and may depend on the values of other attributes of the object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_MODIFIABLE</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if object can be modified Default is CK_TRUE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_LABEL</td>
<td>RFC2279 string</td>
<td>Description of the object (default empty).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_COPYABLE</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if object can be copied using C_CopyObject. Defaults to CK_TRUE. Can’t be set to TRUE once it is set to FALSE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_DESTROYABLE</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if the object can be destroyed using C_DestroyObject. Default is CK_TRUE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only the CKA_LABEL attribute can be modified after the object is created. (The CKA_TOKEN, CKA_PRIVATE, and CKA_MODIFIABLE attributes can be changed in the process of copying an object, however.)

The CKA_TOKEN attribute identifies whether the object is a token object or a session object.

When the CKA_PRIVATE attribute is CK_TRUE, a user may not access the object until the user has been authenticated to the token.

The value of the CKA_MODIFIABLE attribute determines whether or not an object is read-only.

The CKA_LABEL attribute is intended to assist users in browsing.

The value of the CKA_COPYABLE attribute determines whether or not an object can be copied. This attribute can be used in conjunction with CKA_MODIFIABLE to prevent changes to the permitted usages of keys and other objects.

The value of the CKA_DESTROYABLE attribute determines whether the object can be destroyed using C_DestroyObject.

4.5 Data objects

4.5.1 Definitions

This section defines the object class CKO_DATA for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

4.5.2 Overview

Data objects (object class CKO_DATA) hold information defined by an application. Other than providing access to it, Cryptoki does not attach any special meaning to a data object. The following table lists the attributes supported by data objects, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:
### Table 17, Data Object Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_APPLICATION</td>
<td>RFC2279 string</td>
<td>Description of the application that manages the object (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_OBJECT_ID</td>
<td>Byte Array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of the object identifier indicating the data object type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_VALUE</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>Value of the object (default empty)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CKA_APPLICATION attribute provides a means for applications to indicate ownership of the data objects they manage. Cryptoki does not provide a means of ensuring that only a particular application has access to a data object, however.

The CKA_OBJECT_ID attribute provides an application independent and expandable way to indicate the type of the data object value. Cryptoki does not provide a means of insuring that the data object identifier matches the data value.

The following is a sample template containing attributes for creating a data object:

```c
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_DATA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A data object";
CK_UTF8CHAR application[] = "An application";
CK_BYTE data[] = "Sample data";
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_APPLICATION, application, sizeof(application)-1},
    {CKA_VALUE, data, sizeof(data)}
};
```

### 4.6 Certificate objects

#### 4.6.1 Definitions

This section defines the object class CKO_CERTIFICATE for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

#### 4.6.2 Overview

Certificate objects (object class CKO_CERTIFICATE) hold public-key or attribute certificates. Other than providing access to certificate objects, Cryptoki does not attach any special meaning to certificates. The following table defines the common certificate object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

### Table 18, Common Certificate Object Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE¹</td>
<td>CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE</td>
<td>Type of certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_TRUSTED¹⁰</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>The certificate can be trusted for the application that it was created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY</td>
<td>CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY</td>
<td>(default CKCERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_UNSPECIFIED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_CHECK_VALUE</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>Checksum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute</td>
<td>Data type</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_START_DATE</td>
<td>CK_DATE</td>
<td>Start date for the certificate (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_END_DATE</td>
<td>CK_DATE</td>
<td>End date for the certificate (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO</td>
<td>Byte Array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo for the public key contained in this certificate (default empty)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Refer to Table 10 for footnotes

Cryptoki does not enforce the relationship of the CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO to the public key in the certificate, but does recommend that the key be extracted from the certificate to create this value.

The **CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE** attribute may not be modified after an object is created. This version of Cryptoki supports the following certificate types:

- X.509 public key certificate
- WTLS public key certificate
- X.509 attribute certificate

The **CKA_TRUSTED** attribute cannot be set to CK_TRUE by an application. It MUST be set by a token initialization application or by the token’s SO. Trusted certificates cannot be modified.

The **CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY** attribute is used to indicate if a stored certificate is a user certificate for which the corresponding private key is available on the token (“token user”), a CA certificate (“authority”), or another end-entity certificate (“other entity”). This attribute may not be modified after an object is created.

The **CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY** and **CKA_TRUSTED** attributes will together be used to map to the categorization of the certificates.

**CKA_CHECK_VALUE**: The value of this attribute is derived from the certificate by taking the first three bytes of the SHA-1 hash of the certificate object’s CKA_VALUE attribute.

The **CKA_START_DATE** and **CKA_END_DATE** attributes are for reference only; Cryptoki does not attach any special meaning to them. When present, the application is responsible to set them to values that match the certificate’s encoded “not before” and “not after” fields (if any).

### 4.6.3 X.509 public key certificate objects

X.509 certificate objects (certificate type **CKC_X_509**) hold X.509 public key certificates. The following table defines the X.509 certificate object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:
Table 19, X.509 Certificate Object Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_SUBJECT1</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of the certificate subject name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_ID</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>Key identifier for public/private key pair (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_ISSUER</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of the certificate issuer name (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of the certificate serial number (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_VALUE2</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>BER-encoding of the certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_URL</td>
<td>RFC2279 string</td>
<td>If not empty this attribute gives the URL where the complete certificate can be obtained (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY4</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>Hash of the subject public key (default empty). Hash algorithm is defined by CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY4</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>Hash of the issuer public key (default empty). Hash algorithm is defined by CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN</td>
<td>CK_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN</td>
<td>Java MIDP security domain. (default CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_UNSPECIFIED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM</td>
<td>CK_MECHANISM_TYPE</td>
<td>Defines the mechanism used to calculate CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY and CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY. If the attribute is not present then the type defaults to SHA-1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1MUST be specified when the object is created.
2MUST be specified when the object is created. MUST be non-empty if CKA_URL is empty.
3MUST be non-empty if CKA_VALUE is empty.
4Can only be empty if CKA_URL is empty.

Only the CKA_ID, CKA_ISSUER, and CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER attributes may be modified after the object is created.

The CKA_ID attribute is intended as a means of distinguishing multiple public-key/private-key pairs held by the same subject (whether stored in the same token or not). (Since the keys are distinguished by subject name as well as identifier, it is possible that keys for different subjects may have the same CKA_ID value without introducing any ambiguity.)

It is intended in the interests of interoperability that the subject name and key identifier for a certificate will be the same as those for the corresponding public and private keys (though it is not required that all be stored in the same token). However, Cryptoki does not enforce this association, or even the uniqueness of the key identifier for a given subject; in particular, an application may leave the key identifier empty.

The CKA_ISSUER and CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER attributes are for compatibility with PKCS #7 and Privacy Enhanced Mail (RFC1421). Note that with the version 3 extensions to X.509 certificates, the key identifier may be carried in the certificate. It is intended that the CKA_ID value be identical to the key identifier in such a certificate extension, although this will not be enforced by Cryptoki.
The **CKA_URL** attribute enables the support for storage of the URL where the certificate can be found instead of the certificate itself. Storage of a URL instead of the complete certificate is often used in mobile environments.

The **CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY** and **CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY** attributes are used to store the hashes of the public keys of the subject and the issuer. They are particularly important when only the URL is available to be able to correlate a certificate with a private key and when searching for the certificate of the issuer. The hash algorithm is defined by **CKA_NAMEHASH_ALGORITHM**.

The **CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN** attribute associates a certificate with a Java MIDP security domain.

The following is a sample template for creating an X.509 certificate object:

```c
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE certType = CKC_X_509;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = “A certificate object”;
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK_BYTE certificate[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, &certType, sizeof(certType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
    {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
    {CKA_VALUE, certificate, sizeof(certificate)}
};
```

### 4.6.4 WTLS public key certificate objects

WTLS certificate objects (certificate type **CKC_WTLS**) hold WTLS public key certificates. The following table defines the WTLS certificate object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class.
### Table 20: WTLS Certificate Object Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_SUBJECT$^1$</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>WTLS-encoding (Identifier type) of the certificate subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_ISSUER</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>WTLS-encoding (Identifier type) of the certificate issuer (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_VALUE$^2$</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>WTLS-encoding of the certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_URL$^3$</td>
<td>RFC2279 string</td>
<td>If not empty this attribute gives the URL where the complete certificate can be obtained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY$^4$</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>SHA-1 hash of the subject public key (default empty). Hash algorithm is defined by CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY$^4$</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>SHA-1 hash of the issuer public key (default empty). Hash algorithm is defined by CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM</td>
<td>CK_MECHANISM_TYPE</td>
<td>Defines the mechanism used to calculate CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY and CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY. If the attribute is not present then the type defaults to SHA-1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^1$MUST be specified when the object is created. Can only be empty if CKA_VALUE is empty.

$^2$MUST be specified when the object is created. MUST be non-empty if CKA_URL is empty.

$^3$MUST be non-empty if CKA_VALUE is empty.

$^4$Can only be empty if CKA_URL is empty.

Only the **CKA_ISSUER** attribute may be modified after the object has been created.

The encoding for the **CKA_SUBJECT**, **CKA_ISSUER**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes can be found in [WTLS](#) (see References).

The **CKA_URL** attribute enables the support for storage of the URL where the certificate can be found instead of the certificate itself. Storage of a URL instead of the complete certificate is often used in mobile environments.

The **CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY** and **CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY** attributes are used to store the hashes of the public keys of the subject and the issuer. They are particularly important when only the URL is available to be able to correlate a certificate with a private key and when searching for the certificate of the issuer. The hash algorithm is defined by CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM.

The following is a sample template for creating a WTLS certificate object:

```plaintext
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE certType = CKC_WTLS;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A certificate object";
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE certificate[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, &certType, sizeof(certType)};
```
4.6.5 X.509 attribute certificate objects

X.509 attribute certificate objects (certificate type `CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT`) hold X.509 attribute certificates. The following table defines the X.509 attribute certificate object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_OWNER¹</td>
<td>Byte Array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of the attribute certificate’s subject field. This is distinct from the CKA_SUBJECT attribute contained in CKC_X_509 certificates because the ASN.1 syntax and encoding are different.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_AC_ISSUER</td>
<td>Byte Array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of the attribute certificate’s issuer field. This is distinct from the CKA_ISSUER attribute contained in CKC_X_509 certificates because the ASN.1 syntax and encoding are different. (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER</td>
<td>Byte Array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of the certificate serial number. (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_ATTR_TYPES</td>
<td>Byte Array</td>
<td>BER-encoding of a sequence of object identifier values corresponding to the attribute types contained in the certificate. When present, this field offers an opportunity for applications to search for a particular attribute certificate without fetching and parsing the certificate itself. (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_VALUE¹</td>
<td>Byte Array</td>
<td>BER-encoding of the certificate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹MUST be specified when the object is created

Only the `CKA_AC_ISSUER`, `CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER` and `CKA_ATTR_TYPES` attributes may be modified after the object is created.

The following is a sample template for creating an X.509 attribute certificate object:

```c
CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE certType = CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An attribute certificate object";
CK_BYTE owner[] = {...};
CK_BYTE certificate[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, &certType, sizeof(certType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_OWNER, owner, sizeof(owner)},
    {CKA_VALUE, certificate, sizeof(certificate)}
};
```
4.7 Key objects

4.7.1 Definitions

There is no CKO_ definition for the base key object class, only for the key types derived from it. This section defines the object class CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY and CKO_SECRET_KEY for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

4.7.2 Overview

Key objects hold encryption or authentication keys, which can be public keys, private keys, or secret keys. The following common footnotes apply to all the tables describing attributes of keys:

The following table defines the attributes common to public key, private key and secret key classes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 22. Common Key Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_KEY_TYPE</td>
<td>CK_KEY_TYPE</td>
<td>Type of key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_ID</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>Key identifier for key (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_START_DATE</td>
<td>CK_DATE</td>
<td>Start date for the key (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_END_DATE</td>
<td>CK_DATE</td>
<td>End date for the key (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_DERIVE</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key supports key derivation (i.e., if other keys can be derived from this one (default CK_FALSE))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| CKA_LOCAL            | CK_BBOOL           | CK_TRUE only if key was either
|                      |                    | • generated locally (i.e., on the token) with a C_GenerateKey or C_GenerateKeyPair call |
|                      |                    | • created with a C_CopyObject call as a copy of a key which had its CKA_LOCAL attribute set to CK_TRUE |
| CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANIS | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE  | Identifier of the mechanism used to generate the key material.         |
| CK_ALLOWED_MECHANI  | CK_MECHANISM_TYPE _TYPE_PTR,    | A list of mechanisms allowed to be used with this key. The number of mechanisms in the array is uValueLen component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_MECHANISM_TYPE. |
| SMS                  |                    |                                                                         |

*Refer to Table 10 for footnotes*

The CKA_ID field is intended to distinguish among multiple keys. In the case of public and private keys, this field assists in handling multiple keys held by the same subject; the key identifier for a public key and its corresponding private key should be the same. The key identifier should also be the same as for the corresponding certificate, if one exists. Cryptoki does not enforce these associations, however. (See Section 4.6 for further commentary.)

In the case of secret keys, the meaning of the CKA_ID attribute is up to the application.

Note that the CKA_START_DATE and CKA_END_DATE attributes are for reference only; Cryptoki does not attach any special meaning to them. In particular, it does not restrict usage of a key according to the dates; doing this is up to the application.

The CKA_DERIVE attribute has the value CK_TRUE if and only if it is possible to derive other keys from the key.
The **CKA_LOCAL** attribute has the value **CK_TRUE** if and only if the value of the key was originally generated on the token by a **C_GenerateKey** or **C_GenerateKeyPair** call.

The **CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM** attribute identifies the key generation mechanism used to generate the key material. It contains a valid value only if the **CKA_LOCAL** attribute has the value **CK_TRUE**. If **CKA_LOCAL** has the value **CK_FALSE**, the value of the attribute is **CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION**.

### 4.8 Public key objects

Public key objects (object class **CKO_PUBLIC_KEY**) hold public keys. The following table defines the attributes common to all public keys, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

*Table 23, Common Public Key Attributes*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_SUBJECT</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of the key subject name (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_ENCRYPT</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td><strong>CK_TRUE</strong> if key supports encryption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_VERIFY</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td><strong>CK_TRUE</strong> if key supports verification where the signature is an appendix to the data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td><strong>CK_TRUE</strong> if key supports verification where the data is recovered from the signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_WRAP</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td><strong>CK_TRUE</strong> if key supports wrapping (i.e., can be used to wrap other keys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_TRUSTED</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>The key can be trusted for the application that it was created. The wrapping key can be used to wrap keys with CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED set to <strong>CK_TRUE</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE</td>
<td>CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR</td>
<td>For wrapping keys. The attribute template to match against any keys wrapped using this wrapping key. Keys that do not match cannot be wrapped. The number of attributes in the array is the <em>ulValueLen</em> component of the attribute divided by the size of <strong>CK_ATTRIBUTE</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo for this public key. (MAY be empty, DEFAULT derived from the underlying public key data)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Refer to Table 10 for footnotes

It is intended in the interests of interoperability that the subject name and key identifier for a public key will be the same as those for the corresponding certificate and private key. However, Cryptoki does not enforce this, and it is not required that the certificate and private key also be stored on the token.

To map between ISO/IEC 9594-8 (X.509) keyUsage flags for public keys and the PKCS #11 attributes for public keys, use the following table.
Table 24, Mapping of X.509 key usage flags to Cryptoki attributes for public keys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key usage flags for public keys in X.509 public key certificates</th>
<th>Corresponding cryptoki attributes for public keys.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dataEncipherment</td>
<td>CKA_ENCRYPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>digitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign</td>
<td>CKA_VERIFY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>digitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign</td>
<td>CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keyAgreement</td>
<td>CKA_DERIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keyEncipherment</td>
<td>CKA_WRAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonRepudiation</td>
<td>CKA_VERIFY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonRepudiation</td>
<td>CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The value of the CKA_PUBLICATION_INF attribute is the DER encoded value of SubjectPublicKeyInfo:

```
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm             AlgorithmIdentifier,
    subjectPublicKey      BIT_STRING }
```

The encodings for the subjectPublicKey field are specified in the description of the public key types in the appropriate [PKCS11-Curr] document for the key types defined within this specification.

### 4.9 Private key objects

Private key objects (object class CKO_PRIVATE_KEY) hold private keys. The following table defines the attributes common to all private keys, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 25, Common Private Key Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_SUBJECT&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of certificate subject name (default empty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_SENSITIVE&lt;sup&gt;6,11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key is sensitive&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_DECRYPT&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key supports decryption&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_SIGN&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key supports signatures where the signature is an appendix to the data&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_SIGN_RECOVER&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key supports signatures where the data can be recovered from the signature&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_UNWRAP&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key supports unwrapping (i.e., can be used to unwrap other keys)&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_EXTRACTABLE&lt;sup&gt;8,12&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key is extractable and can be wrapped&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE&lt;sup&gt;2,4,6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key has always had the CKA_SENSITIVE attribute set to CK_TRUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE&lt;sup&gt;2,4,6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key has never had the CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute set to CK_TRUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if the key can only be wrapped with a wrapping key that has CKA_TRUSTED set to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute</td>
<td>Data type</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE</td>
<td>CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR</td>
<td>For wrapping keys. The attribute template to apply to any keys unwrapped using this wrapping key. Any user supplied template is applied after this template as if the object has already been created. The number of attributes in the array is the ulValueLen component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>If CK_TRUE, the user has to supply the PIN for each use (sign or decrypt) with the key. Default is CK_FALSE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO®</td>
<td>Byte Array</td>
<td>DER-encoding of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo for the associated public key (MAY be empty; DEFAULT derived from the underlying private key data; MAY be manually set for specific key types; if set; MUST be consistent with the underlying private key data)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Refer to Table 10 for footnotes

It is intended in the interests of interoperability that the subject name and key identifier for a private key will be the same as those for the corresponding certificate and public key. However, this is not enforced by Cryptoki, and it is not required that the certificate and public key also be stored on the token.

If the CKA_SENSITIVE attribute is CK_TRUE, or if the CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute is CK_FALSE, then certain attributes of the private key cannot be revealed in plaintext outside the token. Which attributes these are is specified for each type of private key in the attribute table in the section describing that type of key.

The CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE attribute can be used to force re-authentication (i.e. force the user to provide a PIN) for each use of a private key. “Use” in this case means a cryptographic operation such as sign or decrypt. This attribute may only be set to CK_TRUE when CKA_PRIVATE is also CK_TRUE.

Re-authentication occurs by calling C_Login with userType set to CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC immediately after a cryptographic operation using the key has been initiated (e.g. after C_SignInit). In this call, the actual user type is implicitly given by the usage requirements of the active key. If C_Login returns CKR_OK the user was successfully authenticated and this sets the active key in an authenticated state that lasts until the cryptographic operation has successfully or unsuccessfully been completed (e.g. by C_Sign, C_SignFinal, ...). A return value CKR_PIN_INCORRECT from C_Login means that the user was denied permission to use the key and continuing the cryptographic operation will result in a behavior as if C_Login had not been called. In both of these cases the session state will remain the same, however repeated failed re-authentication attempts may cause the PIN to be locked. C_Login returns in this case CKR_PIN_LOCKED and this also logs the user out from the token. Failing or omitting to re-authenticate when CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE is set to CK_TRUE will result in CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN to be returned from calls using the key. C_Login will return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, but the active cryptographic operation will not be affected, if an attempt is made to re-authenticate when CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE is set to CK_FALSE.
The \texttt{CKA\_PUBLIC\_KEY\_INFO} attribute represents the public key associated with this private key. The data it represents may either be stored as part of the private key data, or regenerated as needed from the private key.

If this attribute is supplied as part of a template for \texttt{C\_CreateObject}, \texttt{C\_CopyObject} or \texttt{C\_SetAttributeValue} for a private key, the token MUST verify correspondence between the private key data and the public key data as supplied in \texttt{CKA\_PUBLIC\_KEY\_INFO}. This can be done either by deriving a public key from the private key and comparing the values, or by doing a sign and verify operation. If there is a mismatch, the command SHALL return \texttt{CKR\_ATTRIBUTE\_VALUE\_INVALID}. A token MAY choose not to support the \texttt{CKA\_PUBLIC\_KEY\_INFO} attribute for commands which create new private keys. If it does not support the attribute, the command SHALL return \texttt{CKR\_ATTRIBUTE\_TYPE\_INVALID}.

As a general guideline, private keys of any type SHOULD store sufficient information to retrieve the public key information. In particular, the RSA private key description has been modified in <this version> to add the \texttt{CKA\_PUBLIC\_EXPONENT} to the list of attributes required for an RSA private key. All other private key types described in this specification contain sufficient information to recover the associated public key.

