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Related work:

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- *MQTT Version 3.1.1*. Edited by Andrew Banks and Rahul Gupta. Latest version: <http://docs.oasis-open.org/mqtt/mqtt/v3.1.1/mqtt-v3.1.1.html>.

Abstract:

This document provides guidance for organizations wishing to deploy MQTT in a way consistent with the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure cybersecurity.

Status:

This document was last revised or approved by the OASIS Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the "Latest version" location noted above for possible later revisions of this document.

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1 Introduction

2 The purpose of this supplemental publication is to introduce implementors and senior
3 executives to the *NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity* (herein
4 referred as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework) and its relationship with the MQTT security
5 recommendations. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework provides a common language and
6 mechanism for organizations to: 1) describe current cybersecurity posture; 2) describe their
7 target state for cybersecurity; 3) identify and prioritize opportunities for improvement within
8 the context of risk management; 4) assess progress toward the target state; 5) foster
9 communications among internal and external stakeholders.

10 The NIST Cybersecurity Framework complements, and does not replace, an organization's
11 existing business or cybersecurity risk management process and cybersecurity program. Rather,
12 the organization can use its current processes and leverage the NIST Cybersecurity Framework
13 to identify opportunities to improve an organization's cybersecurity risk management. It also
14 provides a consensus description of what's needed for a comprehensive cybersecurity program.

15 This supplemental document focuses solely on the MQTT protocol's integration within the NIST
16 Cybersecurity Framework. Keep in mind that a complete cybersecurity management framework
17 can include a wide variety of topics that must be tailored for specific needs according to the
18 organization's missions, environments of operation, and technologies used. Please refer to the
19 NIST Cybersecurity Framework for more information: <http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/>

20 1.1 Terminology

21 1.2 References (non-normative)

22 Information regarding Informative References may be found at the following locations:

- 23 • *Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT)*.
24 <http://www.isaca.org/COBIT/Pages/default.aspx>NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- 25 • *Council on CyberSecurity (CCS) Top 20 Critical Security Controls (CSC)*.
26 <http://www.counciloncybersecurity.org>
- 27 • *ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1 (99.02.01)-2009, Security for Industrial Automation and Control*
28 *Systems: Establishing an Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security Program:*
29 <http://www.isa.org/Template.cfm?Section=Standards8&Template=/Ecommerce/ProductDisplay.cfm&ProductID=10243>
- 30
31 • *ANSI/ISA-62443-3-3 (99.03.03)-2013, Security for Industrial Automation and Control*
32 *Systems: System Security Requirements and Security Levels.*
33 <http://www.isa.org/Template.cfm?Section=Standards2&template=/Ecommerce/ProductDisplay.cfm&ProductID=13420>
34

- 35 • *ISO/IEC 27001, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information security*
36 *management systems – Requirements.*
37 [http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnumber](http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnumber=54534)
38 [=54534](http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnumber=54534)
- 39 • *NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4: NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy*
40 *Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations.* April 2013.
41 <http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4>

42 1.3 NIST Cybersecurity Framework

43 The NIST Cybersecurity Framework is a risk-based approach to managing cybersecurity risk, and
44 is composed of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Implementation Tiers, and the
45 Framework Profiles. Each Framework component reinforces the connection between business
46 drivers and cybersecurity activities. The components are described below.

47 1.3.1 The Framework Core

48 The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity activities, desired outcomes, and applicable
49 references that are common across critical infrastructure sectors. The Core presents industry
50 standards, guidelines, and practices in a manner that allows for communication of cybersecurity
51 activities and outcomes across the organization from the executive level to the implementation
52 and operations level. The Framework Core consists of five concurrent and continuous functions:
53 Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover. When considered together, these Functions provide
54 a high-level, strategic view of the lifecycle of an organization’s management of cybersecurity
55 risk. The Framework Core then identifies underlying key Categories and Subcategories for each
56 Function, and matches them with example Informative references such as existing standards,
57 guidelines, and practices for each Subcategory.

