OASIS 🕅

SAML V2.0 Information Card Token Profile Version 1.0

Committee Specification 01

21 July 2010

Specification URIs:

This Version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/cs/imi-saml2.0-profile-cs-01.html http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/cs/imi-saml2.0-profile-cs-01.doc (Authoritative) http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/cs/imi-saml2.0-profile-cs-01.pdf

Previous Version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/cd/imi-saml2.0-profile-cd-03.html http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/cd/imi-saml2.0-profile-cd-03.doc (Authoritative) http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/cd/imi-saml2.0-profile-cd-03.pdf

Latest Version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/imi-saml2.0-profile.html http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/imi-saml2.0-profile.doc (Authoritative) http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/imi-saml2.0-profile.pdf

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Related work:

This specification replaces or supersedes:

None

This specification is related to:

- OASIS Standard, "Identity Metasystem Interoperability Version 1.0", July 2009. http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/v1.0/identity.pdf
- OASIS Standard, "Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March 2005. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf
- OASIS Committee Draft, "SAML V1.1 Information Card Token Profile Version 1.0", July 2010. http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/cd/imi-saml1.1-profile-cd-02.pdf

Declared XML Namespace(s):

http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/ns/token/saml2/200908

Abstract:

This profile describes a set of rules for Identity Providers and Relying Parties to follow when using SAML V2.0 assertions as managed Information Card security tokens, so that interoperability and security is achieved commensurate with other SAML authentication profiles.

Status:

This document was last revised or approved by the Identity Metasystem Interoperability TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the "Latest Version" or "Latest Approved Version" location noted above for possible later revisions of this document.

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1 **1 Introduction**

OASIS has standardized a set of profiles for acquiring and delivering security tokens, collectively referred to as "Information Card" technology. These profiles are agnostic with respect to the format and semantics of a security token, but interoperability between Issuing and Relying Parties cannot be achieved without additional rules governing the creation and use of the tokens exchanged. This document describes a set of rules for the use of SAML V2.0 assertions, as defined in [SAML2Core], as security tokens within the Information Card architecture.

8 **1.1 Notational Conventions**

9 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD 10 NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described 11 in [RFC 2119].

- 12 This specification uses the following syntax to define outlines for assertions:
- The syntax appears as an XML instance, but values in italics indicate data types instead of literal values.
- Characters are appended to elements and attributes to indicate cardinality:
- 16 o "?" (0 or 1)

18

- 17 o "*" (0 or more)
 - "+" (1 or more)
- The character "|" is used to indicate a choice between alternatives.
- The characters "(" and ")" are used to indicate that contained items are to be treated as a group with respect to cardinality or choice.
- The characters "[" and "]" are used to call out references and property names.
- Ellipses (i.e., "...") indicate points of extensibility. Additional children and/or attributes MAY be
 added at the indicated extension points but MUST NOT contradict the semantics of the parent
 and/or owner, respectively. By default, if a receiver does not recognize an extension, the receiver
 SHOULD ignore the extension; exceptions to this processing rule, if any, are clearly indicated
 below.
- XML namespace prefixes (see Section 1.2) are used to indicate the namespace of the element being defined.
- Elements and Attributes defined by this specification are referred to in the text of this document using
 XPath 1.0 expressions. Extensibility points are referred to using an extended version of this syntax:
- An element extensibility point is referred to using {any} in place of the element name. This
 indicates that any element name can be used, from any namespace other than the namespace of
 this specification.
- An attribute extensibility point is referred to using @{any} in place of the attribute name. This
 indicates that any attribute name can be used, from any namespace other than the namespace of
 this specification.
- 38 Extensibility points in the exemplar may not be described in the corresponding text.
- 39 This specification uses the following typographical conventions in text: <SAMLElement>,
- 40 <ns:ForeignElement>, Attribute, **Datatype**, OtherCode.