4.9.1 RSA private key objects

RSA private key objects (object class \texttt{CKO\_PRIVATE\_KEY}, key type \texttt{CKK\_RSA}) hold RSA private keys. The following table defines the RSA private key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Attribute} & \textbf{Data type} & \textbf{Meaning} \\
\hline
\texttt{CKA\_MODULUS} & Big integer & Modulus $n$ \\
\hline
\texttt{CKA\_PUBLIC\_EXPONENT} & Big integer & Public exponent $e$ \\
\hline
\texttt{CKA\_PRIVATE\_EXPONENT} & Big integer & Private exponent $d$ \\
\hline
\texttt{CKA\_PRIME\_1} & Big integer & Prime $p$ \\
\hline
\texttt{CKA\_PRIME\_2} & Big integer & Prime $q$ \\
\hline
\texttt{CKA\_EXPONENT\_1} & Big integer & Private exponent $d$ modulo $p-1$ \\
\hline
\texttt{CKA\_EXPONENT\_2} & Big integer & Private exponent $d$ modulo $q-1$ \\
\hline
\texttt{CKA\_COEFFICIENT} & Big integer & CRT coefficient $q^{-1} \mod p$ \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Refer to Table 10 for footnotes

Depending on the token, there may be limits on the length of the key components. See PKCS #1 for more information on RSA keys.

Tokens vary in what they actually store for RSA private keys. Some tokens store all of the above attributes, which can assist in performing rapid RSA computations. Other tokens might store only the \texttt{CKA\_MODULUS} and \texttt{CKA\_PRIVATE\_EXPONENT} values. Effective with version 2.40, tokens MUST also store \texttt{CKA\_PUBLIC\_EXPONENT}. This permits the retrieval of sufficient data to reconstitute the associated public key.

Because of this, Cryptoki is flexible in dealing with RSA private key objects. When a token generates an RSA private key, it stores whichever of the fields in Table 26 it keeps track of. Later, if an application asks for the values of the key’s various attributes, Cryptoki supplies values only for attributes whose values it can obtain \textit{(i.e., if Cryptoki is asked for the value of an attribute it cannot obtain, the request fails)}. Note that a Cryptoki implementation may or may not be able and/or willing to supply various attributes of RSA private keys which are not actually stored on the token. \textit{E.g.,} if a particular token stores values only for the \texttt{CKA\_PRIVATE\_EXPONENT}, \texttt{CKA\_PUBLIC\_EXPONENT}, \texttt{CKA\_PRIME\_1}, and \texttt{CKA\_PRIME\_2} attributes, then Cryptoki is certainly \textit{able} to report values for all the attributes above (since they can all be computed efficiently from these four values). However, a Cryptoki implementation may or may not actually do this extra computation. The only attributes from Table 26 for which a Cryptoki
implementation is required to be able to return values are CKA_MODULUS, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, and CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT. A token SHOULD also be able to return CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO for an RSA private key. See the general guidance for Private Keys above.

4.10 Secret key objects

Secret key objects (object class CKO_SECRET_KEY) hold secret keys. The following table defines the attributes common to all secret keys, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:
Table 27, Common Secret Key Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_SENSITIVE&lt;sup&gt;8,11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if object is sensitive (default CK_FALSE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_ENCRYPT&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key supports encryption&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_DECRYPT&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key supports decryption&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_SIGN&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key supports signatures (i.e., authentication codes) where the signature is an appendix to the data&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_VERIFY&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key supports verification (i.e., of authentication codes) where the signature is an appendix to the data&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_WRAP&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key supports wrapping (i.e., can be used to wrap other keys)&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_UNWRAP&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key supports unwrapping (i.e., can be used to unwrap other keys)&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_EXTRACTABLE&lt;sup&gt;8,12&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key is extractable and can be wrapped&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE&lt;sup&gt;2,4,6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key has always had the CKA_SENSITIVE attribute set to CK_TRUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA.Never_EXTRACTABLE&lt;sup&gt;2,4,6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if key has never had the CKA.EXTRACTABLE attribute set to CK_TRUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_CHECK_VALUE</td>
<td>Byte array</td>
<td>Key checksum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE if the key can only be wrapped with a wrapping key that has CKA_TRUSTED set to CK_TRUE. Default is CK_FALSE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_TRUSTED&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>The wrapping key can be used to wrap keys with CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED set to CK_TRUE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE</td>
<td>CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR</td>
<td>For wrapping keys. The attribute template to match against any keys wrapped using this wrapping key. Keys that do not match cannot be wrapped. The number of attributes in the array is the ulValueLen component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE</td>
<td>CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR</td>
<td>For wrapping keys. The attribute template to apply to any keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute</td>
<td>Data type</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unrolled using this wrapping key. Any user supplied template is applied after this template as if the object has already been created. The number of attributes in the array is the ulValueLen component of the attribute divided by the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Refer to Table 10 for footnotes

If the **CKA_SENSITIVE** attribute is CK_TRUE, or if the **CKA_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is CK_FALSE, then certain attributes of the secret key cannot be revealed in plaintext outside the token. Which attributes these are is specified for each type of secret key in the attribute table in the section describing that type of key.

The key check value (KCV) attribute for symmetric key objects to be called **CKA_CHECK_VALUE**, of type byte array, length 3 bytes, operates like a fingerprint, or checksum of the key. They are intended to be used to cross-check symmetric keys against other systems where the same key is shared, and as a validity check after manual key entry or restore from backup. Refer to object definitions of specific key types for KCV algorithms.

**Properties:**

1. For two keys that are cryptographically identical the value of this attribute should be identical.

2. CKA_CHECK_VALUE should not be usable to obtain any part of the key value.

3. Non-uniqueness. Two different keys can have the same CKA_CHECK_VALUE. This is unlikely (the probability can easily be calculated) but possible.

The attribute is optional, but if supported, regardless of how the key object is created or derived, the value of the attribute is always supplied. It SHALL be supplied even if the encryption operation for the key is forbidden (i.e. when CKA_ENCRYPT is set to CK_FALSE).

If a value is supplied in the application template (allowed but never necessary) then, if supported, it MUST match what the library calculates it to be or the library returns a CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID. If the library does not support the attribute then it should ignore it. Allowing the attribute in the template this way does no harm and allows the attribute to be treated like any other attribute for the purposes of key wrap and unwrap where the attributes are preserved also.

The generation of the KCV may be prevented by the application supplying the attribute in the template as a no-value (0 length) entry. The application can query the value at any time like any other attribute using C_GetAttributeValue. C_SetAttributeValue may be used to destroy the attribute, by supplying no-value.

Unless otherwise specified for the object definition, the value of this attribute is derived from the key object by taking the first three bytes of an encryption of a single block of null (0x00) bytes, using the default cipher and mode (e.g. ECB) associated with the key type of the secret key object.

### 4.11 Domain parameter objects

#### 4.11.1 Definitions

This section defines the object class CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.
4.11.2 Overview

This object class was created to support the storage of certain algorithm's extended parameters. DSA and DH both use domain parameters in the key-pair generation step. In particular, some libraries support the generation of domain parameters (originally out of scope for PKCS11) so the object class was added.

To use a domain parameter object you MUST extract the attributes into a template and supply them (still in the template) to the corresponding key-pair generation function.

Domain parameter objects (object class CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) hold public domain parameters.

The following table defines the attributes common to domain parameter objects in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 28, Common Domain Parameter Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_KEY_TYPE¹</td>
<td>CK_KEY_TYPE</td>
<td>Type of key the domain parameters can be used to generate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA_LOCAL²,⁴</td>
<td>CK_BBOOL</td>
<td>CK_TRUE only if domain parameters were either</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• generated locally (i.e., on the token) with a C_GenerateKey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• created with a C_CopyObject call as a copy of domain parameters which had</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>its CKA_LOCAL attribute set to CK_TRUE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Refer to Table 10 for footnotes

The CKA_LOCAL attribute has the value CK_TRUE if and only if the values of the domain parameters were originally generated on the token by a C_GenerateKey call.

4.12 Mechanism objects

4.12.1 Definitions

This section defines the object class CKO_MECHANISM for type CK_OBJECT_CLASS as used in the CKA_CLASS attribute of objects.

4.12.2 Overview

Mechanism objects provide information about mechanisms supported by a device beyond that given by the CK_MECHANISM_INFO structure.

When searching for objects using C_FindObjectsInit and C_FindObjects, mechanism objects are not returned unless the CKA_CLASS attribute in the template has the value CKO_MECHANISM. This protects applications written to previous versions of Cryptoki from finding objects that they do not understand.

Table 29, Common Mechanism Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE</td>
<td>CK_MECHANISM_TYPE</td>
<td>The type of mechanism object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 Functions

Cryptoki’s functions are organized into the following categories:
- general-purpose functions (4 functions)
- slot and token management functions (9 functions)
- session management functions (8 functions)
- object management functions (9 functions)
- encryption functions (4 functions)
- decryption functions (4 functions)
- message digesting functions (5 functions)
- signing and MACing functions (6 functions)
- functions for verifying signatures and MACs (6 functions)
- dual-purpose cryptographic functions (4 functions)
- key management functions (5 functions)
- random number generation functions (2 functions)
- parallel function management functions (2 functions)

In addition to these functions, Cryptoki can use application-supplied callback functions to notify an application of certain events, and can also use application-supplied functions to handle mutex objects for safe multi-threaded library access.

The Cryptoki API functions are presented in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General purpose functions</td>
<td>C_Initialize</td>
<td>initializes Cryptoki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C_Finalize</td>
<td>clean up miscellaneous Cryptoki-associated resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C_GetInfo</td>
<td>obtains general information about Cryptoki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C_GetFunctionList</td>
<td>obtains entry points of Cryptoki library functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slot and token management functions</td>
<td>C_GetSlotList</td>
<td>obtains a list of slots in the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C_GetSlotInfo</td>
<td>obtains information about a particular slot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C_GetMechanismList</td>
<td>obtains a list of mechanisms supported by a token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C_GetMechanismInfo</td>
<td>obtains information about a particular mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C_InitToken</td>
<td>initializes a token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C_InitPIN</td>
<td>initializes the normal user’s PIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C_SetPIN</td>
<td>modifies the PIN of the current user</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session management</td>
<td>C_OpenSession</td>
<td>opens a connection between an application and a particular token or sets up an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Description</td>
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Execution of a Cryptoki function call is in general an all-or-nothing affair, i.e., a function call accomplishes either its entire goal, or nothing at all.

- If a Cryptoki function executes successfully, it returns the value CKR_OK.
- If a Cryptoki function does not execute successfully, it returns some value other than CKR_OK, and the token is in the same state as it was in prior to the function call. If the function call was supposed to modify the contents of certain memory addresses on the host computer, these memory addresses may have been modified, despite the failure of the function.
In unusual (and extremely unpleasant!) circumstances, a function can fail with the return value CKR_GENERAL_ERROR. When this happens, the token and/or host computer may be in an inconsistent state, and the goals of the function may have been partially achieved.

There are a small number of Cryptoki functions whose return values do not behave precisely as described above; these exceptions are documented individually with the description of the functions themselves.

A Cryptoki library need not support every function in the Cryptoki API. However, even an unsupported function MUST have a "stub" in the library which simply returns the value CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED. The function's entry in the library's CK_FUNCTION_LIST structure (as obtained by C_GetFunctionList) should point to this stub function (see Section 3.6).

5.1 Function return values

The Cryptoki interface possesses a large number of functions and return values. In Section 5.1, we enumerate the various possible return values for Cryptoki functions; most of the remainder of Section 5.1 details the behavior of Cryptoki functions, including what values each of them may return.

Because of the complexity of the Cryptoki specification, it is recommended that Cryptoki applications attempt to give some leeway when interpreting Cryptoki functions' return values. We have attempted to specify the behavior of Cryptoki functions as completely as was feasible; nevertheless, there are presumably some gaps. For example, it is possible that a particular error code which might apply to a particular Cryptoki function is unfortunately not actually listed in the description of that function as a possible error code. It is conceivable that the developer of a Cryptoki library might nevertheless permit his/her implementation of that function to return that error code. It would clearly be somewhat ungraceful if a Cryptoki application using that library were to terminate by abruptly dumping core upon receiving that error code for that function. It would be far preferable for the application to examine the function's return value, see that it indicates some sort of error (even if the application doesn't know precisely what kind of error), and behave accordingly.

See Section 5.1.8 for some specific details on how a developer might attempt to make an application that accommodates a range of behaviors from Cryptoki libraries.

5.1.1 Universal Cryptoki function return values

Any Cryptoki function can return any of the following values:

- **CKR_GENERAL_ERROR:** Some horrible, unrecoverable error has occurred. In the worst case, it is possible that the function only partially succeeded, and that the computer and/or token is in an inconsistent state.
- **CKR_HOST_MEMORY:** The computer that the Cryptoki library is running on has insufficient memory to perform the requested function.
- **CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED:** The requested function could not be performed, but detailed information about why not is not available in this error return. If the failed function uses a session, it is possible that the CK_SESSION_INFO structure that can be obtained by calling C_GetSessionInfo will hold useful information about what happened in its ulDeviceError field. In any event, although the function call failed, the situation is not necessarily totally hopeless, as it is likely to be when CKR_GENERAL_ERROR is returned. Depending on what the root cause of the error actually was, it is possible that an attempt to make the exact same function call again would succeed.
- **CKR_OK:** The function executed successfully. Technically, CKR_OK is not quite a "universal" return value; in particular, the legacy functions C_GetFunctionStatus and C_CancelFunction (see Section 5.15) cannot return CKR_OK.

The relative priorities of these errors are in the order listed above, e.g., if either of CKR_GENERAL_ERROR or CKR_HOST_MEMORY would be an appropriate error return, then CKR_GENERAL_ERROR should be returned.
5.1.2 Cryptoki function return values for functions that use a session handle

Any Cryptoki function that takes a session handle as one of its arguments (i.e., any Cryptoki function except for C_Initialize, C_Finalize, C_GetInfo, C_GetFunctionList, C_GetSlotList, C_GetSlotInfo, C_GetTokenInfo, C_WaitForSlotEvent, C_GetMechanismList, C_GetMechanismInfo, C_InitToken, C_OpenSession, and C_CloseAllSessions) can return the following values:

- **CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID**: The specified session handle was invalid at the time that the function was invoked. Note that this can happen if the session’s token is removed before the function invocation, since removing a token closes all sessions with it.

- **CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED**: The token was removed from its slot during the execution of the function.

- **CKR_SESSION_CLOSED**: The session was closed during the execution of the function. Note that, as stated in [PKCS11-UG], the behavior of Cryptoki is undefined if multiple threads of an application attempt to access a common Cryptoki session simultaneously. Therefore, there is actually no guarantee that a function invocation could ever return the value CKR_SESSION_CLOSED. An example of multiple threads accessing a common session simultaneously is where one thread is using a session when another thread closes that same session.

The relative priorities of these errors are in the order listed above, e.g., if either of CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID or CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED would be an appropriate error return, then CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID should be returned.

In practice, it is often not crucial (or possible) for a Cryptoki library to be able to make a distinction between a token being removed before a function invocation and a token being removed during a function execution.

5.1.3 Cryptoki function return values for functions that use a token

Any Cryptoki function that uses a particular token (i.e., any Cryptoki function except for C_Initialize, C_Finalize, C_GetInfo, C_GetFunctionList, C_GetSlotList, C_GetSlotInfo, or C_WaitForSlotEvent) can return any of the following values:

- **CKRDEVICE_MEMORY**: The token does not have sufficient memory to perform the requested function.

- **CKR_DEVICE_ERROR**: Some problem has occurred with the token and/or slot. This error code can be returned by more than just the functions mentioned above; in particular, it is possible for C_GetSlotInfo to return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR.

- **CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT**: The token was not present in its slot at the time that the function was invoked.

- **CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED**: The token was removed from its slot during the execution of the function.

The relative priorities of these errors are in the order listed above, e.g., if either of CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY or CKR_DEVICE_ERROR would be an appropriate error return, then CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY should be returned.

In practice, it is often not critical (or possible) for a Cryptoki library to be able to make a distinction between a token being removed before a function invocation and a token being removed during a function execution.

5.1.4 Special return value for application-supplied callbacks

There is a special-purpose return value which is not returned by any function in the actual Cryptoki API, but which may be returned by an application-supplied callback function. It is:

- **CKR_CANCEL**: When a function executing in serial with an application decides to give the application a chance to do some work, it calls an application-supplied function with a CKN_SURRENDER callback (see Section 5.16). If the callback returns the value CKR_CANCEL, then the function aborts and returns CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED.
5.1.5 Special return values for mutex-handling functions

There are two other special-purpose return values which are not returned by any actual Cryptoki functions. These values may be returned by application-supplied mutex-handling functions, and they may safely be ignored by application developers who are not using their own threading model. They are:

- CKR_MUTEX_BAD: This error code can be returned by mutex-handling functions that are passed a bad mutex object as an argument. Unfortunately, it is possible for such a function not to recognize a bad mutex object. There is therefore no guarantee that such a function will successfully detect bad mutex objects and return this value.
- CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED: This error code can be returned by mutex-unlocking functions. It indicates that the mutex supplied to the mutex-unlocking function was not locked.

5.1.6 All other Cryptoki function return values

Descriptions of the other Cryptoki function return values follow. Except as mentioned in the descriptions of particular error codes, there are in general no particular priorities among the errors listed below, i.e., if more than one error code might apply to an execution of a function, then the function may return any applicable error code.

- CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED: This value can only be returned by C_CopyObject, C_SetAttributeValue and C_DestroyObject. It denotes that the action may not be taken, either because of underlying policy restrictions on the token, or because the object has the the relevant CKA_COPYABLE, CKA_MODIFIABLE or CKA_DESTROYABLE policy attribute set to CK_FALSE.
- CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD: This is a rather generic error code which indicates that the arguments supplied to the Cryptoki function were in some way not appropriate.
- CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY: An attempt was made to set a value for an attribute which may not be set by the application, or which may not be modified by the application. See Section 4.1 for more information.
- CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE: An attempt was made to obtain the value of an attribute of an object which cannot be satisfied because the object is either sensitive or un-extractable.
- CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID: An invalid attribute type was specified in a template. See Section 4.1 for more information.
- CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID: An invalid value was specified for a particular attribute in a template. See Section 4.1 for more information.
- CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: The output of the function is too large to fit in the supplied buffer.
- CKR_CANT_LOCK: This value can only be returned by C_Initialize. It means that the type of locking requested by the application for thread-safety is not available in this library, and so the application cannot make use of this library in the specified fashion.
- CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED: This value can only be returned by C_Initialize. It means that the Cryptoki library has already been initialized (by a previous call to C_Initialize which did not have a matching C_Finalize call).
- CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED: This value can be returned by any function other than C_Initialize and C_GetFunctionList. It indicates that the function cannot be executed because the Cryptoki library has not yet been initialized by a call to C_Initialize.
- CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED: This curve is not supported by this token. Used with Elliptic Curve mechanisms.
- CKR_DATA_INVALID: The plaintext input data to a cryptographic operation is invalid. This return value has lower priority than CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE.
- CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE: The plaintext input data to a cryptographic operation has a bad length. Depending on the operation’s mechanism, this could mean that the plaintext data is too short, too long, or is not a multiple of some particular block size. This return value has higher priority than CKR_DATA_INVALID.
• **CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID**: Invalid or unsupported domain parameters were supplied to the function. Which representation methods of domain parameters are supported by a given mechanism can vary from token to token.

• **CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID**: The encrypted input to a decryption operation has been determined to be invalid ciphertext. This return value has lower priority than **CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE**.

• **CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE**: The ciphertext input to a decryption operation has been determined to be invalid ciphertext solely on the basis of its length. Depending on the operation’s mechanism, this could mean that the ciphertext is too short, too long, or is not a multiple of some particular block size. This return value has higher priority than **CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID**.

• **CKR_EXCEEDED_MAX_ITERATIONS**: An iterative algorithm (for key pair generation, domain parameter generation etc.) failed because we have exceeded the maximum number of iterations. This error code has precedence over **CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED**. Examples of iterative algorithms include DSA signature generation (retry if either \( r = 0 \) or \( s = 0 \)) and generation of DSA primes \( p \) and \( q \) specified in FIPS 186-4.

• **CKR_FIPS_SELF_TEST_FAILED**: A FIPS 140-2 power-up self-test or conditional self-test failed. The token entered an error state. Future calls to cryptographic functions on the token will return **CKR_GENERAL_ERROR**. **CKR_FIPS_SELF_TEST_FAILED** has a higher precedence over **CKR_GENERAL_ERROR**. This error may be returned by **C_Initialize**, if a power-up self-test failed, by **C_GenerateRandom** or **C_SeedRandom**, if the continuous random number generator test failed, or by **C_GenerateKeyPair**, if the pair-wise consistency test failed.

• **CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED**: The function was canceled in mid-execution. This happens to a cryptographic function if the function makes a **CKN_SURRENDER** application callback which returns **CKR_CANCEL** (see **CKR_CANCEL**). It also happens to a function that performs PIN entry through a protected path. The method used to cancel a protected path PIN entry operation is device dependent.

• **CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL**: There is currently no function executing in parallel in the specified session. This is a legacy error code which is only returned by the legacy functions **C_GetFunctionStatus** and **C_CancelFunction**.

• **CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED**: The requested function is not supported by this Cryptoki library. Even unsupported functions in the Cryptoki API should have a “stub” in the library; this stub should simply return the value **CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED**.

• **CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED**: The signature request is rejected by the user.

• **CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE**: The information requested could not be obtained because the token considers it sensitive, and is not able or willing to reveal it.

• **CKR_KEY_CHANGED**: This value is only returned by **C_SetOperationState**. It indicates that one of the keys specified is not the same key that was being used in the original saved session.