58 1.3.2 Framework Implementation Tiers

59 Framework Implementation Tiers (“Tiers”) provide context on how an organization views
60 cybersecurity risk and the processes in place to manage that risk. Tiers describe the degree to
61 which their cybersecurity risk management practices exhibit the characteristics defined in the
62 Framework (e.g., risk and threat aware, repeatable, and adaptive). The Tiers characterize an
63 organization’s practices over a range, from Partial (Tier 1) to Adaptive (Tier 4). These Tiers
64 reflect a progression from informal, reactive responses to approaches that are agile and risk-
65 informed. During the Tier selection process, an organization should consider its current risk
66 management practices, threat environment, legal and regulatory requirements,
67 business/mission objectives, and organizational constraints.

68 1.3.3 Framework Profile

69 A Framework Profile (“Profile”) represents the outcomes based on business needs that an
70 organization has selected from the Framework Categories and Subcategories. The Profile can be
71 characterized as the alignment of standards, guidelines, and practices to the Framework Core in
72 a particular implementation scenario. Profiles can be used to identify opportunities for

73 improving cybersecurity posture by comparing a *Current* Profile (the “as is” state) with a *Target*
74 Profile (the “to be” state). To develop a Profile, an organization can review all of the Categories
75 and Subcategories and, based on business drivers and a risk assessment, determine which are
76 most important; they can add Categories and Subcategories as needed to address the
77 organization’s risks. The Current Profile can then be used to support prioritization and
78 measurement of progress toward the Target Profile, while factoring in other business needs
79 including cost-effectiveness and innovation. Profiles can be used to conduct self-assessments
80 and communicate within an organization or between organizations.

81 1.4 NIST Cybersecurity Framework for MQTT

82 In the context of the MQTT protocol, each NIST Cybersecurity component has been reduced to
83 solely reflect security considerations of the protocol and are renamed accordingly: MQTT
84 cybersecurity Framework Core, MQTT cybersecurity Framework Implementation Tiers, and
85 MQTT cybersecurity Framework Profile.

86 1.4.1 MQTT Cybersecurity Framework Core

87 The MQTT cybersecurity Framework Core consists of the same five Functions (Identify, Protect,
88 Detect, Respond, Recover) which can provide a high-level, strategic view of an organization’s
89 management of MQTT related cybersecurity risk. The MQTT cybersecurity Framework Core then
90 identifies underlying key Categories and Subcategories for each of these Functions described in
91 Section 2. Because the MQTT cybersecurity Framework is smaller in scope it is unnecessary to
92 provide references for every Category and Subcategory. A non-exhaustive list of informative
93 references is provided in Section 1.2.

94 1.4.2 MQTT Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Tiers

95 The MQTT cybersecurity Framework Implementation Tiers demonstrate the implementation of
96 the MQTT cybersecurity Framework Core Functions and Categories and indicate how
97 cybersecurity risk is managed. Organizations should determine the desired Tiers at the Category
98 level, ensuring that the selected levels meet the organizational goals, mitigate cybersecurity risk,
99 and are feasible to implement. External guidance will be helpful, such as information that could
100 be obtained from OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), the Federal Information
101 Processing Standards (FIPS), and Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). The
102 Tier definitions are described below.

103 1.4.2.1 Tier 1: Partial

104 The organization has not yet implemented a formal, threat-aware MQTT risk management
105 process to determine a prioritized list of cybersecurity activities. The organization might
106 implement some portions of the Framework on an ad hoc basis due to varied experience or
107 information gained from outside sources.

108 1.4.2.2 Tier 2: Risk-Informed

109 The organization uses a formal, threat-aware MQTT risk management process to develop an
110 MQTT Profile of the Framework. In addition, risk-informed, management approved processes
111 and procedures are defined and implemented. Staff have adequate resources to perform their
112 cybersecurity duties.