1.2 Namespaces 41

42

Conventional XML namespace prefixes are used throughout the listings in this specification to stand for their respective namespaces as follows, whether or not a namespace declaration is present in the 43 44 example:

Prefix	XML Namespace	Comments
saml:	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion	This is the SAML V2.0 assertion namespace defined in the SAML V2.0 core specification [SAML2Core].
md:	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata	This is the SAML V2.0 metadata namespace defined in the SAML V2.0 metadata specification [SAML2Meta].
ic:	http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity	This is the Information Card namespace defined in the Identity Metasystem Interoperability standard [IMI].
wsa:	http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing	This is the WS-Addressing namespace defined in the WS-Addressing specification [WS-Addressing].
wsp:	http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/09/policy	This is the WS-Policy namespace defined in the March 2006 WS-Policy specification [WS-Policy].
sp:	May refer to either http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/07/securitypolicy or http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws- securitypolicy/200702 since both may be used	This is either the WS-SecurityPolicy namespace defined by the WS-SecurityPolicy 1.1 specification [WS-SecPol11] or the OASIS WS-SecurityPolicy 1.2 specification [WS- SecPol12].
wst:	May refer to any of http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust, http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512, or http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200802, since all may be used	This is one the WS-Trust namespaces defined in the February 2005 WS-Trust specification [WS-Trust12], the OASIS WS-Trust 1.3 standard [WS-Trust13], or the OASIS WS- Trust 1.4 standard [WS-Trust14].
ds:	http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#	This is the XML Signature namespace [XMLSig].

1.3 Normative References 45

46 47	[IMI]	OASIS Standard, "Identity Metasystem Interoperability V1.0", July 2009. http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/v1.0/os/identity-1.0-spec-os.pdf
48 49	[RFC2119]	S. Bradner. "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels". IETF RFC 2119, March 1997. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt.
50 51 52	[SAML2Core]	OASIS Standard, "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March 2005. http://docs.oasis- open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf
53 54 55	[SAML2Meta]	OASIS Standard, "Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March 2005. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf

56 57 58	[SAML2Prof]	OASIS Standard, "Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March 2005. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf
59	[WS-Addressing]	M. Gudgin et al. "WS-Addressing 1.0 Core". World Wide Web Consortium
60 61		Recommendation, May 2006. http://www.w3.org/TR/2006/REC-ws-addr-core-20060509/
62	[WS-Policy]	"Web Services Policy Framework, Version 1.2", March 2006.
63		http://specs.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/09/policy/ws-policy.pdf
64	[WS-SecPol11]	"Web Services Security Policy Language", July 2005.
65		http://specs.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/07/securitypolicy/ws-securitypolicy.pdf
66	[WS-SecPol12]	OASIS Standard, "WS-SecurityPolicy 1.2", July 2007. http://docs.oasis-
67		open.org/ws-sx/ws-securitypolicy/200702/ws-securitypolicy-1.2-spec-os.pdf
68	[WS-Trust12]	"Web Services Trust Language (WS-Trust)", February 2005.
69		http://specs.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/trust/WS-Trust.pdf
70	[WS-Trust13]	OASIS Standard, "WS-Trust 1.3", March 2007. http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-
71		sx/ws-trust/200512/ws-trust-1.3-os.pdf
72	[WS-Trust14]	OASIS Standard, "WS-Trust 1.4", February 2009. http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-
73		sx/ws-trust/v1.4/os/ws-trust-1.4-spec-os.pdf
74	[XMLSig]	D. Eastlake et al. "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing, Second Edition".
75		World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation, June 2008.
76		http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/

77 1.4 Non-Normative References

78	[SAML2Sec]	OASIS Standard, "Security Considerations for the OASIS Security Assertion
79		Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March 2005. http://docs.oasis-
80		open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-sec-consider-2.0-os.pdf
81	[SAML1.1IMI]	OASIS Committee Draft, "SAML V1.1 Information Card Token Profile Version
82		1.0", July 2010. http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/cd/imi-saml1.1-profile-cd-
83		02.pdf

2 SAML V2.0 Information Card Token Profile 84

2.1 Required Information 85

- Identification: http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/ns/token/saml2/200908 86
- 87 Contact information: imi-comment@lists.oasis-open.org
- 88 **Description:** Given below
- 89 Updates: None

2.2 Profile Overview 90

- 91 Identity Providers and Relying Parties employing the Identity Metasystem Interoperability [IMI] profile to
- 92 request and exchange security tokens are able to use arbitrary token formats, provided there is
- 93 agreement on the token's syntax and semantics, and a way to connect the token's content to the 94
- supported protocol features.
- 95 This profile provides a set of requirements and guidelines for the use of SAML V2.0 assertions as security
- tokens that, where possible, emulates existing SAML V2.0 authentication profiles [SAML2Prof] so as to 96
- 97 limit the amount of new work that must be done by existing software to support the use of Information
- 98 Cards. It also provides for the use of SAML assertions in this new context that is safe and consistent with 99 best practices in similar contexts.
- This profile does not seek to alter the required behavior of existing Identity Selector software, or conflict 100 101 with the profile defined by [IMI].