• **CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED**: An attempt has been made to use a key for a cryptographic purpose that the key’s attributes are not set to allow it to do. For example, to use a key for performing encryption, that key MUST have its **CKA_ENCRYPT** attribute set to **CK_TRUE** (the fact that the key MUST have a **CKA_ENCRYPT** attribute implies that the key cannot be a private key). This return value has lower priority than **CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT**.

• **CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID**: The specified key handle is not valid. It may be the case that the specified handle is a valid handle for an object which is not a key. We reiterate here that 0 is never a valid key handle.

• **CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE**: This error code can only be returned by **C_DigestKey**. It indicates that the value of the specified key cannot be digested for some reason (perhaps the key isn’t a secret key, or perhaps the token simply can’t digest this kind of key).

• **CKR_KEY_NEEDED**: This value is only returned by **C_SetOperationState**. It indicates that the session state cannot be restored because **C_SetOperationState** needs to be supplied with one or more keys that were being used in the original saved session.
- **CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED**: An extraneous key was supplied to `C_SetOperationState`. For example, an attempt was made to restore a session that had been performing a message digesting operation, and an encryption key was supplied.

- **CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE**: Although the specified private or secret key does not have its `CKA_EXTRACTABLE` attribute set to `CK_FALSE`, Cryptoki (or the token) is unable to wrap the key as requested (possibly the token can only wrap a given key with certain types of keys, and the wrapping key specified is not one of these types). Compare with `CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE`.

- **CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE**: Although the requested keyed cryptographic operation could in principle be carried out, this Cryptoki library (or the token) is unable to actually do it because the supplied key's size is outside the range of key sizes that it can handle.

- **CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT**: The specified key is not the correct type of key to use with the specified mechanism. This return value has a higher priority than `CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED`.

- **CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE**: The specified private or secret key can't be wrapped because its `CKA_EXTRACTABLE` attribute is set to `CK_FALSE`. Compare with `CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE`.

- **CKR_LIBRARY_LOAD_FAILED**: The Cryptoki library could not load a dependent shared library.

- **CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID**: An invalid mechanism was specified to the cryptographic operation. This error code is an appropriate return value if an unknown mechanism was specified or if the mechanism specified cannot be used in the selected token with the selected function.

- **CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID**: Invalid parameters were supplied to the mechanism specified to the cryptographic operation. Which parameter values are supported by a given mechanism can vary from token to token.

- **CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS**: This value can only be returned by `C_Initialize`. It is returned when two conditions hold:
  1. The application called `C_Initialize` in a way which tells the Cryptoki library that application threads executing calls to the library cannot use native operating system methods to spawn new threads.
  2. The library cannot function properly without being able to spawn new threads in the above fashion.

- **CKR_NO_EVENT**: This value can only be returned by `C_GetSlotEvent`. It is returned when `C_GetSlotEvent` is called in non-blocking mode and there are no new slot events to return.

- **CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID**: The specified object handle is not valid. We reiterate here that 0 is never a valid object handle.

- **CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE**: There is already an active operation (or combination of active operations) which prevents Cryptoki from activating the specified operation. For example, an active object-searching operation would prevent Cryptoki from activating an encryption operation with `C_EncryptInit`. Or, an active digesting operation and an active encryption operation would prevent Cryptoki from activating a signature operation. Or, on a token which doesn't support simultaneous dual cryptographic operations in a session (see the description of the `CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS` flag in the `CK_TOKEN_INFO` structure), an active signature operation would prevent Cryptoki from activating an encryption operation.

- **CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED**: There is no active operation of an appropriate type in the specified session. For example, an application cannot call `C_Encrypt` in a session without having called `C_EncryptInit` first to activate an encryption operation.

- **CKR_PIN_EXPIRED**: The specified PIN has expired, and the requested operation cannot be carried out unless `C_SetPIN` is called to change the PIN value. Whether or not the normal user's PIN on a token ever expires varies from token to token.

- **CKR_PIN_INCORRECT**: The specified PIN is incorrect, i.e., does not match the PIN stored on the token. More generally-- when authentication to the token involves something other than a PIN-- the attempt to authenticate the user has failed.
• **CKR_PIN_INVALID**: The specified PIN has invalid characters in it. This return code only applies to functions which attempt to set a PIN.

• **CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE**: The specified PIN is too long or too short. This return code only applies to functions which attempt to set a PIN.

• **CKR_PIN_LOCKED**: The specified PIN is “locked”, and cannot be used. That is, because some particular number of failed authentication attempts has been reached, the token is unwilling to permit further attempts at authentication. Depending on the token, the specified PIN may or may not remain locked indefinitely.

• **CKR_PIN_TOO_WEAK**: The specified PIN is too weak so that it could be easy to guess. If the PIN is too short, **CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE** should be returned instead. This return code only applies to functions which attempt to set a PIN.

• **CKR_PUBLIC_KEY_INVALID**: The public key fails a public key validation. For example, an EC public key fails the public key validation specified in Section 5.2.2 of ANSI X9.62. This error code may be returned by **C_CreateObject**, when the public key is created, or by **C_VerifyInit** or **C_VerifyRecoverInit**, when the public key is used. It may also be returned by **C_DeriveKey**, in preference to **CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID**, if the other party's public key specified in the mechanism's parameters is invalid.

• **CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG**: This value can be returned by **C_SeedRandom** and **C_GenerateRandom**. It indicates that the specified token doesn't have a random number generator. This return value has higher priority than **CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED**.

• **CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED**: This value can only be returned by **C_SeedRandom**. It indicates that the token’s random number generator does not accept seeding from an application. This return value has lower priority than **CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG**.

• **CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID**: This value can only be returned by **C_SetOperationState**. It indicates that the supplied saved cryptographic operations state is invalid, and so it cannot be restored to the specified session.

• **CKR_SESSION_COUNT**: This value can only be returned by **C_OpenSession**. It indicates that the attempt to open a session failed, either because the token has too many sessions already open, or because the token has too many read/write sessions already open.

• **CKR_SESSION_EXISTS**: This value can only be returned by **C_InitToken**. It indicates that a session with the token is already open, and so the token cannot be initialized.

• **CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED**: The specified token does not support parallel sessions. This is a legacy error code—in Cryptoki Version 2.01 and up, no token supports parallel sessions. **CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED** can only be returned by **C_OpenSession**, and it is only returned when **C_OpenSession** is called in a particular [deprecated] way.

• **CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY**: The specified session was unable to accomplish the desired action because it is a read-only session. This return value has lower priority than **CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED**.

• **CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS**: A read-only session already exists, and so the SO cannot be logged in.

• **CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS**: A read/write SO session already exists, and so a read-only session cannot be opened.

• **CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE**: The provided signature/MAC can be seen to be invalid solely on the basis of its length. This return value has higher priority than **CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID**.

• **CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID**: The provided signature/MAC is invalid. This return value has lower priority than **CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE**.

• **CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID**: The specified slot ID is not valid.
- CKR_STATE_UNSAVABLE: The cryptographic operations state of the specified session cannot be saved for some reason (possibly the token is simply unable to save the current state). This return value has lower priority than CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED.
- CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE: The template specified for creating an object is incomplete, and lacks some necessary attributes. See Section 4.1 for more information.
- CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT: The template specified for creating an object has conflicting attributes. See Section 4.1 for more information.
- CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED: The Cryptoki library and/or slot does not recognize the token in the slot.
- CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED: The requested action could not be performed because the token is write-protected. This return value has higher priority than CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY.
- CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID: This value can only be returned by C_UnwrapKey. It indicates that the key handle specified to be used to unwrap another key is not valid.
- CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE: This value can only be returned by C_UnwrapKey. It indicates that although the requested unwrapping operation could in principle be carried out, this Cryptoki library (or the token) is unable to actually do it because the supplied key's size is outside the range of key sizes that it can handle.
- CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT: This value can only be returned by C_UnwrapKey. It indicates that the type of the key specified to unwrap another key is not consistent with the mechanism specified for unwrapping.
- CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN: This value can only be returned by C_Login. It indicates that the specified user cannot be logged into the session, because it is already logged into the session. For example, if an application has an open SO session, and it attempts to log the SO into it, it will receive this error code.
- CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN: This value can only be returned by C_Login. It indicates that the specified user cannot be logged into the session, because another user is already logged into the session. For example, if an application has an open SO session, and it attempts to log the normal user into it, it will receive this error code.
- CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN: The desired action cannot be performed because the appropriate user (or an appropriate user) is not logged in. One example is that a session cannot be logged out unless it is logged in. Another example is that a private object cannot be created on a token unless the session attempting to create it is logged in as the normal user. A final example is that cryptographic operations on certain tokens cannot be performed unless the normal user is logged in.
- CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED: This value can only be returned by C_Login. It indicates that the normal user’s PIN has not yet been initialized with C_InitPIN.
- CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES: An attempt was made to have more distinct users simultaneously logged into the token than the token and/or library permits. For example, if some application has an open SO session, and another application attempts to log the normal user into a session, the attempt may return this error. It is not required to, however. Only if the simultaneous distinct users cannot be supported does C_Login have to return this value. Note that this error code generalizes to true multi-user tokens.
- CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID: An invalid value was specified as a CK_USER_TYPE. Valid types are CKU_SO, CKU_USER, and CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC.
- CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID: This value can only be returned by C_UnwrapKey. It indicates that the provided wrapped key is not valid. If a call is made to C_UnwrapKey to unwrap a particular type of key (i.e., some particular key type is specified in the template provided to C_UnwrapKey), and the wrapped key provided to C_UnwrapKey is recognizably not a wrapped key of the proper type, then C_UnwrapKey should return CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID. This return value has lower priority than CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE.
• CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE: This value can only be returned by C_UnwrapKey. It indicates that the provided wrapped key can be seen to be invalid solely on the basis of its length. This return value has higher priority than CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID.

• CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID: This value can only be returned by C_WrapKey. It indicates that the key handle specified to be used to wrap another key is not valid.

• CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE: This value can only be returned by C_WrapKey. It indicates that although the requested wrapping operation could in principle be carried out, this Cryptoki library (or the token) is unable to actually do it because the supplied wrapping key’s size is outside the range of key sizes that it can handle.

• CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT: This value can only be returned by C_WrapKey. It indicates that the type of the key specified to wrap another key is not consistent with the mechanism specified for wrapping.

5.1.7 More on relative priorities of Cryptoki errors

In general, when a Cryptoki call is made, error codes from Section 5.1.1 (other than CKR_OK) take precedence over error codes from Section 5.1.2, which take precedence over error codes from Section 5.1.3, which take precedence over error codes from Section 5.1.6. One minor implication of this is that functions that use a session handle (i.e., most functions!) never return the error code CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT (they return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID instead). Other than these precedences, if more than one error code applies to the result of a Cryptoki call, any of the applicable error codes may be returned. Exceptions to this rule will be explicitly mentioned in the descriptions of functions.

5.1.8 Error code “gotchas”

Here is a short list of a few particular things about return values that Cryptoki developers might want to be aware of:

1. As mentioned in Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, a Cryptoki library may not be able to make a distinction between a token being removed before a function invocation and a token being removed during a function invocation.

2. As mentioned in Section 5.1.2, an application should never count on getting a CKR_SESSION_CLOSED error.

3. The difference between CKR_DATA_INVALID and CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE can be somewhat subtle. Unless an application needs to be able to distinguish between these return values, it is best to always treat them equivalently.

4. Similarly, the difference between CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID and CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, and between CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID and CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE, can be subtle, and it may be best to treat these return values equivalently.

5. Even with the guidance of Section 4.1, it can be difficult for a Cryptoki library developer to know which of CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, or CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT to return. When possible, it is recommended that application developers be generous in their interpretations of these error codes.

5.2 Conventions for functions returning output in a variable-length buffer

A number of the functions defined in Cryptoki return output produced by some cryptographic mechanism. The amount of output returned by these functions is returned in a variable-length application-supplied buffer. An example of a function of this sort is C_Encrypt, which takes some plaintext as an argument, and outputs a buffer full of ciphertext.

These functions have some common calling conventions, which we describe here. Two of the arguments to the function are a pointer to the output buffer (say pBuf) and a pointer to a location which will hold the
length of the output produced (say $\text{pulBufLen}$). There are two ways for an application to call such a function:

1. If $\text{pBuf}$ is NULL_PTR, then all that the function does is return (in $\text{pulBufLen}$) a number of bytes which would suffice to hold the cryptographic output produced from the input to the function. This number may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but should not exceed it by a large amount. CKR_OK is returned by the function.

2. If $\text{pBuf}$ is not NULL_PTR, then $\text{pulBufLen}$ MUST contain the size in bytes of the buffer pointed to by $\text{pBuf}$. If that buffer is large enough to hold the cryptographic output produced from the input to the function, then that cryptographic output is placed there, and CKR_OK is returned by the function. If the buffer is not large enough, then CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL is returned. In either case, $\text{pulBufLen}$ is set to hold the exact number of bytes needed to hold the cryptographic output produced from the input to the function.

All functions which use the above convention will explicitly say so.

Cryptographic functions which return output in a variable-length buffer should always return as much output as can be computed from what has been passed in to them thus far. As an example, consider a session which is performing a multiple-part decryption operation with DES in cipher-block chaining mode with PKCS padding. Suppose that, initially, 8 bytes of ciphertext are passed to the $\text{C_DecryptUpdate}$ function. The block size of DES is 8 bytes, but the PKCS padding makes it unclear at this stage whether the ciphertext was produced from encrypting a 0-byte string, or from encrypting some string of length at least 8 bytes. Hence the call to $\text{C_DecryptUpdate}$ should return 0 bytes of plaintext. If a single additional byte of ciphertext is supplied by a subsequent call to $\text{C_DecryptUpdate}$, then that call should return 8 bytes of plaintext (one full DES block).

### 5.3 Disclaimer concerning sample code

For the remainder of this section, we enumerate the various functions defined in Cryptoki. Most functions will be shown in use in at least one sample code snippet. For the sake of brevity, sample code will frequently be somewhat incomplete. In particular, sample code will generally ignore possible error returns from C library functions, and also will not deal with Cryptoki error returns in a realistic fashion.

### 5.4 General-purpose functions

Cryptoki provides the following general-purpose functions:

- **$\text{C_Initialize}$**

  ```c
  CKDEFINEDECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize) {
    CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs;
  }
  ```

  $\text{C_Initialize}$ initializes the Cryptoki library. $\text{pInitArgs}$ either has the value NULL_PTR or points to a $\text{CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS}$ structure containing information on how the library should deal with multi-threaded access. If an application will not be accessing Cryptoki through multiple threads simultaneously, it can generally supply the value NULL_PTR to $\text{C_Initialize}$ (the consequences of supplying this value will be explained below).

  If $\text{pInitArgs}$ is non-NULL_PTR, $\text{C_Initialize}$ should cast it to a $\text{CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR}$ and then dereference the resulting pointer to obtain the $\text{CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS}$ fields $\text{CreateMutex}$, $\text{DestroyMutex}$, $\text{LockMutex}$, $\text{UnlockMutex}$, $\text{flags}$, and $\text{pReserved}$. For this version of Cryptoki, the value of $\text{pReserved}$ thereby obtained MUST be NULL_PTR; if it’s not, then $\text{C_Initialize}$ should return with the value CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

  If the $\text{CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS}$ flag in the $\text{flags}$ field is set, that indicates that application threads which are executing calls to the Cryptoki library are not permitted to use the native operation system calls to spawn off new threads. In other words, the library’s code may not create its own threads. If the library is unable to function properly under this restriction, $\text{C_Initialize}$ should return with the value CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS.
A call to \texttt{C\_Initialize} specifies one of four different ways to support multi-threaded access via the value of the \texttt{CK\\_F\\_OS\\_LOCKING\\_OK} flag in the \texttt{flags} field and the values of the \texttt{CreateMutex}, \texttt{DestroyMutex}, \texttt{LockMutex}, and \texttt{UnlockMutex} function pointer fields:

1. If the flag isn’t set, and the function pointer fields aren’t supplied (i.e., they all have the value \texttt{NULL\_PTR}), that means that the application won’t be accessing the Cryptoki library from multiple threads simultaneously.

2. If the flag is set, and the function pointer fields aren’t supplied (i.e., they all have the value \texttt{NULL\_PTR}), that means that the application will be performing multi-threaded Cryptoki access, and the library needs to use the native operating system primitives to ensure safe multi-threaded access. If the library is unable to do this, \texttt{C\_Initialize} should return with the value \texttt{CKR\_CANT\_LOCK}.

3. If the flag isn’t set, and the function pointer fields are supplied (i.e., they all have non-\texttt{NULL\_PTR} values), that means that the application will be performing multi-threaded Cryptoki access, and the library needs to use the supplied function pointers for mutex-handling to ensure safe multi-threaded access. If the library is unable to do this, \texttt{C\_Initialize} should return with the value \texttt{CKR\_CANT\_LOCK}.

4. If the flag is set, and the function pointer fields are supplied (i.e., they all have non-\texttt{NULL\_PTR} values), that means that the application will be performing multi-threaded Cryptoki access, and the library needs to use either the native operating system primitives or the supplied function pointers for mutex-handling to ensure safe multi-threaded access. If the library is unable to do this, \texttt{C\_Initialize} should return with the value \texttt{CKR\_CANT\_LOCK}.

If some, but not all, of the supplied function pointers to \texttt{C\_Initialize} are non-\texttt{NULL\_PTR}, then \texttt{C\_Initialize} should return with the value \texttt{CKR\_ARGUMENTS\_BAD}.

A call to \texttt{C\_Initialize} with \texttt{pInitArgs} set to \texttt{NULL\_PTR} is treated like a call to \texttt{C\_Initialize} with \texttt{pInitArgs} pointing to a \texttt{CK\\_C\\_INITIALIZE\\_ARGS} which has the \texttt{CreateMutex}, \texttt{DestroyMutex}, \texttt{LockMutex}, and \texttt{UnlockMutex}, and \texttt{pReserved} fields set to \texttt{NULL\_PTR}, and has the \texttt{flags} field set to 0.

\texttt{C\_Initialize} should be the first Cryptoki call made by an application, except for calls to \texttt{C\_GetFunctionList}. What this function actually does is implementation-dependent; typically, it might cause Cryptoki to initialize its internal memory buffers, or any other resources it requires.

If several applications are using Cryptoki, each one should call \texttt{C\_Initialize}. Every call to \texttt{C\_Initialize} should (eventually) be succeeded by a single call to \texttt{C\_Finalize}. See [PKCS11-UG] for further details.

Return values: \texttt{CKR\\_ARGUMENTS\\_BAD}, \texttt{CKR\\_CANT\\_LOCK}, \texttt{CKR\\_CRYPTOKI\\_ALREADY\\_INITIALIZED}, \texttt{CKR\\_FUNCTION\\_FAILED}, \texttt{CKR\\_GENERAL\\_ERROR}, \texttt{CKR\\_HOST\\_MEMORY}, \texttt{CKR\\_NEED\\_TO\\_CREATE\\_THREADS}, \texttt{CKR\\_OK}.

Example: see \texttt{C\_GetInfo}.

\begin{verbatim}
♦ C_Finalize

CK\_DECLARE\_FUNCTION(CK\_RV, C\_Finalize)(
    CK\_VOID\_PTR pReserved
);

C\_Finalize is called to indicate that an application is finished with the Cryptoki library. It should be the last Cryptoki call made by an application. The \texttt{pReserved} parameter is reserved for future versions; for this version, it should be set to \texttt{NULL\_PTR} (if \texttt{C\_Finalize} is called with a non-\texttt{NULL\_PTR} value for \texttt{pReserved}, it should return the value \texttt{CKR\\_ARGUMENTS\\_BAD}.

If several applications are using Cryptoki, each one should call \texttt{C\_Finalize}. Each application’s call to \texttt{C\_Finalize} should be preceded by a single call to \texttt{C\_Initialize}; in between the two calls, an application can make calls to other Cryptoki functions. See [PKCS11-UG] for further details.

Despite the fact that the parameters supplied to \texttt{C\_Initialize} can in general allow for safe multi-threaded access to a Cryptoki library, the behavior of \texttt{C\_Finalize} is nevertheless undefined if it is called by an application while other threads of the application are making Cryptoki calls. The exception to this exceptional behavior of \texttt{C\_Finalize} occurs when a thread calls \texttt{C\_Finalize} while another of the
\end{verbatim}
application's threads is blocking on Cryptoki’s C_WaitForSlotEvent function. When this happens, the blocked thread becomes unblocked and returns the value CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED. See C_WaitForSlotEvent for more information.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_FUNCTION FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK.

Example: see C_GetInfo.

* C_GetInfo

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetInfo)(
    CK_INFO_PTR pInfo
);
```

C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. pInfo points to the location that receives the information.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK.

Example:

```c
CK_INFO info;
CK_RV rv;
CK_C_INITIALIZER_ARGS InitArgs;

InitArgs.CreateMutex = &MyCreateMutex;
InitArgs.DestroyMutex = &MyDestroyMutex;
InitArgs.LockMutex = &MyLockMutex;
InitArgs.UnlockMutex = &MyUnlockMutex;
InitArgs.flags = CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK;
InitArgs.pReserved = NULL_PTR;

rv = C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&InitArgs);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

rv = C_GetInfo(&info);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
if(info.version.major == 2) {
    /* Do lots of interesting cryptographic things with the token */
    .
    .
}

rv = C_Finalize(NULL_PTR);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
```

* C_GetFunctionList

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetFunctionList)(
    void* pReserved
);
```
CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList
);

**C_GetFunctionList** obtains a pointer to the Cryptoki library’s list of function pointers. *ppFunctionList* points to a value which will receive a pointer to the library’s **CK_FUNCTION_LIST** structure, which in turn contains function pointers for all the Cryptoki API routines in the library. *The pointer thus obtained may point into memory which is owned by the Cryptoki library, and which may or may not be writable.* Whether or not this is the case, no attempt should be made to write to this memory.