113 1.4.2.3 Tier 3: Repeatable

114 The organization updates its Profile based on regular application of its MQTT risk management
115 process to respond to a changing cybersecurity landscape. Risk informed policies, processes, and
116 procedures are defined, implemented as intended, and validated. The organization will also
117 have consistent methods in place to provide updates when a risk change occurs.

118 1.4.2.4 Tier 4: Adaptive

119 The organization updates its Profile based on predictive indicators derived from previous and
120 anticipated cybersecurity activities. These updates to the Profile enable the organization to
121 adapt to an evolving cybersecurity landscape and address emerging threats. Risk-informed
122 policies, processes, and procedures are part of the organizational culture and are reviewed
123 regularly - including feedback from lessons learned and information shared from other sources -
124 to predict and address potential cybersecurity events.

125 1.4.3 MQTT Cybersecurity Framework Profile

126 An MQTT cybersecurity Framework Profile enables organizations to establish a roadmap for
127 reducing MQTT related cybersecurity risk that is well-aligned with organization and sector goals,
128 considers legal and regulatory requirements, and reflects risk management priorities. An MQTT
129 cybersecurity Framework Profile can be used to describe both the current state and the desired
130 target state of specific MQTT cybersecurity activities, thus revealing gaps that could be
131 addressed to meet MQTT cybersecurity risk management objectives.

132 The Profile is the selection of the Functions, Categories, and Subcategories that are aligned with
133 the business requirements, risk tolerance, and resources of the organization. The Target Profile
134 should support business requirements and aid in the communication of risk within and between
135 organizations. Identifying the gaps between the Current Profile and the Target Profile allows the
136 creation of a roadmap that organizations could implement to reduce MQTT related
137 cybersecurity risk.

138 1.4.4 Establishing or Improving a Cybersecurity Program

139 Together, the three MQTT Cybersecurity Framework components allow organizations to
140 understand and shape their cybersecurity program. The following sub sections illustrate how
141 this can be done.

142 1.4.4.1 Prioritize and Scope

143 The organization identifies its business/mission objectives and high-level organizational
144 priorities. With this information, the organization makes strategic decisions regarding

145 cybersecurity implementations and determines the scope of systems and assets that support
146 the selected business line or process.

147 1.4.4.2 Orient

148 Once the scope of the cybersecurity program has been determined for the business line or
149 process, the organization identifies related systems and assets, regulatory requirements, and
150 their overall risk approach. The organization then identifies threats to, and vulnerabilities of,
151 those systems and assets.

152 1.4.4.3 Create a Current Profile

153 The organization develops a Current Profile by indicating which Category and Subcategory
154 outcomes from the Framework Core are currently being achieved.

155 1.4.4.4 Conduct a Risk Assessment

156 This assessment could be guided by the organization's overall risk management process or
157 previous risk assessment activities. The organization analyzes the operational environment in
158 order to discern the likelihood of a cybersecurity event and the impact that the event could have
159 on the organization. It is important that organizations seek to incorporate emerging risks and
160 threat and vulnerability data to facilitate a robust understanding of the likelihood and impact of
161 cybersecurity events.

162 1.4.4.5 Create a Target Profile

163 The organization creates a Target Profile that focuses on the assessment of the Framework
164 Categories and Subcategories describing the organization's desired cybersecurity outcomes.
165 Organization may develop their own additional Categories and Subcategories to account for
166 unique organizational risks. The organization also consider influences and requirements of
167 external stakeholders such as sector entities, customers, and business partners when creating a
168 Target Profile.

169 1.4.4.6 Determine, Analyze, and Prioritize Gaps

170 The organization compares the Current Profile and the Target Profile to determine gaps. Next it
171 creates a prioritized action plan to address those gaps that draws upon mission drivers, a "cost
172 benefit" analysis, and understanding of risk to achieve the outcomes in the Target Profile. The
173 organization then determines resources necessary to address the gaps. Using Profiles in this
174 manner enables the organization to make informed decisions about cybersecurity activities,
175 supports risk management, and enables the organization to perform cost-effective, targeted
176 improvements.