2.3 Identity Provider Requirements 102

- 103 While the SAML V2.0 specification [SAML2Core] defines an Identity Provider solely in terms of the SAML
- 104 Authentication Request protocol, the term is generally applicable to an entity that issues authentication
- 105 assertions by means of other, similar protocols. In this case, the Identity Provider functions as an Identity
- 106 Provider/Security Token Service (IP/STS) in the Information Card vocabulary, and issues assertions in
- 107 response to <wst:RequestSecurityToken> messages [WS-Trust12] or [WS-Trust13] or [WS-Trust14]. 108
- 109 As defined by [IMI], the request contains information that provides input into the assertion creation
- process. The following sections outline requirements for interpreting this input and the resulting assertion 110 111 content.

2.3.1 Token Types 112

- Identity Providers MUST support both of the following token type strings in conjunction with this profile: 113
- 114 • http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/ns/token/saml2/200908
- 115 • urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion
- 116 These strings appear in various content produced and consumed by an Identity Provider, such as (but not
- 117 limited to) the <wst:TokenType> element.
- Information Cards issued by the Identity Provider MUST indicate support for both token types above. 118

2.3.2 Identifying Token Issuers 119

- 120 Information Cards produced by Identity Providers MUST contain the Identity Provider's unique name as
- the value of the <ic:Issuer> element. This name corresponds to the SAML concept of an "entityID" 121
- 122 and may correspond to an actual entityID in the SAML sense of the term, or a logically equivalent name for the Identity Provider. 123

124 2.3.3 General Assertion Requirements

- 125 Assertions issued in accordance with this profile MUST contain a single <saml:AuthnStatement> that
- reflects the authentication of the token requester to the Identity Provider. Note that it does NOT reflect the
- 127 authentication taking place by means of the assertion to the Relying Party. It MAY contain a single
- 128 <saml:AttributeStatement> that carries one or more <saml:Attribute> elements reflecting the
- 129 claims requested by the Relying Party, in the manner specified by [IMI].
- 130 When satisfying these requested claims, the resulting <saml:Attribute> element's NameFormat XML 131 attribute MUST be:
- 132 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri
- 133 The element's Name XML attribute MUST correspond to the requested claim type's URI value (e.g., in 134 <ic:ClaimType> elements).
- A <saml:NameID> element MAY be included in the assertion's <saml:Subject> element. If the
- 136 requested claim types include a claim type with a URI corresponding to a SAML name identifier format
- 137 known to the Identity Provider, it may satisfy that claim request by including a <saml:NameID> element
- 138 of the proper format in the assertion's subject. If more than one claim type corresponding to a name
- 139 identifier format is requested, the Identity Provider MAY fault the request or choose any requested format,
- 140 at its discretion. If two such claim types are "required" by the Relying Party, a fault MUST be generated.
- 141 The assertion's <saml:Subject> element MUST contain at least one
- 142 <saml:SubjectConfirmation> element, the details of which are defined in Section 2.3.4 below.
- 143 Finally, the assertion MUST be signed.