**C_GetFunctionList** is the only Cryptoki function which an application may call before calling **C_Initialize**. It is provided to make it easier and faster for applications to use shared Cryptoki libraries and to use more than one Cryptoki library simultaneously.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK.

Example:

```c
CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFunctionList;
CK_C_Initialize pC_Initialize;
CK_RV rv;

/* It’s OK to call C_GetFunctionList before calling C_Initialize */
rv = C_GetFunctionList(&pFunctionList);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
pC_Initialize = pFunctionList -> C_Initialize;

/* Call the C_Initialize function in the library */
rv = (*pC_Initialize)(NULL_PTR);
```

### 5.5 Slot and token management functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for slot and token management:

- **C_GetSlotList**

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSlotList)(
    CK_BBOOL tokenPresent,
    CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList,
    CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount
);
```

**C_GetSlotList** is used to obtain a list of slots in the system. *tokenPresent* indicates whether the list obtained includes only those slots with a token present (CK_TRUE), or all slots (CK_FALSE); *pulCount* points to the location that receives the number of slots.

There are two ways for an application to call **C_GetSlotList**:

1. If *pSlotList* is NULL_PTR, then all that **C_GetSlotList** does is return (in *pulCount*) the number of slots, without actually returning a list of slots. The contents of the buffer pointed to by *pulCount* on entry to **C_GetSlotList** has no meaning in this case, and the call returns the value CKR_OK.

2. If *pSlotList* is not NULL_PTR, then *pulCount* MUST contain the size (in terms of **CK_SLOT_ID** elements) of the buffer pointed to by *pSlotList*. If that buffer is large enough to hold the list of slots, then the list is returned in it, and CKR_OK is returned. If not, then the call to **C_GetSlotList** returns the value CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. In either case, the value *pulCount* is set to hold the number of slots.
Because \texttt{C\_GetSlotList} does not allocate any space of its own, an application will often call \texttt{C\_GetSlotList} twice (or sometimes even more times)—if an application is trying to get a list of all slots with a token present, then the number of such slots can (unfortunately) change between when the application asks for how many such slots there are and when the application asks for the slots themselves). However, multiple calls to \texttt{C\_GetSlotList} are by no means required.

All slots which \texttt{C\_GetSlotList} reports MUST be able to be queried as valid slots by \texttt{C\_GetSlotInfo}. Furthermore, the set of slots accessible through a Cryptoki library is checked at the time that \texttt{C\_GetSlotList}, for list length prediction (NULL pSlotList argument) is called. If an application calls \texttt{C\_GetSlotList} with a non-NULL pSlotList, and then the user adds or removes a hardware device, the changed slot list will only be visible and effective if \texttt{C\_GetSlotList} is called again with NULL. Even if \texttt{C\_GetSlotList} is successfully called this way, it may or may not be the case that the changed slot list will be successfully recognized depending on the library implementation. On some platforms, or earlier PKCS11 compliant libraries, it may be necessary to successfully call \texttt{C\_Initialize} or to restart the entire system.

Return values: \texttt{CKR\_ARGUMENTS\_BAD}, \texttt{CKR\_BUFFER\_TOO\_SMALL}, \texttt{CKR\_CRYPTOKI\_NOT\_INITIALIZED}, \texttt{CKR\_FUNCTION\_FAILED}, \texttt{CKR\_GENERAL\_ERROR}, \texttt{CKR\_HOST\_MEMORY}, \texttt{CKR\_OK}.

Example:

```c
CK\_ULONG ulSlotCount, ulSlotWithTokenCount;
CK\_ SLOT\_ID\_PTR pSlotList, pSlotWithTokenList;
CK\_RV rv;

/* Get list of all slots */
rv = C\_GetSlotList(CK\_FALSE, NULL\_PTR, \&ulSlotCount);
if (rv == CKR\_OK) {
    pSlotList =
        (CK\_ SLOT\_ID\_PTR) malloc(ulSlotCount\_sizeof(CK\_ SLOT\_ID));
    rv = C\_GetSlotList(CK\_FALSE, pSlotList, \&ulSlotCount);
    if (rv == CKR\_OK) {
        /* Now use that list of all slots */
        
    }
}
free(pSlotList);
}

/* Get list of all slots with a token present */
pSlotWithTokenList = (CK\_ SLOT\_ID\_PTR) malloc(0);
ulSlotWithTokenCount = 0;
while (1) {
    rv = C\_GetSlotList(
        CK\_TRUE, pSlotWithTokenList, ulSlotWithTokenCount);
    if (rv != CKR\_BUFFER\_TOO\_SMALL)
        break;
pSlotWithTokenList = realloc(
```
pSlotWithTokenList,
    ulSlotWithTokenList*sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));

if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    /* Now use that list of all slots with a token present */
    .
    .
} }
free(pSlotWithTokenList);

♦ C_GetSlotInfo

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSlotInfo)(
    CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
    CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo
);

C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in the system. slotID is the ID of the slot; pInfo points to the location that receives the slot information.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID.

Example: see C_GetTokenInfo.

♦ C_GetTokenInfo

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetTokenInfo)(
    CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
    CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo
);

C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token in the system. slotID is the ID of the token's slot; pInfo points to the location that receives the token information.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

CK_ULONGLONG ulCount;
CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList;
CK_SLOT_INFO slotInfo;
CK_TOKEN_INFO tokenInfo;
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulCount);
if ((rv == CKR_OK) && (ulCount > 0)) {
    pSlotList = (CK_SLOT_ID_PTR) malloc(ulCount*sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
    rv = C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulCount);
    assert(rv == CKR_OK);

    /* Get slot information for first slot */
    rv = C_GetSlotInfo(pSlotList[0], &slotInfo);
    assert(rv == CKR_OK);

    /* Get token information for first slot */
    rv = C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[0], &tokenInfo);
    if (rv == CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT) {
        ...
    }
    ...
    free(pSlotList);
}

♦ C_WaitForSlotEvent

CK_DECLARE FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_WaitForSlotEvent)(
    CK_FLAGS flags,
    CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot,
    CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
);

C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event, such as token insertion or token removal, to occur. flags determines whether or not the C_WaitForSlotEvent call blocks (i.e., waits for a slot event to occur); pSlot points to a location which will receive the ID of the slot that the event occurred in. pReserved is reserved for future versions; for this version of Cryptoki, it should be NULL_PTR.

At present, the only flag defined for use in the flags argument is CKF_DONT_BLOCK:

Internally, each Cryptoki application has a flag for each slot which is used to track whether or not any unrecognized events involving that slot have occurred. When an application initially calls C_Initialize, every slot’s event flag is cleared. Whenever a slot event occurs, the flag corresponding to the slot in which the event occurred is set.

If C_WaitForSlotEvent is called with the CKF_DONT_BLOCK flag set in the flags argument, and some slot’s event flag is set, then that event flag is cleared, and the call returns with the ID of that slot in the location pointed to by pSlot. If more than one slot’s event flag is set at the time of the call, one such slot is chosen by the library to have its event flag cleared and to have its slot ID returned.

If C_WaitForSlotEvent is called with the CKF_DONT_BLOCK flag set in the flags argument, and no slot’s event flag is set, then the call returns with the value CKR_NO_EVENT. In this case, the contents of the location pointed to by pSlot when C_WaitForSlotEvent are undefined.

If C_WaitForSlotEvent is called with the CKF_DONT_BLOCK flag clear in the flags argument, then the call behaves as above, except that it will block. That is, if no slot’s event flag is set at the time of the call, C_WaitForSlotEvent will wait until some slot’s event flag becomes set. If a thread of an application has
a `C_WaitForSlotEvent` call blocking when another thread of that application calls `C_Finalize`, the `C_WaitForSlotEvent` call returns with the value CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED.

Although the parameters supplied to `C_Initilize` can in general allow for safe multi-threaded access to a Cryptoki library, `C_WaitForSlotEvent` is exceptional in that the behavior of Cryptoki is undefined if multiple threads of a single application make simultaneous calls to `C_WaitForSlotEvent`.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_OK.

Example:

```c
CK_FLAGS flags = 0;
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_SLOT_INFO slotInfo;

/* Block and wait for a slot event */
rv = C_WaitForSlotEvent(flags, &slotID, NULL_PTR);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* See what’s up with that slot */
rv = C_GetSlotInfo(slotID, &slotInfo);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
```

**C_GetMechanismList**

```c
CK_DECLARE FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetMechanismList)(
    CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList,
    CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount
);
```

`C_GetMechanismList` is used to obtain a list of mechanism types supported by a token. `SlotID` is the ID of the token’s slot; `pulCount` points to the location that receives the number of mechanisms.

There are two ways for an application to call `C_GetMechanismList`:

1. If `pMechanismList` is NULL_PTR, then all that `C_GetMechanismList` does is return (in `pulCount`) the number of mechanisms, without actually returning a list of mechanisms. The contents of `pulCount` on entry to `C_GetMechanismList` has no meaning in this case, and the call returns the value CKR_OK.

2. If `pMechanismList` is not NULL_PTR, then `pulCount` MUST contain the size (in terms of `CK_MECHANISM_TYPE` elements) of the buffer pointed to by `pMechanismList`. If that buffer is large enough to hold the list of mechanisms, then the list is returned in it, and CKR_OK is returned. If not, then the call to `C_GetMechanismList` returns the value CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. In either case, the value `pulCount` is set to hold the number of mechanisms.

Because `C_GetMechanismList` does not allocate any space of its own, an application will often call `C_GetMechanismList` twice. However, this behavior is by no means required.

Return values: CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED,
CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```c
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_ULONG ulCount;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList;
CK_RV rv;

//

rv = C_GetMechanismList(slotID, NULL_PTR, &ulCount);
if ((rv == CKR_OK) && (ulCount > 0)) {
    pMechanismList = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR) malloc(ulCount*sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
    rv = C_GetMechanismList(slotID, pMechanismList, &ulCount);
    if (rv == CKR_OK) {
        //
        //
    }
    free(pMechanismList);
}
```

**C_GetMechanismInfo**

```c
CK_UNDEFINED_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetMechanismInfo)(
    CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
    CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo
);
```

C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular mechanism possibly supported by a token. slotID is the ID of the token’s slot; type is the type of mechanism; pInfo points to the location that receives the mechanism information.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```c
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
CK_RV rv;

//

/* Get information about the CKM_MD2 mechanism for this token */
```
rv = C_GetMechanismInfo(slotID, CKM_MD2, &info);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    if (info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) {
        ..
    ..
    }
}

♦ C_InitToken

CK_DEFINE_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_InitToken)(
    CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
    CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin,
    CK_ULONG ulPinLen,
    CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel
);

C_InitToken initializes a token. slotID is the ID of the token’s slot; pPin points to the SO’s initial PIN (which need not be null-terminated); ulPinLen is the length in bytes of the PIN; pLabel points to the 32-byte label of the token (which MUST be padded with blank characters, and which MUST not be null-terminated). This standard allows PIN values to contain any valid UTF8 character, but the token may impose subset restrictions.

If the token has not been initialized (i.e. new from the factory), then the pPin parameter becomes the initial value of the SO PIN. If the token is being reinitialized, the pPin parameter is checked against the existing SO PIN to authorize the initialization operation. In both cases, the SO PIN is the value pPin after the function completes successfully. If the SO PIN is lost, then the card MUST be reinitialized using a mechanism outside the scope of this standard. The CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED flag in the CK_TOKEN_INFO structure indicates the action that will result from calling C_InitToken. If set, the token will be reinitialized, and the client MUST supply the existing SO password in pPin.

When a token is initialized, all objects that can be destroyed are destroyed (i.e., all except for “indestructible” objects such as keys built into the token). Also, access by the normal user is disabled until the SO sets the normal user’s PIN. Depending on the token, some “default” objects may be created, and attributes of some objects may be set to default values.

If the token has a “protected authentication path”, as indicated by the CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH flag in its CK_TOKEN_INFO being set, then that means that there is some way for a user to be authenticated to the token without having the application send a PIN through the Cryptoki library. One such possibility is that the user enters a PIN on a PINpad on the token itself, or on the slot device. To initialize a token with such a protected authentication path, the pPin parameter to C_InitToken should be NULL_PTR. During the execution of C_InitToken, the SO’s PIN will be entered through the protected authentication path.

If the token has a protected authentication path other than a PINpad, then it is token-dependent whether or not C_InitToken can be used to initialize the token.

A token cannot be initialized if Cryptoki detects that any application has an open session with it; when a call to C_InitToken is made under such circumstances, the call fails with error CKR_SESSION_EXISTS. Unfortunately, it may happen when C_InitToken is called that some other application does have an open session with the token, but Cryptoki cannot detect this, because it cannot detect anything about other applications using the token. If this is the case, then the consequences of the C_InitToken call are undefined.

The C_InitToken function may not be sufficient to properly initialize complex tokens. In these situations, an initialization mechanism outside the scope of Cryptoki MUST be employed. The definition of “complex token” is product specific.
Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKRDEVICE_ERROR, CKRDEVICE_MEMORY, CKRDEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKRGENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_INCORRECT, CKR_PIN_LOCKED, CKR_SESSION_EXISTS, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKRTOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKRTOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED, CKRTOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```c
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pin = "MyPIN";
CK_UTF8CHAR label[32];
CK_RV rv;

//
//
memset(label, ' ', sizeof(label));
memcpy(label, "My first token", strlen("My first token"));
rv = C_InitToken(slotID, pin, strlen(pin), label);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    //
    //
}
```

**C_InitPIN**

```c
CK_DEFINEDECLARE FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_InitPIN)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin,
    CK ULONG ulPinLen
);
```

_C_InitPIN_ initializes the normal user’s PIN. _hSession_ is the session’s handle; _pPin_ points to the normal user’s PIN; _ulPinLen_ is the length in bytes of the PIN. This standard allows PIN values to contain any valid UTF8 character, but the token may impose subset restrictions.

_C_InitPIN_ can only be called in the “R/W SO Functions” state. An attempt to call it from a session in any other state fails with error CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

If the token has a “protected authentication path”, as indicated by the CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH flag in its _CK_TOKEN_INFO_ being set, then that means that there is some way for a user to be authenticated to the token without having to send a PIN through the Cryptoki library. One such possibility is that the user enters a PIN on a PIN pad on the token itself, or on the slot device. To initialize the normal user’s PIN on a token with such a protected authentication path, the _pPin_ parameter to _C_InitPIN_ should be NULL_PTR. During the execution of _C_InitPIN_, the SO will enter the new PIN through the protected authentication path.

If the token has a protected authentication path other than a PIN pad, then it is token-dependent whether or not _C_InitPIN_ can be used to initialize the normal user’s token access.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKRDEVICE_ERROR, CKRDEVICE_MEMORY, CKRDEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKRGENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_INVALID, CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.
Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_UTF8CHAR newPin[] = {"NewPIN"};
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_InitPIN(hSession, newPin, sizeof(newPin)-1);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    
    
}
```

**C_SetPIN**

```c
CK_DEFINEDECLAIMER FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SetPIN)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin,
    CK_ULONG ulOldLen,
    CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin,
    CK_ULONG ulNewLen
)
```

C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user that is currently logged in, or the CKU_USER_PIN if the session is not logged in. hSession is the session’s handle; pOldPin points to the old PIN; ulOldLen is the length in bytes of the old PIN; pNewPin points to the new PIN; ulNewLen is the length in bytes of the new PIN. This standard allows PIN values to contain any valid UTF8 character, but the token may impose subset restrictions.

C_SetPIN can only be called in the “R/W Public Session” state, “R/W SO Functions” state, or “R/W User Functions” state. An attempt to call it from a session in any other state fails with error CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY.

If the token has a “protected authentication path”, as indicated by the CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH flag in its CK_TOKEN_INFO being set, then that means that there is some way for a user to be authenticated to the token without having to send a PIN through the Cryptoki library. One such possibility is that the user enters a PIN on a PIN pad on the token itself, or on the slot device. To modify the current user’s PIN on a token with such a protected authentication path, the pOldPin and pNewPin parameters to C_SetPIN should be NULL_PTR. During the execution of C_SetPIN, the current user will enter the old PIN and the new PIN through the protected authentication path. It is not specified how the PIN pad should be used to enter two PINs; this varies.

If the token has a protected authentication path other than a PIN pad, then it is token-dependent whether or not C_SetPIN can be used to modify the current user's PIN.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKRDEVICE REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_INCORRECT, CKR_PIN_INVALID, CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE, CKR_PIN LOCKED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION HANDLE INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ ONLY, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_UTF8CHAR oldPin[] = {"OldPIN"};
CK_UTF8CHAR newPin[] = {"NewPIN"};
CK_RV rv;
```
rv = C_SetPIN(
    hSession, oldPin, sizeof(oldPin)-1, newPin, sizeof(newPin)-1);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    ...  
    ...
}

5.6 Session management functions

A typical application might perform the following series of steps to make use of a token (note that there are other reasonable sequences of events that an application might perform):

1. Select a token.
2. Make one or more calls to C_OpenSession to obtain one or more sessions with the token.
3. Call C_Login to log the user into the token. Since all sessions an application has with a token have a shared login state, C_Login only needs to be called for one of the sessions.
4. Perform cryptographic operations using the sessions with the token.
5. Call C_CloseSession once for each session that the application has with the token, or call C_CloseAllSessions to close all the application’s sessions simultaneously.

As has been observed, an application may have concurrent sessions with more than one token. It is also possible for a token to have concurrent sessions with more than one application.

Cryptoki provides the following functions for session management:

♦ C_OpenSession

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_OpenSession)(
    CK_SLOT_ID slotID,
    CK_FLAGS flags,
    CK_VOID_PTR pApplication,
    CK_NOTIFY Notify,
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession
);
```

C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a token in a particular slot. slotID is the slot’s ID; flags indicates the type of session; pApplication is an application-defined pointer to be passed to the notification callback; Notify is the address of the notification callback function (see Section 5.16); phSession points to the location that receives the handle for the new session.

When opening a session with C_OpenSession, the flags parameter consists of the logical OR of zero or more bit flags defined in the CK_SESSION_INFO data type. For legacy reasons, the CKF_SERIAL_SESSION bit MUST always be set; if a call to C_OpenSession does not have this bit set, the call should return unsuccessfully with the error code CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED.

There may be a limit on the number of concurrent sessions an application may have with the token, which may depend on whether the session is “read-only” or “read/write”. An attempt to open a session which does not succeed because there are too many existing sessions of some type should return CKR_SESSION_COUNT.

If the token is write-protected (as indicated in the CK_TOKEN_INFO structure), then only read-only sessions may be opened with it.

If the application calling C_OpenSession already has a R/W SO session open with the token, then any attempt to open a R/O session with the token fails with error code CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS (see [PKCS11-UG] for further details).
The Notify callback function is used by Cryptoki to notify the application of certain events. If the application does not wish to support callbacks, it should pass a value of NULL_PTR as the Notify parameter. See Section 5.16 for more information about application callbacks.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_COUNT, CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example: see C_CloseSession.

♦ C_CloseSession

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CloseSession)(
    _CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```

C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a token. `hSession` is the session’s handle.

When a session is closed, all session objects created by the session are destroyed automatically, even if the application has other sessions "using" the objects (see [PKCS11-UG] for further details).

If this function is successful and it closes the last session between the application and the token, the login state of the token for the application returns to public sessions. Any new sessions to the token opened by the application will be either R/O Public or R/W Public sessions.

Depending on the token, when the last open session any application has with the token is closed, the token may be "ejected" from its reader (if this capability exists).

Despite the fact this C_CloseSession is supposed to close a session, the return value CKR_SESSION_CLOSED is an error return. It actually indicates the (probably somewhat unlikely) event that while this function call was executing, another call was made to C_CloseSession to close this particular session, and that call finished executing first. Such uses of sessions are a bad idea, and Cryptoki makes little promise of what will occur in general if an application indulges in this sort of behavior.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```c
CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_BYTE application;
CK_NOTIFY MyNotify;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_RV rv;

application = 17;
MyNotify = &EncryptionSessionCallback;
rv = C_OpenSession(
    slotID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION | CKF_RW_SESSION,
    (CK_VOID_PTR) &application, MyNotify,
    &hSession);
```
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  .
  C_CloseSession(hSession);
}

♦ C_CloseAllSessions

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CloseAllSessions)(
  CK_SLOT_ID slotID
);

C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions an application has with a token. slotID specifies the token's slot. When a session is closed, all session objects created by the session are destroyed automatically. After successful execution of this function, the login state of the token for the application returns to public sessions. Any new sessions to the token opened by the application will be either R/O Public or R/W Public sessions.

Depending on the token, when the last open session any application has with the token is closed, the token may be "ejected" from its reader (if this capability exists).

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID, CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT.