177 1.4.5 Document Overview

178 The remainder of this supplemental document contains the following sections:

- 179 • Section 2 describes the MQTT cybersecurity Framework Core Functions.
- 180 • Appendix A is an Example Implementation of the MQTT cybersecurity Framework.

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- 181 • Appendix B are Acknowledgements
- 182 • Appendix C is the Revision History
- 183

184 2 MQTT Cybersecurity Framework Core Functions

185 This section describes the five MQTT cybersecurity Framework Core Functions and how they can
186 be used to assess an organization's cybersecurity level where the MQTT protocol is used. The list
187 of components associated with each function presented here is non-exhaustive and provided as
188 a starting point for a cybersecurity Management Framework. Implementors should modify
189 Categories and Subcategories as they see fit such as to tailor the MQTT Cybersecurity
190 Framework functions for their organization. Informative References described in Section 1.2
191 should also be modified to reflect an organization's regulatory requirements.

192 2.1.1 Identify

193 The purpose of this function is to:

- 194 1. Develop the institutional understanding of which MQTT related organizational systems,
195 assets, data, and capabilities need to be protected;
- 196 2. determine priority in light of organizational mission;
- 197 3. establish processes to achieve risk management goals.

Function	Category	Subcategory
Identify	Asset Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• List of hardware devices• Software inventory• Network mapping• Lifecycle tracking
	Risk Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Defining Risk Tolerance• Risk Identification• Risk Assessment• Authentication of the Server by the Clients• Analysis of Alternatives
	Compliance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Business Requirements• Legislative and Regulatory• Contractual Requirements• Technology Certification
	Information Sharing and Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Understand Data Flows• Internal Communications• External Communications• Cryptographic suites versioning and implementation how-to
	Environmental Awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Location of (client-side) end-devices• Location of end-to-end communication infrastructures• Location of (server-side) brokers and vicinity

198 **2.1.2 Protect**

199 The purpose of this function is to develop and implement the appropriate MQTT safeguards,
 200 prioritized through the organization’s risk management process, to ensure delivery of critical
 201 infrastructure services.

Function	Category	Subcategory
Protect	Security Awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • User Awareness Training • Formal Training • Exercise and Evaluation
	Identity, Credential and Access Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of PKI (e.g. TLS, VPN) • Choose a well-known Certificate Authority • Authentication of Clients by the Server • Authentication of the Server by the Clients • Authorization of Clients by the Server
	Information Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of cryptographic suites (e.g. TLS, VPN) • Integrity of Application Messages and Control Packets • Privacy of Application Messages and Control Packets • Non-repudiation of message transmission • Secure Random Number Generation for all involved devices
	Server-side Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compliance with MQTT specification • Automatic Client disconnect mechanisms • Suspicious behavior detection • Dynamic Access Control Listing (e.g. IP address or Client ID) • Rate limiting and/or blocking (e.g. IP address) • Data-at-rest encryption • Frequent session renegotiation to establish new cryptographic parameters (e.g. replace session keys or change cipher suites)
	Client-side Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tamper proof end-devices • Proper storage of the client certificate (key management considerations) • Two-factor authentication

202

203 **2.1.3 Detect**

204 The purpose of this function is to develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify
 205 the occurrence of an MQTT related cybersecurity event.

Function	Category	Subcategory
Detect	Network Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repeated connection attempts

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abnormal termination of connections
	Physical Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Client availability verification End-devices and their vicinity physical inspection
	Intrusion Detection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Repeated authentication attempts Topic scanning (attempts to send or subscribe to many topics) Sending undeliverable messages (no subscribers to the topics) Clients that connect but do not send data

206

207 2.1.4 Respond

208 The purpose of this function is to develop and implement the appropriate activities, prioritized
 209 through the organization’s risk management process, to take action in response to a detected
 210 cybersecurity event.