144 2.3.4 Proof Keys and Subject Confirmation

145 [IMI] defines three classes of "proof keys" that bind the issued token to key material controlled by the

- client: symmetric, asymmetric, and no key. The notion of a proof key maps directly to a
- 147 <saml:SubjectConfirmation> element in the issued assertion.
- 148 If a token request does not include a <wst:KeyType> element, the Identity Provider SHOULD assume
- that a symmetric proof key is required, in accordance with [WS-Trust13] or [WS-Trust14].
- 150 Both symmetric and asymmetric proof key types generally correspond to the "holder-of-key" confirmation
- 151 method defined in Section 3.1 of [SAML2Prof]. For the proof key types and algorithms specified by [IMI],
- 152 the resulting assertion MUST contain a <saml:SubjectConfirmation> element with a Method of:
- 153 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:holder-of-key
- 154 The accompanying <ds:KeyInfo> element MUST identify the proof key. In the case of an RSA
- asymmetric proof key, the key SHOULD be represented as a <ds:RSAKeyValue> element within a
 <ds:KeyValue> element.
- Proof key algorithms defined outside of [IMI] MAY specify alternate <saml:SubjectConfirmation>
 content, if necessary.
- 159 The "no key" proof key type corresponds to the "bearer" confirmation method defined in Section 3.3 of
- 160 [SAML2Prof]. The resulting assertion MUST contain a <saml:SubjectConfirmation> element with a
- 161 Method of:
- 162 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer
- 163 In the case of bearer assertions, the <saml:SubjectConfirmation> element MUST include a
- 164 <saml:SubjectConfirmationData> element containing a NotOnOrAfter XML attribute to limit their
- 165 use, typically to a very short window of time, although the exact duration may be use case dependent.
- 166 The attribute MAY be included for "holder-of-key" assertions, at the discretion of the Identity Provider.
- 167 The <saml:SubjectConfirmationData> element, if present, MUST NOT contain a NotBefore or
- 168 Recipient XML attribute. The Address XML attribute MAY be included to indicate the expected
- 169 network address of the client to the Relying Party.

- 170 Finally, note that other <saml:SubjectConfirmation> elements MAY be included at the discretion of
- 171 the Identity Provider.

172 2.3.5 Conditions

- 173 Assertions MAY contain a <saml:Conditions> element with NotBefore and NotOnOrAfter
- 174 attributes. This validity period can be independent of the window during which the client can present the 175 assertion to a Relying Party as a security token (see Section 2.3.4), but of course must be a superset of
- 176 that window.
- 177 If the request contains a <wsp:AppliesTo> element, then a <saml:AudienceRestriction>
- 178 containing a <saml:Audience> element MUST be included with the value of that element.
- 179 Other conditions MAY be included at the discretion of the Identity Provider.

180 **2.3.6 Encryption**

- 181 If a suitable key belonging to the Relying Party is known, the Identity Provider SHOULD encrypt the
- 182 resulting assertion in accordance with Section 6 of [SAML2Core], and return the result to the requester in 183 the form of a <saml:EncryptedAssertion> element.
- 184 If a public key belonging to the Relying Party is communicated to the Identity Provider in the
- 185 <wst:RequestSecurityToken> request message in the <wsp:AppliesTo> element, this key
- 186 SHOULD be used in preference to any other key known to the Identity Provider through others means
- 187 (e.g., SAML V2.0 metadata).

188 **2.4 Relying Party Requirements**

- 189 A Relying Party uses the mechanisms defined by [IMI] to request security tokens in the form of SAML 2.0
- assertions issued by particular or arbitrary Identity Providers. The following sections outline requirements
 for describing a Relying Party's needs based on this profile.

192 **2.4.1 Token Types**

- 193 Relying Parties SHOULD use the following token type string when requesting a token in conjunction with194 this profile:
- 195 http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/ns/token/saml2/200908
- 196 This string appears in various content produced by a Relying Party, such as (but not limited to) the
- 197 <wst:TokenType> element.
- 198 For backward compatibility, Relying Parties MAY use the following token type string:
- 199 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion
- When using the legacy token type, Relying Parties should be aware that the resulting assertions may or may not conform to this profile. If such a guarantee is required, the newer token type SHOULD be used instead.

203 2.4.2 Identifying Token Issuers

When identifying a requirement for a specific token issuer, the Relying Party SHOULD use the Identity Provider's unique name (i.e., its "entityID"), either as the value of the <sp:Issuer>/<wsa:Address> element in its security policy or as the value of the issuer OBJECT tag parameter.

207 **2.4.3 Identifying Relying Parties**

- 208 If the Relying Party provides security policy metadata (see Section 3.1 of [IMI]), it MAY include a
- 209 <wsp:AppliesTo> element inside a <sp:RequestSecurityTokenTemplate> element that refers to

- 211 If it does include a <wsp:AppliesTo> element, it SHOULD NOT identify itself using the location of its
- endpoint, as this complicates the Identity Provider's ability to identify the Relying Party. A logical name
 SHOULD be used instead.