Example:

CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
CK_RV rv;

. .

rv = C_CloseAllSessions(slotID);

♦ C_GetSessionInfo

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSessionInfo)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo
);

C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about a session. hSession is the session's handle; pInfo points to the location that receives the session information.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_SESSION_INFO info;
CK_RV rv;

. .
rv = C_GetSessionInfo(hSession, &info);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
  if (info.state == CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS) {
    .
    .
  }
  .
  .
}

**C_GetOperationState**

```c
CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetOperationState)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen
);
```

C_GetOperationState obtains a copy of the cryptographic operations state of a session, encoded as a string of bytes. hSession is the session's handle; pOperationState points to the location that receives the state; pulOperationStateLen points to the location that receives the length in bytes of the state.

Although the saved state output by C_GetOperationState is not really produced by a "cryptographic mechanism", C_GetOperationState nonetheless uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

Precisely what the "cryptographic operations state" this function saves is varies from token to token; however, this state is what is provided as input to C_SetOperationState to restore the cryptographic activities of a session.

Consider a session which is performing a message digest operation using SHA-1 (i.e., the session is using the CKM_SHA_1 mechanism). Suppose that the message digest operation was initialized properly, and that precisely 80 bytes of data have been supplied so far as input to SHA-1. The application now wants to "save the state" of this digest operation, so that it can continue it later. In this particular case, since SHA-1 processes 512 bits (64 bytes) of input at a time, the cryptographic operations state of the session most likely consists of three distinct parts: the state of SHA-1's 160-bit internal chaining variable; the 16 bytes of unprocessed input data; and some administrative data indicating that this saved state comes from a session which was performing SHA-1 hashing. Taken together, these three pieces of information suffice to continue the current hashing operation at a later time.

Consider next a session which is performing an encryption operation with DES (a block cipher with a block size of 64 bits) in CBC (cipher-block chaining) mode (i.e., the session is using the CKM_DES_CBC mechanism). Suppose that precisely 22 bytes of data (in addition to an IV for the CBC mode) have been supplied so far as input to DES, which means that the first two 8-byte blocks of ciphertext have already been produced and output. In this case, the cryptographic operations state of the session most likely consists of three or four distinct parts: the second 8-byte block of ciphertext (this will be used for cipher-block chaining to produce the next block of ciphertext); the 6 bytes of data still awaiting encryption; some administrative data indicating that this saved state comes from a session which was performing DES encryption in CBC mode; and possibly the DES key being used for encryption (see C_SetOperationState for more information on whether or not the key is present in the saved state).

If a session is performing two cryptographic operations simultaneously (see Section 5.12), then the cryptographic operations state of the session will contain all the necessary information to restore both operations.
An attempt to save the cryptographic operations state of a session which does not currently have some active savable cryptographic operation(s) (encryption, decryption, digesting, signing without message recovery, verification without message recovery, or some legal combination of two of these) should fail with the error CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED.

An attempt to save the cryptographic operations state of a session which is performing an appropriate cryptographic operation (or two), but which cannot be satisfied for any of various reasons (certain necessary state information and/or key information can’t leave the token, for example) should fail with the error CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE.

Return values: CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example: see C_SetOperationState.

C_SetOperationState

```c
CKDEFINEDECLAREFUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SetOperationState)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState,
    CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey
);
```

C_SetOperationState restores the cryptographic operations state of a session from a string of bytes obtained with C_GetOperationState. hSession is the session’s handle; pOperationState points to the location holding the saved state; ulOperationStateLen holds the length of the saved state; hEncryptionKey holds a handle to the key which will be used for an ongoing encryption or decryption operation in the restored session (or 0 if no encryption or decryption key is needed, either because no such operation is ongoing in the stored session or because all the necessary key information is present in the saved state); hAuthenticationKey holds a handle to the key which will be used for an ongoing signature, MACing, or verification operation in the restored session (or 0 if no such key is needed, either because no such operation is ongoing in the stored session or because all the necessary key information is present in the saved state).

The state need not have been obtained from the same session (the “source session”) as it is being restored to (the “destination session”). However, the source session and destination session should have a common session state (e.g., CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS), and should be with a common token. There is also no guarantee that cryptographic operations state may be carried across logins, or across different Cryptoki implementations.

If C_SetOperationState is supplied with alleged saved cryptographic operations state which it can determine is not valid saved state (or is cryptographic operations state from a session with a different session state, or is cryptographic operations state from a different token), it fails with the error CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID.

Saved state obtained from calls to C_GetOperationState may or may not contain information about keys in use for ongoing cryptographic operations. If a saved cryptographic operations state has an ongoing encryption or decryption operation, and the key in use for the operation is not saved in the state, then it MUST be supplied to C_SetOperationState in the hEncryptionKey argument. If it is not, then C_SetOperationState will fail and return the error CKR_KEY_NEEDED. If the key in use for the operation is saved in the state, then it can be supplied in the hEncryptionKey argument, but this is not required.

Similarly, if a saved cryptographic operations state has an ongoing signature, MACing, or verification operation, and the key in use for the operation is not saved in the state, then it MUST be supplied to C_SetOperationState in the hAuthenticationKey argument. If it is not, then C_SetOperationState will
fail with the error CKR_KEY_NEEDED. If the key in use for the operation is saved in the state, then it can be supplied in the hAuthenticationKey argument, but this is not required.

If an irrelevant key is supplied to C_SetOperationState call (e.g., a nonzero key handle is submitted in the hEncryptionKey argument, but the saved cryptographic operations state supplied does not have an ongoing encryption or decryption operation, then C_SetOperationState fails with the error CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED.

If a key is supplied as an argument to C_SetOperationState, and C_SetOperationState can somehow detect that this key was not the key being used in the source session for the supplied cryptographic operations state (it may be able to detect this if the key or a hash of the key is present in the saved state, for example), then C_SetOperationState fails with the error CKR_KEY_CHANGED.

An application can look at the CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED flag in the flags field of the CK_TOKEN_INFO field for a token to determine whether or not it needs to supply key handles to C_SetOperationState calls. If this flag is true, then a call to C_SetOperationState never needs a key handle to be supplied to it. If this flag is false, then at least some of the time, C_SetOperationState requires a key handle, and so the application should probably always pass in any relevant key handles when restoring cryptographic operations state to a session.

C_SetOperationState can successfully restore cryptographic operations state to a session even if that session has active cryptographic or object search operations when C_SetOperationState is called (the ongoing operations are abruptly cancelled).

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKRDEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_OK, CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_MECHANISM digestMechanism;
CK_ULONG ulStateLen;
CK_BYTE data1[] = {0x01, 0x03, 0x05, 0x07};
CK_BYTE data2[] = {0x02, 0x04, 0x08};
CK_BYTE data3[] = {0x10, 0x0F, 0x0E, 0x0D, 0x0C};
CK_BYTE pDigest[20];
CK_ULONG ulDigestLen;
CK_RV rv;

/* Initialize hash operation */
rv = C_DigestInit(hSession, &digestMechanism);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Start hashing */
rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, data1, sizeof(data1));
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Find out how big the state might be */
rv = C_GetOperationState(hSession, NULL_PTR, &ulStateLen);
```
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Allocate some memory and then get the state */
pState = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc(ulStateLen);
rv = C_GetOperationState(hSession, pState, &ulStateLen);

/* Continue hashing */
rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, data2, sizeof(data2));
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Restore state. No key handles needed */
rv = C_SetOperationState(hSession, pState, ulStateLen, 0, 0);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Continue hashing from where we saved state */
rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, data3, sizeof(data3));
assert(rv == CKR_OK);

/* Conclude hashing operation */
ulDigestLen = sizeof(pDigest);
rv = C_DigestFinal(hSession, pDigest, &ulDigestLen);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    /* pDigest[] now contains the hash of 0x01030507100F0E0D0C */
    .
    .
}

◆ C_Login

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Login)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_USER_TYPE userType,
    CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin,
    CK_ULONG ulPinLen
);

C_Login logs a user into a token. hSession is a session handle; userType is the user type; pPin points to the user’s PIN; ulPinLen is the length of the PIN. This standard allows PIN values to contain any valid UTF8 character, but the token may impose subset restrictions.

When the user type is either CKU_SO or CKU_USER, if the call succeeds, each of the application’s sessions will enter either the “R/W SO Functions” state, the “R/W User Functions” state, or the “R/O User Functions” state. If the user type is CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC, the behavior of C_Login depends on the context in which it is called. Improper use of this user type will result in a return value CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED.

If the token has a “protected authentication path”, as indicated by the CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH flag in its CK_TOKEN_INFO being set, then that means that there is some way for a user to be authenticated to the token without having to send a PIN through the Cryptoki library. One such possibility is that the user enters a PIN on a PIN pad on the token itself, or
on the slot device. Or the user might not even use a PIN—authentication could be achieved by some fingerprint-reading device, for example. To log into a token with a protected authentication path, the \texttt{pPin} parameter to \texttt{C\_Login} should be \texttt{NULL\_PTR}. When \texttt{C\_Login} returns, whatever authentication method supported by the token will have been performed; a return value of \texttt{CKR\_OK} means that the user was successfully authenticated, and a return value of \texttt{CKR\_PIN\_INCORRECT} means that the user was denied access.

If there are any active cryptographic or object finding operations in an application’s session, and then \texttt{C\_Login} is successfully executed by that application, it may or may not be the case that those operations are still active. Therefore, before logging in, any active operations should be finished.

If the application calling \texttt{C\_Login} has a R/O session open with the token, then it will be unable to log the SO into a session (see \cite{PKCS11-UG} for further details). An attempt to do this will result in the error code \texttt{CKR\_SESSION\_READ\_ONLY\_EXISTS}.

\texttt{C\_Login} may be called repeatedly, without intervening \texttt{C\_Logout} calls, if (and only if) a key with the \texttt{CKA\_ALWAYS\_AUTHENTICATE} attribute set to \texttt{CK\_TRUE} exists, and the user needs to do cryptographic operation on this key. See further Section 4.9.

Return values: \texttt{CKR\_ARGUMENTS\_BAD}, \texttt{CKR\_CRYPTOKI\_NOT\_INITIALIZED}, \texttt{CKR\_DEVICE\_ERROR}, \texttt{CKR\_DEVICE\_MEMORY}, \texttt{CKR\_DEVICE\_REMOVED}, \texttt{CKR\_FUNCTION\_CANCELED}, \texttt{CKR\_FUNCTION\_FAILED}, \texttt{CKR\_GENERAL\_ERROR}, \texttt{CKR\_HOST\_MEMORY}, \texttt{CKR\_OK}, \texttt{CKR\_OPERATION\_NOT\_INITIALIZED}, \texttt{CKR\_PIN\_INCORRECT}, \texttt{CKR\_PIN\_LOCKED}, \texttt{CKR\_SESSION\_CLOSED}, \texttt{CKR\_SESSION\_HANDLE\_INVALID}, \texttt{CKR\_SESSION\_READ\_ONLY\_EXISTS}, \texttt{CKR\_USER\_ALREADY\_LOGGED\_IN}, \texttt{CKR\_USER\_ANOTHER\_ALREADY\_LOGGED\_IN}, \texttt{CKR\_USER\_PIN\_NOT\_INITIALIZED}, \texttt{CKR\_USER\_TOO\_MANY\_TYPES}, \texttt{CKR\_USER\_TYPE\_INVALID}.

Example: see \texttt{C\_Logout}.

\section*{C\_Logout}

\begin{verbatim}
CK\_DEFINE\_FUNCTION(CK\_RV, C\_Logout)(
    CK\_SESSION\_HANDLE hSession
);
\end{verbatim}

\texttt{C\_Logout} logs a user out from a token. \texttt{hSession} is the session’s handle.

Depending on the current user type, if the call succeeds, each of the application’s sessions will enter either the “R/W Public Session” state or the “R/O Public Session” state.

When \texttt{C\_Logout} successfully executes, any of the application’s handles to private objects become invalid (even if a user is later logged back into the token, those handles remain invalid). In addition, all private session objects from sessions belonging to the application are destroyed.

If there are any active cryptographic or object-finding operations in an application’s session, and then \texttt{C\_Logout} is successfully executed by that application, it may or may not be the case that those operations are still active. Therefore, before logging out, any active operations should be finished.

Return values: \texttt{CKR\_CRYPTOKI\_NOT\_INITIALIZED}, \texttt{CKR\_DEVICE\_ERROR}, \texttt{CKR\_DEVICE\_MEMORY}, \texttt{CKR\_DEVICE\_REMOVED}, \texttt{CKR\_FUNCTION\_FAILED}, \texttt{CKR\_GENERAL\_ERROR}, \texttt{CKR\_HOST\_MEMORY}, \texttt{CKR\_OK}, \texttt{CKR\_SESSION\_CLOSED}, \texttt{CKR\_SESSION\_HANDLE\_INVALID}, \texttt{CKR\_USER\_NOT\_LOGGED\_IN}.

Example:

\begin{verbatim}
CK\_SESSION\_HANDLE hSession;
CK\_UTF8\_CHAR userPIN[] = {"MyPIN"};
CK\_RV rv;

rv = C\_Login(hSession, CKU\_USER, userPIN, sizeof(userPIN)-1);
if (rv == CKR\_OK) {
\end{verbatim}
5.7 Object management functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for managing objects. Additional functions provided specifically for managing key objects are described in Section 5.13.

♦ C_CreateObject

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CreateObject)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
    CK_ULONG ulCount,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject
);
```

C_CreateObject creates a new object. hSession is the session’s handle; pTemplate points to the object’s template; ulCount is the number of attributes in the template; phObject points to the location that receives the new object’s handle.

If a call to C_CreateObject cannot support the precise template supplied to it, it will fail and return without creating any object.

If C_CreateObject is used to create a key object, the key object will have its CKA_LOCAL attribute set to CK_FALSE. If that key object is a secret or private key then the new key will have the CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE attribute set to CK_FALSE, and the CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE attribute set to CK_FALSE.

Only session objects can be created during a read-only session. Only public objects can be created unless the normal user is logged in.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, CKR_Template_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
    hData,
    hCertificate,
    hKey;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS
    dataClass = CKO_DATA,
```
certificateClass = CKO_CERTIFICATE,
    keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
CK_UTF8CHAR application[] = {"My Application"};
CK_BYTE dataValue[] = {...};
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {...};
CK_BYTE certificateValue[] = {...};
CK_BYTE modulus[] = {...};
CK_BYTE exponent[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE dataTemplate[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &dataClass, sizeof(dataClass)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_APPLICATION, application, sizeof(application) - 1},
    {CKA_VALUE, dataValue, sizeof(dataValue)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE certificateTemplate[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &certificateClass, sizeof(certificateClass)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
    {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
    {CKA_VALUE, certificateValue, sizeof(certificateValue)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_WRAP, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_MODULUS, modulus, sizeof(modulus)},
    {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, exponent, sizeof(exponent)}
};
CK_RV rv;

/* Create a data object */
rv = C_CreateObject(hSession, &dataTemplate, 4, &hData);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    
    
} /* Create a certificate object */
rv = C_CreateObject(
    hSession, &certificateTemplate, 5, &hCertificate);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    
    
}

/* Create an RSA public key object */
rv = C_CreateObject(hSession, &keyTemplate, 5, &hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    
    
}

♦ C_CopyObject

CK_DEFINEDECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CopyObject)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject,
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
    CK_ULONG ulCount,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject
);

C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the copy. hSession is the session’s handle; hObject is the object’s handle; pTemplate points to the template for the new object; ulCount is the number of attributes in the template; phNewObject points to the location that receives the handle for the copy of the object.

The template may specify new values for any attributes of the object that can ordinarily be modified (e.g., in the course of copying a secret key, a key’s CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute may be changed from CK_TRUE to CK_FALSE, but not the other way around. If this change is made, the new key’s CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE attribute will have the value CK_FALSE. Similarly, the template may specify that the new key’s CKA_SENSITIVE attribute be CK_TRUE; the new key will have the same value for its CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE attribute as the original key). It may also specify new values of the CKA_TOKEN and CKA_PRIVATE attributes (e.g., to copy a session object to a token object). If the template specifies a value of an attribute which is incompatible with other existing attributes of the object, the call fails with the return code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT.

If a call to C_CopyObject cannot support the precise template supplied to it, it will fail and return without creating any object. If the object indicated by hObject has its CKA_COPYABLE attribute set to CK_FALSE, C_CopyObject will return CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED.

Only session objects can be created during a read-only session. Only public objects can be created unless the normal user is logged in.

Return values: CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, hNewKey;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES;
CK_BYTE id[] = {...};
CK_BYTE keyValue[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL false = CK_FALSE;
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(false)},
    {CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
    {CKA_VALUE, keyValue, sizeof(keyValue)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE copyTemplate[] = {
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
CK_RV rv;

/* Create a DES secret key session object */
rv = C_CreateObject(hSession, &keyTemplate, 5, &hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    /* Create a copy which is a token object */
    rv = C_CopyObject(hSession, hKey, &copyTemplate, 1, &hNewKey);
    .
    .
}

♦ C_DestroyObject

CK_DECLARE FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DestroyObject)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject
);

C_DestroyObject destroys an object. hSession is the session’s handle; and hObject is the object’s handle.

Only session objects can be destroyed during a read-only session. Only public objects can be destroyed unless the normal user is logged in.

Certain objects may not be destroyed. Calling C_DestroyObject on such objects will result in the CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED error code. An application can consult the object’s CKA_DESTROYABLE attribute to determine if an object may be destroyed or not.
Return values: CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKRGENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED.

Example: see C_GetObjectSize.

 dez C_GetObjectSize

CK DEFINED DECLARE FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetObjectSize)
; CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject,
CKULONG_PTR pulSize
);

C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. hSession is the session’s handle; hObject is the object’s handle; pulSize points to the location that receives the size in bytes of the object.

Cryptoki does not specify what the precise meaning of an object’s size is. Intuitively, it is some measure of how much token memory the object takes up. If an application deletes (say) a private object of size S, it might be reasonable to assume that the ulFreePrivateMemory field of the token’s CK_TOKEN_INFO structure increases by approximately S.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS dataClass = CKO_DATA;
CK_UTF8CHAR application[] = {"My Application"};
CK_BYTE dataValue[] = {...};
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &dataClass, sizeof(dataClass)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_APPLICATION, application, sizeof(application)-1},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};
CK ULONG ulSize;
CK RV rv;

rv = C_CreateObject(hSession, &template, 4, &hObject);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    rv = C_GetObjectSize(hSession, hObject, &ulSize);
}
if (rv != CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE) {
    .
    .
}

rv = C_DestroyObject(hSession, hObject);
.  
.  

♦ C_GetAttributeValue

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetAttributeValue) {
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject,
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
    CK_ULONG ulCount
};

C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more attributes of an object. *hSession* is the session's handle; *hObject* is the object's handle; *pTemplate* points to a template that specifies which attribute values are to be obtained, and receives the attribute values; *ulCount* is the number of attributes in the template.

For each (type, pValue, ulValueLen) triple in the template, C_GetAttributeValue performs the following algorithm:

1. If the specified attribute (i.e., the attribute specified by the type field) for the object cannot be revealed because the object is sensitive or unextractable, then the ulValueLen field in that triple is modified to hold the value CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION.
2. Otherwise, if the specified value for the object is invalid (the object does not possess such an attribute), then the ulValueLen field in that triple is modified to hold the value CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION.
3. Otherwise, if the *pValue* field has the value NULL_PTR, then the *ulValueLen* field is modified to hold the exact length of the specified attribute for the object.
4. Otherwise, if the length specified in *ulValueLen* is large enough to hold the value of the specified attribute for the object, then that attribute is copied into the buffer located at *pValue*, and the *ulValueLen* field is modified to hold the exact length of the attribute.
5. Otherwise, the ulValueLen field is modified to hold the value CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION.

If case 1 applies to any of the requested attributes, then the call should return the value CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE. If case 2 applies to any of the requested attributes, then the call should return the value CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID. If case 5 applies to any of the requested attributes, then the call should return the value CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. As usual, if more than one of these error codes is applicable, Cryptoki may return any of them. Only if none of them applies to any of the requested attributes will CKR_OK be returned.

In the special case of an attribute whose value is an array of attributes, for example CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE, where it is passed in with *pValue* not NULL, then if the *pValue* of elements within the array is NULL_PTR then the ulValueLen of elements within the array will be set to the required length. If the *pValue* of elements within the array is not NULL_PTR, then the ulValueLen element of attributes within the array MUST reflect the space that the corresponding *pValue* points to, and *pValue* is filled in if there is sufficient room. Therefore it is important to initialize the contents of a buffer before calling C_GetAttributeValue to get such an array value. If any ulValueLen within the array isn't large enough, it will be set to CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION and the function will return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, as it does if an attribute in the *pTemplate* argument has ulValueLen too.
small. Note that any attribute whose value is an array of attributes is identifiable by virtue of the attribute
type having the CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE bit set.

Note that the error codes CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, and
CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL do not denote true errors for C_GetAttributeValue. If a call to
C_GetAttributeValue returns any of these three values, then the call MUST nonetheless have processed
every attribute in the template supplied to C_GetAttributeValue. Each attribute in the template whose
value can be returned by the call to C_GetAttributeValue will be returned by the call to
C_GetAttributeValue.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE,
CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY,
CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR,
CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED,
CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject;
CK_BYTE_PTR pModulus, pExponent;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_MODULUS, NULL_PTR, 0},
    {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL_PTR, 0}
};
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hObject, &template, 2);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    pModulus = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc(template[0].ulValueLen);
    template[0].pValue = pModulus;
    /* template[0].ulValueLen was set by C_GetAttributeValue */

    pExponent = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc(template[1].ulValueLen);
    template[1].pValue = pExponent;
    /* template[1].ulValueLen was set by C_GetAttributeValue */

    rv = C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hObject, &template, 2);
    if (rv == CKR_OK) {
        
    }
    free(pModulus);
    free(pExponent);
}
```
C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more attributes of an object. \( hSession \) is the session’s handle; \( hObject \) is the object’s handle; \( pTemplate \) points to a template that specifies which attribute values are to be modified and their new values; \( ulCount \) is the number of attributes in the template.