Function	Category	Subcategory
Respond	Response Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revoke lost and/or compromised certificates Revoke lost and/or compromised Client or Server authentication credentials Disconnect suspicious or compromised end-devices Block compromised telemetry channels Increase Firewall policies Shutdown compromised brokers and servers

211 2.1.5 Recover

212 The purpose of this function is to develop and implement the appropriate activities, prioritized
 213 through the organization’s risk management process, to restore the appropriate capabilities that
 214 were impaired through a cybersecurity event.

Function	Category	Subcategory
Recover	Recover Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perform information system recovery (e.g. restart broker, create new telemetry channels, etc.) Perform reconstitution activities Provide alternate work site to recover work activities Review Firewall policies Reissue certificates and authentication credentials Inspect end-devices Review Key Management and cryptographic deployments Backup systems Updated contingency plan

215 Appendix A. Example Implementation

216 Large Energy Provider MQTT Bus Architecture


217

218 This section provides a worked example to show how the Framework can be applied to help
219 manage MQTT cybersecurity risk. A large energy provider intends to implement an open-source,
220 broker-agnostic, and distributed field message bus architecture based on the MQTT protocol.

221 Protecting the bus architecture is essential because the energy provider is a critical
222 infrastructure.

223 Context

224 The organization is looking to build a new architecture around an open-source, broker agnostic
225 'communication node' concept and is running a pilot project to assess feasibility, and integration
226 within its wider message bus. Its primary role is to facilitate interoperability between the various
227 operational technologies deployed (i.e. SCADA, EMS, DMS, OMS, MDM, etc.) and also augment
228 these technologies by using the MQTT protocol for the efficient sharing and processing of data
229 closer to the asset(s) required for the rapid, reliable, and safe execution of operational functions
230 of all priorities on the electric grid.



231


Current State – Message Bus at Data Center

Future State – Message Bus in Field and Data Center

232 Consequently, using the MQTT protocol will not only improve the simplicity and the integrity of
233 the information exchanges between disparate assets in the field, but also inherently filter a
234 significant amount of unused data overhead and, more importantly, will eliminate the need to
235 backhaul all raw data to a central data center. Fundamentally, these benefits will translate into
236 vast savings in the cost of operating the IT systems and telecommunication networks, but can
237 also achieve further value by enabling deployed control schemes that are not presently feasible
238 without distributed decision-making closer to the electric grid assets.

239 Test Lab Scenario

240 The energy provider is running the following Field Message Bus scenario, based on MQTT. The
241 initial and final state of the system is shown in picture form. The intermediate publish and
242 subscribe steps are described the following paragraph.



243


244 Initial State: Scenario starts when the Tablet UI publishes low voltage – 114V.

245 A Tablet PC is used to control the voltage of a power supply that feeds input voltage to a smart
246 meter. The scenario starts when the Tablet UI publishes low voltage – 114V. The smart meter
247 sees the low voltage and publishes its voltage status change to the distribution management
248 system (DMS). The DMS subscribes and updates its status. The DMS publishes a control
249 command to the cap bank controller to close the cap bank, thus raising the voltage. The cap
250 bank controller publishes its status change – closed – back to the DMS. The DMS subscribes to
251 the cap bank controller status change; it updates its single-line diagram and publishes a raise
252 voltage volt-120 command to the Power Supply who subscribes and makes the change. The
253 meter publishes its voltage status change – 120V. The DMS publishes an updated single-line
254 diagram to the Tablet UI showing the closed cap bank. This scenario is complete when the
255 Tablet UI subscribes to and displays the updated single-line diagram from the DMS.

256 This simple test scenario reveals the richness, flexibility, and ease of use of publish and subscribe
257 Field Message Bus, MQTT technology. Future plans for the Field Message Bus is to include the
258 necessary security layers: authentication, authorization, encryption, intrusion detection, and
259 quality of trust behavior analytics to the distributed enterprise.

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273 MQTT Cybersecurity Framework


274 The NIST Cybersecurity Framework document in section 3.2 provides guidance on the steps an
275 organization can take to establish or improve a cybersecurity program.