214 **2.4.4 Identifying Claim Types**

- 215 SAML attributes required or desired by the Relying Party are identified by using the SAML attribute's
- 216 Name XML attribute in various places, such as the <ic:ClaimType> element's Uri XML attribute. Such
- 217 SAML attributes MUST have a NameFormat XML attribute of:
- 218 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri
- A claim type URI corresponding to a SAML name identifier format MAY be used to request a particular
- type of <saml:NameID> element in the resulting assertion. A Relying Party MUST NOT request more
- than one "required" claim type corresponding to a name identifier format.

222 2.4.5 Assertion Validity

- Relying Parties SHOULD evaluate assertions using the rules defined by [SAML2Core] (and [SAML2Prof] in the case of the defined subject confirmation methods). Invalid assertions SHOULD NOT be used to authenticate clients that present them.
- In assessing validity, a Relying Party MUST verify the signature over the assertion, evaluate any
- 227 conditions present, and successfully evaluate at least one <saml:SubjectConfirmation> element in
- the assertion based on the presentation of the assertion. This may include verifying that the
- 229 NotOnOrAfter attribute in the <saml:SubjectConfirmationData> (if present) has not passed,
- 230 subject to allowable clock skew between it and the Identity Provider.
- 231 If the <saml:SubjectConfirmationData> includes an Address attribute, the Relying Party MAY 232 check the client address against it.
- 233 In the case of the "holder-of-key" method, the Relying Party MUST establish proof of possession by the
- client of the key identified by the accompanying <ds:KeyInfo> element, such as through the use of a
- message signature or authentication over a secure transport. The exact means are out of scope of thisprofile.
- 237 In the case of the "bearer" method, the Relying Party MUST ensure that assertions are not replayed, by
- 238 maintaining the set of used ID values for the length of time for which the assertion would be considered
- 239 valid based on the NotOnOrAfter attribute in the <saml:SubjectConfirmationData> element.

240 **2.5 Use of SAML Metadata**

- 241 While not required, sites exchanging SAML assertions based on this profile MAY rely on SAML V2.0
- 242 metadata [SAML2Meta] as a way of deriving information about endpoints and keys, to supplement
- 243 mechanisms that exist within [IMI]. Where similarities or overlaps exist, precedence MUST be given to 244 metadata information exchanged using the mechanisms defined by [IMI].
- When referring to token issuers or Relying Parties by "logical" names, in the manner described by [IMI],
 the names used SHOULD correspond to the "entityID" values used in SAML metadata.
- 247 The value http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/ns/token/sam12/200908 MUST be used in the
- 248 protocolSupportEnumeration attribute to identify support for this profile within a
- 249 <md:IDPSSODescriptor> or <md:SPSSODescriptor> role.
- 250 If <md:SingleSignOnService> or <md:AssertionConsumerService> endpoints supporting this
- 251 profile are included, the same value MUST be used as the value of the Binding attribute. In addition, a
- 252 <wsa:EndpointReference> element MAY be included within an endpoint element to describe the
- 253 endpoint and its security policy in accordance with [IMI].

254 **2.6 Security Considerations**

255 2.6.1 Unconstrained Bearer Assertions

The Information Card model's support for hiding the identity of the Relying Party from the Identity Provider, combined with constraints on the implementation of the model for use with web browsers, leads to requests for "unconstrained" bearer assertions with no audience or subject confirmation conditions on use. While all uses of bearer assertions are subject to certain threats and attacks (see [SAML2Sec]), the lack of conditions on such assertions introduces additional serious threats to consider.