Certain objects may not be modified. Calling C_SetAttributeValue on such objects will result in the CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED error code. An application can consult the object’s CKA_MODIFIABLE attribute to determine if an object may be modified or not.

Only session objects can be modified during a read-only session.

The template may specify new values for any attributes of the object that can be modified. If the template specifies a value of an attribute which is incompatible with other existing attributes of the object, the call fails with the return code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT.

Not all attributes can be modified; see Section 4.1.2 for more details.

Return values: CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = {"New label");
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {  
    CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1
};
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_SetAttributeValue(hSession, hObject, &template, 1);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    ...
}
```

C_FindObjectsInit

```c
CK_DEFINEDDECLARE FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_FindObjectsInit)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
```
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
CK_ULONG ulCount
);

C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session objects that match a template. hSession is the session’s handle; pTemplate points to a search template that specifies the attribute values to match; ulCount is the number of attributes in the search template. The matching criterion is an exact byte-for-byte match with all attributes in the template. To find all objects, set ulCount to 0.

After calling C_FindObjectsInit, the application may call C_FindObjects one or more times to obtain handles for objects matching the template, and then eventually call C_FindObjectsFinal to finish the active search operation. At most one search operation may be active at a given time in a given session.

The object search operation will only find objects that the session can view. For example, an object search in an “R/W Public Session” will not find any private objects (even if one of the attributes in the search template specifies that the search is for private objects).

If a search operation is active, and objects are created or destroyed which fit the search template for the active search operation, then those objects may or may not be found by the search operation. Note that this means that, under these circumstances, the search operation may return invalid object handles.

Even though C_FindObjectsInit can return the values CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID and CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, it is not required to. For example, if it is given a search template with nonexistent attributes in it, it can return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, or it can initialize a search operation which will match no objects and return CKR_OK.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.
Example: see C_FindObjectsFinal.

♦ C_FindObjects

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_FindObjects)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject,
  CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount
);

C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session objects that match a template, obtaining additional object handles. hSession is the session’s handle; phObject points to the location that receives the list (array) of additional object handles; ulMaxObjectCount is the maximum number of object handles to be returned; pulObjectCount points to the location that receives the actual number of object handles returned.

If there are no more objects matching the template, then the location that pulObjectCount points to receives the value 0.

The search MUST have been initialized with C_FindObjectsInit.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.
Example: see C_FindObjectsFinal.
C_FindObjectsFinal terminates a search for token and session objects. \textit{hSession} is the session's handle.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKRDEVICE_ERROR, CKRDEVICE_MEMORY, CKRDEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKRGENERAL_ERROR, CKRHOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKROperationNOT_INITIALIZED, CKRSESSION_CLOSED, CKRSESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject;
CK ULONG ulObjectCount;
CK RV rv;

rv = C_FindObjectsInit(hSession, NULL_PTR, 0);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
while (1) {
    rv = C_FindObjects(hSession, &hObject, 1, &ulObjectCount);
    if (rv != CKR_OK || ulObjectCount == 0)
        break;
}
rv = C_FindObjectsFinal(hSession);
assert(rv == CKR_OK);
```

5.8 Encryption functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for encrypting data:

C_EncryptInit

```c
CK_DEFINEDECLARE FUNCTION(CK RV, C_EncryptInit)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

\textbf{C_EncryptInit} initializes an encryption operation. \textit{hSession} is the session's handle; \textit{pMechanism} points to the encryption mechanism; \textit{hKey} is the handle of the encryption key.

The \textbf{CKA_ENCRYPT} attribute of the encryption key, which indicates whether the key supports encryption, MUST be \textbf{CK_TRUE}.
After calling `C_EncryptInit`, the application can either call `C_Encrypt` to encrypt data in a single part; or call `C_EncryptUpdate` zero or more times, followed by `C_EncryptFinal`, to encrypt data in multiple parts. The encryption operation is active until the application uses a call to `C_Encrypt` or `C_EncryptFinal` to actually obtain the final piece of ciphertext. To process additional data (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call `C_EncryptInit` again.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see `C_EncryptFinal`.

♦ `C_Encrypt`

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Encrypt)(
   CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
   CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
   CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
   CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
   CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen
);
```

`C_Encrypt` encrypts single-part data. `hSession` is the session's handle; `pData` points to the data; `ulDataLen` is the length in bytes of the data; `pEncryptedData` points to the location that receives the encrypted data; `pulEncryptedDataLen` points to the location that holds the length in bytes of the encrypted data.

`C_Encrypt` uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The encryption operation MUST have been initialized with `C_EncryptInit`. A call to `C_Encrypt` always terminates the active encryption operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the ciphertext.

`C_Encrypt` cannot be used to terminate a multi-part operation, and MUST be called after `C_EncryptInit` without intervening `C_EncryptUpdate` calls.

For some encryption mechanisms, the input plaintext data has certain length constraints (either because the mechanism can only encrypt relatively short pieces of plaintext, or because the mechanism’s input data MUST consist of an integral number of blocks). If these constraints are not satisfied, then `C_Encrypt` will fail with return code CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE.

The plaintext and ciphertext can be in the same place, i.e., it is OK if `pData` and `pEncryptedData` point to the same location.

For most mechanisms, `C_Encrypt` is equivalent to a sequence of `C_EncryptUpdate` operations followed by `C_EncryptFinal`.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see `C_EncryptFinal` for an example of similar functions.
C_EncryptUpdate

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptUpdate)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
    CK_UULONG ulPartLen,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
    CK_UULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen
);
```

C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation, processing another data part. 

- `hSession` is the session’s handle;
- `pPart` points to the data part;
- `ulPartLen` is the length of the data part;
- `pEncryptedPart` points to the location that receives the encrypted data part;
- `pulEncryptedPartLen` points to the location that holds the length in bytes of the encrypted data part.

C_EncryptUpdate uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The encryption operation MUST have been initialized with C_EncryptInit. This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to C_EncryptUpdate which results in an error other than CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL terminates the current encryption operation.

The plaintext and ciphertext can be in the same place, i.e., it is OK if `pPart` and `pEncryptedPart` point to the same location.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see C_EncryptFinal.

C_EncryptFinal

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptFinal)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart,
    CK_UULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen
);
```

C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. 

- `hSession` is the session’s handle;
- `pLastEncryptedPart` points to the location that receives the last encrypted data part, if any;
- `pulLastEncryptedPartLen` points to the location that holds the length of the last encrypted data part.

C_EncryptFinal uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The encryption operation MUST have been initialized with C_EncryptInit. A call to C_EncryptFinal always terminates the active encryption operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the ciphertext.

For some multi-part encryption mechanisms, the input plaintext data has certain length constraints, because the mechanism’s input data MUST consist of an integral number of blocks. If these constraints are not satisfied, then C_EncryptFinal will fail with return code CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```c
#define PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ 200
```
#define CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ 256

CK_ULONG firstPieceLen, secondPieceLen;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_BYTE iv[8];
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_DES_CBC_PAD, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
CK_BYTE data[PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ];
CK_BYTE encryptedData[CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ];
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedData1Len;
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedData2Len;
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedData3Len;
CK_RV rv;

firstPieceLen = 90;
secondPieceLen = PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ-firstPieceLen;
rv = C_EncryptInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    /* Encrypt first piece */
    ulEncryptedData1Len = sizeof(encryptedData);
    rv = C_EncryptUpdate(
        hSession,
        &data[0], firstPieceLen,
        &encryptedData[0], &ulEncryptedData1Len);
    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
        .
    }
}

/* Encrypt second piece */
ulEncryptedData2Len = sizeof(encryptedData)-ulEncryptedData1Len;
rv = C_EncryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &data[firstPieceLen], secondPieceLen,
    &encryptedData[ulEncryptedData1Len], &ulEncryptedData2Len);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
}
5.9 Decryption functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for decrypting data:

- **C_DecryptInit**

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptInit)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. hSession is the session's handle; pMechanism points to the decryption mechanism; hKey is the handle of the decryption key.

The CKA_DECRYPT attribute of the decryption key, which indicates whether the key supports decryption, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling C_DecryptInit, the application can either call C_Decrypt to decrypt data in a single part; or call C_DecryptUpdate zero or more times, followed by C_DecryptFinal, to decrypt data in multiple parts. The decryption operation is active until the application uses a call to C_Decrypt or C_DecryptFinal to actually obtain the final piece of plaintext. To process additional data (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call C_DecryptInit again.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see C_DecryptFinal.

- **C_Decrypt**

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Decrypt)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
    CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
```
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen

C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. hSession is the session's handle; pEncryptedData points to the encrypted data; ulEncryptedDataLen is the length of the encrypted data; pData points to the location that receives the recovered data; pulDataLen points to the location that holds the length of the recovered data.

C_Decrypt uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The decryption operation MUST have been initialized with C_DecryptInit. A call to C_Decrypt always terminates the active decryption operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the plaintext.

C_Decrypt cannot be used to terminate a multi-part operation, and MUST be called after C_DecryptInit without intervening C_DecryptUpdate calls.

The ciphertext and plaintext can be in the same place, i.e., it is OK if pEncryptedData and pData point to the same location.

If the input ciphertext data cannot be decrypted because it has an inappropriate length, then either CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID or CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE may be returned.

For most mechanisms, C_Decrypt is equivalent to a sequence of C_DecryptUpdate operations followed by C_DecryptFinal.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see C_DecryptFinal for an example of similar functions.

♦ C_DecryptUpdate

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptUpdate)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
    CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
    CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen
);

C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation, processing another encrypted data part. hSession is the session's handle; pEncryptedPart points to the encrypted data part; ulEncryptedPartLen is the length of the encrypted data part; pPart points to the location that receives the recovered data part; pulPartLen points to the location that holds the length of the recovered data part.

C_DecryptUpdate uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The decryption operation MUST have been initialized with C_DecryptInit. This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to C_DecryptUpdate which results in an error other than CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL terminates the current decryption operation.

The ciphertext and plaintext can be in the same place, i.e., it is OK if pEncryptedPart and pPart point to the same location.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.
Example: See **C_DecryptFinal**.

**C_DecryptFinal**

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptFinal)
{
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart,
    CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen
}
```

**C_DecryptFinal** finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. *hSession* is the session’s handle; *pLastPart* points to the location that receives the last recovered data part, if any; *pulLastPartLen* points to the location that holds the length of the last recovered data part.

**C_DecryptFinal** uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The decryption operation MUST have been initialized with **C_DecryptInit**. A call to **C_DecryptFinal** always terminates the active decryption operation unless it returns **CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL** or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns **CKR_OK**) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the plaintext.

If the input ciphertext data cannot be decrypted because it has an inappropriate length, then either **CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID** or **CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE** may be returned.


Example:

```c
#define CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ 256
#define Plaintext_BUF_SZ 256

CK_ULONG firstEncryptedPieceLen, secondEncryptedPieceLen;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_BYTE iv[8];
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_DES_CBC_PAD, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
CK_BYTE data[PLAINTEXT_BUF_SZ];
CK_BYTE encryptedData[CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ];
CK_ULONG ulData1Len, ulData2Len, ulData3Len;
CK_RV rv;

firstEncryptedPieceLen = 90;
secondEncryptedPieceLen = CIPHERTEXT_BUF_SZ-firstEncryptedPieceLen;
rv = C_DecryptInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
```
/* Decrypt first piece */
ulData1Len = sizeof(data);
rv = C_DecryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &encryptedData[0], firstEncryptedPieceLen,
    &data[0], &ulData1Len);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
    }

/* Decrypt second piece */
ulData2Len = sizeof(data)-ulData1Len;
rv = C_DecryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &encryptedData[firstEncryptedPieceLen],
    secondEncryptedPieceLen,
    &data[ulData1Len], &ulData2Len);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
    }

/* Get last little decrypted bit */
ulData3Len = sizeof(data)-ulData1Len-ulData2Len;
rv = C_DecryptFinal(
    hSession,
    &data[ulData1Len+ulData2Len], &ulData3Len);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
    }
}

5.10 Message digesting functions
Cryptoki provides the following functions for digesting data:

♦ C_DigestInit

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestInit)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism
);
```
**C_DigestInit** initializes a message-digesting operation. *hSession* is the session’s handle; *pMechanism* points to the digesting mechanism.

After calling **C_DigestInit**, the application can either call **C_Digest** to digest data in a single part; or call **C_DigestUpdate** zero or more times, followed by **C_DigestFinal**, to digest data in multiple parts. The message-digesting operation is active until the application uses a call to **C_Digest** or **C_DigestFinal** to actually obtain the message digest. To process additional data (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call **C_DigestInit** again.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKRDEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKRGENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see **C_DigestFinal**.

**C_Digest**

```c
define DECLARE _FUNCTION (CK_RV, C_Digest)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
    CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
    CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen
);
```

**C_Digest** digests data in a single part. *hSession* is the session’s handle, *pData* points to the data; *ulDataLen* is the length of the data; *pDigest* points to the location that receives the message digest; *pulDigestLen* points to the location that holds the length of the message digest.

**C_Digest** uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The digest operation MUST have been initialized with **C_DigestInit**. A call to **C_Digest** always terminates the active digest operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the message digest.

**C_Digest** cannot be used to terminate a multi-part operation, and MUST be called after **C_DigestInit** without intervening **C_DigestUpdate** calls.

The input data and digest output can be in the same place, i.e., it is OK if *pData* and *pDigest* point to the same location.

**C_Digest** is equivalent to a sequence of **C_DigestUpdate** operations followed by **C_DigestFinal**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKRDEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKRGENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see **C_DigestFinal** for an example of similar functions.

**C_DigestUpdate**

```c
define DECLARE _FUNCTION (CK_RV, C_DigestUpdate)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
    CK_ULONG ulPartLen
);
```
C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation, processing another data part.  
\( hSession \) is the session’s handle, \( pPart \) points to the data part; \( ulPartLen \) is the length of the data part.

The message-digesting operation MUST have been initialized with C_DigestInit. Calls to this function and C_DigestKey may be interspersed any number of times in any order. A call to C_DigestUpdate which results in an error terminates the current digest operation.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see C_DigestFinal.

♦ C_DigestKey

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestKey)(
   CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

C_DigestKey continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation by digesting the value of a secret key. \( hSession \) is the session’s handle; \( hKey \) is the handle of the secret key to be digested.

The message-digesting operation MUST have been initialized with C_DigestInit. Calls to this function and C_DigestUpdate may be interspersed any number of times in any order.

If the value of the supplied key cannot be digested purely for some reason related to its length, C_DigestKey should return the error code CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see C_DigestFinal.

♦ C_DigestFinal

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestFinal)(
   CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
   CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
   CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen
);
```

C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation, returning the message digest.  
\( hSession \) is the session’s handle; \( pDigest \) points to the location that receives the message digest; \( pulDigestLen \) points to the location that holds the length of the message digest.

C_DigestFinal uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The digest operation MUST have been initialized with C_DigestInit. A call to C_DigestFinal always terminates the active digest operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the message digest.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.
Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_MD5, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE data[] = {...};
CK_BYTE digest[16];
CK_ULONG ulDigestLen;
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_DigestInit(hSession, &mechanism);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
}

rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, data, sizeof(data));
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
}

rv = C_DigestKey(hSession, hKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
}

ulDigestLen = sizeof(digest);
rv = C_DigestFinal(hSession, digest, &ulDigestLen);
```

5.11 Signing and MACing functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for signing data (for the purposes of Cryptoki, these operations also encompass message authentication codes):

♦ C_SignInit
C_SignInit initializes a signature operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data. TemplateSession is the session’s handle; pMechanism points to the signature mechanism; hKey is the handle of the signature key.

The CKA_SIGN attribute of the signature key, which indicates whether the key supports signatures with appendix, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling C_SignInit, the application can either call C_Sign to sign in a single part; or call C_SignUpdate one or more times, followed by C_SignFinal, to sign data in multiple parts. The signature operation is active until the application uses a call to C_Sign or C_SignFinal to actually obtain the signature. To process additional data (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call C_SignInit again.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see C_SignFinal.

♦ C_Sign

C_Sign signs data in a single part, where the signature is an appendix to the data. TemplateSession is the session’s handle; pData points to the data; ulDataLen is the length of the data; pSignature points to the location that receives the signature; pulSignatureLen points to the location that holds the length of the signature.

C_Sign uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The signing operation MUST have been initialized with C_SignInit. A call to C_Sign always terminates the active signing operation unless it returns CKR BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the signature.

C_Sign cannot be used to terminate a multi-part operation, and MUST be called after C_SignInit without intervening C_SignUpdate calls.

For most mechanisms, C_Sign is equivalent to a sequence of C_SignUpdate operations followed by C_SignFinal.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED.

Example: see C_SignFinal for an example of similar functions.
C_SignUpdate

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignUpdate)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
    CK_ULONG ulPartLen
);
```

C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, processing another data part. hSession is the session's handle, pPart points to the data part; ulPartLen is the length of the data part.

The signature operation MUST have been initialized with C_SignInit. This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to C_SignUpdate which results in an error terminates the current signature operation.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see C_SignFinal.

C_SignFinal

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignFinal)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
    CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen
);
```

C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, returning the signature. hSession is the session's handle; pSignature points to the location that receives the signature; pulSignatureLen points to the location that holds the length of the signature.

C_SignFinal uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The signing operation MUST have been initialized with C_SignInit. A call to C_SignFinal always terminates the active signing operation unless it returns CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the signature.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_DES_MAC, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE data[] = { ... };
CK_BYTE mac[4];
CK_ULONG ulMacLen;
CK_RV rv;
```
rv = C_SignInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    rv = C_SignUpdate(hSession, data, sizeof(data));
    ulMacLen = sizeof(mac);
    rv = C_SignFinal(hSession, mac, &ulMacLen);
}

♦ C_SignRecoverInit

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignRecoverInit)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);

C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where the data can be recovered from the signature. 
hSession is the session's handle; pMechanism points to the structure that specifies the signature mechanism; hKey is the handle of the signature key.

The CKA_SIGN_RECOVER attribute of the signature key, which indicates whether the key supports signatures where the data can be recovered from the signature, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling C_SignRecoverInit, the application may call C_SignRecover to sign in a single part. The signature operation is active until the application uses a call to C_SignRecover to actually obtain the signature. To process additional data in a single part, the application MUST call C_SignRecoverInit again.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see C_SignRecover.

♦ C_SignRecover

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignRecover)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
    CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
    CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen
);

C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the data can be recovered from the signature. 
hSession is the session’s handle; pData points to the data; ulDataLen is the length of the data;
**pSignature** points to the location that receives the signature; **pulSignatureLen** points to the location that holds the length of the signature.

**C_SignRecover** uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The signing operation MUST have been initialized with **C_SignRecoverInit**. A call to **C_SignRecover** always terminates the active signing operation unless it returns **CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL** or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns **CKR_OK**) to determine the length of the buffer needed to hold the signature.


**Example:**

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_RSA_9796, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE data[] = {...};
CK_BYTE signature[128];
CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen;
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_SignRecoverInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    ulSignatureLen = sizeof(signature);
    rv = C_SignRecover(
        hSession, data, sizeof(data), signature, &ulSignatureLen);
    if (rv == CKR_OK) {
        ...
    }
}
```

Functions for verifying signatures and MACs

Cryptoki provides the following functions for verifying signatures on data (for the purposes of Cryptoki, these operations also encompass message authentication codes):

- **C_VerifyInit**

```c
CK_DECLARE FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyInit)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```
**C_VerifyInit** initializes a verification operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data. *hSession* is the session’s handle; *pMechanism* points to the structure that specifies the verification mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the verification key.

The CKA_VERIFY attribute of the verification key, which indicates whether the key supports verification where the signature is an appendix to the data, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling **C_VerifyInit**, the application can either call **C_Verify** to verify a signature on data in a single part; or call **C_VerifyUpdate** one or more times, followed by **C_VerifyFinal**, to verify a signature on data in multiple parts. The verification operation is active until the application calls **C_Verify** or **C_VerifyFinal**. To process additional data (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call **C_VerifyInit** again.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see **C_VerifyFinal**.

**C_Verify** verifies a signature in a single-part operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data. *hSession* is the session’s handle; *pData* points to the data; *ulDataLen* is the length of the data; *pSignature* points to the signature; *ulSignatureLen* is the length of the signature.

The verification operation MUST have been initialized with **C_VerifyInit**. A call to **C_Verify** always terminates the active verification operation.

A successful call to **C_Verify** should return either the value CKR_OK (indicating that the supplied signature is valid) or CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID (indicating that the supplied signature is invalid). If the signature can be seen to be invalid purely on the basis of its length, then CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE should be returned. In any of these cases, the active signing operation is terminated.

**C_Verify** cannot be used to terminate a multi-part operation, and MUST be called after **C_VerifyInit** without intervening **C_VerifyUpdate** calls.

For most mechanisms, **C_Verify** is equivalent to a sequence of **C_VerifyUpdate** operations followed by **C_VerifyFinal**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE.

Example: see **C_VerifyFinal** for an example of similar functions.
C_VerifyUpdate