276 Following the initial steps the energy provider has developed a Framework Core informed by
277 several recommendation publications such as NIST Special publication 800-26 (Security Self-
278 Assessment Guide for Information Technology Systems" for advice on how to manage IT security
279 and ISO 15408 (Evaluation criteria for IT security) to test the security of the bus architecture.
280 The energy provider has also a list of standards it must comply with imposed by the US
281 government. The Framework Core established for the current MQTT bus architecture is defined
282 below.

Function	Category	Subcategory
Identify	Asset Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> List of hardware devices Software inventory Network mapping
	Risk Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defining Risk Tolerance Risk Identification Risk Assessment Analysis of Alternatives
	Information Sharing and Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Understand Data Flows Internal Communications External Communications Cryptographic suites versioning and implementation how-to
	Environmental Awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Location of (client-side) end-devices Location of end-to-end communication infrastructures Location of (server-side) brokers and vicinity
Protect	Information Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> User Awareness Training Identity, Credential and Access Management
Detect	Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Network Physical Intrusion
Respond	Response Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revoke lost and/or compromised certificates Revoke lost and/or compromised Client or Server authentication credentials Disconnect suspicious or compromised end-devices Block compromised telemetry channels Increase Firewall policies Shutdown compromised brokers and servers
Recover	Recover Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perform information system recovery (e.g. restart broker, create new telemetry channels, etc.)
	Post Recovery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perform reconstitution activities Provide alternate work site to recover work activities Review Firewall policies Backup systems

283

284 Using this Framework Core the energy provider assesses the current Implementation Tier status
 285 (in this case at the Function level), conducts a risk assessment of the current operational
 286 environment and creates a Target Profile indicating the desired Implementation Tier status for
 287 each Function.



288

289 The differences between the current and target profiles are analyzed to determine the actions
290 required to bridge the gaps, the results of which are fed into the energy provider's existing
291 cybersecurity program.

292 Energy Provider Cybersecurity Program

293 While the majority of the cybersecurity program is concerned with security governance and risk
294 management, there are three distinct sections where MQTT critically interlocks with other
295 compliance processes.

296 Identify -> Information Sharing and Communications

297 - Message Flow (internal & external communications)

298 ○ In order to provide resilience, an effect approach is to segregate the message
299 system control plane from the message delivery system. This enables system
300 management processes to analyze control information from message content.

301 ○ It is recommended that QoS levels for the system control plane have a higher
302 priority than the normal message delivery channel. This approach ensures that
303 reconfiguration, partitioning or isolation of internal and external
304 communications channels can be applied without hindrance from the message
305 delivery system.

306 - Cryptography and versioning

307 ○ Security within MQTT is predominantly TLS. However for the energy provider,
308 there are a number of small form factor/constrained devices such as SCADA
309 control systems that leverage existing light-weight cryptography as well as the
310 prolific AES standard. Thus the energy provider would use TLS, however higher
311 level security process would use PKI management to interoperate with existing
312 Cryptography suites.

313

314 Detect -> Monitoring -> Network

- 315 - While MQTT is a backbone messaging system, the segregation of the system control
316 plane (with QoS settings) and the message delivery system allows third party monitoring
317 systems easy access to information flow.

318 Recover-> Post Recovery

- 319 - The use, placement and location of persistent and non-persistent MQTT queues has a
320 huge bearing on recovery. For the Energy power provider, MQTT uses non-persistent
321 queues on edge devices and persistent queues for all server side brokers. This approach
322 allows the central services to recover much quicker as the edge devices are always
323 synchronized with the server side MQTT persistent queues.

324 Appendix B. Acknowledgments

325 The following individuals have participated in the creation of this specification and are gratefully
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327 **Participants:**

- 328 Geoff Brown, Machine-To-Machine Intelligence (M2Mi) Corporation
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- 337 Andrew Banks, IBM

338 **Appendix C. Revision History**

Revision	Date	Editor	Changes Made
2.0	03/31/2014	Geoff Brown	Incorporated latest JIRAs (200, 206, and 207).

339