Ordinarily, the threat of a stolen assertion is mitigated by the fact that it can only be used to authenticate to a particular Relying Party. Without conditions on use, an attacker that successfully steals such an assertion has many more targets of opportunity. Essentially, the ability to mount an attack against a user's interactions with any single Relying Party become effective against all parties that are willing to accept such an assertion. Consider that some low value services may choose to forgo the use of TLS/SSL, leaving the assertions issued for their use much more vulnerable to theft. A successful attacker can then impersonate the intended user even with Relying Parties that choose to deploy such protection, rendering

- their investment moot.
- 269 Perhaps more seriously, Relying Parties that choose to accept such assertions are in turn empowered
- with the opportunity to impersonate the user for the duration of the subject confirmation window with any
- 271 other like-minded Relying Parties. This threat looms larger when one considers that a compromised

272 Relying Party could expose all its users to this risk if an attacker can tap the flow of incoming assertions.

- 273 With traditional constraints in place, this threat is mitigated by the fact that a compromise, while potentially
- exposing user data, does not extend beyond the scope of access to the affected Relying Party.

Note that one of the only mitigating mechanisms to these threats are to enforce restrictions on use of

- assertions based on an IP address placed into the assertion by the Identity Provider. While moderately
- effective, this practice often proves impractical for services offered to large user populations, many of whom are likely to encounter proxies and network configurations that result in inability to satisfy the
- 279 restriction.

As a result, this profile recommends against the use of unconstrained bearer assertions as a general

281 matter, and urges implementations to provide deployers with the ability to control this behavior. The

privacy advantages of such a model need to be carefully weighed against the risks to users and Relying
 Parties.

284 **2.6.2 Encryption**

Identity Providers should generally make every attempt to encrypt the assertions they produce if a key for
the Relying Party can be established. If encryption is not used, then the Identity Provider should be aware
of the potential for exposure of the assertion's contents, both to the requester and potentially to network
observers if TLS/SSL is not used (particularly between the requester and the eventual Relying Party).

Caution, however, should be exercised in relying solely on the TLS/SSL certificate found at a Relying Party's endpoint to identify the key. In particular, the key has to be authenticated in order to ensure that it actually belongs to the eventual endpoint used by the client. Furthermore, there can be no guarantee that the software responsible for decrypting the security token will have access to the corresponding private key.

294 **2.7 Examples**

295 2.7.1 Two Required Claims

In this example, a Relying Party asks for two required claims, an email address and a displayable name.
 These are standard, well-known LDAP/X.500 attributes with a standard representation in SAML.

298 Given the following OBJECT syntax:

299 <OBJECT type="application/x-informationCard" name="xmlToken">

300 <PARAM Name="tokenType"
301 Value="http://docs.oasis</pre>

Value="http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/ns/token/saml2/200908">

```
302
       <PARAM Name="issuer" Value="https://idp.example.org/entity">
303
       <PARAM Name="requiredClaims"
304
        Value="urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3 urn:oid:2.16.840.1.113730.3.1.241">
305
      </OBJECT>
306
      the following assertion could be issued:
307
      <Assertion xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"</pre>
308
           ID=" a75adf55-01d7-40cc-929f-dbd8372ebdfc"
309
           IssueInstant="2009-04-17T00:46:02Z" Version="2.0">
310
        <Issuer>https://idp.example.org/entity</Issuer>
311
        <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
312
313
        </ds:Signature>
314
        <Subject>
315
          <SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
316
             <SubjectConfirmationData Address="192.168.1.1"
317
                 NotOnOrAfter="2009-04-17T00:51:02Z" />
318
          </SubjectConfirmation>
319
        </Subject>
320
        <Conditions
321
             NotBefore="2009-04-17T00:46:02Z" NotOnOrAfter="2009-04-17T01:51:02Z">
322
           <AudienceRestriction>
323
             <Audience>https://puppies.com/entity</Audience>
324
          </AudienceRestriction>
325
        </Conditions>
326
        <AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2009-04-17T00:46:00Z">
327
          <AuthnContext>
328
             <AuthnContextClassRef>
329
            urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Password
330
            </AuthnContextClassRef>
331
          </AuthnContext>
332
        </AuthnStatement>
333
        <AttributeStatement>
334
          <Attribute NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"</pre>
335
              Name="urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3" FriendlyName="mail">
336
             <AttributeValue>jdoe@example.org</AttributeValue>
337
          </Attribute>
338
          <Attribute NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"</pre>
339
              Name="urn:oid:2.16.840.1.113730.3.1.241" FriendlyName="displayName">
340
             <AttributeValue>John Doe</AttributeValue>
341
          </Attribute>
342
        </AttributeStatement>
343
      </Assertion>
```

344 2.7.2 One Required Claim, as Federated NamelD

In this example, a Relying Party asks for a single claim using a name that is recognized by the Identity Provider as a SAML name identifier format. Any claim name could be interpreted in this fashion since the taxonomy of such formats is extensible, but it is expected that deployments making use of SAML name identifiers would already agree on appropriate use of them.