```c
CK_DEFINE_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyUpdate)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
    CK_ULONG ulPartLen
);
```

C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation, processing another data part. hSession is the session’s handle, pPart points to the data part; ulPartLen is the length of the data part.

The verification operation MUST have been initialized with C_VerifyInit. This function may be called any number of times in succession. A call to C_VerifyUpdate which results in an error terminates the current verification operation.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example: see C_VerifyFinal.

C_VerifyFinal

```c
CK_DEFINE_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyFinal)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
    CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen
);
```

C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation, checking the signature. hSession is the session’s handle; pSignature points to the signature; ulSignatureLen is the length of the signature.

The verification operation MUST have been initialized with C_VerifyInit. A call to C_VerifyFinal always terminates the active verification operation.

A successful call to C_VerifyFinal should return either the value CKR_OK (indicating that the supplied signature is valid) or CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID (indicating that the supplied signature is invalid). If the signature can be seen to be invalid purely on the basis of its length, then CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE should be returned. In any of these cases, the active verifying operation is terminated.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_DES_MAC, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE data[] = {...};
CK_BYTE mac[4];
CK_RV rv;
```
rv = C_VerifyInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    rv = C_VerifyUpdate(hSession, data, sizeof(data));
    ...
    rv = C_VerifyFinal(hSession, mac, sizeof(mac));
    ...
}

**C_VerifyRecoverInit**

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyRecoverInit)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
);
```

*C_VerifyRecoverInit* initializes a signature verification operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the structure that specifies the verification mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the verification key.

The *CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER* attribute of the verification key, which indicates whether the key supports verification where the data is recovered from the signature, MUST be CK_TRUE.

After calling *C_VerifyRecoverInit*, the application may call *C_VerifyRecover* to verify a signature on data in a single part. The verification operation is active until the application uses a call to *C_VerifyRecover* to actually obtain the recovered message.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see *C_VerifyRecover*.

**C_VerifyRecover**

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyRecover)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
    CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
    CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen
);
```

*C_VerifyRecover* verifies a signature in a single-part operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. *hSession* is the session’s handle; *pSignature* points to the signature; *ulSignatureLen* is the length of the signature; *pData* points to the location that receives the recovered data; and *pulDataLen* points to the location that holds the length of the recovered data.
C_VerifyRecover uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.
The verification operation MUST have been initialized with C_VerifyRecoverInit. A call to
C_VerifyRecover always terminates the active verification operation unless it returns
CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or is a successful call (i.e., one which returns CKR_OK) to determine the
length of the buffer needed to hold the recovered data.
A successful call to C_VerifyRecover should return either the value CKR_OK (indicating that the
supplied signature is valid) or CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID (indicating that the supplied signature is
invalid). If the signature can be seen to be invalid purely on the basis of its length, then
CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE should be returned. The return codes CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID
and CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE have a higher priority than the return code
CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, i.e., if C_VerifyRecover is supplied with an invalid signature, it will never
return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE,
CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR,
CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED,
CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE, CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_RSA_9796, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE data[] = {...};
CKULONG ulDataLen;
CK_BYTE signature[128];
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_VerifyRecoverInit(hSession, &mechanism, hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    ulDataLen = sizeof(data);
    rv = C_VerifyRecover{
        hSession, signature, sizeof(signature), data, &ulDataLen);
    ...
    ...
}
```

5.12 Dual-function cryptographic functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions to perform two cryptographic operations “simultaneously” within
a session. These functions are provided so as to avoid unnecessarily passing data back and forth to and
from a token.
DECLARE _FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestEncryptUpdate)(

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen
);

C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues multiple-part digest and encryption operations, processing another data part. hSession is the session’s handle; pPart points to the data part; ulPartLen is the length of the data part; pEncryptedPart points to the location that receives the digested and encrypted data part; pulEncryptedPartLen points to the location that holds the length of the encrypted data part.

C_DigestEncryptUpdate uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output. If a C_DigestEncryptUpdate call does not produce encrypted output (because an error occurs, or because pEncryptedPart has the value NULL_PTR, or because pulEncryptedPartLen is too small to hold the entire encrypted part output), then no plaintext is passed to the active digest operation.

Digest and encryption operations MUST both be active (they MUST have been initialized with C_DigestInit and C_EncryptInit, respectively). This function may be called any number of times in succession, and may be interspersed with C_DigestUpdate, C_DigestKey, and C_EncryptUpdate calls (it would be somewhat unusual to intersperse calls to C_DigestEncryptUpdate with calls to C_DigestKey, however).

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```c
#define BUF_SZ 512

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_BYTE iv[8];
CK_MECHANISM digestMechanism = {
    CKM_MD5, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_MECHANISM encryptionMechanism = {
    CKM_DES_ECB, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
CK_BYTE encryptedData[BUF_SZ];
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen;
CK_BYTE digest[16];
CK_ULONG ulDigestLen;
CK_BYTE data[(2*BUF_SZ)+8];
CK_RV rv;
int i;
```
memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
memset(data, 'A', ((2*BUF_SZ)+5));
rv = C_EncryptInit(hSession, &encryptionMechanism, hKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    ...
}
rv = C_DigestInit(hSession, &digestMechanism);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    ...
}
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_DigestEncryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &data[0], BUF_SZ,
    encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);

ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_DigestEncryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &data[BUF_SZ], BUF_SZ,
    encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);

/*
 * The last portion of the buffer needs to be handled with separate calls to deal with padding issues in ECB mode
 */

/* First, complete the digest on the buffer */
rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, &data[BUF_SZ*2], 5);

ulDigestLen = sizeof(digest);
rv = C_DigestFinal(hSession, digest, &ulDigestLen);
/* Then, pad last part with 3 0x00 bytes, and complete encryption */
for(i=0;i<3;i++)
    data[((BUF_SZ*2)+5)+i] = 0x00;

/* Now, get second-to-last piece of ciphertext */
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_EncryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &data[BUF_SZ*2], 8,
    encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);

/* Get last piece of ciphertext (should have length 0, here) */
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_EncryptFinal(hSession, encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);

♦ C_DecryptDigestUpdate

CK_DEIGNED DECLAR FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptDigestUpdate)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
    CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
    CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen
);

C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part combined decryption and digest operation, processing another data part. hSession is the session’s handle; pEncryptedPart points to the encrypted data part; ulEncryptedPartLen is the length of the encrypted data part; pPart points to the location that receives the recovered data part; pulPartLen points to the location that holds the length of the recovered data part.

C_DecryptDigestUpdate uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output. If a C_DecryptDigestUpdate call does not produce decrypted output (because an error occurs, or because pPart has the value NULL_PTR, or because pulPartLen is too small to hold the entire decrypted part output), then no plaintext is passed to the active digest operation.

Decryption and digesting operations MUST both be active (they MUST have been initialized with C_DecryptInit and C_DigestInit, respectively). This function may be called any number of times in succession, and may be interspersed with C_DecryptUpdate, C_DigestUpdate, and C_DigestKey calls (it would be somewhat unusual to intersperse calls to C_DigestEncryptUpdate with calls to C_DigestKey, however).

Use of C_DecryptDigestUpdate involves a pipelining issue that does not arise when using C_DigestEncryptUpdate, the “inverse function” of C_DecryptDigestUpdate. This is because when C_DigestEncryptUpdate is called, precisely the same input is passed to both the active digesting operation and the active encryption operation; however, when C_DecryptDigestUpdate is called, the input passed to the active digesting operation is the output of the active decryption operation. This issue comes up only when the mechanism used for decryption performs padding.
In particular, envision a 24-byte ciphertext which was obtained by encrypting an 18-byte plaintext with DES in CBC mode with PKCS padding. Consider an application which will simultaneously decrypt this ciphertext and digest the original plaintext thereby obtained.

After initializing decryption and digesting operations, the application passes the 24-byte ciphertext (3 DES blocks) into C_DecryptDigestUpdate. C_DecryptDigestUpdate returns exactly 16 bytes of plaintext, since at this point, Cryptoki doesn’t know if there’s more ciphertext coming, or if the last block of ciphertext held any padding. These 16 bytes of plaintext are passed into the active digesting operation.

Since there is no more ciphertext, the application calls C_DecryptFinal. This tells Cryptoki that there’s no more ciphertext coming, and the call returns the last 2 bytes of plaintext. However, since the active decryption and digesting operations are linked only through the C_DecryptDigestUpdate call, these 2 bytes of plaintext are not passed on to be digested.

A call to C_DigestFinal, therefore, would compute the message digest of the first 16 bytes of the plaintext, not the message digest of the entire plaintext. It is crucial that, before C_DigestFinal is called, the last 2 bytes of plaintext get passed into the active digesting operation via a C_DecryptUpdate call.

Because of this, it is critical that when an application uses a padded decryption mechanism with C_DecryptDigestUpdate, it knows exactly how much plaintext has been passed into the active digesting operation. Extreme caution is warranted when using a padded decryption mechanism with C_DecryptDigestUpdate.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```c
#define BUF_SZ 512

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_BYTE iv[8];
CK_MECHANISM decryptionMechanism = {
  CKM_DES_ECB, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
CK_MECHANISM digestMechanism = {
  CKM_MD5, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE encryptedData[(2*BUF_SZ)+8];
CK_BYTE digest[16];
CK_ULONGLONG ulDigestLen;
CK_BYTE data[BUF_SZ];
CK_ULONGLONG ulDataLen, ulLastUpdateSize;
CK_RV rv;

memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
memset(encryptedData, 'A', ((2*BUF_SZ)+8));
```
rv = C_DecryptInit(hSession, decryptionMechanism, hKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
}
rv = C_DigestInit(hSession, digestMechanism);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
}
ulDataLen = sizeof(data);
rv = C_DecryptDigestUpdate(
    hSession,
    &encryptedData[0], BUF_SZ,
    data, &ulDataLen);
    .
    .
ulDataLen = sizeof(data);
rv = C_DecryptDigestUpdate(
    hSession,
    &encryptedData[BUF_SZ], BUF_SZ,
    data, &ulDataLen);
    .
    .

/*
* The last portion of the buffer needs to be handled with
* separate calls to deal with padding issues in ECB mode
*/

/* First, complete the decryption of the buffer */
ulLastUpdateSize = sizeof(data);
rv = C_DecryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &encryptedData[BUF_SZ*2], 8,
    data, &ulLastUpdateSize);
    .
    .
/* Get last piece of plaintext (should have length 0, here) */
ulDataLen =sizeof(data)-ulLastUpdateSize;
rv = C_DecryptFinal(hSession, data[ulLastUpdateSize], &ulDataLen);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
/ * Digest last bit of plaintext */
rv = C_DigestUpdate(hSession, &data[BUF_SZ*2], 5);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}
ulDigestLen = sizeof(digest);
rv = C_DigestFinal(hSession, digest, &ulDigestLen);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  .
  .
}

♦ C_SignEncryptUpdate

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignEncryptUpdate)(
  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
  CK_ULONG ulPartLen,
  CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
  CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen);

C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part combined signature and encryption operation,
processing another data part. hSession is the session's handle; pPart points to the data part; ulPartLen is
the length of the data part; pEncryptedPart points to the location that receives the digested and encrypted
data part; and pulEncryptedPartLen points to the location that holds the length of the encrypted data part.

C_SignEncryptUpdate uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output. If a
C_SignEncryptUpdate call does not produce encrypted output (because an error occurs, or because
pEncryptedPart has the value NULL_PTR, or because pulEncryptedPartLen is too small to hold the entire
encrypted part output), then no plaintext is passed to the active signing operation.

Signature and encryption operations MUST both be active (they MUST have been initialized with
C_SignInit and C_EncryptInit, respectively). This function may be called any number of times in
succession, and may be interspersed with C_SignUpdate and C_EncryptUpdate calls.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR,
CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED,
CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK,
CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID,
CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

#define BUF_SZ 512

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, hMacKey;
CK_BYTE iv[8];
CK_MECHANISM signMechanism = {
    CKM_DES_MAC, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_MECHANISM encryptionMechanism = {
    CKM_DES_ECB, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
CK_BYTE encryptedData[BUF_SZ];
CKULONG ulEncryptedDataLen;
CK_BYTE MAC[4];
CKULONG ulMacLen;
CK_BYTE data[(2*BUF_SZ)+8];
CK_RV rv;
int i;

memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
memset(data, 'A', ((2*BUF_SZ)+5));
rv = C_EncryptInit(hSession, &encryptionMechanism, hEncryptionKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    ...
} else {
rv = C_SignInit(hSession, &signMechanism, hMacKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    ...
} else {
    ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_SignEncryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &data[0], BUF_SZ,
    encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
    ...
} else {
    ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_SignEncryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &data[BUF_SZ], BUF_SZ,
    encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
    ...
}
/*
 * The last portion of the buffer needs to be handled with
 * separate calls to deal with padding issues in ECB mode
 */

/* First, complete the signature on the buffer */
rv = C_SignUpdate(hSession, &data[BUF_SZ*2], 5);
    .
    .
ulMacLen = sizeof(MAC);
rv = C_SignFinal(hSession, MAC, &ulMacLen);
    .
    .

/* Then pad last part with 3 0x00 bytes, and complete encryption */
for(i=0;i<3;i++)
    data[((BUF_SZ*2)+5)+i] = 0x00;

/* Now, get second-to-last piece of ciphertext */
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_EncryptUpdate(
    hSession,
    &data[BUF_SZ*2], 8,
    encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
    .
    .

/* Get last piece of ciphertext (should have length 0, here) */
ulEncryptedDataLen = sizeof(encryptedData);
rv = C_EncryptFinal(hSession, encryptedData, &ulEncryptedDataLen);
    .
    .

♦ C_DecryptVerifyUpdate

CK DEFINED DECLARE FUNCTION(CK RV, C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)(
    CK SESSION HANDLE hSession,
    CK BYTE PTR pEncryptedPart,
    CK ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
    CK BYTE PTR pPart,
    CK ULONG_PTR pulPartLen
);
**C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** continues a multiple-part combined decryption and verification operation, processing another data part. `hSession` is the session’s handle; `pEncryptedPart` points to the encrypted data; `ulEncryptedPartLen` is the length of the encrypted data; `pPart` points to the location that receives the recovered data; and `pulPartLen` points to the location that holds the length of the recovered data.

**C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output. If a **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** call does not produce decrypted output (because an error occurs, or because `pPart` has the value NULL_PTR, or because `pulPartLen` is too small to hold the entire encrypted part output), then no plaintext is passed to the active verification operation.

Decryption and signature operations MUST both be active (they MUST have been initialized with **C_DecryptInit** and **C_VerifyInit**, respectively). This function may be called any number of times in succession, and may be interspersed with **C_DecryptUpdate** and **C_VerifyUpdate** calls.

Use of **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** involves a pipelining issue that does not arise when using **C_SignEncryptUpdate**, the “inverse function” of **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate**. This is because when **C_SignEncryptUpdate** is called, precisely the same input is passed to both the active signing operation and the active encryption operation; however, when **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** is called, the input passed to the active verifying operation is the output of the active decryption operation. This issue comes up only when the mechanism used for decryption performs padding.

In particular, envision a 24-byte ciphertext which was obtained by encrypting an 18-byte plaintext with DES in CBC mode with PKCS padding. Consider an application which will simultaneously decrypt this ciphertext and verify a signature on the original plaintext thereby obtained.

After initializing decryption and verification operations, the application passes the 24-byte ciphertext (3 DES blocks) into **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate**. **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** returns exactly 16 bytes of plaintext, since at this point, Cryptoki doesn’t know if there’s more ciphertext coming, or if the last block of ciphertext held any padding. These 16 bytes of plaintext are passed into the active verification operation.

Since there is no more ciphertext, the application calls **C_DecryptFinal**. This tells Cryptoki that there’s no more ciphertext coming, and the call returns the last 2 bytes of plaintext. However, since the active decryption and verification operations are linked only through the **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate** call, these 2 bytes of plaintext are not passed on to the verification mechanism.

A call to **C_VerifyFinal**, therefore, would verify whether or not the signature supplied is a valid signature on the first 16 bytes of the plaintext, not on the entire plaintext. It is crucial that, before **C_VerifyFinal** is called, the last 2 bytes of plaintext get passed into the active verification operation via a **C_VerifyUpdate** call.

Because of this, it is critical that when an application uses a padded decryption mechanism with **C_DecryptVerifyUpdate**, it knows exactly how much plaintext has been passed into the active verification operation. **Extreme caution is warranted when using a padded decryption mechanism with C_DecryptVerifyUpdate**.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID.

Example:

```c
#define BUF_SZ 512

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hDecryptionKey, hMacKey;
CK_BYTE iv[8];
CK_MECHANISM decryptionMechanism = {
    CKM_DES_ECB, iv, sizeof(iv)
};
```
CK_MECHANISM verifyMechanism = {
    CKM_DES_MAC, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE encryptedData[(2*BUF_SZ)+8];
CK_BYTE MAC[4];
CK_ULONG ulMacLen;
CK_BYTE data[BUF_SZ];
CK_ULONG ulDataLen, ulLastUpdateSize;
CK_RV rv;

memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
memset(encryptedData, 'A', (2*BUF_SZ)+8);
rv = C_DecryptInit(hSession, &decryptionMechanism, hDecryptionKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
}
rv = C_VerifyInit(hSession, &verifyMechanism, hMacKey);
if (rv != CKR_OK){
    .
    .
}
ulDataLen = sizeof(data);
rv = C_DecryptVerifyUpdate(
    hSession,
    &encryptedData[0], BUF_SZ,
    data, &ulDataLen);
    .
    .
ulDataLen = sizeof(data);
rv = C_DecryptVerifyUpdate(
    hSession,
    &encryptedData[BUF_SZ], BUF_SZ,
    data, &ulDataLen);
    .
    .

/*
 * The last portion of the buffer needs to be handled with
 * separate calls to deal with padding issues in ECB mode
/*
 /* First, complete the decryption of the buffer */
 ulLastUpdateSize = sizeof(data);
 rv = C_DecryptUpdate(
     hSession,
     &encryptedData[BUF_SZ*2], 8,
     data, &ulLastUpdateSize);

 /* Get last little piece of plaintext. Should have length 0 */
 ulDataLen = sizeof(data) - ulLastUpdateSize;
 rv = C_DecryptFinal(hSession, &data[ulLastUpdateSize], &ulDataLen);
 if (rv != CKR_OK) {
     .
     .
 }

 /* Send last bit of plaintext to verification operation */
 rv = C_VerifyUpdate(hSession, &data[BUF_SZ*2], 5);
 if (rv != CKR_OK) {
     .
     .
 }
 rv = C_VerifyFinal(hSession, MAC, ulMacLen);
 if (rv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID) {
     .
     .
 }

5.13 Key management functions
Cryptoki provides the following functions for key management:

♦ C_GenerateKey

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GenerateKey)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
    CK_UINTEGER ulCount,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey
);

C_GenerateKey generates a secret key or set of domain parameters, creating a new object. hSession is
the session's handle; pMechanism points to the generation mechanism; pTemplate points to the template
for the new key or set of domain parameters; ulCount is the number of attributes in the template; phKey
points to the location that receives the handle of the new key or set of domain parameters.
If the generation mechanism is for domain parameter generation, the **CKA_CLASS** attribute will have the value CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS; otherwise, it will have the value CKO_SECRET_KEY.

Since the type of key or domain parameters to be generated is implicit in the generation mechanism, the template does not need to supply a key type. If it does supply a key type which is inconsistent with the generation mechanism, **C_GenerateKey** fails and returns the error code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT. The **CKA_CLASS** attribute is treated similarly.

If a call to **C_GenerateKey** cannot support the precise template supplied to it, it will fail and return without creating an object.

The object created by a successful call to **C_GenerateKey** will have its **CKA_LOCAL** attribute set to CK_TRUE.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
   CKM_DES_KEY_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_RV rv;
.
.
rv = C_GenerateKey(hSession, &mechanism, NULL_PTR, 0, &hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
   .
   .
}

♦ **C_GenerateKeyPair**

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GenerateKeyPair)(
   CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
   CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
   CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate,
   CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount,
   CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate,
   CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount,
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,
   CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey
);
```

**C_GenerateKeyPair** generates a public/private key pair, creating new key objects. **hSession** is the session's handle; **pMechanism** points to the key generation mechanism; **pPublicKeyTemplate** points to
the template for the public key; ulPublicKeyAttributeCount is the number of attributes in the public-key template; pPrivateKeyTemplate points to the template for the private key; ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount is the number of attributes in the private-key template; phPublicKey points to the location that receives the handle of the new public key; phPrivateKey points to the location that receives the handle of the new private key.

Since the types of keys to be generated are implicit in the key pair generation mechanism, the templates do not need to supply key types. If one of the templates does supply a key type which is inconsistent with the key generation mechanism, C_GenerateKeyPair fails and returns the error code CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT. The CKA_CLASS attribute is treated similarly.