349 Given the following OBJECT syntax:

```
350
      <OBJECT type="application/x-informationCard" name="xmlToken">
351
       <PARAM Name="tokenType"
352
        Value="http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/ns/token/saml2/200908">
353
       <PARAM Name="issuer" Value="https://idp.example.org/entity">
354
       <PARAM Name="requiredClaims"
355
        Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent">
356
      </OBJECT>
357
      the following assertion could be issued:
358
      <Assertion xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"</pre>
359
           ID=" a75adf55-01d7-40cc-929f-dbd8372ebdfc"
360
          IssueInstant="2009-04-17T00:46:02Z" Version="2.0">
```

361 362	<issuer>https://idp.example.org/entity</issuer> <ds:signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"></ds:signature>
363	••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
364	
365	<subject></subject>
366	<pre><nameid <="" format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent" pre=""></nameid></pre>
367	1
368	NameQualifier="https://idp.example.org/entity"
369	SPNameQualifier="https://puppies.com/entity">
	rfhyfeefod893434923gqwdmtgr9090f
370	
371	<subjectconfirmation method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"></subjectconfirmation>
372	<subjectconfirmationdata <="" address="192.168.1.1" th=""></subjectconfirmationdata>
373	NotOnOrAfter="2009-04-17T00:51:02Z" />
374	
375	
376	<conditions< th=""></conditions<>
377	NotBefore="2009-04-17T00:46:02Z" NotOnOrAfter="2009-04-17T01:51:02Z">
378	<audiencerestriction></audiencerestriction>
379	<audience>https://puppies.com/entity</audience>
380	
381	
382	<authnstatement authninstant="2009-04-17T00:46:00Z"></authnstatement>
383	<authncontext></authncontext>
384	<authncontextclassref></authncontextclassref>
385	urn:oasis:names:tc:SAMI:2.0:ac:classes:Password
386	
387	
388	
389	
009	

390 **3 Conformance**

- 391 An Identity Provider implementation conforms to this profile if it can produce assertions consistent with the 392 normative text in Section 2.3.
- A Relying Party implementation conforms to this profile if it can accept assertions consistent with the normative text of Section 2.4.
- 395 Use of SAML V2.0 metadata [SAML2Meta] per Section 2.5 is OPTIONAL.

396 A. Acknowledgements

397 The editors would like to acknowledge the contributions of the OASIS Identity Metasystem Interoperability

398 Technical Committee, whose voting members at the time of publication were:

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- 400 John Bradley, Individual
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- 407 The editors would also like to acknowledge the following contributors:
- 408 Jim Fox, University of Washington

409 **B. Revision History**

Revision	Date	Editor	Changes Made
cd-03	7 July 2010	Michael B. Jones	Committee draft for promotion to committee specification.
ed-07	10 June 2010	Michael B. Jones	Incorporate feedback from public review. Changes made are non-normative. They address issue IMI-36: "Examples in sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 are incorrect" and keep the references between the SAML 1.1 and SAML 2.0 profiles in sync.
cd-02	31 March 2010	Michael B. Jones	Committee draft for public review.
ed-06	2 February 2010	Michael B. Jones	Typographic corrections.
ed-05	1 February 2010	Michael B. Jones	Consistency pass relative to other IMI TC documents. Made internal references hyperlinks.
ed-04	16 December 2009	Scott Cantor	Resolutions to issues IMI-26 and IMI-27.
cd-01	6 December 2009	Scott Cantor	Committee Draft 01, CD edits.
ed-03	16 November 2009	Scott Cantor	Legacy token type language added.
ed-02	27 October 2009	Scott Cantor	Revised based on IMI TC feedback and to correct for spec formatting issues.
ed-01	19 August 2009	Scott Cantor	Revised from Draft 02 of the SSTC-submitted version of this profile.

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