If a call to C_GenerateKeyPair cannot support the precise templates supplied to it, it will fail and return without creating any key objects.

A call to C_GenerateKeyPair will never create just one key and return. A call can fail, and create no keys; or it can succeed, and create a matching public/private key pair.

The key objects created by a successful call to C_GenerateKeyPair will have their CKA_LOCAL attributes set to CK_TRUE.

Note carefully the order of the arguments to C_GenerateKeyPair. The last two arguments do not have the same order as they did in the original Cryptoki Version 1.0 document. The order of these two arguments has caused some unfortunate confusion.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, hPrivateKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK ULONG modulusBits = 768;
CK BYTE publicExponent[] = { 3 };
CK_BYTE subject[] = {...};
CK_BYTE id[] = {123};
CK BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK ATTRIBUTE publicKeyTemplate[] = {
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_WRAP, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &modulusBits, sizeof (modulusBits)},
    {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, publicExponent, sizeof (publicExponent)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE privateKeyTemplate[] = {
    {CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof(true)},
```
```c
{CKA_PRIVATE, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_SUBJECT, subject, sizeof(subject)},
{CKA_ID, id, sizeof(id)},
{CKA_SENSITIVE, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_UNWRAP, &true, sizeof(true)}
};

CK_RV rv;

rv = C_GenerateKeyPair(
    hSession, &mechanism,
    publicKeyTemplate, 5,
    privateKeyTemplate, 8,
    &hPublicKey, &hPrivateKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
}
```

**CWrapKey**

CWrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a private or secret key. hSession is the session's handle; pMechanism points to the wrapping mechanism; hWrappingKey is the handle of the wrapping key; hKey is the handle of the key to be wrapped; pWrappedKey points to the location that receives the wrapped key; and pulWrappedKeyLen points to the location that receives the length of the wrapped key.

CWrapKey uses the convention described in Section 5.2 on producing output.

The CKA_WRAP attribute of the wrapping key, which indicates whether the key supports wrapping, MUST be CK_TRUE. The CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute of the key to be wrapped MUST also be CK_TRUE.

If the key to be wrapped cannot be wrapped for some token-specific reason, despite its having its CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute set to CK_TRUE, then CWrapKey fails with error code CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE. If it cannot be wrapped with the specified wrapping key and mechanism solely because of its length, then CWrapKey fails with error code CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE.

CWrapKey can be used in the following situations:

- To wrap any secret key with a public key that supports encryption and decryption.
- To wrap any secret key with any other secret key. Consideration MUST be given to key size and mechanism strength or the token may not allow the operation.
- To wrap a private key with any secret key.
Of course, tokens vary in which types of keys can actually be wrapped with which mechanisms.

To partition the wrapping keys so they can only wrap a subset of extractable keys the attribute CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE can be used on the wrapping key to specify an attribute set that will be compared against the attributes of the key to be wrapped. If all attributes match according to the C_FindObject rules of attribute matching then the wrap will proceed. The value of this attribute is an attribute template and the size is the number of items in the template times the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE. If this attribute is not supplied then any template is acceptable. If an attribute is not present, it will not be checked. If any attribute mismatch occurs on an attempt to wrap a key then the function SHALL return CK_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID.

Return Values:
- CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD
- CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED
- CKR_DEVICE_ERROR
- CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY
- CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED
- CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED
- CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED
- CKR_GENERAL_ERROR
- CKR_HOST_MEMORY
- CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID
- CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE
- CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE
- CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE
- CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID
- CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID
- CKR_OK
- CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE
- CKR_PIN_EXPIRED
- CKR_SESSION_CLOSED
- CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID
- CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN
- CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID
- CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE
- CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_DES3_ECB, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE wrappedKey[8];
CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen;
CK_RV rv;
.
ulWrappedKeyLen = sizeof(wrappedKey);
rv = C_WrapKey(
    hSession, &mechanism,
    hWrappingKey, hKey,
    wrappedKey, &ulWrappedKeyLen);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
}
```

♦ C_UnwrapKey

```c
CK_DEFINE_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_UnwrapKey)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
    CK_ULONG_PTR pUlWrappedKeyLen,
```
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey
);

C_UnwrapKey unwraps (i.e. decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new private key or secret key object. 

hSession is the session’s handle; pMechanism points to the unwrapping mechanism; hUnwrappingKey is the 
handle of the unwrapping key; pWrappedKey points to the wrapped key; ulWrappedKeyLen is the 
length of the wrapped key; pTemplate points to the template for the new key; ulAttributeCount is the 
number of attributes in the template; phKey points to the location that receives the handle of the 
recovered key.

The CKA_UNWRAP attribute of the unwrapping key, which indicates whether the key supports 
unwrapping, MUST be CK_TRUE.

The new key will have the CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE attribute set to CK_FALSE, and the 
CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE attribute set to CK_FALSE. The CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute is by 
default set to CK_TRUE.

Some mechanisms may modify, or attempt to modify, the contents of the pMechanism structure at the 
same time that the key is unwrapped.

If a call to C_UnwrapKey cannot support the precise template supplied to it, it will fail and return without 
creating any key object.

The key object created by a successful call to C_UnwrapKey will have its CKA_LOCAL attribute set to 
CK_FALSE.

To partition the unwrapping keys so they can only unwrap a subset of keys the attribute 
CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE can be used on the unwrapping key to specify an attribute set that will be 
added to attributes of the key to be unwrapped. If the attributes do not conflict with the user supplied 
attribute template, in ‘pTemplate’, then the unwrap will proceed. The value of this attribute is an attribute 
template and the size is the number of items in the template times the size of CK_ATTRIBUTE. If this 
attribute is not present on the unwrapping key then no additional attributes will be added. If any attribute 
conflict occurs on an attempt to unwrap a key then the function SHALL return 
CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, 
CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID, 
CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, 
CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, 
CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, 
CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, 
CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, 
CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, 
CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, 
CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, 
CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, 
CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN, 
CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID, CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE.

Example:

CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_DES3_ECB, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE wrappedKey[8] = {...};
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES;
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_UnwrapKey(
    hSession, &mechanism, hUnwrappingKey,
    wrappedKey, sizeof(wrappedKey), template, 4, &hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
}

♦ C_DeriveKey

CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DeriveKey)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey,
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
    CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey
);

C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. hSession is the session's
handle; pMechanism points to a structure that specifies the key derivation mechanism; hBaseKey is the
handle of the base key; pTemplate points to the template for the new key; ulAttributeCount is the number
of attributes in the template; and phKey points to the location that receives the handle of the derived key.

The values of the CKA_SENSITIVE, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_EXTRACTABLE, and
CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE attributes for the base key affect the values that these attributes can hold
for the newly-derived key. See the description of each particular key-derivation mechanism in Section
5.16.2 for any constraints of this type.

If a call to C_DeriveKey cannot support the precise template supplied to it, it will fail and return without
creating any key object.

The key object created by a successful call to C_DeriveKey will have its CKA_LOCAL attribute set to
CK_FALSE.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY,
CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID,
CKRCRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CURVE_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR,
CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID,
CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR,
CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE,
CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID,
CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED,
CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY,
CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT,
CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, hPrivateKey, hKey;
CK_MECHANISM keyPairMechanism = {
    CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE prime[] = {...};
CK_BYTE base[] = {...};
CK_BYTE publicValue[128];
CK_BYTE otherPublicValue[128];
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, otherPublicValue, sizeof(otherPublicValue)
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE pTemplate[] = {
    CKA_VALUE, &publicValue, sizeof(publicValue)
};
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_DES;
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE publicKeyTemplate[] = {
    {CKA_PRIME, prime, sizeof(prime)},
    {CKA_BASE, base, sizeof(base)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE privateKeyTemplate[] = {
    {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
CK_RV rv;
```

```c
rv = C_GenerateKeyPair(
    hSession, &keyPairMechanism,
    publicKeyTemplate, 2,
    privateKeyTemplate, 1,
```
&hPublicKey, &hPrivateKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    rv = C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hPublicKey, &pTemplate, 1);
    if (rv == CKR_OK) {
        /* Put other guy’s public value in otherPublicValue */
        .
        .
        rv = C_DeriveKey(
            hSession, &mechanism,
            hPrivateKey, template, 4, &hKey);
        if (rv == CKR_OK) {
            .
            .
        }
    }
}

5.14 Random number generation functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for generating random numbers:

♦ C_SeedRandom

CK DEFINED DECLARE FUNCTION(CK RV, C_SeedRandom)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed,
    CK_ULONG ulSeedLen
);

C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token’s random number generator. hSession is the session’s handle; pSeed points to the seed material; and ulSeedLen is the length in bytes of the seed material.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example: see C_GenerateRandom.

♦ C_GenerateRandom

CK DEFINED DECLARE FUNCTION(CK RV, C_GenerateRandom)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomData,
    CK_ULONG ulRandomLen
);
**C_GenerateRandom** generates random or pseudo-random data. *hSession* is the session’s handle; *pRandomData* points to the location that receives the random data; and *ulRandomLen* is the length in bytes of the random or pseudo-random data to be generated.

Return values: CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSIONHANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.

Example:

```c
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_BYTE seed[] = {...};
CK_BYTE randomData[] = {...};
CK_RV rv;

rv = C_SeedRandom(hSession, seed, sizeof(seed));
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
    //...
}
rv = C_GenerateRandom(hSession, randomData, sizeof(randomData));
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    //...
}
```

### 5.15 Parallel function management functions

Cryptoki provides the following functions for managing parallel execution of cryptographic functions. These functions exist only for backwards compatibility.

♦ **C_GetFunctionStatus**

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetFunctionStatus)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```

In previous versions of Cryptoki, **C_GetFunctionStatus** obtained the status of a function running in parallel with an application. Now, however, **C_GetFunctionStatus** is a legacy function which should simply return the value CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL.

Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_SESSIONHANDLE_INVALID, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED.

♦ **C_CancelFunction**

```c
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CancelFunction)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
);
```
In previous versions of Cryptoki, **C_CancelFunction** cancelled a function running in parallel with an application. Now, however, **C_CancelFunction** is a legacy function which should simply return the value **CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL**.


### 5.16 Callback functions

Cryptoki sessions can use function pointers of type **CK_NOTIFY** to notify the application of certain events.

#### 5.16.1 Surrender callbacks

Cryptographic functions (**i.e.**, any functions falling under one of these categories: encryption functions; decryption functions; message digesting functions; signing and MACing functions; functions for verifying signatures and MACs; dual-purpose cryptographic functions; key management functions; random number generation functions) executing in Cryptoki sessions can periodically surrender control to the application who called them if the session they are executing in had a notification callback function associated with it when it was opened. They do this by calling the session's callback with the arguments (**hSession**, **CKN_SURRENDER**, **pApplication**), where **hSession** is the session's handle and **pApplication** was supplied to **C_OpenSession** when the session was opened. Surrender callbacks should return either the value **CKR_OK** (to indicate that Cryptoki should continue executing the function) or the value **CKR_CANCEL** (to indicate that Cryptoki should abort execution of the function). Of course, before returning one of these values, the callback function can perform some computation, if desired.

A typical use of a surrender callback might be to give an application user feedback during a lengthy key pair generation operation. Each time the application receives a callback, it could display an additional "." to the user. It might also examine the keyboard’s activity since the last surrender callback, and abort the key pair generation operation (probably by returning the value **CKR_CANCEL**) if the user hit <ESCAPE>.

A Cryptoki library is not **required** to make any surrender callbacks.

#### 5.16.2 Vendor-defined callbacks

Library vendors can also define additional types of callbacks. Because of this extension capability, application-supplied notification callback routines should examine each callback they receive, and if they are unfamiliar with the type of that callback, they should immediately give control back to the library by returning with the value **CKR_OK**.
PKCS #11 Implementation Conformance

An implementation is a conforming implementation if it meets the conditions specified in one or more server profiles specified in [PKCS #11-Prof].

If a PKCS #11 implementation claims support for a particular profile, then the implementation SHALL conform to all normative statements within the clauses specified for that profile and for any subclauses to each of those clauses.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments

The following individuals have participated in the creation of this specification and are gratefully acknowledged:

Participants:

Gil Abel, Athena Smartcard Solutions, Inc.
Warren Armstrong, QuintessenceLabs
Jeff Bartell, Semper Foris Solutions LLC
Peter Bartok, Venafi, Inc.
Anthony Berglas, Cryptsoft
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Robert Griffin, EMC
Paul Grojean, Individual
Peter Gutmann, Individual
Dennis E. Hamilton, Individual
Thomas Hardjono, M.I.T.
Tim Hudson, Cryptsoft
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Stefan Kaesar, Infineon Technologies
Greg Kazmierczak, Wave Systems Corp.
Appendix B. Manifest constants

The following definitions for manifest constants specified in this document can be found in the appropriate header file. Also, refer [PKCS11_Curr] and [PKCS11_HIST] for additional definitions following normative computer language definition files:

- include/pkcs11-v2.40/pkcs11.h
- include/pkcs11-v2.40/pkcs11t.h
- include/pkcs11-v2.40/pkcs11f.h

```c
# define CK_INVALID_HANDLE           0UL
# define CKN_SURRENDER               0UL
# define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL)
# define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE     0UL
# define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1
# define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000UL
# define CKU_SO                      0UL
# define CKU_USER                    1UL
# define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC        2UL
# define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION       0UL
# define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS       1UL
# define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION       2UL
# define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS       3UL
# define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS         4UL
# define CKO_DATA                    0x00000000UL
# define CKO_CERTIFICATE             0x00000001UL
# define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY              0x00000002UL
# define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY             0x00000003UL
# define CKO_SECRET_KEY              0x00000004UL
```
#define CKO_HW_FEATURE         0x00000005UL
#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS   0x00000006UL
#define CKO_MECHANISM          0x00000007UL
#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED     0x80000000UL
#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER  0x00000001UL
#define CKH_CLOCK              0x00000002UL
#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE     0x00000003UL
#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED     0x80000000UL
#define CKA_CLASS              0x00000000UL
#define CKA_TOKEN              0x00000001UL
#define CKA_PRIVATE            0x00000002UL
#define CKA_LABEL              0x00000003UL
#define CKA_APPLICATION        0x00000010UL
#define CKA_VALUE              0x00000011UL
#define CKA_OBJECT_ID          0x00000012UL
#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE   0x00000080UL
#define CKA_ISSUER             0x00000081UL
#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER      0x00000082UL
#define CKA_AC_ISSUER          0x00000083UL
#define CKA_OWNER              0x00000084UL
#define CKA_ATTRIBUTE_TYPES    0x00000085UL
#define CKA_TRUSTED            0x00000086UL
#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087UL
#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088UL
#define CKA_URL                0x00000089UL
#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008AUL
#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008BUL
#define CKA_NAME_HASH_ALGORITHM 0x0000008CUL
#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE        0x00000090UL
#define CKA_KEY_TYPE           0x00000100UL
#define CKA_SUBJECT            0x00000101UL
#define CKA_ID                 0x00000102UL
#define CKA_SENSITIVE          0x00000103UL
#define CKA_ENCRYPT            0x00000104UL
#define CKA_DECRYPT            0x00000105UL
#define CKA_WRAP               0x00000106UL
#define CKA_UNWRAP             0x00000107UL
#define CKA_SIGN               0x00000108UL
#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER       0x00000109UL
#define CKA_VERIFY             0x0000010AUL
#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER     0x0000010BUL
#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010CUL
#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110UL
#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111UL
#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120UL
#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121UL
#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122UL
#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123UL
#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124UL
#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125UL
#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126UL
#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127UL
#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128UL
#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000130UL
#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131UL
#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132UL
#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000133UL
#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000134UL
#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000160UL
#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161UL
#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162UL
#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163UL
#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164UL
#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165UL
#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166UL
#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170UL
#define CKA_COPYABLE 0x00000171UL
#define CKA_DESTROYABLE 0x00000172UL
#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180UL
#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180UL
#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181UL
#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200UL /* Deprecated */
#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201UL /* Deprecated */
#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202UL
#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210UL
#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211UL)
#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212UL)
#define CKA_HARDWARE_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300UL
#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301UL
#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302UL
#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400UL
#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401UL
#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402UL
#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403UL
#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404UL
#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405UL
#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406UL
#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480UL
#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481UL
#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482UL
#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500UL
#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501UL
#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502UL
#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503UL
#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600UL)
#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000UL

#define CKR_OK 0x00000000UL
#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001UL
#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002UL
#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003UL
#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005UL
#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006UL
#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007UL
#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008UL
#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009UL
#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000AUL
#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010UL
#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011UL
#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012UL
#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013UL
#define CKR_COPY_PROHIBITED 0x0000001AUL
#define CKR_ACTION_PROHIBITED 0x0000001BUL
#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020UL
#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021UL
#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030UL
#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031UL
#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032UL
#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040UL
#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041UL
#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050UL
#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051UL
#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054UL
#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060UL
#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062UL
#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063UL
```c
#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED                0x00000064UL
#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED                   0x00000065UL
#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED                    0x00000066UL
#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE              0x00000067UL
#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED    0x00000068UL
#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE             0x00000069UL
#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE             0x0000006AUL
#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID             0x00000070UL
#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID       0x00000071UL
#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID         0x00000082UL
#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE              0x00000090UL
#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED     0x00000091UL
#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT                 0x000000A0UL
#define CKR_PIN_INVALID                   0x000000A1UL
#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE                 0x000000A2UL
#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED                   0x000000A3UL
#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED                    0x000000A4UL
#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED                0x000000B0UL
#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT                 0x000000B1UL
#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID        0x000000B3UL
#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4UL
#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY             0x000000B5UL
#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS                0x000000B6UL
#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS      0x000000B7UL
#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO.Exists  0x000000B8UL
#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID             0x000000C0UL
#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE           0x000000C1UL
#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE           0x000000D0UL
#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT         0x000000D1UL
#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT             0x000000E0UL
#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED          0x000000E1UL
#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED         0x000000E2UL
#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0UL
#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE     0x000000F1UL
#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2UL
#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN        0x00000100UL
#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN            0x00000101UL
#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED      0x00000102UL
#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID             0x00000103UL
#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104UL
#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES           0x00000105UL
#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID           0x00000110UL
#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE         0x00000112UL
```
#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113UL
#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114UL
#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115UL
#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120UL
#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121UL
#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130UL
#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150UL
#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160UL
#define CKR_INFORMATIONSENSITIVE 0x00000170UL
#define CKR_STATE_UNSALVABLE 0x00000180UL
#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190UL
#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191UL
#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0UL
#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1UL
#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200UL
#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000UL
#define CK_CERTIFICATECATEGORY_UNSPECIFIED 0UL
#define CK_CERTIFICATECATEGORY_TOKEN_USER 1UL
#define CK_CERTIFICATECATEGORYAUTHORITY 2UL
#define CK_CERTIFICATECATEGORYOTHERENTITY 3UL
#define CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_UNSPECIFIED 0UL
#define CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_MANUFACTURER 1UL
#define CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_OPERATOR 2UL
#define CK_SECURITY_DOMAIN_THIRD_PARTY 3UL
# Appendix C. Revision History

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<tr>
<th>Revision</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Editor</th>
<th>Changes Made</th>
</tr>
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<td>wd01</td>
<td>Apr 30 2013</td>
<td>Chris Zimman</td>
<td>Initial import into OASIS template</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wd02</td>
<td>July 7 2013</td>
<td>Chris Zimman</td>
<td>Move explanatory material to PKCS #11 Usage Guide v2.40 wd02</td>
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<td>wd03</td>
<td>Aug 16 2013</td>
<td>Chris Zimman</td>
<td>Incorporation of recent ballot items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wd04</td>
<td>Oct 1 2013</td>
<td>Chris Zimman</td>
<td>Incorporation of ballot items, prep for Committee Specification Draft promotion</td>
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<tr>
<td>wd05</td>
<td>Oct 7 2013</td>
<td>Chris Zimman</td>
<td>Typo correction and proof. This is the candidate for promotion to Committee Specification Draft.</td>
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<td>wd06</td>
<td>Oct 27 2013</td>
<td>Robert Griffin</td>
<td>Final participant list and other editorial changes for Committee Specification Draft</td>
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<td>Oct 30 2013</td>
<td>OASIS</td>
<td>Committee Specification Draft</td>
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<td>Feb 17 2014</td>
<td>Chris Zimman</td>
<td>Incorporation of comments and changes from public feedback and review</td>
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<td>Apr 23 2014</td>
<td>OASIS</td>
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<td>Chris Zimman</td>
<td>Incorporated changes from PKCS 11 TC face-to-face meeting</td>
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<td>Jul 2 2014</td>
<td>Chris Zimman</td>
<td>Corrected manifest constants</td>
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<td>Jul 16 2014</td>
<td>OASIS</td>
<td>Committee Specification Draft</td>
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<td>csd03a</td>
<td>Sep 3 2014</td>
<td>Robert Griffin</td>
<td>Updated revision history and participant list in preparation for Committee Specification ballot</td>
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<td>Nov 3 2014</td>
<td>Robert Griffin</td>
<td>Editorial corrections</td>
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<td>Dec 9 2015</td>
<td>Robert Griffin</td>
<td>Change bar edits corresponding to Errata01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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